Info and Intel

ESP: Info and Intel
“Information and Intelligence” is the “Fire and Maneuver” of the 21st Century.
Major General Michael Flynn, March 2011
Content:
Forward
Part 1
Unit 1: What is intelligence?
Unit 2: Categories of classified information
Unit 3: Types of intelligence
Unit 4: Defense intelligence
Unit 5: What is intelligence assessment?
Unit 6: Language of persuasion
Part 2:Read on
Forward
This book addresses the master students studying Intelligence in organization and intends to
offer the necessary English terms and the common acronymsused in this field.
It uses authentic up -to -date texts with information about different issues of this field.The
development of an intelligence product involves collecting information from a number of
different sources and disseminating information. This type of raw intelligence is usually based
on fragmentary information about fast-breaking events and may contain substantial
inaccuracies or uncertainties that must be resolved through subsequent report and analysis.
Finished intelligence products contain information that is compared, analyzed, and weighted
to allow the development of conclusions. The intelligence process confirms a fact or set of
facts through a multiplicity of sources to reduce the chance of erroneous conclusions. In most
cases the information the analysts collect come from international sources and the knowledge
of terms in English is of utmost importance. That is why the book has a part with Read on to
improve the specialized vocabulary in English. The information from this book is only the
start of a more thorough study of the necessary English terminology used in this field.
The author
Part 1
Unit I
A. Words and phrases:
 Intelligence= the ability to acquire and apply knowledge and skills; the collection of
information of military or political value
 Exploitation= the action or fact of treating someone unfairly in order to benefit from
their work; the action of making use of and benefiting from resources
 Collation= collecting and combining; bringing together
 Dissemination= the opening of a subject to widespread discussion and debate;
diffusion for propagation and permanence; a scattering or spreading abroad, as of
ideas, beliefs, etc.
 SlGINT
 IMINT
 MASINT
 HUMINT
B. Exchange what you know: What is intelligence?
To most, intelligence is information that is secret. This misses a fundamental point.

Information is anything that can be known, regardless of how it is discovered. Intelligence is
information that meets the stated or understood needs of policy makers, and has been
collected, processed, and narrowed to meet those needs. Therefore, intelligence is a subset of
the broader category of information. Intelligence and the entire process by which it is
identified, obtained, and analyzed responds to the needs of policy makers. It can be said that
all intelligence is information; not all information is intelligence.
C.Learn more:
What is Intelligence?
Intelligence is information that agencies collect, analyze and distribute in response to
government leaders’ questions and requirements. Intelligence is a broad term that entails:
-Collection, analysis, and production of sensitive information to support national security
leaders, including policymakers, military commanders.
-Safeguarding these processes and this information through counterintelligence activities.
-Execution of covert operations approved by the President.
The IC strives to provide valuable insight on important issues by gathering raw intelligence,
analyzing that data in context, and producing timely and relevant products for customers at all
levels of national security—from the war-fighter on the ground to the President in Washington.
Levels of intelligence include:
Strategic: intelligence needed by policymakers to make policy and military decisions at
the national and international level.
Operational: intelligence used by military leaders to plan and accomplish strategic
objectives within the operational area.
Intelligence is defined by Mark Lowenthal in his book From Secrets to Policy in three ways:
 Intelligence as a process.
A means by which certain types of information are required and requested, collected,
analyzed, and disseminated, and as the way in which certain types of covert action are
conceived and conducted.
 Intelligence as a product.
A knowledge product resulting from analyses and intelligence operations themselves.
 Intelligence as an organization.
Entities that carry out various functions for Intelligence.
The intelligence process is
-an organized process by which information is gathered, assessed, and distributed in order to
fulfill the goals of the intelligence function. It is a method of performing analytic activities
and placing the analysis in a useable form.[1]
- the process by which information is converted into intelligence and made available to users.
The process consists of six interrelated intelligence operations: planning and direction,
collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination and
integration, and evaluation and feedback. (in the military) [2]
Figure 1: The Intelligence Cycle (SOURCE: http://www.wmd.gov/report.)
The intelligence process (or cycle) is the means of developing raw information into finished
intelligence products for use in decision making and formulating policies/actions.
1. The first step, planning and direction, involves identifying the need for data. Investigators
must engage in a process of deciding what they want to know (or what they need to collect)
before they collect it, or they may end up with indiscriminate, unfocused information. When
we are tasked with a specific job, we begin planning what we’ll do and how. We move in a
specific direction to get the job done, listing what we know about the issue and what we need
to find out. We discuss ways to gather the necessary intelligence.
2. Collection is the gathering of the raw data needed to produce intelligence products. Data
may be collected from many sources, including but not limited to public records, the Internet,
confidential sources, incident reports, and periodicals. We collect information overtly (openly)
and covertly (secretly). Reading foreign newspapers and magazine articles, listening to foreign
radio, and watching overseas television broadcasts are examples of “overt” (or open) sources
for us. Other information sources can be “covert” (or secret), such as information collected
with listening devices and hidden cameras. We can even use space-age technology like satellite
photography. For instance, some analysts could actually view how many airplanes are present
at a foreign military base by looking at a picture taken from a satellite in space.
3. Processing and collation, involves evaluating the information‘s validity and reliability.
Collation entails sorting, combining, categorizing, and arranging the data collected so
relationships can be determined.
4. Analysis is the portion of the intelligence process that transforms the raw data into products
that are useful. This is also the function that separates information from intelligence.” It is this
vital function that makes the collection effort beneficial. Without this portion of the process,
we are left with disjointed pieces of information to which no meaning has been attached. The
goal is to develop a report where the information has been connected in a logical and valid
manner to produce an intelligence report that contains valid judgments based on information
analyzed. During this step, we take a closer look at all the information and determine how it
fits together, while concentrating on answering the original tasking. We assess what is
happening, why it is happening, what might occur next
5 Dissemination is also a vital step in the process. Without disseminating the intelligence
developed, it is pointless to collect it. The intelligence disseminated must be timely and
credible to be useful. Dissemination must also be evaluated based on a “right to know” and the
“ need to know.” In this final step, we give our final written analysis to a policymaker, the
same policymaker who started the cycle. After reading the final analysis and learning the
answer to the original question, the policymaker may come back with more questions. Then
the whole process starts over again.
6. Obtaining feedback on the process performed and the products produced by the intelligence
function. This step allows evaluation of the performance or effectiveness of an intelligence
function.
Each step of the process needs to be understood to produce accurate, timely intelligence
reports.
Collection
There are six basic intelligence sources, or collection disciplines:
 Human-Source Intelligence (HUMINT)
 Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
 Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)
 Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT)
 Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT)
 Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT)
HUMINT or Human-source intelligence consists of information obtained from individuals

who know, or have access to, sensitive information that has implications for the security
interests. Human intelligence serves policymakers by providing a unique window into the
targets' most guarded intentions, plans, and programs. Some of the principal types of
collection associated with HUMINT are:
 Clandestine source acquisition of information (including photography, documents,
and other material) of intelligence value.
 Overt data collection by civilian and military personnel assigned to US diplomatic and
consular posts.
 Debriefing of foreign nationals and US citizens who have traveled abroad or have
access to foreign information. During military operations, this would also include the
interrogation or debriefing of prisoners of war or detainees.
 Official contacts with foreign governments, including liaison with their intelligence
and security services.
SIGINT.Signals intelligence includes information derived from intercepted communications,

radar, and telemetry and is derived from signal intercepts comprising — however transmitted
— either individually or in combination:
o all communications intelligence (COMINT)
o electronic intelligence (ELINT)
o foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT)
IMINT.Imagery intelligence includes representations of objects reproduced electronically or
by optical means on film, electronic display devices, or other media. Imagery can be derived
from visual photography, radar sensors, infrared sensors, lasers, and electro-optics.
MASINT . Measurement and signature intelligence is technically derived intelligence data
other than imagery and SIGINT. The data results in intelligence that locates, identifies, or
describes distinctive characteristics of targets. It employs a broad group of disciplines
including nuclear, optical, radio frequency, acoustics, seismic, and materials sciences.
Examples of this might be the distinctive radar signatures of specific aircraft systems or the
chemical composition of air and water samples.
OSINT.Open-source information is publicly available information appearing in print or
electronic form including radio, television, newspapers, journals, the Internet, commercial
databases, and videos, graphics, and drawings. Much has happened in the world of open
source in the past ten years. Internet search tools like Google have brought significant new
capabilities and expectations for open source information to analysts and users alike. Possible
problems:
 Intelligence Community professionals need to quickly assimilate social, economic,
and cultural information about a country--information often detailed in open
sources.
 Open source information provides a base for understanding classified materials.
 Open source materials can protect sources and methods.
 A robust open source program can, in effect, gather data to monitor the world's
cultures and how they change with time.
GEOINT or geospatial intelligence is the analysis and visual representation of security

related activities on the earth. It is produced through an integration of imagery, imagery
intelligence, and geospatial information. “TPED" is an acronym that stands for "tasking,
processing, exploitation and dissemination." There is an emerging belief that the community
would be better served with a TPPU cycle that is Task, Post, Process, and Use. Some have
suggested that TPED is the supply-chain management for the GEOINT Community.
It is important to understand that information from collection sources is information, not
intelligence. Information becomes intelligence through processing, exploitation, and analysis.
Processing and Exploitation
Interpreting imagery; decoding messages; translating foreign-language broadcasts; reducing
telemetry to meaningful measures; preparing information for computer processing, storage
and retrieval; placing human-source reports in a form and context to make them more
comprehensible - these are all processing and exploitation.
Analysis and Production
Analysts obtain information from all sources pertinent to their area of responsibility through
the collection, processing and forwarding systems. Analysts absorb incoming information,
evaluate it, test it against other information and their knowledge and expertise, produce an
assessment of the current state of affairs within an assigned field or substantive area, and then
forecast future trends or outcomes. Analysts almost never work alone, but instead operate
within a system of peer review and oversight by more senior analysts.
D.Review the reading:
1. What is the difference between information and intelligence?

2. What is the intelligence process?
3. What are the steps of the intelligence process?
4. Which are the collection disciplines?
E. Read on and then make up sentences of your own with: decision making, spill the beans,
lethal situation, Ops HQ,to toss,to be overheard;
The decision in the Hampshire orchard led to a blizzard of decision making from the two
spymasters. To start with, sanction and approval had to be sought from both men’s political
masters.
This was easier said than done, because Mike Martin’s first condition was that no more than
a dozen people should ever know what Operation Crowbar was about. His concern was
completely understood.
If fifty people know anything that interesting, one will eventually spill the beans. Not
intentionally, not viciously, not even mischievously, but inevitably. Those who have ever been
in deep cover in a lethal situation know that it is nerve-racking enough to trust in one’s own
tradecraft never to make a mistake and be caught. To hope that one will never be given away
by some utterly unforeseeable flukeis constantly stressful. But the ultimate nightmare is to
know that the capture and the long, agonizing death to follow happened because some fool in
a bar boasted to his girlfriend and was overheard-that is the worst fear of all. So Martin’s
condition was acceded to at once.
When they had unpacked and convened in the drawing room, he tossed them both a thick file.
“Finding an Ops HQ starts tomorrow,” he said. “You have twenty-four hours to commit this
to memory. This is the man who is going to go in. You will work with him until that day, and
for him after that. This”-he tossed a thinner file on the coffee table “is the man he is going to
replace. Clearly, we know much less. But that is everything the U.S. interrogators have been
able to secure from him in hundreds of hours of interrogations at Gitmo.( adapted from The
Afghan by Frederick Forsyth)
References:
[1; 2]DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Nov. 8, 2010, as amended through
May 15, 2011) http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary
Unit 2

 to be peppered=to be scattered
 covert=Not openly practiced, avowed, engaged in, accumulated, or shown
 overt=Open and observable; not hidden, concealed, or secret
 accountability=the state of being accountable, liable, or answerable; a policy of
holding public officials or other employees accountable for their actions and results
 to enhance=to intensify or increase in quality, value, power; to raise to a higher degree;
Intensify; magnify.
 surfeit=an excessive or immoderate amount; general disgust caused by excess or
satiety.
 quid pro quo=Latin phrase meaning "something for something; a mutual agreement
between two parties in which each party provides a good or service in return for a
good or service.
B. Exchange what you know: Why is good communication necessary in every field of activity?
Man is always a part of a social interaction. It can never be removed from us to deal with
others, to be a part of others, and be able to relate with others. All these can only be achieved
through communication. Body language, basic oral communication and other forms won’t
matter as long as man can pass on to others what is in his mind or feelings. Without
communication, issues cannot be brought up or resolved. Relationships cannot be developed
or mended if communication is non existent. We are born to communicate with others and we
have the vocal system to back it up.
B. Learn more:
Definitions of categories of classified information
No nation can function without secrets. It is a fundamental characteristic of sovereignty that

information vital to the conduct of a nation’s business be kept confidential. The history of
civilization is peppered with tales of secret intelligence, codes, covert correspondence and
closely held military inventions used to vanquish enemies.
State Secretes are classified by the President based on the level of possible harm to the
nation’s security:
Top Secret: “Disclosure would cause exceptionally grave danger to national security.”
Secret: “Disclosure would cause grave damage to national security.”
Confidential: “Disclosure would cause damage or prejudice to national security.”
The implications of changes for intelligence services
The work of the intelligence services has become more time-sensitive, complex, dangerous
and controversial. Effective decision- and policymaking is increasingly dependent upon early
identification of problems, rapid assessment of the likely consequences of decisions and real-
time monitoring of their implementation. With changes in the strategic environment, there has
been an increase in the number and kind of consumers of intelligence, both domestic and
foreign. Their needs vary enormously. Only if top executive decision- and policymakers are
well informed can they provide the necessary guidance to intelligence services and make
sound judgments on policy.
The operations of intelligence services have become increasingly dependent on data that is
difficult and dangerous to collect. Maintaining secrets is increasingly difficult, for both
technical and political reasons.
National intelligence services need to be able to work with their counterparts in other
countries if they are to fulfill their missions; yet this can be complicated by mutual suspicion
and differences in practices among partner services.
The work of intelligence services in some countries is being hampered by a crisis of
confidence in their efficiency and their commitment to democratic oversight. The problem is
exacerbated where the public is not sufficiently informed about the activities of the
intelligence services and the methods for controlling them.
How can these issues be addressed?
There are four main areas where the intelligence services need to adjust their approaches:
• information collection and utilization;
• national coordination and cooperation among intelligence services and with other security
sector actors;
• information sharing with international organizations and other countries; and
• public acceptability and accountability.
The Information Revolution
The Information Revolution (IR) may be the most important new factor impacting the
management and work of intelligence services. It has implications for information availability
and access, as well as for its analysis.
As a result of changes in collection techniques, there is now a surfeit of information in
contrast to the information scarcity that characterized many aspects of the Cold War; the bulk
of information for national assessment comes from open source intelligence, though a crucial
portion is still generated by methods that largely remain the exclusive competence of
intelligence services; and data mining and other automated collection techniques have become
essential for the filtering and storing of information.
The IR has also had a dramatic impact on the way intelligence analysis is conducted. In
particular, it has altered working relationships among individual analysts and analytical
groups within intelligence services as technology trends have enhanced horizontal networking
and facilitated decentralization. It made possible the privatization of assessment, with many
companies offering expertise in global risk analysis whose products and services are often
superior to those of government intelligence organizations and contributed to the emergence
of informal networks of information distribution that compete with intelligence services for
the attention of policymakers.
These developments require significant changes in the management and craft of intelligence.
For example, one new challenge involves deciding in which domains to rely on open sources
and existing methods of collection, and in which to develop new capacities. Another involves
developing new methods of exchanging and protecting data as cooperation among intelligence
agencies increases.
The IR will not solve all problems facing intelligence services due to the following:
• costly high-tech intelligence systems designed for monitoring the electronic environment
may be ineffective against organizations employing simpler methods of communication;
• most terrorist and criminal organizations lack the type of infrastructure that technological
collection methods can most easily target;
• technological advances also help intelligence targets themselves to better protect their
secrets and more easily hide their activities; examples include publicly available encryption
methods for communications, widening access to the Internet (which also facilitates the
exchange of funds and information) and the growth of commercially available satellite
imagery; and
• many new threats require a greater emphasis on human intelligence collection, in particular
by individuals who have the linguistic and cultural knowledge necessary for infiltrating
today’s terrorist and criminal groups.
Intelligence sharing and international cooperation
Since intelligence must address global and transnational matters with increasing frequency,
intelligence relationships among countries have been expanding. The benefits of intelligence
sharing are obvious: intelligence exchange is a prerequisite for timely, informed and well
developed security decision making. In addition, by eliminating duplicated effort, it may bring
countries significant resource savings.
Intelligence is shared both bilaterally and multilaterally. Bilateral cooperation normally
involves the sharing of intelligence information and analyses on topics of mutual interest.
Such cooperation generally operates on a quid pro quo basis, since countries are reluctant to
share information that may reveal sources or methods without deriving a concrete benefit.
Though countries with more limited intelligence resources are not always able to provide
capabilities matching those of larger services, they can reciprocate in other ways, such as
providing access to regions and languages that services might otherwise have to develop
independently. Multilateral cooperation is evolving in response to the following challenges:
• coalition forces deployed in peace support operations and military operations require nearly
the full range of wartime intelligence support;
• transnational issues such as crime and terrorism, in which success on the part of one country
benefits all, motivate many countries to obtain and to provide greater access to an increasingly
broad range of information;
• multilateral networking can be crucial in the development of liaison arrangements, modern
technologies and databases, and mutual legal assistance.
Some international organizations such as the EU are in the process of developing
supranational mechanisms for intelligence assessment, but for the time being such
mechanisms are still dependent on national intelligence inputs.
Public accountability and acceptability
The intelligence services and responsible executive agencies can enhance public
accountability and acceptability in two ways in particular. They must ensure that intelligence
officers possess the necessary professional qualifications and receive proper training with a
sound ethical basis. They must also ensure that the need for is not misused to conceal
information that should be in the public domain. In an age where it is no longer necessary or
possible to keep the existence of agencies or all of their capabilities secret, such steps could
not only help the intelligence services improve their effectiveness, but could also help to
improve their image.
Furthermore, the media, non-governmental organizations and the general public need to be
informed – and need to inform themselves – about the activities of the intelligence services
and be able to do so without fear of sanction.
What is Covert Action?
According to National Security Act Sec. 503 (e), covert action is, “An activity or activities
of the Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad….”
Proper covert actions are undertaken because policymakers—not the intelligence
agencies—believe that secret means are the best way to achieve a desired end or a specific
policy goal. Covert action encompasses a broad spectrum of activities, but may include:
Propaganda: Intelligence agencies covertly disseminate specific information to
advance foreign policy goals.
Political/Economic Action: Intelligence agencies covertly influence the political or
economic workings of a foreign nation.
Paramilitary Operations: Intelligence agencies covertly train and equip personnel to
attack an adversary or to conduct intelligence operations. These operations normally
do not involve the use of uniformed military personnel as combatants.
Lethal Action: During times of war or armed conflict, states may need to use covert
lethal force against enemies who pose a threat.
One distinction between covert action and other overt activities, such as traditional
diplomatic or military operations, is that the officials could plausibly deny involvement in
the activity.
(Adapted from TheBelfer Center for Science and International Affairs / The Harvard Kennedy
School )
D. Review the reading:
1.How are state secretes classified?

2.How would you characterize the work of the intelligence services nowadays?
3.What are the challenges the multilateral cooperation faces these days?
4. What do you understand by IR?
5. Why are covert actions used over overt ones?
E. Read on and then make up sentences of your own with:Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS),policymakers,hallmarks of terrorism,adherent,to forge, sluggish
economic growth, apprehension
In many respects, CSIS shares the mission of our intelligence community: to help
policymakers identify, understand and, hopefully, successfully address the myriad national
security issues that our nation faces in a dynamic and very dangerous world – a very
dangerous world indeed.
My opening remarks this morning are different from those I reviewed and finalized in the
early afternoon of last Friday. They are different because our sensibilities and our souls have
been jarred once again by the horrific and wanton violence perpetrated upon the innocent in
the streets, cafes, and concert halls of the beautiful city of Paris. Our hearts ache for the
scores killed and injured in those savage attacks, and our thoughts are with them and their
families…
And while we await confirmation of culpability for those tragedies, they each bear the
hallmarks of terrorism carried out by the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Levant, or ISIL,
an organization of murderous sociopaths that carries out its criminal and morally depraved
actions under bogus religious pretense. With its roots in al-Qaida in Iraq, and empowered by
a large influx of foreign adherents, ISIL over the past several years has swallowed up large
swaths of territory in Iraq and Syria, brutally killing thousands upon thousands of men,
women and children along the way. Not content to limiting its killing fields to Iraqi and
Syrian lands, and to setting up local franchises in other countries of the Middle East, South
Asia and Africa, ISIL has developed an external operations agenda that is now implementing
– it is implementing with lethal effect.
I am sure we will talk more about ISIL in the question-and-answer session, but let me note
that the grave threat posed by the phenomenon of ISIL makes it absolutely imperative that the
international community urgently commit to achieve an even greater and unprecedented level
of cooperation, collaboration, information-sharing, and joint action in intelligence, in law
enforcement, in military operations, and in diplomatic channels. The ISIL threat demands it.
At CIA, we work closely with foreign intelligence security services around the globe to
advance our shared counterterrorism goals. Over the course of many years, we have forged
broad and deep partnerships with our closest allies in Europe, such as Great Britain, France,
and many, many others. These strategic relationships have been instrumental in helping to
knit together a transnational architecture that allows counterterrorism officials and experts to
work closely together across sovereign borders to disrupt terrorist plans and activities. And
while many terrorist operations have been thwarted as a result of strong transnational
teamwork, tragically, not all terrorist plans are uncovered in time.
… These strategic counterterrorism relationships need to stretch far beyond the traditional
transatlantic environment and alliances, which is why we are working closely with so many
services in different parts of the world…
These relationships are an essential adjunct to diplomacy and military operations. By
working with our foreign partners, we enhance global security by helping them tackle
challenges that threaten us all. And we benefit from a wider net of collection and from the
insights of local services, all of which enhance the intelligence we provide to policymakers.
The fact is, good intelligence – timely, accurate and insightful – is the cornerstone of almost
every aspect of national security policy today, from military action to diplomacy to
international law enforcement. With good intelligence, our policymakers can better
understand the risks, the challenges, as well as the opportunities attendant to key national
security issues, which is ever more important given the unprecedentedly complex and
overlapping array of major challenges to U.S. and global security that we face today.
The impression one might get from the daily headlines is that the world has become more
unstable. And, indeed, the historical record supports that judgment. First, the ideas,
institutions and states that have undergirded the post-Cold War system are under significant
stress. It is easy to think of this as a phenomenon confined solely to the developing world, and
that is certainly where we see states that have actually failed and borders that no longer carry
any practical effect, such as the border between Syria and Iraq. But there is considerable
stress on governments in even the world’s most stable regions.
In Europe, for instance, the migration crisis, sluggish economic growth and a host of other
factors have given rise to heightened nationalism, secession movements, and the increasing
popularity of political parties on both the far right and far left. Even ideas that were the
pillars of
the continent’s postwar prosperity, such as economic integration and democracy itself, are
being questioned in some quarters.
Across the globe, in both authoritarian and democratic societies, governments are finding it
increasingly difficult to meet the demands, realistic or not, of their skeptical and restive
populaces. The so-called Arab Spring revolutions were not fought for democracy per se as
much as they were fought for relief from regimes that had failed to meet basic standards of
governance and civil society. And as we have seen, when people become disillusioned with
the powers that be, social media enable them to more quickly and easily form associations
that defy the status quo. And in part, that is why the global landscape has been changing at a
faster and much more disruptive pace.
How nations respond to these challenges, adapt to them, and evolve will be one of the great
plotlines of the 21st century. When I meet with my foreign counterparts – both from friendly
and from not-so-friendly governments – I sense a very real apprehension about instability and
its various manifestations: terrorism, humanitarian crises, proliferation and so on.
Interestingly, I hear these concerns even from officials representing governments whose
policies are quite arguably contributing to the problem.
In many developing societies, growing pessimism about the prospects for economic
advancement is fueling instability. Regions with burgeoning youth populations, such as the
Arab World, have been unable to achieve the growth needed to reduce high unemployment
rates. Perceptions of growing inequality have resulted in more assertive street politics and
populism. At the same time, slower growth has left these nations with fewer resources to
devote to economic, humanitarian and peacekeeping assistance to address these challenges.
Mankind’s relationship with the natural world is aggravating these problems and is a
potential source of crisis itself. Last year was the warmest on record, and this year is on track
to be even warmer. Extreme weather, along with public policies affecting food and water
supplies, can worsen or create humanitarian crises. Of the most immediate concern, sharply
reduced crop
yields in multiple places simultaneously could trigger a shock in food prices with devastating
effect, especially in already-fragile regions such as Africa, the Middle East and South Asia.
Compromised access to food and water greatly increases the prospect for famine and deadly
epidemics… Across the globe, in both authoritarian and democratic societies, governments
are finding it increasingly difficult to meet the demands, realistic or not, of their skeptical and
restive populaces. The so-called Arab Spring revolutions were not fought for democracy per
se as much as they were fought for relief from regimes that had failed to meet basic standards
of governance and civil society. And as we have seen, when people become disillusioned with
policies are quite arguably contributing to the problem. (www.
http://time.com/4114870/paris-attacks-cia-john-brennan -CIA Director John Brennan On
Paris Attacks)
Unit 3
A Words and Phrases
 strength=force as measured in numbers : effective numbers of anybody or organization ‘an
army at full strength’
 clearance= an official decision saying that someone has permission to do something
 assessment= the act of making a judgment about something: the act of assessing
something: an idea or opinion about something
 malicious= having or showing a desire to cause harm to another person: having or
showing malice
 UAV =unmanned aerial vehicle
B.Exchange what you know: What do you know about Intel?
Military intelligence, abbreviated as “intel” or MI, refers to the collection, analysis, and
distribution of information relevant to military operations. Every nation on Earth utilizes
military intelligence to make itself more secure and prepared for battle. Like other types of
intelligence, military intelligence is gathered by skilled professionals who work in the field
and in offices to gather cohesive, useful information which will support the armed forces.
Most intelligence officers are recruited directly from the armed services, and each service has
its own intelligence branch, although intelligence officers from other branches may cooperate.
C Learn more:
Types of Intelligence
There are three essential divisions of intelligence. The first is strategic intelligence, general
information about the enemy and the world in general. Strategic intelligence is gathered from
a variety of sources, and includes information like the size of a standing army, available
weaponry, and foreign policy standards. Within a nation, several agencies will often share
strategic intelligence with each other.
Operational intelligence focuses on a specific operation. Data about the area in which
operations may be carried out is collected, along with specific information about troop
strength and movements, local sentiments, and other relevant material. Gathering accurate
operational intelligence is a crucial duty of military intelligence, and will make the difference
between a success and a failure. Tactical intelligence is an extension of operational
intelligence, focusing specifically on factors which may influence tactics on the battlefield.
Tactical intelligence is typically gathered by commanders in the field while operations are
carried out, as opposed to operational intelligence, which is collected before the action begins.
In both peacetime and wartime, military intelligence is an important part of the security
system for a nation. Intelligence officers receive special training to make them more effective,
and can choose to work in the field collecting raw data, or in centralized offices interpreting
and packaging the data. Office workers are an important part of intelligence, because they
filter through communications from other nations and analyze foreign newspapers, radio,
television, and other material in order to gather clues. Other officers collate the large amounts
of data collected and turn it into a briefing which can be read and understood.
Typically, intelligence officers have varying levels of clearance. Top clearance, allowing
access to all available information, is very rare. Most officers work on a small level, focusing
on a specific topic. If they are captured or they turn into double agents, they can only provide
information about a small part of the whole, rather than the entire system. This type of
isolation is typical in intelligence agencies and is especially important in military intelligence,
which deals with sensitive information about troop movements and plans.
Strategic intelligence
Strategic intelligence is concerned with broad issues such as economics, political assessments,
military capabilities and intentions of foreign nations (and, increasingly, non-state
actors).Such intelligence may be scientific, technical, tactical, diplomatic or sociological, but
these changes are analyzed in combination with known facts about the area in question, such
as geography, demographics and industrial capacities.
Operational intelligence
Operational intelligence is focused on support to an expeditionary force commander and will
be attached to the formation headquarters.
Tactical intelligence
Tactical intelligence is focused on support to operations at the tactical level and would be
attached to the battlegroup. At the tactical level, briefings are delivered to patrols on current
threats and collection priorities. These patrols are then debriefed to elicit information for
analysis and communication through the reporting chain. Any security system can come under
special assault from malicious forces.
Finished Intelligence
The information do not go directly to the policy maker or military commander. Developing
finished intelligence involves analytical techniques not different from those of the social
sciences.
 Scientific Intelligence. Understanding new weapon systems that the enemy was
developing thus became an important objective. It was important to obtain fairly
detailed information about the way a system worked in order to develop methods of
countering it.
 Military Intelligence. Military intelligence deals with information about foreign

militaries and preparing your own military forces for the time of war. The basic
military intelligence is the "order of battle," a tabulation of information about a
military forces-amount of manpower, numbers and types of weapons, organizational
structure, and similar data. One step up is information about how the forces could be
expected to fight, their tactics, and their strategy. Finally, when military operations
appear imminent or are beginning, there must be information about the disposition and
movement of military forces.
 Political Intelligence. Political intelligence consists of information concerning the

political processes, ideas, and intentions of foreign countries, factions, and leaders.
The analysis that produces this intelligence is similar to all academic and journalistic
research on both international and domestic politics.
 Overhead Surveillance
One of the primary methods any state uses to gather vital national security information is
through air- and space-based platforms, collectively known as “overhead surveillance.”
“Overhead surveillance” describes a means to gather information about people and places
from above the Earth’s surface. These collection systems gather imagery intelligence
(IMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT) and measurement and signature intelligence
(MASINT). Today, overhead surveillance includes:
 Space-based systems, such as satellites.
 Aerial collection platforms that range from large manned aircraft to small
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
A Brief History of Overhead Surveillance

Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms, collectively known as ISR, date back
to the 1790s when the French military used observation balloons to oversee battlefields and
gain tactical advantage over their adversaries. Almost all WWI and WWII belligerents used
aerial surveillance to gain intelligence on enemy lines, fortifications and troop movements.
Since the end of the Cold War, overhead surveillance technology has evolved significantly,
greatly expanding the amount of information that the policymaker and the warfighter can use
to make critical, time-sensitive decisions. For example, UAVs can remain over a target for
hours or days providing pictures and full-motion video directly to the commander on the
ground.
D:Review the reading:
1.Name the essential divisions of intelligence.

2. What does developing finished intelligence involve?
3. What is meant by overhead surveillance?
4 What does ISR refer to?
E. Read on and then make up sentences of your own with:collapse, human

toll,disillusioned, to erode.
In the past three years, there have been more outbreaks of instability than at any time since the
collapse of the Soviet Union, matching the rate we saw during decolonization in the 1960s.
This has not been a period of protests and government – this has not just been a period of
protests and government change, but of violent insurgency, and in particular of breakdowns in
many states’ ability to govern.
Ongoing conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Ukraine, Yemen, and Libya, and parts of Africa are clear
examples. The human toll is reflected in the U.N.’s recent announcement that the number of
refugees and internally displaced persons in the world is the highest it has been since World
War II. And of course, all of this localized strife gives rise to the persistent threat of
international terrorism.
When CIA analysts look for deeper causes of this rising instability, they find nationalistic,
sectarian and technological factors that are eroding the structure of the international system.
They also see socioeconomic trends, the impact of climate change, and other elements that are
In Europe, for instance, the migration crisis, sluggish economic growth and a host of other
factors have given rise to heightened nationalism, secession movements, and the increasing
popularity of political parties on both the far right and far left. Even ideas that were the pillars
of
the continent’s postwar prosperity, such as economic integration and democracy itself, are
being questioned in some quarters.
Across the globe, in both authoritarian and democratic societies, governments are finding it
increasingly difficult to meet the demands, realistic or not, of their skeptical and restive
populaces. The so-called Arab Spring revolutions were not fought for democracy per se as
much as they were fought for relief from regimes that had failed to meet basic standards of
governance and civil society. And as we have seen, when people become disillusioned with
policies are quite arguably contributing to the problem. (CIA Director John Brennan)
Unit 4
A.Words and phrases
 capability=the facility or potential for an indicated use or deployment

 trawl= to search through (something) in order to find someone or something
 asset=an item of value owned; something useful in an effort to foil or defeat an
enemy: as a: a piece of military equipment b: spy
 liaison= a person who helps organizations or groups to work together and provide
information to each other; communication for establishing and maintaining mutual
understanding and cooperation (as between parts of an armed force);a close bond or
connection
 hazard= a source of danger
 hoard= a large amount of something valuable that is kept hidden
 defacement=to mar the appearance of: injure by effacing significant details ‘deface an
inscription’, vandalization
B.Exchange what you know: What do you mean by defence intelligence?
Defense Intelligence
Largely due to its size, mission and capability, the Department of Defense (DoD) controls a
significant portion of the nation’s intelligence resources. As both a consumer and producer of
intelligence, defense intelligence assets play a crucial and unique role in the Intelligence
Community (IC).The primary role of Defense Intelligence is that of 'all-source' intelligence
analysis. This discipline draws information from a variety of overt and covert sources to
provide the intelligence needed to support military operations, contingency planning, and to
inform defense policy and procurement decisions. The maintenance of the ability to give
timely strategic warning of politico-military and scientific and technical developments with
the potential to affect a state’s interests is a vital part of the process.
C.Learn more:
What is Defense Intelligence?

Unlike the rest of the IC, DoD’s intelligence capabilities primarily focus on providing units at
all levels of the armed forces with the information necessary to successfully accomplish their
respective missions. Some functions of defense intelligence include:
 Providing early threat warnings for deployed military forces.
 Supporting the decisions behind the technology acquisition process.
 Informing commanders at the operational and strategic levels of military
operations.
 Supplying critical tactical intelligence to smaller units and individual warfighters
on the ground.
The DoD’s intelligence assets are diverse and reflect a broad spectrum of military capabilities.
The Need for Military Intelligence
Military intelligence is a military discipline that exploits a number of information collection
and analysis approaches to provide guidance and direction to commanders in support of their
decision. This is achieved by providing an assessment of available data from a wide range of
sources, directed towards the commanders' mission requirements or responding to focused
questions as part of the operational or campaign planning activity. In order to provide an
informed analysis, the commander's information requirements are first identified. These
information requirements are then incorporated into a process of intelligence collection,
analysis and dissemination.Intelligence should respond to the needs of the commander, based
on the military objective and the outline plans for the operation. The military objective
provides a focus for the estimate process, from which a number of information requirements
are derived. Information requirements may be related to terrain and impact on vehicle or
personnel movement, disposition of hostile forces, sentiments of the local population and
capabilities of the hostile order of battle.
In response to the information requirements, the analysis staff trawls existing information,
identifying gaps in the available knowledge. Where gaps in knowledge exist, the staff may be
able to task collection assets to collect against the requirement.
Analysis reports draw on all available sources of information, whether drawn from existing
material or collected in response to the requirement. The analysis reports are used to inform
the remaining planning staff, influencing planning and seeking to predict adversary intent.
Intelligence and International Cooperation
“Given the inherently secretive character of secret intelligence, there is immediately a tension
between the need to maintain the secret, on the one hand, and sharing the secret – or operating
in a more open and collaborative manner – on the other.” (Warren Tucker, Head of the New
Zealand Security Intelligence Service). A multilateral agreement is an accord among three or
more parties, agencies, or national governments.
International cooperation between national security and intelligence services represents one of
most significant challenges to security sector accountability today. The proliferation of
transnational threats has necessitated increased international cooperation among intelligence
and security agencies. Yet, information sharing and other forms of cooperation have
significant implications for human rights and therefore demand robust external oversight.
Advantages to Foreign Intelligence Relationships
The benefits from international or liaison partnerships consist of:
Access: Liaison may have access to or information about areas denied to direct
penetration.
Speed: Liaison may be able to gather and disseminate crucial data, giving any state the
ability to respond to time-sensitive threats.
Insight: Liaison may have greater cultural understanding into a particular issue that the
officials of a state may otherwise misinterpret.
Ability to Perform Direct Action: Liaison sometimes can provide direct military force to
solve a particular problem, usually within their home country.
Disadvantages of Foreign Intelligence Relationships
Liaison relationships with foreign services have disadvantages as well. A state must remain
vigilant for signs of:
Conflicting Interests: Liaison may provide adversaries with critical sensitive
information about interests, strategies and plans.
Hostile Collection: Liaison may attempt to gain insight into the intentions, sources and
methods through overt or covert means.
Poor Information Gathering: Liaison may use less rigorous collection methods. The
Intelligence Community analysts must independently verify specific information.
Moral Hazards: Members of foreign intelligence services may be involved in
unethical or illegal activities, or utilize illegal methods to obtain intelligence.
Information Sharing
After the terrorist attacks of September 11th, information sharing became one of the United
States government's goals in developing their resources to try to avert such atrocities. It was
mandated among government agencies and departments that personnel create a methodology
for regularly sharing relevant information. The US needed information sharing improvements
to respond to various threats more effectively. The lesson was learned that when information
is hoarded instead of shared, those needing it may not be able to react in a timely manner
Using information sharing intelligently has been shown to be a more effective way to manage
any organization; a government or a business. Overall, when used intelligently, information
sharing is a useful way of lowering costs, improving overall accuracy of public data and
allowing organizations and individuals alike to have access to information that they might
need and entertainment that they want to experience. Information sharing includes providing
information, confirming the information has been received, and confirming that the
information is jointly understood. Information sharing is an important component of
information behavior. It is an essential activity in all collaborative work, and helps to bind
groups and communities together.(Davenport, E., & Hall, H. (2002).Organizational knowledge and
communities of practice.Annual Review of Information Science and Technology, 36 171-222.)
The Cyber Threat

The significance and potential impact of cyber threats to the states has grown quickly over the
past decade. Cyber attacks can potentially undermine:
 Information systems and military responses.
 Civilian and military aviation systems.
 Critical first-response systems, especially during times of crisis.
 Financial markets and the free flow of financial data
One of the most problematic elements of cybersecurity is the quickly and constantly evolving
nature of security risks. The traditional approach has been to focus most resources on the most
crucial system components and protect against the biggest known threats, which necessitated
leaving some less important system components undefended and some less dangerous risks
not protected against.
To deal with the current environment, advisory organizations are promoting a more proactive
and adaptive approach.
National cyber warfare programs are unique in posing a threat along the entire spectrum of
objectives that might harm a state’s interests. These threats range from propaganda and low-
level nuisance web page defacements to espionage and serious disruption with loss of life and
extensive infrastructure disruption.
Recent National Initiatives
In recent years, policymakers have recognized the importance of securing the information
infrastructure and responded by increasing resources and focus on cyber security the efforts
aimed at preventing cyber attacks against infrastructures, reducing national vulnerability, and
minimizing the damage and recovery time from cyber attacks that do occur and secure the
governments’ cyber networks.
A cyber terror attack on vital national infrastructure such as power facilities, transport
networks and the financial sector could be imminent—and international governments are ill-
prepared, cyber security experts have warned. The next big attack will be against national
critical infrastructure and could cripple a country's ability to function. "There is no such thing
as 'the short-term national interest' anymore, the only thing that matters is a confidence and
credible security strategy," said Dutch Defense Minister
While mitigating all possible vectors for preventing all attacks is of course unachievable,
there are numerous efforts an organization can make to reduce the probability of being
targeted by raising the threshold for network penetration to a level that it becomes a more
daunting task for the assailants.
Understanding which are the critical assets and systems that need to be protected, identifying
the potential risks those assets may be confronted with, and fine-tuning the security solutions
in place to protect those critical assets will make the organization better able to detect threats,
respond in real-time to prevent further compromise, and produce a robust state of resiliency
that works to protect the organization’s interests.
D Review the reading:
1. How is military intelligence achieved?

2.Name one of most significant challenges to security sector accountability today?
3 Mention some of the advantages of international partnerships.
4.Mention some of the disadvantages of international partnerships.
5. Why are cyber attacks dangerous to the national security?
E. Read on and then make up sentences of your own with:cyber realm, hacking, intrusion,
prevention, to hamper
… the rapid advance of information technology has given rise to an entirely new and wide-
open domain for human interaction and progress: the cyber realm. As an intelligence officer,
much of my job involves dealing with the unintended consequences of the cyber revolution.
For as much as it brings the world together, it also serves the purpose of those who wish us
harm. Of greatest concern, the cyber realm gives small groups and even individuals the
potential to inflict damage on a scale previously restricted to nation-states. And while states
are largely rational actors subject to deterrence, the same does not apply to terrorists and
criminals.
Both government and private networks are under constant attack. The Department of
Homeland Security reports that more than 640,000 cyber-related incidents affected federal
agencies in fiscal year 2014. The massive and prolonged hacking of employee records held by
the Office of Personnel Management underscores the intensity of assaults on government IT
systems. And I am personally all too familiar with the ease with which miscreant hackers can
use social engineering techniques to perpetrate criminal intrusions into personal email
accounts, and information technology and communication systems.
Unfortunately, there is every reason to expect cyber intrusions to increase in quantity,
cunning and impact. For one thing, the economics of cyberattacks are skewed to favor the
attacker. Exploits, or malicious software tools, are easily acquired. In fact, their prices are
falling dramatically in some criminal markets – not because of declining demand, but because
of an increasingly competitive marketplace. These exploits can be reused on multiple targets,
and the likelihood of detection and punishment remains low in most instances.
And while the vast majority of cyberattacks target money, proprietary information and
privacy itself, we need to realize that the range of potential targets is much, much greater. We
simply cannot discount the very real possibility of attacks against vital infrastructure –
utilities, transportation, and other essential underpinnings of modern civilization.
The world has changed dramatically… our lives – as well as our fingers – are inextricably
linked to the cyber realm, the new digital frontier where most human interactions,
transactions and communications take place. And while that digital environment holds
tremendous potential and opportunity for the further advancement of humanity, our
increasing dependence on it brings obvious risks and challenges.
To deal with those risks and challenges, reactive strategies are insufficient. There has to be
systemic learning informed by constant information sharing, so that one organization’s
detection becomes another’s prevention. In other words, countering cyber threats is very
much a team effort.
And a crucial point to bear in mind is that about 85 percent of the World Wide Web’s critical
infrastructure is held by the private sector. This is a privately owned and operated
environment in which the rules remain uncertain at best.
A number of federal efforts in recent years have promoted the sharing of cyber threat
information between the private sector and government. We should be sharing a lot more
information than we do as a nation, but programmatic, technical and legal challenges – as
well as concerns about privacy and the role of government – have hampered
progress.(adapted from CIA Director John Brennan- Thoughts on Paris attacks, 2015)
Unit 5
 imagery=theformationofmentalimages,figures,orlikenessesofthings,orofsuchimagescol
lectively;pictorialimages
 forge=toformormake,especiallybyconcentratedeffort:e.g.toforgeafriendshipthroughmu
tualtrust;toimitate(handwriting,asignature,etc.)fraudulently
 inclusion=theactofincluding;thestateofbeingincluded;somethingthatisincluded.
 redundant=characterized by verbosity or unnecessary repetition in expressing ideas;
prolix: a redundant style; being in excess; exceeding what is usual or natural: a
redundant part; having some unusual or extra part or feature. ; characterized by
superabundance or superfluity; lush, redundant vegetation.
 congruous=exhibiting harmony of parts.; appropriate or fitting.
 prosecution=the institution and carrying on of legal proceedings against a person; the
body of officials by whom such proceedings are instituted and carried on ;the
following up of something undertaken or begun, usually to its completion.
 holistic= incorporating the concept of holism (the theory that whole entities, as
fundamental components of reality, have an existence other than as the mere sum of
their parts), or the idea that the whole is more than merely the sum of its parts, in
theory or practice
 clutter=cover or fill (something) with an untidy collection of things;a collection of
things lying about in an untidy state
 yield=to produce or furnish (payment, profit, or interest): to give up, as to superior
power or authority: to give up or surrender (oneself);to give way to influence,
entreaty, argument, or the like.
B.Exchange what you know: What is intelligence assessment?
Intelligence assessment is the development of forecasts of behavior or recommended courses

of action to the leadership of an organization, based on a wide range of available
informationsources both overt and covert. Assessments are developed in response to
requirements declared by the leadership in order to inform decision making. Assessment may
be carried out on behalf of a state, military or commercial organization with a range of
available sources of information available to each.An intelligence assessment reviews both
available information and previous assessments for relevance and currency. Where additional
information is required, some collection may be directed by the analyst.
C.Learn more:
The Intelligence Cycle
Intelligence assessment is based on a customer requirement or need, which may be a standing

requirement or tailored to a specific circumstance or a Request for Information (RFI). The
"requirement" is passed to the assessing agency and worked through the intelligence cycle, a
structured method for responding to the RFI. The RFI may indicate in what format the
requester prefers to consume the product. New information may be collected through one or
more of the various collection disciplines: human source, electronic and communications
intercept, imagery or open sources. The nature of the RFI and the urgency placed on it may
indicate that some collection types are unsuitable due to the time taken to collect or validate
the information gathered. Intelligence gathering disciplines and the sources and methods used
are often highly classified and compartmentalized, with analysts requiring an appropriate high
level of security clearance.
The process of taking known information about situations and entities of importance to the
RFI, characterizing what is known and attempting to forecast future events is termed "all
source" assessment, analysis or processing. The analyst uses multiple sources to mutually
corroborate, or exclude, the information collected, reaching a conclusion along with a
measure of confidence around that conclusion. Where sufficient current information already
exists, the analysis may be tasked directly without reference to further collection. The analysis
is then communicated back to the requester in the format directed, although subject to the
constraints on both the RFI and the methods used in the analysis, the format may be made
available for other uses as well and disseminated accordingly. The analysis will be written to
a defined classification level with alternative versions potentially available at a number of
classification levels for further dissemination.
Target-centric intelligence cycle
This approach, known as Fix-Find-Finish-Exploit-Assess (F3EA), is complementary to the

intelligence cycle and focused on the intervention itself, where the subject of the assessment is
clearly identifiable and provisions exist to make some form of intervention against that
subject, the target-centric assessment approach may be used.
The subject for action, or target, is identified and efforts are initially made to find the target
for further development. This activity will identify where intervention against the target will
have the most beneficial effects.
When the decision is made to intervene, action is taken to fix the target, confirming that the
intervention will have a high probability of success and restricting the ability of the target to
take independent action.
During the finish stage, the intervention is executed, potentially an arrest or detention or the
placement of other collection methods.
Following the intervention, exploitation of the target is carried out, which may lead to further
refinement of the process for related targets. The output from the exploit stage will also be
passed into other intelligence assessment activities.
Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate (F3EAD), pronounced “F-three-e-a-d”
or “feed,” is a version of the targeting methodology utilized by the special operations forces
(SOF) responsible for some of the most widely-publicized missions in support of overseas
contingency operations. F3EAD is a system that allows SOF to anticipate and predict enemy
operations, identify, locate, and target enemy forces, and to perform intelligence exploitation
and analysis of captured enemy personnel and materiel. Central to the F3EAD process is the
functional fusion of operations and intelligence functions throughout the SOF organization. In
F3EAD, commanders establish targeting priorities, the intelligence system provides the
direction to the target, and the operations system performs the decisive operations necessary
to accomplish the SOF mission.
UThe most significant aspect of F3EAD is the establishment of a true symbiotic relationship
between theoperations and intelligence warfighting functions. In F3EAD, operations
constantly directs the overall intelligence effort, and intelligence in turn feeds operations with
the information necessary to enable the successful accomplishment of the mission. This kind
of synchronization is crucial because on the modern battlefield the two functions are
becoming fused; indeed, some may now say that “intelligence is operations.” The goal of the
operations/intelligence fusion and rapid pace of the F3EAD process is to enable commanders
at all levels to plan and execute operations against the enemy faster than the enemy can react.
When utilized successfully, the process allows SOF to get into the enemy’s decision cycle and
simultaneously direct operations against several parts of the network. This results in the
ability of friendly forces to dictate the operational tempo, and sets the conditions for the
friendly operations.
F3EAD is a natural evolution of targeting, combining aspects of the conventional intelligence
cycle and doctrinal operational planning with best practices and emerging tactics, techniques,
and procedures forged in worldwide overseas contingency operations.
Figure 1: F3EAD as a Function of D3A. Source: FM 3-60.
There are some other important distinctions between the ways SOF and conventional forces
implementF3EAD:
1) the degree to which the process is understood and implemented within the SOF
community;
2) the emphasis placed on the process by SOF commanders, and
3)the degree success the process achieves for the SOF units who utilize it.
In SOF units effectively utilizing F3EAD, operational leaders at all levels took responsibility
for the intelligence effort, developing lines of communication and direct contact with the
intelligence personnel supporting them at all levels throughout the intelligence community.
This interaction allowed intelligence enablers to better understand and anticipate operational
needs, and facilitated the development of useful, long-term professional relationships between
intelligence and operations personnel. Additionally, units which successfully utilize F3EAD
often possess organizational adaptability that facilitates the conscious incorporation of
personnel, assets and capabilities that are not always considered as part of the warfighting
enterprise. Specifically, the inclusion of law enforcement personnel and their investigative,
forensic, and information-sharing capabilities were critical in the process of turning
intelligence into evidence, which became more and more important in the nonlethal
capabilities of F3EAD as the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan evolved. Unlike other
traditional targeting models and processes that focus on the operational or “finish” aspect, the
main effort of F3EAD is the intelligence effort, specifically the “exploit-analyze-disseminate”
portion. This allows F3EAD to be equally effective in lethal and non-lethal targeting, and is
key to understanding the F3EAD process. It is useful to visualize the F3EAD process as a
web, with the different elements of the process on the periphery, connected both directly to
each other and to the fusion of the operations and intelligence systems, in the manner shown
below. The cycle is continuous, but not necessarily congruous; steps can be and often are
skipped or shortened in order for the process to keep up with the “speed of war.”
Figure 2The F3EAD Process.Source:Charles Faint and Michael Harris
Find
The “find” function of the process takes place at all levels of both the intelligence and
operations systems, with both operations and intelligence personnel intimately involved in the
effort. In simplest terms, the find component of F3EAD is the process of establishing a start
point for intelligence collection. These start points often take the form of target nominations,
which can be generated internally by individual units or can be directed from external
headquarters. After receiving planning guidance from the commander and operations
planners, F3EAD practitioners employ the full range of intelligence capabilities from organic,
to national, and sometimes even to international assets to get a starting point for the rest of the
process. The targeting start point can be deliberate or opportunity-based, and can focus on a
known personality, a facility, an organization, or some other type of signature.
Fix
Once a target is identified, the full gamut of intelligence collection capability is applied
against the target in order to develop operational triggers to “fix” the target in space and time.
Fixing a target simply means that the intelligence effort has progressed enough that the
operations function has sufficient information to execute the mission, whether that mission be
kinetic or non-kinetic. When possible, Special operations Force (SOF)utilizes a practice of
“federating” or spreading the intelligence effort out amongst multiple agencies in order to
maximize effects while minimizing costs, effort, and time. This is often done as far forward as
possible in order to increase the speed of the process, but much of the effort can be
accomplished via reach back. Federated intelligence processes enable the organization
practicing F3EAD to spread the collection effort across the IC, calling on specific
organizations and in some cases specific personnel to provide the expertise and capability to
bring the process into the “finish” phase. Redundant, persistent, and centralized intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capability allows commanders to mass ISR against a
specific target for the period of time necessary to support F3EAD. The goal of an ISR is to
provide an “unblinking eye” squarely focused on the target, to bring the targeting process into
the decisive next phase.
Finish
The first two steps of F3EAD lead to decisive operations against the enemy. Lethal combat
operations in which SOF or their surrogates close with and destroy or seize enemy facilities,
equipment, or personnel are one type of operation associated with the finish phase. However,
the finish phase can just as easily be non-kinetic in nature. Neutralization of an enemy
communications node, disrupting a courier network, legal prosecution of key terrorist
personalities, or achieving a desired psychological, political, or social effect are just as much a
part of “finish” as missile strikes or combat assaults. Therefore, in F3EAD, finish refers more
to finishing a particular mission, than finishing enemy forces. Under legacy targeting
methodologies, the finish phase was considered the main effort. This made sense in prior wars
which were focused more on physical destruction of enemy forces and infrastructure as a
means to end his will to resist. However, in an information-age era of protracted conflicts, risk
aversion, non-state actors and networked warfare, the main effort cannot be on “finishing”
enemy forces in a traditional sense, in large part because the nature of warfare has changed.
Therefore, F3EAD does not end in the finish phase; indeed, with “finish,” the main effort of
F3EAD is just beginning.
Exploit
The “exploit” phase, as the main effort of F3EAD, is the most critical single step in the
process as it leads to the finding, fixing, and finishing of the next target and the perpetuation
of the cycle. Exploitation also best fulfills the main purpose of intelligence, which is to enable
“decision advantage” for decision-makers at all levels. In the F3EAD model, exploitation is
the process of examining, analyzing, interrogating, and processing captured enemy personnel,
equipment, and materiel for intelligence purposes. The overall aim of the exploitation effort is
to produce enough actionable intelligence and/or prosecutorial evidence to perpetuate the
F3EAD process as rapidly as possible. In support of this aim, exploitation has four broad
goals: force protection, targeting, component and material sourcing, and prosecution. (adapted
from McIntyre, Russell, Criteria for a Successful Theater Exploitation Effort, 19 September
2009)
Exploiting captured enemy personnel and materiel for force protection purposes allows
operations and intelligence to function together in order to prevent enemy attacks on friendly
forces, installations, and capabilities. Targeting allows friendly forces to engage enemy
forces, installations, and capabilities in order to achieve lethal or non-lethal effects.
Component and materiel sourcing allows intelligence personnel to backtrack sources of
enemy personnel and materiel, thereby enabling friendly forces to engage the enemy across
his network. Finally, exploitation enables prosecution of enemy forces after they and their
materiel have been fully exploited for intelligence purposes. This represents another
fundamental evolution in warfare, since prior to the current Overseas Contingency
Operations, prosecution was most often associated with events that occurred after a conflict
was resolved, not during hostilities. By including prosecution as a part of the overall
exploitation process, practitioners of the F3EAD process allow friendly forces to then turn
intelligence into evidence, enabling successful legal prosecution of enemy forces, and
ensuring that both the population and friendly forces are protected. This is particularly useful
in the kind of “adaptive, security-conscious networks” frequently encountered in irregular
warfare.
F3EAD vs. F3EA
Some organizations utilize the acronym “F3EA” instead of “F3EAD.” While the processes are
essentially the same except for the last letter of the acronym, the difference between the two
involves more than mere semantics. The argument for F3EA is that the “D,” dissemination, is
an “understood” part of the process and does not need to be specifically designated as an
individual component. This thinking is in error. “Exploit” and “analyze” were added to the
legacy find-fix-finish (F3) process because those functions required specific emphasis in order
for the process to realize its maximum potential. The same holds true with dissemination;
without emphasizing it as a specific and essential part of the of the targeting process, SOF
runs the risk of creating “stovepipes of excellence” that deliberately or inadvertently
compartmentalize information, thereby inhibiting the effective fusion of operation and
intelligence functions and bogging down the targeting process. Emphasizing “dissemination”
as a formal part of the process ensures that practitioners keep the dissemination element in
mind as a continuous part of the process. (adapted from: F3EAD: Ops/Intel Fusion ?Feeds?
The SOF Targeting Process by Charles Faint and Michael Harris )
DR eview the reading:
1. How can information be collected?

2.What isF3EAD?
3 Which is the most significant aspect of F3EAD?
4.Name some important distinctions between the ways SOF and conventional forces
implementF3EAD.
5. How can a force turn intelligence into evidence?
E. Read on and then make up sentences of your own with: clutter , insurgent, tracking,
detainee, yield.
Use F3EA
An aggressive targeting model known as find, fix, finish, exploit, and analyze (F3EA) features
massed, persistent ISR cued to a powerful and decentralized all-source intelligence apparatus
in order to find a target amidst civilian clutter and fix his exact location. This precision
geolocation enables a start point into the enemy network that can be exploited through
persistent and patient observation. With this type of start point, one can mass ISR with
confidence that assets are not being wasted.
Mass ISR
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance are most effective against low-contrast

enemies when massed. The insurgent’s ability to hide in plain sight demands persistent
collection in order to detect his presence. Persistent collection requires long dwell times and
must be focused using multiple sensors on discrete parts of the network in order to achieve the
fidelity of information required for targeting. Several tactics can be applied to improve ISR
(Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) effectiveness against the insurgent.
The Unblinking Eye provides an opportunity to learn about the network in action and how it
operates. It is long dwell, persistent surveillance directed against known and suspected
terrorist sites or individuals. The purpose of this long dwell airborne stakeout is to apply
multisensor observation 24/7 to achieve a greater understanding of how the enemy’s network
operates by building a pattern of life analysis. This is an important concept and has proven
itself time and again with hundreds of examples of successful raids. Nodal analysis is spatially
connecting relationships between places and people by tracking their patterns of life. While
the enemy moves from point to point, airborne ISR tracks and notes every location and person
visited. Connections between those sites and persons to the target are built, and nodes in the
enemy’s low-contrast network emerge. Nodal analysis has the effect of taking a shadowy foe
and revealing his physical infrastructure for things such as funding, meetings, headquarters,
media outlets, and weapons supply points. As a result, the network becomes more visible and
vulnerable, thus negating the enemy’s asymmetric advantage of denying a target. Nodal
analysis uses the initial start point to generate additional start points that develop even more
lines of operation into the enemy’s network. The payoff of this analysis is huge but requires
patience to allow the network’s picture to develop over a long term and accept the
accompanying risk of potentially losing the prey. Vehicle follow is tracking vehicle
movements from the air. These are important in illustrating the network and generating fix-
finish operations. Vehicle follows were surprisingly central to understanding how a network
functions. They are also among the most difficult airborne ISR operations to conduct and
often require massing of assets to ensure adequate tracking.
Airborne ISR effectiveness increases by an order of magnitude when massed. A single
combat air patrol (CAP) of ISR is defined as one platform 24/7 over a target. Use of three
CAPs is generally the best practice for massing on a target set during the fix and finish phase
of the operation. This allows mass not only in space but also in time, which equates to
persistence. It is not enough to have several eyes on a target—several eyes are needed on a
target for a long period. Three CAPs permit persistent surveillance of a target while
simultaneously developing the network’s pattern of life through nodal analysis and vehicle
follows. It gives the finishing force commander more options than merely killing or letting an
observed enemy go; with sufficient ISR, a ground force commander can demonstrate much
greater operational patience, thus allowing a larger insurgent network to emerge. Massing ISR
in time and space has operational results that should not be ignored. The undertaken
studyconcluded that massed and persistent collection was an important element of success in
SOF operations.
Conventional forces tend to cover disparate targets for a shorter period than SOF, which tend
to focus collection on a smaller number of targets for much longer. The conventional force
approach reveals a desire to service a large number of targets and units instead of developing
the pattern of life of an enemy network.
The Exploit and Analyze
F3EA differs from other targeting models because of its emphasis on exploit-analyze as the
main effort. This recognizes the importance of intelligence in fighting the low-contrast foe
and aggressively supplying multisource start points for new ISR collection. More than the
other phases, this feeds the intelligence operations cycle in which intelligence leads to
operations that yield more intelligence leading to more operations. The Joint Special
Operations Task Force(JSOTF) emphasis on raids is essential to gather intelligence on the
enemy network; simply killing the enemy will not lead to greater effectiveness against their
networks. In fact, capturing the enemy for purposes of interrogating is normally the preferred
option. The bottom line of exploit-analyze is to gather information and rapidly turn it into
operational action by applying it to defeat the enemy’s network. Target exploitation and
document exploitation are important law enforcement–type activities critical to F3EA.
Documents and pocket litter, as well as information found on computers and cell phones, can
provide clues that analysts need to evaluate enemy organizations, capabilities, and intentions.
The enemy’s low-contrast network comes to light a little more clearly by reading his email,
financial records, media, and servers. Target and document exploitation help build the picture
of the enemy as a system of systems and as such enables counternetwork forces to attack it
holistically.
Detainee intelligence is another law enforcement–like function crucial to revealing the
enemy’s network. The ability to talk to insurgent leaders, facilitators, and financiers on how
the organization functions offers significant insight on how to take that organization apart. In
terms of analysis and developing targeting lines of operation, detainee intelligence is the key
to the “slow, deliberate exploitation of leads and opportunities, person-to-person” that drive
operations.
Intelligence from detainees drives operations, yielding more detainees for additional
exploitation and intelligence. A tight connection between interrogators and detainee analysts
on one hand and all-source intelligence, collections, and operators on the other is critical to
take advantage of raw information. (adapted from Employing ISRSOF Best Practices by MT
Flynn)
Unit6
A. Words and phrases

 anxiety=fear or nervousness about what might happen; an abnormal and
overwhelming sense of apprehension and fear often marked by physiological
signs (as sweating, tension, and increased pulse), by doubt concerning the reality
and nature of the threat, and by self-doubt about one's capacity to cope with it
 emphasize=to give special attention to (something)
 mistrust= lack of trust or confidence : a feeling that someone is not honest and
cannot be trusted
 constrain= to limit or restrict (something or someone): to use pressure to force
(someone) to do something
 persuasion= the act of causing people to do or believe something : the act or
activity of persuading people: a particular type of belief or way of thinking
 fuzzy= not clear : not sharp or distinct: not clear in thought
 cuddly= having the soft or appealing quality of a thing or person that you would
like to cuddle; designed to be easy to like and not to offend people
 stack= a usually neat pile : a group of things that are put one on top of the other;
a large amount of something
 bandwagon= a popular activity, effort, cause, etc., that attracts growing support
 scapegoat= a person who is unfairly blamed for something that others have done
 straw man= a weak or imaginary argument or opponent that is set up to be easily
defeated
 crave=to have a very strong desire for (something)
B.Exchange what you know: What is communication?
Communication
Man is always a part of a social interaction. It can never be removed from us to deal with
others, to be a part of others, and be able to relate with others. All these can only be achieved
through communication. Body language, basic oral communication and other forms won’t
matter as long as man can pass on to others what is in his mind or feelings. Without
communication, issues cannot be brought up or resolved. Relationships cannot be developed
or mended if communication is nonexistent. We are born to communicate with others and we
have the vocal system to back it up.
When we interact with others, we continuously give and receive wordless signals. All of our
nonverbal behaviors—the gestures we make, the way we sit, how fast or how loud we talk,
how close we stand, how much eye contact we make—send strong messages. These messages
don't stop when you stop speaking either. Even when you're silent, you're still communicating
nonverbally.
Oftentimes, what comes out of our mouths and what we communicate through our body
language are two totally different things. When faced with these mixed signals, the listener
has to choose whether to believe your verbal or nonverbal message, and, in most cases, they're
going to choose the nonverbal because it's a natural, unconscious language that broadcasts our
true feelings and intentions in any given moment.
C.Learn more:
Why nonverbal communication matters
The way you listen, look, move, and react tells the other person whether or not you care, if
you’re being truthful, and how well you’re listening. When your nonverbal signals match up
with the words you’re saying, they increase trust, clarity, and rapport. When they don’t, they
generate tension, mistrust, and confusion.
If you want to become a better communicator, it’s important to become more sensitive not
only to the body language and nonverbal cues of others, but also to your own.
Nonverbal communication cues can play five roles:
 Repetition: they can repeat the message the person is making verbally.
 Contradiction: they can contradict a message the individual is trying to convey.
 Substitution: they can substitute for a verbal message. For example, a person's eyes
can often convey a far more vivid message than words do.
 Complementing: they may add to or complement a verbal message. A boss who pats
a person on the back in addition to giving praise can increase the impact of the
message.
 Accenting: they may accent or underline a verbal message. Pounding the table, for
example, can underline a message.
It is often said that in face-to-face and even body-to-body communication the words we speak
actually account for less than 10% of the message that we convey, while body language
accounts for more than half of our message. Effective communication is a crucial factor in
any close relationship. What to do to improve communication is:
Identify your body language patterns. Make a conscious effort to think about what your
body is doing in different interactions with different people paying attention to what your
body does when you're angry, nervous or happy.
Determine whether your body language is in sync with your message. Your body
language is effective if it communicates the message you want it to communicate. If your
non-verbal signals match your words, you'll not only communicate more clearly, you'll also
be perceived as being more charismatic.
Emphasize a point. Have more than one gesture. If you want to make sure you're not
misunderstood, repeat both gestures when you speak the idea aloud. If the listener doesn't pick
up on one gesture, he or she will likely be familiar with the other.
Direct the most positive gestures toward the listener. This lets you more clearly indicate
that you are offering a favorable outcome to the listener. Direct the most negative gestures
away from yourself and the listener. This way you clearly indicate that you wish that no
obstacle stands in the way of your intended message.
Use hand gestures carefully. Be conscious of what your hands are saying as you speak.
Some hand gestures can be very effective in highlighting your points (open gestures), while
others can be distracting or even offensive to some listeners, and can lead to the conversation
or listening being closed down (closed gestures). It also helps to watch other people's hand
gestures to see how they come across to you.
Keep a check on other body language signals. Watch for wandering eyes, hands picking at
fluff on your clothing and constant sniffling. These small gestures add up and are all
guaranteed to dampen the effectiveness of your message. Don't worry about if you
accidentally perform a few of these in any given setting. The point here is to be certain that
your body language is not distracting for your listener and for you to pay attention to what
your body is doing.
Use facial expressions consciously. Aim to reflect passion and generate empathy with the
listener by using soft, gentle, and aware facial expressions. As much as possible, except when
culture dictates, avoid negative facial expressions, such as frowns or raised eyebrows. What is
or isn't negative is dependent on the context, including cultural context, so be guided by your
situation. Be alert for unexpected behavior that suggests you're cross-culturally colliding, such
as a clenched fist, a slouched posture, or even silence. If you don't know the culture, ask
questions about communication challenges before you start to speak with people in their
cultural context.
Communicate eye to eye. Eye contact establishes rapport, helps to convince that you're
trustworthy, and displays interest. During a conversation or presentation, it is important to
look into the other person's eyes if possible and maintain contact for a reasonable amount of
time (but don't overdo it; just as much as feels natural, about 2-4 seconds at a time).
Remember to take in all of your audience. If you're addressing a boardroom, look every
member of the board in the eye. Neglecting any single person can easily be taken as a sign of
offense and could lose your business, admission, success, or whatever it is you are
endeavoring to achieve. If you're addressing an audience, pause and make eye contact with a
member of audience for up to 2 seconds before breaking away and resuming your talk. This
helps to make individual members of the audience feel personally valued.Be aware that eye
contact is culturally ordained. In some cultures it is considered to be unsettling or
inappropriate. Ask or research in advance.
Touching one's face signals anxiety. Improve your posture. If you're constantly hunched
over or touching your face, you'll never look confident, approachable or at ease. Improving
your posture and working to eliminate nervous tics can be difficult and will take time, but
you'll quickly improve your overall non-verbal communication
Identify cultural norms. If you have recently entered a new culture, you may need to adjust
your body language. Cultural norms regarding body language (i.e. how far away you should
stand from someone, how much eye contact you should make, and what gestures are
considered taboo), vary considerably and if you don't speak the same body language as the
locals, you're liable to be misunderstood a great deal. This can even sometimes be met with
very serious implications.
Concentrate on difficult situations. It's most important to make sure your body language is
clear in interactions with people you don't know very well
Say what you mean. For most people, body language that effectively reinforces the speaker's
intent comes naturally when they mean what they say. The problem, of course, is that we
don't always say what we mean. If you're trying to lie convincingly for example, you'll
probably have to alter your body language to prevent it from arousing suspicion. It's often
easier to just say what you feel. (adapted fromThe Importance of Effective
Communication by Edward G. Wertheim).
Reading body language is "almost" a science. If at all possible it is best if you know the person
well enough to be able to see how their body reacts to situations. Just because someone wears
sunglasses when its cloudy doesn't mean they are trying to hide "something" or look cool. But
if that same person is wearing them indoors on the elevator, chances are, they believe they are
cool and want you to know it. But it "could" also mean they are recovering from a bad
hangover, or just got back from the eye doctor and actually need to wear shades to protect their
eyes. The atypical signs are what you should be looking at.
Communication with people of different cultures.Effective communication with people of
different cultures is especially challenging. Cultures provide people with ways of thinking-
ways of seeing, hearing, and interpreting the world. Thus the same words can mean different
things to people from different cultures, even when they talk the "same" language. When the
languages are different, and translation has to be used to communicate, the potential for
misunderstandings increases. Experts in communication describe three ways in which culture
interferes with effective cross-cultural understanding. First is what she calls "cognitive
constraints." These are the frames of reference or world views that provide a backdrop that all
new information is compared to or inserted into. Second are "behavior constraints." Each
culture has its own rules about proper behavior which affect verbal and nonverbal
communication. Whether one looks the other person in the eye-or not; whether one says what
one means overtly or talks around the issue; how close the people stand to each other when
they are talking--all of these and many more are rules of politeness which differ from culture
to culture. The third factor is "emotional constraints." Different cultures regulate the display
of emotion differently. Some cultures get very emotional when they are debating an issue.
They yell, they cry, they exhibit their anger, fear, frustration, and other feelings openly. Other
cultures try to keep their emotions hidden, exhibiting or sharing only the "rational" or factual
aspects of the situation. All of these differences tend to lead to communication problems. If
the people involved are not aware of the potential for such problems, they are even more
likely to fall victim to them, although it takes more than awareness to overcome these
problems and communicate effectively across cultures. Language of Persuasion
Public relations (PR) "sells" us a positive image of a corporation, government or organization.
Politicians and advocacy groups (groups that support a particular belief, point of view, policy,
or action) try to persuade us to vote for or support them, using ads, speeches, newsletters,
websites, and other means.
These "persuaders" use a variety of techniques to grab our attention, to establish credibility
and trust, to stimulate desire for the product or policy, and to motivate us to act (buy, vote,
give money, etc.)
We call these techniques the "language of persuasion.”
Basic persuasion techniques
Association. This persuasion technique tries to link a product, service, or idea with
something already liked or desired by the target audience, such as fun, pleasure, beauty,
security, intimacy, success, wealth, etc. The media message doesn’t make explicit claims that
you’ll get these things; the association is implied. Association can be a very powerful
technique. A good ad can create a strong emotional response and then associate that feeling
with a brand (family = Coke, victory = Nike). This process is known as emotional transfer.
Bandwagon. Many ads show lots of people using the product, implying that "everyone is
doing it" (or at least, "all the cool people are doing it"). No one likes to be left out or left
behind, and these ads urge us to "jump on the bandwagon.” Politicians use the same technique
when they say, "The people want..." How do they know?
Beautiful people. Beautiful people uses good-looking models (who may also be celebrities)
to attract our attention. This technique is extremely common in ads, which may also imply
(but never promise!) that we’ll look like the models if we use the product.
Bribery. This technique tries to persuade us to buy a product by promising to give us
something else, like a discount, a rebate, a coupon, or a "free gift.” Sales, special offers,
contests, and sweepstakes are all forms of bribery. Unfortunately, we don’t really get
something for free -part of the sales price covers the cost of the bribe.
Celebrities. We tend to pay attention to famous people. That’s why they’re famous! Ads
often use celebrities to grab our attention. By appearing in an ad, celebrities implicitly endorse
a product; sometimes the endorsement is explicit. Many people know that companies pay
celebrities a lot of money to appear in their ads but this type of testimonial still seems to be
effective.
Experts. We rely on experts to advise us about things that we don’t know ourselves.
Scientists, doctors, professors and other professionals often appear in ads and advocacy
messages, lending their credibility to the product, service, or idea being sold. Sometimes,
plain folks can also be experts, as when a mother endorses a brand of baby powder or a
construction worker endorses a treatment for sore muscles.
Explicit claims. Something is "explicit" if it is directly, fully, and/or clearly expressed or
demonstrated. For example, some ads state the price of a product, the main ingredients,
where it was made, or the number of items in the package – these are explicit claims. So are
specific, measurable promises about quality, effectiveness, or reliability, like “Works in only
five minutes!” Explicit claims can be proven true or false through close examination or
testing. It can be surprising to learn how few ads make explicit claims. Most of them try to
persuade us in ways that cannot be proved or disproved.
Fear. It uses something disliked or feared by the intended audience (like bad breath, failure,
high taxes or terrorism) to promote a "solution.” Ads use fear to sell us products that claim to
prevent or fix the problem.
Humor. Many ads use humor because it grabs our attention and it’s a powerful persuasion
technique. When we laugh, we feel good. Advertisers make us laugh and then show us their
product or logo because they’re trying to connect that good feeling to their product. They
hope that when we see their product in a store, we’ll subtly re-experience that good feeling
and select their product.
Intensity. The language of ads is full of intensifiers, including superlatives (greatest, best,
most, fastest, lowest prices), comparatives (more, better than, improved, increased, fewer
calories), hyperbole (amazing, incredible, forever), exaggeration, and many other ways to
hype the product.
Maybe. Unproven, exaggerated or outrageous claims are commonly preceded by "weasel
words" such as may, might, can, could, some, many, often, virtually, as many as, or up to.
Watch for these words if an offer seems too good to be true.
Plain folks. (– the opposite of Celebrities.) This technique works because we may believe a
"regular person" more than an intellectual or a highly-paid celebrity. It’s often used to sell
everyday products like laundry detergent because we can more easily see ourselves using the
product, too.Most of the "plain folks" in ads are actually paid actors carefully selected
because they look like "regular people.”
Repetition. Advertisers use repetition in two ways: Within an ad or advocacy message,
words, sounds or images may be repeated to reinforce the main point. And the message itself
(a TV commercial, a billboard, a website banner ad) may be displayed many times. Even
unpleasant ads and political slogans work if they are repeated enough to pound their message
into our minds.
Testimonials. Media messages often show people testifying about the value or quality of a
product, or endorsing an idea. They can be experts, celebrities, or plain folks. We tend to
believe them because they appear to be a neutral third party. This technique works best when
it seems like the person “testifying” is doing so because they genuinely like the product or
agree with the idea. Some testimonials may be less effective when we recognize that the
person is getting paid to endorse the product.
Warm and fuzzy. This technique uses sentimental images (especially of families, kids and
animals) to stimulate feelings of pleasure, comfort, and delight. It may also include the use of
soothing music, pleasant voices, and evocative words like "cozy" or "cuddly.”
Intermediate persuasion techniques
The Big Lie. According to Adolf Hitler, one of the 20th century’s most dangerous
propagandists, people are more suspicious of a small lie than a big one. The Big Lie is more
than exaggeration or hype; it’s telling a complete falsehood with such confidence and
charisma that people believe it. Recognizing The Big Lie requires "thinking outside the box"
of conventional wisdom and asking the questions other people don’t ask.
Charisma. Sometimes, persuaders can be effective simply by appearing firm, bold, strong,
and confident. This is particularly true in political and advocacy messages. People often
follow charismatic leaders even when they disagree with their positions on issues that affect
them.
Euphemism. Euphemism tries to pacify audiences in order to make an unpleasant reality
more palatable. Bland or abstract terms are used instead of clearer, more graphic words. Thus,
we hear about corporate "downsizing" instead of "layoffs," or "intensive interrogation
techniques" instead of "torture.”
Extrapolation. Persuaders sometimes draw huge conclusions on the basis of a few small
facts. Extrapolation works by ignoring complexity. It’s most persuasive when it predicts
something we hope can or will be true.
Flattery. Persuaders love to flatter us. Politicians and advertisers sometimes speak directly to
us: "You know a good deal when you see one." "You expect quality." "You work hard for a
living." "You deserve it." Flattery works because we like to be praised and we tend to believe
people we like.
Glittering generalities. This is the use of so-called "virtue words" such as civilization,
democracy, freedom, patriotism, motherhood, fatherhood, science, health, beauty, and love.
Persuaders use these words in the hope that we will approve and accept their statements
without examining the evidence. They hope that few people will ask whether it’s appropriate
to invoke these concepts, while even fewer will ask what these concepts really mean.
New. We love new things and new ideas, because we tend to believe they’re better than old
things and old ideas. That’s because the dominant culture in the world places great faith in
technology and progress. But sometimes, new products and new ideas lead to new and more
difficult problems.
Nostalgia. This is the opposite of the New technique. Many advertisers invoke a time when
life was simpler and quality was supposedly better ("like Mom used to make"). Politicians
promise to bring back the "good old days" and restore "tradition." But whose traditions are
being restored? This technique works because people tend to forget the bad parts of the past,
and remember the good.
Rhetorical questions. These are questions designed to get us to agree with the speaker.
They are set up so that the “correct” answer is obvious. ("Do you want to get out of debt?"
"Do you want quick relief from headache pain?" and "Should we leave our nation vulnerable
to terrorist attacks?" are all rhetorical questions.) Rhetorical questions are used to build trust
and alignment before the sales pitch.
Scientific evidence. It uses the paraphernalia of science (charts, graphs, statistics, lab coats,
etc.) to "prove" something. It often works because many people trust science and scientists.
It’s important to look closely at the "evidence," however, because it can be misleading.
Simple solution. Life is complicated. People are complex. Problems often have many causes,
and they’re not easy to solve. These realities create anxiety for many of us. Persuaders offer
relief by ignoring complexity and proposing a simple solution. Politicians claim one policy
change (lower taxes, a new law, a government program) will solve big social problems.
Advertisers take this strategy even further, suggesting that a deodorant, a car, or a brand of
beer will make you beautiful, popular and successful.
Slippery slope. This technique combines Extrapolation and Fear. Instead of predicting a
positive future, it warns against a negative outcome. It argues against an idea by claiming it’s
just the first step down a “slippery slope” toward something the target audience opposes. ("If
we let them ban smoking in restaurants because it’s unhealthy, eventually they’ll ban fast
food, too." This argument ignores the merits of banning smoking in restaurants.) The
slippery slope technique is commonly used in political debate, because it’s easy to claim that
a small step will lead to a result most people won’t like, even though small steps can lead in
many directions.
Symbols. Symbols are words or images that bring to mind some larger concept, usually one
with strong emotional content, such as home, family, nation, religion, gender, or lifestyle.
Persuaders use the power and intensity of symbols to make their case. But symbols can have
different meanings for different people. Hummer SUVs are status symbols for some people,
while to others they are symbols of environmental irresponsibility.
Advanced persuasion techniques
Ad hominem. Latin for "against the man," the ad hominem technique responds to an
argument by attacking the opponent instead of addressing the argument itself. It’s also called
"attacking the messenger.” It works on the belief that if there’s something wrong or
objectionable about the messenger, the message must also be wrong.
Analogy. An analogy compares one situation with another. A good analogy, where the
situations are reasonably similar, can aid decision-making. A weak analogy may not be
persuasive, unless it uses emotionally-charged images that obscure the illogical or unfair
comparison.
Card stacking. No one can tell the whole story; we all tell part of the story. Card stacking,
however, deliberately provides a false context to give a misleading impression. It "stacks the
deck," selecting only favorable evidence to lead the audience to the desired conclusion.
Cause vs. Correlation. While understanding true causes and true effects is important,
persuaders can fool us by intentionally confusing correlation with cause. For example: Babies
drink milk. Babies cry. Therefore, drinking milk makes babies cry.
Denial. This technique is used to escape responsibility for something that is unpopular or
controversial. It can be either direct or indirect. A politician who says, "I won’t bring up my
opponent’s marital problems," has just brought up the issue without sounding mean.
Diversion. This technique diverts our attention from a problem or issue by raising a separate
issue, usually one where the persuader has a better chance of convincing us. Diversion is often
used to hide the part of the story not being told. It is also known as a “red herring.”
Group dynamics. We are greatly influenced by what other people think and do. We can get
carried away by the potent atmosphere of live audiences, rallies, or other gatherings. Group
dynamics is a more intense version of the Majority belief and Bandwagon techniques.
Majority belief. This technique is similar to the Bandwagon technique. It works on the
assumption that if most people believe something, it must be true. That’s why polls and
survey results are so often used to back up an argument, even though pollsters will admit that
responses vary widely depending on how one asks the question.
Scapegoating. Extremely powerful and very common in political speech, Scapegoating
blames a problem on one person, group, race, religion, etc. Some people, for example, claim
that undocumented (“illegal”) immigrants are the main cause of unemployment in the United
States, even though unemployment is a complex problem with many causes. Scapegoating is
a particularly dangerous form of the Simple solution technique.
Straw man. This technique builds up an illogical or deliberately damaged idea and presents
it as something that one’s opponent supports or represents. Knocking down the "straw man" is
easier than confronting the opponent directly.
Timing. Sometimes a media message is persuasive not because of what it says, but because
of when it’s delivered. This can be as simple as placing ads for flowers and candy just before
Valentine’s Day, or delivering a political speech right after a major news event. Sophisticated
ad campaigns commonly roll out carefully-timed phases to grab our attention, stimulate
desire, and generate a response. (adapted from Stella Ting-Toomey:Theories in intercultural
communication.)
Reading body language and nonverbal communication
Once the abilities to manage stress and recognize emotionsare developed, one will naturally
become better at reading the nonverbal signals sent by others.
Pay attention to inconsistencies. Nonverbal communication should reinforce what is being
said. Is the person is saying one thing, and their body language something else? For example,
are they telling you “yes” while shaking their head no?
Look at nonverbal communication signals as a group. Don’t read too much into a single
gesture or nonverbal cue. Consider all of the nonverbal signals you are receiving, from eye
contact to tone of voice and body language. Taken together, are their nonverbal cues
consistent—or inconsistent—with what their words are saying?
Trust your instincts. Don’t dismiss your gut feelings. If you get the sense that someone isn’t
being honest or that something isn’t adding up, you may be picking up on a mismatch
between verbal and nonverbal cues.
D: Review the reading:
1. How can you become a better communicator?

2. How does culture interfere with effective cross-cultural understanding?
3. How can you persuade others? Describe 3 techniques.
4. How can you read the nonverbal signals sent by others?
E. Read on and then make up sentences of your own with: to be stunned,communication

gap,liability,Achilles heel,human assets,accountable,crave.
The big unreported story of the Iraqi crisis is the failure of American intelligence
agencies to foresee the ISIS campaign. Indeed, the ISIS phenomenon from its emergence two
years ago until now has largely passed under the radar of the CIA, NSA et al. Officials are
quoted as admitting that we were "caught by surprise," "of being stunned." That should not
surprise us in the light of a depressing record of serial failure to identify in advance
developments in Egypt, Mali, Libya, Kenya, Ukraine, Afghanistan and Iran. By any
objective measure, the intelligence establishment's performance in its main task of gathering
and interpreting information has been mediocre. It is hard to believe that there were not
people in the CIA or DIA or wherever who had some sense of the ISIS - its emergence and
implications -- however inadequate. As often is the case, the communications gap between
analysts' reports and policy-making levels is the Achilles heel of the American intelligence
establishment. Essential information and analysis can easily be misplaced, warped, diluted or
distorted to serve ulterior purposes. The risk of this happening is magnified several fold
when certain conditions exist. Agency leaders who have pronounced views as what policy
should be are one liability. Agency leaders who are careerists mainly concerned with what
reporting will win favor with the White House and/or Congress is another. Infatuation with
technology at the expense of human assets at every phase of the intelligence gathering and
assessment process is a third. The negative consequences are aggravated when senior makers
… are not paying focused attention to the workings of those agencies or the quality of their
product. It derives from a number of sources: inexperience, undue attention paid the
domestic political aspect of foreign policy, unjustified confidence in and loyalty to certain
individuals, or viewing a high position less as public trust than as a vehicle to advance
personal ambitions…This is the environment in which belief substitutes for strategy, policy
results are automatically spun, failure is a world unspoken - and, therefore, no one is held
accountable for it, especially the intelligence agencies.
The distressing truth is that our leaders have inhabited a policy world so twisted out of
shape by deceit and self-delusion that that their grip on reality has been dangerously
loosened…Freedom of conscience about the truth of the "terrorism years" is not prized or
sought. It is the comfort and convenience promised by "corrected" truth that better serves
what our leaders' crave and need most. (adapted from Intelligence Failure in Iraq by Michael
Brenner)
Part 2
Read on. Enrich your vocabulary.
Text 1:
The modern world is a virtual panopticon, a surveillance state which records huge quantities
of data about our every action and provides an easily retrievable metadata record of our
movements, our contacts, our purchases, and our activities. This panopticon has two potential
functions: prospective and retrospective. The prospective function is to stop the bad guys
before they do the bad thing. The retrospective function allows intelligence and law
enforcement authorities to comb through data following an event and piece together what
happened. The emotional resonance of the prospective function is highest following an event
like the Paris terrorist attacks – it allows proponents of increased surveillance authorities to
say “If only…”
Details are still emerging but we are now starting to get a picture of how the Paris attackers
operated, and how, despite being known to authorities, they evaded detection. These attacks
demonstrate that, whatever the investigative benefits of the retrospective panopticon, the
prospective panopticon is inherently limited. Put simply, the prospective panopticon failed in
Paris (as it fails in every successful terrorist attack), and the reasons why probably can’t be
fixed.
To begin, consider the retrospective panopticon. This panopticon is so powerful that even the
CIA can’t reliably evade it, with at least two operations attributed through cellphone metadata
records. Once a suspect is identified, it is relatively straightforward to reconstruct movements,
associates, patterns of activity, and many communications. This explains the incredible
success of French and Belgian authorities in the aftermath of the attacks at quickly identifying
suspects and known associates and mapping their movements.
But the success of this retrospective panopticon only highlights the failure of the prospective
panopticon. If the individuals in Paris were known to authorities, why weren’t they stopped?
First, the sheer volume of “known radicals” –at least 5000—makes prospective monitoring
impossible. How does one effectively monitor 5000 individuals and identify who among them
will pose an actual threat? After all, most never will. It didn’t matter that Salah Abdeslamused
his own name and credit card when booking his hotel room.He was simply one of thousands
identified as maybe or maybe not posing a threat.
Even reducing the volume of targets may be insufficient. Assuming the authorities were able
to focus on 500 or 50 individuals instead of 5000, the communication patterns of a terrorist
cell are remarkably similar to those of any family or group. Unless authorities are aware that
an individual is actively (rather than potentially) dangerous, electronic monitoring may
provide little prospective benefit, unless they can intercept the contents of a communication
that makes a threat clear.
But the communication content of an even minimally proficient terrorist provides little value.
Human codes are often employed. We now know that final coordination took place using
unencrypted SMS, but unless one already has already identified the terrorist cell and at least
some basic details of a plot, tracking an SMS that says " On estparti on commence" (which
roughly translates to “Let’s go, we’re starting”) provides little actionable intelligence.
Which bring us to cryptography, or rather the lack thereof. The Paris attackers consisted of
individuals who knew one another and lived in the same neighborhoods. Meeting in person
was not only feasible but unsuspicious. Afterall, low-tech methods –face-to-face meetings and
using couriers—provide the best protection against electronic surveillance. And even if
physically followed, it is not unusual for someone to meet a brother, friend, or cousin in a
loud public space.
This is all to say, providing more electronic surveillance powers to the security services won’t
fix the actual problem. Sure, it ups the power of the panopticon’s retrospective analysis but
that wasn’t what failed here. To the contrary, the retrospective panopticon appears to be
working quite well under current authorities…
It would be a mistake to allow proponents of increased surveillance authority to use a failure
of the prospective panopticon to argue for more power relevant to the retrospective
panopticon. The limits of the prospective panopticon cannot be wished away by cryptographic
backdoors and the like. These are inherent limitations of the system. Therefore, rather than
using Paris as an argument for increasing surveillance authority, security services should look
to where they can overcome the panopticon’s failings. For example, authorities should
redouble their focus on human intelligence. Here, the relatively large cell size (perhaps 20 or
more based on the number of arrests) made the conspiracy more vulnerable to infiltration, and
the security services have all the necessary legal authorities to carry out this mission.
The electronic panopticon is attractive because it is often effective and inexpensive by
design. But Paris presents an opportunity to acknowledge its limitations and recognize that
making it “stronger” will not actually make it more effective.
(https://www.lawfareblog.com/limits-panopticon The Limits of the Panopticon by Nicolas

Weaver)
Text 2:The U.S. intelligence community is scouring its own data to see if any warning signs
were missed in the lead-up to Friday’s deadly terror attacks in Paris, though top U.S. and
French officials argued Monday that intelligence lapses were not to blame.
President Obama said Monday that “threat streams” received before the attack included no
“specific mentions” of the deadly strikes.
“There were no specific mentions of this particular attack that would give us a sense of
something that we could provide French authorities,” said the president, three days after 129
people were killed in the attacks, for which the Islamic State terror group has claimed
responsibility.
His remarks, at an international summit in Turkey, follow French officials giving a similar
response to questions about an Iraqi intelligence warning to the U.S.-led coalition fighting the
Islamic State.The apparent warning from the Iraqi government pertained to an imminent
assault by the terror group and came one day before the Friday evening attacks. It warned that
Abu Bakral-Baghdadi, the group’s leader, had ordered supporters to use guns and bombs and
take hostages in coalition countries, as well as Iran and Russia.
A France security official said in response that French intelligence teams get such non-
specific communication “all the time” and “every day.”
Fox News has learned that the U.S. intelligence community, though, is doing a review of their
“holdings,” going back through their data to see if anything was missed. Fox News also
learned over the weekend about so-called “chatter” roughly 72 hours before the Paris attacks
involving ISIS-linked accounts that showed such images as weapons and the Eiffel tower.
French officials apparently failed to capitalize on at least some information concerning the
attacks. Abdeslam was one of three men in a getaway car, headed for France’s border with
Belgium, when police pulled them over after daybreak Saturday. The French president had
already announced new border controls to prevent the perpetrators from escaping. Hours had
passed since investigators identified the possible terrorist as the renter of a Volkswagen Polo
that carried hostage-takers to the Paris theater where almost three-quarters of the 129 victims
were killed.
It’s not clear why the local French police didn’t take this guy into custody. They checked his
identification, but it’s not known whether they had been informed of his apparent connection
to the attacks.
“It was a simple check. There was no lookout notice at the time of the traffic stop,” a French
police official said.
It may not have been the only missed opportunity before and after France’s deadliest
extremist attack since World War II.
In addition to giving the dispatch to French authorities, Iraqi intelligence officers said they
also shared specific details before the attack about the possible masterminds and them being
trained in Syria.
Also, another suicide bomber in the Paris attacks, reportedly had a long record of petty-crime
arrests and was identified in 2010 as a target for “radicalization.” However, he was never in
prison or implicated in a terror plot.
German officials on Thursday appeared to have stopped another attacker on the way to
France. They reportedly stopped a 51-year-old Montenegrin man carrying several handguns,
ammunition, grenades, eight assault rifles and 200 grams of TNT. However, they evidently
did not alert other authorities.
In addition, an FBI team is going to Paris to review how the attackers communicated.
The agents will focus on the terror suspects’ smart phones and computers and whether they
used encrypted communications, met in person or used alternate methods including gaming
consoles, which terrorists and others use to communicate without being detected by law
enforcement.
(Fox News’ Catherine Herridge and The Associated Press contributed to this report.
(http://www.topnewslive.com/missed-signals-intel-officers-scan-data-for-paris-attack-
warnings/)
Text 3:
The horrendous November 13th attacks on Paris are exactly what intelligence agencies have
told us all along: Something bad will happen because they can’t conduct massive surveillance
operations in light of the Snowden revelations, and because more products and online services
offer end-to-end encryption that can’t be tapped into.
The NSA and all its international partners might be right about encryption, but at the same
time, they’re doing a poor job of selling it to the public. It’s all a huge PR mess.
In light of the various terrorists attacks that hit multiple targets this year, including Paris
(twice now, counting Charlie Hebdo), Beirut (a day before Paris), and the Russian passenger
jet that exploded a few weeks ago, many government officials will tell us how we need
special laws that would make it easier for spy agencies to get intel on targets, and how we
need to spend more money on spying to prevent ISIS-like attacks.
“In the past several years because of a number of unauthorized disclosures and a lot of hand-
wringing over the government’s role in the effort to try to uncover these terrorists there have
been some policy and legal and other actions taken that make our ability collectively,
internationally, to find these terrorists much more challenging,” CIA Director John Brennan
said at a Center for Strategic and International Studies talk a few days ago, according to The
Verge.
He continued, “I do hope that this is going to be a wake-up call, particularly in areas of
Europe where I think there has been a misrepresentation of what the intelligence and security
service is doing…”
There’s simply no proof this proposed spying works. Do the air raids in Syria, based on
intelligence received by the many nations involved in bombings, actually have the desired
effect? Have any arrests made following the Paris attacks offer any clues as to what else is
about to happen?
Have these intelligence agencies managed actually to thwart any other terrorist attacks in the
recent past? What about in the years preceding Snowden’s revelations? We’ve all seen spy
movies. We have a pretty good idea what happens to suspects caught before a terrorist attack
takes place and it makes sense. Rather than revealing details about these failed attacks, the
NSA and Co. would be better off milking the apprehended suspects for intelligence that
might prevent future threats.
But that’s not very reassuring to the general public who’s told that it should agree with new
laws that demand increased budgets for massive surveillance operations that may or may not
be an invasion of privacy for regular Internet users. The problem is that we don’t get to see
any results that would make the privacy tradeoff worthwhile. Sure, the NSA can record all my
conversations because it caught 10 bad guys looking to blow up hundreds of innocent people
in the past five months. That’s something you’re not going to hear anyone say.
And no, David Cameron’s revelations that U.K.’s secret services stopped seven attacks in the
last six months aren’t enough. After all, these statements came after the Paris attacks — and
they’re not even accurate.
“Our security services have stopped seven attacks in the last six months, albeit on a smaller
scale,” Cameron said earlier this week. According to Daily Mail. Downing Street later
clarified that it stopped seven attacks in the last year. The publication also revealed that on
October 28th, MI5 chief Andrew Parker said “with our partners, we have thwarted six
attempts at terrorist attacks in the UK in the last year, and several plots overseas.” These
statements suggest that one attack should have taken place on U.K. soil at some point in the
last three weeks, and also proves that intelligence agencies aren’t willing to explain what
attacks they prevented or how.
More annoying is the fact that while there’s no real transparency concerning successful
operations that have stopped terrorist hits around the world, there’s total transparency when it
comes to some degree of incompetence. France was told numerous times that hits
were coming. The U.S. warned its ally a few months ago, and France bombed Syria hoping to
kill some of the people planning the attacks. Then Germany told France weeks ago that there
was an imminent pre-planned terrorist attack for Paris, according to a SOFREP report.
A Turkey official told The Guardian that French authorities were informed twice about one of
the suicide bombers, in December 2014 and June 2015, but French spies requested more
information about him only after Friday’s attack. Finally, senior Iraqi intelligence officials
warned coalition countries of imminent assaults by ISIS a day before the attacks last week,
according to the Associated Press. Other reports have said that some of the radicals who died
after killing at least 129 and injuring hundreds of civilians in Paris were known to law
enforcement in Europe.
Figure 1: Attack on Paris-2015
France, for reasons unknown, failed to prevent last week’s tragedy. And yes, it’s likely that
intelligence conducted in the recent past through sophisticated operations helped French set
up swift raids in the aftermath of November 13th, arresting many suspects, and culminating in
the assault on an apartment building in Paris that was sheltering other ISIS members and
possibly the mastermind behind the attacks. This operation may have even prevented a second
attack on Paris in the process.
It’s also clear that a country as resourceful as France can’t handle this issue by itself. France,
for the first time in EU history, invoked a mutual defense article that forces other countries to
help out in any way they can. But government officials and intelligence agencies have yet to
prove to regular citizens that massive spying operations actually work in this complex war on
terror. All we see are failures like last week’s attacks that leave hundreds of people dead and
injured, and that leave millions wondering anyone is really making sure they’re safe.
Oh, and asking tech companies to include backdoors in encryption and to store personal data
for more time isn’t the way to do it either. Let’s all pretend for a second that many of these
extremists are at least as sophisticated and well-funded as the NSA & Co. and, therefore, have
ways of communicating without anyone listening in. Breaking encryption would only
jeopardize the online security of regular users when they’re hit by hackers who would
inevitably find the same security holes, as we’ve seen in the
past.(http://news.yahoo.com/selling-us-safety-huge-pr-problem-spy-agencies)
Text 4:
The intelligence and law enforcement
Since September 11, 2001, the intelligence and law enforcement communities have struggled
to adapt to new challenges and to refocus and reorderpriorities. The media at times has been
critical; Congress has demanded change; and the public has expected more. These
communities have endured adjustments and upheaval while simultaneously confronting the
war on terrorism—what many call The Long WarBoth law enforcement and intelligence
organizationsrecognize the need to collaborate, share, and exchange information; however,
the events leading up to 9/11 document how the legal and artificial boundaries between them
created a serious impediment to protecting the country.
Traditionally, participants in the intelligence arena use information to gauge
foreigncapabilities and intentions while members of law enforcement organizations collect
information to support domesticprosecution,
Calls for Sharing Information
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, most observers concluded that
the U.S. Intelligence Community and the law enforcementagencies need to share more
information. Most also concluded that operational strategies andtactics—especially those
focused on transnational issues such as terrorism, drugs, counterintelligence, and weapons of
mass destruction—needed to be better integrated. Understanding the need for change,
Congress quickly passed the USA Patriot Act of 2001. It also enacted the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA).
Congress wanted to strengthen the nation’s ability to protect itself from future attacks and to
provide more effective tools to fight the war on terrorism. These acts removed many of the
barriers to cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement and mandated exchanging
information related to international terrorist threats. The goal of sharing information has a
long, murky, and complex history. Part of the problem has been an inconsistent
implementation of policies stemming from different interpretations of what is legally allowed.
The groups recommended that the channels of communication among agencies be
significantly improved to allow better and faster exchange of information; thereby fostering
greater cooperation, particularly when focused on investigating terrorists’ activities. In
addition, the reviews almost universally concluded that many of the obstacles were
bureaucratic or cultural (or both).
Widespread Internet access and other modern communications technology provided enemies
with tools to exploit the seam.
The lack of information sharing between the law enforcement and intelligence communities
was highlighted as a failure that might have made the 9/11 attacks possible. Objections
against closer cooperation largely disappeared.
The Intelligence Community
The intelligence community has its own deeply embedded culture and value systems. In
contrast to law enforcement, the intelligence community focuses beyond the borders of the
United States and on the future—assessing foreign trends and actions. Intelligence community
analysts evaluate what they learn, interpret the importance of the information, and determine
who should be informed. “Need to know” historically has been paramount.
Protecting “sources and methods” is regarded as crucial to keeping sources intact.Intelligence
professionals are constantly reminded that they are responsible for foreign intelligence and
must unerringly adhere to the laws and policies designed to protect the rights of U.S. persons.
Intelligence community policies have in the past erred by being too cautious. The intelligence
community agencies created policies and guidelines to ensure personnel complied with legal
boundaries for the gathering and use of national intelligence information. While these
practices were designed to ensure full protection of the rights of U.S. persons, the policies
were sometimes so restrictive that they effectively prohibited legal exchanges of information
outside the community and at times even within. In many circumstances, no information was
exchanged, and “connecting the dots” was nearly impossible. Communicate and Reinforce the
Need for Sharing:
People have a natural tendency to resist change. For this reason, leaders throughout the
intelligence and law enforcement communities must consistently and repeatedly deliver the
message of change and ensure that everyone understands the importance of sharing
information. Analysts who have been told for years that releasing certain types of information
violates the law must now be strongly encouraged to exchange the information with others.
The new Director of National Intelligence, Mike McConnell, has made a strong statement to
all intelligence professionals with his direction that it is not enough to share intelligence:
There is a responsibility to provide it. (http://www.afcea.org/mission/intel/documents)
Text 5:
Last week, The Intercept released a trove of classified documents (provided by an unnamed
source) relating to America’s use of unmanned aerial vehicles as weapons of
assassination.The US government has been conducting drone strikes outside of declared war
zones since 2002. The CIA has traditionally carried out these covert operations."Our entire
Middle East policy seems to be based on firing drones," Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn, former head
of the Defense Intelligence Agency, told The Intercept. "They're enamored by the ability of
special operations and the CIA to find a guy in the middle of the desert in some shitty little
village and drop a bomb on his head and kill him."Regardless of which agency is planning the
strike, the overall process of identifying, tracking and killing a target is the same. Targets are
usually discovered through Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Communications Intelligence
(COMINT) - specifically eavesdropping on mobile communications by tracing cellphone calls
and skimming SIM card data. For flights over Iraq, most UAVs only have to travel about 100
km. For operations in Yemen, that average jumps to 500 km and in Somalia drones must
travel more than 1,500 km per leg on average. They can sometimes spend more than half their
flight time in transit, rather than loitering over their target, leaving precious little time to
perform much meaningful surveillance. What's more, these distances lead to "blinks" wherein
intelligence agencies temporarily lose sight of a target during the handover when a new UAV
or manned aircraft relieves the current one.
"I think that having [more drones capable of sharing intel] could improve the situation in
some ways. There's a lot of talk in the papers about blinks, which is a nice euphemism for
gaps in the surveillance coverage
Intelligence reform is a critical element of democratization, but it is frequently relegated to the

back burner in the early days of post-authoritarian regime transitions. This is due, in part, to a
reflexive aversion to what was commonly the most brutal legacy of the former regimes.
Transition populations tend to favor the destruction of intelligence apparatuses, not their
reform.Evaluating intelligence reform in the emerging democracies of central and eastern
Europe is complicated by their simultaneous response to conflicting security paradigms, their
varying reform contexts, and the often very different criteria used by the evaluators, ranging
from the ridiculous-the presence or absence of scandal-to the sublime-the extent of actual
democratic oversight and real operational effectiveness… Despite the reputation of
intelligence-gathering as the world's "second oldest profession," national intelligence services
were one of the last components of the modern state to be formally instituted, becoming
prevalent only in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. This paradox underscores the informal
and secret nature of what is essentially a practitioner-driven task. The characteristics of
informality and secrecy reinforced the tendency among intelligence bodies to operate within
limits set chiefly by their relative effectiveness, unhindered by restrictive mandates or clear
regulation. The potential for abuse was always inherent in such wide-ranging discretionary
powers.(From America's drone strike program needs a low-tech fix by Andrew Tarantola)
Text 6
The vital need for intelligence and the often-secret nature of intelligence-gathering make the
effectiveness and control of national intelligence services two of the most important
challenges faced by all democracies. Lacking effective intelligence services, a state cannot
anticipate, prevent, or protect itself against major threats to its national security.Where control
is lacking, intelligence cannot be directed to serve legitimate national interests, civil liberties
are placed at risk, and democracy itself may be undermined…The 9/11 attacks accelerated
efforts to transform the orientation of intelligence services from rivalry, both domestic and
international, to cooperation against the new threats. This was an unprecedented situation for
intelligence services where considerations of secrecy, trust, and national security made them
the strongest bastion of the nation-state and its sovereignty against all other states and their
institutions
The Cold War "model" of intelligence reform in the West was aimed above all at
implementing democratic control through greater oversight and restricting the potential for
abuse by separating intelligence agencies according to specific missions, constructing
bureaucratic barriers to cooperation (and feared collusion), and encouraging interagency
rivalry as part of the system of checks and balances. The same precepts held true for post-
communist intelligence reform in an even more fundamental manner: "Monolithic" services
were broken up into smaller services with each assigned a more narrowly defined mission,
barriers were erected, and rivalries were encouraged.
However, this model stood in tension with, if not outright contradiction to, the requirements
of the post-Cold War security environment, where effectiveness against new threats
necessitated new forms of inter-service cooperation and reorganization. While traditional
principles of separating military and civilian intelligence services may remain valid, the
separation of foreign- and domestic- intelligence services and their tasks, as well as the
separation of intelligence from law-enforcement bodies and their tasks, may be on less certain
ground. Clearly, the new levels of cooperation and convergence complicate the exercise of
oversight and control and conflict with traditional models of reform. It is likely that new
oversight and control mechanisms, or the modification of older arrangements, will be
necessary.
The dynamism inherent in countries adapting to two contradictory reform paradigms adds
immensely to the challenges facing the intelligence analyst, challenges already complicated
by the substantial differences among the services of central and eastern Europe that prevent
straightforward comparisons. How does one evaluate the salience of personnel vetting for
intelligence sharing when the group of services includes one that was independent before
1989 along with six that were directly subordinated to Moscow until 1989-91? How can
analysis factor in the effect of western expertise and material assistance that some have
received since 1990, but others only since the middle or end of the decade? How does one
judge the political neutrality of services in different parliamentary, presidential, and semi-
presidential systems?
A new template must be developed to gauge intelligence reform in the post-communist
countries. NATO's role in defining the security sector reform agenda through its Partnership
for Peace and Membership Action Plans (MAP) has proven a major boon to intelligence
reform in the region, but there is no NATO model to emulate. Nor does the European Union
provide a useful template. Both NATO and the EU fall short of supplying needed guidance
because many of their long-time members exercise poor or no democratic control over their
intelligence services and/or have recurring problems with operational effectiveness. The
reforms that have proven of greatest utility are those previously undertaken largely in North
America and northern Europe.
If the NATO MAP experience has proven anything, it is that outside assistance, when sought,
is critical to the nature of intelligence reform. What is taught is important. It is imperative,
therefore, that the West identify and agree on what constitutes "best practices"--even if
Western countries do not yet meet all of the standards themselves. Once agreed upon, these
best practices could be made part of the official reform agenda for central and Eastern Europe
and incorporated into MAP requirements and EU conditions for membership. Useful
evaluation against a system of almost universally valid "best practice" criteria might then be
possible--as applicable in Brussels and Berlin as in Bratislava and Budapest.
(Adapted from Intelligence Reform in Europe's Emerging DemocraciesConflicting
Paradigms, Dissimilar Contexts by Larry L. Watts)
Text 7:
Belgium is a failed state. That the Paris terrorist attacks had strong links to a suburb of
Brussels didn’t shock many of us who live in the Belgian capital. Radio stations here in both
French and Dutch are full of discussions that elicit indignation, sorrow, anger, guilt, despair,
defiance. But not surprise.
The absence of surprise also makes sense because long before the emergence of jihadism,
Molenbeek had acquired a reputation for lawlessness. Most people in Brussels have very little
understanding of what such jihadism is and how it comes to link Brussels with Paris, Iraq and
Syria, but they were already aware that Molenbeek had high levels of petty crime: muggings,
drug dealing and burglaries.
But the more painful question that should be asked is: What do Molenbeek’s failures
reveal about the deep dysfunction in the Belgian state? That Molenbeek has been allowed to
become a breeding-ground for jihadism says some damning things about formal and informal
structures in Belgium, and in particular Brussels.
Decades of failed reforms
What is remarkable about Molenbeek is the proximity of the poverty and lawlessness to the
center of a European capital city, including the political and cultural institutions of the
Brussels, Flemish and national governments. The sociologists tell us that the distribution of
wealth in Brussels follows a pattern that is more commonly found in American cities —
wealthy suburbs surrounding a hollowed-out center of poverty and blight. The European
norm, exemplified by London and Paris, would have the most expensive and chic areas in the
center...
All of which raises the question of why Molenbeek’s problems have been allowed to persist
for so long. This is not a task on the same scale as reviving the South Bronx or redressing the
industrial blight of Glasgow. The nearest parallel I can think of is Brixton, a London suburb,
three miles south of Westminster. Blighted by wartime bomb damage, then home to large
contingents of West Indian immigrants in the 1950s and 1960s, it suffered race riots in the
1980s. But much of Brixton has been turned round, so why not Molenbeek?
The answers are an indictment of the Belgian political establishment and of successive
reforms over the past 40 years.
Those failures are perhaps one part politics and government; one part police and justice; one
part fiscal and economic. In combination they created the vacuum that is being exploited by
jihadi terrorists...
Belgium came late, by western European standards, to statehood. As in Italy, another
latecomer, there were already existing allegiances to the locality, and although Belgium’s
liberal elite threw off Dutch rule in 1830, it could neither uproot nor supplant these
attachments to the local community, often intertwined with the Roman Catholic Church. So
the formal structure of a Belgian state was erected but framing within it the cultural, social
and welfare structures of the Church’s state within a state. That was followed in due course by
the development of a socialist/labor movement with its rival structures for mutual assurance,
cultural associations, newspapers. Ranged against the Christian Democrats and the socialists
were the anti-clerical and middle-class liberals, who constituted the third corner in Belgium’s
political triangle. They did not have the same popular support, nor the equivalent social
structures. Administrations were divided by their political allegiances. Politicians were
masters of patronage. In due course, the formal state developed its own services in, for
example, education, health care and other expressions of a welfare state, but it was obliged to
do so respecting (and indeed using) the structures of the political parties... Administrations
were divided by their political allegiances. Politicians were masters of patronage, with jobs
and money at their disposal, and, as a consequence, public service suffered. Although
attempts at reforms were made, in many cases those reforms were not deep-rooted, but
involved formalizing the division of spoils, for instance, to allocate control of certain jobs
between different political parties. Belgium’s linguistic differences — between Flanders, the
Dutch-speaking north, and Wallonia, the French-speaking south, with a small German-
speaking enclave in the southeast — added extra layers of complexity to public service,
particularly in and around Brussels, which was eventually designated as a bilingual region.
Parallel structures were created to cater for the different language groups.
...
Those linguistic tensions were exacerbated by an inversion in the distribution of Belgium’s
economic strength. Belgium was the second European country (after Britain) to undergo a
classic 19th century industrial revolution, founded on its coal, steel and railway industries and
helped by the mineral riches of the Congo. But a post-war economic downturn for the coal
and steel industries hit Wallonia hard.
It was those heavy industries that spurred the first waves of economic migration to Belgium.
Belgium companies went to the Mediterranean basin — North Africa as well as Italy — to
entice migrants to the coal mines and steelworks. The large Muslim population, including that
in Molenbeek, has its origins in migration from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia.
However, the de-industrialization left areas of poverty and urban blight in what had been the
country’s economic engine — the coal belt from Mons to Liège via Charleroi...
...In a country where all politics is local, politicians are reluctant to give up their patronage by
merging resources. For instance, Brussels has 19 communes, or boroughs, which range in
population from 20,000 to 150,000. Each commune had its own police force. Although they
have been now consolidated into six, that is still a logistical nonsense in a city of only 1.4
million. It still means that the commune police are perceived as a local provider of jobs for the
low-skilled. Occasional brushes with such police do not inspire confidence. ... What is also
apparently missing is a commitment to enforce.
Newcomers to Brussels are often struck by how widely the traffic rules are flouted. This
culture of disregard for the law is much more pronounced than in neighboring France, the
Netherlands and Germany. In a society where some people consider themselves to have
political protection (formal or informal) from the law, disrespect for that law spreads.
This is not to deny that there have been some improvements. Belgian passports have long
been prized by criminals because they give easy access not just to the Schengen zone, but to
the many countries with which Belgium had visa-waiver agreements. In 1998, Belgium
belatedly decided to centralize the production of passports, which had previously been a
responsibility for each of the then 520 town halls. Before that, those wishing to forge
passports needed only to break into some local town hall to steal blank passports.
There have been attempts too at judicial reform. Although these have probably made the
judiciary more independent, it is hard to see a significant improvement in the pace of legal
process. ... There have also been improvements in the collection and administration of taxes,
with the finance ministry making a massive investment for tax returns to be filed online. But
that masks deeper structural problems with Belgium’s taxation. The taxes (including social
security) on labor have been so high that they encouraged evasion and the development of a
sizeable black economy. This black economy is in some ways attractive to those excluded
from the formal economy — newly arrived illegal immigrants, for example — but they
remain on the margins and are not integrated.
By contrast, the Belgian fiscal set-up taxes lightly those who already have wealth (hence the
enclaves in wealthy parts of Brussels of fiscal migrants from Paris), so that the gap between
rich and poor is accentuated. Belgium is, per capita, a wealthy country, but has contrived to
achieve a situation in which the employed population feels heavily taxed and doubts the
quality of public services that it receives in return. Having too narrow a tax base, the Belgian
state is poorly equipped to address the few pockets of desperate poverty, such as Molenbeek.
...
Even if it had the means, the federal state would struggle to find the instruments to distribute
and spend the money effectively. Transfers of money across the regions and linguistic
boundaries are hard to achieve. The contrast between the dirty and pot-holed streets of
Brussels on the one hand and the cleanliness and order of most small Flemish towns is stark.
While Brussels provides the services and infrastructure for thousands of people who work in
Brussels but commute from Flanders, it must do so with taxes levied in Brussels. And while
the city has become the de facto capital of Europe, home of the EU institutions, NATO, and
various other international organizations, Brussels airport is across the regional border in
Flanders. So while Interior Minister Jan Jambon has vowed to clean up Molenbeek, the state
structures are aligned against him. He needs the cooperation of the Brussels region and of the
French-speaking community to address, for instance, employment agencies and schools. But
Jambon is from the Flemish nationalist party N-VA, which has hardly any political capital in
Brussels. Brussels is the capital of Flanders, but its population is by and large majority
French-speaking. So Jambon’s declaration is viewed with suspicion and in some cases
hostility by the Francophone establishment in Brussels....
In virtually every other European country, the fight against terrorism involves greater
centralization of power, people and money. Combating terrorism, particularly in the Internet
age, involves specialist teams of individuals, whether military, police, secret service, or
civilian. It involves specialist equipment, particularly for surveillance and intelligence-
gathering, and it involves sharing information across national borders. Actually, that trend to
greater centralization and specialization is not peculiar to the fight against terrorism. It is also
frequently found, for instance, in healthcare, education and research.
But Belgium, in thrall to its linguistic politics, is moving in the opposite direction. Almost
every general election and subsequent negotiation of a coalition federal government brings
another round of devolving powers to its regions, ranging now to the most banal of subjects
— such as, to cite a recent example, the recognition of foreigners’ professional qualifications.
...This failure to connect is a feature of the Belgian state. The machinery that elsewhere would
link local, regional and national is not joined up. To a large extent, the political class has
come to terms with these dysfunctionalities, accepting them as a price that has to be paid for
various linguistic and factional divisions.
For outsiders, it should be admitted, this is part of what makes Belgium an easy place in
which to live. The state, by and large, is unassertive. People can get by, perhaps relying on
informal support structures. For the most part, they do not need the law.
But as events last Friday night in Paris showed, the rest of Europe must pay a price for
Belgium’s failures.
(Adapted from POLITICO‘s Brussels Sketch. by Tim King)
Bibliography
 Absher, Kenneth; Desch, ; and Popadiuk, Roman: (2012) Privileged and Confidential: The
Secret History of the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board, Lexington: University of
Kentucky Press
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UK: Royal Military College Sandhurst, Conflict Studies Research Centre, January 1995;
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Services Are Still Watching, Camberely, UK: Royal Military College Sandhurst, Conflict Studies
Research Centre, 1996;
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 Brennan ,John (2015 ) On Paris Attacks accessible at www.http;//time.com/4114870/paris-
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Force Quarterly;Summer2008, Issue 50
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 Lowenthal, M.,Mark (2012), Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 5th edition, Sage Publications
Inc. London
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Intelligence Community, a publication of The Intelligence and Policy Project of Harvard
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 Warner, Michael, (2002) Wanted : A definition of Intelligence in Studies in Intelligence 46, pp

15-23
 Weaver , Nicholas (2015 )The limits of the Panopticon accessible at
https://www.lawfareblog.com/limits-panopticon
 Wertheim Edward G. (2012) The Importance of Effective Communication) accessible at
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 ***Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated terms, 8 November 2010

(as amended through 15 November 2012), accessible at
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary

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ESP: Info and Intel

A. Words and phrases:

B. Exchange what you know: What is intelligence?

To most, intelligence is information that is secret. This misses a fundamental point.

Figure 1: The Intelligence Cycle (SOURCE: http://www.wmd.gov/report.)

HUMINT or Human-source intelligence consists of information obtained from individuals

SIGINT.Signals intelligence includes information derived from intercepted communications,

GEOINT or geospatial intelligence is the analysis and visual representation of security

1. What is the difference between information and intelligence?

A. Words and phrases:

Definitions of categories of classified information

No nation can function without secrets. It is a fundamental characteristic of sovereignty that

D. Review the reading:

1.How are state secretes classified?

B.Exchange what you know: What do you know about Intel?

 Military Intelligence. Military intelligence deals with information about foreign

 Political Intelligence. Political intelligence consists of information concerning the

A Brief History of Overhead Surveillance

D:Review the reading:

1.Name the essential divisions of intelligence.

E. Read on and then make up sentences of your own with:collapse, human

A.Words and phrases

 capability=the facility or potential for an indicated use or deployment

B.Exchange what you know: What do you mean by defence intelligence?

What is Defense Intelligence?

Intelligence and International Cooperation

The Cyber Threat

D Review the reading:

1. How is military intelligence achieved?

A. Words and phrases:

B.Exchange what you know: What is intelligence assessment?

Intelligence assessment is the development of forecasts of behavior or recommended courses

The Intelligence Cycle

Intelligence assessment is based on a customer requirement or need, which may be a standing

Target-centric intelligence cycle

This approach, known as Fix-Find-Finish-Exploit-Assess (F3EA), is complementary to the

Figure 1: F3EAD as a Function of D3A. Source: FM 3-60.

Figure 2The F3EAD Process.Source:Charles Faint and Michael Harris

F3EAD vs. F3EA

DR eview the reading:

1. How can information be collected?

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance are most effective against low-contrast

A. Words and phrases

B.Exchange what you know: What is communication?

Why nonverbal communication matters

Nonverbal communication cues can play five roles:

D: Review the reading:

1. How can you become a better communicator?

E. Read on and then make up sentences of your own with: to be stunned,communication

Read on. Enrich your vocabulary.

(https://www.lawfareblog.com/limits-panopticon The Limits of the Panopticon by Nicolas

Figure 1: Attack on Paris-2015

Intelligence reform is a critical element of democratization, but it is frequently relegated to the

(Adapted from POLITICO‘s Brussels Sketch. by Tim King)

 Warner, Michael, (2002) Wanted : A definition of Intelligence in Studies in Intelligence 46, pp

 ***Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated terms, 8 November 2010

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