THIRD DIVISION This is the established rule of evidence, as the matter of assigning values

to the testimony of witnesses is a function best performed by the trial

[G.R. No. 109775. November 14, 1996.] court which can weigh said testimony in the light of the witness'
demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial. And although the rule
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE ENCARNACION admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) when patent inconsistencies in
MALIMIT alias "MANOLO", accused- appellant. the statements of witnesses are ignored by the trial court, or (2) when the
conclusions arrived at are clearly unsupported by the evidence, we found
none in this case.
SYLLABUS
4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION; NOT APPLICABLE WHERE THE EVIDENCE SOUGHT TO BE
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; NON-PRESENTATION OF THE
EXCLUDED IS NOT AN INCRIMINATING STATEMENT BUT AN OBJECT
POLICE BLOTTER IN COURT AS EVIDENCE IS NOT FATAL TO THE
EVIDENCE. — The right against self-incrimination guaranteed under our
PROSECUTION'S CASE; CASE AT BAR. — Appellant derided the non-
fundamental law finds no application in this case. This right, as put by Mr.
presentation by the prosecution of the police blotter which could prove if
Justice Holmes in Holt vs. United States, ". . . is a prohibition of the use of
appellant was indeed implicated right away by Batin to the crime. We do
physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from him . . ."
not believe, however, that it was necessary for the prosecution to present
It is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from
as evidence a copy of the aforementioned police blotter. Neither was its
the [accused]'s own lips, against his will, admission of his guilt. It does not
non-presentation in court fatal to the prosecution's case. Entries in the
apply to the instant case where the evidence sought to be excluded is not
police blotter are merely corroborative evidence of the uncontroverted
an incriminating statement but an object evidence. Wigmore, discussing
testimony of Batin that he identified the appellant as the perpetrator of
the question now before us in his treatise on evidence, thus, said: "If, in
the crime before the Silago police. As such, its presentation as evidence is
other words (the rule) created inviolability not only for his [physical
not indispensable. cdasia
control of his] own vocal utterances, but also for his physical control in
2. ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL NOTICE; NATURAL RETICENCE OF MOST whatever form exercise, then, it would be possible for a guilty person to
PEOPLE TO GET INVOLVED IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS AGAINST shut himself up in his house, with all the tools and indicia of his crime,
IMMEDIATE NEIGHBORS. — Even assuming arguendo that Rondon and and defy the authority of the law to employ in evidence anything that
Batin identified the appellant only on September 15, 1991, or after the might be obtained by forcibly overthrowing his possession and
lapse of five months from commission of the crime, this fact alone does compelling the surrender of the evidential articles — a clear reduction ad
not render their testimony less credible. The non-disclosure by the absurdum. In other words, it is not merely compulsion that is the kernel of
witness to the police officers of appellant's identity immediately after the the privilege, but testimonial compulsion." CHTcSE
occurrence of the crime is not entirely against human experience. In fact
5. ID.; ID.; INFRACTIONS OF THE SO-CALLED "MIRANDA RIGHTS"
the natural reticence of most people to get involved in criminal
WILL RENDER INADMISSIBLE ONLY THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION OR
prosecutions against immediate neighbors, as in this case, is of judicial
ADMISSION MADE DURING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION. — Neither are
notice. SDHCac
we prepared to order the exclusion of the questioned pieces of evidence
3. ID.; ID.; THE MATTER OF ASSIGNING VALUES TO THE pursuant to the provision of the Constitution under Article III, Section 12,
TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES IS A FUNCTION BEST PERFORMED BY THE the so-called "Miranda rights" so oftenly disregarded by our men in
TRIAL COURT. — The consistent teaching of our jurisprudence is that the uniform. However, infractions thereof render inadmissible only the
findings of the trial court with regard to the credibility of witnesses are extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation.
given weight and the highest degree of respect by the appellate court. The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the
issue and is not otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if wounds"; (3) witness Elmer Ladica saw the appellant on August 6, 1991,
obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation. Concededly, accompanied by some policemen, retrieve Malaki's wallet underneath a
appellant was not informed of his right to remain silent and to have his stone at the seashore in Barangay Hingatungan; (4) appellant himself
own counsel by the investigating policemen during the custodial admitted in his testimony that on August 6, 1991, he accompanied
investigation. Neither did he execute a written waiver of these rights in several policemen to the seashore where he hid Malaki's wallet; and (5)
accordance with the constitutional prescriptions. Nevertheless, these appellant's flight and his subsequent disappearance from Hingatungan
constitutional shortcuts do not affect the admissibility of Malaki's wallet, immediately after the incident. CAcIES
identification card, residence certificate and keys for the purpose of
8. ID.; ID.; DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS; THAT A PERSON FOUND
establishing other facts relevant to the crime. Thus, the wallet is
IN POSSESSION OF A THING TAKEN IN THE DOING OF A RECENT
admissible to establish the fact that it was the very wallet taken from
WRONGFUL ACT IS THE TAKER AND DOER OF THE WHOLE ACT;
Malaki on the night of the robbery. The identification card, residence
APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — Appellant's insistence that he merely
certificate and keys found inside the wallet, on the other hand, are
found Malaki's wallet by chance while gathering shells along the
admissible to prove that the wallet really belongs to Malaki. Furthermore,
seashore, and that he feared being implicated in the crime for which
even assuming arguendo that these pieces of evidence are inadmissible,
reason he hid the wallet underneath a stone, hardly inspires belief. We
the same will not detract from appellant's culpability considering the
are at a loss, just as the trial court was, as to why appellant should fear
existence of other evidence and circumstances establishing appellant's
being implicated in the crime if indeed he merely found Malaki's wallet by
identity and guilt as perpetrator of the crime charged.
chance. No inference can be drawn from appellant's purported
6. ID.; EVIDENCE; WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY; CONVICTION BASED apprehension other than the logical conclusion that appellant had
ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; ESSENTIAL REQUISITES. — Time and knowledge of the crime. Besides, proof that appellant is in possession of
again, we ruled that there can be a verdict of conviction based on a stolen property gives rise to a valid presumption that he stole the
circumstantial evidence when the circumstances proved form an same.
unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion
9. CRIMINAL LAW; ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE; DEFENSE OF ALIBI;
pinpointing the accused, to the exclusion of all the others, as the
MUST FAIL IN VIEW OF THE DEFENSE'S FAILURE TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE
perpetrator of the crime. In order that circumstantial evidence may be
NEGATING THE PHYSICAL PRESENCE OF THE ACCUSED AT THE PLACE OF
sufficient to convict, the same must comply with these essential
THE CRIME OR IN ITS VICINITY AT THE TIME OF ITS COMMISSION; CASE AT
requisites, viz., (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from
BAR. — As the defense of alibi is weak in view of the positive
which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of
identification of the appellant by the prosecution witnesses, it becomes
all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
weaker because of the unexplained failure of the defense to present any
reasonable doubt.
corroboration. Furthermore, proof that appellant was in his house when
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. — In this the crime was committed is not enough. Appellant must likewise
case, there were at least five (5) circumstances constituting an unbroken demonstrate that he could not have been physically present at the place
chain of events which by their "concordant combination and cumulative of the crime or in its vicinity, at the time of its commission. In this case,
effect," satisfy the requirements for the conviction of the appellant, appellant himself admitted that his house was just about eighty (80)
specifically: (1) appellant was seen by Rondon and Batin, whose meters away from the house of Malaki. It was, therefore, not impossible
credibilities were untarnished, holding a bolo in his right hand and for him to have been physically present at the place of the commission of
rushing out of Malaki's store seconds prior to their discovery of the the crime, as in fact, no evidence to negate this possibility was ever
crime; (2) Malaki sustained multiple stab wounds and he died of "cardiac adduced by him at the trial. ETDSAc
arrest, secondary to severe external hemorrhage due to multiple stab
 DECISION "On April 15, 1991, around 8:00 o'clock in the
evening, [Onofre] Malaki was attending to his store.
Malaki's houseboy Edilberto Batin, on the other hand,
FRANCISCO, J p: was busy cooking chicken for supper at the kitchen
located at the back of the store (TSN, June 19, 199 (sic),
Appellant Jose Encarnacion Malimit, charged with 1 and convicted p. 14).
of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, 2 was meted by "Soon thereafter, Florencio Rondon, a farmer,
the trial court 3 the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was also ordered to arrived at the store of Malaki. Rondon was to purchase
indemnify the heirs of Onofre Malaki the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos chemical for his rice farm (TSN, May 22, 1992, p. 19).
(P50,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and Rondon came from his house, approximately one
to pay the cost. 4 hundred and fifty (150) meters distant from Malaki's
In this appeal, appellant asks for his acquittal alleging that the store (Ibid., p. 24).
trial court committed the following errors, to wit: "Meanwhile, Batin had just finished cooking and
"I from the kitchen, he proceeded directly to the store, to
ask his employer (Malaki) if supper is to be prepared. As
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE Batin stepped inside the store, he was taken aback
UNRELIABLE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION when he saw appellant coming out of the store with a
WITNESSES ON THEIR ALLEGED IDENTIFICATION OF THE bolo (TSN, June 9, 1992, p. 14), while his boss, bathed in
ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS THE PERPETRATOR OF THE his own blood, was sprawled on the floor 'struggling' for
CRIME DESPITE THE FACT (SIC) THEY REVEALED THEIR his life' (hovering between life and death) (Ibid.).
ALLEGED 'KNOWLEDGE' OF THE CRIME MORE THAN
FIVE MONTHS AFTER THE INCIDENT. "Rondon, who was outside and barely five (5)
meters away from the store, also saw appellant Jose
II Malimit (or 'Manolo') rushing out through the front door
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE of Malaki's store with a blood-stained bolo (TSN, May
THE WALLET AND ITS CONTENTS ALTHOUGH THE 22, 1992, p. 29). Aided by the illumination coming from
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LEAD TO ITS PRODUCTION a pressure lamp ('petromax') inside the store, Rondon
WAS OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE clearly recognized Malimit (Ibid., p. 22).
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED. "Batin immediately went out of the store to
III seek help. Outside the store, he met Rondon (TSN, June
9, 1992, p. 15). After a brief conversation, both Batin
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE and Rondon rushed to the nearby house of Malaki's
ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE FAILURE OF THE brother-in-law Eutiquio Beloy and informed Beloy of the
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND tragic incident which befell Malaki. Batin, along with
REASONABLE DOUBT. 5 Beloy, went back to the store. Inside, they saw the
lifeless body of Malaki in a pool of blood lying prostrate
The following is the recital of facts as summarized by the appellee
at the floor. Beloy readily noticed that the store's
in its Brief, and duly supported by the evidence on record:
 drawer was opened and ransacked and the wallet of cannot now pass the blame on the prosecution for something which
Malaki was missing from his pocket (Ibid., pp. 16-17)." 6 appellant himself should have done.

In his first assignment of error, appellant questions the credibility Even assuming arguendo that Rondon and Batin identified the
of prosecution witnesses Florencio Rondon and Edilberto Batin by appellant only on September 15, 1991, or after the lapse of five months
pointing out their alleged delay in revealing what they knew about the from commission of the crime, this fact alone does not render their
incident. He posits that while the crime took place on April 15, 1991, it testimony less credible. The non-disclosure by the witness to the police
was only on September 17, 1991 when these witnesses tagged him as the officers of appellant's identity immediately after the occurrence of the
culprit. crime is not entirely against human experience. 15 In fact the natural
reticence of most people to get involved in criminal prosecutions against
We find these contentions bereft of merit. Appellant haphazardly
immediate neighbors, as in this case, 16 is of judicial notice. 17 At any
concluded that Rondon and Batin implicated the appellant to this
rate, the consistent teaching of our jurisprudence is that the findings of
gruesome crime only on September 17, 1991. The aforementioned date
the trial court with regard to the credibility of witnesses are given weight
however, was merely the date 7 when Rondon and Batin executed their
and the highest degree of respect by the appellate court. 18 This is the
respective affidavits, 8 narrating that they saw the appellant on the night
established rule of evidence, as the matter of assigning values to the
of April 15, 1991 carrying a bolo stained with blood and rushing out of
testimony of witnesses is a function best performed by the trial court
Malaki's store. As to appellant's claim of delay suffice it to state that
which can weigh said testimony in the light of the witness' demeanor,
extant from the records are ample testimonial evidence negating
conduct and attitude at the trial. 19 And although the rule admits of
appellant's protestation, to wit. (1) after having discovered the
certain exceptions, namely: when patent inconsistencies in the
commission of the crime, Rondon and Batin immediately looked for
statements of witnesses are ignored by the trial court, or (2) when the
Eutiquio Beloy, Malaki's brother-in-law, and informed him that appellant
conclusions arrived at are clearly unsupported by the evidence, 20 we
was the only person they saw running away from the crime scene; 9 (2)
found none in this case.
Beloy and Batin reported the crime with the CAFGU detachment in their
barangay where Batin declared that it was appellant who robbed Malaki In his second assignment of error, appellant asseverates that the
on that fateful night; 10 and (3) Batin again made a similar statement admission as evidence of Malaki's wallet 21 together with its
later at the Silago Police Station. 11 contents, viz., (1) Malaki's residence certificate; 22 (2) his identification
card; 23 and (3) bunch of keys, 24 violates his right against self-
Next, appellant derided the non-presentation by the prosecution
incrimination. 25 Likewise, appellant sought for their exclusion because
of the police blotter which could prove, if appellant was indeed
during the custodial investigation, wherein he pointed to the
implicated right away by Batin to the crime. 12 We do not believe,
investigating policemen the place where he hid Malaki's wallet, he was
however, that it was necessary for the prosecution to present as
not informed of his constitutional rights.
evidence a copy of the aforementioned police blotter. Neither was its
non-presentation in court fatal to the prosecution's case. Entries in the We are not persuaded. The right against self-incrimination
police blotter are merely corroborative evidence of the uncontroverted guaranteed under our fundamental law finds no application in this case.
testimony of Batin that he identified the appellant as the perpetrator of This right, as put by Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt vs. United States, 26 ". . . is a
the crime before the Silago police. As such, its presentation as evidence is prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort
not indispensable. 13 Besides, if appellant believed that he was not communications from him . . ." It is simply a prohibition against legal
identified therein, then he should have secured a copy thereof from the process to extract from the [accused]'s own lips, against his will, admission of
Silago Police Station and utilized the same as controverting evidence to his guilt. 27 It does not apply to the instant case where the evidence
impeach Batin's credibility as witness. 14 Having failed to do so appellant sought to be excluded is not an incriminating statement but
an object evidence. Wigmore, discussing the question now before us in not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial
his treatise on evidence, thus, said: investigation. Concededly, appellant was not informed of his right to
remain silent and to have his own counsel by the investigating policemen
"If, in other words (the rule) created inviolability
during the custodial investigation. Neither did he execute a written
not only for his [physical control of his] own vocal
waiver of these rights in accordance with the constitutional prescriptions.
utterances, but also for his physical control in whatever
Nevertheless, these constitutional short-cuts do not affect the
form exercise, then, it would be possible for a guilty
admissibility of Malaki's wallet, identification card, residence certificate
person to shut himself up in his house, with all the tools
and keys for the purpose of establishing other facts relevant to the crime.
and indicia of his crime, and defy the authority of the
Thus, the wallet is admissible to establish the fact that it was the very
law to employ in evidence anything that might be
wallet taken from Malaki on the night of the robbery. The identification
obtained by forcibly overthrowing his possession and
card, residence certificate and keys found inside the wallet, on the other
compelling the surrender of the evidential articles — a
hand, are admissible to prove that the wallet really belongs to Malaki.
clear reduction ad absurdum. In other words, it is not
Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that these pieces of evidence are
merely compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, . . .
inadmissible, the same will not detract from appellant's culpability
but testimonial compulsion." 28
considering the existence of other evidence and circumstances
Neither are we prepared to order the exclusion of the questioned establishing appellant's identity and guilt as perpetrator of the crime
pieces of evidence pursuant to the provision of the Constitution under charged.
Article III, Section 12, viz:
We now come to appellant's third assignment of error where he
"(1) Any person under investigation for the demurs on the prosecution's evidence, contending that they are
commission of an offense shall have the right to be insufficient to sustain his conviction.
informed of his right to remain silent and to have
Our close scrutiny of the record reveals otherwise. Time and
competent and independent counsel preferably of his
again, we ruled that there can be a verdict of conviction based on
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
circumstantial evidence when the circumstances proved form an
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
pinpointing the accused, to the exclusion of all the others, as the
of counsel.
perpetrator of the crime. 30 In order that circumstantial evidence may be
xxx xxx xxx sufficient to convict, the same must comply with these essential
requisites, viz., (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from
"(3) Any confession or admission obtained in which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of
violation of this or Sec. 17 hereof, shall be inadmissible all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
in evidence against him." (Italics ours.) reasonable doubt. 31 In this case, there were at least five (5)
xxx xxx xxx" circumstances constituting an unbroken chain of events which by their
"concordant combination and cumulative effect", satisfy the
These are the so-called "Miranda rights" so oftenly disregarded requirements for the conviction of the appellant, 32 specifically: (1)
by our men in uniform. However, infractions thereof render inadmissible appellant was seen by Rondon and Batin, whose credibilities were
only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial untarnished, holding a bolo in his right hand and rushing out of Malaki's
investigation. The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are store seconds prior to their discovery of the crime; 33 (2) Malaki
relevant to the issue and is not otherwise excluded by law or rules, 29 is sustained multiple stab wounds 34 and he died of "cardiac arrest,
secondary to severe external hemorrhage due to multiple stab In fine, as the killing of Malaki took place on the occasion of
wounds"; 35 (3) witness Elmer Ladica saw the appellant on August 6, robbery, appellant was correctly convicted by the trial court of the special
1991, accompanied by some policemen, retrieve Malaki's wallet complex crime of robbery with homicide, defined and penalized
underneath a stone at the seashore in Barangay Hingatungan; 36 (4) under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
appellant himself admitted in his testimony that on August 6, 1991, he
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of conviction is hereby
accompanied several policemen to the seashore where he hid Malaki's
AFFIRMED in toto.
wallet; 37 and (5) appellant's flight and his subsequent disappearance
from Hingatungan immediately after the incident. 38 SO ORDERED.
On the other hand, appellant's version of the story does not
inspire belief. He maintains that on that fateful night he was in his house
together with his wife. He claims that they had just arrived from a
gambling spree allegedly in the house of a certain Maui Petalcorin.
Surprisingly, however, the defense did not bother to call appellant's wife
to the witness stand to corroborate appellant' s alibi. Neither did it
present as witness Maui Petalcorin, or any other person who may have
seen the appellant in the said place, if only to provide a semblance of
truth to this assertion. As the defense of alibi is weak in view of the
positive identification of the appellant by the prosecution witnesses, 39 it
becomes weaker because of the unexplained failure of the defense to
present any corroboration. 40 Furthermore, proof that appellant was in
his house when the crime was committed is not enough. Appellant must
likewise demonstrate that he could not have been physically present at
the place of the crime on in its vicinity, at the time of its
commission. 41 In this case, appellant himself admitted that his house
was just about eighty (80) meters away from the house of Malaki. 42 It
was, therefore, not impossible for him to have been physically present at
the place of the commission of the crime, as in fact, no evidence to
negate this possibility was ever adduced by him at the trial.

Appellant's insistence that he merely found Malaki's wallet by

chance while gathering shells along the seashore, and that he feared
being implicated in the crime for which reason he hid the wallet
underneath a stone, hardly inspires belief. We are at a loss, just as the
trial court was, as to why appellant should fear being implicated in the
crime if indeed he merely found Malaki's wallet by chance. No inference
can be drawn from appellant's purported apprehension other than the
logical conclusion that appellant had knowledge of the crime. Besides,
proof that appellant is in possession of a stolen property gives rise to a
valid presumption that he stole the same. 43