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Blind at Shiloh - Jean Luc Marion PDF

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The Blind at Shiloh 47

It would be fitting therefore to celebrate this tranquil revolution


with fervor and without reticence. However, we will not participate. We
will not say that the audiovisual revolution neither liberates nor reveals.
lor it is necessary-if there is still room in the midst of the soft consensus
I hat stifles us already-to pose a simple question: As the image of what

.loes this image offer itself? In other words: from which original does the
IllIage originate? To what original does it return in the end? Here, the re­
The Blind at Shiloh \ponse is obvious. Any journalist, television producer, indeed television
viewer will reply with sufficiency and commiseration: the image has no
other original than itself and itself alone. In fact, the necessity of postu­
lating that an image referred to any original would be taken to be largely
.lue to an anachronistic lack of culture and concealed metaphysical ob­
«urity: it is precisely the image released by contemporary technique that
Iiherates itself as such because it frees itself-finally!-from the require­
merit of an original other than itself that would govern it. Today, the im­
I ,,~e covers the surface of the earth-in addition to the surface of the eye­
IIJlls [des globes oeulaires] of the inhabitants of the world-only insofar as
The liberation of the image-how much we required it, provoked i I produces itself, multiplies itself, and expands without restriction or ref­
it! And the image, in the end, has already been liberated. What we want, «renee. In the case of [economic] inflation, the monetary mass can grow
we have irrevocably. As free, it is neither censored nor technologically lim­ without any restriction imposed by gold reserves or exchange; here the vi­
ited. Being free, it infiltrates, besieges, reigns. We recognized it before all ';lIal mass grows so much better because it is never commanded by any
the virtues: in principle it informs, teaches, entertains, gathers people to­ original; this is not to say that what one shows defines precisely the con­
gether: in short, it contributes to liberty, equality, fraternity. In the end, dition of the monstration. But the image, in contrast to paper currency,
the plastic arts are able to encounter "life," since they no longer consist ill .iccrues [aeerozt] I its authority by disconnecting itself from every original:
images as such. Knowledge is opened at last to the public, since hence­ I he less gold there is, the more value the image has; so the dollar is not an
forth the image assures its advertisement. The sacred no longer hides it image; but fortunately, the images produce dollars. In short, the libera­
self, since-far from disappearing-it appears in these "High Masses" I ion of the image consists precisely in its being liberated from every orig­
that, as one says, are found henceforth more often in political congresses inal; the image is valued in itself and for itself, because it is valued by it­
or athletic encounters than in eucharistic celebrations. In the end, desire "dE The image has no original other than itself and undertakes to make
drags its objects out from obscurity, since it is nothing more than an im­ itself acceptable only to the unique original.
age that can be made visible and thus, in one sense, acceptable, or at least
accepted in the circuit of distribution. The image becomes for us more
than a mode-s-jit becomes] a world [une mode-un monde]. The world II
is made into an image [sestpit image]. To speak a platitude, we live in the
The arrogance of the image is marked most notably by its televisual
audiovisual epoch of history-and with every expectation of a long life, a
development, insofar as the television is valued as a universal mode of be­
virtual thousand-year reign.
ing that overflows even onto images not directly produced by electronic
48 The Blind at Shiloh The Blind at Shiloh 49

equipment. The television is not limited to pursuing, by other means, of time but also in the televisual use of Jpace. This can be seen all the
what cinema-and before it, theater-have already accomplished. These more in an example that would seem to contradict the preceding thesis:
always, at the very same moment that they produce fiction, maintain a re­ television news, news reports, and so on. Here, without manipulation' or
lationship between the image and the original. Theater [does so], of censorship, the image indeed refers to this or that actual event, from the
course, because the original remains present at the same moment where, most real world; certainly, but the images make available to the gaze
with my active consent, the illusions are born from images from another events not only without common measure, without connection of mean­
world: I will applaud, in terms of the representation of images, the origi­ ing between them, but above all from geographic origins so dispersed,
nal in the flesh and in person, acting here and now. Film certainly hin­ sometimes so heterogeneous, that we have at our disposal not a single
ders or even prohibits this return to the ideal: the actors were able to die, imaginable world, lived and familiar, to welcome them, organize them, in
flee, and hide themselves, disappearing into anonymity; but, by right, I short, to comprehend them. The space that these images throw into my
can find them at a film festival, or better, attend a film shoot (for this film face-whether geographically far or near is of little import-I cannot
or the next), indeed learn in the books who the actors were. In short, even claim to attain there myself, not only because I lack equipment but be­
in the most deliberate fiction, the image at least refers back to a reality­ cause it has no place in the world in which I in fact live. The space that
in this case, the actors. A fortiori so was it the case with the "Actualite instantaneously crosses the televisual flow of images gives not a single
Pathe" of ancient times: I did not have to succumb to the harangue of a possible world but rather discord-a blur. Thus space and time no longer
promoter to know that this image, even when deformed by propaganda, constitute the a priori structures of experience but instead constitute the
had "something of truth" about it. This refers back to an original that the a priori conditions of the impossibility of any real experience-of the im­
televisual image destroyed. possibility of moving back from images to their conditional [tventuel]
Before delivering [livrer] to us the image of any original, television original. Paradoxically, a television news report shows me nothing that I
liberates [delivre] images-widows of every intentionality. First because, would know thanks to it; on the contrary, it enumerates for me all that I
in the televisual order, the principal caesura between the image (as will never be able to know, since the original, in manifestly appearing for
avowed fiction) and reality has disappeared: the time of representation. me, is lost at that moment. The televisual image does not have the time
Every screening or performance used to admit a limit, precisely the dura­ to move across the space that separates it from its original-of which, in
tion of the performance of irreality. But television abolishes this time; fact, it should have the honesty to acknowledge it is the fOrclusion. 2
there is neither a first nor a last showing: without interruption the elec­ The image, closed off to its original, thus no longer has any reality
tron gun bombards the screen and there reconstitutes the images, day and other than itself. This reality [realitt] finds its only reality or actuality [if­
night, around the clock ("The channel that never sleeps"). The unending fectivite] on the televisual screen. The image produces itself on the screen
flow of time-a mark of the actuality of the real world in philosophy­ because, being a screen' to its original, it produces itself only by becom­
here becomes, on the contrary, a constitutive trait of imaginary fiction. ing identical to its support, the screen. It is admirable that one then calls
The irreality thus competes with the temporality of reality: as soon as its the screen the place of the image-since one then implicitly recognizes
programs openly aspired to coverage twenty-four hours a day, seven days that an image cannot deploy itself (escape) as such while being on screen.
of the week, television confessed its essential goal: to appropriate the ac­ To what, except to the original? The image produces a screen only be­
tuality of the world while reproducing it-or better, while directly pro­ cause it is the screen that produces the image-in the place of the origi­
ducing it. The images, like manufactured objects, depend upon a pro­ nal. The screen-and thus the electronic cannon-produce the image in
duction, a "production company." The lack of distinction between the the place of reception [of welcome, la recevoir] (like the cinematographic
world and the flux of images inscribes itself not only in the televisual use screen). It produces the image according to an uninterrupted time and by
50 The Blind at Shiloh The Blind at Shiloh 51

covering an unlimited space that imitates that of the world, nevertheless munication strategies" themselves rest upon an implacable principle:
without belonging to the world. The screen, this antiworld in the world, every emitted image, in order to be seen by its viewer, must precisely sat­
produces images without ever referring them to some original: form isfY his desire to see, its limits and its demands; thus every image must re­
without matter, the image maintains only a ghostly reality, completely produce in itself the measure of a desire; this is to say that every image
spiritualized. Admittedly, it could still be said that such an image refers must make itself the idol of its viewer. With the image, the viewer sees the
itself to an original-but, as its spectator, I will never know it; between satisfaction of his desire, thus of himself. Every image is an idol, or it
the fictive image and the image without original, the distinction escapes isn't even seen.
me. Fiction and special effects belong to a normal regime of the image on The image, joyously widowed by its original, accomplishes not a
the televisual screen, the reference to an original being the exception. single element of liberation, nor does it open up a single new perspective:
On the basis of what criteria could such an image be governed? it only confirms a determined metaphysical situation-nihilism. If one
Since the original for it is lacking, it is thus governed by the one who sees admits that metaphysics, from its Platonic origin, established the opposi­
it. Like every object, it settles on the subject, active or passive, who con­ tion between the thing itself and the image in favor of the thing and, at
stitutes it on the basis of the simple fact of being able to welcome it and its Nietzschean phase, reversed this opposition in favor of the image, tak­
support it by the gaze. And deftcto the televisual image is measured to the ing it to be as real as the thing itself, then it is necessary to say that the
viewer [ie voyeur]. Completely contrary to the view (which, to it, sees the idol of the viewer simply and precisely satisfies the demands of nihilism:
unavailable and invisible), the viewer devours the visible that is all the nothing in itself, everything is according to the measure of the evaluation
more available. A "viewer": thus is defined the one who, under the most that ratifies it, or nor. The televisual idol appears only if the viewers value
neutral names of "spectator" or "consumer," undergoes, governs, and de­ it-the poll, in its derisory tyranny, illustrates in the mode of the ridicu­
fines the image-all under the pretexts of access to information, the lous the revaluation of all the values by the superman (that is to say, the
opening of the world, and "connecting" on (albeit poor) coverage of cur­ petty telespectator). The viewer, who values his idol, satisfies absolutely
rent events of situations even more trivial and yet more restrictive. the metaphysical principle: to be is to beperceived.
The viewer watches for the sole pleasure of seeing: thanks to tech­
nology, he is finally able to succumb without limit or restriction to the
III
fascination of the libido vivendi, which was always denounced by the Fa­
thers:" a pleasure [jouissance] of seeing, of seeing all, especially what I do As soon as the image has lost access to an original, it becomes an
not have the right or strength to see; the pleasure also of seeing without original itself-immediately and inevitably-under the mode of a
being seen-that is, of mastering by the view [vue] what does not return pseudo- or counter-original. To become an image, "to go on the air," de­
to me without exposing me to the gaze of another. The viewer thus main­
lines the mode of presence par excellence and no longer its merely deriv­
tains a perverse and impotent relationship with the world that it both .uive mode. An event does not prove its reality by having indeed taken
flees and possesses at one and the same time in the image. place; for if it takes place, it takes place only in a determinate time and
The viewer fixes the norm of the image without original by the de­ place, with actors and spectators in a limited number, in short in a world
mand of his desire to see merely in order to see; each image thus becomes I hat is defined since it is real. And yet the real world has disappeared,
valid, so long as and as soon as it satisfies this desire, filling it perfectly or since the image there makes a screen of its counter-world; henceforth, to
partially; thus the image must be conformed to the expectation of this de­ have actually taken place, the event must be produced in the counter­
sire. Whence the efforts of announcers, programmers, producers to target world itself-it must reduce itself (or "pull itself up," it matters little) to
this desire, to measure it in order to satisfy it. But these pompous "com- I he level of an image. Only this counter-world frees itself from the limits
52 The Blind at Shiloh The Blind at Shiloh 53

of space and time, and diffuses the event without end, in the dull irreal­ longer first an image of me, but rather an image of the idol expected by
ity of the dream. Thus, it is better to appear than to be, since to be is not the viewers-an idol, the image of a desire, thus of a voyeuristic gaze; I
to appear. Better a minuscule manifestation on a grand plane than an im­ must, in order to be, give myself up, twice: to the gaze and to the desire of
mense manifestation on a reduced plane; better a well-"covered" silliness the viewers. My own desire to be seen demands, in the end, that I let my­
than an ignored performance. The technological possibility of being seen self be seen as an approximate image of the idol desired by those who, in
by an indefinite mass of viewers gives, today, a despotic power to the triv­ order to be, see. The ambition to dominate, in whatever field it might be,
ial (and Sartrean) adage: "I am what the look of others wants (and sees) paradoxically requires being reduced to the rank of an idol-thus an idol
that I should be." The necessity-to which even the best (above all) suc­ of viewers. From which we get the modern myth of the big picture [le
cumb-to show oneself, to make oneself seen, not to pass unnoticed, grand vu]: the one that, as image, gives rise to and satisfies the desire of
rests on a metaphysical principle: to be is to beperceived. Following a strict all the viewers: whether it be the cosmic actor (whose excesses the mass
reversal of Platonism, we admit that the image is as much as-indeed concerts mime), or the great communicator (who governs while making
more than-the thing itself: what I am does not remain behind what I himself seen on the screen), or in the end, the great prostitute ("God," ac­
appear to be; on the contrary, what I appear to be (the look)5 invests my cording to the definition risked by Baudelaire), Prostitution, taken in a
identity bit by bit and, in the end, completely, the deep strata of the per­ strict sense: a face (in fact everything) attains being, under the regime of
son. To maintain one's identity is to recognize and at the same time to the televisual image, only insofar as it accepts not only being reduced to
transmit an image of oneself, a self-as-image [un moi-comme-image]­ self-as-image [so i-comme-image] but above all conforming this first image
which should satisfy both the viewers and the view [le uu]. This desire for to the draconian laws of another image-the idol (of desire) of the
image-the desire to completely become an image-exhausts the entire viewer. From which comes the illusion of expecting that an absolute real­
wisdom of our time: even the sage is wise through his image; he is wise as ity will suddenly appear among the new images, a new original, finally
an image. All wisdom, in every field, amounts to making oneself as wise adapted to the televisual regime of the visible: but images cannot deliver
as one's image. For politicians, athletes, journalists, CEOs, writers, noth­ any original other than the same one that they know; the most beautiful
ing is more precious than this-"my image": I am only a self-as-image. image of the world can give only what it has-an original-in-image, a
Publicity. The term imposes itself here, beyond its current usage. By counter-world where the original remains always an image. To be, here,
"publicity" we understand first of all the mode of being of every reality will only ever be to be seen. To be seen will only ever be to prostitute one­
traced back to the status of an image: I am becauseI am seen, and as I am self, to mime the idol of the viewer. The great prostitute-Babylon­
seen; what constitutes me is first and foremost the image that I become, designates nothing less than a world, our own, which is a mode of pres­
always available for transmission, broadcast, and consumption by the ence, the televisual image. In order to be, it is necessary to be seen, thus
viewers. But precisely when the image that I am returns or is iterated to to expose oneself as an image of an idol-the original immediately be­
the viewers, it falls in line with a second demand: so that myself-as-image comes inaccessible, since it appears as specter of itself. The original dis­
can be returned to the viewers, it is necessary that they value it as suitable appears, unless it makes itself an image-to be is to be seen.
to them. Since the viewers judge myself-as-image as voters, supporters, The image takes the place of the original, since nothing is if it is not
readers, or fans, it must necessarily be that they recognize in myself-as­ seen, or has just been seen, on the screen. Thus the original disappears ei­
image the object that their desire expects, rather as an objectified image; ther by remaining invisible or by being imagined (by becoming an image
it is thus necessary that myself-as-image delimit itself according to the ex­ pure and simple), The broadcasting and production of images has as its
act expectations of their desire; now this desire finds only an idol, that is goal not the opening of a world but rather the (en)closure of it by a
to say, the image of an image. I must constitute myself as an image, no screen; the screen substitutes for the things of the world an idol con­
II'

;11;1:

54 The Blind at Shiloh The Blind at Shiloh 55 1


, I"

stantly repeated for viewers, an idol multiplied without spatial or tempo­ thing. This equivalence is an absolute tyranny: the entry into the world
rallimits, in order to attain the cosmic scope of a counter-world. The of images does less to liberate the imaginary for a jubilant pleasure than
televisual image, structurally idolatrous, obeys the viewer and produces it does to confine our spirit and our desire outside of things, as in a prison
only prostituted images. This onanism of the gaze fulfills the metaphysic of images-an imaginal exile. The censure that the image (erected in a
of the monad: every supposed extroverted perception of the world is re­ thing) exerts in our world no longer authorizes the least bit of access to
duced to an expression of the monad itself, deploying its only essence in the original, simply reducing it to the status of an unimaginable, an un­
images taking the place of the world. The "communication" of images imagable (that which cannot be imaged): what cannot be seen, simply is
thus exerts a strategy for the consumption of visual goods and is obedi­ not. The original must therefore disappear, since, by definition, it can
ent to the market needs of the viewers; far from being a disruption, it as­ never appear.
sumes the autistic monadism of the viewers. Such "communication" not This simple fact, however, deserves interrogation: does invisibility
only communicates nothing-other than images, idols of viewers, with­ indicate, in the case of a possible original, the pure and simple denial
out original-but goes against all communion. The exchange of idola­ [denegation] of its reality? In other words, does the fact that the original
tries requires a screen before every gaze: I only ever look at the screen that remains invisible suffice to disqualify every possible original? Indeed, it
imprisons me outside of the world. The screen closes me off from the could be that the original defines itself precisely by its very invisibility­
world, the channels [fes chaines] chain me to the screen, the programs [fa by its irreducibility to its placement in an image. Let us consider three ex­
grille] lock me there all the time. The image constitutes every prototype amples of such a principled invisibility. Admittedly, knowledge [fa con­
into an idol, because it is itself first devalued to the level of an idol. Dou­ naissance] always traffics in images, sensible or intelligible; in fact, to
bly retaining the possibility of referring back to an original, which it know a thing supposedly always consists in reconstituting it in terms of a
should be, the image tyrannizes the world, things, and souls. We know series of images (and concepts)-a constitution that is in principle in­
today, following the violence of weapons (war) and the violence of words complete and undefined. I never see a cube: rather, along with the images
(ideology), the terror of the idolatrous image; like the preceding ones, of three of the sides, I constitute a "thing" that I will never see from a sin­
this violence bears a grudge against our souls-but, to reach there, it no gle glance (the six sides), but I give the six sides to it on the basis of the
longer exercises this blackmail upon our bodies (as in war) or upon our first three coupled with the requirements of the mathematical concept of
intelligence (as in ideology). It takes hold of our desire itself: the tyranny the cube. In this perception, the referent or the thing itself remains invis­
of the idolatrous image defeats us with our willing consent. We desire to ible to me: I really see only certain aspects, certain parameters, in virtue
see or be seen by only what is proportionate to our desire. Henceforth all of which I infer a totality that, really, I never have before my eyes. This
can pass-through the screen; there on the screen is all to see and to gap between what is seen [fe vu] and the original invisible can be de­
communicate, but nothing to give or receive, since nothing persists out­ scribed, in philosophical terms, as the difference between accidents (or at­
side the screen. The libido vivendi, which satisfies itself with the solitary tributes) and substance, between the phenomenon and the thing in itself,
pleasure of the screen, does away with love by forbidding sight of the between fulfilling intuition and intention, between the sign and the ref­
other face-invisible and real. erent, and so on. As a result, we live and we move not in the middle of
what we see, but in a relation-through what we see to what we don't
see. What we do not see can take two forms. On the one hand, that
IV
which we cannot see completely, but which can, by means of subsequent
gazes, become entirely visible (the cube, this page, this fountain pen, that
The libido vivendi, a pure desire to see that establishes a strict
car traveling down the street, a room, etc.)-the potential visible, always
equivalence between the image and the thing, determines a world where
invisible in actuality. On the other hand we have that which we see, but
everything is reduced to an image and where every image is valued as a
56 The Blind at Shiloh The Blind at Shiloh 57

which could never be equal to what we are really aiming at: if we are mands), but the invisible gaze that wells up through the obscurity of the
looking to experience something of the sublime, pleasure, the beautiful, pupils of the other's face; in short, I see the other of the visible face. Seri­
or love, what we aim at in this spectacle does not come down to either ously (thus passionately) envisaging the face of the other comes down to
what we in fact see or what we are attempting to experience; it is precisely intending there the invisible itself-that is to say, its invisible gaze placed
a matter of that which most radically exceeds our interiority and which, upon me." The intentionality of love thus exempts itself from the power
in itself [pour cela meme], exceeds it. Here the invisible will remain for­ of the image since my gaze, by definition invisible, claims to cross there
ever such: the invisible is confirmed by the increase of the visible itself. another gaze, by definition invisible. Love escapes from the image, and
Thus let us move to the second manner by which the invisible in­ that is why, when the image wants to take over love while visibly repre­
dicates its irreducibility. If I see, not really in the mode of objectivity, not senting it, it sinks to pornography, meaninglessness, or a combination of
some inanimate object but rather a face-what do I really see? Certainly the two.
an outline, a look [une allure], a shape, the lines of the face, and so forth. There remains a third occurrence of the invisible. We have held that
But in the end these are not really important to me; this or that detail, the gaze, beloved or loving, escapes the image and performs the invisible.
this color, that grin can all change, without the face that I intend really But it is necessary to assume a final hypothesis: that this gaze could be
varying to my eyes; one knows that a face can attract me (and strongly) to holy to the point that, as a transparency, it could provide an icon of God,
an insignificant character (insignificant to everyone other than to me) and the invisible par excellence. This hypothesis is in fact offered in the case
that, conversely, I might never notice such evident characteristics of the of Christ Jesus, whom Saint Paul does not hesitate to call the "icon of the
beloved person (the color of the eyes, etc.). Is it a matter of a distraction invisible God" (Colossians 1:15).7 How is this invisibility exerted here?
or absent-mindedness? In no way, since my gaze, here possibly amorous, Christ offers to the gaze only an icon, while showing a face, that is to say,
is intensely focused on this face, of which it wants to see everything, since a gaze, itself invisible. It is thus a matter, in a first instance, of a crossing
it expects everything. But precisely, what it wants to see does not coincide of gazes [une croiseedes regards], conforming to the schema in love; I look,
with what this face gives to be seen to every other gaze; the indifference with my invisible gaze, upon a gaze that envisages me; in the icon, in ef­
will see, without difficulty even amidst distraction, the color of the eyes fect, it is a matter not so much of seeing a spectacle as of seeing another
or the details of the appearance; why therefore is it that I and my fasci­ gaze that sustains mine, confronts it, and eventually overwhelms it." But
nated gaze do not see what the image of the other gives us so easily to see? Christ does not offer only himself to my gaze to see and be seen; if he re­
Certainly because I do not want to see what is visibly given to be seen. quires of me a love, it is a love not for him but for his Father; if he de­
What is it then that my gaze wants to see if not the visible of this face? In­ mands that I lift my eyes to him, this not at all so that I see him, him
evitably, it wants to see the invisible. But how could a visible face see only, but so that I might see also and especially the Father: "Philip. he
what is invisible? How could a sensible gaze ever see something invisible? who has seen me has seen the Father" (John 14:9)· But since the Father
The response, which is paradoxical, goes nevertheless from oneself [va remains invisible, how can I see the Father when seeing Christ? Does not
pourtant de soi]: my impassioned gaze can see, on the face of the other, Christ constitute only what can be seen of the Father in place of the Fa­
only the sole place that does not offer anything to be seen-the pupils of ther? On that interpretation, Christ would thus not show the Father but
the two eyes, obscure and empty holes. Why privilege this site that offers would be a substitute for him, a visible lieutenant of an invisible, which
precisely nothing there to see? Because this invisible nothing signals not a he would conceal by the very fact that he would claim to show it." But
single new visible, nor a counter-visible, but rather the invisible origin of Christ Jesus came to earth only to glorify the Father and in no way to
the gaze of the other upon me. I see not the visible face of the other, an draw attention to his own glory: "What shall I say, 'Father, save me from
object still reducible to an image (as the social game and its makeup de­ this hour?' But I came for this very hour. Father, glorify your name"

58 The Blind at Shiloh The Blind at Shiloh 59

(John 12:27)· We thus come to understand how Christ Jesus offers not of the thing. And yet the seriousness of the debate demands examina­
only a visible image of the Father who remains invisible but even a (visi­ tion, well beyond this development, to determine whether the modern
ble) face of the invisible itself (the Father), a visible image of the invisible (televisual) model of the image exhausts the essence of the visible, or
as invisible. If one tried to evade this paradox, it would no longer be in­ whether perhaps it is possible to oppose it to a radically distinct model of
terpreted according to the logic of the image: if every image offered of the the image. And could it perhaps be precisely the contemporary develop­
invisible God is a caricatutal usurpation, it would be necessary therefore ment of the image (in postcubist painting) that already sketches the ele­
to condemn Jesus Christ to death for blasphemy, which is exactly what ments of another image of image?
happened (Matthew 26:66). The paradox of an iconic monstration of the Historically at least, a model of the image has opposed itself to icon­
invisible in the visible would allow only the reception of Christ, without oclasm, and, at least in the Church, has won out. It is a matter of the
the crucifixion for blasphemy. But this paradox becomes intelligible only icon. Icon does not designate a particular pictorial gente, for example "the
if we can release the icon from the logic of the image-and thus only if icons" on wood (since Roman frescos and Byzantine mosaics or certain
we ourselves can escape from the tyranny of the image. The invisible-of gothic statues are less icons than "the icons," and sometimes less than
the thing, of the gaze, and of the "invisible God"-thus requires that we some others, belated and anecdotal). Icon here designates a doctrine con­
take a new plunge. cerning the visibility of the image, more exactly, concerning the usage of
this visibility. This doctrine is characterized, in summary, by two radical
innovations.
v For the duo (or duel) of a spectator's gaze, objectively visible, it [the
doctrine of the icon] substitutes a third: a spectator's gaze, objectively vis­
In the face of the contemporary situation of the image, which
ible, but also a prototype. The prototype does not only play the role, at
usurps every reality precisely because it sets itself up as the norm of every
first here, finally very banal, of an original (mimetically reproduced by the
possible thing, we find a situation that appears to call for an attitude at
objectively visible), of a referent (possibly inaccessible), or of a phantom
once conceptually simple and spiritually holy: iconoclasm. If the image
from the nether world [l'arriere-monde]; it does not intervene as a second
claims to establish itself as its own original, thus to be satisfied with it­
visible, behind the first, concealed by the first mimetic objectivity-un­
self, the invisible must claim invisibility, definitively. No face, especially
controllable, unusable, indefinitely repeatable; it intervenes as a second
not the one of the unique God, can either be seen or claim to be seen.
gaze that, as through the transpierced screen of the first visible (the
To see God-that would be blasphemy, and in any case an impossibil­
painted or sculpted image, etc.), envisages the first visage, that of the gaz­
ity. A number of religious movements have tended toward this radical re­
ing spectator. Before the profane image, I remain the viewer unseen by an
sponse, not only in the seventh and eighth centuries, and not only in Is­
image that is reduced to the rank of an object (the aesthetic object re­
lam or Judaism. One can even foresee that the response would win
mains an object) constituted, at least in part, by my gaze. Before the icon,
support in the future, only reinforcing the tyranny of the image under
if I continue to look, I feel myself seen (I must feel myself thus in order
the pretext of resisting it. However, iconoclasm implies a complete ral­
for it to function effectively as an icon). Thus the image no longer creates
lying to this tyranny: in effect, it contents itself with merely inverting
a screen (or, as in the case of the idol, a mirror) since through it and un­
the common attitude in view of the reigning definition of the image as
der its features another gaze-invisible like all gazes-envisages me. The
norm of the thing; instead of including there the face of God, icono­
original thus does not belong to the objectivity (confiscated or not by the
clasm confirms the divorce between this face and every image; by doing
image) that it would reduplicate. The original intervenes, through the im­
so, it completely legitimates the modern tyranny of the image as norm
aged objectivity, as a pure gaze crossing a gaze.
Iii'!!)
il',
60 The Blind at Shiloh The Blind at Shiloh 61
il!ll!i
ii"
As a result, what is at stake in the operation of the icon concerns the image in it, in order to there prevent any self-sufficiency, autonomy, 1
1,1:
1

1
,

or self-affirmation. The icon inverts the modern logic of the image: far
not the perception of the visible or the aesthetic but the intersection of
two gazes; in order for the viewer to be allowed to see and escape from From claiming its equivalence with the thing while Baunting itself in
r
I""

the status of being a mere voyeur, it is necessary for him to move, glory, instead it removes the prestige of the visible from its face, in order
through the visible icon, toward the origin of another gaze, confessing to effectively render it an imperceptible transparency, translucent for the
and admitting to be seen by it. What the Second Council of Nicaea counter-gaze. The icon does not expect one to see it, but rather gives itself
[787J formulated with the utmost precision is required: "For the more so that one might see or permit oneself to see through it. A dulled,
continually these [Christ, the Virgin, the saints] are observed by means dressed-down image-in short, transpierced-the icon allows another
of such representations'? (81 ciKOVlKTl<; avu't'Unw0Eco<; oprovtrn), so gaze, which it gives to be seen, to suddenly appear through it. It with­
much the more will the beholders be aroused to recollect the original draws from the invisible evidence that it nevertheless reveals. The ques­
[the prototype] (nov nporro-rumov), and desiring them and testifying to tion can henceforth be formulated as such: where to encounter, originar­
them; to these should be given respectful veneration (npooxuvnoic), ily, an image that effaces its own visibility in order to allow itself to be
but not true adoration (Au'tpciu), which pertains only to the divine na­ pierced by another gaze? The answer is obvious: the Servant of Yahweh
ture."ll The "respectful veneration" is not to be confused with adoration: literally allows himself to be disfigured (shedding [perdreJ 15 the visible
the one, in effect, is concerned with a (real) nature, the other a (irreal, splendor of his own visage) in order to do the will of God (which will ap­
intentional) gaze; before the icon, one should not adore, since the visible pear only in his actions). The Servant sacrifices his visage-he allows the
and real support (the image in its materiality) does not merit what a di­ effacement of his "image": "the multitudes were astonished at the sight of
vine nature alone demands (in the Eucharist par excellence); but it is him; his form, disfigured, lost all human likeness; his appearance so
necessary to venerate, that is, by my gaze, to climb back up [remonter], changed he no longer looked like a man" (Isaiah 52:14; cf Psalms 22:7)·
to cross the visible image and be exposed to the invisible counter-gaze of By completely effacing the glory of his own image, to the point of ob­
the prototype. The icon is given not to be seen but to be venerated, be­ scuring even his humanity, the Servant allows nothing other than his ac­
cause it thus offers its prototype to be seen. The icon is crossed by the tions to be seen: these result from obedience to the will of God and thus
veneration of my gaze in response to a first gaze. This is precisely what allow it to become manifest. "I shall declare your name to my brethren;
the Second Council of Nicaea decreed, taking up the felicitous formula in the midst of the assembly, I will praise you" (Psalms 22:22). The self-re­
of Saint Basil: "the honor paid to the icon is transferred [8ta~uiVEl, nunciation of the image itself-a condition of its transformation into an
transits to the prototype."l2 Thus the doctrine of the icon represents a icon-is thus accomplished in the obedience of the one who sheds his
radical break with the status of the image, since for the visible object (ex­ face, renouncing his visibility in order to do the will of God. By this para­
clusive, today, of every other thing), it substitutes a visible transit where doxical glory, Christ displays the logic of the iconic image: "Then they
two gazes cross each other and are exposed to each other, viewers [voy­ spat on his face and beat him; and others struck him with the palms of
ants], the one seen, the other aimed at-at least. their hands, saying, 'Prophesy to us, Christ! Who is the one who struck
It remains to determine which images can be qualified as icons. you?'" (Matthew 26:67-68). In fact, it is precisely at the moment that he
Since the icon is defined by a second gaze that envisages the first, the vis­ loses his human appearance [figure] that Christ becomes the figure of the
ible image is no longer a screen; on the contrary, it permits itself to be divine will: in him, it is no longer his human appearance [figureJ that is
transpierced; but two gazes cross there. Thus the visible surface must, imagined [se figureJ; and shedding appearance, he gives shape [donne fig­
paradoxically, efface itself, or at least efface within it every opacity that ure] to a holiness that would have remained invisible without the shrine
would obfuscate the crossing of gazes [fa croisee des regardJJ: the icon dulls [ecrinJ (not screen [ecranD of his body. When, on the face, it undoes the
62 The BLindat ShiLoh The BLindat Shiloh 63

glory of every image, the body remains what, in obedience to the will of out innovation, to infinity.'? Hence the appearance of the non-art objects
another, shows this other all the more: "You desired neither sacrifice nor that, in the museum, are disappointing from the viewpoint of the ob­
offering, you formed a body for me. You required neither burnt offering server, forces him, with pleasure or not, to reconsider his relation of plea­
nor sin offering, then I said, 'Here I come!' In the scroll of the book it is sure and of possession with respect to the visible object. The strategy of
written of me, I delight to do your will" (Psalms 40:7-9 [6-8]' LXX). By these aesthetic approaches is intended precisely to liberate the gaze from
accomplishing in the movements of the body not his own will but that of the image (the deception being suspended by the spectator), and also to
God, Christ indicates not his own face but the trace of God. His disfig­ liberate the image from the gaze (the visible nullity being concealed by
ured appearance is thus given as a transparency, in order that we might the desire of the observer); in short, to dissociate the mutual closure of
regard there the gaze of God. The dulling of the image, which is accom­ the gaze and the image by each other. Of course, there it is a matter of a
plished in the disfiguration of Christ, delivers the first icon: the veil of recognition of tendencies rather than a doctrine; without a doubt also,
Veronica wipes away not a visible image but the kenosis of every figure­ the impoverishment of the image does not take place, in the contempo­
the kenosis of the image, "the condition of a slave" (Philippians 2:])­ rary schools, until a second gaze envisaging the first is recognized through
and allows the trace of the invisible to appear, which envisages us. the screen of the visible; nonetheless, the fact remains that a strategy of
the impoverished image effectively attempts to give to the gaze its free ini­
VI tiative and its problematic liberty.
One might wonder if Christian art was not attempting, consciously
The icon, therefore, is derived from the kenosis of the image. The or not, in each of its genuine epochs, the practice of a kenosis of the im­
first kenosis (that of the Word [John 1:14]) permits the first "icon of the age; unless it is on the contrary respect for this kenosis that is ordained
invisible God" [Colossians 1:15]. And vice versa: Christ testifies to us that (or not) by Christ. That not a single image claims self-sufficiency, but
he offers an authentic icon of the Father (not a mere image of himself) by rather returns itself to an Other-this can be accomplished in a number
the kenosis of his own will given over to the Father. The self-affirmation of ways: either by digging the visible screen from a counter-gaze found to
of the image, like all others, yields only in front of an abandonment: it is be invisible (as in "the icons," Roman and Gothic sculpture); or by di­
precisely because the icon is not given for itself, but rather undoes its own verting light, outside of its function of illuminating the present, toward
prestige, that it perhaps demands veneration-veneration that it does not the summons of the Infinite, of the invisible, of the unattainable (as in
seize but rather lets pass through it to the invisible prototype. It remains Baroque domes, Rubens, etc.); or by employing shadows and lights not
to be seen how the theological paradigm of a kenosis of the image trans­ to confirm the visible shapes but rather to confound and disrupt for the
lates into aesthetic principles. We must limit ourselves here to proposing sake of the undecidable appearance of the invisible Spirit (Caravaggio,
some evidence in support of the aesthetic pertinence of such a kenosis. Rembrandt, Nain). More could be said about other, similar devices, but
Contemporary painting already practices, in certain schools at least of particular importance is their common trait: that the prestige of the
(minimalist art, art povera, 14 ready made, etc.), a systematic impoverish­ image or the visible object impoverishes itself [sappauvrisse] , 16 imposing
ment of the spectacle offered to the gaze by the work; on the one hand, it limits on itself so that the veneration is brought back not to itself, the im­
may be a matter of a choice of very banal materials, or even vulgar ones age, but rather to the prototype, possibly aimed at through it [par Lui
(cardboard, plaster, wrapping paper, various scraps, etc.): on the other euentuellement visabLe].
hand, it may be a matter of giving up the inventiveness of plastic art, in If such poverty characterizes art insofar as it is Christian, one can
the reuse of prefabricated objects and shapes, even in duplications with- draw a surprising but probable conclusion: the often indisputable mean­
ness [La LaideurJl7 of art said to be "Sulpician" [supicien] I S ought not to

64 The Blind at Shiloh The Blind at Shiloh 65

be discredited. For as Andre Frossard remarked one day, in front of a Vir­ crossing (or being crossed) by an invisible gaze. Whether one who sees
gin by Raphael, "A Raphael!"; but in front of a Sulpician Virgin, one rec­ the eucharistic liturgy as a spectacle is condemned less to idolatry than
ognizes rhe Virgin herself Thus Sulpician an practices, more than "great to himself, with regret or pleasure, is of little import. The attitude of my
art," the impoverishment of the image and the transfer of veneration gaze before the liturgy determines my general attitude before the cross­
from the image to the original. Its unintentional arte pOllera assures that ing of the visible by the invisible. It may be that only the liturgy sum­
less than ever does it seize veneration for the sake of the image, thus pro­ mons us to such a decision: it provokes the last judgment of every gaze,
tecting it against every tyranny of the image. This paradox of Sulpician which must, before it and it alone, either continue still to desire to see
art is obviously not sufficient to compensate for the obvious bankruptcy an idol or agree to pray. Prayer signifies here: letting the other (of the)
of religious art in the twentieth century; it explains why this is the case gaze see me [laij'ser l'autre (du) regard me lJOil].n The liturgy alone im­
even less, seeing especially that the contribution of notable artists has poverishes the image enough to wrest it from every spectacle, so that in
done nothing to change this defeated situation. In their'? chapels, it is this way might appear the splendor that the eyes can neither hope for
simply a matter of recognizing, "That is by Matisse'," "That is by nor bear, but a splendor that love-shed abroad in our hearts [Romans
Cocteau!,"-thus, to see; but it is not a place of prayer-that is, of being 5:5]-makes it possible to endure.
seen; or better, it is necessary to forget [oublierj2° that these are "by Ma­ In order not to remain blind-obsessed by the incessant stream of
tisse" or "by Cocteau"-to forget the visible. These chapels celebrate their static images that wall up [murent] our eyes on themselves-in order to
painters, not the addressee [the object of worship]-they play the role of be liberated from the muddy tyranny of the visible, one must pray-go­
simple idols, not of icons. If the lowly [Ie laid] 21 does not offer to holiness ing to wash oneself in the pool of Shiloh. 23 At the pool of the Sent One,
its better shrine [ecrin] (though does not holiness rid itself of every such who was sent only for that-we are granted a vision of the invisible.
treasure chest [ecrin]?), the beautiful perhaps makes itself a screen [ecran].
Where, then, is the paradigmatic kenosis of the image for the ben­
efit of the holiness of God accomplished? In the liturgy. The liturgy pro­
poses to demonstrate a visible spectacle, which summons and possibly
fills vision, but also the senses of hearing, smell, touch, and even taste. It
accomplishes an entire possible aesthetic and perhaps thus appears to be
a complete spectacle, more than opera, which moreover is its mimic and,
by the oratio, results from it. Nevertheless, this apotheosis of the image
itself remains an illusion, or, by way of illusion, a deviation and a temp­
tation. For, in the performance of the liturgy, the celebrant acts in per­
sona Christi-in the name of Christ and as supponer of his role: Christ
speaks in the readings, makes himself seen, touched, eaten, and breathed
in his eucharistic body. Every liturgy effects the appearance of Christ
and results from it. Of course it always remains possible to apprehend
(in fact to miss) the celebration as a "grand mass," to know it as the ide­
ological self-celebration and closed system of an Internet community, of
a culture, or of power. But there it is a matter of a gaze already com­
pletely absorbed by the idolatrous spectacle and certainly closed to its

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