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Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan

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ZALDIVAR V.

SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. NOS. 79690-707

OCTOBER 7, 1988

FACTS:

Respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, as Tanodbayan filed several graft and corruption charges
against Petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar and his co-defendants before the Sandiganbayan. In a petition
before the Supreme Court, Zaldivar questioned the authority of the Tanodbayan. Acting on the petition,
the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order, ordering the respondents Sandiganbayan and Hon.
Gonzalez to cease and desist from hearing the cases.

On 9 February 1988, Zaldivar filed with the Court a Motion to Cite in Contempt against
respondent Gonzalez for issuing scornful statements to the media in relation to the proceedings in G.R.
No. 80578. After arguing the legal merits of his position in his Comment, Gonzalez made the following
statements: (1) That he "ha(d) been approached twice by a leading member of the court ... and he was
asked to 'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him (2) That he "was approached and asked to
refrain from investigating the COA report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will
embarass the Court;" and (3) That "(i)n several instances, the undersigned respondent was called over
the phone by a leading member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the cases against (two Members
of the Court)."

ISSUE:
Whether or not Gonzalez’s statement, made in the exercise of freedom of speech, is absolute

RULING:
No. Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to
deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of
speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of
expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally
important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity
and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression
and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom
of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of
dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of
justice which are accepted by the general community. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it:

... A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an independent judiciary to a free
press. Neither has primacy over the other; both are indispensable to a free society. The freedom of the
press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary through which that freedom may, if necessary be
vindicated. And one of the potent means for assuring judges their independence is a free press.

Mr. Justice Malcolm of this Court expressed the same thought in the following terms:
The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This constitutional right must be
protected in its fullest extent. The Court has heretofore given evidence of its tolerant regard for charges
under the Libel Law which come dangerously close to its violation. We shall continue in this chosen path.
The liberty of the citizens must be preserved in all of its completeness. But license or abuse of liberty of
the press and of the citizens should not be confused with liberty ill its true sense. As important as is the
maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizens is the maintenance
of the independence of the Judiciary. Respect for the Judiciary cannot be had if persons are privileged to
scorn a resolution of the court adopted for good purposes, and if such persons are to be permitted by
subterranean means to diffuse inaccurate accounts of confidential proceedings to the embarassment of
the parties and the courts.

Only slightly (if at all) less important is the public interest in the capacity of the Court effectively to
prevent and control professional misconduct on the part of lawyers who are, first and foremost,
indispensable participants in the task of rendering justice to every man. Some courts have held,
persuasively it appears to us, that a lawyer's right of free expression may have to be more limited than
that of a layman.

It is well to recall that respondent Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also
a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to this Court as the
embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic. The
responsibility of the respondent "to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court' and "not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.

Respondent Gonzalez claims to be and he is, of course, entitled to criticize the rulings of this Court, to
point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. Once more, however, the right of
criticism is not unlimited. Its limits were marked out by Mr. Justice Castro in In re Almacen which are
worth noting

“But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bonafide and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse
and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary
action.”

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly
administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers even those gifted with
superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.

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