Language and Reality:

The World-View of the Nyaya-Vaisesika System

of Indian Philosophy

V.N. Jha, Pune

No system of philosophy can be developed without the world-view of the

philosopher.1 One can examine the truthfulness of this statement even in the
context of Indian philosophical systems. There are six astika darshanas and three
nastika darshanas. Samkhya, Yoga, Nyaya, Vaisesika, Purvamimamsa and
Uttaramimamsa are the astika-darsanas and Buddhism, Jainism, and the Carvaka-
darshana are the nastika-darsanas. The first six are called astika because they
believe in the authoritativeness of the Vedas and the later three are called nastika
because they do not accept the authority of the Vedas. The classification of astika
and nastika has nothing to do with the believing and non-believing in God. There
is nirisvara-samkhya and Purvamimamsa which did not accept God and Vaisesika
too did not believe in God during its early development and still they are called
astika-darsanas.2
Although Nyaya and Vaisesika were distinct systems of thought in their
initial period of development, they started merging gradually because of coming
closer and closer in their world-views and by the nineth century AD the merger
seems to be very close. This can be drawn from the following statement of
Jayantabhatta, the celebrated Kashmiri logician of the 9th century AD:
Vaisesikah asmad-anuyayina eva (Nyayamanjari, Ahnika I)3
Purvamimamsa develped into three schools: Bhatta, Prabhakara and
Murari.
Uttaramimamsa or Vedanta manifested in various forms: Advaita, Dvaita,
Visistadvaita, Bhedabheda, Acintyabhedabheda and so on.
Even Advaita did not remain one. There is Advaita of Sankaracarya,
Advaita of Bhartrhari, Advaita of Kashmir Saivism and Suddhadvaita of Vallabha.
Notable fact is this that all Vedantins, whether a Dvaitin or an Advaitin or a
Visistadvaitin or a Suddhadvaitin, claim distinctness of their respective system of
 Language and Reality / 2

philosophy on the evidence of the same Upanisads. Sometimes, the same

Upanisadic sentence is quoted in favour of Advaita and also for Dvaita4.
How could all this happen? Obviously, the philosophers enjoyed complete
freedom of interpretation. The same sentence is interpreted in one way by the
Advaitins and in another way by the Dvaitins. This difference in interpretatiion is
based upon diferent sets of presuppositions or world-views held by diferent
philosophical systems. The Purvamimamsa provided a powerful tool of treating
some statement as metaphorical or Arthavada.5 This has been freely used by
philosophers of different schools as per their convenience. Thus, while the identity
statements of the Upanisads are cited by the Advaitins to support Monism, the
same sentences are treated as metaphorical by the Dvaitins.
These presuppositions of a particular philosophical system are the world-
views of that system. A world-view is constructed by a philosopher over a period
of time, out of direct experiences and reflections on the heritage inherited.
The Vedanta systems adopted a top-down model. It starts from the
Upanisadic sentences and prepares the set of presuppsitions and wants to offer a
logical basis to our experiences of plurality. If, for instnce, one brings the following
Vedic statements together, they can very well help develop a world-view of
Monism:
1. ekam sat, viprah vahudha vadanti (The Truth is One, wise men call it by
various names).6
2. Tat tvam asi (You are the same Truth).7
3. Aham brahma asmi (I am the same Truth called Brahman).8
4. Sarvam khalu idam brahma (All this world of plurality is nothing but the same
Brahman).9
5. Prusha eva idam sarvam, yad bhutam yat ca bhavyam (All that is present today,
was present yesterday and will be present tomorrow, is nothing but the
same Truth called Purusa or the Brahman).10
Obviously, these statements helped the philosophers, who tried to agrue in
favour of Advaita, develop a set of philosophical world-views or presuppositions.
This is what I call a top-down moldel of philosophical enquiry. Here, the Truth is
presupposed to be One and in support of this presumption the Vedic statements
are quoted. In other words, in this model the enquiry begins by accepting the
validity of the Vedic statements.
 Language and Reality / 3

Nyayasastra, on the other hand, offers a ‘down-to-top’ model of enquiry

and anlysis. The Naiyayikas start with analysing human experiences and
ultimately demonstrate, how the Vedic sentences too say the same thing. In other
words, the Vedic sentences are brought at the end to corroborate what has been
arrived at by the application of logic.11 Truth is not assumed first, rather Truth is
arrived at by logical analysis.
The system of Nyaya-Vaisesika, therefore, believes that the world of our
experience is plural, not only at the level of experience but also at the Source-
level.12 The ‘Many’ of our experience have emerged from the ‘Many’ of the Source.
The plurality of the experience is as much true as their source. Hence, the entire
world is Real and ultimately Real. There is no degree in Reality like transactional
reality (vyavharika satta) or constructed reality (pratibhasika-satta). Reality can be
of only one variety ie. Parmarthika or ultimate Reality.
As God is ultimately Real so also an atom (paramanu). This system of
Nyaya-Vaisesika understands only dichotomy. If x exists in this world, it has to be
real and if it does not exist and astill if we talk about it, it has to be taken as
constructed or unreal and hence fictcious (alika or asat).
Such a world of plurality is accessible to us because we behave with this
world all our life. We know seuch a world exists because it becomes object (visaya)
of our knowledge and the knowledge reveals it with a Name (naman) and a Form
(rupa) and also because our behviour is not frustrated (saphalapravrtti)13. Had
there not been this world we could not have behaved with it consistently. When
we are hungry we take food and hunger is satisfied; when we are thirsty we take
water and our thirst gets satisfied. Thus, plurality is the Reality.
When the knowledge of the world emerges the world too plyas the role of a
cause (karana) and so unless it existed, independent of my knowledge, it could not
cause its own knowledge. The world, therefore, is knowable (jneya) and nameable
(abhidheya)14.
Since it is abhideya (nameable), one can communicate its knowledge to
others and can undertand what was going on in others’ mind15.
One position in our intellectual and philosophical history was this that the
idealist philosophers like Sankaracarya and the Buddhists had held the view that
language cannot caputre Rality. Language is a liar. The Truth, as it were, is beyond
the scope of language (a-van-manasoh gocarah)16. The idealist concept of Reality is
this that Reality is without any attribute and hence without a structure. All
 Language and Reality / 4

structures are mental constructions and since language presents only structured
Reality, language is a liar.
The Buddhist idealists too held that the universe consists of only two types
of entities: (a) svalaksanas (attributeless particulars) and (b) samanyalaksana or a
series or a chain constructed out svalaksana. Svalaksana alone is a Fact or Reality
and the samanya-laksana is a mental construction. Only samayalaksanana can be
expressed by language, whereas svalaksana is beyond language17.
Thus, in the idealists’ philosophy, Reality cannot be captured by language.
As against this position of the idealists, the Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers
took a stand that the entire world consists of structured entities (dharma-dharmi-
bhavapanna-padartha) and the elements and relations which form the structures
also belong to the Reality and nothing of it is constructed by mind and hence
language alone can capture Reality. If it is held that language cannot capture
Reality then we cannot establish Reality through language. We cannot even talk
about Reality. All our wordly transaction (lokayatra) will remain unexplained.
The world appears before us with a Name and a Form and only after that
worldly transactions take place. Only because the world is nameable we can share
our experience with others. There can be rapport (samvada) in our behaviour only
becaue language referes to the world. There is a private world and a public world.
Language presents both with a Name and a Form. Both are very much real. This is
why, the Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers are called utter Realists.
For samvada (rapport), the world has to be a common and sharable world.
If there were no samvada, life would have been entirely miserable. It is not the case
that there is no visamvada (lac of rapport) in life, but there is visamvada because of
some other factors and not because language does not refer to Reality18.
With this analysis in the back-drop, the Nyaya-Vaisesika philosphers
modelled the entire universe in terms of language. For them the universe is a
grand total of Referents of language (padartha i.e. padasya arthah)19.
This universal Set of referents called the world of our experience consists of
two sub-sets: (i) a set of positive entities (bhava-padartha) and (ii) a set of negative
entities (abhavapadartha). Reality is nothing more than these positive entities and
negative entities.
Vatsyayana, the Nyayabhasyakara, beautifully put this fact as follows:
Kim punah tattvam? satas ca sad-bhavah, astas ca asad-bhavah/
 Language and Reality / 5

Sat sad iti grhyamanam yathabhutam aviparitam tattvam bhavati/ ast ca asad iti
grhyamanam yathabhutam aviparitam tattvam bhavati/20
In other words, knowing x as x and y as y is the knowledge of Truth. Knowing
bhava-padartha as bhava-padartha and abhava-padartha as abhava-padartha is
the knowledge of Truth or Reality.
It may be noted here that as bhava is a padartha i.e. Referent of language so
also abhava is a padartha or Referent of language or an entity21.
Bhava-padartha, then, is divided into six sub-sets namely, dravya
(substance), guna (quality), karman (action), samanya (universal), visesa
(particular) and samavaya (permanent relationship) and the abhava-padartha is
divided into two sub-sets such samsargabhava (relational absence) and
anyonyabhava (mutual absence). Samsargabhava is further divided into three
types namely, pragabhava (pre-absence), dhvamsa (destruction) and atyantabhava
(absolute absence).
Then each of the bhava-padartha-subset has been further divided into its
further sub-sub-sets till we are brought to the actual world around us.
Thus, substance is classified into nine namely,
Prthivi (earth), ap (water), tejas (fire), marut (air), vyoman (sky), kala (time),
dis (space), atman (soul) and manas (mind).
Qualities are classified into 24 types such as
Rupa (colour), rasa (taste), gandha (smell), sparsa (touch), samkhya
(number), parimana (size), prthaktva (discreteness), samyoga (contact),
vibhaga (disjunction), gurutva (weight), dravatva (fluidity), sneha
(moisture), paratva (remoteness), apratva (nearness), sabda (soud), buddhi
(cognition), sukha (happiness), duhkha (unhappiness), iccha (desire), dvesa
(aversion), prayatna (volition), dharma (merit), adharma (demerit) and
samskara (impression).
Karman (action) can be seen in utksepana (upward movement), apaksepana
(downward movement), akuncana (shrinking), prasarana (expanding) and in
gamana (any other movement like rotating etc.).
Samanya is classified in two types namely, para (wider or pervader) and
apara (narrower or pervaded).
There are as many permanent substances so many visesa-s (particulars or
distinguishing features).
 Language and Reality / 6

Samavaya (permanent relationship) is said to be only one22.

This is the plural world of our experience, inner (antara)23 and outer
(bahya), minute (suksma)24 and gross (sthula), abstract and concrete25, spiritual
and mudane: right from an atom (paramanu) upto God, the creator26 of this
universe. Entire universe is knowable and neameable i.e. an entity or padartha. It
can be captured by language and it can also be communcated through language.
This linguistic modelling of the universe by the Nyaya-Vaisesika system
establishes direct correspondance between language and Reality27. This also shows
that universe can be known by more than one way. As it can be known by the
physicists’ model or by the model of the mathematician or by the model of the
cognitive science or by any other model of physical science, it can also be known
by a linguistic model as demonstrated by the Nyaya-Vaisesika system of Indian
philosophy28. This is simply amazing.
The linguistic model is more comprehensive because human beings
understand only through language. No human understanding is possible without
language. Language, on one hand, helps acquisition of knowledge of the universe
with clarity, and on the other hand, facilitates verbalisation of human thought for
sharing.
The Nyaya-Vaisesika modelling of the universe is a distinct contribution of
India to human knowledge. It is profound and at the same time it has universal
applicability. As long as human beings feel the necessity of communication and
sharing, this system of knowledge is not going to be irrelevant.
It can offer insights to even computer scientists, cognitive scientists and any
other system designer to make use of this knowledge in their domain of
knowledge-systems. Computer- scientists, particularly those who are working in
the area of Artificial Intelligence, machine translation and the like can profitably
derive insights from this long tradition of Nyaya-Vaisesika system of cognitive
analysis29.
In fact, the linguistic modelling of the universe of the Nyaya Vaisesika
system should be incorporated into the main stream of education so that the next
generation of learners can develop innovative tools for enriching human
knowledge in various fields of knowledge.30

* * *
 Language and Reality / 7

Endnotes

1See “The Plural World of Our Experience” by V N Jha in the Journal of Indian Intellectual
Traditions, Vol. II no. 2, pp.147-152.
2 See Introduction of Tarkasangraha of Annambhatta Eng. Tr. By V N Jha, Chinmaya
International Foundation, Veliyanad, Kerala, 2010, p. xiii.
3 Mysore Edition, Vol. 1, 1970, p. 9.
4 If it is quoted by an Advaitin he will argue that it is an identity statement and hence it
supports Monism and if the same is quoted by a Dvaitin he will take it as a metaphorical
statement (arthavada) and hence it does not prove Monism, they will opine.
5 Arthavada is a narrative sentence which does not convey any injunction. But it becomes
meaningful only when it is contrued with an injunction. It either praises the act enjoined
by the injunction or decries a prohibited act. The sentences are not intended to convey
their literal meaning. This was used by the philosophers as an effective tool to treat some
expression as a metaphorical expression as per their need in tune with the accepted set of
presuppositions.
6 Rgveda 1.164.46.
7 Chandogya 6.8.7.
8 Brhadaranyaka 1.4.10.
9 Brhadaranyaka.
10 Rgveda 10.90.2.
11For instance, God is established first on the basis of pararthanumana (deductive logic)
and at the end the relevant Vedic statement is quoted in order to corroborate the
conclusion of the Inference. In this way the validity of the process of Inference is proved
and that of the Vedic statement is also established.
12Some philosophers held that the Source is ‘One’ and others held that the Source should
be ‘Many’. Out of these two variables Four possibilities will emerge: (a) +One +Many; (b)
+One -Many; (c) –One +Many and (d) -One -Many. Here (c) is the position of Realism
(Nyaya-Vaisesika) and (b) and (d) are the stand of Sankaracarya and Dinnaga respectively.
(a) represents Vallabhacarya.
13Human behaviours are of three kinds: (i) pravrtti (going forward to get something), (ii)
nivrtti (withdrawal); and (iii) audasinya (indifference). All the three types of behaviour are
prompted by knowledge. If one gets what was shown by the knowledge it is a case of
successful behaviour (saphala-pravritti) and it is concluded that the prompting knowledge
 Language and Reality / 8

is saphalapravrtii-janaka and when the behaviour is frustrated, the knowledge is called

viphala-pravrtti-janaka.
14For knowledge to emerge as the knower, his or her instruments are the cause, so also the
object (visaya) of knowledge is considered to be the cause of knowledge because as
without the knower or his or her instruments the knowledge cannot arise, in the same
way, without the object, the knowledge of the object cannot arise. Hence, object must be
treated as the cause of its knowledge. This also proves that the world is independent of
mind and it is not mind-dependent as the idealists hold.
15 The solves ‘the problem of other mind’ as discussed in the Western philosophical
tradition. When one speaks, the hearer can know the mind of the speaker.
16 For the Idealists the Truth is atributeless and language can work only if there is some
property in the thing which is going to be named. That is why for the Idealists the Reality
is beyond language. If it is beyond language it has to be beyond mind. Only that can be
expressed which can be known.
17 The Buddhist Idealists’s world consists of svalaksana and samanyalaksana. Svalaksana
is without any attribute and hence Real. Samanyalaksana is made of svalaksana. It is a
construction and hence false.
18The cause of visamvada is multiple. The process of knowing may be faulty; the object
may not be fit for ordinary perception. The object may be at a far distance or may be so
subtle that it cannot be the object of perception. Mind may be unsteady. There is a number
of reasons for erroneous knowledge to arise.
19There are as many things so many names (yavadartham vai namadheyasabdah). So what
language refers to is real. If one prepares the grand total of the Referents of language he
will arrive at the notion of the universe.
20 See the Nyayabhasya on Nyayasutra 1.1.1.
21Whatever is existent is an entity. There are positive entities and also negative entity.
Both a pot and its absence are entities. Language refers to both. The referent of the
negative particle in a language is ‘absence’. See, The Doctrine of Negation by Bimal Krishna
Matilal, Harvard Oriental Series, Volume 46, 1968.
22The Tarkasangraha is one of the best texts which present the linguistic modelling of the
universe so clearly. See English Translation of Annabhatta by V.N. Jha, Chinmaya
International Foundation Shodha Sansthan, Veliyanad, Kerala, 2010.
23The entities like buddhi (cognition), sukha (happiness), duhkha (unhappiness), iccha
(desire), dvesa (aversion), prayatna (volition), dharma (merit), adharma (demerit) and
 Language and Reality / 9

samskara (impression) constitute our inner world and the rest constitute the outer or
public world.
24 Like paramanu (atom), dvyanuka (diad). See Tarkasamgraha of Annambhatta.
25 Like manifest entities which are observable.
26The Nyaya-Vaisesika system believes in pralaya (delusion) of the creation. At that time
there remain God, all permanent substances like atoms, sky, time, space, souls, and minds
and the properties in those permanent substances, universals, particulars and the
permanent relation called inherence. God’s knowledge and desire are permanent. When
He wishes to destroy, the destruction of the universe occurs and all the effects go back to
their initial states. When again God will have desire to create He offers forms to the effects
step-by-step. See Prasastapadabhasya (GOS No.164 edition pp.60-64) and Kiranavali of
Udayanacarya thereon.
27 Reality becomes object of thought (jnana) first and then thought is expressed by
language. Hence, Reality is related to language directly by thought. The Nyaya-Vaisesika
system does not believe in bauddha-padartha (conceptual referent). The universe consists
of Referents.
28 Physicists’ method is observation in phisical laboratory and analysis of the observed
data. Hence their statements are Physical Laboratory Report. Nyaya-Vaisesika system’s
statements, on the other hand, are the results of language analysis since language is
treated as encoded thought. This analysis is, therefore, a cognitive analysis. See Nyaya-
Vaisesika Metaphysics by Sadananda Bhaduri published from Bhandarkar Oriental Research
Institute, Pune.
29The system of Nyaya-Vaisesika will provide deeper insights for preparing Wordnets of
various languages, for improving the process of inferencing, for preparing software for
machine translation and for many other areas of application. Many computer scientists are
already engaged in these jobs.
30This system will generate competence in the students to analyse human thoughts which
is the minimum requirement for engaging oneself in any intellectual activity. This
knowledge-treasure created and developed by our forefathers must be made available to
one and all by incorporating it in the main stream of education.