G.R. No.

179987

Today is Sunday, July 15, 2018

Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 179987, 3 September 2013

♦ Resoluton, Bersamin, [J]

♦ Separate Opinion, Brion [J]

♦ Concurrinig and Dissentng Opinion, Leonen [J]

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Pettoners,

vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

For our consideraton and resoluton are the motons for reconsideraton of the partes who both
assail the decision promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the ruling of the Court of
Appeals (CA) denying the applicaton of the pettoners for the registraton of a parcel of land situated
in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that they had not established by sufficient evidence
their right to the registraton in accordance with either Secton 14(1) or Secton 14(2) of Presidental
Decree No. 1529 (Property Registraton Decree).
Antecedents

The property subject of the applicaton for registraton is a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig,
Silang Cavite, more partcularly identfied as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of 71,324-square
meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco, filed an applicaton for land registraton covering the property in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
contnuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupaton of the land for more than
30 years, thereby enttling him to the judicial confirmaton of his ttle.1

To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan
presented during trial a certficaton dated June 11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
which reads:

This is to certfy that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre as
surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing an area of
249,734 sq. meters as shown and described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within the
Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classificaton Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A
and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.2

After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment grantng Malabanan’s applicaton for
land registraton, disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this applicaton for registraton and thus places under the
operaton of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registraton Law, the
lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One
Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical
descripton now forming part of the record of this case, in additon to other proofs adduced in the
name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Muntng
Ilog, Silang, Cavite.

Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registraton shall
forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.3

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan
had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, and that the RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the
manner and for the length of tme required by law for confirmaton of imperfect ttle.

On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the
applicaton for registraton of Malabanan. Citng the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto),4 the CA
declared that under Secton 14(1) of the Property Registraton Decree, any period of possession prior
to the classificaton of the land as alienable and disposable was inconsequental and should be
excluded from the computaton of the period of possession. Notng that the CENRO-DENR
certficaton stated that the property had been declared alienable and disposable only on March 15,
1982, Velazco’s possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of computng
Malabanan’s period of possession.

Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the CA’s
decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court through a petton for review on certorari.

The pettoners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon Naguit5 (Naguit)
remains the controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is agricultural land. In this regard,
Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural land prior to its declaraton as alienable and
disposable could be counted in the reckoning of the period of possession to perfect ttle under the
Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property Registraton Decree. They point out
that the ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the declaraton of the land subject of the applicaton for
registraton as alienable and disposable should also date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a mere
obiter dictum considering that the land registraton proceedings therein were in fact found and
declared void ab inito for lack of publicaton of the notce of inital hearing.

The pettoners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Propertes, Inc.6 to support their argument
that the property had been ipso jure converted into private property by reason of the open,
contnuous, exclusive and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest of an alienable land
of the public domain for more than 30 years. According to them, what was essental was that the
property had been "converted" into private property through prescripton at the tme of the
applicaton without regard to whether the property sought to be registered was previously classified
as agricultural land of the public domain.
As earlier stated, we denied the petton for review on certorari because Malabanan failed to
establish by sufficient evidence possession and occupaton of the property on his part and on the part
of his predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Pettoners’ Moton for Reconsideraton

In their moton for reconsideraton, the pettoners submit that the mere classificaton of the land as
alienable or disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the
State. Relying on the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos,7 Menguito v. Republic8 and Republic v.
T.A.N. Propertes, Inc.,9 they argue that the reclassificaton of the land as alienable or disposable
opened it to acquisitve prescripton under the Civil Code; that Malabanan had purchased the
property from Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest
had been the real owners of the land with the right to validly transmit ttle and ownership thereof;
that consequently, the ten-year period prescribed by Artcle 1134 of the Civil Code, in relaton to
Secton 14(2) of the Property Registraton Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan
filed the applicaton for registraton on February 20, 1998, he had already been in possession of the
land for almost 16 years reckoned from 1982, the tme when the land was declared alienable and
disposable by the State.

The Republic’s Moton for Partal Reconsideraton

The Republic seeks the partal reconsideraton in order to obtain a clarificaton with reference to the
applicaton of the rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.

Chiefly citng the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has enlarged, by implicaton, the
interpretaton of Secton 14(1) of the Property Registraton Decree through judicial legislaton. It
reiterates its view that an applicant is enttled to registraton only when the land subject of the
applicaton had been declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Ruling

We deny the motons for reconsideraton.

In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperatve to discuss the different classificatons
of land in relaton to the existng applicable land registraton laws of the Philippines.
Classificatons of land according to ownership

Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified as either of public dominion or of private
ownership.11 Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b)
belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public service or for the
development of the natonal wealth.12 Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or
although of such character but no longer intended for public use or for public service forms part of
the patrimonial property of the State.13 Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property of
the State, provinces, cites and municipalites is of private ownership if it belongs to a private
individual.

Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country from
the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,14 all lands of the public
domain belong to the State.15 This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land, and is charged with the conservaton of such patrimony.16

All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown
to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.17

Classificatons of public lands

according to alienability

Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the
classificaton of public lands made under the Consttuton. Under the 1935 Consttuton,18 lands of
the public domain were classified into three, namely, agricultural, tmber and mineral.19 Secton 10,
Artcle XIV of the 1973 Consttuton classified lands of the public domain into seven, specifically,
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residental, resettlement, mineral, tmber or forest, and grazing
land, with the reservaton that the law might provide other classificatons. The 1987 Consttuton
adopted the classificaton under the 1935 Consttuton into agricultural, forest or tmber, and mineral,
but added natonal parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according to the uses
to which they may be devoted.21 The identficaton of lands according to their legal classificaton is
done exclusively by and through a positve act of the Executve Department.22

Based on the foregoing, the Consttuton places a limit on the type of public land that may be
alienated. Under Secton 2, Artcle XII of the 1987 Consttuton, only agricultural lands of the public
domain may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the
State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under Artcle 425 of the Civil Code,23 without
limitaton; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the Consttuton, but
with the limitaton that the lands must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as forest or
tmber, mineral, or natonal parks are not susceptble of alienaton or dispositon unless they are
reclassified as agricultural.24 A positve act of the Government is necessary to enable such
reclassificaton,25 and the exclusive prerogatve to classify public lands under existng laws is vested
in the Executve Department, not in the courts.26 If, however, public land will be classified as neither
agricultural, forest or tmber, mineral or natonal park, or when public land is no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the natonal wealth, thereby effectvely removing the land
from the ambit of public dominion, a declaraton of such conversion must be made in the form of a
law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidental proclamaton in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law to that effect.27 Thus, untl the Executve Department exercises its prerogatve to
classify or reclassify lands, or untl Congress or the President declares that the State no longer intends
the land to be used for public service or for the development of natonal wealth, the Regalian
Doctrine is applicable.

Dispositon of alienable public lands

Secton 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:

Secton 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and not
otherwise:

(1) For homestead settlement;

(2) By sale;

(3) By lease; and

(4) By confirmaton of imperfect or incomplete ttles;

(b) By administratve legalizaton (free patent).

The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretaton of Secton 11(4), in relaton to
Secton 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by a Filipino citzen of the
land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz:

Secton 48. The following-described citzens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain
or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose ttles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmaton of their claims and the issuance of a certficate of ttle thereafter, under the Land
Registraton Act, to wit:

xxxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
contnuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupaton of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisiton of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applicatons for confirmaton of ttle, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditons essental to a Government grant and shall be enttled to a certficate of ttle under the
provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)

Note that Secton 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the public domain" or
"alienable and disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise
classified, i.e., mineral, forest or tmber, or natonal parks, and lands of patrimonial or private
ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the law does not include, it
excludes. The use of the descriptve phrase "alienable and disposable" further limits the coverage of
Secton 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in Artcle XII, Secton 2 of
the 1987 Consttuton. Bearing in mind such limitatons under the Public Land Act, the applicant must
satsfy the following requirements in order for his applicaton to come under Secton 14(1) of the
Property Registraton Decree,28 to wit:

1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession and
occupaton of the property subject of the applicaton;
2. The possession and occupaton must be open, contnuous, exclusive, and notorious;

3. The possession and occupaton must be under a bona fide claim of acquisiton of ownership;

4. The possession and occupaton must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and

5. The property subject of the applicaton must be an agricultural land of the public domain.

Taking into consideraton that the Executve Department is vested with the authority to classify lands
of the public domain, Secton 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relaton to Secton 14(1) of the Property
Registraton Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the applicaton for registraton must have
been already classified as agricultural land of the public domain in order for the provision to apply.
Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the
Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the presumpton that the land is alienable and disposable
as laid down in Secton 48(b) of the Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on the requirement
that the classificaton required by Secton 48(b) of the Public Land Act is classificaton or
reclassificaton of a public land as agricultural.

The dissent stresses that the classificaton or reclassificaton of the land as alienable and disposable
agricultural land should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier, because any possession
of the land prior to such classificaton or reclassificaton produced no legal effects. It observes that
the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or glossed over by mere judicial interpretaton
or by judicial social policy concerns, and insisted that the full legislatve intent be respected.

We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite possession
and occupaton was the sole prerogatve of Congress, the determinaton of which should best be left
to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period of possession and
occupaton, no other legislatve intent appears to be associated with the fixing of the date of June 12,
1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and literal meaning of the law as written
by the legislators.

Moreover, an examinaton of Secton 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed
no requirement that the land subject of the registraton should have been classified as agricultural
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicant’s imperfect or incomplete ttle is derived only
from possession and occupaton since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the character of the
property subject of the applicaton as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain
determines its eligibility for land registraton, not the ownership or ttle over it.

Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-interest,
openly, contnuously and exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is converted to private
property by the mere lapse or completon of the period.29 In fact, by virtue of this doctrine,
corporatons may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long as the lands were already
converted to private ownership, by operaton of law, as a result of satsfying the requisite period of
possession prescribed by the Public Land Act.30 It is for this reason that the property subject of the
applicaton of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the
public domain for the entre duraton of the requisite period of possession.

To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and
disposable agricultural land at the tme of the applicaton for registraton is necessary only to dispute
the presumpton that the land is inalienable.

The declaraton that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point at which
prescripton may run against the State. The imperfect or incomplete ttle being confirmed under
Secton 48(b) of the Public Land Act is ttle that is acquired by reason of the applicant’s possession
and occupaton of the alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain. Where all the
necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with through actual physical,
open, contnuous, exclusive and public possession of an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by operaton of law not only a right to a grant, but
a grant by the Government, because it is not necessary that a certficate of ttle be issued in order
that such a grant be sanctoned by the courts.31

If one follows the dissent, the clear objectve of the Public Land Act to adjudicate and quiet ttles to
unregistered lands in favor of qualified Filipino citzens by reason of their occupaton and cultvaton
thereof for the number of years prescribed by law32 will be defeated. Indeed, we should always bear
in mind that such objectve stll prevails, as a fairly recent legislatve development bears out, when
Congress enacted legislaton (Republic Act No. 10023)33 in order to liberalize stringent requirements
and procedures in the adjudicaton of alienable public land to qualified applicants, partcularly
residental lands, subject to area limitatons.34

On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for public use or for the
development of natonal wealth by declaraton of Congress or the President, thereby convertng such
land into patrimonial or private land of the State, the applicable provision concerning dispositon and
registraton is no longer Secton 48(b) of the Public Land Act but the Civil Code, in conjuncton with
Secton 14(2) of the Property Registraton Decree.35 As such, prescripton can now run against the
State.

To sum up, we now observe the following rules relatve to the dispositon of public land or lands of
the public domain, namely:

(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to
the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership are also presumed
to belong to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;

(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:

(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable through any of the
exclusive modes enumerated under Secton 11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial
confirmaton of imperfect ttle under Secton 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land
subject of the applicaton needs only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the tme of the
applicaton, provided the applicant’s possession and occupaton of the land dated back to June 12,
1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumpton that the applicant has performed all the
conditons essental to a government grant arises,36 and the applicant becomes the owner of the
land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete ttle. By legal ficton, the land has already ceased to be
part of the public domain and has become private property.37

(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for public
use or for the development of natonal wealth are removed from the sphere of public dominion and
are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that may be alienated
or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of
acquisiton is prescripton, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already
converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitve prescriptve period is a conditon sine
qua non in observance of the law (Artcle 1113, Civil Code) that property of the State not patrimonial
in character shall not be the object of prescripton.

To reiterate, then, the pettoners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satsfying
the requisite character and period of possession - possession and occupaton that is open,
contnuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered
ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaraton of it as alienable and
disposable. Prescripton never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained
ineligible for registraton under Secton 14(1) of the Property Registraton Decree. Likewise, the land
contnues to be ineligible for land registraton under Secton 14(2) of the Property Registraton Decree
unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamaton declaring the land as no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the natonal wealth.1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the pettoners' Moton for Reconsideraton and the respondent's
Partal Moton for Reconsideraton for their lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justce

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justce

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justce PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justce

I submitted my vote joining the Separate Opinion of Justce Brion

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justce In the Result: See Separate Opinion

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justce

DIOSDADO M. PERLATA

Associate Justce MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justce MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justce

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justce JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justce

BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justce ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justce

See separate concurring and dissentng opinion

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justce

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Secton 13, Artcle VIII of the Consttuton, I certfy that the conclusions in the above
Resoluton had been reached in consultaton before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the court.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justce

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 16-17.

2 Id. at 37-38.
3 Id. at 87.

4 G.R. No. 156117, May 26, 2005, 459 SCRA 183.

5 G.R. No. 144057, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 442.

6 G.R. No. 154953, June 26, 2008, 555 SCRA 477.

7 G.R. No. 135527, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 716.

8 G.R. No. 134308, December 14, 2000, 348 SCRA 128.

9 Supra note 6.

10 Artcle 415(1), Civil Code.

11 Artcle 419, Civil Code.

12 Artcle 420, Civil Code.

13 Artcle 421, Civil Code.

14 Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000, 347
SCRA 128, 165.

15 Secton 2, Art. XII, 1987 Consttuton.

17 Republic v. Lao, G.R. No. 150413, July 1, 2003, 405 SCRA 291, 298.

18 1935 Consttuton, Art. XIII, Sec. 1.

19 Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila, 79 Phil. 461, 468 (1947). 20 Secton 3 of Artcle XII, 1987
Consttuton states:

Secton 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or tmber, mineral lands,
and natonal parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according
to the uses which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands. Private corporatons or associatons may not hold such alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.

Citzens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than
twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant.

Taking into account the requirements of conservaton, ecology, and development, and subject to the
requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public
domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditons therefor. 21 Id.

22 See Bernas, The 1987 Consttuton, 2009 Ed., pp. 1188-1189.

23 Artcle 425. Property of private ownership, besides the patrimonial property of the State,
provinces, cites, and municipalites, consists of all property belonging to private persons, either
individually or collectvely. (345a)

24 Director of Forestry v. Villareal, G.R. No. 32266, February 27, 1989, 170 SCRA 598, 608-609.
25 Heirs of Jose Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, No. L-27873, November 29, 1983, 126 SCRA 69,
75.

26 Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, No. L-58867, June 22, 1984, 129 SCRA 689, 692.

27 Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127060, November 19, 2002, 392 SCRA 190, 201.

28 Secton 14. Who may apply. – The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an applicaton for registraton of ttle to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatves:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
contnuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupaton of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

xxxx

29 Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-73002, December 29, 1986, 146 SCRA
509, 518. See also the dissentng opinion of Justce Teehankee in Manila Electric Company v. Judge
Castro-Bartolome, No. L-49623, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 799, 813.

30 Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-73002, December 29, 1986, 146 SCRA
509, 521.

31 Susi v. Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 424, 428 (1925); Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
90380, September 13, 1990, 189 SCRA 550, 560; Cruz v. Navarro, No. L-27644, November 29, 1973,
54 SCRA 109, 115.

32 x x x WHEREAS, it has always been the policy of the State to hasten the settlement, adjudicaton
and quietng of ttles to unregistered lands including alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain in favor of qualified Filipino citzens who have acquired inchoate, imperfect and incomplete
ttles thereto by reason of their open, contnuous, exclusive and notorious occupaton and cultvaton
thereof under bonafide claim of acquisiton of ownership for a number of years prescribed by law; x x
x (Presidental Decree 1073)

33 An Act Authorizing the Issuance of Free Patents to Residental Lands (Approved on March 9, 2010).

34 Republic Act No. 10023 reduces the period of eligibility for ttling from 30 years to 10 years of
unttled public alienable and disposable lands which have been zoned as residental; and enables the
applicant to apply with the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources having jurisdicton over the parcel subject of the applicaton,
provided the land subject of the applicaton should not exceed 200 square meters if it is in a highly
urbanized city, 500 meters in other cites, 750 meters in first-class and second-class municipalites,
and 1,000 meters in third-class municipalites.

35 Secton 14. Who may apply. – The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an applicaton for registraton of ttle to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatves:

xxxx

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescripton under the provisions of
existng laws.

36 Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-75042, November 29, 1988, 168 SCRA 165, 174.

37 Dissentng opinion of Justce Teehankee in Manila Electric Company v. Castro-Bartolome, supra,

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