PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY vs. ELPIDIO S. UY G.R. Nos.

147933-34 December 12, 2001

FACTS: A landscaping agreement was executed between petitioner Public Estates Authority and Elpidio Uy’s company
doing business as Edison Development & Construction. However, due to the failure of petitioner to provide enough land
for Elpidio Uy to work on, the landscaping job has been delayed a couple of times. On the part of petitioner, the delay
was caused by the number of squatters around the area and the presence of a public cemetery. Respondent instituted
with the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission an action for the recovery of losses due to the delay caused by
Public Estates Authority.

On May 16, 2000, the CIAC rendered a decision ordering Public Estates Authority to pay. Both petitioner and respondent
filed petitions for review with the Court of Appeals. In CA-G.R. SP No. 59308, petitioner contested the monetary awards
given by the CIAC. On the other hand, respondent filed CA-G.R. SP No. 59849, arguing that the CIAC erred in awarding a
reduced amount for equipment stand-by costs and for denying his claims for additional costs for topsoil hauling and
operating costs of water trucks.

Both parties filed motions for reconsideration. Subsequently, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals an Urgent
Motion for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, seeking to enjoin the CIAC
from proceeding with CIAC Case No. 03-2001, which respondent has filed. Petitioner alleged that the said case involved
claims by respondent arising from the same Landscaping and Construction Agreement, subject of the cases pending with
the Court of Appeals.

HELD:The petition is without merit.

Petitioner assails the dismissal of its petition by the Court of Appeals based on a technicality, i.e., the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping was signed by its Officer-in-Charge, who did not appear to have been authorized by
petitioner to represent it in the case. Petitioner moreover argues that in an earlier resolution, the First Division of the
Court of Appeals gave due course to its petition. Despite this, it was the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals
which rendered the Joint Decision dismissing its petition.

The contention is untenable. Petitioner, being a government owned and controlled corporation, can act only through its
duly authorized representatives. In the case of Premium Marble Resources, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,which the Court of
Appeals cited, we made it clear that in the absence of an authority from the board of directors, no person, not even the
officers of the corporation, can validly bind the corporation. Thus, we held in that case:

We agree with the finding of public respondent Court of Appeals, that "in the absence of any board resolution
from its board of directors the [sic] authority to act for and in behalf of the corporation, the present action must
necessary fail. The power of the corporation to sue and be sued in any court is lodged with the board of directors
that exercises its corporate powers. Thus, the issue of authority and the invalidity of plaintiff-appellant's
subscription which is still pending, is a matter that is also addressed, considering the premises, to the sound
judgment of the Securities and Exchange Commission."11

Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not err in finding that, in view of the absence of a board resolution authorizing
petitioner's Officer-in-Charge to represent it in the petition, the verification and certification of non-forum shopping
executed by said officer failed to satisfy the requirement of the Rules. In this connection, Rule 43, Section 7, of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure categorically provides:

Effect of failure to comply with requirements. — The failure of the petition to comply with any of the foregoing
requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of
the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal thereof.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for review is DENIED. The Motion to Consolidate this petition with
G.R. No. 147925-26 is also DENIED.
CLAVECILLA vs. QUITAIN G.R. No. 147989 February 20, 2006

FACTS:

Teresito and Rico Quitain (Quitains) filed on March 7, 1997, a complaint against Rolando Clavecilla (Clavecilla) before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 6, Davao City (MTCC) for the enforcement of the amicable settlement entered into
by them on August 19, 1996 before the Lupon Tagapamayapa, Barangay Talomo, Davao. Pertinent portions of said
settlement reads:
1. That the respondent (Clavecilla) agreed to purchase the property on October 15, 1996.
2. Failure to pay the property on the said date the respondent will voluntarily vacate the place with the
assistance of five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos only.
3. The complainant (Rico Quitain) agreed to the demand of the respondent.

The Quitains alleged that Clavecilla failed to pay the amount agreed upon and six months had already passed since the
agreement was entered into and yet Clavecilla has still not left the premises.

When the trial ensued it was shown that the Verification and Certification of non-forum shopping, which accompanied
the petition at bench, was executed and signed by petitioner’s counsel Atty. Oswaldo A. Macadangdang, without the
proper authority from petitioner, in violation of Sec. 5, Rule 7 and Sec. 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The duty to certify under oath is strictly addressed to petitioner, Rolando Clavecilla. To allow delegation of said duty to
anyone would render Revised Circular No. 28-91 inutile.

Petitioner moves for the reconsideration of our Resolution dated 05 October 2000 dismissing the petition for the reason
that the certificate of non-forum shopping was signed by petitioner’s counsel and not by the petitioner.

Admitting that the duty to sign under oath the certificate is addressed to the petitioner, petitioner attached to his
motion a Special Power of Attorney dated 09 August 2000 authorizing his counsel to sign the certificate. The court
believes that this authorization was made after the petition had been filed, in a vain attempt to cure the fatal defect, for
if Atty. Maca[d]angdang had such authority, he would have indicated that in the Verification and Certification he signed
on 25 August 2000 attached to the petition.

In any event, it is a settled rule that the certificate against forum shopping must be executed by the petitioner and not
by counsel. xxx To merit the Court’s Consideration, petitioner must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign
the certification. x x x This petitioner failed to show.

Petitioner avers that: his lawyer had the authority to sign the certification against forum shopping; the CA was hasty in
concluding that the authorization of petitioner’s lawyer was made after the petition had been filed; the CA should have
granted petitioner the benefit of the doubt that he gave such authorization to his lawyer at the time that his lawyer
signed the verification and certification against forum shopping; petitioner’s failure to have a properly executed
certification against forum shopping attached to his petition for review is not fatal; the rules of procedure are used only
to help secure and not override substantial justice, and the CA departed from the established liberal interpretation of
the rules despite petitioner’s substantial compliance with the rule on non-forum shopping.

Rico Quitain in his Comment countered that: the petition is not sufficient in form and substance and is utterly deficient
in factual and procedural bases; petitioner named "Teresito Quitain, Rico Quitain, et al." as respondents without
specifying who "et al." referred to; Teresito Quitain is already deceased and the MTCC as early as June 5, 1998 already
ordered Teresito’s substitution; the spouse and children of Teresito, to wit, Lolita, Rene, Ruel, Radi and Romy, all
surnamed Quitain, have the right to be informed of the filing of the petition and the fact that they were not so
specifically named as respondents but were referred to as "et al." makes the petition a sham pleading; petitioner failed
to attach certified true copies of the MTCC Decision dated March 8, 2000 and the RTC Order dated July 5, 2000 which
should have been included as annexes in the present petition as they are material to the case, and the petition does not
allege a good and valid defense which, if appreciated, could probably cause the reversal of the July 5, 2000 and March 8,
2000 issuances.21
The parties filed their respective Memoranda reiterating their respective contentions. After evaluating the records of the
case and the issues raised by the parties, the Court finds that the CA did not err in denying the petition and motion for
reconsideration filed by Clavecilla before it. The Court however finds different grounds for denying Clavecilla’s petition.

First, it must be determined whether there existed a special power of attorney in favor of petitioner’s counsel when the
petition before the CA was filed.

The CA in its Resolution dated March 28, 2001, stated that it believes that the special power of attorney in favor of the
lawyer attached to petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was only made after the petition had been filed reasoning
that if the counsel had such authority from the beginning, he would have attached the same when the petition was first
filed.

HELD: The Court disagrees.

The rule is that any suspicion on the authenticity and due execution of the special power of attorney which is a notarized
document, thus a public document, cannot stand against the presumption of regularity in their favor absent evidence
that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant.

In this case, the petition before the CA was filed on September 13, 2000. The special power of attorney meanwhile was
dated August 9, 2000. Absent any proof that the special power of attorney was not actually in existence before the
petition was filed, this Court has no recourse but to believe that it was indeed in existence at such time.

The next matter to be determined is whether the CA was correct in dismissing Clavecilla’s petition and motion for
reconsideration, notwithstanding the authority given by Clavecilla in favor of his lawyer to sign the verification and
certification in his behalf.

The Court answers in the affirmative. Obedience to the requirements of procedural rules is needed if we are to expect
fair results therefrom, and utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal
construction. Time and again, this Court has strictly enforced the requirement of verification and certification of non-
forum shopping under the Rules of Court. This case is no exception.

Verification is required to secure an assurance that the allegations of the petition have been made in good faith, or are
true and correct and not merely speculative. In this case, petitioner’s counsel signed the verification alleging that he had
read the petition and the contents thereof are true and correct of his own "knowledge and belief." On this ground
alone, the petition should already be dismissed for as provided for in Section 4 Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC dated May 1, 2000:

Sec. 4. Verification. ---xxx

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and
correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief," or upon "knowledge,
information and belief," or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.

While the Court has exercised leniency in cases where the lapse in observing the rules was committed when the rules
have just recently taken effect, the attendant circumstances in this case however do not warrant such leniency.

The certification against forum shopping in this case was signed by petitioner’s counsel despite the clear requirement of
the law that petitioners themselves must sign the certification. The certification must be made by petitioner himself and
not by counsel, since it is petitioner who is in the best position to know whether he has previously commenced any
similar action involving the same issues in any other tribunal or agency. And the lack of a certification against forum
shopping, unlike that of verification, is generally not cured by its submission after the filing of the petition.
Heirs of Dicman v. Cariño 490 SCRA 240 (2006)

FACTS:

The subject land had been part of the land claim of Mateo Cariño. Within this site, buildings were constructed which
were bought by Sioco Cariño, son of Mateo Cariño and grandfather of private respondent Jose Cariño. Sioco Cariño then
took possession of the buildings and the land.

Ting-el Dicman, predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, had been employed by Sioco Cariño as his cattle herder.

On the advice of his lawyers, and because there were already many parcels of land recorded in his name, Sioco Cariño
caused the survey of the land in controversy in the name of Ting-el Dicman.

Ting-el Dicman executed a public instrument entitled "Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural
Land" with Sioco Cariño, which reads: That Mr. Sioco Cariño has advanced all expenses for said survey xxx, and also all
other expenses for the improvement of said land, to date; That for and in consideration of said advance expenses, I
hereby pledge and promise to convey, deliver and transfer unto said Sioco Cariño, his heirs and assigns, one half (1/2) of
my title, rights, and interest to and in the aforesaid parcel of land; same to be delivered, conveyed and transferred to
him, his heirs and assigns, by me, my heirs, and assigns, xxx.

After the execution of the foregoing deed, Sioco Cariño, who had been in possession of the land in controversy since
1916, continued to stay thereon.

On January 10, 1938, Sioco Cariño executed, as seller, a public instrument entitled "Deed of Absolute Sale" covering the
subject land and its improvements with his son, Guzman Cariño, as buyer. Consequently, Guzman Cariño took
possession of the property publicly, peacefully, and in the concept of owner.

Guzman Cariño had the entire Lot resurveyed so as to indicate the half portion that belonged to him and the other half
that belonged to the petitioners. The resurvey evenly divided the lot into Lot 76-A and 76-B

A petition was later filed by the heirs of Ting-el Dicman which sought to establish ownership over Lot 76-A and Lot 76-B.
Guzman Cariño opposed the petition insofar as he insisted ownership over Lot 76-B, the land in controversy.

While the foregoing petition was pending in the trial court, President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 628
excluding from the operation of the Baguio Townsite Reservation certain parcels of public land known as ‘Igorot Claims’.
One such claim pertained to the "Heirs of Dicman,"

As a consequence, the trial court dismissed the petition insofar as Lot 76-B was concerned, and the certificate of title
issued pursuant to the partial decision involving Lot 76-A was invalidated.

After the dismissal of the case, Guzman Cariño was left undisturbed in his possession of the subject property until his
death. His remains are buried on the land in question

On April 20, 1983, petitioners, suing as compulsory heirs of Ting-el Dicman, revived the foregoing case by filing a
complaint for recovery of possession with damages involving the subject property

Private respondent Jose Cariño filed his answer and prayed for dismissal. RTC ruled in favor of respondents Carino

CA affirmed RTC. CA based its ruling on the following reasons: that the petitioners raised for the first time on appeal the
issue on whether the "Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" is void ab initio under
Sections 145 and 146 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu

ISSUE: W/N the Deed of Conveyance was invalid, hence, would not make Carino the lawful owner and possessor of the
subject lot

RULING: NO. SC ruled in favor of Carino.

RATIO: The foregoing issue and the incidents thereunder were never raised by the petitioners during the proceedings
before the RTC. Suffice it to say that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised timely in the proceedings in
the lower court are barred by estoppel. Matters, theories or arguments not brought out in the original proceedings
cannot be considered on review or appeal where they are raised for the first time. To consider the alleged facts and
arguments raised belatedly would amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair play, justice and due process.

Even if this Court should declare the sale null and void or the agreement merely a contract to sell subject to a suspensive
condition that has yet to occur, private respondent nonetheless acquired ownership over the land in question through
acquisitive prescription.

The records show that as early as 1938, the land in controversy had been in the possession of Guzman Cariño,
predecessor-in-interest of private respondent, continuously, publicly, peacefully, in concept of owner, and in good faith
with just title, to the exclusion of the petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest, well beyond the period required
under law to acquire title by acquisitive prescription which, in this case, is 10 years.

As correctly held by the RTC, there is no evidence to the effect that Ting-el Dicman or his successors-in-interest ever filed
any action to question the validity of the "Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" after its
execution on October 22, 1928 despite having every opportunity to do so. Nor was any action to recover possession of
the property from Guzman Cariño instituted anytime prior to April 24, 1959, a time when the period for acquisitive
prescription, reckoned from Guzman’s occupation of the property in 1938, had already transpired in his favor. No
evidence likewise appears on the record that Sioco Cariño or his Estate ever filed any action to contest the validity of the
"Deed of Absolute Sale" dated January 10, 1938. Though counsel for the Estate of Sioco Cariño tried to assail the deed as
a forgery in the trial court, the attempt failed and no appeal was lodged therefrom.

For over 30 years reckoned from the "Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" dated
October 22, 1928, or 20 years reckoned from the "Deed of Absolute Sale" dated January 10, 1938, they neglected to
take positive steps to assert their dominical claim over the property. With the exception of forgery, all other issues
concerning the validity of the two instruments abovementioned, as well as the averment that the former was in the
nature of a contract to sell, were issues raised only for the first time on appeal and cannot therefore be taken up at this
late a stage.
SOLAR TEAM ENTERTAINMENT vs. RICA-FORT G.R. No. 132007 August 5, 1998

FACTS: This is a case for the recovery of possession and damages with a prayer for a writ of replevin. Private
respondents filed their Answer and a copy was furnished to the counsel of petitioner by registered mail but the pleading
did not contain and written explanation why personal service was not made upon petitioner-plaintiff as required by the
Rules of Court.

On 11 August 1997, petitioner filed a motion to expunge the "Answer (with Counterclaims)" and to declare herein
private respondents in default, 5 alleging therein that the latter did not observe the mandate of the aforementioned
Section 11, and that there was:

[A]bsolutely no valid reason why defendant[s] should not have personally served plaintiff's . . . counsel with [a] copy of
their answer [as] (t)he office of defendant's (sic) counsel, Atty. Froilan Cabaltera, is just a stone [sic] throw away from
the office of [petitioner's] counsel, with an estimate (sic) distance of about 200 meters more or less.

Petitioner further alleged that the post office was "about ten (10) times farther from the office of Atty. Cabaltera,"

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in denying petitioner's motion to expunge private respondents' answer with counterclaims on the ground
that said pleading was not served personally

HELD: We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, the exception. Henceforth,
whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal
service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had,
which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to
begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject
matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for
violation of Section 11. This Court cannot rule otherwise, lest we allow circumvention of the innovation introduced by
the 1997 Rules in order to obviate delay in the administration of justice.

Returning, however, to the merits of this case, in view of the proximity between the offices of opposing counsel and the
absence of any attendant explanation as to why personal service of the answer was not effected, indubitably, private
respondents' counsel violated Section 11 of Rule 13 and the motion to expunge was prima facie meritorious. However,
the grant or denial of said motion nevertheless remained within the sound exercise of the trial court's discretion. Thus,
as guided by Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which ordains that the Rules shall be liberally
construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action or
proceeding, as well as by the dictum laid down in Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315 [1910], the trial court opted to exercise
its discretion in favor of admitting the "Answer (with Counterclaims)," instead of expunging it from the record.

To our mind, if motions to expunge or strike out pleadings for violation of Section 11 of Rule 13 were to be
indiscriminately resolved under Section 6 of Rule 1 or Alonzo v. Villamor and other analogous cases, then Section 11
would become meaningless and its sound purpose negated. Nevertheless, we sustain the challenged ruling of the trial
court, but for reasons other than those provided for in the challenged order.

The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect only on 1 July 1997, while the questioned "Answer (with Counterclaims)"
was filed only on 8 August 1997, or on the 39th day following the effectivity of the 1997 Rules. Hence, private
respondents' counsel may not have been fully aware of the requirements and ramifications of Section 11, Rule 13. In
fact, as pointed out by petitioner's counsel, in another case where private respondents' counsel was likewise opposing
counsel, the latter similarly failed to comply with Section 11.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED

Azajar vs. CA Nov. 10, 1986

FACTS:

1. Azajar purchased thru the agent of Cham Samco 100 kegs of nails of various sizes and paid P18,000 in full. However,
Cham Samco only delivered a part of the quantity ordered. Azajar filed a complaint before the CFI of Cam Sur.

2. Instead of submitting an answer, Samco filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds: failure of the complaint to state a
cause of action and that venue was improperly laid.

3. The motion to dismiss contained a notice addressed to the Clerk of Court.

4. Contending that such notice was fatally defective, Azajar filed a motion to declare Samco in default, which the court
granted. Azajar was allowed to present evidence ex parte and the court rendered judgment against Samco.

5. The TC justified its order of default in this wise: that instead of filling an answer to the complaint, Samco filed a
motion to dismiss which is not a motion at all because the “notice” is directed to the Clerk of Court instead of the
party concerned (as required by Sec.5, Rule 15, RC) and is without the requisite notice of hearing directed to the CC
and not to the parties, and merely stating that the same be submitted for resolution. It is without the requisite
notice of time and place of hearing.

6. Aggrieved, Samco went to CA for recourse, but the CA affirmed the decision of the TC. However, on motion for
reconsideration, CA reversed itself and declared that technicalities should be brushed aside so that Samco can be
given a day in court.

ISSUE: WON the failure of Cham Samco to set its motion to dismiss for hearing on a specified date and time and for not
addressing the same to the party interested is fatal to his cause.

HELD: Yes. Although the Court sided with CA that technicalities should be set aside to Samco to be afforded with his day
in court.

1. The law explicitly requires that notice of motion shall be served by the appellant to all parties concerned at least
3 days before the hearing, together with a copy of the motion, and of any affidavits and other papers
accompanying it; and that notices shall be directed to the parties concerned stating the time and place for the
hearing of the motion. Failure to comply with the requirement is a fatal flaw.

2. Such notice is required to avoid surprises upon the opposite party and give the latter time to study and meet the
arguments of the motion as well as to determine or make determinable the time of submission of the motion
for resolution.

3. Without the notice, the occasion would not arise to determine with reasonable certitude whether and within
what time the adverse party would respond to the motion, and when the motion might already be resolved by
the Court.

4. The duty to give that notice is imposed on the movant and not on the court.
Neri v. De La Peña A.M. No. RTJ-05-1896; April 29, 2005

FACTS:

The case stems from a motion for reconsideration from a civil case of damages filed by one Aznar, the plaintiff in the
original case, against Citibank. The motion for reconsideration was re-raffled to the sala of Respondent Judge De La
Peña. Judge De La Peña granted the motion for reconsideration which prompted the filing of Atty. Neri of the
administrative case now in dispute, charging Respondent Judge of dishonesty and gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent Judge, in his defense, contended that he based his decision from an ex parte manifestation made by Aznar.
Petitioner assailed the Respondent’s appreciation of the ex parte manifestation as Citibank was not served a copy of
such.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found Respondent Judge liable for violating for violating Section 4, Rule 13
which requires that adverse parties be served copies of all pleadings and similar papers; in relation to Section 5, Rule 15
which requires a movant to set his motion for hearing, unless it is one of those which a court can act upon without
prejudicing the rights of the other party; both provisions of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

According to the OCA, the fact that plaintiff Aznar had failed to serve a copy of his ex parte manifestation upon Citibank
should have been reason enough for respondent to disregard the same. The OCA found Respondent only liable for
simple misconduct.

ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent Judge is liable for violating the aforesaid provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure

RULING: No, Respondent Judge did not violate the stated provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The prevailing
doctrine in our jurisdiction is that a motion without a notice of hearing addressed to the parties is a mere scrap of paper.
However, the same cannot be said for manifestations which, unless otherwise indicated, are usually made merely for
the information of the court.

Nevertheless, Judge must still be found guilty for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, for having based his decision
on an ex parte manifestation while Citibank was never made aware of such. Said action violates the principle of fair play,
proof that there is something amiss Respondent Judge’s sense of fairness and righteousness.
Boiser v Judge Aguirre, Jr A.M. No. RTJ-04-1886; May 16, 2005

FACTS:

The case stems from an ejectment case filed by Petitioner Boiser against one Julleza, which was decided in favor of
Boiser by the MTC. When the case reached the RTC on appeal by Julleza, Julleza filed a motion to release bond which
was granted by Respondent Judge. Boiser then filed the instant administrative case against Respondent Judge for
ignorance of the law, alleging that the motion did not state that he was furnished a copy of the motion thereby
depriving him of his right to due process.

After it was found out by Boiser that Respondent Judge held in his favor in the decision of his ejectment case, Boiser
withdrew his administrative complaint. The administrative complaint was still placed under investigation with the CA
which held to dismiss the case; the case was raised to the Supreme Court for instant review.

ISSUE: Whether or not the administrative case is moot, the petitioner having withdrawn the case

RULING: No, mere desistance on the part of the complainant does not warrant the dismissal of an administrative
complaint against any member of the bench

The withdrawal of complaints cannot divest the Court of its jurisdiction nor strip it of its power to determine the veracity
of the charges made and to discipline, such as the results of its investigation may warrant, an erring respondent. Even
the retirement of respondent does not oust the Court of its jurisdiction over an administrative case by the mere fact that
the respondent public official ceases to hold office during the pendency of respondent’s case.

On deciding the main issue, the Court held that the Motion to Release Bond was defective, not having a proper notice of
hearing. Not to mention the fact that the date and time of the hearing were not specified, and that neither complainant
nor his counsel was furnished a copy thereof. These were never controverted by respondent judge. A motion without
notice of hearing is pro forma, a mere scrap of paper. It presents no question which the court could decide. The court
has no reason to consider it and the clerk has no right to receive it.
De Jesus vs. Judge DilagA.M. No. RTJ-05-1921 September 30, 2005

ER:

Harlinghausen and De Jesus were spouses. Thereafter, Harlinghausen filed for nullity of marriage with an Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion to Preserve Properties to be Collated and another Ex-Parte Motion to Direct the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation to allow him entry into the country so he can prosecute his petition for nullity of marriage. De Jesus
filed a motion to dismiss the case for nullity on the ground of improper venue but this was denied. Judge Dilag granted
both Ex-Parte Motions without observing due process of notice and hearing, prompting De Jesus to file an
administrative case against Judge Dilag for gross ignorance of the law.

Issue: Whether the judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law?

YES. With respect to the Ex-Parte Motion directing the BID to allow Harlinghausen entry to the country, Judge Dilag is
grossly ignorant of the law. Judge Dilag shows his ignorance of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. This
law confers upon the Commissioner of the BID, to the exclusion of the courts of justice, the power and authority to
enforce its provisions, specifically the admission of foreigners to this country.

With respect to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Protect Properties to be Collated, Judge Dilag blatantly disregarded the
requirements for notice and hearing. Obviously, Judge Dilag disregarded Sections 4 (hearing of motion), 5 (notice of
hearing) and 6 (proof of service), Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Instead of denying the motion outright for
being manifestly defective, he granted the same. While he set the motion for hearing, still the three-day notice was not
observed, thus De Jesus failed to attend the hearing. Clearly, she was deprived of her right to due process.

FACTS:

 De Jesus charged Judge Dilag with gross ignorance of the law, issuing unjust orders, abuse of authority and
misuse of court processes.
 De Jesus alleged that her husband, Wolfgang Harlinghausen filed for nullity of their marriage with the RTC of
Olongapo
o Harlinghausen filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Preserve Properties to be Collated.
 De Jesus was served summons and filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue. This was denied
by Judge Dilag
 Judge Dilag then granted the Urgent Ex-Parte to Preserve Properties to be Collated and placing under legal
custody the properties enumerated therein. The Register of Deeds of Tarlac was directed to annotate the Order
on the 62 land titles allegedly purchased by De Jesus using her husband’s money without consent.
 Harlinghausen filed another Ex-Parte Motion praying for the issuance of an Order directing the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation to allow him to enter this country in order to prosecute his petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage.
o Judge Dilag granted this.
 De Jesus then filed a petition for certiorari in the CA against Judge Dilag because of the granting of the two Ex-
Parte Motions and denying the motion to dismiss.
o CA granted the certiorari and rendered the decisions void and dismissing the complaint for nullity of
marriage.
 Harlinghausen filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA. He then filed a petition for review
on certiorari in the SC but it was denied for failure to show that the CA committed reversible error.

 De Jesus now contends that Judge Dilag is:

o 1) ignorant of the law and abused his authority in granting Harlinghausen’s Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to
Preserve Properties to be Collated. The motion lacks the notice of hearing to be served upon the
adverse party three (3) days before the hearing; and proof of service of the motion upon the adverse
party
 o 2) abused his authority and misused court processes in issuing the Order directing the BID to allow
Harlinghausen to enter this country.

 Judge Dilag’s comment: he did not disregard the basic procedural rules. Although the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to
Preserve Properties to be Collated lacks a notice of hearing, nevertheless he set the motion for hearing to
enable the adverse party, De Jesus, to participate therein or to file an opposition. Besides, the Rules allow him to
act upon an ex-parte motion requiring "quick action," like the motion before him. There was urgency
considering that the conjugal funds are being misappropriated by De Jesus. Moreover, he conducted
clarificatory hearing. At any rate, his questioned Order is not tainted with "bad faith or fraud."
o With respect to the Order directing the BID to allow entry to Harlinghausen, Judge Dilag explained that
he did not overstep his jurisdiction. He recognized the authority of the BID. In fact, he stated in his
questioned Order that it is without prejudice to the authority of the BID over Harlinghausen.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Dilag is guilty of gross ignaorance of the law?

HELD: WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Renato J. Dilag is hereby found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and is
ordered to pay a FINE of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) upon notice.

Ratio:

With respect to the first Urgent Ex-Parte Motion (Protect Properties to be Collated): Judge Dilag blatantly disregarded
the requirements for notice and hearing (not relevant)

 Obviously, Judge Dilag disregarded Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Instead of
denying the motion outright for being manifestly defective, he granted the same. While he set the motion for
hearing, still the three-day notice was not observed, thus De Jesus failed to attend the hearing. Clearly, she was
deprived of her right to due process.
 When a judge fails to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law, or a principle in the discharge of his duties,
he is either too incompetent and undeserving of his position, or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was
deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. In both instances, the judge’s dismissal is
in order. His failure to afford complainant the opportunity to be heard as a matter of due process of law
deserves administrative sanction.

With respect to the second Ex-Parte Motion directing the BID to allow Harlinghausen entry to the country: Judge Dilag
is grossly ignorant of the law. (RELEVANT)

 Judge Dilag shows his ignorance of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. This law confers upon
the Commissioner of the BID, to the exclusion of the courts of justice, the power and authority to enforce its
provisions, specifically the admission of foreigners to this country.
 We sustain the observation of the Court of Appeals that the Order of Judge Dilag directing the BID to allow the
entry of Harlinghausen to this country would effectively countermand the order of detention issued by the BID
and "constitutes an intrusion into its prerogatives as regards the entry, admission, exclusion, registration,
repatriation, monitoring and deportation of foreigners within our national territory."
 In his desperate attempt to evade administrative sanction, respondent judge maintains that since complainant
has already resorted to a proper remedy, i.e., by filing a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
questioning his twin Orders, she is barred from filing the instant administrative complaint involving the same
Orders. He cited our ruling in Hilario vs. Ocampo III, 371 SCRA 260 (2001) that "where some judicial means is
available, an administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for an act of a judge deemed aberrant or
irregular."
 While it is true that the Court of Appeals has set aside the questioned twin Orders, the fact remains that
respondent judge has shown his ignorance of both substantive and procedural laws which warrants an
administrative sanction.
 The Court recognizes that "not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good
faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, but only in cases within the parameters of tolerable
 misjudgment. Where, however, the procedure is so simple and the facts so evident as to be beyond permissible
margins of error, as in this case, to still err thereon amounts to ignorance of the law."
 In this case, Judge Dilag displayed a deplorable deficiency in his grasp of the basic principles governing motions,
specifically, the three-day notice rule and the requisite proof of service. Also, he showed his utter lack of
knowledge and understanding of our immigration laws.
 As an advocate of justice and a visible representation of the law, a judge is expected to keep abreast with and be
proficient in the application and interpretation of the law. When the law is sufficiently basic, as what is involved
in the present case, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; anything less than that would be gross
ignorance of the law.
 In Tugot v. Coliflores, we held that judicial competence demands that judges should be proficient in both
procedural and substantive aspects of the law. Anything less than this strict standard would subject them to
administrative sanction.
 It is imperative that judges be conversant with basic legal principles. The Code of Judicial Conduct, in fact,
enjoins judges to "be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence."
 Under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court on the Discipline of Justices and Judges, gross ignorance
of the law is classified as a serious charge punishable by either dismissal from the service, suspension from office
or a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
 We believe that an imposition of P30,000.00 fine upon respondent judge is in order.