G.R. No.

190817

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner

vs.
ROVENCY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the 10 March 2009
Decision1 and the 3 December 2009 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 00651, which affirmed the 7 November 2003 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 41, Cagayan de Oro City, in LRA Case No. N-2000-084, which granted the application
for original registration of title to land by respondent Rovency Realty and Development
Corporation (RRDC).

THE FACTS

On 22 March 2001, RRDC filed before the RTC an Amended Application for Registration4
covering a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 3009 (subject land) situated in Barangay
Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City, described as follows:

A parcel of land (Lot No. 3009, Cad-237, Cagayan Cadastre) situated in the Barrio of Carmen,
City of Cagayan de Oro, Island of Mindanao. Bounded on the S., along line 1-2 by Lot 6648; on
the NW., along line 2-3 by Lot 30011; along line 3-4 by Lot 301 O; along line 4-5 by Lot 3047;
along line 5-6 by Lot 3020; on the N., along line 6-7 by Lot 3007; on the SE., along line 8-9 by
Lot 6645; along line 9-1 by Lot 3008; all of Cad-237, Cagayan Cadastre.

Beginning at the point marked "1" on the plan being N. 51 deg. 24'W., 1091.05 m. from PBM
No. 24, Cad-237, Thence;

1-2 S. 79 deg. 15'W. 260.92 m.

2-3 N. 19 deg. 02'E. 231.49 m.
3-4 N. 13 deg. 32'E. 489.77 m.
4-5 N. 61 deg. 39'E. 302.54 m.
5-6 N. 40 deg. 09'E. 146.06 m.
6-7 S. 82 deg. 14'E. 140.06 m.
7-8 S. 24 deg. 28'E. 152.88 m.
8-9 S. 34 deg. 00'W. 448.33 m.
9-1 S. 33 deg. 26'W. 445.73 m.

beginning; containing an area of THREE HUNDRED EIGHTEEN THOUSAND THREE

HUNDRED FORTY FIVE (318,345) square meters more or less. All points referred to are
indicated on the plan and marked on the ground by Old BL., cyl. cone. mons. 15 x 60 cm.
Bearing true, date of Original Survey August 9 & 13, 1929, and that of the preparation June 29,
2000, executed by Crisanto M. Bagares, Geodetic Engineer and approved on August 1, 2000.5

RRDC alleged, among others, that it is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under
and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines; that it is the absolute owner in fee
simple of the subject land having acquired the same from its previous owner, P.N. Roa
Enterprises, Inc., by virtue of a notarized deed of absolute sale executed on 05 March 1997; that

1
the subject land was assessed at ₱2,228,000.00 as shown in the Tax Declaration (TD) No.
141011; that it has registered the subject land for taxation purposes and paid the realty taxes due
therein from its acquisition, to the filing of the application; that immediately after acquiring the
subject land, it took actual physical possession of the same and has been continuously occupying
the subject land; and that it and its predecessors-in- interest have been in open, continuous,
adverse, and peaceful possession in concept of owner of the subject land since time immemorial,
or for more than thirty (30) years.

Attached to the application are: original copy of the technical description of the subject land6;
the Tracing Cloth Plan of the survey plan7; Certification in Lieu of Surveyor's/Geodetic
Engineer's Certificate8 issued by the Chief of the Land Surveys Assistance Section, Department
of Environment and Natural Resources, Region X; T.D. No. 141011 in the name of RRDC9 ; and
the Deed of Absolute Sale between RRDC and P.N. Roa Enterprises, Inc., dated 5 March
1997.10

On 16 July 2001, an opposition to the application was filed by the Heirs of Paulino Avancena.
They alleged, that the subject land was already claimed and owned by the late Atty. Paulino
Avancena (Paulino), their father and predecessor-in-interest, as early as 1926; that Paulino had
been in open, continuous, notorious, adverse, and exclusive possession and occupation of the
subject land; that Paulino registered the subject land for taxation purposes and has paid the taxes
due thereon in 1948; that their parents, Paulino and Rizalina Neri (Rizalina) merely allowed and
tolerated Pedro N. Roa's (Pedro) possession of the subject land after the latter approached them
and requested that he be allowed to use the subject land for his businesses; that Pedro is one of
RRDC's predecessors-in-interest; that sometime in 1994, Rizalina demanded the return of the
subject land from the heirs of Pedro, but to no avail; that in 1996, Rizalina died leaving the
private oppositors as the rightful heirs of the subject land; that their parents never sold the subject
land to Pedro nor to RRDC, and as such, no right or title over the subject land was passed on to
RRDC. Thus, they prayed that RRDC's application be dismissed, and that their opposition be
treated as their own application for registration.11

On 3 August 2001, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its opposition to the application on the following grounds: that
neither RRDC nor its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto;
that the subject land exceeds the twelve (12)-hectare limit for confirmation of imperfect title set
by Section 47 of Commonwealth Act (CA.) No. 141, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6940; and that the subject land forms part of the public domain belonging to the Republic and,
thus, not subject to private appropriation.12

During trial, RRDC presented the following documents in support of its application: (i) Deed of
Absolute Sale notarized by notary public Paulino Avancena showing that the subject land was
sold by Catalino Ebalo to Nicolas Beja and Maximo Amper on 21 June 193713 ; (ii) Deed of
Absolute Sale notarized by notary public Paulino A vancefia showing that a portion of the
subject land consisting of 159, 178.5 square meters (first portion) was sold by Maximo Amper to
Perfecto Virtudazo on 07 October 194014 ; (iii) Deed of Absolute Sale notarized by notary
public Troadio C. Ubay-ubay showing that the first portion consisting of 15 hectares, 91 ares and
72 centares (159,172 square meters) was sold by Trinidad Virtudazo, Israel Virtudazo, and
Adelina Virtudazo to Victor D. Beja on 22 April 196115 ; (iv) Deed of Absolute Sale showing
that the first portion of the subject land consisting of 159,172 square meters was sold by Victor
D. Beja to Pedro N. Roa on 01 February 19616 ; (v) Deed of Absolute Sale notarized by notary
public Troadio C. Ubay-ubay showing that the other portion (second portion) of the subject land
was sold by Nicolas Beja to Victor Beja on 22 April 196117 ; (vi) Deed of Sale showing that the
second portion was sold by Victor Beja to Pedro N. Roa on 01 February 196718 ; (vii) Deed of
Exchange notarized by notary public Jose L. Sabio, Jr. showing that the two portions of the
subject land were conveyed by Pedro N. Roa in favor of P.N. Roa Enterprises, Inc. on 23
September 1987;19 and (viii) Deed of Sale notarized by Rene C. Barbaso showing that the two

2
(2) portions of the subject land were sold by P.N. Roa Enterprises, Inc. to RRDC on 25 July
1996.20

RRDC also presented a certification21 from the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO), Cagayan de Oro City, certifying that the subject land is alienable and
disposable and not covered by any public land application patent and hence, no patent has been
issued thereon. Lastly, RRDC presented several tax declarations in the name of its predecessors-
in-interest, the earliest of which is T.D. No. 91264, which showed that realty taxes on the subject
land have been paid in 1947.22

On the other hand, to support their claim that a patent over the subject land had been issued in
the name of their father, the private oppositors presented a certification23 issued by the Records
Management Division of the Lands Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources which merely states that " ...according to the verification made by the
Geodetic Surveys Division, survey plan no. Psu-45882 with an accession no. 284578 is located
at Cagayan, Misamis, as per their EDP listing. It is unfortunate however that as of this moment,
this office (Records Management Division) cannot locate said records despite diligent search
made thereon."

The RTC Ruling

In its decision, dated 7 November 2003, the RTC granted RRDC's application for registration of
the subject land. It opined that the CENRO certification, stating that the subject land is alienable
and disposable and not covered by any public land application, is sufficient to show the character
of the land. It further ruled, that RRDC and its predecessors-in-interest had been in open and
continuous possession under a bona fide claim of ownership over the subject land based on the
documentary and testimonial evidence offered by RRDC, without discussing how these pieces of
evidence established the required possession.

The trial court further brushed aside the opposition interposed by the heirs of Paulino Avanceña.
It was not convinced that the evidence they presented were sufficient to grant the application in
their favor. It noted that the oppositors' claim that they were the rightful owners of the subject
land does not hold water considering that the deeds of sale presented by RRDC in support of
their claim were notarized by Paulino himself.

The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court considering the evidence of the applicant, the reports of the Land
Registration Authority, Director of Lands and the Certification of the CENRO, DENR, Cagayan
de Oro City, hereby declares that the applicant, Rovency Realty & Development Corporation,
have sufficient title proper for registration over the parcel of land subject of this application. The
opposition of the Heirs of Paulino Avanceña, is hereby ordered dismissed, being lack of merit.

Accordingly, in accordance with the prayer of the applicant herein, the Commissioner, or anyone
acting on his behalf is hereby directed to ISSUE A DECREE OF REGISTRATION and the
CORRESPONDING CERTIFICATE OF TITLE FOR THE PARCEL OF LAND described in
the instant application in favor of RO VEN CY REAL TY and DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION. SO ORDERED.24

Unconvinced, the Republic, through the OSG, and private oppositors heirs of Paulino Avancena,
elevated their respective appeals to the CA.25

The Republic contended that the trial court erred in granting the application for registration,
considering that the land applied for is in excess of what is allowed by the Constitution; and that
the Corporation Code further prohibits RRDC to acquire the subject land unless the acquisition
thereof is reasonably necessary for its business. On the other hand, the Avancena heirs insisted

3
that they are the rightful owners of the subject land, by virtue of the homestead patent granted to
their predecessor-in-interest.

The CA Ruling

In its assailed decision, dated 10 March 2009, the CA affirmed the 7 November 2003 RTC
decision. The appellate court concurred with the trial court's findings that the subject land is
alienable and disposable, and that RRDC has sufficiently established the required period and
character of possession. Likewise, the appellate court was not persuaded by the claims of the
heirs. It noted that the private oppositors anchored their claim on the alleged homestead grant to
Paulino, their predecessor-in-interest, which claim was unsupported by sufficient documentary
evidence.

The appellate court also ruled that the 12-hectare limit under the Constitution was not violated. It
explained that Section 3 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the constitutional provision
which provided for the 12-hectare limit in the acquisition of land, covers only agricultural lands
of the public domain. It ratiocinated that when the subject land was acquired through acquisitive
prescription by RRDC's predecessors-in-interest, it was converted into a private property and, as
such, it ceased to be part of the public domain. Thus, when RRDC acquired the subject land by
purchase, it was no longer within the ambit of the constitutional limitation.

As to the contention that the Corporation Code bars RRDC to acquire the subject land, the
appellate court simply stated that while the said code imposes certain limitations on the
acquisition of real property, there is no such prohibition. It stressed that RRDC is an artificial
being imbued with the power to purchase, hold, and convey real and personal property for such
purposes that are within the objects of its creation. Considering that RRDC is a corporation
engaged in realty business, it has the power to purchase real properties. The dispositive portion
of said decision states:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed November 7, 2003 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Misamis Oriental, Branch 41, Cagayan de Oro City is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.26

The Republic moved for reconsideration; while the Heirs of Paulino Avanceña adopted the
Republic's motion for reconsideration as their own. In its resolution, dated 3 December 2009, the
CA denied the motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition.

THE ISSUES

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE AMENDED APPLICATION FOR

REGISTRATION AND ORDERING THE ISSUANCE OF A DECREE OF REGISTRATION
AND THE CORRESPONDING CERTIFICATE OF TITLE FOR A PARCEL OF LAND
CONTAINING AN AREA OF THREE HUNDRED EIGHTEEN THOUSAND THREE
HUNDRED FORTY FIVE (318,345) SQUARE METERS IN FAVOR OF ROVENCY
REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, DESPITE THE FACTS THAT-

(i) THE LAND APPLIED FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE IS IN EXCESS OF

WHAT IS ALLOWED BY LAW; AND,

(ii) RESPONDENT'S RIGHT TO ACQUIRE THE SUBJECT PARCEL OF

LAND IS FURTHER LIMITED BY THE CORPORATION CODE.

II.

4
RESPONDENT'S EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE THAT IT OR ITS
PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST HAVE BEEN IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE
AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION UNDER A BONA FIDE CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP SINCE
JUNE 12, 1945 OR EARLIER AND THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS NO LONGER
INTENDED FOR PUBLIC USE OR FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL
WEALTH.27

THE COURT'S RULING

The petition is meritorious.

12-hectare limit under Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution

The Republic argues that the trial and appellate courts erred in granting RRDC's application for
the registration of the subject land, as the same has a total land area of 31.8 hectares, which is
way beyond the 12-hectare limit under Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides:

SECTION 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by
law according to the uses which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall
be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five
years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in
area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire
not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant. [emphasis
supplied]

As can be clearly gleaned from its language, Section 3, Article XII applies only to lands of the
public domain. Private lands are, therefore, outside of the prohibitions and limitations stated
therein. Thus, the appellate court correctly declared that the 12-hectare limitation on the
acquisition of lands under Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution has no application to
private lands.

A case in point is the absolute prohibition on private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain. This prohibition could be traced to the 1973 Constitution
which limited the alienation of lands of the public domain to individuals who were citizens of the
Philippines. This constitutional prohibition, however, does not necessarily mean that
corporations may not apply for original registration of title to lands. In fact, the Court, in several
instances, affirmed the grant of applications for original registration filed by corporations,28 for
as long as the lands were already converted to private ownership by operation of law as a result
of satisfying the requisite possession required by the Public Land Act.29

In Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court30 (Director of Lands), the Court granted
the application for original registration of parcels of land filed by a corporation which acquired
the lands by purchase from members of the Dumagat tribe. The Court ratiocinated that the lands
applied for registration were already private lands even before the corporation acquired them.
The Court observed that the sellers, being members of the national cultural minorities, had by
themselves and through their predecessors, possessed and occupied the lands since time
immemorial. As a consequence of their open, exclusive, and undisputed possession over the said
lands for the period required by law for the acquisition of alienable lands of the public domain,
said lands ceased to become part of the public land and were converted, by operation of law, into
private ownership. As such, the sellers, if not for their conveyance of the lands in question to the
corporation, were entitled to exercise the right granted to them by the Public Land Act to have
their title judicially confirmed. Considering further that the lands in question were already
private in character at the time the corporation acquired them, the constitutional prohibition does
not apply to the corporation.

5
In Republic v. TA.N. Properties 31 (TA.N. Properties), the Court stressed that what is
determinative for the application of the doctrine in Director of Lands is for the corporate
applicant for land registration to establish that when it acquired the land, the same was already
private land by operation of law because the statutory acquisitive prescriptive period of 30 years
had already lapsed.

The pronouncements in Director of Lands and TA.N. Properties apply with equal force to the 12-
hectare limitation, considering that both the limitation and the prohibition on corporations to
acquire lands, do not cover ownership of private lands. Stated differently, whether RRDC can
acquire the subject land and to what extent, depends on whether the pieces of evidence it
presented before the trial court sufficiently established that the subject land is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; and that the nature and duration of the possession of its
individual predecessors-in-interest converted the subject land to private land by operation of law.

Requirements for original registration of title to land

In Republic of the Philippines vs. Cortez,32 the Court explained that applicants for original
registration of title to land must first establish compliance with the provisions of either Section
14(1) or Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, which state:

Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of
existing laws.

It must be emphasized that the requirements and bases for registration under these two provisions
of law differ from one another. Section 14 (1) mandates registration on the basis of possession,
while Section 14 (2) entitles registration on the basis of prescription.33 Thus, it is important to
ascertain under what provision of Section 14 the registration is sought.

A reading of the application, however, is unavailing. In its application, RRDC alleged that it and
its predecessors-in-interest "had been in open, continuous, adverse, and peaceful possession in
concept of owner of the subject property since time immemorial or for more than thirty years."
This allegation made it unclear whether registration is sought under Section 14(1) - possession
since 12 June 1945 or earlier; or under Section 14(2) - possession for more than thirty years.

An examination of the 7 November 2003 RTC decision also proved futile considering that, and
as previously pointed out, aside from enumerating the exhibits offered by the applicant, the trial
court did not discuss how these pieces of evidence established the requisites for registration.
Thus, for the proper resolution of the issues and arguments raised herein, it becomes necessary
for the present application to be scrutinized based on the requirements of the provisions of
Sections 14 (1) and (2) of P.D. No. 1529.

Registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529

Under Section 14(1), applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish the following
requisites: first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the
public domain; second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third, that the
possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945, or earlier.34

6
The first requisite of Section 14(1) entails only that the property sought to be registered be
alienable and disposable at the time of the filing of the application for registration.35 To prove
that the land sought to be registered is alienable and disposable, the present rule is that the
application for original registration must be accompanied by (1) a CENRO or PENRO
Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary, and
certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.36This strict requirement for
the registration of lands enunciated in TA.N Properties had been consistently applied and
affirmed by the Court in a plethora of cases.37

In the present case, to prove that the subject land is alienable and disposable, RRDC presented a
CENRO certification stating that the subject land is "alienable and disposable and not covered by
any public land application." RRDC, however, failed to present a certified true copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary declaring the subject land alienable and
disposable. Clearly, the evidence presented by RRDC falls short of the requirements in TA.N.
Properties. Thus, the trial and appellate courts erred when they ruled that the subject land is
alienable and disposable part of the public domain and susceptible to original registration.

Furthermore, RRDC also failed to prove that it and its individual predecessors-in-interest
sufficiently complied with the required period and nature of possession.

An applicant for land registration must exhibit that it and its predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona
fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier. It has been held that possession is open
when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious, and not clandestine; it is continuous when
uninterrupted, unbroken, and not intermittent or occasional; it is exclusive when the adverse
possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use
and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous, that it is generally known and talked of by
the public or the people in the neighborhood.38

In Republic vs. Remman Enterprises, Inc., 39 the Court held that for purposes of land registration
under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, proof of specific acts of ownership must be presented to
substantiate the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of the land subject of the application. Applicants for land registration cannot just offer general
statements which are mere conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of possession. Actual
possession is in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such nature as a party would
actually exercise over his own property.

In Republic v. Gielczyk, the Court explained that "possession" and "occupation" are not
synonymous to each other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes
constructive possession; whereas occupation delimits the all-encompassing effect of constructive
possession. Thus, taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious, the
word occupation means that for one's title to land to be judicially recognized, his possession of
the land must not be mere fiction.40

In this case, aside from the deeds of absolute sale covering the subject land which were executed
prior to 12 June 1945, RRDC did not present any evidence which would show that its
predecessors-in-interest actually exercised acts of dominion over the subject land even before the
cut-off period. As such, RRDC failed to prove that its possession of the land, or at the very least,
its individual predecessors-in-interest's possession over the same was not mere fiction.

Neither would the tax declarations presented by RRDC suffice to prove the required possession.
To recall, the earliest of these tax declarations dates back only to 1948. Clearly, the required
possession and occupation since 12 June 1945 or earlier, was not demonstrated.

From the foregoing, it is clear that RRDC failed to prove that its individual predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier; and that said

7
possession and occupation converted the subject land into a private property by operation of law.
Consequently, the subject land cannot be registered in the name of RRDC under Section 14(1) of
P.D. No. 1529.

Requirements under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529

RRDC also failed to establish compliance with the requirements for registration under Section
14(2).

In Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic (Malabanan),41 the Court explained that when
Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 provides that persons "who have acquired ownership over private
lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws," it unmistakably refers to the Civil
Code as a valid basis for the registration of lands. The Civil Code is the only existing law that
specifically allows the acquisition by prescription of private lands, including patrimonial
property belonging to the State.

The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by private
persons through prescription.1âwphi1 This is brought about by Article 1113, which states that all
things which are within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription, and that property of
the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription.42

Nonetheless, this does not necessarily mean that when a piece of land is declared alienable and
disposable part of the public domain, it can already be acquired by prescription. In Malabanan,
this Court ruled that declaration of alienability and disposability is not enough - there must be an
express declaration that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or
the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial,
thus:

"(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the
Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property.
However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that
these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that
the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of
national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become
patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion
begin to run. "43 [emphasis supplied]

The classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not
change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. As
such, said land, although classified as alienable and disposable, is insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.44

In this case, RRDC did not present any evidence which would show that the subject land was
expressly declared as no longer intended for public service or the development of the national
wealth, or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Hence, it failed to prove that
acquisitive prescription has begun to run against the State, and that it has acquired title to the
subject land by virtue thereof.

In fine, RRDC failed to satisfy all the requisites for registration of title to land under either
Sections 14(1) or (2) of P.D. No. 1529. RRDC also failed to establish that when it or P.N. Roa
Enterprises, Inc., also a corporation and its direct predecessor-in-interest, acquired the subject
land, it had already been converted to private property, thus, the prohibition on the corporation's
acquisition of agricultural lands of the public domain under Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution applies. RRDC's application for original registration of imperfect title over Lot No.
3009 must perforce be denied.

8
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The 10 March 2009 Decision and 3
December 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00651, which affirmed
the 7 November 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Cagayan de Oro City, in
LRA Case No. N-2000-084, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Application for
Registration of Lot No. 3009 filed by Rovency Realty and Development Corporation is
DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
Associate Justice

9
G.R. No. 182913 November 20, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
ANTONIO, FELIZA, NEMESIO, ALBERTO, FELICIDAD, RICARDO, MILAGROS
AND CIPRIANO, ALL SURNAMED BACAS; EMILIANA CHABON, SATURNINO
ABDON, ESTELA, CHABON, LACSASA DEMON, PDERITA CHABON, FORTUNATA
EMBALSADO, MINDA J. CASTILLO, PABLO CASTILLO, ARTURO P. LEGASPI, and
JESSIE I. LEGASPI, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to review,
reverse and set aside the November 12, 2007 Decision1 and the May 15, 2008 Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 64142, upholding the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 17, Cagayan de Oro City (RTC) , which dismissed the consolidated cases of Civil
Case No. 3494, entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Antonio, et al. and Civil Case No. 5918,
entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Emiliana Chabon , et al. Said civil cases were filed by the
Republic of the Philippines (Republic) for the cancellation and annulment of Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. 0-358 and OCT No. O-669, covering certain parcels of land occupied and
utilized as part of the Camp Evangelista Military Reservation, Misamis Oriental, presently the
home of the 4th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army.

The Antecedents:

In 1938, Commonwealth President Manuel Luis Quezon (Pres. Quezon) issued Presidential
Proclamation No. 265, which took effect on March 31, 1938, reserving for the use of the
Philippine Army three (3) parcels of the public domain situated in the barrios of Bulua and
Carmen, then Municipality of Cagayan, Misamis Oriental. The parcels of land were withdrawn
from sale or settlement and reserved for military purposes, "subject to private rights, if any there
be."

Land Registration Case No. N-275

[Antonio, Feliza, Nemesio, Roberto, and Felicidad, all surnamed Bacas, and the Heirs of Jesus
Bacas, Applicants (The Bacases)]

The Bacases filed their Application for Registration3 on November 12, 1964 covering a parcel of
land, together with all the improvements found thereon, located in Patag, Cagayan de Oro City,
more particularly described and bounded as follows:

A parcel of land, Lot No. 4354 of the Cadastral Survey of Cagayan, L.R.C. Record No. 1612,
situated at Barrio Carmen, Municipality of Cagayan, Province of Misamis Oriental. Bounded on
the SE., along lines 1-2-3-4, by Lot 4357; and alongline 4-5, by Lot 3862; on the S., along line 5-
6, by Lot 3892; on the W. and NW., along lines 6-7-8, by Lot 4318; on the NE., along line 8-9,
by Lot 4319, along line 9-10, by Lot 4353 and long line 10-11, by Lot 4359; and on the SE.,
along line 11-1, by Lot 4356, all of Cagayan Cadastre; containing an area of THREE
HUNDRED FIFTY FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY SEVEN (354,377)
square meters, more or less, under Tax Declaration No. 35436 and assessed at ₱3,540.00.4

They alleged ownership in fee simple of the property and indicated in their application the names
and addresses of the adjoining owners, as well as a statement that the Philippine Army (Fourth
Military Area) recently occupied a portion of the land by their mere tolerance.5

10
The Director of the Bureau of Lands, thru its Special Counsel, Benito S. Urcia (Urcia) ,
registered its written Opposition6 against the application. Later, Urcia, assisted by the District
Land Officer of Cagayan de Oro City, thru the Third Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Misamis
Oriental, Pedro R. Luspo (Luspo) , filed an Amended Opposition.7

On April 10, 1968, based on the evidence presented by the Bacases, the Land Registration Court
(LRC) rendered a decision8 holding that the applicants had conclusively established their
ownership in fee simple over the subject land and that their possession, including that of their
predecessor-in-interest, had been open, adverse, peaceful, uninterrupted, and in concept of
owners for more than forty (40) years.

No appeal was interposed by the Republic from the decision of the LRC. Thus, the decision
became final and executory, resulting in the issuance of a decree and the corresponding
certificate of title over the subject property.

Land Registration Case No. N-521 [Emiliana Chabon, Estela Chabon and Pedrita Chabon,
Applicants (The Chabons)]

The Chabons filed their Application for Registration9 on May 8, 1974 covering a parcel of land
located in Carmen-District, Cagayan de Oro City, known as Lot 4357, Cagayan Cadastre,
bounded and described as:

A parcel of land (Lot 4357, Cagayan Cadastre, plan Ap-12445), situated in the District of
Carmen, City of Cagayan de Oro. Bounded on the NE. by property of Potenciano Abrogan vs.
Republic of the Philippines (Public Land); on the SE. by properties of Geronimo Wabe and
Teofilo Batifona or Batipura; on the SW. by property of Teofilo Batifona or Batipura; and on the
NW. by property of Felipe Bacao or Bacas vs. Republic of the Philippines (Public Land). Point
"1" is N. 10 deg. 39’W., 379.88 M. from B.L.L.M. 14, Cagayan Cadastre. Area SIXTY NINE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED THIRTY TWO (69,632) SQUARE METERS, more or less.10

They alleged ownership in fee simple over the property and indicated therein the names and
addresses of the adjoining owners, but no mention was made with respect to the occupation, if
any, by the Philippine Army. The Chabons likewise alleged that, to the best of their knowledge,
no mortgage or encumbrance of any kind affecting said land with the exception of 18,957 square
meters sold to Minda J. Castillo and 1,000 square meters sold and conveyed to Atty. Arturo R.
Legaspi.11

On February 18, 1976, there being no opposition made, even from the government, hearing on
the application ensued. The LRC then rendered a decision12 holding that Chabons’ evidence
established their ownership in fee simple over the subject property and that their possession,
including that of their predecessor-in-interest, had been actual, open, public, peaceful, adverse,
continuous, and in concept of owners for more than thirty (30) years.

The decision then became final and executory. Thus, an order13 for the issuance of a decree and
the corresponding certificate of title was issued.

The present cases

As a consequence of the LRC decisions in both applications for registration, the Republic filed a
complaint for annulment of titles against the Bacases and the Chabons before the RTC. More
specifically, on September 7, 1970 or one (1) year and ten (10) months from the issuance of OCT
No. 0-358, a civil case for annulment, cancellation of original certificate of title, reconveyance of
lot or damages was filed by the Republic against the Bacases, which was docketed as Civil Case
No. 3494. On the other hand, on April 21, 1978 or two (2) years and seven (7) months after
issuance of OCT No. 0-669, the Republic filed a civil case for annulment of title and reversion
against the Chabons, docketed as Civil Case No. 5918.

11
Civil Case No. 3494 against the Bacases

The Republic claimed in its petition for annulment before the RTC14 that the certificate of title
issued in favor of the Bacases was null and void because they fraudulently omitted to name the
military camp as the actual occupant in their application for registration. Specifically, the
Republic, through the Fourth Military Area, was the actual occupant of Lot No. 4354 and also
the owner and possessor of the adjoining Lots Nos. 431815 and 4357. Further, the Bacases failed
to likewise state that Lot No. 4354 was part of Camp Evangelista. These omissions constituted
fraud which vitiated the decree and certificate of title issued.

Also, the Republic averred that the subject land had long been reserved in 1938 for military
purposes at the time it was applied for and, so, it was no longer disposable and subject to
registration.16

Civil Case No. 5918 against the Chabons

In this case, the Republic claimed that it was the absolute owner and possessor of Lot No. 4357.
The said lot, together with Lots 431817 and 4354, formed part of the military reservation known
as Camp Evangelista in Cagayan de Oro City, which was set aside and reserved under
Presidential Proclamation No. 265 issued by President Quezon on March 31, 1938.18

In its petition for annulment before the RTC,19 the Republic alleged that OCT No. 0-669 issued
in favor of the Chabons and all transfer certificates of titles, if any, proceeding therefrom, were
null and void for having been vitiated by fraud and/or lack of jurisdiction.20 The Chabons
concealed that the fact that Lot 4357 was part of Camp Evangelista and that the Republic,
through the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was its actual occupant and possessor.21 Further,
Lot 4357 was a military reservation, established as such as early as March 31, 1938 and, thus,
could not be the subject of registration or private appropriation.22 As a military reservation, it
was beyond the commerce of man and the registration court did not have any jurisdiction to
adjudicate the same as private property.23

Decision of the Regional Trial Court

As the facts and issues in both cases were substantially the same and identical, and the pieces of
evidence adduced were applicable to both, the cases were consolidated and jointly tried.
Thereafter, a joint decision dismissing the two complaints of the Republic was rendered.

In dismissing the complaints, the RTC explained that the stated fact of occupancy by Camp
Evangelista over certain portions of the subject lands in the applications for registration by the
respondents was a substantial compliance with the requirements of the law.24 It would have
been absurd to state Camp Evangelista as an adjoining owner when it was alleged that it was an
occupant of the land.25 Thus, the RTC ruled that the respondents did not commit fraud in filing
their applications for registration.

Moreover, the RTC was of the view that the Republic was then given all the opportunity to be
heard as it filed its opposition to the applications, appeared and participated in the proceedings. It
was, thus, estopped from contesting the proceedings.

The RTC further reasoned out that assuming arguendo that respondents were guilty of fraud, the
Republic lost its right to a relief for its failure to file a petition for review on the ground of fraud
within one (1) year after the date of entry of the decree of registration.26 Consequently, it would
now be barred by prior judgment to contest the findings of the LRC.27

Finally, the RTC agreed with the respondents that the subject parcels of land were exempted
from the operation and effect of the Presidential Proclamation No. 265 pursuant to a proviso
therein that the same would not apply to lands with existing "private rights." The presidential
proclamation did not, and should not, apply to the respondents because they did not apply to

12
acquire the parcels of land in question from the government, but simply for confirmation and
affirmation of their rights to the properties so that the titles over them could be issued in their
favor.28 What the proclamation prohibited was the sale or disposal of the parcels of land
involved to private persons as a means of acquiring ownership of the same, through the modes
provided by law for the acquisition of disposable public lands.29

The Republic filed its Notice of Appeal before the RTC on July 5, 1991. On the other hand, the
Bacases and the Chabons filed an Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of the Writ of Execution and
Possession on July 16, 1991. An amended motion was filed on July 31, 1991. The RTC then
issued the Order,30 dated February 24, 1992, disapproving the Republic’s appeal for failure to
perfect it as it failed to notify the Bacases and granting the writ of execution.

Action of the Court of Appeals and the Court regarding the Republic’s Appeal

The Republic filed a Notice of Appeal on April 1, 1992 from the February 24, 1992 of the RTC.
The same was denied in the RTC Order,31 dated April 23, 1992. The Republic moved for its
reconsideration but the RTC was still denied it on July 8, 1992.32

Not satisfied, the Republic filed a petition before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 28647,
entitled Republic vs. Hon. Cesar M. Ybañez,33 questioning the February 24, 1992 Order of the
RTC denying its appeal in Civil Case No. 3494. The CA sustained the government and,
accordingly, annulled the said RTC order.

The respondents appealed to the Court, which later found no commission of a reversible error on
the part of the CA. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal as well as the subsequent
motions for reconsideration. An entry of judgment was then issued on February 16, 1995.34

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The appeal allowed, the CA docketed the case as CA G.R. CV No. 64142.

On November 12, 2007, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. It explained that once a decree
of registration was issued under the Torrens system and the reglementary period had passed
within which the decree may be questioned, the title was perfected and could not be collaterally
questioned later on.35 Even assuming that an action for the nullification of the original
certificate of title may still be instituted, the review of a decree of registration under Section 38
of Act No. 496 [Section 32 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529] would only prosper upon
proof that the registration was procured through actual fraud,36 which proceeded from an
intentional deception perpetrated through the misrepresentation or the concealment of a material
fact.37 The CA stressed that "[t]he fraud must be actual and extrinsic, not merely constructive or
intrinsic; the evidence thereof must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant,
because the proceedings which are assailed as having been fraudulent are judicial proceedings
which by law, are presumed to have been fair and regular."38

Citing the rule that "[t]he fraud is extrinsic if it is employed to deprive parties of their day in
court and, thus, prevent them from asserting their right to the property registered in the name of
the applicant,"39 the CA found that there was none. The CA agreed with the RTC that there was
substantial compliance with the requirement of the law. The allegation of the respondent that
Camp Evangelista occupied portions of their property negated the complaint that they committed
misrepresentation or concealment amounting to fraud.40

As regards the issue of exemption from the proclamation, the CA deemed that a discussion was
unnecessary because the LRC already resolved it. The CA stressed that the proceeding was one
in rem, thereby binding everyone to the legal effects of the same and that a decree of registration
that had become final should be deemed conclusive not only on the questions actually contested
and determined, but also upon all matters that might be litigated or decided in the land
registration proceeding.41

13
Not in conformity, the Republic filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied on May 15,
2008 for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition.

GROUNDS RELIED UPON

WARRANTING REVIEW OF THE
PETITION

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN HOLDING

THAT THE LAND REGISTRATION COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION FILED BY RESPONDENTS DESPITE THE
LATTER’S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE MANDATORY REQUIREMENT OF
INDICATING ALL THE ADJOINING OWNERS OF THE PARCELS OF LAND
SUBJECT OF THE APPLICATION.

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN HOLDING

THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE A REGISTRABLE RIGHT OVER THE SUBJECT
PARCELS OF LAND WHICH ARE WITHIN THE CAMP EVANGELISTA
MILITARY RESERVATION.

3. IN G.R. NO. 157306 ENTITLED "REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.

ANATALIA ACTUB TIU ESTONILO, ET AL.," WHICH INVOLVES PRIVATE
INDIVIDUALS CLAIMING RIGHTS OVER PORTIONS OF THE CAMP
EVANGELISTA MILITARY RESERVATION, THIS HONORABLE COURT HELD
THAT THESE INDIVIDUALS COULD NOT HAVE VALIDLY OCCUPIED THEIR
CLAIMED LOTS BECAUSE THE SAME WERE CONSIDERED INALIENABLE
FROM THE TIME OF THEIR RESERVATION IN 1938. HERE, THE CERTIFICATES
OF TITLE BEING SUSTAINED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS WERE ISSUED
PURSUANT TO THE DECISIONS OF THE LAND REGISTRATION COURT IN
APPLICATIONS FOR REGISTRATION FILED IN 1964 AND 1974. VERILY, THE
COURT OF APPEALS, IN ISSUING THE HEREIN ASSAILED DECISION DATED
NOVEMBER 15, 2007 AND RESOLUTION DATED MAY 15, 2008, HAS DECIDED
THAT INSTANT CONTROVERSY IN A MANNER THAT IS CONTRARY TO LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE.42

Position of the Republic

In advocacy of its position, the Republic principally argues that (1) the CA erred in holding that
the LRC acquired jurisdiction over the applications for registration of the reserved public lands
filed by the respondents; and (2) the respondents do not have a registrable right over the subject
parcels of land which are within the Camp Evangelista Military Reservation.

With respect to the first argument, the Republic cites Section 15 of P.D. No. 1529, which
requires that applicants for land registration must disclose the names of the occupants of the land
and the names and addresses of the owners of the adjoining properties. The respondents did not
comply with that requirement which was mandatory and jurisdictional. Citing Pinza v.
Aldovino,43 it asserts that the LRC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. Moreover,
such omission constituted fraud or willful misrepresentation. The respondents cannot invoke the
indefeasibility of the titles issued since a "grant tainted with fraud and secured through
misrepresentation is null and void and of no effect whatsoever."44

On the second argument, the Republic points out that Presidential Proclamation No. 265 reserved
for the use of the Philippine Army certain parcels of land which included Lot No. 4354 and Lot
No. 4357. Both lots were, however, allowed to be registered. Lot No. 4354 was registered as
OCT No. 0-0358 and Lot No. 4357 as OCT No. O-669.

14
The Republic asserts that being part of the military reservation, these lots are inalienable and
cannot be the subject of private ownership. Being so, the respondents do not have registrable
rights over them. Their possession of the land, however long, could not ripen into ownership, and
they have not shown proof that they were entitled to the land before the proclamation or that the
said lots were segregated and withdrawn as part thereof.

Position of the Respondents

The Bacases

The Bacases anchor their opposition to the postures of the Republic on three principal
arguments:

First, there was no extrinsic fraud committed by the Bacases in their failure to indicate Camp
Evangelista as an adjoining lot owner as their application for registration substantially complied
with the legal requirements. More importantly, the Republic was not prejudiced and deprived of
its day in court.

Second, the LRC had jurisdiction to adjudicate whether the Bacases had "private rights" over Lot
No. 4354 in accordance with, and therefore exempt from the coverage of, Presidential
Proclamation No. 265, as well as to determine whether such private rights constituted registrable
title under the land registration law.

Third, the issue of the registrability of the title of the Bacases over Lot No. 4354 is res judicata
and cannot now be subject to a re-litigation or reopening in the annulment proceedings.45

Regarding the first ground, the Bacases stress that there was no extrinsic fraud because their
application substantially complied with the requirements when they indicated that Camp
Evangelista was an occupant by mere tolerance of Lot No. 4354. Also, the Republic filed its
opposition to the respondents’ application and actively participated in the land registration
proceedings by presenting evidence, through the Director of Lands, who was represented by the
Solicitor General. The Republic, therefore, was not deprived of its day in court or prevented from
presenting its case. Its insistence that the non-compliance with the requirements of Section 15 of
P.D. No. 1529 is an argument that is at once both empty and dangerous.46

On jurisdiction, the Bacases assert that even in the case of Republic v. Estonilo,47 it was
recognized in Presidential Proclamation No. 265 that the reservation was subject to private
rights. In other words, the LRC had authority to hear and adjudicate their application for
registration of title over Lot No. 4354 if they would be able to prove that their private rights
under the presidential proclamation constituted registrable title over the said lot. They claim that
there is completely no basis for the Republic to argue that the LRC had no jurisdiction to hear
and adjudicate their application for registration of their title to Lot No. 4354 just because the
proclamation withdrew the subject land from sale and settlement and reserved the same for
military purposes. They cited the RTC statement that "the parcels of land they applied for in
those registration proceedings and for which certificates of title were issued in their favor are
precisely exempted from the operation and effect of said presidential proclamation when the very
same proclamation in itself made a proviso that the same will not apply to lands with existing
‘private rights’ therein."48

The Bacases claim that the issue of registrability is no longer an issue as what is only to be
resolved is the question on whether there was extrinsic or collateral fraud during the land
registration proceedings. There would be no end to litigation on the registrability of their title if
questions of facts or law, such as, whether or not Lot No. 4354 was alienable and disposable land
of the public domain prior to its withdrawal from sale and settlement and reservation for military
purposes under Presidential Proclamation No. 265; whether or not their predecessors-in-interest
had prior possession of the lot long before the issuance of the proclamation or the establishment
of Camp Evangelista in the late 1930’s; whether or not such possession was held in the concept

15
of an owner to constitute recognizable "private rights" under the presidential proclamation; and
whether or not such private rights constitute registrable title to the lot in accordance with the land
registration law, which had all been settled and duly adjudicated by the LRC in favor of the
Bacases, would be re-examined under this annulment case.49

The issue of registrability of the Bacases’ title had long been settled by the LRC and is

res judicata between the Republic and the respondents. The findings of the LRC became final
when the Republic did not appeal its decision within the period to appeal or file a petition to
reopen or review the decree of registration within one year from entry thereof.50

To question the findings of the court regarding the registrability of then title over the land would
be an attempt to reopen issues already barred by res judicata. As correctly held by the RTC, it is
estopped and barred by prior judgment to contest the findings of the LRC.51

The Chabons

In traversing the position of the Republic, the Chabons insist that the CA was correct when it
stated that there was substantial compliance52 with the requirements of the P.D. No. 1529
because they expressly stated in their application that Camp Evangelista was occupying a portion
of it. It is contrary to reason or common sense to state that Camp Evangelista is an adjoining
owner when it is occupying a portion thereof.

And as to the decision, it was a consequence of a proceeding in rem and, therefore, the decree of
registration is binding and conclusive against all persons including the Republic who did not
appeal the same. It is now barred forever to question the validity of the title issued. Besides, res
judicata has set in because there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action.53

The Chabons also assailed the proclamation because when it was issued, they were already the
private owners of the subject parcels of land and entitled to protection under the Constitution.
The taking of their property in the guise of a presidential proclamation is not only oppressive and
arbitrary but downright confiscatory.54

The Issues

The ultimate issues to be resolved are: 1) whether or not the decisions of the LRC over the
subject lands can still be questioned; and 2) whether or not the applications for registration of the
subject parcels of land should be allowed.

The Court’s Ruling

The Republic can question even final and executory judgment when there was fraud.

The governing rule in the application for registration of lands at that time was Section 21 of Act
49655 which provided for the form and content of an application for registration, and it reads:

Section 21. The application shall be in writing, signed and sworn to by applicant, or by some
person duly authorized in his behalf. x x x It shall also state the name in full and the address of
the applicant, and also the names and addresses of all adjoining owners and occupants, if known;
and, if not known, it shall state what search has been made to find them. x x x

The reason behind the law was explained in the case of Fewkes vs. Vasquez,56 where it was
written:

Under Section 21 of the Land Registration Act an application for registration of land is required
to contain, among others, a description of the land subject of the proceeding, the name, status and
address of the applicant, as well as the names and addresses of all occupants of the land and of

16
all adjoining owners, if known, or if unknown, of the steps taken to locate them. When the
application is set by the court for initial hearing, it is then that notice (of the hearing), addressed
to all persons appearing to have an interest in the lot being registered and the adjoining owners,
and indicating the location, boundaries and technical description of the land being registered,
shall be published in the Official Gazette for two consecutive times. It is this publication of the
notice of hearing that is considered one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court in
land registration cases, for the proceedings being in rem, it is only when there is constructive
seizure of the land, effected by the publication and notice, that jurisdiction over the res is vested
on the court. Furthermore, it is such notice and publication of the hearing that would enable all
persons concerned, who may have any rights or interests in the property, to come forward and
show to the court why the application for registration thereof is not to be granted.

Here, the Chabons did not make any mention of the ownership or occupancy by the Philippine
Army. They also did not indicate any efforts or searches they had exerted in determining other
occupants of the land. Such omission constituted fraud and deprived the Republic of its day in
court. Not being notified, the Republic was not able to file its opposition to the application and,
naturally, it was not able to file an appeal either.

The Republic can also question a final and executory judgment when the LRC had no
jurisdiction over the land in question

With respect to the Bacases, although the lower courts might have been correct in ruling that
there was substantial compliance with the requirements of law when they alleged that Camp
Evangelista was an occupant, the Republic is not precluded and estopped from questioning the
validity of the title.

The success of the annulment of title does not solely depend on the existence of actual and
extrinsic fraud, but also on the fact that a judgment decreeing registration is null and void. In
Collado v. Court of Appeals and the Republic,57 the Court declared that any title to an
inalienable public land is void ab initio. Any procedural infirmities attending the filing of the
petition for annulment of judgment are immaterial since the LRC never acquired jurisdiction
over the property. All proceedings of the LRC involving the property are null and void and,
hence, did not create any legal effect. A judgment by a court without jurisdiction can never attain
finality.58 In Collado, the Court made the following citation:

The Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-registrable properties, such as public
navigable rivers which are parts of the public domain, and cannot validly adjudge the registration
of title in favor of private applicant. Hence, the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga as regards the Lot No. 2 of certificate of Title No. 15856 in the name of petitioners
may be attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally, by the State which is not bound by
any prescriptive period provided for by the Statute of Limitations.59

Prescription or estoppel cannot lie against the government

In denying the petition of the Republic, the CA reasoned out that 1) once a decree of registration
is issued under the Torrens system and the reglementary period has passed within which the
decree may be questioned, the title is perfected and cannot be collaterally questioned later on;60
2) there was no commission of extrinsic fraud because the Bacases’ allegation of Camp
Evangelista’s occupancy of their property negated the argument that they committed
misrepresentation or concealment amounting to fraud;61 and 3) the Republic did not appeal the
decision and because the proceeding was one in rem, it was bound to the legal effects of the
decision.

Granting that the persons representing the government was negligent, the doctrine of estoppel
cannot be taken against the Republic. It is a well-settled rule that the Republic or its government
is not estopped by mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents. In Republic v. Court of
Appeals,62 it was written:

17
In any case, even granting that the said official was negligent, the doctrine of estoppel cannot
operate against the State . "It is a well-settled rule in our jurisdiction that the Republic or its
government is usually not estopped by mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents
(Manila Lodge No. 761 vs. CA, 73 SCRA 166, 186; Republic vs. Marcos, 52 SCRA 238, 244;
Luciano vs. Estrella, 34 SCRA 769).

Consequently, the State may still seek the cancellation of the title issued to Perpetuo Alpuerto
and his successors-interest pursuant to Section 101 of the Public Land Act. Such title has not
become indefeasible, for prescription cannot be invoked against the State (Republic vs. Animas,
supra).

The subject lands, being part of a military reservation, are inalienable and cannot be the subjects
of land registration proceedings

The application of the Bacases and the Chabons were filed on November 12, 1964 and May 8,
1974, respectively. Accordingly, the law governing the applications was Commonwealth Act
(C.A.) No. 141,63 as amended by RA 1942,64 particularly Sec. 48(b) which provided that:

Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this chapter.

As can be gleaned therefrom, the necessary requirements for the grant of an application for land
registration are the following:

1. The applicant must, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, have been in

possession and occupation of the subject land;

2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive and notorious;

3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of ownership for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application; and

4. The subject land must be an agricultural land of the public domain. As earlier stated, in
1938, President Quezon issued Presidential Proclamation No. 265, which took effect on
March 31, 1938, reserving for the use of the Philippine Army parcels of the public
domain situated in the barrios of Bulua and Carmen, then Municipality of Cagayan,
Misamis Oriental. The subject parcels of land were withdrawn from sale or settlement or
reserved for military purposes, "subject to private rights, if any there be."65

Such power of the President to segregate lands was provided for in Section 64(e) of the old
Revised Administrative Code and C.A. No. 141 or the Public Land Act. Later, the power of the
President was restated in Section 14, Chapter 4, Book III of the 1987 Administrative Code.
When a property is officially declared a military reservation, it becomes inalienable and outside
the commerce of man.66 It may not be the subject of a contract or of a compromise
agreement.67 A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private
appropriation or ownership, until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to
withdraw it from being such.68 In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and De Jesus,69 it
was even stated that

Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be
acquired.1âwphi1 The claims 0f persons who have settled on, occupied, and improved a parcel
of public land which is later included in a reservation are considered worthy of protection and are

18
usually respected, but where the President, as authorized by law, issues a proclamation reserving
certain lands and warning all persons to depart therefrom, this terminates any rights previously
acquired in such lands by a person who was settled thereon in order to obtain a preferential right
of purchase. And patents for lands which have been previously granted, reserved from sale, or
appropriate, are void.

Regarding the subject lots, there was a reservation respecting "private rights." In Republic v.
Estonilo,70 where the Court earlier declared that Lot No. 4318 was part of the Camp Evangelista
Military Reservation and, therefore, not registrable, it noted the proviso in Presidential
Proclamation No. 265 requiring the reservation to be subject to private rights as meaning that
persons claiming rights over the reserved land were not precluded from proving their claims.
Stated differently, the said proviso did not preclude the LRC from determining whether or not
the respondents indeed had registrable rights over the property.

As there has been no showing that the subject parcels of land had been segregated from the
military reservation, the respondents had to prove that the subject properties were alienable and
disposable land of the public domain prior to its withdrawal from sale and settlement and
reservation for military purposes under Presidential Proclamation No. 265. The question is of
primordial importance because it is determinative if the land can in fact be subject to acquisitive
prescription and, thus, registrable under the Torrens system. Without first determining the nature
and character of the land, all the other requirements such as the length and nature of possession
and occupation over such land do not come into play. The required length of possession does not
operate when the land is part of the public domain.

In this case, however, the respondents miserably failed to prove that, before the proclamation, the
subject lands were already private lands. They merely relied on such "recognition" of possible
private rights. In their application, they alleged that at the time of their application,71 they had
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject parcels of land for at
least thirty (30) years and became its owners by prescription. There was, however, no allegation
or showing that the government had earlier declared it open for sale or settlement, or that it was
already pronounced as inalienable and disposable.

It is well-settled that land of the public domain is not ipso facto converted into a patrimonial or
private property by the mere possession and occupation by an individual over a long period of
time. In the case of Diaz v. Republic,72 it was written:

But even assuming that the land in question was alienable land before it was established as a
military reservation, there was nevertheless still a dearth of evidence with respect to its
occupation by petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest for more than 30 years. x x x.

x x x.

A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant, and the raising thereon of
cattle, do not constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not
exclusive and notorious as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State. While grazing
livestock over land is of course to be considered with other acts of dominion to show possession,
the mere occupancy of land by grazing livestock upon it, without substantial enclosures, or other
permanent improvements, is not sufficient to support a claim of title thru acquisitive prescription.
The possession of public land, however long the period may have extended, never confers title
thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not
operate against the State unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same
under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State.
[Emphases supplied]

In the recent case of Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines,73 the Court
emphasized that fundamental is the rule that lands of the public domain, unless declared
otherwise by virtue of a statute or law, are inalienable and can never be acquired by prescription.

19
No amount of time of possession or occupation can ripen into ownership over lands of the public
domain. All lands of the public domain presumably belong to the State and are inalienable.
Lands that are not clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and,
therefore, may not be alienated or disposed.74

Another recent case, Diaz v. Republic,75 also held that possession even for more than 30 years
cannot ripen into ownership.76 Possession is of no moment if applicants fail to sufficiently and
satisfactorily show that the subject lands over which an application was applied for was indeed
an alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain. It would not matter even if
they declared it for tax purposes. In Republic v. Heirs of Juan Fabio,77 the rule was reiterated.
Thus:

Well-entrenched is the rule that unless a land is reclassified and declared alienable and
disposable, occupation in the concept of an owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
ownership and be registered as a title. Consequently, respondents could not have occupied the
Lot in the concept of an owner in 1947 and subsequent years when respondents declared the Lot
for taxation purposes, or even earlier when respondents' predecessors-in-interest possessed the
Lot, because the Lot was considered inalienable from the time of its declaration as a military
reservation in 1904. Therefore, respondents failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence,
that the Lot is alienable and disposable.

Public lands not shown to have been classified as alienable and disposable land remain part of
the inalienable public domain. In view of the lack of sufficient evidence showing that the Lot
was already classified as alienable and disposable, the Lot applied for by respondents is
inalienable land of the public domain, not subject to registration under Section 14(1) of PD 1529
and Section 48(b) of CA 141, as amended by PD 1073. Hence, there is no need to discuss the
other requisites dealing with respondents' occupation and possession of the Lot in the concept of
an owner.

While it is an acknowledged policy of the State to promote the distribution of alienable public
lands to spur economic growth and in line with the ideal of social justice, the law imposes
stringent safeguards upon the grant of such resources lest they fall into the wrong hands to the
prejudice of the national patrimony. We must not, therefore, relax the stringent safeguards
relative to the registration of imperfect titles. [Emphases Supplied]

In Estonilo,78 where the Court ruled that persons claiming the protection of "private rights" in
order to exclude their lands from military reservations must show by clear and convincing
evidence that the properties in question had been acquired by a legal method of acquiring public
lands, the respondents therein failed to clearly prove that the lands over which they lay a claim
were alienable and disposable so that the same belonged and continued to belong to the State and
could not be subject to the commerce of man or registration. Specifically, the Court wrote:

Land that has not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belongs to
the State as part of the public domain. For this reason, imperfect titles to agricultural lands are
subjected to rigorous scrutiny before judicial confirmation is granted. In the same manner,
persons claiming the protection of "private rights" in order to exclude their lands from military
reservations must show by clear and convincing evidence that the pieces of property in question
have been acquired by a legal method of acquiring public lands.

In granting respondents judicial confirmation of their imperfect title, the trial and the appellate
courts gave much weight to the tax declarations presented by the former. However, while the tax
declarations were issued under the names of respondents’ predecessors-in-interest, the earliest
one presented was issued only in 1954.19 The Director, Lands Management Bureau v. CA20
held thus:

"x x x. Tax receipts and tax declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership.1âwphi1
They are mere indicia of [a] claim of ownership. In Director of Lands vs. Santiago:

20
‘x x x [I]f it is true that the original owner and possessor, Generosa Santiago, had been in
possession since 1925, why were the subject lands declared for taxation purposes for the first
time only in 1968, and in the names of Garcia and Obdin? For although tax receipts and
declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership,
they constitute at least proof that the holder had a claim of title over the property.’"

In addition, the lower courts credited the alleged prior possession by Calixto and Rosendo Bacas,
from whom respondents’ predecessors had purportedly bought the property. This alleged prior
possession, though, was totally devoid of any supporting evidence on record. Respondents’
evidence hardly supported the conclusion that their predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the land since "time immemorial."

Moreover, as correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the evidence on record
merely established the transfer of the property from Calixto Bacas to Nazaria Bombeo . The
evidence did not show the nature and the period of the alleged possession by Calixto and
Rosendo Bacas. It is important that applicants for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles must
present specific acts of ownership to substantiate their claims; they cannot simply offer general
statements that are mere conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of possession.

It must be stressed that respondents, as applicants, have the burden of proving that they have an
imperfect title to Lot 4318. Even the absence of opposition from the government does not relieve
them of this burden. Thus, it was erroneous for the trial and the appellate courts to hold that the
failure of the government to dislodge respondents, judicially or extrajudicially, from the subject
land since 1954 already amounted to a title. [Emphases supplied]

The ruling reiterated the long standing rule in the case of Director Lands Management Bureau v.
Court of Appeals,79

x x x. The petitioner is not necessarily entitled to have the land registered under the Torrens
system simply because no one appears to oppose his title and to oppose the registration of his
land. He must show, even though there is no opposition to the satisfaction of the court, that he is
the absolute owner, in fee simple. Courts are not justified in registering property under the
Torrens system, simply because there is no opposition offered. Courts may, even in the absence
of any opposition, deny the registration of the land under the Torrens system, upon the ground
that the facts presented did not show that the petitioner is the owner, in fee simple, of the land
which he is attempting to have registered.

The Court is not unmindful of the principle of immutability of judgments that nothing is more
settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes immutable and
unalterable.80 Such principle, however, must yield to the basic rule that a decision which is null
and void for want of jurisdiction of the trial court is not a decision m contemplation of law and
can never become final and executory.81

Had the LRC given primary importance on the status of the land and not merely relied on the
testimonial evidence of the respondents without other proof of the alienability of the land, the
litigation would have already been ended and finally settled in accordance with law and
jurisprudence a long time ago.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The November 12, 2007 Decision and the May 15,
2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 64142 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Judgment is rendered declaring the proceedings in the Land Registration Court
as NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, Original Certificate of Title Nos. 0-
358 and 0-669 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City are CANCELLED. Lot
No. 4354 and Lot No. 4357 are ordered reverted to the public domain.

SO ORDERED.

21
G.R. No. 173423 March 5, 2014

SPS. ANTONIO FORTUNA and ERLINDA FORTUNA, Petitioners,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by the petitioners, spouses Antonio
and Erlinda Fortuna, assailing the decision dated May 16, 20052 and the resolution dated June
27, 20063 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71143. The CA reversed and set
aside the decision dated May 7, 20014 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La
Union, Branch 66, in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 2372.

THE BACKGROUND FACTS

In December 1994, the spouses Fortuna filed an application for registration of a 2,597-square
meter land identified as Lot No. 4457, situated in Bo. Canaoay, San Fernando, La Union. The
application was filed with the RTC and docketed as LRC No. 2372.

The spouses Fortuna stated that Lot No. 4457 was originally owned by Pastora Vendiola, upon
whose death was succeeded by her children, Clemente and Emeteria Nones. Through an affidavit
of adjudication dated August 3, 1972, Emeteria renounced all her interest in Lot No. 4457 in
favor of Clemente. Clemente later sold the lot in favor of Rodolfo Cuenca on May 23, 1975.
Rodolfo sold the same lot to the spouses Fortuna through a deed of absolute sale dated May 4,
1984.

The spouses Fortuna claimed that they, through themselves and their predecessors-in-interest,
have been in quiet, peaceful, adverse and uninterrupted possession of Lot No. 4457 for more than
50 years, and submitted as evidence the lot’s survey plan, technical description, and certificate of
assessment.

Although the respondent, Republic of the Philippines (Republic), opposed the application,5 it did
not present any evidence in support of its opposition. Since no private opposition to the
registration was filed, the RTC issued an order of general default on November 11, 1996 against
the whole world, except the Republic.6

In its Decision dated May 7, 2001,7 the RTC granted the application for registration in favor of
the spouses Fortuna. The RTC declared that "[the spouses Fortuna] have established [their]
possession, including that of their predecessors-in-interest of the land sought to be registered, has
been open, continuous, peaceful, adverse against the whole world and in the concept of an owner
since 1948, or for a period of over fifty (50) years."8

The Republic appealed the RTC decision with the CA, arguing that the spouses Fortuna did not
present an official proclamation from the government that the lot has been classified as alienable
and disposable agricultural land. It also claimed that the spouses Fortuna’s evidence – Tax
Declaration No. 8366 – showed that possession over the lot dates back only to 1948, thus, failing
to meet the June 12, 1945 cut-off period provided under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree (PRD).

In its decision dated May 16, 2005,9 the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision. Although
it found that the spouses Fortuna were able to establish the alienable and disposable nature of the
land,10 they failed to show that they complied with the length of possession that the law
requires, i.e., since June 12, 1945. It agreed with the Republic’s argument that Tax Declaration

22
No. 8366 only showed that the spouses Fortuna’s predecessor-in-interest, Pastora, proved that
she had been in possession of the land only since 1948.

The CA denied the spouses Fortuna’s motion for reconsideration of its decision in its resolution
dated June 27, 2006.11

THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS

Through the present petition, the spouses Fortuna seek a review of the CA rulings.

They contend that the applicable law is Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the
Public Land Act (PLA), as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942. RA No. 1942 amended the
PLA by requiring 30 years of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession to acquire
imperfect title over an agricultural land of the public domain. This 30-year period, however, was
removed by PD No. 1073 and instead required that the possession should be since June 12, 1945.
The amendment introduced by PD No. 1073 was carried in Section 14(1) of the PRD.12

The spouses Fortuna point out that PD No. 1073 was issued on January 25, 1977 and published
on May 9, 1977; and the PRD was issued on June 11, 1978 and published on January 2, 1979.
On the basis of the Court’s ruling in Tañada, et al. v. Hon. Tuvera, etc., et al.,13 they allege that
PD No. 1073 and the PRD should be deemed effective only on May 24, 1977 and January 17,
1979, respectively. By these dates, they claim to have already satisfied the 30-year requirement
under the RA No. 1942 amendment because Pastora’s possession dates back, at the latest, to
1947.

They allege that although Tax Declaration No. 8366 was made in 1948, this does not contradict
that fact that Pastora possessed Lot No. 4457 before 1948. The failure to present documentary
evidence proving possession earlier than 1948 was explained by Filma Salazar, Records Officer
of the Provincial Assessor’s Office, who testified that the records were lost beyond recovery due
to the outbreak of World War II.

Notwithstanding the absence of documents executed earlier than 1948, the spouses Fortuna
contend that evidence exists indicating that Pastora possessed the lot even before 1948. First, Tax
Declaration No. 8366 does not contain a statement that it is a new tax declaration. Second, the
annotation found at the back of Tax Declaration No. 8366 states that "this declaration cancels
Tax Nos. 10543[.]"14 Since Tax Declaration No. 8366 was issued in 1948, the cancelled Tax
Declaration No. 10543 was issued, at the latest, in 1947, indicating that there was already an
owner and possessor of the lot before 1948. Third, they rely on the testimony of one Macaria
Flores in LRC No. 2373. LRC No. 2373 was also commenced by the spouses Fortuna to register
Lot Nos. 4462, 27066, and 27098,15 which were also originally owned by Pastora and are
adjacent to the subject Lot No. 4457. Macaria testified that she was born in 1926 and resided in a
place a few meters from the three lots. She stated that she regularly passed by these lots on her
way to school since 1938. She knew the property was owned by Pastora because the latter’s
family had constructed a house and planted fruit-bearing trees thereon; they also cleaned the
area. On the basis of Macaria’s testimony and the other evidence presented in LRC No. 2373, the
RTC granted the spouses Fortuna’s application for registration of Lot Nos. 4462, 27066, and
27098 in its decision of January 3, 2005.16 The RTC’s decision has lapsed into finality
unappealed.

The spouses Fortuna claim that Macaria’s testimony in LRC No. 2373 should be considered to
prove Pastora’s possession prior to 1948. Although LRC No. 2373 is a separate registration
proceeding, it pertained to lots adjacent to the subject property, Lot No. 4457, and belonged to
the same predecessor-in-interest. Explaining their failure to present Macaria in the proceedings
before the RTC in LRC No. 2372, the spouses Fortuna said "it was only after the reception of
evidence x x x that [they] were able to trace and establish the identity and competency of
Macaria[.]"17

23
Commenting on the spouses Fortuna’s petition, the Republic relied mostly on the CA’s ruling
which denied the registration of title and prayed for the dismissal of the petition.

THE COURT’S RULING

We deny the petition for failure of the spouses Fortuna to sufficiently prove their compliance
with the requisites for the acquisition of title to alienable lands of the public domain.

The nature of Lot No. 4457 as alienable and

disposable public land has not been sufficiently
established

The Constitution declares that all lands of the public domain are owned by the State.18 Of the
four classes of public land, i.e., agricultural lands, forest or timber lands, mineral lands, and
national parks, only agricultural lands may be alienated.19 Public land that has not been
classified as alienable agricultural land remains part of the inalienable public domain. Thus, it is
essential for any applicant for registration of title to land derived through a public grant to
establish foremost the alienable and disposable nature of the land. The PLA provisions on the
grant and disposition of alienable public lands, specifically, Sections 11 and 48(b), will find
application only from the time that a public land has been classified as agricultural and declared
as alienable and disposable.

Under Section 6 of the PLA,20 the classification and the reclassification of public lands are the
prerogative of the Executive Department. The President, through a presidential proclamation or
executive order, can classify or reclassify a land to be included or excluded from the public
domain. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary is likewise
empowered by law to approve a land classification and declare such land as alienable and
disposable.21

Accordingly, jurisprudence has required that an applicant for registration of title acquired
through a public land grant must present incontrovertible evidence that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable by establishing the existence of a positive act of the
government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.

In this case, the CA declared that the alienable nature of the land was established by the notation
in the survey plan,22 which states:

This survey is inside alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 13 L.C. Map No. 1395
certified August 7, 1940. It is outside any civil or military reservation.23

It also relied on the Certification dated July 19, 1999 from the DENR Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) that "there is, per record, neither any public land
application filed nor title previously issued for the subject parcel[.]"24 However, we find that
neither of the above documents is evidence of a positive act from the government reclassifying
the lot as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain.

Mere notations appearing in survey plans are inadequate proof of the covered properties’
alienable and disposable character.25 These notations, at the very least, only establish that the
land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved alienable and disposable
area per verification through survey by the proper government office. The applicant, however,
must also present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and disposable
land, as declared by the DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the President.26 In Republic v.
Heirs of Juan Fabio,27 the Court ruled that [t]he applicant for land registration must prove that
the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public
domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration
falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO28 or CENRO. In

24
addition, the applicant must present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable
and disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary, or as proclaimed by the President.

The survey plan and the DENR-CENRO certification are not proof that the President or the
DENR Secretary has reclassified and released the public land as alienable and disposable. The
offices that prepared these documents are not the official repositories or legal custodian of the
issuances of the President or the DENR Secretary declaring the public land as alienable and
disposable.29

For failure to present incontrovertible evidence that Lot No. 4457 has been reclassified as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain though a positive act of the Executive
Department, the spouses Fortuna’s claim of title through a public land grant under the PLA
should be denied.

In judicial confirmation of imperfect

or incomplete title, the period of
possession should commence, at the
latest, as of May 9, 1947

Although the above finding that the spouses Fortuna failed to establish the alienable and
disposable character of Lot No. 4457 serves as sufficient ground to deny the petition and
terminate the case, we deem it proper to continue to address the other important legal issues
raised in the petition.

As mentioned, the PLA is the law that governs the grant and disposition of alienable agricultural
lands. Under Section 11 of the PLA, alienable lands of the public domain may be disposed of,
among others, by judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title. This mode of acquisition
of title is governed by Section 48(b) of the PLA, the original version of which states:

Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in- interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, except as against the
Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety- four, except when prevented
by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. [emphasis supplied]

On June 22, 1957, the cut-off date of July 26, 1894 was replaced by a 30-year period of
possession under RA No. 1942. Section 48(b) of the PLA, as amended by RA No. 1942, read:

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or
force majeure. [emphasis and underscore ours]

On January 25, 1977, PD No. 1073 replaced the 30-year period of possession by requiring
possession since June 12, 1945. Section 4 of PD No. 1073 reads:

25
SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act
are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945. [emphasis supplied]

Under the PD No. 1073 amendment, possession of at least 32 years – from 1945 up to its
enactment in 1977 – is required. This effectively impairs the vested rights of applicants who had
complied with the 30-year possession required under the RA No. 1942 amendment, but whose
possession commenced only after the cut-off date of June 12, 1945 was established by the PD
No. 1073 amendment. To remedy this, the Court ruled in Abejaron v. Nabasa30 that "Filipino
citizens who by themselves or their predecessors-in-interest have been, prior to the effectivity of
P.D. 1073 on January 25, 1977, in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since January 24, 1947 may apply for judicial
confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title under Sec. 48(b) of the [PLA]." January 24,
1947 was considered as the cut-off date as this was exactly 30 years counted backward from
January 25, 1977 – the effectivity date of PD No. 1073.

It appears, however, that January 25, 1977 was the date PD No. 1073 was enacted; based on the
certification from the National Printing Office,31 PD No. 1073 was published in Vol. 73, No. 19
of the Official Gazette, months later than its enactment or on May 9, 1977. This uncontroverted
fact materially affects the cut-off date for applications for judicial confirmation of incomplete
title under Section 48(b) of the PLA.

Although Section 6 of PD No. 1073 states that "[the] Decree shall take effect upon its
promulgation," the Court has declared in Tañada, et al. v. Hon. Tuvera, etc., et al.32 that the
publication of laws is an indispensable requirement for its effectivity. "[A]ll statutes, including
those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature."33 Accordingly, Section 6 of PD No. 1073 should be understood to mean that the
decree took effect only upon its publication, or on May 9, 1977. This, therefore, moves the cut-
off date for applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under Section
48(b) of the PLA to May 8, 1947. In other words, applicants must prove that they have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least 30 years, or at
least since May 8, 1947.

The spouses Fortuna were unable to prove

that they possessed Lot No. 4457 since May 8, 1947

Even if the Court assumes that Lot No. 4457 is an alienable and disposable agricultural land of
the public domain, the spouses Fortuna’s application for registration of title would still not
prosper for failure to sufficiently prove that they possessed the land since May 8, 1947.

The spouses Fortuna’s allegation that: (1) the absence of a notation that Tax Declaration No.
8366 was a new tax declaration and (2) the notation stating that Tax Declaration No. 8366
cancels the earlier Tax Declaration No. 10543 both indicate that Pastora possessed the land prior
to 1948 or, at the earliest, in 1947. We also observe that Tax Declaration No. 8366 contains a
sworn statement of the owner that was subscribed on October 23, 1947.34 While these
circumstances may indeed indicate possession as of 1947, none proves that it commenced as of
the cut-off date of May 8, 1947. Even if the tax declaration indicates possession since 1947, it
does not show the nature of Pastora’s possession. Notably, Section 48(b) of the PLA speaks of
possession and occupation. "Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear
intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than
occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word
occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken

26
together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to
highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction."35
Nothing in Tax Declaration No. 8366 shows that Pastora exercised acts of possession and
occupation such as cultivation of or fencing off the land. Indeed, the lot was described as
"cogonal."36

The spouses Fortuna seeks to remedy the defects of Tax Declaration No. 8366 by relying on
Macaria’s testimony in a separate land registration proceeding, LRC No. 2373. Macaria alleged
that she passed by Pastora’s lots on her way to school, and she saw Pastora’s family construct a
house, plant fruit-bearing trees, and clean the area. However, the Court is not convinced that
Macaria’s testimony constituted as the "well-nigh incontrovertible evidence" required in cases of
this nature.

The records disclose that the spouses Fortuna acquired adjoining parcels of land, all of which are
claimed to have previously belonged to Pastora. These parcels of land were covered by three
separate applications for registration, to wit:

a. LRC No. N-1278, involving Lot Nos. 1 and 2, with a total area of 2,961 sq. m.,
commenced by Emeteria;

b. LRC No. 2373, involving Lot Nos. 4462, 27066, and 27098, with a total area of 4,006
sq. m., commenced by the spouses Fortuna; and

c. LRC No. 2372 (the subject case), involving Lot No. 4457, with a total area of 2,597 sq.
m.

As these cases involved different but adjoining lots that belonged to the same predecessor-in-
interest, the spouses Fortuna alleged that the final rulings in LRC Nos. N-1278 and 2373,37
upholding Pastora’s ownership, be taken into account in resolving the present case.

Notably, the total land area of the adjoining lots that are claimed to have previously belonged to
Pastora is 9,564 sq. m. This is too big an area for the Court to consider that Pastora’s claimed
acts of possession and occupation (as testified to by Macaria) encompassed the entirety of the
lots. Given the size of the lots, it is unlikely that Macaria (age 21 in 1947) could competently
assess and declare that its entirety belonged to Pastora because she saw acts of possession and
occupation in what must have been but a limited area. As mentioned, Tax Declaration No. 8366
described Lot No. 4457 as "cogonal," thus, Macaria could not have also been referring to Lot No.
4457 when she said that Pastora planted fruit-bearing trees on her properties.

The lower courts' final rulings in LRC Nos. N-1278 and 2373, upholding Pastora's possession, do
not tie this Court's hands into ruling in favor of the spouses Fortuna. Much to our dismay, the
rulings in LRC Nos. N-1278 and 2373 do not even show that the lots have been officially
reclassified as alienable lands of the public domain or that the nature and duration of Pastora's
occupation met the requirements of the PLA, thus, failing to convince us to either disregard the
rules of evidence or consider their merits. In this regard, we reiterate our directive in Santiago v.
De las Santos:38 Both under the 193 5 and the present Constitutions, the conservation no less
than the utilization of the natural resources is ordained. There would be a failure to abide by its
command if the judiciary does not scrutinize with care applications to private ownership of real
estate. To be granted, they must be grounded in well-nigh incontrovertible evidence. Where, as
in this case, no such proof would be forthcoming, there is no justification for viewing such claim
with favor. It is a basic assumption of our polity that lands of whatever classification belong to
the state. Unless alienated in accordance with law, it retains its rights over the same as do minus.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated May 16, 2005 and the resolution
dated June 27, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71143 are AFFIRMED insofar
as these dismissed the spouses Antonio and Erlinda Fortuna's application of registration of title
on the basis of the grounds discussed above. Costs against the spouses Fortuna.

27
G.R. No. 133168 March 28, 2006

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,1

vs.
BENJAMIN GUERRERO, Respondent.

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
is the decision2 dated February 12, 1998 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
50298 affirming an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City in Civil
Case No. 89-3899, entitled "Petition for Amendment of Plan and Technical Description of
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-28 in the name of Benjamin Guerrero, Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City."

The assailed decision of the CA recites the facts as follows:

Sometime in December 1964, respondent Benjamin Guerrero filed with the Bureau of Lands
(now Lands Management Bureau) a Miscellaneous Sales Application No. V-83191 covering a
parcel of land situated at Pugad Lawin, Quezon City, consisting of 256 square meters. Upon
favorable report and recommendation of the District Land Officer, Guerrero’s application was
approved per Order of Award (Exhibit "B"), with the boundaries of the land awarded specified as
follows: N-Lot No. 10-C, Psd-37801; S-Culiat Creek; E-Road; and W-Public Land. A sketch of
the land awarded is contained at the back of the Order of Award.

Subsequently, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 8991 dated August 16, 1982 was issued in favor
of respondent. Pursuant thereto the corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. 0-28 was
issued on August 27, 1982.

On July 29, 1983, one Angelina Bustamante filed a protest with the Bureau of Lands claiming
that respondent obtained the sales patent through fraud, false statement of facts and/or omission
of material facts considering that 174 square meters awarded to respondent covered the land
where her house is situated and where she has been residing since 1961.

A formal investigation was conducted by the Bureau of Lands, after which the Director of Lands
issued an order dismissing the protest of Angelina Z. Bustamante. The dismissal of the protest
was affirmed by the then Minister of Natural Resources and by the Office of the President in a
Decision dated July 22, 1985.

Bustamante filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision dated July 22, 1985. Acting on the
motion for reconsideration, the President, …, ordered that the case be remanded to the DENR
[Department of Environment and Natural Resources] for the latter’s office to conduct an ocular
investigation and resurvey of the disputed area. The said directive is contained in the Order dated
October 30, 1987(Exhibit "J").

Pursuant to the order of the Office of the President, an ocular investigation and relocation survey
was conducted by the DENR. A report (Exhibit "K") was thereafter submitted with a finding that
83 square meters of the titled property of Guerrero consisting of 174 square meters is under
ACTUAL PHYSICAL POSSESSION of Marcelo Bustamante (husband of Angelina
Bustamante) with only 91 square meters under the physical possession of Guerrero. It was also
found out that OCT No. 0-28 is supposed to be traversed by a road 3 meters wide, as even the
Order of Award in favor of Guerrero, shows by the boundaries of the land indicated therein, viz:
bounded on the N-Lot No. 10-C, Psd-37801, S-Culiat Creek, E-Road and W-Public Land.

28
On January 10, 1989, the Office of the President, upon receipt of the [DENR] Ocular
Investigation and Relocation Survey Report (Exhibit "K") …, issued an order directing the
DENR to implement the … Report for the ‘proper correction’ of the technical description of the
land covered by OCT No. 0-28 issued to respondent.

Pursuant to the directive of the Office of the President, the Director of Lands [on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines] instituted the instant action [Petition for Amendment of Plan and
Technical Description of OCT No. 0-28 in the name of Benjamin Guerrero] on November 7,
1989.

On April 6, 1990, the [respondent] Benjamin Guerrero filed a motion to dismiss the petition …,
alleging among other things, that the RTC of Quezon City was without jurisdiction over the
Director of Lands’ petition and that the said petition was defective in form and substance,
inasmuch as it failed to name [Guerrero] who holds a certificate of title (OCT No. 0-28) over the
properties subject of the petition, as respondent in the action, and that the title sought to be
amended was irrevocable and can no longer be questioned.

In its order dated July 8, 1992, the lower court denied the said motion to dismiss for lack of
merit. Trial of the petition followed with the Director of Lands, on one hand, and [Guerrero], on
the other, presenting their respective evidence and witnesses.3 [Words in bracket added.]

On July 13, 1995, the RTC, on the postulate that petitioner Republic failed to prove its allegation
that respondent obtained the sales patent and the certificate of title through fraud and
misrepresentation, rendered judgment finding for the latter. The trial court likewise ruled that the
original certificate of title (OCT No. 0-28) in the name of respondent acquired the characteristics
of indefeasibility after the expiration of one (1) year from the entry of the decree of registration.

Consequently, petitioner interposed an appeal to the CA, which, in a decision dated February 12,
1998, affirmed that of the trial court, rationalizing as follows:

It is a settled rule that a certificate of title issued pursuant to any grant or patent involving public
lands is as conclusive and indefeasible as any other certificate of title issued upon private lands
in ordinary or cadastral registration proceedings. The effect of registration of a homestead or any
other similar patent and the issuance of a certificate of title to the patentee is to vest in him an
incontestable title to the land, in the same manner as if ownership had been determined by final
decree of the court, and the title so issued is absolutely conclusive and indisputable.

In the same way, therefore, that a decree of registration may be reviewed or reopened within one
year after the entry thereof, upon a charge of actual fraud, a patent awarded in accordance with
the Public Land Law may be reviewed within one year from the date of the order for the issuance
of the patent also on the ground of actual fraud.

x x x x x x x x x

xxx there is no showing … that at the time the [respondent] applied for his miscellaneous sales
patent, there were third persons who had been in occupation of the land applied for. While
subsequent survey documents, prepared as a consequence of the protest filed by the
Bustamentes, report the possession of the Bustamantes of a portion of the land, and the erection
of their house thereon, these reports do not indicate if such structures were existing at the time
the application of the [respondent] was filed in 1964.

There is no support, therefore, to the submission that the [respondent] was guilty of actual fraud
in the acquisition of his miscellaneous sales patent, and subsequently, OCT No. 0-28.4 (Words in
bracket added)

Petitioner then moved for a reconsideration of the above decision but the same was denied by the
appellate court in its resolution of March 23, 1998.5

29
Hence, this recourse, petitioner Republic contending that the appellate court erred in holding -

I. That a certificate of title issued pursuant to any grant or patent involving public lands is
conclusive and indefeasible despite the fact that respondent’s title was procured through
fraud and misrepresentation.

II. That there is no basis for the submission that respondent was guilty of actual fraud in
the acquisition of his miscellaneous sales patent despite the final ruling of the Office of
the President from which ruling respondent did not appeal.

III. That the Director of Lands cannot raise the issue of possession of a third person of the
land, or a portion thereof, after the award and issuance of the patent to the applicant
despite the obvious fact that the protest was filed within one year from the issuance of
patent.6

Petitioner argues in esse that respondent procured his sales patent and certificate of title through
fraud and misrepresentation. To support its basic posture, petitioner points to the verification
survey conducted by Engr. Ernesto Erive of the DENR, which, to petitioner, argues for the
proposition that respondent’s entitlement to a public land award should have been limited to a
91-square meter area instead of the 174 square meters eventually granted.

On the other hand, respondent contends that his OCT No. 0-28 which he secured pursuant to a
sales patent is conclusive and indefeasible under the Torrens system of registration. As such, his
title can no longer be altered, impugned or cancelled.

At the outset, it must be pointed out that the essential issue raised in this Petition ― the presence
of fraud ― is factual. As a general rule, this Court does not review factual matters, as only
questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari filed with this Court. And as
the Court has consistently held, factual findings of trial courts, when adopted and confirmed by
the CA, are final and conclusive on this Court,7 save when the judgment of the appellate court is
based on a misapprehension of facts or factual inferences manifestly incorrect or when that court
overlooked certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.8 Obviously, petitioner is invoking these exceptions toward having the Court review
the factual determinations of the CA.

The basic issue in this case turns on whether or not petitioner has proven by clear and convincing
evidence that respondent procured Miscellaneous Sales Patent (MSP) No. 8991 and OCT No. 0-
28 through fraud and misrepresentation.

It bears to stress that the property in question, while once part of the lands of the public domain
and disposed of via a miscellaneous sales arrangement, is now covered by a Torrens certificate.
Grants of public land were brought under the operation of the Torrens system by Act No. 496, or
the Land Registration Act of 1903. Under the Torrens system of registration, the government is
required to issue an official certificate of title to attest to the fact that the person named is the
owner of the property described therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted
or what the law warrants or reserves.9 As it were, the Torrens system aims to obviate possible
conflicts of title by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate and
to dispense, as a rule, with the necessity of inquiring further; on the part of the registered owner,
the system gives him complete peace of mind that he would be secured in his ownership as long
as he has not voluntarily disposed of any right over the covered land.10

Section 122 of Act No. 496 provides:

SEC. 122. Whenever public lands … belonging to the Government of the [Republic of the
Philippines] are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations,
the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act and shall become registered
lands. It shall be the duty of the official issuing the instrument of alienation, grant, or conveyance

30
in behalf of the Government to cause such instrument before its delivery to the grantee, to be
filed with the register of deeds for the province where the land lies and to be there registered like
other deeds and conveyances, whereupon a certificate shall be entered as in other cases of
registered land, and an owner’s duplicate certificate issued to the grantee. The deed, grant, or
instrument of conveyance from the Government shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind the
land, but shall operate only as a contract between the Government and the grantee and as
evidence of authority to the clerk or register of deeds to make registration. The act of registration
shall be the operative act to convey and affect the land, and in all cases under this Act
registration shall be made in the office of the register of deeds for the province where the land
lies. xxx. (Words in bracket added)

Upon its registration, the land falls under the operation of Act No. 496 and becomes registered
land. Time and again, we have said that a Torrens certificate is evidence of an indefeasible title
to property in favor of the person whose name appears thereon.11

However, Section 38 of Act No. 496 recognizes the right of a person deprived of land to institute
an action to reopen or revise a decree of registration obtained by actual fraud. Section 38 of Act
No. 496 says so:

SEC. 38. ― xxx. Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto, subject
only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all
persons, including the [Republic of the Philippines] and all the branches thereof, …. Such decree
shall not be opened by reason of the absence, minority, or other disability of any person affected
thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees, subject,
however, to the right of any person deprived of the land or of any estate or interest therein by
decree of registration obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance [now
Regional Trial Court] a petition for review of the decree of registration within one year after
entry of the decree provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. Upon the
expiration of said term of one year, every decree or certificate of title issued in accordance with
this section shall be incontrovertible. xxx. (Emphasis and words in bracket supplied)

Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or positive fraud proceeds from an
intentional deception practiced by means of the misrepresentation or concealment of a material
fact. Constructive fraud is construed as a fraud because of its detrimental effect upon public
interests and public or private confidence, even though the act is not done with an actual design
to commit positive fraud or injury upon other persons.12

Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is regarded as intrinsic where the fraudulent
acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action, or where the acts constituting the fraud
were or could have been litigated therein. The fraud is extrinsic if it is employed to deprive
parties of their day in court and thus prevent them from asserting their right to the property
registered in the name of the applicant.13

The distinctions assume significance because only actual and extrinsic fraud had been accepted
and is contemplated by the law as a ground to review or reopen a decree of registration. Thus,
relief is granted to a party deprived of his interest in land where the fraud consists in a deliberate
misrepresentation that the lots are not contested when in fact they are; or in willfully
misrepresenting that there are no other claims; or in deliberately failing to notify the party
entitled to notice; or in inducing him not to oppose an application; or in misrepresenting about
the identity of the lot to the true owner by the applicant causing the former to withdraw his
application. In all these examples, the overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of
the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court or from presenting his case.
The fraud, therefore, is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the court.14

We have repeatedly held that relief on the ground of fraud will not be granted where the alleged
fraud goes into the merits of the case, is intrinsic and not collateral, and has been controverted
and decided. Thus, we have underscored the denial of relief where it appears that the fraud

31
consisted in the presentation at the trial of a supposed forged document, or a false and perjured
testimony, or in basing the judgment on a fraudulent compromise agreement, or in the alleged
fraudulent acts or omissions of the counsel which prevented the petitioner from properly
presenting the case.15

Petitioner fails to convince the Court that the facts relied upon by it to justify a review of the
decree constitute actual and extrinsic fraud. It has not adduced adequate evidence that would
show that respondent employed actual and extrinsic fraud in procuring the patent and the
corresponding certificate of title. Petitioner miserably failed to prove that it was prevented from
asserting its right over the lot in question and from properly presenting its case by reason of such
fraud. In fact, other than its peremptory statement in its petition filed before the trial court that
"the patentee, Benjamin Guerrero, obtained the above indicated sales patent through fraud, false
statement of facts and/or omission of material facts,"16 petitioner did not specifically allege how
fraud was perpetrated by respondent in procuring the sales patent and the certificate of title. Nor
was any evidence proffered to substantiate the allegation. Fraud cannot be presumed, and the
failure of petitioner to prove it defeats it own cause.

Well-settled is the rule that the party alleging fraud or mistake in a transaction bears the burden
of proof.17 The circumstances evidencing fraud are as varied as the people who perpetrate it in
each case. It may assume different shapes and forms; it may be committed in as many different
ways.18 Thus, the law requires that fraud be established, not just by preponderance of evidence,
but by clear and convincing evidence.19

Petitioner relies heavily on the verification survey report20 which stated that respondent Guerrero
was entitled to only 91 square meters of the subject lot instead of 174 square meters which was
awarded to him. There is, however, no proof that the area eventually awarded to respondent was
intentionally and fraudulently increased. It was never proven that respondent was a party to any
fraud that led to the award of a bigger area of 174 square meters instead of 91 square meters.
Petitioner even failed to give sufficient proof of any error which may have been committed by its
agents who had surveyed the subject property nor had petitioner offered a sensible explanation as
to the reason for such discrepancy. Thus, the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official functions must be respected.

This Court agrees with the RTC that the issuance of the sales patent over the subject lot was
made in accordance with the procedure laid down by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended,
otherwise known as the Public Land Act.21 Under Section 91 thereof, an investigation should be
conducted for the purpose of ascertaining the veracity of the material facts set out in the
application.22 The law also requires sufficient notice to the municipality and barrio where the
land is located in order to give adverse claimants the opportunity to present their claims.23

In the instant case, records reveal that on December 22, 1964, a day after respondent filed his
miscellaneous sales application, an actual investigation and site verification of the parcel of land
was conducted by Land Investigator Alfonso Tumbocon who reported that the land was free
from claims and conflicts.24 Likewise, the notice of sale of the lot in question was posted at the
District Land Office in San Miguel, Manila, at the Quezon City Hall, and at Pugad Lawin,
Quezon City for 30 consecutive days from February 17, 1965 to March 17, 1965 which was the
date scheduled for the sale of the lot. The said notice was worded as follows:

If there is any adverse claim to the land, such claim must be filed at the Bureau of Lands, Manila
on or before the date of the sale; otherwise such claim shall forever be barred.25

Further, the "Order of Award" 26 dated May 20, 1971, as well as the "Issuance of Patent"27 dated
June 28, 1982 were both duly signed by the Director of Lands. The "Order of Award" even
declared that Guerrero has in good faith established his residence on the land in question. On the
other hand, the "Issuance of Patent" stated that the land consisting of 174 square meters is free
from any adverse claim and that Guerrero has fully paid the purchase price of the lot. Having
complied with all the requirements of the law preliminary to the issuance of the patent,

32
respondent was thus issued MSP No. 8991 dated August 16, 1982. Thereafter, the corresponding
OCT No. 0-28 was issued on August 27, 1982 in the name of respondent Guerrero.

At any rate, by legal presumption, public officers are deemed to have regularly performed their
official duties. Thus, the proceedings for land registration that led to the issuance of MSP No.
8991 and OCT No. 0-28 in respondent’s name are presumptively regular and proper. To overturn
this legal presumption will not only endanger judicial stability, but also violate the underlying
principle of the Torrens system. Indeed, to do so would reduce the vaunted legal indefeasibility
of Torrens titles to meaningless verbiage.28 Besides, this presumption of regularity has not been
overcome by the evidence presented by petitioner. We, therefore, cannot sustain petitioner’s
contention that fraud tainted the sales patent granted to respondent Guerrero, as well as the
certificate of title issued in consequence thereof.

Granting that Guerrero committed extrinsic and actual fraud, petitioner failed to avail itself of the
remedy within the prescribed period. Under Section 38 of Act No. 496, a petition for reopening
and review of the decree of registration must be filed within one year from the date of entry of
said decree.

In the case of public land grants or patents, the one-year period commences from the issuance of
the patent by the government.29

In the instant case, the sales patent was issued to respondent on August 16, 1982, while petitioner
instituted an action to amend respondent’s certificate of title on November 7, 1989 or after the
lapse of more than seven (7) years from the issuance of the patent. Clearly, petitioner failed to
timely avail of the remedy to contest Guerrero’s title.

Petitioner argues that the right of the State for the reversion of unlawfully acquired property is
not barred by prescription. Thus, it can still recover the land granted to respondent.

True, prescription, basically, does not run against the State and the latter may still bring an
action, even after the lapse of one year, for the reversion to the public domain of lands which
have been fraudulently granted to private individuals.30 However, this remedy of reversion can
only be availed of in cases of fraudulent or unlawful inclusion of the land in patents or
certificates of title. In the present case, petitioner cannot successfully invoke this defense for, as
discussed earlier, it was never proven that respondent’s patent and title were obtained through
actual fraud or other illegal means.

Lest it be overlooked, a piece of land covered by a registered patent and the corresponding
certificate of title ceases to be part of the public domain. As such, it is considered a private
property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction.31

Petitioner likewise insists that respondent’s title had yet to attain the status of indefeasibility. As
argued, Angelina Bustamante was able to timely file a protest on July 29, 1983, which was well
within the one-year prescriptive period.

We do not agree.

While Angelina Bustamante indeed protested the award of a sales patent in favor of respondent,
the protest was, however, filed with the Bureau of Lands instead of with the regional trial court
as mandated by the aforequoted provision of Section 38 of Act No. 496. Said provision expressly
states that a petition for review of a decree of registration shall be filed in the "proper Court of
First Instance" (now Regional Trial Court). The law did not say that such petition may be filed
with an administrative agency like the Bureau of Lands. To be sure, what the law contemplates
in allowing a review of the decree of registration is a full-blown trial before a regular court
where each party could be afforded full opportunity to present his/its case and where each of
them must establish his case by preponderance of evidence and not by mere substantial evidence,
the usual quantum of proof required in administrative proceedings. The concept of

33
"preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing,
than that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.32 On the
other hand, substantial evidence refers to such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might
conceivably opine otherwise.33

As the review of a decree of registration constitutes an attack on the very integrity of land titles
and the Torrens system, a full-blown trial on the merits before a regular court is necessary for the
purpose of achieving a more in-depth and thorough determination of all issues involved.

Hence, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the protest filed by Bustamante with the Bureau of
Lands cannot be considered in the context of a petition to review the decree of registration issued
to respondent. It was only on November 7, 1989 that such petition was filed by the Director of
Lands with the RTC and obviously, it was way beyond the one-year period prescribed by law.

It is worth stressing that the Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed
to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their
indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a
piece of land on the assurance that the seller’s title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of
being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair to
him. What is worse is that if this were permitted, public confidence in the system would be
eroded and land transactions would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily
conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence would be that land
conflicts could be even more abrasive, if not even violent. The government, recognizing the
worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to accept the validity of titles issued
thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied.34

Instead of stabilizing the Torrens system, petitioner, in filing a suit for the amendment of OCT
No. 0-28, derogates the very integrity of the system as it gives the impression to Torrens title
holders, like herein respondent, that their titles can be questioned by the same authority who had
approved their titles. In that case, no Torrens title holder shall be at peace with the ownership and
possession of his land, for land registration officers can question his title any time they make a
finding unfavorable to said title holder. This is all the more frustrating for respondent Guerrero
considering that he had bought the subject lot from the government itself, the very same party
who is now impugning his title.

While the Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands but merely a system of
registration of titles to lands,35 justice and equity demand that the titleholder should not be made
to bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the State’s agents, in the absence of
proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third persons. The real purpose of the
Torrens system is to quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any question as to the legality of
the title, except claims that were noted in the certificate at the time of the registration or that may
arise subsequent thereto.36 Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system shall forever be sullied
by the ineptitude and inefficiency of land registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to
have regularly performed their duties.37

Respondent’s certificate of title, having been registered under the Torrens system, was thus
vested with the garment of indefeasibility.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

34
G.R. No. 192896 July 24, 2013

DREAM VILLAGE NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its

Incumbent President, GREG SERIEGO, Petitioner,
vs.
BASES DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before us on Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision2 dated
September 10, 2009 and Resolution3 dated July 13, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 85228 nullifying and setting aside for lack of jurisdiction the Resolution4 dated
April 28, 2004 of the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) in COS LAP
Case No. 99-500. The fallo of the assailed COS LAP Resolution reads, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Declaring the subject property, covering an area of 78,466 square meters, now being
occupied by the members of the Dream Village Neighborhood Association, Inc. to be
outside of Swo-00-0001302 BCDA property.

2. In accordance with the tenets of social justice, members of said association are advised
to apply for sales patent on their respective occupied lots with the Land Management
Bureau, DENR-NCR, pursuant to R.A. Nos. 274 and 730.

3. Directing the Land Management Bureau-DENR-NCR to process the sales patent

application of complainants pursuant to existing laws and regulation.

4. The peaceful possession of actual occupants be respected by the respondents.

SO ORDERED.5

Antecedent Facts

Petitioner Dream Village Neighborhood Association, Inc. (Dream Village) claims to represent
more than 2,000 families who have been occupying a 78,466-square meter lot in Western
Bicutan, Taguig City since 1985 "in the concept of owners continuously, exclusively and
notoriously."6 The lot used to be part of the Hacienda de Maricaban (Maricaban), owned by
Dolores Casal y Ochoa and registered under a Torrens title,7 Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. 291, issued on October 17, 1906 by the Registry of Deeds of Rizal.8 Maricaban covered
several parcels of land with a total area of over 2,544 hectares spread out over Makati, Pasig,
Taguig, Pasay, and Parañaque.9

Following the purchase of Maricaban by the government of the United States of America (USA)
early in the American colonial period, to be converted into the military reservation known as Fort
William Mckinley, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 192 was issued in the name of the
USA to cancel OCT No. 291.10 The US government later transferred 30 has. of Maricaban to the
Manila Railroad Company, for which TCT No. 192 was cancelled by TCT Nos. 1218 and 1219,
the first in the name of the Manila Railroad Company for 30 has., and the second in the name of
the USA for the rest of the Maricaban property.11

On January 29, 1914, TCT No. 1219 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 1688, and later that
year, on September 15, 1914, TCT No. 1688 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 2288, both
times in the name of the USA.12 On December 6, 1956, the USA formally ceded Fort William
Mckinley to the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), and on September 11, 1958, TCT No.

35
2288 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 61524, this time in the name of the Republic.13 On
July 12, 1957, President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 423 withdrawing from sale or
settlement the tracts of land within Fort William Mckinley, now renamed Fort Bonifacio, and
reserving them for military purposes.14

On January 7, 1986, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476 declaring
certain portions of Fort Bonifacio alienable and disposable15 in the manner provided under
Republic Act (R.A.) Nos. 274 and 730, in relation to the Public Land Act,16 thus allowing the
sale to the settlers of home lots in Upper Bicutan, Lower Bicutan, Signal Village, and Western
Bicutan.17

On October 16, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 172 amending
Proclamation No. 2476 by limiting to Lots 1 and 2 of the survey Swo-13-000298 the areas in
Western Bicutan open for disposition.18

On March 13, 1992, R.A. No. 7227 was passed19 creating the Bases Conversion and
Development Authority (BCDA) to oversee and accelerate the conversion of Clark and Subic
military reservations and their extension camps (John Hay Station, Wallace Air Station,
O’Donnell Transmitter Station, San Miguel Naval Communications Station and Capas Relay
Station) to productive civilian uses. Section 820 of the said law provides that the capital of the
BCDA will be provided from sales proceeds or transfers of lots in nine (9) military camps in
Metro Manila, including 723 has. of Fort Bonifacio. The law, thus, expressly authorized the
President of the Philippines "to sell the above lands, in whole or in part, which are hereby
declared alienable and disposable pursuant to the provisions of existing laws and regulations
governing sales of government properties,"21 specifically to raise capital for the BCDA. Titles to
the camps were transferred to the BCDA for this purpose,22 and TCT No. 61524 was cancelled
on January 3, 1995 by TCT Nos. 23888, 23887, 23886, 22460, 23889, 23890, and 23891, now in
the name of the BCDA.23

Excepted from disposition by the BCDA are: a) approximately 148.80 has. reserved for the
National Capital Region (NCR) Security Brigade, Philippine Army officers’ housing area, and
Philippine National Police jails and support services (presently known as Camp Bagong Diwa);
b) approximately 99.91 has. in Villamor Air Base for the Presidential Airlift Wing, one squadron
of helicopters for the NCR and respective security units; c) twenty one (21) areas segregated by
various presidential proclamations; and d) a proposed 30.15 has. as relocation site for families to
be affected by the construction of Circumferential Road 5 and Radial Road 4, provided that the
boundaries and technical description of these exempt areas shall be determined by an actual
ground survey.24

Now charging the BCDA of wrongfully asserting title to Dream Village and unlawfully
subjecting its members to summary demolition, resulting in unrest and tensions among the
residents,25 on November 22, 1999, the latter filed a letter-complaint with the COSLAP to seek
its assistance in the verification survey of the subject 78,466-sq m property, which they claimed
is within Lot 1 of Swo-13-000298 and thus is covered by Proclamation No. 172. They claim that
they have been occupying the area for thirty (30) years "in the concept of owners continuously,
exclusively and notoriously for several years," and have built their houses of sturdy materials
thereon and introduced paved roads, drainage and recreational and religious facilities. Dream
Village, thus, asserts that the lot is not among those transferred to the BCDA under R.A. No.
7227, and therefore patent applications by the occupants should be processed by the Land
Management Bureau (LMB).

On August 15, 2000, Dream Village formalized its complaint by filing an Amended Petition26 in
the COSLAP. Among the reliefs it sought were:

d. DECLARING the subject property as alienable and disposable by virtue of applicable

laws;

36
 e. Declaring the portion of Lot 1 of subdivision Plan SWO-13-000298, situated in the
barrio of Western Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila, which is presently being occupied by
herein petitioner as within the coverage of Proclamation Nos. 2476 and 172 and outside
the claim of AFP-RSBS INDUSTRIAL PARK COMPLEX and/or BASES
CONVESION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY.

f. ORDERING the Land Management Bureau to process the application of the

ASSOCIATION members for the purchase of their respective lots under the provisions of
Acts Nos. 274 and 730. (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent BCDA in its Answer28 dated November 23, 2000 questioned the jurisdiction of the
COSLAP to hear Dream Village’s complaint, while asserting its title to the subject property
pursuant to R.A. No. 7227. It argued that under Executive Order (E.O.) No. 561 which created
the COSLAP, its task is merely to coordinate the various government offices and agencies
involved in the settlement of land problems or disputes, adding that BCDA does not fall in the
enumeration in Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, it being neither a pastureland-lease holder, a timber
concessionaire, or a government reservation grantee, but the holder of patrimonial government
property which cannot be the subject of a petition for classification, release or subdivision by the
occupants of Dream Village.

In its Resolution29 dated April 28, 2004, the COSLAP narrated that it called a mediation
conference on March 22, 2001, during which the parties agreed to have a relocation/verification
survey conducted of the subject lot. On April 4, 2001, the COSLAP wrote to the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)-Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office-NCR requesting the survey, which would also include Swo-00-0001302, covering the
adjacent AFP-RSBS Industrial Park established by Proclamation No. 1218 on May 8, 1998 as
well as the abandoned Circumferential Road 5 (C-5 Road).30

On April 1, 2004, the COSLAP received the final report of the verification survey and a
blueprint copy of the survey plan from Atty. Rizaldy Barcelo, Regional Technical Director for
Lands of DENR. Specifically, Item No. 3 of the DENR report states:

3. Lot-1, Swo-000298 is inside Proclamation 172. Dream Village Neighborhood Association,

Inc. is outside Lot-1, Swo-13-000298 and inside Lot-10, 11 & Portion of Lot 13, Swo-00-
0001302 with an actual area of 78,466 square meters. Likewise, the area actually is outside Swo-
00-0001302 of BCDA.31 (Emphasis ours and underscoring supplied)

COSLAP Ruling

On the basis of the DENR’s verification survey report, the COSLAP resolved that Dream Village
lies outside of BCDA, and particularly, outside of Swo-00-0001302, and thus directed the LMB
of the DENR to process the applications of Dream Village’s members for sales patent, noting
that in view of the length of time that they "have been openly, continuously and notoriously
occupying the subject property in the concept of an owner, x x x they are qualified to apply for
sales patent on their respective occupied lots pursuant to R.A. Nos. 274 and 730 in relation to the
provisions of the Public Land Act."32

On the question of its jurisdiction over the complaint, the COSLAP cited the likelihood that the
summary eviction by the BCDA of more than 2,000 families in Dream Village could stir up
serious social unrest, and maintained that Section 3(2) of E.O. No. 561 authorizes it to "assume
jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes which are critical and explosive in nature
considering, for instance, the large number of parties involved, the presence or emergence of
social tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action," even as
Section 3(2)(d) of E.O. No. 561 also allows it to take cognizance of "petitions for classification,
release and/or subdivision of lands of the public domain," exactly the ultimate relief sought by
Dream Village. Rationalizing that it was created precisely to provide a more effective

37
mechanism for the expeditious settlement of land problems "in general," the COSLAP invoked
as its authority the 1990 case of Bañaga v. COSLAP,33 where this Court said:

It is true that Executive Order No. 561 provides that the COSLAP may take cognizance of cases
which are "critical and explosive in nature considering, for instance, the large number of parties
involved, the presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations
requiring immediate action." However, the use of the word "may" does not mean that the
COSLAP’s jurisdiction is merely confined to the above mentioned cases. The provisions of the
said Executive Order are clear that the COSLAP was created as a means of providing a more
effective mechanism for the expeditious settlement of land problems in general, which are
frequently the source of conflicts among settlers, landowners and cultural minorities. Besides,
the COSLAP merely took over from the abolished PACLAP whose functions, including its
jurisdiction, power and authority to act on, decide and resolve land disputes (Sec. 2, P.D. No.
832) were all assumed by it. The said Executive Order No. 561 containing said provision, being
enacted only on September 21, 1979, cannot affect the exercise of jurisdiction of the PACLAP
Provincial Committee of Koronadal on September 20, 1978. Neither can it affect the decision of
the COSLAP which merely affirmed said exercise of jurisdiction.34

In its Motion for Reconsideration35 filed on May 20, 2004, the BCDA questioned the validity of
the survey results since it was conducted without its representatives present, at the same time
denying that it received a notification of the DENR verification survey.36 It maintained that there
is no basis for the COSLAP’s finding that the members of Dream Village were in open,
continuous, and adverse possession in the concept of owner, because not only is the property not
among those declared alienable and disposable, but it is a titled patrimonial property of the
State.37

In the Order38 dated June 17, 2004, the COSLAP denied BCDA’s Motion for Reconsideration,
insisting that it had due notice of the verification survey, while also noting that although the
BCDA wanted to postpone the verification survey due to its tight schedule, it actually stalled the
survey when it failed to suggest an alternative survey date to ensure its presence.

CA Ruling

On Petition for Review39 to the CA, the BCDA argued that the dispute is outside the jurisdiction
of the COSLAP because of the land’s history of private ownership and because it is registered
under an indefeasible Torrens title40; that Proclamation No. 172 covers only Lots 1 and 2 of
Swo-13-000298 in Western Bicutan, whereas Dream Village occupies Lots 10, 11 and part of 13
of Swo-00-0001302, which also belongs to the BCDA 41; that the COSLAP resolution is based
on an erroneous DENR report stating that Dream Village is outside of BCDA, because Lots 10,
11, and portion of Lot 13 of Swo-00-0001302 are within the DA42; that the COSLAP was not
justified in ignoring BCDA’s request to postpone the survey to the succeeding year because the
presence of its representatives in such an important verification survey was indispensable for the
impartiality of the survey aimed at resolving a highly volatile situation43; that the COSLAP is a
mere coordinating administrative agency with limited jurisdiction44; and, that the present case is
not among those enumerated in Section 3 of E.O. No. 56145.

The COSLAP, on the other hand, maintained that Section 3(2)(e) of E.O. No. 561 provides that it
may assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes in "other similar land problems of
grave urgency and magnitude,"46 and the present case is one such problem.

The CA in its Decision47 dated September 10, 2009 ruled that the COSLAP has no jurisdiction
over the complaint because the question of whether Dream Village is within the areas declared as
available for disposition in Proclamation No. 172 is beyond its competence to determine, even as
the land in dispute has been under a private title since 1906, and presently its title is held by a
government agency, the BCDA, in contrast to the case of Bañaga relied upon by Dream Village,
where the disputed land was part of the public domain and the disputants were applicants for
sales patent thereto.

38
Dream Village’s motion for reconsideration was denied in the appellate court’s Order48 of July
13, 2010.

Petition for Review in the Supreme Court

On petition for review on certiorari to this Court, Dream Village interposes the following issues:

IN ANNULLING THE RESOLUTION OF COSLAP IN COSLAP CASE NO. 99-500, THE

HONORABLE CA DECIDED THE CASE IN A MANNER NOT CONSISTENT WITH LAW
AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT;

THE HONORABLE CA ERRED IN RULING THAT COSLAP HAD NO JURISDICTION

OVER THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE PARTIES HEREIN.49

The Court’s Ruling

We find no merit in the petition.

The BCDA holds title to Fort Bonifacio.

That the BCDA has title to Fort Bonifacio has long been decided with finality. In Samahan ng
Masang Pilipino sa Makati, Inc. v. BCDA,50 it was categorically ruled as follows:

First, it is unequivocal that the Philippine Government, and now the BCDA, has title and
ownership over Fort Bonifacio. The case of Acting Registrars of Land Titles and Deeds of Pasay
City, Pasig and Makati is final and conclusive on the ownership of the then Hacienda de
Maricaban estate by the Republic of the Philippines. Clearly, the issue on the ownership of the
subject lands in Fort Bonifacio is laid to rest. Other than their view that the USA is still the
owner of the subject lots, petitioner has not put forward any claim of ownership or interest in
them.51

The facts in Samahan ng Masang Pilipino sa Makati are essentially not much different from the
controversy below. There, 20,000 families were long-time residents occupying 98 has. of Fort
Bonifacio in Makati City, who vainly sought to avert their eviction and the demolition of their
houses by the BCDA upon a claim that the land was owned by the USA under TCT No. 2288.
The Supreme Court found that TCT No. 2288 had in fact been cancelled by TCT No. 61524 in
the name of the Republic, which title was in turn cancelled on January 3, 1995 by TCT Nos.
23888, 23887, 23886, 22460, 23889, 23890, and 23891, all in the name of the BCDA. The Court
ruled that the BCDA’s aforesaid titles over Fort Bonifacio are valid, indefeasible and beyond
question, since TCT No. 61524 was cancelled in favor of BCDA pursuant to an explicit authority
under R.A. No. 7227, the legal basis for BCDA’s takeover and management of the subject lots.52

Dream Village sits on the

abandoned C-5 Road, which lies
outside the area declared in
Proclamation Nos. 2476 and 172 as
alienable and disposable.

Pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476, the following surveys were conducted by the Bureau of
Lands to delimit the boundaries of the areas excluded from the coverage of Proclamation No.
423:

Barangay Survey Plan Date Approved

39
 1. Lower Bicutan SWO-13-000253 October 21, 1986

2. Signal Village SWO-13-000258 May 13, 1986

3. Upper Bicutan SWO-13-000258 May 13, 1986

4. Western Bicutan SWO-13-000298 January 15, 198753

However, the survey plan for Western Bicutan, Swo-13-000298, shows that Lots 3, 4, 5 and 6
thereof are inside the area segregated for the Libingan ng mga Bayani under Proclamation No.
208, which then leaves only Lots 1 and 2 of Swo-13-000298 as available for disposition. For this
reason, it was necessary to amend Proclamation No. 2476. Thus, in Proclamation No. 172 only
Lots 1 and 2 of Swo-13-000298 are declared alienable and disposable.54

The DENR verification survey report states that Dream Village is not situated in Lot 1 of Swo-
13-000298 but actually occupies Lots 10, 11 and part of 13 of Swo-00-0001302: "x x x Dream
Village is outside Lot1, SWO-13-000298 and inside Lot 10, 11 & portion of Lot 13, SWO-00-
0001302 with an actual area of 78466 square meters. The area is actually is [sic] outside SWO-
00-0001302 of BCDA."55 Inexplicably and gratuitously, the DENR also states that the area is
outside of BCDA, completely oblivious that the BCDA holds title over the entire Fort Bonifacio,
even as the BCDA asserts that Lots 10, 11 and 13 of SWO-00-0001302 are part of the abandoned
right-of-way of C-5 Road. This area is described as lying north of Lot 1 of Swo-13-000298 and
of Lots 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Swo-13-000298 (Western Bicutan) inside the Libingan ng mga Bayani,
and the boundary line of Lot 1 mentioned as C-5 Road is really the proposed alignment of C-5
Road, which was abandoned when, as constructed, it was made to traverse northward into the
Libingan ng mga Bayani. Dream Village has not disputed this assertion.

The mere fact that the original plan for C-5 Road to cross Swo-00-0001302 was abandoned by
deviating it northward to traverse the southern part of Libingan ng mga Bayani does not signify
abandonment by the government of the bypassed lots, nor that these lots would then become
alienable and disposable. They remain under the title of the BCDA, even as it is significant that
under Section 8(d) of R.A. No. 7227, a relocation site of 30.5 has. was to be reserved for families
affected by the construction of C-5 Road. It is nowhere claimed that Lots 10, 11 and 13 of Swo-
00-0001302 are part of the said relocation site. These lots border C-5 Road in the south,56
making them commercially valuable to BCDA, a farther argument against a claim that the
government has abandoned them to Dream Village.

While property of the State or any

of its subdivisions patrimonial in
character may be the object of
prescription, those "intended for
some public service or for the
development of the national
wealth" are considered property of
public dominion and therefore not
susceptible to acquisition by
prescription.

Article 1113 of the Civil Code provides that "property of the State or any of its subdivisions not
patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription." Articles 420 and 421 identify
what is property of public dominion and what is patrimonial property:

Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;

40
 (2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for
some public service or for the development of the national wealth.

Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding
article, is patrimonial property.

One question laid before us is whether the area occupied by Dream Village is susceptible of
acquisition by prescription. In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic,57 it was pointed out that
from the moment R.A. No. 7227 was enacted, the subject military lands in Metro Manila

became alienable and disposable. However, it was also clarified that the said lands did not
thereby become patrimonial, since the BCDA law makes the express reservation that they are to
be sold in order to raise funds for the conversion of the former American bases in Clark and
Subic. The Court noted that the purpose of the law can be tied to either "public service" or "the
development of national wealth" under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code, such that the lands
remain property of the public dominion, albeit their status is now alienable and disposable. The
Court then explained that it is only upon their sale to a private person or entity as authorized by
the BCDA law that they become private property and cease to be property of the public
dominion:58

For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or
disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when it is "intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth."59

Thus, under Article 422 of the Civil Code, public domain lands become patrimonial property
only if there is a declaration that these are alienable or disposable, together with an express
government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for
public service or the development of national wealth. Only when the property has become
patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion
begin to run. Also under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, it is provided that
before acquisitive prescription can commence, the property sought to be registered must not only
be classified as alienable and disposable, it must also be expressly declared by the State that it is
no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth, or that the
property has been converted into patrimonial. Absent such an express declaration by the State,
the land remains to be property of public dominion.60

Since the issuance of Proclamation No. 423 in 1957, vast portions of the former Maricaban have
been legally disposed to settlers, besides those segregated for public or government use.
Proclamation No. 1217 (1973) established the Maharlika Village in Bicutan, Taguig to serve the
needs of resident Muslims of Metro Manila; Proclamation No. 2476 (1986), as amended by
Proclamation No. 172 (1987), declared more than 400 has. of Maricaban in Upper and Lower
Bicutan, Signal Village, and Western Bicutan as alienable and disposable; Proclamation No. 518
(1990) formally exempted from Proclamation No. 423 the Barangays of Cembo, South Cembo,
West Rembo, East Rembo, Comembo, Pembo and Pitogo, comprising 314 has., and declared
them open for disposition.

The above proclamations notwithstanding, Fort Bonifacio remains property of public dominion
of the State, because although declared alienable and disposable, it is reserved for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth, in this case, for the conversion of military
reservations in the country to productive civilian uses.61 Needless to say, the acquisitive
prescription asserted by Dream Village has not even begun to run.

Ownership of a land registered

under a Torrens title cannot be lost
by prescription or adverse
possession.

41
Dream Village has been unable to dispute BCDA’s claim that Lots 10, 11 and part of 13 of Swo-
00-0001302 are the abandoned right-of-way of C-5 Road, which is within the vast titled territory
of Fort Bonifacio. We have already established that these lots have not been declared alienable
and disposable under Proclamation Nos. 2476 or 172.

Moreover, it is a settled rule that lands under a Torrens title cannot be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession.62 Section 47 of P.D. No. 1529, the Property Registration Decree, expressly
provides that no title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession. And, although the registered landowner may still
lose his right to recover the possession of his registered property by reason of laches,63 nowhere
has Dream Village alleged or proved laches, which has been defined as such neglect or omission
to assert a right, taken in conjunction with lapse of time and other circumstances causing
prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity. Put any way, it is a delay in the
assertion of a right which works disadvantage to another because of the inequity founded on
some change in the condition or relations of the property or parties. It is based on public policy
which, for the peace of society, ordains that relief will be denied to a stale demand which
otherwise could be a valid claim.64

The subject property having been

expressly reserved for a specific
public purpose, the COSLAP
cannot exercise jurisdiction over the
complaint of the Dream Village
settlers.

BCDA has repeatedly asserted that the COSLAP has no jurisdiction to hear Dream Village’s
complaint. Concurring, the CA has ruled that questions as to the physical identity of Dream
Village and whether it lies in Lots 10, 11 and 13 of Swo-00-0001302, or whether Proclamation
No. 172 has released the disputed area for disposition are issues which are "manifestly beyond
the scope of the COSLAP’s jurisdiction vis-á-vis Paragraph 2, Section 3 of E.O. No. 561,"65
rendering its Resolution a patent nullity and its pronouncements void. Thus, the CA said, under
Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP’s duty would have been to refer the conflict to another
tribunal or agency of government in view of the serious ramifications of the disputed claims:

In fine, it is apparent that the COSLAP acted outside its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the
case. It would have been more prudent if the COSLAP has [sic] just referred the controversy to
the proper forum in order to fully thresh out the ramifications of the dispute at bar. As it is, the
impugned Resolution is a patent nullity since the tribunal which rendered it lacks jurisdiction.
Thus, the pronouncements contained therein are void. "We have consistently ruled that a
judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right or the
creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have
no legal effect."66 (Citation omitted)

We add that Fort Bonifacio has been reserved for a declared specific public purpose under R.A.
No. 7227, which unfortunately for Dream Village does not encompass the present demands of its
members. Indeed, this purpose was the very reason why title to Fort Bonifacio has been
transferred to the BCDA, and it is this very purpose which takes the dispute out of the direct
jurisdiction of the COSLAP. A review of the history of the COSLAP will readily clarify that its
jurisdiction is limited to disputes over public lands not reserved or declared for a public use or
purpose.

On July 31, 1970, President Marcos issued E.O. No. 251 creating the Presidential Action
Committee on Land Problems (PACLAP) to expedite and coordinate the investigation and
resolution of all kinds of land disputes between settlers, streamline and shorten administrative
procedures, adopt bold and decisive measures to solve land problems, or recommend other
solutions.67 E.O. No. 305, issued on March 19, 1971, reconstituted the PACLAP and gave it
exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving public lands and other lands of the public

42
domain,68 as well as adjudicatory powers phrased in broad terms: "To investigate, coordinate,
and resolve expeditiously land disputes, streamline administrative proceedings, and, in general,
to adopt bold and decisive measures to solve problems involving public lands and lands of the
public domain."69

On November 27, 1975, P.D. No. 832 reorganized the PACLAP and enlarged its functions and
duties. Section 2 thereof even granted it quasi judicial functions, to wit:

Sec. 2. Functions and duties of the PACLAP. – The PACLAP shall have the following functions
and duties:

1. Direct and coordinate the activities, particularly the investigation work, of the various
government agencies and agencies involved in land problems or disputes, and streamline
administrative procedures to relieve small settlers and landholders and members of
cultural minorities of the expense and time-consuming delay attendant to the solution of
such problems or disputes;

2. Refer for immediate action any land problem or dispute brought to the attention of the
PACLAP, to any member agency having jurisdiction thereof: Provided, That when the
Executive Committee decides to act on a case, its resolution, order or decision thereon
shall have the force and effect of a regular administrative resolution, order or decision,
and shall be binding upon the parties therein involved and upon the member agency
having jurisdiction thereof;

xxxx

4. Evolve and implement a system of procedure for the speedy investigation and resolution of
land disputes or problems at provincial level, if possible. (Underscoring supplied)

On September 21, 1979, E.O. No. 561 abolished the PACLAP and created the COSLAP to be a
more effective administrative body to provide a mechanism for the expeditious settlement of
land problems among small settlers, landowners and members of the cultural minorities to avoid
social unrest.70 Paragraph 2, Section 3 of E.O No. 561 now specifically enumerates the instances
when the COSLAP can exercise its adjudicatory functions:

Sec. 3. Powers and Functions. — The Commission shall have the following powers and
functions:

1. Coordinate the activities, particularly the investigation work, of the various

government offices and agencies involved in the settlement of land problems or disputes,
and streamline administrative procedures to relieve small settlers and landholders and
members of cultural minorities of the expense and time consuming delay attendant to the
solution of such problems or disputes;

2. Refer and follow-up for immediate action by the agency having appropriate
jurisdiction any land problem or dispute referred to the Commission: Provided, That the
Commission may, in the following cases, assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems
or disputes which are critical and explosive in nature considering, for instance, the large
number of the parties involved, the presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or
other similar critical situations requiring immediate action:

(a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders or timber

concessionaires;

(b) Between occupants/squatters and government reservation grantees;

(c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or applicants;

43
 (d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of lands of the public
domain; and

(e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and magnitude.

xxxx

Citing the constant threat of summary eviction and demolition by the BCDA and the seriousness
and urgency of the reliefs sought in its Amended Petition, Dream Village insists that the
COSLAP was justified in assuming jurisdiction of COSLAP Case No. 99-500. But in Longino v.
Atty. General,71 it was held that as an administrative agency, COSLAP’s jurisdiction is limited to
cases specifically mentioned in its enabling statute, E.O. No. 561. The Supreme Court said:

Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and, as such,
could wield only such as are specifically granted to them by the enabling statutes. x x x.

xxxx

Under the law, E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP has two options in acting on a land dispute or
problem lodged before it, namely, (a) refer the matter to the agency having appropriate
jurisdiction for settlement/resolution; or (b) assume jurisdiction if the matter is one of those
enumerated in paragraph 2(a) to (e) of the law, if such case is critical and explosive in nature,
taking into account the large number of the parties involved, the presence or emergence of social
tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action. In resolving
whether to assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer the same to the particular agency
concerned, the COSLAP has to consider the nature or classification of the land involved, the
parties to the case, the nature of the questions raised, and the need for immediate and urgent
action thereon to prevent injuries to persons and damage or destruction to property. The law does
not vest jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any land dispute or problem.72 (Citation omitted)

The Longino ruling has been consistently cited in subsequent COSLAP cases, among them
Davao New Town Development Corp. v. COSLAP,73 Barranco v. COSLAP,74 NHA v.
COSLAP,75 Cayabyab v. de Aquino,76 Ga, Jr. v. Tubungan,77 Machado v. Gatdula,78 and Vda. de
Herrera v. Bernardo.79

Thus, in Machado, it was held that the COSLAP cannot invoke Section 3(2)(e) of E.O. No. 561
to assume jurisdiction over "other similar land problems of grave urgency," since the statutory
construction principle of ejusdem generis prescribes that where general words follow an
enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general
words are not to be construed in their widest extent but are to be held as applying only to persons
or things of the same kind as those specifically mentioned.80 Following this rule, COSLAP’s
jurisdiction is limited to disputes involving lands in which the government has a proprietary or
regulatory interest,81 or public lands covered with a specific license from the government such as
a pasture lease agreements, a timber concessions, or a reservation grants,82 and where moreover,
the dispute is between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders or timber
concessionaires; between occupants/squatters and government reservation grantees; and between
occupants/squatters and public land claimants or applicants.

In Longino, the parties competed to lease a property of the Philippine National Railways. The
high court rejected COSLAP’s jurisdiction, noting that the disputed lot is not public land, and
neither party was a squatter, patent lease agreement holder, government reservation grantee,
public land claimant or occupant, or a member of any cultural minority, nor was the dispute
critical and explosive in nature so as to generate social tension or unrest, or a critical situation
which required immediate action.83

In Davao New Town Development Corp., it was held that the COSLAP has no concurrent
jurisdiction with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in respect of disputes concerning

44
the implementation of agrarian reform laws, since "the grant of exclusive and primary
jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters on the DAR implies that no other court, tribunal, or
agency is authorized to resolve disputes properly cognizable by the DAR."84 Thus, instead of
hearing and resolving the case, COSLAP should have simply referred private respondents’
complaint to the DAR or DARAB. According to the Court:

The abovementioned proviso Section (3)(2) of E.O. No. 561, which vests COSLAP the power to
resolve land disputes, does not confer upon COSLAP blanket authority to assume every matter
referred to it. Its jurisdiction is confined only to disputes over lands in which the government has
proprietary or regulatory interest. Moreover, the land dispute in Bañaga involved parties with
conflicting free patent applications which was within the authority of PACLAP to resolve, unlike
that of the instant case which is exclusively cognizable by the DAR.85

In Barranco, COSLAP issued a writ to demolish structures encroaching into private

property.1âwphi1 The Supreme court ruled that COSLAP may resolve only land disputes
"involving public lands or lands of the public domain or those covered with a specific license
from the government such as a pasture lease agreement, a timber concession, or a reservation
grant."86

In NHA, it was held that COSLAP has no jurisdiction over a boundary dispute between two local
government units, that its decision is an utter nullity correctible by certiorari, that it can never
become final and any writ of execution based on it is void, and all acts performed pursuant to it
and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect.87

In Cayabyab, it was held that "the jurisdiction of COSLAP does not extend to disputes involving
the ownership of private lands, or those already covered by a certificate of title, as these fall
exactly within the jurisdiction of the courts and other administrative agencies."88

In Ga, Jr., it was reiterated that the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over controversies relating to
ownership and possession of private lands, and thus, the failure of respondents to properly appeal
from the COSLAP decision before the appropriate court was held not fatal to the petition for
certiorari that they eventually filed with the CA. The latter remedy remained available despite
the lapse of the period to appeal from the void COSLAP decision.89

In Machado, the high court ruled that COSLAP has no jurisdiction in disputes over private lands
between private parties, reiterating the essential rules contained in Section 3 of E.O. No. 561
governing the exercise by COSLAP of its jurisdiction, to wit:

Under these terms, the COSLAP has two different rules in acting on a land dispute or problem
lodged before it, e.g., COSLAP can assume jurisdiction only if the matter is one of those
enumerated in paragraph 2(a) to (e) of the law. Otherwise, it should refer the case to the agency
having appropriate jurisdiction for settlement or resolution. In resolving whether to assume
jurisdiction over a case or to refer it to the particular agency concerned, the COSLAP considers:
(a) the nature or classification of the land involved; (b) the parties to the case; (c) the nature of
the questions raised; and (d) the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injury
to persons and damage or destruction to property. The terms of the law clearly do not vest on the
COSLAP the general power to assume jurisdiction over any land dispute or problem. Thus,
under EO 561, the instances when the COSLAP may resolve land disputes are limited only to
those involving public lands or those covered by a specific license from the government, such as
pasture lease agreements, timber concessions, or reservation grants.90 (Citations omitted)

In Vda. de Herrera, the COSLAP assumed jurisdiction over a complaint for "interference,
disturbance, unlawful claim, harassment and trespassing" over a private parcel of land. The CA
ruled that the parties were estopped to question COSLAP’s jurisdiction since they participated
actively in the proceedings. The Supreme Court, noting from the complaint that the case actually
involved a claim of title and possession of private land, ruled that the RTC or the MTC has
jurisdiction since the dispute did not fall under Section 3, paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of E.O. No. 561,

45
was not critical and explosive in nature, did not involve a large number of parties, nor was there
social tension or unrest present or emergent.91

In the case at bar, COSLAP has invoked Bañaga to assert its jurisdiction. There, Guillermo
Bañaga had filed a free patent application with the Bureau of Lands over a public land with an
area of 30 has. Gregorio Daproza (Daproza) also filed a patent application for the same property.
The opposing claims and protests of the claimants remained unresolved by the Bureau of Lands,
and neither did it conduct an investigation. Daproza wrote to the COSLAP, which then opted to
exercise jurisdiction over the controversy. The high court sustained COSLAP, declaring that its
jurisdiction is not confined to the cases mentioned in paragraph 2(a) to (e) of E.O. No. 561, but
includes land problems in general, which are frequently the source of conflicts among settlers,
landowners and cultural minorities.

But as the Court has since clarified in Longino and in the other cases aforecited, the land dispute
in Bañaga was between private individuals who were free patent applicants over unregistered
public lands. In contrast, the present petition involves land titled to and managed by a
government agency which has been expressly reserved by law for a specific public purpose other
than for settlement. Thus, as we have advised in Longino, the law does not vest jurisdiction on
the COSLAP over any land dispute or problem, but it has to consider the nature or classification
of the land involved, the parties to the case, the nature of the questions raised, and the need for
immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injuries to persons and damage or destruction to
property.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

46
G.R. No. 181435

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner

vs.
ROSARIO L. NICOLAS, Respondent

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by the Republic of the Philippines to assail the
Court of Appeals (CA) Decision2 and Resolution3 in CA-GR. CV No. 81678. The CA affirmed
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision,4 which granted the Petition5 filed by respondent
Rosario L. Nicolas for the registration of title to a parcel of land located in Barangay (Brgy.) San
Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal.6 The appellate court agreed with the conclusion of the RTC that
respondent had convincingly established her ownership of the land and was therefore entitled to
judicial confirmation and registration of title.7

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

On 22 March 1996, respondent filed a Petition before the RTC of San Mateo, Rizal,8 seeking to
register her title over Lot 2 of Survey Plan Psu-213331, a parcel of land located in Brgy. San
Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal, with an area of 118,448 square meters.9 She asserted that she was
entitled to confirmation and registration of title, as she had been in "natural, open, public,
adverse, continuous, uninterrupted" possession of the land in the concept of an owner since
October 1964.10

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed an Opposition11 to the Petition. It contended that (a)
neither respondent nor her predecessors-ininterest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the land since 12 June 1945;12 (b) the Tax Declarations attached to the
Petition did not constitute sufficient evidence of the acquisition or possession of the property;13
(c) respondent failed to apply for registration of title within six months from 16 February 1976 as
required by Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 892;14 and (d) the land in question was part of the
public domain and not subject to private appropriation.15

After the conduct of proceedings to confirm compliance with jurisdictional requisites,16 the
RTC directed respondent to submit documents to establish that (a) the property that was the
subject of the application for registration of title was not covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program of the Government; (b) there were no tenants on the property; and (c) the land
was not subject to any homestead, free patent, or grant of title from the Land Registration
Authority (LRA), the Bureau of Lands, or the Department of Agrarian Reform.17 Respondent
was also directed to begin the presentation of her evidence.18

In line with this directive, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)
submitted a Report19 on the results of its verification of the existing records on the subject
property. The Report stated that the land "appears to be [n]ot covered by any public land
application nor embraced by any administrative title."20 However, the entry with respect to
whether the land was within the alienable and disposable zone was left blank with a notation that
the area was "not projected due to [u]navailability of coordinates re[:] Tala Estate Tie-Line."21

The LRA likewise submitted a Report22 stating that it "was not in a position to verify whether or
not the parcel of land subject of registration is already covered by land patent and is within the
area classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain."23 Hence, the LRA
recommended that the CENRO of Antipolo, Rizal, be ordered to submit a report on the status of
the land.24 This proposal was adopted by the RTC in an Order25 dated 28 December 1998.

47
During trial, respondent presented three witnesses to prove her right to register the property:
Leonila Alfaro, her daughter and attorney-in-fact, who testified that respondent had occupied the
land since 1940 and had paid the real estate taxes therefor since 1969;26 Santiago Eulin, who
was allegedly hired by respondent to plant vegetables and fruit trees on the land and who acted
as its caretaker since 1942;27 and Roberto M. Valdez of the LRA, who identified the original
tracing cloth plan for the property.28

The following documents were likewise submitted to the trial court: Survey Plan PSU-213331,29
a Surveyor's Certificate30 and technical descriptions of the property,31 which purportedly
proved that the land had been duly surveyed by the Land Management Sector; various Tax
Declarations and receipts;32 and a Certification issued by the CENRO that the land applied for
was not covered by any public land application.33

Petitioner, on the other hand, decided to have the case submitted for resolution without any
further submission.34

THE RULING OF THE RTC

In a Decision dated 31 July 2002, the RTC granted the Petition and ordered the issuance of a
Decree of Registration in favor of respondent.35 It declared that she had acquired ownership of
the land by way of open, continuous, public, adverse, actual and bona fide possession in the
concept of an owner since 1940.36

Petitioner appealed the RTC Decision to the CA. In the Appellant's Brief,37 the Republic argued
that respondent had failed to clearly and convincingly establish that she had actual, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier as required by
Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree.38 Petitioner further asserted that
there was no basis for the finding of the RTC that she had occupied the land since 1940.39

Respondent failed to file an appellee's brief.40 Consequently, the CA considered the case
submitted for resolution.41

THE RULING OF THE CA

On 23 August 2007, the CA dismissed petitioner's appeal.42 According to the appellate court,
the evidence presented proved that respondent had occupied the land since 1940. Even assuming
that her possession of the property started only when she had it privately surveyed in 1964, she
had been its occupant for more than 30 years.43 As such, she was still entitled to registration of
title under Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529.

The CA further characterized the land as private property:

The fact that the subject land is covered by a private survey (PSU) (EXH. "J") way back in 1964,
which survey was approved on April 1965 by Director Nicanor Jorge of the then Bureau of
Lands, is a clear indication that it is already private in nature. Moreover, applicant's evidence
consisting of the DENR-CENRO Certifications (Exhs. "O" and "P") that Lot 2 of PSY 213331 is
not covered by any public land application and that its equivalent is Lot No, 10549 of the
Montalban Cadastre have substantial probative value which established (sic) that the land is
alienable and disposable and not covered by any land grant from the government.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Decision.44 The CA, however, denied the motion in
a Resolution45 dated 22 January 2008, prompting petitioner to elevate the case to this Court.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT

In its Petition for Review, the Republic argues that (a) the decision of the CA and the RTC to
confirm the title of respondent to the land based on her possession and occupation thereof was

48
not supported by evidence; and (b) the testimonial and documentary evidence she presented did
not establish possession of the property in the manner and period required by law, that is, her
possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. Petitioner also emphasizes that the
lower courts gave undue importance to the Tax Declarations and receipts presented,46 as well as
to the testimonies of respondent's witnesses, notwithstanding the inconsistencies in their
statements.

On 26 September 2008, respondent filed a Manifestation and Comment47 in which she pointed
out that the grounds relied upon by petitioner all pertain to allegedly erroneous findings of fact.
She argued that these grounds could not be raised in a Rule 45 proceeding; hence, the dismissal
of the petition was warranted.48

Petitioner reiterate its arguments in its RepIy49 and Memorandum50 filed on 17 March 2009 and
19 February 2010, respectively.

ISSUES

Based on the submissions of the parties and the Decisions of the CA and the RTC, two issues are
presented for resolution by this Court:

(1) Whether the CA erroneously allowed the judicial confirmation of respondent's title to the
property under Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529; and

(2) Whether the CA erred in declaring that respondent is likewise entitled to registration of title
based on ownership by acquisitive prescription under Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529.

OUR RULING

We GRANT the Petition.

Applications for registration of title to land, both public and private, are governed by Section 14
of P.D. 1529:

SECTION 14. Who May Apply. -The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws.

(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of
accession or accretion under the existing laws.

(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.

Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the application jointly.

Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro may file an application for
the original registration of the land, provided, however, that should the period for redemption
expire during the pendency of the registration proceedings and ownership to the property
consolidated in the vendee a retro, the latter shall be substituted for the applicant and may
continue the proceedings.

49
A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of any land held in trust by
him, unless prohibited by the instrument creating the trust.

Each paragraph of Section 14 refers to a distinct type of application depending on the applicable
legal ground. Since each type is governed by its own set of legal principles, the framework for
analysis to be used in resolving an application would vary depending on the paragraph
invoked.51 Hence, it is important for the Court to first determine the exact legal ground used by
an applicant for registration.52

In this case, we note that the application filed by respondent before the RTC did not state the
exact legal basis of her request. At best, the pleading implied that her claim was one for
registration and confirmation of title based on her possession and occupation of the property:

COMES NOW Petitioner Rosario L. Nicolas, of legal age, widow, Pilipino [sic] with address at
Brgy. San Isidro, Rodriguez (formerly Montalban), Rizal Province, Philippines, by her
undersigned counsel and to this Honorable Court respectfully petitions to have the land
hereinafter described below brought under the operation of the Land Registration Act and to
have said land titled, registered and confirmed in her name and further declares that:

xxxx

6. Petitioner acquired the subject parcel of land by way of occupation and has been in natural,
open, public, adverse, contin[u]ous, uninterrupted and in the concept of an owner/possessor
thereof since October 1964 up to the present.53 (Emphases supplied)

From the foregoing allegations, it appears that the claim of respondent is anchored on either of
the first two paragraphs of Section 14. However, it is unclear whether she sought judicial
confirmation and registration of her title pursuant to Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529, or of the
registration of her title on the ground of acquisitive prescription under Section 14(2) of the same
law.

Similarly, no specific provision in P.D. 1529 was identified by the RTC when it granted the
Petition.54 Its mention of the Civil Code, however, seems to indicate an application of the
principle of acquisitive prescription. The CA, for its part, delineated the differences between the
first two paragraphs of Section 14, but decided to apply both clauses. In its Decision, it ruled that
respondent is entitled to register her title under either paragraph:

From the evidence adduced, applicant-appellee has convincingly established her registrable title
to the subject land, which is entitled to confirmation and registration by the trial court. As
testified by the daughter of applicant, her mother commenced occupying the subject land since
1940 and up to the present which (sic) has been planted with fruit-bearing trees and vegetables
by their caretaker. Her testimony was corroborated by Santiago Eulin, their caretaker since 1942
who took over after his father, the original caretaker. These witnesses declared that they even
stayed on the land in question where the applicant has a hut. It was also established that the
applicant had the property surveyed in 1964 resulting in the approval of Plan PS U 213 31 by the
Bureau of Lands. This qualifies applicant under Section 14, par. 1 of the Property Registration
Decree.

Even assuming that applicant's occupation and possession of the subject land did not start on July
12, 1945 or earlier but only in 1964 when she had it surveyed, still she can apply for registration
of title under Sec. 14, par. 2 of the Property Registration Decree as she has been occupying the
land continuously for more than thirty (30) years from the time the application was filed in
1996.55 (Emphases supplied)

Given these findings, the Court has examined the application for registration in this case under
the legal framework of both Section 14(1) and (2) of P.D. 1529. We find that respondent has
failed to sufficiently establish the requisites of both paragraphs; in particular, with respect to the

50
classification and the character of the land in question. Hence, we are constrained to reverse the
CA and the RTC Decisions allowing the registration of her title to the property.

Respondent has failed to prove that the property is alienable and disposable agricultural land
that may be registered under Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529.

Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529 governs applications for registration of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain. This paragraph operationalizes Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No.
141 as amended.56 This provision grants occupants of public land the right to judicial
confirmation of their title. Based on these two provisions and other related sections of C.A. 141,
registration is allowed provided the following requisites have been complied with:

1. The applicant is a Filipino citizen.57

2. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open,

continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the property since 12 June
1945.58

3. The prope1ty has been declared alienable and disposable as of the filing of the application.59

4. If the area applied for does not exceed 12 hectares, the application should be filed by 31
December 2020.60

As earlier stated, respondent failed to establish the third requisite, i.e., that the property subject of
the application is alienable and disposable agricultural land.

The Court has emphasized in a long line of cases61 that an applicant for registration under
Section 14(1) must prove that the subject property has been classified as alienable and disposable
agricultural land by virtue of a positive act of the Executive Department. In Heirs of Malabanan
v. Republic, 62 we declared:

Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands
of the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code,
without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the
Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands
classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of alienation or
disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural. A positive act of the Government is
necessary to enable such reclassification, and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands
under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts. xxx Thus, until the
Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress
or the President declares that the State no longer intends the land to be used for public service or
for the development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.

In this case, we note that both the RTC and the CA glossed over this requirement. The RTC, for
instance, only made a general conclusion as to the classification and alienability of the property,
but without any discussion of the evidence presented:

From the evidence adduced, applicant-appellee has convincingly established her registrable title
to the subject land which is entitled to confirmation and registration by the trial court. x x x It
was also established that the applicant had the property surveyed in 1964 resulting in the
approval of Plan PSU-213331 by the Bureau of Lands. This qualifies applicant under Sec. 14,
par. 1 of the Property Registration Decree.63

The CA, on the other hand, simply relied on the fact that the property had been the subject of a
private survey in 1964:

From the evidence adduced, the following facts have been duly proved:

51
 xxxx

That the land applied for is neither subject to any water, oil/nor (sic) mineral rights, not within
any government reservation, naval or military, or mineral rights, within the forest zone, and
neither is it part of the inalienable or undisposable land of the public domain nor covered by the
Code on Comprehensive Agrarian Reform or subject to any subsisting Public Patent application;

xxxx

That the said parcel of land applied for is duly surveyed for registration (Exh. "J"), classified as
agricultural; that they planted mangoes, buko, sometimes corn in the area through their caretaker
x x x.64

While a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is generally limited to a review of errors
of law, the Court may conduct its own review of the evidence if the findings of the lower courts
are bereft of legal and factual bases.65 In this case, the conclusions of the RTC and the CA are
not only contradicted by the evidence on record; they are likewise contrary to law and
jurisprudence. As a result, the Court is constrained to set aside these pronouncements.

To prove that the property subject of an application for original registration is part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, applicants must "identify a positive act of
the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes."66 To sufficiently establish this positive act,
they must submit (1) a certification from the CENRO or the Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Office (PENRO); and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.67

Here, respondent presented the following pieces of evidence to establish her claim that the land
had been classified as agricultural and considered alienable and disposable:

(1) A CENRO Report68 stating that the land was not covered by any public land application or
embraced by any administrative title, but with a notation that that the alienability of the land was
"[n]ot projected due to [u]navailability of coordinates re: Tala Estate Tieline'';

(2) A CENRO Certification69 that the lot "is not covered by any kind of public land
application";

(3) A Report70 from the Land Registration Authority (LRA) declaring that it was "not in a
position to verify whether or not the parcel of land subject of registration is already covered by
land patent and is within the area classified as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain"; and

(4) The testimonies of Leonila Alfaro,71 her daughter, and Santiago Eulin72 (the caretaker of the
land) confirming that the property is agricultural in nature.

It is evident from the foregoing enumeration that respondent not only neglected to submit the
required CENRO/PENRO certification and DENR classification, but also presented evidence
that completely failed to prove her assertion.

First, the testimonies of Leonila and Santiago on the classification of the land have very little
evidentiary value. That they consider the property agricultural in nature is irrelevant, as their
statements are mere opinions bereft of any legal significance.

Second, none of the documents submitted by respondent to the trial court indicated that the
subject property was agricultural or part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain. At most, the CENRO Report and Certification stated that the land was not covered by
any kind of public land application. This was far from an adequate proof of the classification of

52
the land. In fact, in Republic v Lualhati, 73 the Court rejected an attempt to prove the alienability
of public land using similar evidence:

Here, respondent failed to establish, by the required evidence, that the land sought to be
registered has been classified as alienable or disposable land of the public domain. The records
of this case merely bear certifications from the DENR-CENRO, Region IV, Antipolo City,
stating that no public land application or land patent covering the subject lots is pending nor are
the lots embraced by any administrative title. Said CENRO certifications, however, do not even
make any pronouncement as to the alienable character of the lands in question for they merely
recognize the absence of any pending land patent application, administrative title, or government
project being conducted thereon. But even granting that they expressly declare that the subject
lands form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, these certifications
remain insufficient for purposes of granting respondent's application for registration. As
constantly held by this Court, it is not enough for the CENRO to certify that a land is alienable
and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved
area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. Unfortunately for respondent,
the evidence submitted clearly falls short of the requirements for original registration in order to
show the alienable character of the lands subject herein.

Applying these standards to the instant case, we declare that the RTC did not have sufficient
basis for its finding that the property in question was alienable and disposable.

The Court also finds that the ruling of the CA on the evidentiary value of the private survey is
untenable. The fact that the land has been privately surveyed is not sufficient to prove its
classification or alienable character. While the conduct of a survey and the submission of the
original tracing cloth plan are mandatory requirements for applications for original registration of
land under P.D. 1529, they only serve to establish the true identity of the land and to ensure that
the property does not overlap with another one covered by a previous registration.74 These
documents do not, by themselves, prove a1ienability and disposability of the property. In fact, in
several cases,75 the Court has declared that even a survey plan with a notation that the property
is alienable cannot be considered as sufficient evidence of alienability. Here, the survey plan and
original tracing cloth plan submitted by respondent does not even bear that notation.
Consequently, it was grave error for the CA to consider the mere conduct of a private survey as
proof of the classification and the alienability of the land.

Respondent has failed to prove that the land subject of the application is part of the
patrimonial property of the State that may be acquired by prescription under Section 14(2) of
P.D. 1529.

As previously noted, the CA also allowed the registration of the property under Section 14(2) of
P.D. 1529 based on the following findings: (1) the property is "private in nature" as shown by the
fact that it is "covered by a private survey";76 (2) respondent had occupied the land continuously
for more than 30 years from the time of the filing of the application in 1996;77 and (3) the land is
not covered by any public land application based on the DENR-CENRO Certifications submitted
by respondent.78

We do not agree. The Court fields no sufficient basis to allow the registration of the property
under Section 14(2).

By express provision of the law, only private lands that have been acquired by prescription under
existing laws may be the subject of applications for registration under Section 14(2). The starting
point of the Court's evaluation must, therefore, be whether the property involved falls within the
scope of the paragraph.

53
Under the Civil Code, all things within human commerce are generally susceptible of
prescription.79 Properties of the public dominion, or those owned by the State, are expressly
excluded by law from this general rule,80 unless they are proven to be patrimonial in character.
As the Court explained in Republic of the Philippines v. Tan:

Only private property can be acquired by prescription. Property of public dominion is outside the
commerce of man.1âwphi1 It cannot be the object of prescription because prescription does not
run against the State in its sovereign capac.ty. However, when property of public dominion is no
longer intended for public use or for public service, it becomes part of the patrimonial property
of the State. When this happens, the property is withdrawn from public dominion and becomes
property of private ownership, albeit still owned by the State. The property is now brought
within the commerce of man and becomes susceptible to the concepts of legal possession and
prescription.81 (Emphasis supplied)

To establish that the land subject of the application has been converted into patrimonial property
of the State, an applicant must prove the following:

l. The subject property has been classified as agricultural land.82

2. The property has been declared alienable and disposable.83

3. There is an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial, or is no

longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth.84

It must be emphasized that without the concurrence of these three conditions, the land remains
part of public dominion and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription.85

Here, the records show that respondent has failed to allege or prove that the subject land belongs
to the patrimonial property of the State.1âwphi1 As earlier discussed, the evidence she has
presented does not even show that the property is alienable and disposable agricultural land. She
has also failed to cite any government act or declaration converting the land into patrimonial
property of the State.

Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the DENR-CENRO Certifications submitted by respondent are
not enough; they cannot substitute for the three conditions required by law as proof that the land
may be the subject of prescription under the Civil Code. For the same reason, the mere conduct
of a private survey of a property - even with the approval of the Bureau of Lands - does not
convert the lot into private land or patrimonial property of the State. Clearly, the appellate court
erred when it relied on the survey to justify its conclusion that the land is private in nature.

Considering the absence of sufficient evidence that the subject land is a patrimonial property of
the State, we must consider it part of public dominion and thus immune from acquisitive
prescription.

As a final note, the Court must point out that proof of the classification, alienability and
disposability of the subject property is of particular significance in applications for the
registration of land. Given the general rule that public lands may not be alienated,86 it is the
burden of applicants to prove that the land they seek to register falls within the classifications
enumerated in Section 14 of P.D. 1529; in particular, the specific paragraph they invoke as basis
for registration.87 Absent that proot: no length of possession or occupation would vest any right
of ownership over the property,88 and registration under P.D. 1529 cannot be sanctioned by this
Court.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 23
August 2007 and Resolution dated 22 January 2008 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent's application for land registration is DENIED for lack of merit.

54