Capadosa, Renzy L.

Case Digest

GR no. 187167

Magallona et.al v Ermita

August 16, 2011

Facts:

In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the
Philippines as an Archepelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the
sovereignty of State parties over their territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended by
R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of baselines
around Sabah.

In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of
1984. The requirements complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the
location of some basepoints and classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as ‘regime of
islands.

Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:

1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;

2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence undermining
our sovereignty and security; and

3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would weaken our claim over
those territories.

Issue:

Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?

Ruling:

1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a

codified norm that regulates conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a
baseline law to mark out basepoints along coasts, serving as geographic starting
points to measure. it merely notices the international community of the scope of our
maritime space.

2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation

designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes
passages. but in the absence of such, international law norms operate. the fact that
for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages does not place
them in lesser footing vis a vis continental coastal state. Moreover, RIOP is a
customary international law, no modern state can invoke its sovereignty to forbid
such passage.

3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046
and in fact, it increased the Phils.’ total maritime space. Moreover, the itself commits
the Phils.’ continues claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.

If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:

Art. 47 (3): ‘drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the
general configuration of the archipelago’.

Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.

KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, we’ll breach the
rules: that it should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.
Province of North Cotabato, Province of Zamboanga Del Norte, City of Iligan, City
of Zamboanga, petitioners in intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of
Isabela and Municipality of Linnamon, Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel
Tamano and Sec. Mar Roxas

-vs-

Ermita Exec.Sec., Romulo Sec DFA, Andaya Sec DBM, Ventura Administrator
National Mapping & Resource Information Authority and Davide Jr. and
respondents in intervention Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and
Development and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc.,

  GR 183591 by the Province of Cotabato and Vice Governor Pinol on its prayer
to declare unconstitutional and to have the MOA-AD disclosed to the public and
be open for public consultation.
 GR 183752 by the City of Zamboanga et al on its prayer to declare null and void
said MOA-AD and to exclude the city to the BJE.
 GR 183893 by the City of Iligan enjoining the respondents from signing the MOA-
AD and additionally impleading Exec. Sec. Ermita.
 GR 183951 by the Province of Zamboanga del Norte et al, praying to declare null
and void the MOA-AD and without operative effect and those res R 183692 by
Maceda, Binay and Pimentel III, praying for a judgment pondents enjoined from
executing the MOA-AD.
 G prohibiting and permanently enjoining respondents from formally signing and
executing the MOA-AD and or any other agreement derived therefrom or similar
thereto, and nullifying the MOA-AD for being unconstitutional and illegal and
impleading Iqbal.

The MOA-AD is a result of various agreements entered into by and between the
government and the MILF starting in 1996; then in 1997, they signed the Agreement
on General Cessation of Hostilities; and the following year, they signed the General
Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998. However, in 1999 and in the
early of 2000, the MILF attacked a number of municipalities in Central Mindanao. In
March 2000, they took the hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte; hence, then Pres.
Estrada declared an all-out war-which tolled the peace negotiation. It was when then
Pres. Arroyo assumed office, when the negotiation regarding peace in Mindanao
continued. MILF was hesitant; however, this negotiation proceeded when the
government of Malaysia interceded. Formal peace talks resumed and MILF
suspended all its military actions. The Tripoli Agreement in 2001 lead to the
ceasefire between the parties. After the death of MILF Chairman Hashim and Iqbal
took over his position, the crafting of MOA-AD in its final form was born. 

 MOA-AD Overview

This is an agreement to be signed by the GRP and the MILF. Used as reference in
the birth of this MOA-AD are the Tripoli Agreement, organic act of ARMM, IPRA
Law, international laws such as ILO Convention 169, the UN Charter etc., and the
principle of Islam i.e compact right entrenchment (law of compact, treaty and order).
The body is divided into concepts and principles, territory, resources, and
governance. 

Embodied in concepts and principles, is the definition of Bangsamoro as all

indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. These people have the
right to self- governance of their Bangsamoro homeland to which they have
exclusive ownership by virtue of their prior rights of occupation in the land. The
MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as "the ‘First Nation' with
defined territory and with a system of government having entered into treaties of
amity and commerce with foreign nations." It then mentions for the first time the
"Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction
over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro.

As defined in the territory of the MOA-AD, the BJE shall embrace the Mindanao-
Sulu-Palawan geographic region, involving the present ARMM, parts of which are
those which voted in the inclusion to ARMM in a plebiscite. The territory is divided
into two categories, “A” which will be subject to plebiscite not later than 12 mos. after
the signing and “B” which will be subject to plebiscite 25 years from the signing of
another separate agreement. Embodied in the MOA-AD that the BJE shall have
jurisdiction over the internal waters-15kms from the coastline of the BJE territory;
they shall also have "territorial waters," which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal
waters up to the baselines of the Republic of the Philippines (RP) south east and
south west of mainland Mindanao; and that within these territorial waters, the BJE
and the government shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and management over
all natural resources. There will also be sharing of minerals in the territorial waters;
but no provision on the internal waters. 

Included in the resources is the stipulation that the BJE is free to enter into any
economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries and shall have the
option to establish trade missions in those countries, as well as environmental
cooperation agreements, but not to include aggression in the GRP. The external
defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the government. The BJE
shall have participation in international meetings and events" like those of the
ASEAN and the specialized agencies of the UN. They are to be entitled to
participate in Philippine official missions and delegations for the negotiation of border
agreements or protocols for environmental protection and equitable sharing of
incomes and revenues involving the bodies of water adjacent to or between the
islands forming part of the ancestral domain. The BJE shall also have the right to
explore its resources and that the sharing between the Central Government and the
BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the
BJE. And they shall have the right to cancel or modify concessions and TLAs. 

And lastly in the governance, the MOA-AD claims that the relationship between the
GRP and MILF is associative i.e. characterized by shared authority and
responsibility. This structure of governance shall be further discussed in the
 Comprehensive Compact, a stipulation which was highly contested before the court.
The BJE shall also be given the right to build, develop and maintain its own
institutions, the details of which shall be discussed in the comprehensive compact as
well.

Issue:

WON the petitions have complied with the procedural requirements for the
exercise of judicial review

Ruling:

As regards the procedural issue, SC upheld that there is indeed a need for the
exercise of judicial review. 

The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversy, that is the court
will decline on issues that are hypothetical, feigned problems or mere academic
questions. Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
requirement of ripeness. The contention of the SolGen is that there is no issue ripe for
adjudication since the MOA-AD is only a proposal and does not automatically create
legally demandable rights and obligations. Such was denied.  

The SC emphasized that the petitions are alleging acts made in violation of their duty or
in grave abuse of discretion. Well-settled jurisprudence states that acts made by
authority which exceed their authority, by violating their duties under E.O. No. 3 and the
provisions of the Constitution and statutes, the petitions make a prima facie case for
Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual case or controversy ripe for
adjudication exists. When an act of a branch of government is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute. This is aside from the fact that concrete acts made under
the MOA-AD are not necessary to render the present controversy ripe and that the law
or act in question as not yet effective does not negate ripeness. 

With regards to the locus standi, the court upheld the personalities of the Province of
Cotabato, Province of Zamboanga del norte, City of Iligan, City of Zamboanga,
petitioners in intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and Municipality of
Linnamon to have locus standi since it is their LGUs which will be affected in whole or in
part if include within the BJE. Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano, in alleging
their standing as taxpayers, assert that government funds would be expended for the
conduct of an illegal and unconstitutional plebiscite to delineate the BJE territory. On
that score alone, they can be given legal standing. Senator Mar Roxas is also given a
standing as an intervenor. And lastly, the Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral
Movement for Peace and Development, an advocacy group for justice and the
attainment of peace and prosperity in Muslim Mindanao; and Muslim Legal Assistance
Foundation Inc., a non-government organization of Muslim lawyers since they stand to
be benefited or prejudiced in the resolution of the petitions regarding the MOA-AD. 

On the contention of mootness of the issue considering the signing of the MOA-AD has
already been suspended and that the President has already disbanded the GRP, the
SC disagrees. The court reiterates that the moot and academic principle is a general
rule only, the exceptions, provided in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, that  it will decide
cases, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that (a) there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; (b) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest
is involved; (c) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review; and that where there is a voluntary cessation of the
activity complained of by the defendant or doer, it does not divest the court the power to
hear and try the case especially when the plaintiff is seeking for damages or injunctive
relief.  

Clearly, the suspension of the signing of the MOA-AD and the disbandment of the GRP
did not render the petitions moot and academic. The MOA-AD is subject to further legal
enactments including possible Constitutional amendments more than ever provides
impetus for the Court to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the
public and, in this case, the government and its negotiating entity. 
At all events, the Court has jurisdiction over most if not the rest of the petitions. There is
a reasonable expectation that petitioners will again be subjected to the same problem in
the future as respondents' actions are capable of repetition, in another or any form. But
with respect to the prayer of Mandamus to the signing of the MOA-AD, such has
become moot and academic considering that parties have already complied thereat. 

LA BUGAL B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., et. al. v. V. O. RAMOS, Secretary

Department of Environment and Natural Resources; H. RAMOS, Director, Mines
and Geosciences Bureau (MGB-DENR); R. TORRES, Executive Secretary; and
WMC (PHILIPPINES) INC. 

FACTS:

The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAA is a exception to
the rule that participation in the nation’s natural resources is reserved exclusively to
Filipinos. Provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos.
RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the effectivity
of RA 7942, or on March 30, 1995, the President signed a Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP, a corporation organized under Philippine
laws, covering close to 100,000 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat,
Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the Environment Secretary
Victor Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order 95-23, which was later repealed by
DENR Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on December 20, 1996.
Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA between the
government and WMCP be declared unconstitutional on ground that they allow fully
foreign owned corporations like WMCP to exploit, explore and develop Philippine
mineral resources in contravention of Article XII Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the
Charter.
In January 2001, WMC – a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration company –
sold its whole stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is owned by Filipinos
while 40% of which is owned by Indophil Resources, an Australian company. DENR
approved the transfer and registration of the FTAA in Sagittarius‘ name but Lepanto
Consolidated assailed the same. The latter case is still pending before the Court of
Appeals.
EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the DENR to
accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign owned corporations or foreign
investors for contracts or agreements involving wither technical or financial assistance
for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals which upon
appropriate recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the President may execute with
the foreign proponent. WMCP likewise contended that the annulmentof the FTAA would
violate a treaty between the Philippines and Australia which provides for the protection
of Australian investments.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-
owned corporations to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.

HELD:

RA 7942 is Unconstitutional
RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully
foreign owned corporations to exploit the Philippine natural resources.
Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine which
states that ―All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State. The same section also states that, ―the exploration and development and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the
State.
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution
authorizing the State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploration,
exploitation, development, or utilization of natural resources. By such omission, the
utilization of inalienable lands of the public domain through license, concession or lease
is no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution.
Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equityinvestment for
the purpose of exploiting a particular natural resource within a given area. The
concession amounts to complete control by the concessionaire over the country‘s
natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular
resource at the point of extraction.
The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase ―management or other forms
of assistance in the 1973 Charter. The present Constitution now allows only ―technical
and financial assistance. The management and the operation of the mining activities by
foreign contractors, the primary feature of the service contracts was precisely the evil
the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an exception
to the rule that participation in the nation‘s natural resources is reserved exclusively to
Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment
by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is invalid insofar as the said act authorizes service
contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase ―financial and technical
agreements in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, its pertinent provisions actually
treat these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign
contractors contrary to the fundamental law.
The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor
manages the mineral resources just like the foreign contractor in a service contract. By
allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the mining
operation, RA 7942 has, in effect, conveyed beneficial ownership over the nation‘s
mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title
thereto.
The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the
constitutionally ordained 60-40% capitalization requirement for corporations
or associations engaged in the exploitation, development and utilization of Philippine
natural resources.
When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions,
considerations, inducements or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that
the legislature intended them as a whole, then if some parts are unconstitutional, all
provisions that are thus dependent, conditional or connected, must fail with them.
Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are limited
only to merely technical or financial assistance to the State for large scale exploration,
development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils.

G.R. No. 208566               November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L.
GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al,
Respondents
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

NATURE:
These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which
assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.

FACTS:
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who
declared that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from
the public coffers for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints
were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder,
and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are
some of the lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials
of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by
Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the
Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries
has gone into a dummy NGO. Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly
seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional

G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel
System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently
G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition
With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently
embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and
the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts
constituting grave abuse of discretion.  Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO
against respondents

UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a
cease and desist order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III
(President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of
Congress

ISSUES:

   Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles
of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of
legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and
(f) local autonomy.

HELD:
Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern
the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to
functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or
assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. This violates the
principle of separation of powers. Congress’ role must be confined to mere oversight
that must be confined to:  (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of the
implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of
powers guaranteed by the constitution.

Thus, the court declares the 2013 PDAF article as well as all other provisions of law
which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the
implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as
violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional

PIMENTEL vs ERMITA
GR No. 164978, October 13, 2005

Power of Congress to prescribe qualifications/disqualifications

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:

Due to the vacancies in the cabinet, then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
appointed secretaries in the different executive departments. Their appointment was in
an acting capacity only.

Meanwhile, Senator Aquilino Pimentel and seven other senators filed a complaint
against the appointees and Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, on the ground that the
President cannot make such appointment without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments; that, in accordance with Section 10, Chapter 2, Book IV of Executive
Order No. 292, only the undersecretary of the respective departments should be
designated in an acting capacity and not anyone else.

On the contrary, then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita averred that the
president is empowered by Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to issue
appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries without the consent of the
Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in session. Further, EO 292 itself
allows the president to issue temporary designation to an officer in the civil service
provided that the temporary designation shall not exceed one year.

During the pendency of said case, Congress adjourned and GMA issued ad
interim appointments re-appointing those previously appointed in acting capacity.

ISSUE:

Whether the appointments made by PGMA without the consent of the

Commission of Appointments and while the Congress is in session are constitutional.

RULING:

Yes, the essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature.

It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment
of a permanent occupant to the office.16 In case of vacancy in an office occupied by
an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the
President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before
the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.
 Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to
appoint automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego,
whether tem        porary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence.
Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the
President who her alter ego should be.

The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in

session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting
appointee to the office must necessarily have the President’s confidence. Thus, by the
very nature of the office of a department secretary, the President must appoint in an
acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in session. That person
may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it
expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee.

The law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment.
Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that "[t]he President may
temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other
competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch." Thus,
the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the
government service, as long as the President deems that person competent.

Petitioners assert that Section 17 does not apply to appointments vested in the
President by the Constitution, because it only applies to appointments vested in the
President by law. Petitioners forget that Congress is not the only source of law. "Law"
refers to the Constitution, statutes or acts of Congress, municipal ordinances,
implementing rules issued pursuant to law, and judicial decisions. 17

Finally, petitioners claim that the issuance of appointments in an acting capacity

is susceptible to abuse. Petitioners fail to consider that acting appointments cannot
exceed one year as expressly provided in Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of
EO 292. The law has incorporated this safeguard to prevent abuses, like the use of
acting appointments as a way to circumvent confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.

Wherefore, the petition is denied.

KURODA vs. JALANDONI [G.R. No. L-2662; March 26, 1949]

Facts:

Shigenori Kuroda was the highest-ranking Japanese officer stationed in the

Philippines during the Japanese occupation. He was then charged before the Military
Commission due to the cruelty that were done against non-combatant civilians and
prisoners during the war. His trial was in pursuant to EO No. 68 which established the
National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules and regulations governing the trial of
accused war criminals. Kuroda is questioning the legality of the said EO arguing that the
same is not provided in the Constitution. He further underscores the fact that the
Philippines is not a signatory of the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations
Covering Land Warfare hence we cannot impose against him any criminal charges
because it has no laws to base on, national or international.

Issue:

Whether or not Kuroda can be charged in Philippine courts.

Held:

Yes.

EO No. 68 is constitutional hence the Philippine courts can take cognizance of the
case at bar. EO 68 is in pursuant to the constitutional provision that stated in Article 2 of
the Philippine Constitution. The Hague Convention and other similar conventions whose
principles are generally accepted are considered as part of the law of the land.
G.R. No. 173034             October 9, 2007  PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,  vs. HEALTH SECRETARY
FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III; HEALTH UNDER SECRETARIES DR. ETHELYN P.
NIETO, DR. MARGARITA M. GALON, ATTY. ALEXANDER A. PADILLA, & DR.
JADE F. DEL MUNDO; and ASSISTANT SECRETARIES DR. MARIO C.
VILLAVERDE, DR. DAVID J. LOZADA, AND DR. NEMESIO T. GAKO, respondents.

FACTS : Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and

Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein
petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-respondent since respondents issued
the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive agency.1Executive
Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28,
1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom
Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks
to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk
Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981.
From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be
ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. In
1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate
measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society,
specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. On
May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7,
2006.

Issue: . Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and

Regulations (RIRR) issued by the Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional;
Held: YES

under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for members,in
the same way that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations under
Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of the WHO Constitution reads:
Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to
Members with respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization
for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that
such rule is being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with
such rules

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of
domestic law either

By transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an

international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere
constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.

 Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA

Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be
considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive
agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature

GR NO. 151445: APRIL 11, 2002

LIM V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Lessons Applicable:   Locus Standi,  International Law v. Muncipal Law, Certiorari,
Incorporation Clause, Treaties

Laws Applicable: Constitution

FACTS:

    Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) signed in 1999, personnel from the
armed forces of the United States of America started arriving in Mindanao to take partin
"Balikatan 02-1” on January 2002.  The Balikatan 02-1 exercises involves the simulation
of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense
agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951.  The exercise
is rooted from the international anti-terrorism campaign declared by President George
W. Bush in reaction to the 3 commercial aircrafts hijacking that smashed into twin
towers of the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon building in
Washington, D.C. allegedly by the al-Qaeda headed by the Osama bin Laden that
occurred on September 11, 2001.  Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando as citizens,
lawyers and taxpayers filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition attacking the
constitutionality of the joint exercise.  Partylists Sanlakas and Partido Ng Manggagawa
as  residents of Zamboanga and Sulu directly affected by the operations filed a petition-
in-intervention.

    The Solicitor General commented the prematurity of the action as it is based only on
a fear of future violation of the Terms of Reference and impropriety of availing of
certiorari to ascertain a question of fact specifically interpretation of the VFA whether it
is covers "Balikatan 02-1” and no question of constitutionality is involved.  Moreover,
there is lack of locus standi since it does not involve tax spending and there is no proof
of direct personal injury. 
ISSUE:

W/N the petition and the petition-in-intervention should prosper.

HELD:

NO.  Petition and the petition-in-intervention are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice
to the filing of a new petition sufficient in form and substance in the proper Regional
Trial Court - Supreme Court is not a trier of facts

Doctrine of Importance to the Public

Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping
with the Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other
branches of the government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution
and the laws that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has
brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition.

Although courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question based on the
doctrine of separation of powers, which enjoins upon the department of the government
a becoming respect for each other's act, this Court nevertheless resolves to take
cognizance of the instant petition.
Interpretation of Treaty
The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in
"activities," the exact meaning of which was left undefined. The expression is
ambiguous, permitting a wide scope of undertakings subject only to the approval of the
Philippine government. The sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the
negative, in that United States personnel must "abstain from any activity inconsistent
with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political activity." All other
activities, in other words, are fair game.
To aid in this, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 31 SECTION 3 and
Article 32 contains provisos governing interpretations of international agreements.  It is
clear from the foregoing that the cardinal rule of interpretation must involve an
examination of the text, which is presumed to verbalize the parties' intentions. The
Convention likewise dictates what may be used as aids to deduce the meaning of
terms, which it refers to as the context of the treaty, as well as other elements may be
taken into account alongside the aforesaid context.  According to Professor Briggs,
writer on the Convention, the distinction between the general rule of interpretation and
the supplementary means of interpretation is intended rather to ensure that the
supplementary means do not constitute an alternative, autonomous method of
interpretation divorced from the general rule.
The meaning of the word  “activities" was deliberately made that way to give both
parties a certain leeway in negotiation. Thus, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current
Balikatan exercises.  Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the
VFA support the conclusion that combat-related activities -as opposed to combat itself
-such as the one subject of the instant petition, are indeed authorized.
The Terms of Reference are explicit enough. Paragraph 8 of section I stipulates that US
exercise participants may not engage in combat "except in self-defense."  ." The indirect
violation is actually petitioners' worry, that in reality, "Balikatan 02-1" is actually a war
principally conducted by the United States government, and that the provision on self-
defense serves only as camouflage to conceal the true nature of the exercise. A clear
pronouncement on this matter thereby becomes crucial.  In our considered opinion,
neither the MDT nor the VFA allow foreign troops to engage in an offensive war on
Philippine territory.  Under the salutary proscription stated in Article 2 of the Charter of
the United Nations.
Both the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement, as in all other
treaties and international agreements to which the Philippines is a party, must be read
in the context of the 1987 Constitution especially Sec. 2, 7 and 8 of Article 2:
Declaration of Principles and State Policies in this case.  The Constitution also regulates
the foreign relations powers of the Chief Executive when it provides that "[n]o treaty or
international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-
thirds of all the members of the Senate."  Even more pointedly Sec. 25 on Transitory
Provisions which shows antipathy towards foreign military presence in the country, or of
foreign influence in general.  Hence, foreign troops are allowed entry into the Philippines
only by way of direct exception.
International Law vs. Fundamental Law and Municipal Laws
Conflict arises then between the fundamental law and our obligations arising from
international agreements.
Philip Morris, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: “Withal, the fact that international law has been
made part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of
international law over national law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of
incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international law are given a
standing equal, not superior, to national legislation.”
From the perspective of public international law, a treaty is favored over municipal law
pursuant to the principle of pacta sunt servanda. Hence, "[e]very treaty in force is
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith." Further, a
party to a treaty is not allowed to "invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification
for its failure to perform a treaty."
Our Constitution espouses the opposing view as stated in section 5 of Article VIII: “The
Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and order of lower courts in:
(A) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.”
Ichong v. Hernandez: “provisions of a treaty are always subject to qualification or
amendment by a subsequent law, or that it is subject to the police power of the State”
Gonzales v. Hechanova: “our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not
only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act
of Congress.” 
The foregoing premises leave us no doubt that US forces are prohibited / from engaging
in an offensive war on Philippine territory.
IBP vs. Zamora
G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000 

Facts:

Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution,
the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each
other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in
preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the
services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and
for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved.
The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null
and void and unconstitutional.

Issues:.
(1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the
armed forces is subject to judicial review.

(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility
patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and
the civilian character of the PNP

Held:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his
wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is
no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s
action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a
different category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would
have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review
without any qualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to
grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call
out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose
martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil
rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and
review by the Court.

In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to
determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The
present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support
the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces.

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian
task of law enforcement is “militarized” in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution.
The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy
clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for
civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility
patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the
civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with
the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the
Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no
appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the
joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.
ESTRADA v ESCRITOR

A.M No. P-02-1651. August 4, 2003

FACTS:

Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Caoibes, Jr., requesting for an investigation of rumors
that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter in said court, is living with a man not
her husband. They allegedly have a child of eighteen to twenty years old. He filed the
charge against Escritor as he believes that she is committing an immoral act that
tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed
therein as it might appear that the court condones her act.

ISSUE:

What is the doctrine of benevolent neutrality? Is respondent entitled thereto? Is the

doctrine of benevolent neutrality consistent with the free exercise clause?

RULING:

Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and
interests but at the same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent
possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated
by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality
based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. It still remains
to be seen if respondent is entitled to such doctrine as the state has not been afforded
the chance has demonstrate the compelling state interest of prohibiting the act of
respondent, thus the case is remanded to the RTC.

Benevolent neutrality is inconsistent with the Free Exercise Clause as far as it prohibits
such exercise given a compelling state interest. It is the respondent’s stance that her
conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within the scope of
free exercise protection. Should the Court prohibit and punish her conduct where it is
protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Court’s action would be an unconstitutional
encroachment of her right to religious freedom. We cannot therefore simply take a
passing look at respondent’s claim of religious freedom, but must instead apply the
“compelling state interest” test. The government must be heard on the issue as it has
not been given an opportunity to discharge its burden of demonstrating the state’s
compelling interest which can override respondent’s religious belief and practice.

GUDANI v SENGA

G.R No. 170165: August 15, 2006

FACTS

Petitioners Gen. Gudani and Lieutenant Colonel Balutan are high-ranking officers of
Philippine Marines assigned to the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in Baguio City.
Senator Biazon invited several senior officers of the military to appear at a public
hearing before a Senate Committee to clarify allegations of massive cheating and the
surfacing of copies of an audio excerpt purportedly of a phone conversation between
the President and then Commission on Elections Commissioner Garcillano. At the time
of the 2004 elections, Gen. Gudani had been designated as commander, and Col.
Balutan a member, of “Joint Task Force Ranao” by the AFP Southern Command.
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Lt . Gen. Senga were among the
several AFP officers also received a letter invitation from Sen. Biazon to attend the
hearing. But only Gen. Gudani, and Col. Balutan attended the invitation from Sen.
Biazon.

Thereafter, the Office of the Chief of Staff of the AFP issued a Memorandum addressed
to Gen. Baloing. It was signed by Lt. Col. Hernando DCA Iriberri in behalf of Gen.
Senga. Noting that Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had been invited to attend the Senate
Committee hearing, the Memorandum directed the two officers to attend the hearing.
Conformably, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan filed their respective requests for travel
authority addressed to the PMA Superintendent.

However, Gen. Senga did not attend to the requested hearing as per instruction from
the President that NO AFP PERSONNEL SHALL APPEAR BEFORE ANY
CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE HEARING WITHOUT HER APPROVAL. `

While Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had concluded their testimony, the office of Gen.
Senga issued a statement which noted that the two had appeared before the Senate
Committee “in spite of the fact that a guidance has been given that a Presidential
approval should be sought prior to such an appearance;” that such directive was “in
keeping with the time[-]honored principle of the Chain of Command;” and that the two
officers “disobeyed a legal order, in violation of A[rticles of] W[ar] 65 (Willfully
Disobeying Superior Officer), hence they will be subjected to General Court Martial
proceedings x x x” Both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were likewise relieved of their
assignments then.

On the very day of the hearing, the President issued Executive Order (E.O.) 464. The
Office of the Solicitor General notes that the E.O. “enjoined officials of the executive
department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry
without her approval.

Now, petitioners seek the annulment of a directive from the President enjoining them
and other military officers from testifying before Congress without the President’s
consent. Petitioners also pray for injunctive relief against a pending preliminary
investigation against them, in preparation for possible court-martial proceedings,
initiated within the military justice system in connection with petitioners’ violation of the
aforementioned directive.

The Court has to resolve whether petitioners may be subjected to military discipline on
account of their defiance of a direct order of the AFP Chief of Staff.

ISSUE

Whether or not E.O. 464 which provides among others that NO AFP PERSONNEL
SHALL APPEAR BEFORE ANY CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE HEARING
WITHOUT HER APPROVAL is unconstitutional?

RULING

The Petition is dismissed.

Is EO 464 constitutional or not, or may the President prevent a member of the armed
forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry?

Insofar as E.O. 464 compelled officials of the executive branch to seek prior presidential
approval before appearing before Congress, the notion of executive control also comes
into consideration. The impression is wrong. The ability of the President to require a
military official to secure prior consent before appearing in Congress pertains to wholly
different and independent specie of presidential authority—the commander-in-chief
powers of the President. By tradition and jurisprudence, the commander-in-chief powers
of the President are not encumbered by the same degree of restriction as that which
may attach to executive privilege or executive control.

We hold that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power
as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such
injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, we also hold that any
chamber of Congress which seeks to appear before it a military officer against the
consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance.
Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to
do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be
commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final
judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to
faithfully execute.

Again, let it be emphasized that the ability of the President to prevent military officers
from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief
Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of
members of the armed forces. The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are
not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege. The commander-in-chief
provision in the Constitution is denominated as Section 18, Article VII, which begins with
the simple declaration that “[t]he President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces of the Philippines x x x Outside explicit constitutional limitations, such as
those found in Section 5, Article XVI, the commander-in-chief clause vests on the
President, as commander-in-chief, absolute authority over the persons and actions of
the members of the armed forces. Such authority includes the ability of the President to
restrict the travel, movement and speech of military officers, activities which may
otherwise be sanctioned under civilian law.

OPOSA VS FACTORAN

NATURAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:

INTERGENERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

GR NO. 101083; JULY 30 1993

FACTS:

A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing
their generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against
Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered
ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his
behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or

appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.”
They alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae.
Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and
deforest the remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the
natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and
succeeding generations.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly

pertains to the legislative or executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:

Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

HELD:

Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations
to come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue
in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably include,
inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation
of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other
natural resources to the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as the future generations.

Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that
rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a
little differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at
the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right
for the generations to come.