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Tupaz IV & Tupaz vs. CA & Bpi

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TUPAZ IV & TUPAZ VS.

CA & BPI

G.R. NO. 145578

NOVEMBER 18, 2005

FACTS:

El Oro Corporation had a contract with the Philippine Army to supply the latter with survival bolos. To
finance the purchase for its raw materials, petitioners Jose C. Tupaz IV and Petronila C. Tupaz, the Vice-
President for Operations and Vice-President/Treasurer of El Oro Corporation, applied 2 commercial
letters of credit with respondent bank BPI in favor of Tanchaoco Incorporated for ₱564,871.05 and
₱294,000 for Maresco Corporation. Petitioner Jose C. Tupaz IV signed, in his personal capacity, a trust
receipt corresponding to the letter of credit in favor of Tanchaoco Inc., while the letter of credit
pertaining to Maresco Corp., both Jose and Petronila Tupaz signed in their capacities as officers of El Oro
Corporation, and bound themselves to remit the proceeds to respondent bank, if sold, or to return the
goods, if not sold. After Tanchaoco Incorporated and Maresco Corporation delivered the raw materials
to El Oro Corporation, BPI paid ₱564,871.05 and ₱294,000, respectively. Petitioners did not comply with
their undertaking under the trust receipts claiming that the AFP had delayed paying for the survival
bolos.

BPI charged petitioners with estafa under Section 13, PD 115 or the Trust Receipts Law. The trial court
acquitted petitioners but ordered El Oro Engraver Corporation, Jose C. Tupaz IV and Petronila Tupaz,
jointly and solidarily, to pay BPI of the outstanding balance. CA affirmed the ruling. Hence, the petition
before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner Jose Tupaz is liable as a guarantor only of El Oro Corporation as he signed the trust
receipts in his personal capacity

RULING:
Yes. For the trust receipt dated 30 September 1981 (letter of credit in favor of Tanchaoco Inc), the dorsal
portion of which petitioner Jose Tupaz signed alone, we find that he did so in his personal capacity.
Petitioner Jose Tupaz did not indicate that he was signing as El Oro Corporation’s Vice-President for
Operations. Hence, petitioner Jose Tupaz bound himself personally liable for El Oro Corporation’s
debts. Not being a party to the trust receipt dated 30 September 1981, petitioner Petronila Tupaz is not
liable under such trust receipt.

In Prudential Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court interpreted a substantially identical
clause in a trust receipt signed by a corporate officer who bound himself personally liable for the
corporation’s obligation. The petitioner in that case contended that the stipulation "we jointly and
severally agree and undertake" rendered the corporate officer solidarily liable with the corporation. We
dismissed this claim and held the corporate officer liable as guarantor only. The Court further ruled that
had there been more than one signatories to the trust receipt, the solidary liability would exist between
the guarantors. We held: The clause "we jointly and severally agree and undertake" refers to the
undertaking of the two (2) parties who are to sign it or to the liability existing between themselves. It
does not refer to the undertaking between either one or both of them on the one hand and the
petitioner on the other with respect to the liability described under the trust receipt.
Respondent bank’s suit against petitioner Jose Tupaz stands despite the Court’s finding that he is
liable as guarantor only. First, excussion is not a pre-requisite to secure judgment against a guarantor.
The guarantor can still demand deferment of the execution of the judgment against him until after the
assets of the principal debtor shall have been exhausted. Second, the benefit of excussion may be
waived. Under the trust receipt dated 30 September 1981, petitioner Jose Tupaz waived excussion
when he agreed that his "liability in [the] guaranty shall be DIRECT AND IMMEDIATE, without any
need whatsoever on xxx [the] part [of respondent bank] to take any steps or exhaust any legal
remedies xxx." The clear import of this stipulation is that petitioner Jose Tupaz waived the benefit of
excussion under his guarantee.

As guarantor, petitioner Jose Tupaz is liable for El Oro Corporation’s principal debt and other accessory
liabilities (as stipulated in the trust receipt and as provided by law) under the trust receipt dated 30
September 1981. That trust receipt (and the trust receipt dated 9 October 1981) provided for payment
of attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of the total amount due and an "interest at the rate of 7% per
annum, or at such other rate as the bank may fix, from the date due until paid xxx." In the applications
for the letters of credit, the parties stipulated that drafts drawn under the letters of credit are subject to
interest at the rate of 18% per annum.

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