G.R. No.

L-47820 November 28, 1942 by whom he had four children named Angela, Antonio, Emilia,
and Carlos. Angela and Antonio were born prior to December 8,
Intestate estate of the deceased Antonio Jayme y Ledesma. 1889, when the present Civil Code went into effect in the
FORTUNATO E. JAYME, petitioner-appellant, Philippines.
vs.
GENOVEVA GAMBOA ET AL., oppositors-appellants. After Fortunato's return to the Philippines in the year 1910 until
Antonio Jayme's death, which occurred on October 19, 1937, he
Jose Querubin, Gullas, Leuterio, Tanner and Laput for continued to be recognized and treated as a son not only by
petitioner-appellant. Antonio Jayme but also by the latter's legitimate children.
Hilado and Hilado for oppositors-appellants. Besides other acts and conduct of theirs, letters and
photographs addressed and dedicated to him by Antonio Jayme
and his legitimate children furnish eloquent and undisputed
OZAETA, J.:
testimony to that effect.
Fortunato E. Jayme claims the right to inherit from the deceased
After hearing the evidence Judge Sotero Rodas, in an order
Antonio Jayme as the latter's legally acknowledged natural son.
dated July 10, 1939, declared Fortunato Jayme an
His claim is contested by the widow and the legitimate children
acknowledged natural son of the deceased Antonio Jayme, with
and grandchildren of the deceased, who deny the status of
the right to inherit from him. But upon motion for new trial filed
acknowledged natural child asserted by him.
by counsel for the oppositors, the same judge, on September
21, 1939, modified the said order by holding that although
It is not disputed that Fortunato E. Jayme is the son of Antonio Fortunato Jayme is a legally acknowledged natural son of the
Jayme and Efigenia Enriquez, who appeared to have known deceased Antonio Jayme, he is not entitled to inherit from the
each other with intimacy in Manila. Antonio brought her to his latter because "his rights as a natural acknowledged son of the
home town, Bacolod, where not long after her arrival she gave decedent cannot be enforced." From that order both parties
birth on April 17, 1883, to a child that was baptized on the 21st appealed — the oppositors attacking it insofar as it declares that
of the same month as Fortunato Enriquez, "hijo natural de padre the claimant is a legally acknowledged natural son of the
desconocido y de Efigenia Enriquez." Lucio Jayme, a younger deceased, and the claimant insofar as it declares that he is not
brother of Antonio, acted as the godfather of the child. He had entitled to inherit.
been commissioned by Antonio to arrange for the baptism. At
the age of five or six years, when he began to remember things,
I
Fortunato came to know Antonio Jayme as his father, for the
latter used to visit him two or three times a week in the house
where he lived with his mother. He used to kiss the boy, who We shall first consider the appeal of the oppositors. They
also used to kiss Don Antonio's hand. Antonio used to take contend (1) that Fortunato Jayme has failed to proved that he is
Fortunato to the store of a Chinaman named Cambang, where a natural son of the deceased Antonio Jayme; (2) that even if he
he used to get money, give some to Fortunato, and buy him were a natural son, he nevertheless did not acquire the civil
candies. In 1889 Fortunato and his mother moved from Bacolod status of an acknowledged natural son of Antonio Jayme at any
to Pilar, Capiz, where he stayed until 1899. In that year his time prior to December 8, 1889, in accordance with the laws
mother sent him back to Bacolod for education. Upon his return then in force in the Philippines; and (3) that Fortunato Jayme
to that town his father Antonio Jayme received him in never acquired the civil status of an acknowledged natural son
Cambang's store and made arrangements for his lodging in the of Antonio Jayme on or at any time after December 8, 1889, in
house of his employee name Florencio Fegarido and for his accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code.
enrollment in a private school conducted by a teacher named
Hilario. The father supported the child until the latter went to 1. Under Law 11 of the Laws of Toro, which was the law in force
Manila in the early part of the American occupation. He here at the time Fortunato Jayme was born, natural children
departed with the consent of his father, who recommended him were those at the time of their birth or conception were of
to the care of his friend named Santos, with whom he made fathers who could have married their mothers justly without
arrangements for the boy's education and maintenance in the dispensation. Counsel for the oppositors contend that the mere
city. But in a short time Fortunato secured employment as a fact that Antonio Jayme was married to Genoveva Gamboa on
room boy in Malacañan of one Major Kinley. Eight months later January 16, 1884, does not prove (a) that he was an unmarried
Major Kinley took Fortunato to the United States after Fortunato man in 1882 and 1883 and (b) that there was no legal
had obtained the consent of his father. He stayed in the United impediment, such as close blood relationship, to his marrying
States from 1901 to 1910 as a self-supporting student. Efigenia Enriquez, the mother of Fortunato.

On January 16, 1884, that is to say, nine months after Fortunato Jayme testified without contradiction that his father
Fortunato's birth, Antonio Jayme married Genoveva Gamboa, had never been married before he was married to Genoveva

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Gamboa. Aside from such testimony, which has not been code should not be taken into consideration for the purpose of
impeached, we think that from the fact that Antonio Jayme determining whether the father had acknowledged the natural
lawfully contracted marriage with Genoveva Gamboa on child while the prior legislation was still in force, for the reason
January 16, 1884, in the absence of any evidence to the that the acts performed by the father after the Civil Code took
contrary it may be presumed that he was an unmarried man on effect must be governed by the latter.
April 17, 1883, when Fortunato Jayme was born; for otherwise
we would have to assume that he either committed bigamy or The arguments adduced by counsel for the oppositors are
contracted a second marriage immediately or soon after a ingenious but, we think, unavailing. If, before the Civil Code took
supposed first marriage was dissolved; and both hypotheses are effect, Antonio Jayme had done nothing in relation to Fortunato
contrary to the presumptions established by paragraphs 1 and but to beget him — if he had not performed any act whatsoever
26, section 334 of Act No. 190, now paragraphs (a) and (z), tending to show that he recognized the boy as his natural child
section 69, Rule 123 of the new Rules of Court. Likewise, in the until after the Civil Code had repealed and superseded the Laws
absence of any evidence to the contrary, it may be presumed of Toro — counsel's contention might prevail, on the theory that
that he had no such relationship of consanguinity with Efigenia the mere fact of birth, without recognition of the status of a
Enriquez as that of brother and sister or uncle and niece; for natural child, did not, even under the prior legislation, vest in
otherwise he would have been guilty of incest. Once it has been Fortunato Jayme any right to inherit from his father; and that the
proved that the father, Antonio Jayme, could legally marry father's acts of recognition performed after the Civil Code had
without dispensation at the time Fortunato was born, there is no taken effect should be governed by the latter. But after
need to prove that Efigenia Enriquez, with whom he had the Fortunato was conceived and even before he was born, Antonio
child, could also legally marry without dispensation, for such Jayme began to perform acts tending to show tacit
capacity is presumed by law in default of evidence to the acknowledgment of the former as a natural child of the latter.
contrary. (See Ramirez vs. Gamur, 42 Phil., 855, 861, 862; Thus in pregnancy Efigenia Enriquez was brought by Antonio
Allarde vs. Abaya, 57 Phil., 909, 923, and cases therein cited; Jayme from Manila to his home town, Bacolod, where she gave
Lajom vs. Viola, 1 Off. Gaz., August 1942, 452, 459, 460.) birth to Fortunato on April 17, 1883. He caused his younger
Aside, however, from such legal presumption, the claimant brother Lucio to act as godfather at the child's baptism on April
testified without contradiction that his mother never got married. 21, 1883. He visited the boy in the house of his mother two or
three times a week, used to kiss him and was in turn kissed by
We find, therefore, that Fortunato Jayme is a natural son of him. He also used to take him to the corner store of a Chinaman
Antonio Jayme. Oppositors' first contention is overruled. where he gave him money and candies. The boy came to know
him as his father.
2,3. Oppositors' second and third contentions may be discussed
together. Counsel for the oppositors contend that Fortunato It is, however, contended that all these acts, which took place
Jayme did not acquire the status of an acknowledged natural during the first six and a half years of the boy's life, if completely
child of Antonio Jayme at any time prior to December 8, 1889, in dissociated from the acts of Antonio Jayme and the members of
accordance with the laws then in force in the Philippines, and his family which took place since December 8, 1889, until he
that neither did he acquire such status at any time after the said died intestate on October 19, 1937, are not sufficient to prove
date, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. that Antonio Jayme had acknowledged Fortunato as his natural
child. We do not share this view. We are of the opinion that
It is well known that under the Laws of Toro, which was the those pre-Civil Code acts of Antonio Jayme, taken together, are
legislation in force here prior to the Civil Code, the tacit sufficient to establish tacit recognition by him of Fortunato a his
acknowledgment of a natural child on the part of his father was natural child. In the case of Allarde vs. Abaya (57 Phil., 909,
in itself sufficient to give him the status of an acknowledged 919, 920), the sole act of the father in writing to his mother so
natural child. (Larena vs. Rubio, 43 Phil., 1017.) No form of that she would send for his daughter was held by this Court
acknowledgment was prescribed. (Requejo vs. Rabalo, 34 Phil., sufficient proof of acknowledgment of such daughter in
14.) The recognition was open to such proof as would support accordance with Law 11 of Toro.
the fact in any ordinary action. (Llorente vs. Rodriguez, 3 Phil.,
697.) but under the Civil Code the acknowledgment of a natural Moreover, we are further of the opinion and so hold that the
child must be made in the record of birth, in a will, or in some subsequent acts performed by Antonio Jayme during the rest of
other public document (article 131). Since this is not an action to his life in relation to Fortunato, which were established during
compel the father to acknowledge his natural child upon either the hearing of this case without any objection on the part of the
of the grounds specified in article 135 of the Civil Code, but a oppositors, may be considered as corroborative evidence
claim to inherit based on the allegation that the claimant is an confirmatory of his previous acts of recognition. So even if we
acknowledged natural son of the decedent in accordance with should entertain any doubt as to the sufficiency of the pre-Civil
Law 11 of Toro, it is contended for the oppositors that the acts Code acts to constitute tacit acknowledgment of Fortunato
and conduct of the father and of his legitimate children that took Jayme as a natural son of Antonio Jayme, we could not but
place subsequent to the repeal of the Laws of Toro by the Civil allow such doubt to be completely dispelled by the subsequent
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events that were duly proven. We could not close our eyes to inheritance of those who die after that time, with or
the indubitable truth established by the record. without a will, shall be alloted and divided in
accordance with this code, but in harmony, in so far as
The trial court committed no error in finding that the claimant is a the latter permits it with the testamentary disposition.
legally acknowledged natural son of the deceased Antonio Therefore the legitimes, betterments, and legacies
Jayme. shall be respected; but their amounts shall be reduced
when it is not possible in any other manner to give to
each participant in the inheritance the share pertaining
II
to him, according to this code.
We now come to consider the claimant's appeal from the order
The question to determine, then, is whether rule 1 or rule 12
of the trial court which declares that he is not entitled to inherit.
should be applied.
Article 134 of the Civil Code provides that an acknowledged
In the case of De Gala vs. De Gala (51 Phil., 480, 485,486), this
natural child in entitled "to receive the hereditary portion
Court, commenting on these two rules, said that No. 1 is of a
determined by this Code." Among the forced heirs mentioned in
more general nature than No. 12, since the latter provides a
article 807 are "natural children legally acknowledged." Article
particular rule for the distribution of estates of persons dying
942 provides that in case legitimate descendants survive, the
after the Code enters into effect, while No. 1 states a general
natural children shall receive from the inheritance only the
rule for harmonizing certain competing rights, and that, in
portion granted them by article 84. This in turn provides that
accordance with the rule that the particular governs the general,
"when the testator leaves legitimate children or descendants, an
No. 12 must control over No. 1. The Court also noted that
also natural children, legally acknowledged, each of the latter
in Rocha vs. Tuason (supra), in which three justices dissented,
shall be entitled to one half of the portion pertaining to each of
"a circumstance which detracts in some measure from the
the legitimate children who have not received any betterment,
weight of the precedent," no reference was made to rule 12 of
provided that a sufficient amount remains of the disposable
the transitory provisions, "which if reflectively weighed, might
portion, from which it must be taken, after the burial and funeral
have been found pertinent to the decision."
expenses have been paid."

We think both reason an authority sustain the contention of the

Inasmuch as the right thus given to an acknowledged natural
claimant that rule 12 of the transitory provisions is the one
child is recognized for the first time by the Civil Code, it is
applicable. The circumstance that the claimant and the first two
contended by the oppositors, and the trial court held, that under
legitimate children of the deceased were born before the
rule 1 of the transitory provisions and the case of
present Civil Code went into effect constitutes no legal obstacle
Rocha vs. Tuason (39 Phil., 976), the claimant is not entitled to
against the exercise by the claimant of the right recognized by
inherit because the exercise by him of such right would
said Code. The decedent died long after it entered into effect.
prejudice "other vested rights having the same origin," namely,
Both the claimant and the oppositors base their right to inherit
those of Angela Jayme and Antonio Jayme, who, like the
upon the provisions of the Civil Code. The claimant and the
claimant, were born before December 8, 1889. Said rule 1 of the
oppositors acquired no vested right to the decedent's
transitory provisions reads as follows:
inheritance until the moment of his death. That is another
reason why rule 1 of the transitory provisions is not applicable.
1. Rights vested under the legislation prior to this code Articles 657 and 661 of the Civil Code read a follows:
by virtue of acts which transpired while it was in force,
shall be governed by such prior legislation even if the
Art. 657. The rights to the succession of a person are
code should otherwise provide with respect thereto, or
transmitted from the moment of his death.
should not recognize such rights. But if any such right
is recognized for the first time by this code, it shall be
effective at once, even though the act which gave rise Art. 661. Heirs succeed to all the rights and
thereto may have taken place under the prior obligations of the decedent by the mere fact of his
legislation, provided it does not conflict with other death.
vested rights having the same origin.
As noted by this Court in De Gala vs. De Gala (supra), the
The claimant, on the other hand, invokes rule 12 of the same Supreme Court of Spain, in decisions dated respectively March
transitory provisions, which reads as follows: 20 and June 24, 1897, recognized that rule 12 of the transitory
provisions is applicable to the estates of persons dying after the
Civil Code went into effect, "because in the matter of succession
12. Rights to the inheritance of a person who may
there is no vested right until the succession is opened, that is, till
have died, with or without a will, before this code was
the death of the person whose inheritance is in question." (See
in force, shall be governed by the prior legislation. The
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also Mijares vs. Nery, 3 Phil., 195, 23, 204; Sy Joc Lieng vs. Sy
Quia, 16 Phil., 137, 138.)

Rule 12 of the transitory provisions expressly ordains that the

inheritance of those who die after the Civil Code was in force
"shall be allotted and divided in accordance with this code";
even if a decedent made a will under the prior legislation and
the testamentary dispositions should conflict with the provisions
of the Code, the former should be harmonized with the latter;
"the legitimes, betterments, and legacies shall be respected, but
their amounts shall be reduced when it is not possible in any
other manner to give to each participant in the inheritance the
share pertaining to him, according to this code."

We find inescapable the application herein of rule 12 invoked by

the claimant-appellant. Accordingly, we declare that the latter is
entitled to participate in the inheritance of the deceased Antonio
Jayme in accordance with article 840 of the Civil Code, as
declared modified in the case of Concepcion vs. Jose (46 Phil.,
809), insofar as the same provides that the burial and funeral
expenses must be taken from the disposable portion.

The order appealed from is affirmed insofar as it declares

Fortunato E. Jayme an acknowledged natural son of the
deceased Antonio Jayme but reversed insofar as it declares that
he is not entitled to inherit from said deceased. The oppositors
shall pay the costs in this instance. So ordered.

Yulo, C.J., Moran, Paras and Bocobo, JJ., concur.

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