ACT NO.

3815
THE REVISED PENAL CODE
Prepared by: ATTY. AMADO V. DOMINGO, JR

ART. 290
The act of seizure must be impelled by the desire to discover the
secret of another (Ergo, the offender must be informed beforehand or
must have a hint of the contents of the papers or letters so he seized
the paper or letter for that purpose). It is indispensable to show that the
accused had been informed of the contents of the papers or letters
which he had seized or was apprised of the secret of another.

Phil. Constitution on PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION.

ARTICLE III
Bill of Rights
Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence
shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public
safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
ART. 291
Damage is not a necessary element. In Art. 292, it is necessary.
See: Articles 229 and 230.

ART. 293
(1) Intent to gain (animus lucrandi) means intent to obtain from
the appropriation of the thing (personal property) some Utility, Benefit,
Advantage (U.B.A.). It is not necessary that the gain be realized (intent
will suffice).
Taking a thing under claim of ownership in good faith negates
animus lucrandi.
(2) Asportation (no intent to return): The appropriating or taking
away of the personal property of another without justifiable or legal
reason is sufficient proof of intent to gain.
(3) The animus lucrandi must exist prior to the unlawful taking or
at least coetaneously with the asportation.
(4) Unlawful taking means appropriating a thing belonging to
another and placing it under ones control or possession.
Page 1 of 42
ART. 294
(1) Unlike in Art. 13 [Mitigating Circumstances], Art. 14
[Aggravating Circumstances] does not admit of analogous cases.
Art. 14 is exclusive [Pp v. Armando A. Regala, 5 April 2000 (G.R. No.
130508)] [Pp v. Torres, (EN BANC) March 16, 2004]. EXPRESSIO
UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS. Art. 14 lists down 21 aggravating
circumstances.
(2) Injuries must be seriousArt. 263 (2) EXCEPT in par. 5 of Art.
294 (Less serious and Slight phy. Inj.)

TITLE TEN
CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY

People vs. Disney, et al. February 18, 1983

EN BANC
Article 294 applies only where robbery with violence
against or intimidation of persons takes place without entering
an inhabited house, under the conditions set forth in Article 299
of the Revised Penal Code. When the elements of both
provisions are present, the crime is a complex one, calling for
the imposition as provided in Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code, of the penalty for the most serious offense, in its
maximum period, xxx.(Citing Napolis vs. CA, 2/28/72)

ANNOTATIONS
[1] Robbery with Homicide, elements: (a) the taking of
personal property with the use of violence or intimidation
against a person; (b) the property taken belongs to another; (c)
the taking is characterized by intent to gain (animus lucrandi);
and (d) on occasion of or by reason of the robbery, the crime of
homicide, used in the generic sense, is committed..
[Sumalinog, Jr., 05 Feb. 2004; Rugay, 16 March 2004].
The victim of the homicide need not be the victim of the
robbery as long as the killing has a Direct Relation or Intimate
Connection with the robbery. Even when the killing was not
Page 2 of 42
intentional, still Robbery with Homicide, e.g. Fleeing robbers
shot the ceiling of the house without knowing that somebody
was hiding there, bullet hit and killed that unfortunate guy.
[2] In Robbery with Violence or Intimidation of persons the
violence or intimidation must be present at the time of the
taking of the personal property or before it is complete.
Otherwise, two (2) separate and distinct felonies (e.g.---Theft
plus homicide or physical injuries).
.
[3] Robbery with Multiple Homicides. No such crime in the
RPC. It remains as Robbery with Homicide, regardless of the
number of homicides committed on the occasion of the
robbery, and even if rape, murder and physical injuries were
also committed on the same occasion. [Hijada, En Banc, 11
March 11, 2004].
[4] People vs. Pacapac September 7,1995
However, the denomination of the crime as Robbery in
Band with Homicide is not correct. As we explained in People
v. Pearoso [ G.R. No. 32997, July 30, 1982, 115 SCRA 599.]:
"x x x There is no special complex crime of
robbery in band with double homicide and/or
serious, less serious or slight physical injuries
under the present code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 373. If robbery with homicide
or with the other crimes enumerated above, is
committed by a band, the indictable offense
would still be denominated as 'robbery with
homicide' under Article 294 (1), but the
circumstance that it was committed by a band is
not an element of the crime but is merely a
generic aggravating circumstance which may be
offset by mitigating circumstances, The
homicides or murders and physical injuries,
irrespective of their numbers, committed on the
occasion or by reason of the robbery are
Page 3 of 42
 merged in the composite crime of 'robbery with
homicide."'

The crime committed is, therefore, the

special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide
under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.
All the elements of the crime of robbery, namely:
intent to gain, unlawful taking of personal
property belonging to another and violence
against or intimidation of a person under Article
293 of the Revised Penal Code have been duly
proven.

[5] People vs. Penillos Jan.30,1992:

There is no crime of robbery with homicide and frustrated

homicide or robbery with homicide and attempted homicide .
The term "homicide" in paragraph 1, Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code is to be understood in its generic sense; it includes
murder and slight physical injuries committed during the
robbery which crimes are merged in the crime of robbery with
homicide.
The trial court, however, should have taken into
consideration the aggravating circumstance of dwelling.
[6] Robberies committed in different house are distinct. [Pp
v. Baysa, 29 April 1953]

[7] SINGLE LARCENY DOCTRINE: But if the robberies

are committed upon different victims on the same occasion
and in the same place, only one robbery is committed as the
robberies are mere incidents of a single criminal intent (one
criminal resolution). [Pp v. de la Cruz, 23 May 1950]

[8] In robbery with violence or intimidation of persons, the

taking (asportation) is complete when the offender has already
Page 4 of 42
the possession of the thing even if he has no opportunity to
dispose of it. In robbery with force upon things, the things must
be brought outside the building for consummated robbery to be
committed.
[9] Art. 295 applies only to subd. 3,4,& 5 of Art. 294, but
not to subd. 1 & 2 of Art. 294. Band (at least 4 armed
malefactors) here is a mere G.A.C.
[10] Art. 297 -- Attempted and frustrated robbery: If QUAC
is present in the killing --- two separate crimes, id est, Art. 297
murder.
[11] Art. 298 With VIAI & IDIC plus animus lucrandi. No
intent to gain coercion only. No VIAI & IDIC, but with animus
lucrandiESTAFA. Art. 298 is also robbery, given a different
name because the object is not personal property.

ROBBERY BY THE USE OF FORCE UPON THINGS

[12] Art. 299 -- More severe penalty than Art. 302 because
of the risk to the life and limbs of the occupant.
[13] Art. 300 Band here is QUAC, unlike in Art. 294-
Band is only GAC.
CHAPTER TWO
BRIGANDAGE

ANNOTATION
[1] Art. 306 -- If a group of six armed men were roaming in
a public highway for the purpose of kidnapping persons for
ransom, they are already liable under Art. 306. If the
kidnapping or ransom is actually committed, Art. 306 will no
longer apply, but the six will now be liable under P.D. 532 [Anti-
piracy and anti-highway robbery law of 1974].
However, the number of perpetrators is no longer an
essential element of the crime of brigandage as defined by
P.D. 532 (See Pp v. Laurente, supra).

Page 5 of 42
 [2] People vs. Larry Laurente, et al. March 29, 1996

True, Presidential Decree No. 532 did

introduce amendments to Articles 306 and 307
of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the
penalties, albeit limiting its applicability to the
offenses stated therein when committed on the
highways and without prejudice to the liability for
such acts if committed. Furthermore, the decree
does not require that there be at least four
armed persons forming a band of robbers; and
the presumption in the Code that said accused
are brigands if they use unlicensed firearms no
longer obtains under the decree. But, and this
we broadly underline, the essence of brigandage
under the Code as a crime of depredation
wherein the unlawful acts are directed not only
against specific, intended or preconceived
victims, but against any and all prospective
victims anywhere on the highway and
whosoever they may potentially be, is the same
as the concept of brigandage which is
maintained in Presidential Decree No. 532, in
the same manner as it was under its
aforementioned precursor in the Code and, for
that matter, under the old Brigandage Law.
[2] Art. 307 repealed by P.D. 532.
CHAPTER THREE
THEFT
CHAPTER FOUR
[1] In robbery, the asportation (unlawful taking)is against
the will of the victim. In theft, it is without the consent of the
victim.
[2] TAKING --- is the act of depriving another of the
possession and dominion of movable property. In a juridical
Page 6 of 42
sense, the consummation of the crime of theft takes place
upon the voluntary and malicious taking of the property
belonging to another which is realized by the material
occupation of the thing whereby the thief places it under his
control and is such a situation as he could dispose of it at
once.

[3] People vs. Trinidad March 5, 1927:

CRIMINAL LAW; THEFT.-The defendant

received a finger ring from the offended party for
the purpose of pledging it as security for a loan
of P5 for the benefit of said offended party.
Instead of pledging the ring, the defendant
immediately carried it to one of her neighbors to
whom she sold it for P30 and appropriated the
money to her own use. Held: That this juridical
possession of the ring did not pass to the
defendant but remained in the original owner;
that said defendant was only the agent of the
owner and not a bailee of the property; and that
therefore the crime committed was theft and not
estafa.

[4] DISTINCTION:
THEFT --- Only material possession is transferred
ESTAFA --- Material and juridical possessions are
transferred. [Trust Receipt law]
CIVIL OBLIGATION --- Juridical and material
possession are transferred plus ownership. [e.g. sale on
installment.]

NOTE: Juridical possession --- a possession which gives

the transferee a right owner the thing which the transferee

Page 7 of 42
may set up even against the owner. In estafa, the juridical
possession refers to the ---
Delivery of the thing to the offender:
[a] On Commission.
[b] For Administration.
[c] In Trust.
[d] Under any of the circumstance involving the duty to
deliver or to return the same thing received.

[5] Associated Labor Unions-TUCP, et al. vs.

NLRC, et al., February 10, 1999

As to whether or not complainant acted with

intent to gain, suffice it to say, that in Criminal
Law, intent to gain is presumed from the
unlawful taking of personal property belonging to
another, and in the case at bar the taking of
company property was without the permission or
knowledge of the company. Moreover, it is not
necessary that there was real or actual gain on
the part of the offender. It is enough that on
taking them, he was then actuated by the desire
or intent to gain (People vs. Mercado, 65 Phil.
665).

USURPATION

Art. 312. n.b.--Remember INCREMENTAL PENALTY in

addition to the pecuniary penalty as well as regards
jurisdiction.
Where there is no violence or intimidation in occupation ---
- maybe FORCIBLE ENTRY only [summary proceeding]
CHAPTER FIVE
CULPABLE INSOLVENCY

Page 8 of 42
 Art. 314. Fraudulent insolvency. Any person who
shall abscond with his property to the prejudice of his creditors,
shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor, if he be a merchant
and the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to
prision mayor in its medium period, if he be not a merchant.
CHAPTER SIX
SWINDLING AND OTHER DECEITS
ANNOTATION

[1] Juridical Possession Is a possession, which gives the

transferee a right over the thing which the transferee may set
up even against the owner.
[2] According to Justice Florenz Regalado even if there
was no transfer of juridical possession in sub-division one, Art.
315, as long as there was either fraud or deceit, it is still estafa.
[3] Art. 315, 1(d) --- Only for current obligation, does not
cover pre-existing debt; 3-day notice required.
B. P. 22 --- applies to both current and pre-existing
obligation; 5-day notice required.
[4] P.D. 818, 1975 amended Art. 315 by increasing the
penalties for estafa committed by means of bouncing checks.
CASES:

UNITED STATES VS. CELIS. [GRN 3363 August 17,

1907.]

1. "ESTAFA."-Any person who, taking advantage of the

confidence placed in him by the head or manager of a
commercial firm wherein lie is employed, converts to his own
use a certain sum of money received by him for delivery to the
cashier of the firm, commits the crime of estafa defined by
article 535, No. 5, of the Penal Code.
-------------------------------------------------------
People vs. Yu Chai Ho [GRN 29278 October 3, 1928]

Page 9 of 42
 1. CRIMINAL LAW; "ESTAFA;" CONVERSION OR
MISAPPROPRIATION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY.-In estafa
based upon the conversion or misappropriation of money,
goods, or other personal property, it is essential that a person
other than the accused is prejudiced by such conversion or
misappropriation, but the person so prejudiced need not
necessarily be the legal owner of the goods or property.

Guzman vs. Court of Appeals [GRN L-9572 July 31,

1956]

1. AGENCY; NATURE OF POSSESSION OF AGENT OF

THE GOODS RECEIVED IN AGENCY.-An agent, unlike a
servant or messenger, has both the physical and juridical
possession of the goods received in agency, or the proceeds
thereof, which takes the place of the goods after their sale by
the agent. His duty to turn over the proceeds of the agency
depends upon his discharge, as well as the result of the
accounting between him and the principal; and he may set up
his right of possession as against that of the principal until the
agency is terminated
2. ID.; POSSESSION OF AGENT DISTINGUISHED
FROM POSSESSION OF TELLER OF BANK.-There is an
essential distinction between the possession by a receiving
teller of funds received from third persons paid to the bank,
and an agent who receives the proceeds of sales of
merchandise delivered to him in agency by his principal. In the
former case, payment by third persons to the teller is payment
to the bank itself; the teller is a mere custodian or keeper of the
funds received, and has no independent right or title to retain
or possess the same as against the bank. An agent, on the
other hand, can even assert, as against his own principal, an
independent, autonomous, right to retain the money or goods
received in consequence of the agency; as when the principal
fails to reimburse him for advances he has made, and
Page 10 of 42
indemnify him for damages suffered without his fault (Article
1915, new Civil Code; Article 1730, old).
3. CRIMINAL LAW; ESTAFA; MISAPPROPRIATION OF
GOODS BY SALES AGENT CONSTITUTES ESTAFA.-Where
a sales agent misappropriates or falls to turn over to his
principal proceeds of things or goods he was commissioned or
authorized to sell for the latter, he is guilty not of the crime of
theft but of estafa, as defined by Article 315, paragraph 1,
subparagraph (c), of the Revised Penal Code. (U. S. vs.
Reyes, 36 Phil. 791; U. S. vs. Lim, 36 Phil. 682; People vs.
Leachon, 56 Phil. 737.)
4. ID.; ID.; ELEMENTS OF; FAILURE TO ALLEGE
ELEMENTS OF CRIME IN THE INFORMATION; EFFECT
OF.-It is an essential element of the crime of estafa that the
money or goods misappropriated or converted by the accused
to the prejudice of another was received by him 'in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same".
Where no such, allegation appears in the information the
accused can not be convicted there under of the crime of
estafa.

People vs. Benitez [GRN L-15923. June 30, 1960]

EN BANC
After going over the record, we entertain no doubt that the
accused has committed estafa.
In the case of Tubb vs. People and the Court of Appeals
(101 Phil., 114; 53 Off. Gaz. [18] 6096), this Court held that
"the failure to account upon demand, for funds or property held
in trust is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation." In
another case involving a prosecution for the same crime as in
the present, it was held that ". . . it is the duty of the agent to
return the jewelry upon demand by the owner and the failure to
do so is evidence of the conversion of the property by the
agent. (People vs. Zamora, 2 Phil., 382.)" (People vs. Limbo,
Page 11 of 42
CA, 51 Off. Gaz., 228.) In the case at bar, the accused admits
having collected the amount of P540.00 as rentals from the
different tenants of his employer. It is, likewise, admitted that
he failed to account for and turn over said amount to his
employer, upon demand therefor, without giving any reason or
explanation whatsoever. These circumstances, together with
the fact that the accused even obligated himself to make
restitution, clearly show that the amount of P540.00, which he
was duty bound to deliver to his employer, was
misappropriated by him.

ESTAFA vs. QUALIFIED THEFT:

Chua-Burce vs. CA and People of the Phil.

[GRN 109595 April 27, 2000]
CRISTETA CHUA-BURCE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
xxx xxx
xxx.

The crucial issues, in our mind, are

(1) whether there was a valid trial of the criminal case; and
(2) whether the elements of the crime of estafa under
Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code were duly proven
beyond reasonable doubt.

First, petitioner assails the validity of the proceedings in

the trial court on the ground that the public prosecutor xxx.

On the second issue. petitioner was charged with the

crime of estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal
Code. The elements of estafa through conversion or
misappropriation under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal
Code are:

Page 12 of 42
 (1) that personal property is received in trust, on
commission, for administration or under any other
circumstance involving the duty to make delivery of or to return
the same, even though the obligation is guaranteed by a bond;
(2) that there is conversion or diversion of such property
by the person who has so received it or a denial on his part
that he received it;
(3) that such conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury
of another and
(4) that there be demand for the return of the property.
Have the foregoing elements been met in the case at bar?
We find the first element absent. When the money, goods, or
any other personal property is received by the offender from
the offended party (1) in trust or (2) on commission or (3) for
administration, the offender acquires both material or physical
possession and juridical possession of the thing received.
Juridical possession means a possession, which gives the
transferee a right over the thing, which the transferee may set
up even against the owner. In this case, petitioner was a cash
custodian who was primarily responsible for the cash-in-vault.
Her possession of the cash belonging to the bank is akin to
that of a bank teller, both being mere bank employees.
In People v. Locson,[ 57 Phil. 325 (1932)] the receiving
teller of a bank misappropriated the money received by him for
the bank. He was found liable for qualified theft on the theory
that the possession of the teller is the possession of the bank.
We explained in Locson that -
"The money was in the possession of the defendant as
receiving teller of the bank, and the possession of the
defendant was the possession of the bank. When the
defendant, with grave abuse of confidence, removed the
money and appropriated it to his own use without the consent
of the bank, there was the taking or apoderamiento
contemplated in the definition of the crime of theft."

Page 13 of 42
 In the subsequent case of Guzman v. Court of Appeals,
[99 Phil. 703, 706-707 (1956)] a traveling sales agent
misappropriated or failed to return to his principal the proceeds
of things or goods he was commissioned or authorized to sell.
He was, however, found liable for estafa under Article 315 (1)
(b) of the Revised Penal Code, and not qualified theft. In the
Guzman case, we explained the distinction between
possession of a bank teller and an agent for purposes of
determining criminal liability -
"The case cited by the Court of Appeals (People vs.
Locson, 57 Phil. 325), in support of its theory that appellant
only had the material possession of the merchandise he was
selling for his principal, or their proceeds, is not in point. In said
case, the receiving teller of a bank who misappropriated
money received by him for the bank, was held guilty of
qualified theft on the theory that the possession of the teller is
the possession of the bank. There is an essential distinction
between the possession by a receiving teller of funds received
from third persons paid to the bank, and an agent who receives
the proceeds of sales of merchandise delivered to him in
agency by his principal. In the former case, payment by third
persons to the teller is payment to the bank itself; the teller is a
mere custodian or keeper of the funds received, and has no
independent right or title to retain or possess the same as
against the bank. An agent, on the other hand, can even
assert, as against his own principal, an independent,
autonomous, right to retain money or goods received in
consequence of the agency; as when the principal fails to
reimburse him for advances he has made, and indemnify him
for damages suffered without his fault (Article 1915, [N]ew Civil
Code; Article 1730, old)."
Petitioner herein being a mere cash custodian had no
juridical possession over the missing funds. Hence, the
element of juridical possession being absent, petitioner cannot
be convicted of the crime of estafa under Article 315, No. 1 (b)
Page 14 of 42
of the Revised Penal Code. [Could the present Information
sustain a conviction for qualified theft under Article 310 of
the Revised Penal Code? A perusal of the Information
shows that it did not allege the essential elements of
"intent to gain" and "without the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things."]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and petitioner is
ACQUITTED of the crime of estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of
the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner is ordered RELEASED
from custody unless she is being held for some other lawful
cause. No costs.
*********************************************
SEE; PP vs. Simeon Yusay, 2 Sept. 1927 Theft v. Estafa
(Dissenting opinion of Justices Street and Villamor)
CHAPTER SEVEN
CHATTEL MORTGAGE
ANNOTATIONS

(a) Real Estate Mortgage Law --- C.A. 3135

(b) Chattel Mortgage Law --- C.A. 1508
(b.1.) In order to be valid, must be registered with the
Register of Deeds, otherwise Art. 319 will not apply.
(b.2.) First paragraph, the removal must be coupled
with intent to defraud or the removal is unjustified.
(c) Loan is the principal contract and Mortgage is just an
accessory contract. Idest, no loan --- no mortgage.
(d) In CHATTEL MORTGAGE, the mortgagee has three
(3) alternative [not cumulative] rights, viz:
1. Abandon his mortgage and file a claim for
collection;
2. Foreclose with deficiency judgment; and
3. Just foreclose within the statute of limitation
[mortgage contract: 10 years as per Art. 1142 of the NCC].

Page 15 of 42
 If mortgagee chooses No. 1, mortgagor may now
move, sell, etc the property even without the written consent of
the mortgagee because the mortgage is deemed abandoned.

CHAPTER EIGHT
ARSON AND OTHER CRIMES INVOLVING
DESTRUCTIONS

ANNOTATIONS

(a) Articles 320 to 326-B were expressly repealed by

Section 9 of P.D., 1613, March 7, 1979, but Art. 320 was
restored by P.D. 1744, Nov. 11, 1980.
(b) For properties that are outside the enumeration of P.D.
1744, refer to P.D. 1613, e.g., Stock of lumber, stock of tires,
pile of canned goods, plantation, or growing crops.
(c) Art. 320 eliminated the crime of arson with homicide or
even with murder. Just alleged the fact of death as a
consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized
under the new Art. 320 {See: Sub-par. 2, par. 5, Section 1 of
Art. 320.
People vs. Gutierrez July 5, 1996
Although the whole 2-storey wood and galvanized iron
house has not been completely gutted by the fire, the crime
committed is still consummated arson. It is enough that a
portion thereof is shown to have been destroyed.
People vs. Hernandez December 5, 1929
The trial court held that the crime committed was only
frustrated arson. We agree with the Attorney-General that the
crime was consummated. The appellant did in fact. set fire to
the roof of the house, and said house was in fact partially
burned. With this, the crime of arson was consummated,
notwithstanding the fact that the fire was afterwards
extinguished, for once the fire has been started, the
consummation of the crime of arson does not depend upon the
Page 16 of 42
extent of the damage caused. This court has so held in the
cases of United States vs. Go Foo Suy and Go Jancho (25
Phil., 187) and United States vs. Po Chengco (23 Phil., 487).

United States vs. Valdes. December 10, 1918.

No more frustrated arson as decided in this instant case.
Now, only attempted and consummated arson.

CHAPTER NINE
MALICIOUS MISCHIEF

ANNOTATIONS

(a) It must be shown that the act had for its object the
injury of the property for the sake merely of (deliberately &
maliciously) damaging it --- contra-distinguish with par. 2, Art.
308, which provides:
Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain
but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force
upon things, shall take personal property of another without the
latter's consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
Any person who, after having maliciously damaged
the property of another, shall remove or make use of the fruits
or object of the damage caused by him;

Art. 328. Special cases of malicious mischief. Any

person who:
(a) shall cause damage to obstruct the performance of
public functions, or
(b) using any poisonous or corrosive substance; or
spreading any infection or contagion among cattle; or
(c) who cause damage to the property of the National
Museum or National Library, or to any archive or registry,

Page 17 of 42
waterworks, road, promenade, or any other thing used in
common by the public, shall be punished:
1. By prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods, if the value of the damage caused exceeds 1,000
pesos;
2. By arresto mayor, if such value does not exceed the
abovementioned amount but it is over 200 pesos; and
3. By arresto menor, in such value does not exceed 200
pesos.

NOTE: In (a) above, there must be no element of public

and tumultuous uprising; otherwise, the crime is SEDITION,
Art. 139.
ANNOTATIONS

(a) Damaging only --- not destruction, otherwise Art. 324

[crimes involving destruction, as amended by P.D. 1613 will
apply].
(b) No intent to kill, but someone got killed --- complex
crime; with intent to kill --- murder.

CHAPTER TEN
EXEMPTION FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN
CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
Art. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability.

ANNOTATIONS

(a) This article does not include complex crimes, e.g.,

estafa through falsification of public documents --- offender not
liable for estafa, but liable for falsification.
(b) The term spouse includes common law relationship.
(c) Stepfather being an ascendant by affinity is included.

Page 18 of 42
 TITLE ELEVEN
CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
CHAPTER ONE
ADULTERY AND CONCUBINAGE

ANNOTATIONS

(a) For adultery to exist, there must be a subsisting

marriage although it be subsequently annulled [U.S. vs. Mata,
18 Phil. 490]. But if the marriage was already annulled, even if
the adulterous act was committed during the existence of the
marriage, the unoffending ex-spouse can no longer institute
the criminal complaint [Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera, et al., June 30,
1980]

(b) The nature of the crime of adultery is such that it will

not be often when it can be established by direct evidence.
Nevertheless, strong circumstantial and corroborative evidence
such as will lead the guarded discretion of a reasonable and
just man to the conclusion that the alleged act has been
committed, is sufficient to sustain a conviction for adultery. [5
Groizard, Codigo Penal, p. 24 et seq., Dec, , Sup. Ct. of Spain,
June 23, 1874]

Donio-Teves vs. Hon. Vamenta, Jr., etc., et al., December

26, 1984

Finally, as a last-ditch attempt to throw the ADULTERY

case out of court, petitioners invoked the death of the
complainant which took place on April 14, 1974 and during the
pendency of this case, as an added argument in support of
their plea for dismissal.
Such a stand is erroneous. Death of the offended party is
not a ground for extinguishments of criminal liability whether
total or partial. The participation of the offended party is
Page 19 of 42
essential not for the maintenance of the criminal action, but
solely for the initiation thereof.
The term "private crimes" in reference to felonies, which
cannot be prosecuted except upon complaint filed by the
aggrieved party, is misleading. Far from what it implies, it is not
only the aggrieved party who is offended in such crimes but
also the State. Every violation of penal laws results in the
disturbance of public order and safety which the State is
committed to uphold and protect. If the law imposes the
condition that private crimes like adultery shall not be
prosecuted except upon complaint filed by the offended party,
it is, as herein pointed earlier "out of consideration for the
aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in
silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial."
Once a complaint is filed, the will of the offended party is
ascertained and the action proceeds just as in any other crime.
This is shown by the fact that after filing a complaint, any
pardon given by the complainant to the offender would be
unavailing. It is true, the institution of the action in so-called
private crimes is at the option of the aggrieved party. But it is
equally true that once the choice is made manifest, the law will
be applied in full force beyond the control of, and in spite of the
complainant, his death notwithstanding.

People vs. Zapata and Bondoc

[GRN L-3047 16 May 1951]
1. ADULTERY; EACH SEXUAL INTERCOURSE A
CRIME.-Adultery is a crime of result and not of tendency, as
the Supreme Court of Spain has held (S. 10 December 1945);
it is an instantaneous crime which is consummated and
exhausted or completed at the moment of the carnal union.
Each sexual intercourse constitutes a crime of adultery (Cuello
Calon, Derecho Penal, Vol. 11, p. 569).
2. ID.; ID.; LAW DOES NOT BAR FILING OF AS MANY
COMPLAINTS AS THERE ARE ADULTEROUS ACTS.-True,
Page 20 of 42
two or more adulterous acts committed by the same
defendants are against the same person-the offended
husband, the same status-the union of the husband and wife
by their marriage, and the same conimunity represented. by
the State for its interest in maintaining and preserving such
status. But this identity of the offended party, status and
society does not argue against the commission of the crime of
adultery as many times as there were carnal acts
consummated, for as long as the status remains unchanged,
the nexus undissolved and unbroken, an encroachment or
trespass upon that status constitutes a crime. There is no
constitutional or legal provision which bars the filing of as many
complaints for adultery as there were adulterous acts
committed, each constituting one crime.
3. ID.; ID; ID.; JEOPARDY RULE, NOT VIOLATED;
REASON.-A second complaint charging the commission of
adulterous acts not included in the first complaint does not
constitute a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the
Constitution, otherwise the adultery committed by the male
defendant charged in the second complaint, should he be
absolved from, or acquitted of, the first charge upon the
evidence that he did not know that his codefendant was a
married woman, would remain or go unpunished. The defense
set up by him against the first charge upon which he was
acquitted would no longer be available, because at the time of
the commission of the crime charged in the second complaint,
he already knew that his codefendant was a married woman
and yet he continued to have carnal knowledge of her.
4. ID.; ADULTERY NOT A CONTINUING OFFENSE;
ABSENCE OF UNITY OR CRIMINAL INTENT OR
PURPOSE.-The notion or concept of a continuous crime has
its origin in the juridical fiction favorable to the law
transgressors and in many a case against the interest of
society (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p. 521). For it to
exist there should be (a) plurality of acts performed separately
Page 21 of 42
during a period of time; (b) unity of penal provision infringed
upon or violated; and (c) unity of criminal intent or purpose,
which means that two or more violations of the same penal
provision are united in one and the same intent leading to the
perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim (Ibid. p. 520).
In adultery, the last unity does not exist, because the culprits
perpetrate the crime in every sexual intercourse and they need
not do another or other adulterous acts to consummate it.
5. ID.; PARDON BY HUSBAND.-Even if the husband
should pardon his adulterous wife, such pardon would not
exempt the wife and her paramour from criminal liability for
adulterous acts committed after the pardon was granted,
because the pardon refers to previous, and not to subsequent,
adulterous acts (Viada, 5th ed., Vol. 5, p. 208; Groizard, 2nd
ed., Vol. 5, pp. 57-58).

xxx xxx xxx.

The defense set up by him against the first charge upon
which he was acquitted would no longer be available, because
at the time of the commission of the crime charged in the
second complaint, he already knew that his codefendant was a
married woman and yet he continued to have carnal
knowledge of her.

Art. 334. Concubinage.

ANNOTATIONS

(a) Lack of knowledge on the part of the woman that the

man has a subsisting marriage is a defense.
(b) In (b), if the woman is his wife --- Grave Scandal, Art.
200.
(c) In (c) the cohabitation must be under scandalous
circumstances

U. S. vs. Casipong and Hongoy, September 5,1911.

Page 22 of 42
 1. CONCUBINAGE; NECESSARY ELEMENTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES; PUBLIC SCANDAL-It is an indispensable
condition for convicting a married man of concubinage outside
of his home that his conduct produce scandal and set a bad
example among his neighbors; and the supreme court of
Spain, in applying this provision of law in analogous cases, in
judgments of June 16, 1888, and February 25, 1896, has laid
down the principle that publicity of an immoral act produces
such scandal and bad example.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PUBLIC SCANDAL DEFINED.-The scandal

produced and the bad example set by the concubinage of a
married man with a woman other than his wife occur not only
when they both live in the same house but also when they
appear together in public and perform acts in sight of the
community that give rise to criticism and general protest
among their neighbors.

CHAPTER TWO
ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS

Art. 335. [NOTE: Repealed by R.A. No. 8353, The Anti-

Rape Law of 1997.]

Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness.

ANNOTATIONS

(a) Circumstances: [1] Using force or intimidation; [2]

Offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; or [3} Offended party is 12 years old or under.
(b) Circumstances [1] & [2] are absent and the offended
party is a male --- Art. 336 does not apply. Even Art. 339 will
not apply because in that article the victim must be a woman

Page 23 of 42
more than 12, but less than 18 and none of the above
circumstances, but committed by means of deceit.
(c) Lewd Design must be alleged in the complaint or
information.
(d) In Art. 336, the offended party is either male or female.

U. S. vs. I. BAILOSES. March 16, 1903

CRIMINAL LAW; "ABUSOS DESHONESTOS;" MOTIVE.-

Where the complaining witness was compelled by defendant to
remove her clothes and dance before him and others,
lasciviousness was necessarily a part of the motive, and the
crime of abusos deshonestos was committed even though the
dominating motive was revenge for failure to pay a debt.

People vs. Amadore, April 20, 2001

Where accused-appellant fondled the breast of private

complainant and repeatedly kissed her but he did no further
and there was no showing that he at the time intended to have
sex with the victim, the crime for which he should have been
held guilty was the offense of acts of lasciviousness, not
attempted rape, punishable under Article 336 of the Revised
Penal Code by prision correccional. [citing People vs. Collado,
60 Phil. 610.]

CHAPTER THREE
SEDUCTION, CORRUPTION OF MINORS AND
WHITE SLAVE TRADE

[GRN 97336 February 19, 1993.]

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
Page 24 of 42
 It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (U.S. vs.
Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595) that -
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some
sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield
because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents
merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual
desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit, Seduction, par.
56). She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by
the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which
are calculated to have and do have that effect, and which
result in her ultimately submitting her person to the sexual
embraces of her seducer.
People vs. Teodosio June 3, 1991
Appellant said he planned to marry Elaine and for this
reason he successfully persuaded her to give up her virginity.
This is the deceit contemplated by law that attended the
commission of the offense. [citing: People vs. Iman, 62 Phil. 92
(1935); and U.S. vs, Sarmiento, 27 Phil. 121 (1914)]
Babanto vs. Hon. Zosa, etc., et al. February 28, 1983
It is true that virginity is presumed if the girl is over 12 and
under 18 years of age, is unmarried and of good reputation.
The presumption notwithstanding, virginity is still an essential
element of the crime of qualified seduction and must be
alleged in the complaint.

CHAPTER FOUR
ABDUCTION
Art. 342. Forcible abduction.
ANNOTATIONS
1. Pp v. Jimmy Sabredo y Garbo, 11 May 2000 ---
The elements of forcible abductions are:
(a) That the person abducted is any woman,
regardless of age, civil status, or reputation;
Page 25 of 42
 (b) That the abduction is against her will; and
(c) That the abduction is with lewd designs.
The appellant was moved by lewd designs was
shown in regard to rape by his having carnal knowledge of
private complainant, against her will. While it may appear at
first blush that forcible abduction, as defined and penalized by
Art. 342, RPC, was also committed, the information, though
sufficiently alleging the forcible taking of complainant from
Cebu to Masbate, failed to allege lewd designs. When a
complex crime under Art. 48 of the RPC is charged, such as
forcible abduction with rape, it is axiomatic that the prosecution
must allege and prove the presence of all the elements of
forcible abduction, as well as all the elements of he crime of
rape. When accused, using a bladed weapon, forcibly took
away the complainant for the purpose of sexually assaulting
her, the rape may then absorb forcible abduction.
2. Pp v. Jeffrey Garcia, 28 February 2002 --- Same as
in the Maggie de la Riva case.

CASES:

UNITED STATES VS. DE VIRAR. February 11, 1915.

1. ABDUCTION; ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS.-Article 445 of
the Penal Code punishes the abduction of a woman,
committed against her will and with lewd designs. Viada, in his
commentaries on the said code, says that the elements
constituting this crime are three: (1) The person kidnapped
must be a woman. It is immaterial whether she be a widow, a
married woman, or a virgin, for all three classes are comprised
with the generic term of "woman." (2) The crime must be
committed against her will. (3) It must be committed with
unchaste designs, that is, with the intention of lying with the
woman.
2. ID.; ID.-The injured party went voluntarily with
defendant to a place where she believed she would find her
Page 26 of 42
fianc, and as soon as she became convinced that he was not
there she attempted to return home, but defendant opposed
her returning and took her against her will to the place where
he defiled her. This opposition by defendant to the woman's
returning home was the commencement of the abduction
committed with violence or against her will; and, as he then,
and subsequently for three days, retained her in his company
and against her will, continuously with unchaste designs, these
acts constitute the crime of abduction with force, provided for
and punished by the article above cited.
3. ID.; ID.-It matters not whether the kidnapping of the
aggrieved person was effected after she had voluntarily left her
house, deceived, as she was, by defendant, or whether it took
place in the house itself; nor does it matter whether she was
not then of legal age, because the acts performed by
defendant with respect to her involved offenses against liberty,
honor and public order. These are the offenses, which the law
punishes in the crime of abduction with force, and these same
acts contain the elements that go to make up the said crime,
and not that of abduction with consent as defined in article 446
of the Penal Code.
People vs. Eduardo Tami, et al, May 2, 1995

Appellant's other point is: 'Even if we may assume purely

for sake of argument that the complaining witness was forcibly
abducted and then raped thirteen times, we submit that there
was only one forcible abduction, with rape and that was the
one allegedly committed on the truck of jeep. Any subsequent
acts of intercourse in the house against her will would be only
separate acts of rape and can no longer be considered
separate complex crimes of forcible abduction with rape.'
This point is well taken. There was only one forcible
abduction with rape which was the one committed in the truck.
Thus in People v. Jose, et al., G.R. No. L- 28232, Feb. 6, 1971,
37 SCRA 450, where the four accused forcibly abducted
Page 27 of 42
Maggie de la Riva and each of them raped her, this Court held
'that even while the first act of rape was being performed, the
crime of forcible abduction had already been consummated, so
that each of the three succeeding crimes of the same nature
can not legally be considered as still connected with the
abduction - in other words, they should be detached, from and
considered independently of, that of forcible abduction and,
therefore, the former can no longer be complexed with the
latter." [ People vs. Bohos, June 25, 1980]

Art. 343. Consented abduction.

Perez vs. CA, Nov. 29, 1988
There are similar elements between Consented Abduction
and Qualified Seduction, namely: (1) that the offended party is
a virgin, and, (2) that she must be over twelve (12) and under
eighteen (18) years of age. However, two elements
differentiate the two crimes. Consented Abduction, in addition
to the two common elements, requires that: (1) the taking away
of the offended party must be with her consent, after
solicitation or cajolery from the offender, and, (2) the taking
away of the offended party must be with lewd designs. On the
other hand, an information for Qualified Seduction also
requires that: (1) the crime be committed by abuse of authority,
confidence or relationship, and, (2) the offender has sexual
intercourse with the woman.

United States vs. Reyes. November 7, 1914

1. ABDUCTION WITH CONSENT; ESSENTIAL

ELEMENTS.-As this Supreme Court has already held (U. S.
vs. Reyes, 20 Phil. Rep., 510), the crime of abduction with the
consent of the abducted, punished by article 446 of the Penal
Code, does not require that the abducted woman be personally
removed from the house of her parents or guardians. It is
sufficient that she leave it and be withdrawn from their control
Page 28 of 42
and vigilance, yielding to the cajolery and promises of her
seducer, because the law does not punish the violence done to
the person abducted, when it is assumed that she gave her
consent, but the disgrace to her family and the alarm caused
therein by the disappearance of one of its members who by her
age and sex is susceptible to cajolery and deceit. (Supreme
court of Spain, decision of November 30, 1875.) The place
where the abduction is committed is immaterial, for the law
takes no account of it. (Decisions of October 29, 1895, and
March 31, 1896.)

CHAPTER FIVE
PROVISIONS RELATIVE TO THE PRECEDING
CHAPTERS OF TITLE ELEVEN.

ANNOTATIONS

(a) In people vs. Miranda [57 Phil. 274], the Court said:
"Paragraph 3 of the legal provision above quoted prohibits
a prosecution for seduction, abduction, rape, or acts of
lasciviousness, except upon a complaint made by the offended
party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any
case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the
above-named persons, as the case may be. It does not prohibit
the continuance of a prosecution in the offended patty pardons
the offender after the cause has been instituted, nor does it
order the dismissal of said cause. The only act that according
to article 344 extinguishes the penal action and the penalty that
may have been imposed is the marriage between the offender
and the offended party."
In People vs. Infante [57 Phil. 138], decided just a little
over a month before Miranda, the Court similarly held:
"In this court, after the case had been submitted, a motion
to dismiss was filed on behalf of the appellant predicated on an
affidavit executed by Manuel Artigas, Jr., in which he pardoned
Page 29 of 42
his guilty spouse for her infidelity. But this attempted pardon
cannot prosper for two reasons. The second paragraph of
article 344 of the Revised Penal Code which is in question
reads: 'The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution
without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive,
nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the
offenders.' This provision means that the pardon afforded
the offenders must come before the institution of the
criminal prosecution, and means, further, that both the
offenders must be pardoned by the offended party.

TITLE TWELVE
CRIMES AGAINST THE CIVIL STATUS
OF PERSONS
CHAPTER ONE
SIMULATION OF BIRTHS AND USURPATION OF CIVIL
STATUS

ANNOTATIONS

(a) See Art. 4, R.A. 7610 on Child Trafficking.

(b)The woman who simulates birth and the one who
furnishes the child are both responsible as principals. (Dec.
Supreme Ct. of Spain, March 20, 1880).
(c) The physician or surgeon, or public officer who, in
violation of the duties of his profession or office, takes part in
the execution of the crime whether as a principal [inducement,
direct participation, indispensable cooperation], an accomplice,
or accessory in addition to the prescribed penalty, will be
meted out an additional penalty of temporary special
disqualification.
(d) P.D. 603 and R.A. 7610 punish the parent or guardian
who sells or abandon the child to another for valuable
consideration.
Page 30 of 42
 () FILIATION --- relation of the child to the parent.
() PATERNITY --- relation of the parent to the child.

CHAPTER TWO
ILLEGAL MARRIAGES
ANNOTATIONS
(a) An individual who contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent
declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio, on the
ground of psychological incapacity. [Tenebro v. CA, En Banc,
18 Feb. 2004]. On the other hand, if it is established that the
second marriage has been contracted without the necessary
license and thus void, or that the accused was merely forced to
enter in the second (voidable) marriage, no criminal liability for
the crime of bigamy can attach. [id., Separate Opinion, Vitug,
J.].
(b) Art. 41, Family Code: For purposes of re-marriage,
there must be a summary proceeding to declare the absent
spouse presumptively dead. The period of absence is four (4)
years. However, where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Art. 391 NCC, an
absence of only two (2) years shall be sufficient.

Landicho vs. Relova, et al. February 23, 1968

1. ACTIONS; PROSECUTION FOR BIGAMY;

PREJUDICIAL QUESTION; WHEN ANNULMENT OF
MARRIAGE CAN BE CONSIDERED A PREJUDICIAL
QUESTION IN A BIGAMY CASE.- The mere fact that there are
actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in a
bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are
automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the
suspension of the criminal case, In order that the case of
Page 31 of 42
annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial question to
the bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown that
the petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that
was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation to
show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary
and cannot be the basis Of his conviction for the crime of
bigamy.
Milagros De La Cruz v. Bienvenido Ejercito, Nov. 6, 1975
We hold that the finding in the annulment case that the
second marriage contracted by Milagros de la Cruz with
Sergeant Gaccino was a nullity is determinative of her
innocence and precludes the rendition of a verdict that she
committed bigamy. To try the criminal case in the face of such
a finding would be unwarranted.
People vs. Nepomuceno, Jr. June 27, 1975
En Banc
Appellant's contention that the crime of bigamy entails the
joint liability of two persons who marry each other, while the
previous marriage of one or the other is valid and subsisting is
completely devoid of merit. Even a cursory scrutiny of Art. 349
of the Revised Penal Code will disclose that the crime of
bigamy can be committed by one person who contracts a
subsequent marriage while the former marriage is valid and
subsisting. Bigamy is not similar to the crimes of adultery and
concubinage, wherein the law (Art. 344, first and third pars.,
Revised Penal Code, and Sec. 4, Rule 110, Rules of Court)
specifically requires that the culprits, if both are alive, should
be prosecuted or included in the information. In the crime of
bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the
offended parties depending on the circumstances, as when the
second spouse married the accused without being aware of his
previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge
of the previous undissolved marriage of the accused could she
be included in the information as a co-accused. Bigamy is a
public offense and a crime against status, while adultery and
Page 32 of 42
concubinage are private offenses and are crimes against
chastity, In adultery and concubinage, pardon by the offended
party will bar the prosecution of the case, which is not so in
bigamy. It is, therefore, clear that bigamy is not similar to
adultery or concubinage.
xxx xxx xxx
Whether or not the second spouse, Norma Jimenez,
should be included in the information is a question of fact that
was determined by the fiscal who conducted the preliminary
investigation in this case. That the fiscal did not include Norma
Jimenez in the information simply shows absence of evidence
that could make her liable for the crime. Her non-inclusion in
the information as a co-accused of appellant Nepomuceno in
the crime of bigamy is not a defect in the information filed
against Nepomuceno alone since her inclusion or not in said
information depended upon available evidence against her.
The conclusion is, therefore, irresistible that the lower court
committed no error when it refused to quash the information
against the accused, Nepomuceno, on the mere flimsy ground
that the second wife was not included therein.

People vs. Zapata and Bondoc 16 May 1951

1. ADULTERY; EACH SEXUAL INTERCOURSE A

CRIME.-Adultery is a crime of result and not of tendency, as
the Supreme Court of Spain has held (S. 10 December 1945);
it is an instantaneous crime which is consummated and
exhausted or completed at the moment of the carnal union.
Each sexual intercourse constitutes a crime of adultery (Cuello
Calon, Derecho Penal, Vol. 11, p. 569).
2. ID.; ID.; LAW DOES NOT BAR FILING OF AS MANY
COMPLAINTS AS THERE ARE ADULTEROUS ACTS.-True,
two or more adulterous acts committed by the same
defendants are against the same person-the offended
husband, the same status-the union of the husband and wife
Page 33 of 42
by their marriage, and the same conimunity represented. by
the State for its interest in maintaining and preserving such
status. But this identity of the offended party, status and
society does not argue against the commission of the crime of
adultery as many times as there were carnal acts
consummated, for as long as the status remains unchanged,
the nexus undissolved and unbroken, an encroachment or
trespass upon that status constitutes a crime. There is no
constitutional or legal provision which bars the filing of as many
complaints for adultery as there were adulterous acts
committed, each constituting one crime.
3. ID.; ID; ID.; JEOPARDY RULE, NOT VIOLATED;
REASON.-A second complaint charging the commission of
adulterous acts not included in the first complaint does not
constitute a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the
Constitution, otherwise the adultery committed by the male
defendant charged in the second complaint, should he be
absolved from, or acquitted of, the first charge upon the
evidence that he did not know that his codefendant was a
married woman, would remain or go unpunished. The defense
set up by him against the first charge upon which he was
acquitted would no longer be available, because at the time of
the commission of the crime charged in the second complaint,
he already knew that his codefendant was a married woman
and yet he continued to have carnal knowledge of her.
4. ID.; ADULTERY NOT A CONTINUING OFFENSE;
ABSENCE OF UNITY OR CRIMINAL INTENT OR
PURPOSE.-The notion or concept of a continuous crime has
its origin in the juridical fiction favorable to the law
transgressors and in many a case against the interest of
society (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p. 521). For it to
exist there should be plurality of acts performed separately
during a period of time; unity of penal provision infringed upon
or violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which
means that two or more violations of the same penal provision
Page 34 of 42
are united in one and the same intent leading to the
perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim (Ibid. p. 520).
In adultery, the last unity does not exist, because the culprits
perpetrate the crime in every sexual intercourse and they need
not do another or other adulterous acts to consummate it.
5. ID.; PARDON BY HUSBAND.-Even if the husband
should pardon his adulterous wife, such pardon would not
exempt the wife and her paramour from criminal liability for
adulterous acts committed after the pardon was granted,
because the pardon refers to previous, and not to subsequent,
adulterous acts (Viada, 5th ed., Vol. 5, p. 208; Groizard, 2nd
ed., Vol. 5, pp. 57-58).

TITLE THIRTEEN
CRIMES AGAINST HONOR
CHAPTER ONE
LIBEL

ANNOTATIONS
Borjal and Soliven v. CA Et Al., 14 Jan. 1999

In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the

victim be identifiable although it is not necessary that he be
named. It is also not sufficient, that the offended party
recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed, but it
must be shown that at least a third person could identify him as
the object of the libelous publication.
To be sure, the enumeration under Art. 354 is not an
exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications since
fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise
privileged. The rule on privileged communications had its
genesis not in the nation's penal code but in the Bill of Rights
of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the
press [Art. III, Sec. 4]. As early as 1918, in United States v.
Caete [38 Phil. 253, 265 (1918)], this Court ruled that
Page 35 of 42
publications which are privileged for reasons of public policy
are protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of
speech. This constitutional right cannot be abolished by the
mere failure of the legislature to give it express recognition in
the statute punishing libels.
In order that such discreditable imputation to a public
official may be actionable, it must, either be a false allegation
of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the
comment is an expression of opinion, based on established
facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be
mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the
facts.

Navarrete vs. CA and Leonila Generoso Feb.15, 2000

It is a settled principle in this jurisdiction that statements

made in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely
privileged. This absolute privilege remains regardless of the
defamatory tenor and the presence of malice if the same are
relevant, pertinent, or material to the cause in hand or subject
of the inquiry. Thus, the person making these statements such
as a judge, lawyer or witness does not thereby incur the risk of
being found liable thereon in a criminal prosecution or an
action for the recovery of damages.
xxx xxx xxx
The doctrine of privileged communication has a practical
purpose. As enunciated in the case of Deles vs. Aragona, Jr.
[27 SCRA 633 (1969)]:
"The privilege is not intended so much for the protection of
those engaged in the public service and in the enactment and
administration of law, as for the promotion of public welfare,
the purpose being that members of the legislature, judges of
courts, jurors, lawyers and witnesses may speak their minds
freely and exercise their respective functions without incurring
the risk of a criminal prosecution or an action for damages."
Page 36 of 42
 In determining the issue of relevancy of statements made
in judicial proceedings, courts have adopted a liberal attitude
by resolving all doubts in favor of relevancy. In People vs.
Aquino [18 SCRA 555 (1966).], we emphasized that "it is the
rule that what is relevant or pertinent should be liberally
considered to favor the writer, and the words are not to be
scrutinized with microscopic intensity".

Jimenez vs. Reyes. March 9, 1914.

1. LIBEL AND SLANDER; CONSTRUCTION OF
LIBELOUS PUBLICATION.-When neither party endeavors to
show a hidden meaning or latent ambiguities in the publication
complained of, it is for the court to determine whether its
contents are libelous, after giving to the article as a whole such
a meaning as is natural and obvious in the plain and ordinary
sense in which the publication would naturally be understood.
Opinions of witnesses upon this point are immaterial.
2. ID.; INTENTION OF AUTHOR NOT MATERIAL.-What
the author intended to convey by such a publication is not
material. The court will therefore disregard any ingenious or
subtle explanation offered by the publisher on being called to
account, as such an explanation comes too late to counteract
the libelous effect, if such there be, of the publication on the
minds of the readers.
3. xxx.
4. ID.; ATTORNEYS AS COUNSEL IN MALICIOUS
PROSECUTION.-A publication which states that a named
attorney represented the prosecution in a case described in
such language as to give the impression that the charges were
willfully fabricated for the purpose of harassing the defendant is
libelous.
5. ID.; REPUBLICATION WITH PRETENDED
EXPLANATION CONTAINING PSEUDO PRAISE [Note:
Praise undeserved].-Upon the institution of suit on the first
publication the defendant published another article in which the
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first was reproduced, with a pretended disavowal of any
intention to cast aspersion on the plaintiff. In this article a
resume of the various activities of the plaintiff was given, in
which his qualifications were hyperbolized, followed by
comment on the perverted tendencies of discredited members
of the professions in which plaintiff was engaged: Held,
Libelous.

Oliver and Chamblise Oliver vs. "La Vanguardia, Inc."

September 10, 1925

ID.; ID.; ID.-The distinction between criticism and

defamation is that criticism deals only with such things as invite
public attention or call for public comment, and does not follow
a public man into his private life or pry into his domestic
concerns. It never attacks the individual, but only his work. A
true critic never indulges in personalities, but confines himself
to the merits of the subject-matter, and never takes advantage
of the occasion to attain any other object beyond the fair
discussion of matters of public interest and the judicious
guidance of the public taste. (Triggs vs. Sun Printing and
Publishing Association [1904], 179 N. Y., 144.)
ID.; ID.; ID.; MITIGATION OF DAMAGES.-A previous
publication by another newspaper, common rumor and belief,
and retraction are in the nature of mitigating circumstances
which, while not proving the truth of the publication, permit of
an inference that the tort was not aggravated, and that the
defendant was not actuated by malice except as the statute
makes it presumptively so.

Art. 356. Threatening to publish and offer to present such

publication for a compensation. The penalty of arresto
mayor or a fine from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, shall be
imposed upon any person who threatens another to publish a
libel concerning him or the parents, spouse, child, or other
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members of the family of the latter or upon anyone who shall
offer to prevent the publication of such libel for a compensation
or money consideration.
NOTE: (a) This is blackmail. See Art. 283, light threats.

NOTE: Reyes vs. People March 28, 1969

The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the
utterance of the words, "Agustin, putang ina mo." This is a
common enough expression in the dialect that is often
employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or
displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the
hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother. In the
instant case, it should be viewed as part of the threats voiced
by appellant against Agustin Hallare, evidently to make the
same more emphatic. In the case of People vs. Yebra, G.R.
No. L-14348, Sept. 30, 1960, this Court said:
"The letter containing the allegedly libelous remarks is
more threatening than libelous and the intent to threaten is the
principal aim and object to the letter. The libelous remarks
contained in the letter, if so they be considered, are merely
preparatory remarks culminating in the final threat. In other
words, the libelous remarks express the heat of passion which
engulfs the writer of the letter, which heat of passion in the
latter part of the letter culminates into a threat. This is more
important and serious offense committed by the accused.
Under the circumstances the Court believes, after the study of
the whole letter, that the offense committed therein is clearly
and principally that of threats and that the statements therein
derogatory to the person named do not constitute an
independent crime of libel, for which the writer maybe
prosecuted separately from the threats and which should be
considered as part of the more important offense of threats."
The foregoing ruling applies with equal force to the facts of
the present case..
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 CHAPTER TWO
INCRIMINATORY MACHINATIONS

Sometimes referred to as PLANTING OF EVIDENCE.

TITLE FOURTEEN
QUASI-OFFENSES
SOLE CHAPTER
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE

ANNOTATIONS

People v. De los Santos, March 27, 2001

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when

the single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime
shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period. Since Article 48 speaks of felonies, it is applicable to
crimes through negligence in view of the definition of felonies
in Article 3 as acts or omissions punishable by law committed
either by means of deceit (dolo) or fault (culpa).
In Reodica v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that if a reckless,
imprudent, or negligent act results in two or more grave or less
grave felonies, a complex crime is committed. Thus, in Lapuz
v. Court of Appeals, the accused was convicted, in conformity
with Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, of the complex
crime of homicide with serious physical injuries and damage
to property through reckless imprudence, and was sentenced
to a single penalty of imprisonment, instead of the two
penalties imposed by the trial court.
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 Also, in Soriao v. Court of Appeals, the accused was
convicted of the complex crime of multiple homicide with
damage to property through reckless imprudence for causing
a motor boat to capsize, thereby drowning to death its twenty-
eight passengers.
The slight physical injuries caused by GLENN to the ten
other victims through reckless imprudence, would, had they
been intentional, have constituted light felonies. Being light
felonies, which are not covered by Article 48, they should be
treated and punished as separate offenses. Separate
informations should have, therefore, been filed.

LBC Air Cargo, Inc. vs. CA February 23, 1995.

Petitioners poorly invoke the doctrine of
"Last Clear Chance" (also referred to, at times,
as "Supervening Negligence" or as
"discovered peril"). The doctrine, in essence, is
to the effect that where both parties are
negligent, but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later in time than that of the other, or
when it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence should be attributed to the incident,
the one who had the last clear opportunity to
avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is
chargeable with the consequences thereof (see
Picart vs. Smith, 37 Phil. 809). Stated differently,
the rule would also mean that an antecedent
negligence of a person does not preclude the
recovery of damages for the supervening
negligence of, or bar a defense against liability
sought by, another if the latter, who had the last
fair chance, could have avoided the impending
harm by the exercise of due diligence
(Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Baesa, 179
SCRA 384; Glan People's Lumber and
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Hardware vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 173
SCRA 464).

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