Land Law Case Study
Land Law Case Study
Land Law Case Study
THE FACTS:
The plaintiff and the defendant had entered into a sale and purchase agreement (‘the 2013
SPA’) of a land located in Bukit Nanas, Kuala Lumpur. A dispute arose between the
parties in relation of the 2013 SPA and consequently, the defendant entered caveat on the
land. The defendant then commenced an action against the plaintiff (‘the suit’) and
subsequently they entered into consent order in relation to the said action. On 20
December 2016, the plaintiff entered into a sale and purchase agreement (‘the SPA’) with
a third-party whereby the plaintiff agreed to sell and the buyer agreed to buy the land for
a purchase price of RM29m. The plaintiff’s solicitors had notified the defendant of the
SPA (‘the notice’) and requested that the defendant withdraw the caveat in accordance
with cl 2(g) of the consent order but the defendant refused to withdraw the caveat. The
plaintiff then filed the present application (‘encl 1’) under s 327 of the National Land
Code for the removal of the caveat entered by the defendant on the land. The plaintiff
submitted that the caveat ought to be removed because the defendant did not have any
registrable interest and/or caveatable interest in the land; and there was no serious
question meriting trial. As opposed to the plaintiff’s submission, the defendant contended
that the SPA did not conform to the terms of the consent order and that the consent order
accorded him the right to maintain the caveat on the land. The defendant further
submitted that he had a caveatable interest on the land, which interest originated from the
2013 SPA.
THE ISSUES:
1) Whether the plaintiff has right to seek for the removal of the caveat?
2) Whether the defendant disclosed a caveatable interest pursuant to consent order?
3) Whether the defendant has right to the title of the land under National Land Code?
1. The law on removal of private caveat is well established. The plaintiff as the
registered owner of the land could rely on its registered title as prima facie
evidence of his interest in the land. The plaintiff did not have to prove that it was
an aggrieved person in seeking the removal of the caveat. The onus of proof was
on the defendant to persuade the court as to why the caveat should remain on the
land.
2. It is settled law that a consent order is like a contract and should be interpreted in
accordance with the rules of contractual construction. Like a binding contract, the
terms and conditions of the consent order were binding on the plaintiff and the
defendant.
3. There was nothing in the consent order that expressly stated that the ‘offer to
purchase’ must be an unconditional agreement. Moreover, it was usual
conveyancing practice that sales and purchase agreements for land and
immovable property were subjected to conditions precedent, which both the seller
and buyer must fulfill before the agreement could be completed. It would not be
possible to imply into the consent order, by custom or practice, the interpretation
that the phrase ‘offer to purchase’ meant an unconditional agreement.
4. Having found that the defendant has no caveatable interest in the Land, it is not
necessary for the court to consider the other two stages of the enquiry set out in
Luggage Distributors which the questions on whether there is a serious issue to be
tried and whether on a balance of convenience the Caveat should remain.
5. Based on the terms of the consent order, the defendant did not have any residual
rights and/or interests on the land under the 2013 SPA and the suit. The
defendant’s right under the consent order was to a refund of the sum of
RM2,050,000. Any right granted under the consent order for the defendant to
maintain caveat on the land was for a definite period, which ended 14 days after
the defendant’s receipt of the notice from the plaintiff. The right neither was a
right to the title of the land nor was it a right capable of registration on the land.
The right was of a pure monetary claims which it is a right in personam against
the plaintiff and it did not create any interest in the land. The defendant therefore,
did not have any caveatable interest in the land.