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 Introduction to the Theory
of Sphota
GOURINATH BHATTACHARYYA, M.A.—ReSearch Scholar.

T HE theory of Sphota is one of the most magnificent contributions

of Sanskrit grammarians to the school of Indian thought. The
problem—What is it that expresses import?—has been variously solved
by the different schools of Indian Philosophy. But the theory of
Sphota which the grammarians have propounded with a view to solving
the aforesaid problem unmistakably proves their keen metaphysical
insight. At the outset, they maintain that it is Sphota which is expres-
sive of sense ; but, on a more intensive study of the problem, they
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discover that Sphota can be identified with Brahman. Thus from

the empirical point of view they show that a sentence which is in-
divisible into parts (we mean words and letters) is endowed with the
power of denotation (Cf. Vakyasphota). But they do not stop here.
They have studied the problem in its metaphysical aspect and they
affirm that the whole truth remains unrevealed if we concentrate
solely on the empirical point of view. From the metaphysical stand-
point, there is only one indivisible sentence which, by means of formal
transformations, assumes diversity of forms (we mean, so many sen-
tences) and expresses the so-called world of thoughts and this one
indivisible sentence is Sphota (Cf. Akhandavakyasphota). In his
monumental treatise on the philosophy of Sanskrit grammar—the
Vakyapadiya, Bhartrihari points out that there is in reality one in-
divisible sentence and the so-called sentences which, from the empirical
standpoint, appear to be different from one another and are expressive
of different senses are absolutely fictitious from the metaphysical point
of view.' An earthen jar and an earthen plate, for instance, are
different from each other in respect of their forms only ; but, there is
no material difference between the two—it is the same clay out of
which either of them is made. Similarly, the one sentence undergoes
formal transformations and we have so many sentences. Thus we
observe that Sanskrit grammarians go so far as to prove that there
is perfect identity between Sphota and Brahman. As Brahman mani-
fests itself in and through the numberless objects of the universe, so

i. Vak. I. I.
 THEORY OF SPHOTA 115

there is one Sphota which reveals itself through diverse forms of

language and consequently through different senses too (Cf. Sabdar-
thayos tadatmyam—identity of word with sense). It has been main-
tained that there are two kinds of transformation—in the one, we have
material change whereas in the other, there is only formal change.
When milk changes into curd we have a case of material change ; but
when a man mistakes a rope for a snake or a mother-o'-pearl for a
piece of silver, we say that the rope or the mother-o'-pearl has under-
gone a formal change only ; for, no sooner the man discovers his
mistake than he ceases to take the rope for a snake or the mother-
o'-pearl for a piece of silver. Now when Brahman, it is said, under-
goes a formal transformation, we have this world of ours. The exist-
ence of this world is not real—it is a dream which sinks into nothing-
ness with the dawn of spiritual consciousness. The grammarians
maintain that Sphota, which is otherwise called Sabdatattva, is in its
nature identical with Brahman. Sphota undergoes a formal change
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and we have so many sentences and senses which should, after all, be
looked upon as being different manifestations of that ' one indivisible
Sphota.' It is certainly a positive mistake to think that there are in
reality so many sentences and with them so many senses too. In
more instances than one, the Vedas say that Sabda is one and that it
assumes diverse forms.' Hence it is why Bhattojidiksita in his
Sabdakaustubha observes that by drawing a comparison between
Sabda and Brahman, the grammarians have found out a priceless gem
in their quest of an insignificant cowrie.'
We do not know when and by whom the doctrine of Sphota was
first promulgated. There is no reference to it in the sutras of Panini
nor in the varttikas (supplementary rules) of Katyayana. But we
may observe that Panini, in one of his sutras on assimilation of letters
(Sandhi,)' quotes the opinion of a grammarian, a predecessor of his,
named Sphotayana. Haradatta, in his well-known commentary on
Kasika, has, however, commented on the name and he suggests that
this learned scholar might have been, in all probability, an exponent
of the doctrine of Sphota. 4 This enables us to surmise that though

i. Suksmaryenapravibhaktatattvamekavamekavacamabhispandamanam
Utanye viduranyainiva ca putam nana rupatmani sannivistam.
2. Tadevam varatikanvesanaya pravrttas cintamanim labdhavaniti-
sabdavicaraya pravrttah prasangad advaite aupanisadi brahmanyapi vyut-
padyatam—.—Sabdakaustubha, p. 12.
3. Pan. VI. i. 123.
4. Sphotah ayanam parayanam yasya sah sphotayanah sphotaprati-
padanaparah vaiya.karanacaryah—Kasikavrtti, p.
 n6 PRESIDENCY COLLEGE MAGAZINE

the theory appears to have been propounded long before Panini, its
claims were not consistently pressed by its exponents ; and, as such,
it did not find due recognition at the hands of Panini and Katyayana.
It is Patanjali who, for the first time, appears to make a reference to
the theory in his epoch-making work on Sanskrit grammar, the Maha-
bhasya. For therein Patanjali acknowledges in clear terms the dis-
tinction between the two kinds of Sabda—permanent (Nitya) and
created (Karya)'; and it is with reference to the former that he uses
such epithets as " Dhruva " (fixed), " Kutastha " (unchangeable),
etc.—epithets that are ascribed to Brahman with which Sphota has
been identified. But Patanjali has not only hinted at Sphota by
noticing the distinction referred to above, but he has actually used
the term in his work and has also given us a definition of the same
Thus, Patanjali observes a distinction between Sphota and Sound by
asserting that Sound is only a quality of Sphota and that it serves
to manifest the latter. 2 And he defines Sphota as what is perceived
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by auditory organs, apprehended by intellect, manifested by sound

and pertaining to ether.'
Patanjali opens his work by starting an enquiry into the nature
of Sabda and he defines " Sabda " as one which is endowed with
the power of expressing import. 4 Suffice it to say for the present
that, according to this definition, sentence or word is ordinarily sup-
posed to be expressive of sense. But the question that arises in this
connexion is, whether sentence or word taken as an indivisible unit
is endowed with the power of expressing its import or whether the
constituent members (i.e., the letters) severally or conjointly express
the same. Kaiyata, the well-known author of the Pradipa—an ex-
plantory treatise on the Mahabhasya,—points out that letters are tran-
sient in character ; they die out as soon as they are uttered. And
when a number of letters, said to constitute a word or a sentence,
cannot be simultaneously pronounced by one individual, an aggregate
of letters is a logical absurdity. He further avers that letters cannot
severally express the sense for the obvious reason that when any one
letter in a word is competent to express the import, there is hardly
any justification for the use of the rest. He, therefore, opines that,
according to grammarians, a word as an indivisible unit is expressive

r. Kini punar nityas sabda ahosvit karyah—Mahabhasya, Ip. 54.

2. Evain tarhi sphotas sabdo dhvanis sabdagunah. Katham?
Bheryaghatavat—Sphotas tavaneva dhvanikrta vrddhih—Ibid.
3. Srotropalabdhir buddhinirgrahyah prayogenabhijvalita akasadesas
sabdah—Ibid., p. 87.
4. Arthavasayaprasavanimittam sabda isyate—Sphotasiddhi, sl. i.
 THEORY OF SPHOTA 117

of import.' And a word which cannot be viewed as an aggregate of

letters but possesses an indivisible character is regarded as Padasphota
in treatises on grammar. 2 Kaiyata also speaks of Vakyasphota accord-
ing to which a. sentence indivisible into parts expresses the required
sense. It is a matter of common knowledge that sentence is the
unit of thought and expression. Language is the articulated expres-
sion of human thought. All thought is essentially a judgment. A
judgment is concerned with two concepts which are grammatically
known as subject and predicate. Now a sentence contains a subject
and a predicate. So sentence is the fundamental form or unit of
language. But it should not be concluded that a single or two words
cannot express an idea. They do, e.g., Fire, Ink, Go, I say, etc. But
these are really sentences in which either the subject or the predicate
is understood and it is to be supplied from the circumstance. Thus
"Fire" means "a fire has broken out"—here the predicate "has broken
out " is understood. " Ink " means " You bring ink "—here the
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subject " You " and part of the predicate "bring " is understood.
" I say" means " I am astonished." Thus we see that even a word
may be a potential sentence. It may generally appear that a word is
properly the unit of language. But a. word is but a single concept.
And a single concept cannot form a judgment, and as such it cannot
carry a complete idea, unless the circumstance forms the other concept
as we have shown above. 3 So we see that sentence is really the unit
of language. It is natural, therefore, that it should be endowed with
the power of denotation. We propose to enter into a detailed study
of Vakyasphota and Padasphota at a subsequent occasion. But we
should do well to state in unambiguous terms from the very beginning
that from the empirical standpoint, it is Vakyasphota which represents
the conception of Sphota. 4 It has been definitely said that Padasphota
is explained and illustrated in treatises on grammar for the exclusive
purpose of enabling the beginner to get at the conception of Vakya-
sphota 3 and we should state here that it is therefore that in our
;

subsequent disquisitions, we shall often seek to explain our point by

means of Padasphota.
i. Vaiyakarana varnavyatirilaasya padasya vakyasya va vacakatv-
micchanti—Pradipa, p. 16.
2. Nirastabhedam padatattvameka .rn— Sphotasidclhi, A. 36.
3. Vatrapi kevalam padam prayuyuksitam, tatrapyavasyamastitistati-
devadattadipadam buddhau viparivartate=Tatha na hyasadhana kriyasti,
kevalakarmaprayoge kimapi sadhanani dravyam guno vavagarnyate-
Sankara on Yogasutrabhasya.
4. Vakyasphoto'tiniskarse tisthatiti matasthitih—Vaiyakaranabhu-
sana, sl. 61.