Being and Participation The Method and S PDF
Being and Participation The Method and S PDF
Being and Participation The Method and S PDF
REGINA APOSTOLORUM
FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY
Volume II
Dissertatio ad Doctoratum
in Facultate Philosophiæ
Pontificii Athenaei Regina Apostolorum
Rome 2012
Vidimus et adprobavimus ad normam statutorum
Pontificii Athenæi Regina Apostolorum
Imprimi potest
Being and Participation: The Method and Structure of Metaphysical Reflection according to Cornelio
Fabro – Tesi dottorato. Filosofia 14 – 2 volumi.
Roma : Ateneo Pontificio Regina Apostolorum, 2012. I vol. 432 pp.; II vol. 416 pp.; 17x24 cm.
In testa al front.: Ateneo Pontificio Regina Apostolorum.
ISBN: 978-88-96990-09-4
Finito di stampare nel mese di dicembre 2012 dalla Tipografia Città Nuova della P.A.M.O.M.- Roma
TABLE OF CONTENTS
VOLUME II
435
3.6 Conference on the originality and emergence of esse (1991) ............................... 660
4. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 662
436
Chapter Four
THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
1
See C. FABRO, PC, 9.
2
Fabro characterizes the studies of NMP and PC as follows: “Also for this
study on the metaphysical foundation of causality, as in the preceding one on the
metaphysical structure of the creature, one is immediately struck by the impression
of the profound simplicity and coherence that an assiduous, direct and critically
ordered reading of St. Thomas’s work presents” (PC, 41).
3
See C. FABRO, “The Intensive Hermeneutics of Thomistic Philosophy…”,
450-451 n. 3: “The complex and difficult notion of dynamic participation is the
subject matter of my second volume devoted to the study of Thomistic
participation […] [It] contains the results of twenty years of research”. See H.
JOHN, The Thomist Spectrum, 97: “In this massive volume, the principles of
Partecipazione, which emphasize ‘static’ or structural participation, are extended
to consideration of the problems of causality, seen as ‘dynamic participation.’
Similarly, where Partecipazione explored St. Thomas’ relation to his immediate
sources, the Mercier lectures offer a confrontation of the Thomistic doctrine of
being with the whole history of Western philosophy, from the Pre-Socratics to
Heidegger”.
4
C. FABRO, Participation et causalité selon s. Thomas D’Aquin, Éditions
Nauwelaerts, Paris-Louvain 1961; Partecipazione e Causalità secondo S. Tommaso
d’Aquino, Società Editrice Internazionale, Torino 1960. Fabro notes that the Italian
version contains further developments in the text and notes and some slight
modifications in the arrangement of the material (See PC 10). I will be quoting
from the Italian version. Several sections of the work were published before 1960:
“Actualité et originalité de l’esse thomiste” (1956); “Per una semantica originaria
437
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
439
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
6
See H. JOHN, “Participation Revisited”, The Modern Schoolman 39 (1962),
159.
440
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
7
See De ente et essentia, ch. 3: “Talis autem invenitur habitudo materiae et
formae, quia forma dat esse materiae”; In V Metaph., lect. 2: “Et similiter materia
et forma: nam forma dat esse, materia autem recipit”.
8
See I, q. 75, a. 5 ad 3: “Forma est causa essendi materiae, et agens, unde
agens, inquantum reducit materiam in actum formae transmutando, est ei causa
essendi”; In II Phys., lect. 10: “Sed quia forma est causa essendi absolute, aliae
vero tres sunt causae essendi secundum quod aliquid accipit esse; inde est quod in
immobilibus non considerantur aliae tres causae, sed solum causa formalis”; De
anima, a. 14 ad 8: “Ad octavum dicendum quod anima dicitur forma corporis in
quantum est causa vitae, sicut forma est principium essendi: vivere enim viventibus
est esse, ut dicit philosophus in II de anima”; In I Phys., lect. 15: “Et ideo dicit
quod de principio formali, utrum sit unum vel plura, et quot et quae sint, pertinet
determinare ad philosophiam primam, et usque ad illud tempus reservetur: quia
forma est principium essendi, et ens inquantum huiusmodi est subiectum primae
philosophiae; sed materia et privatio sunt principia entis transmutabilis, quod a
philosopho naturali consideratur”; In Boethii de Hebdomadibus, lect. 2: “Circa
primum considerandum est, quod ex quo id quod est, potest aliquid habere praeter
suam essentiam, necesse est quod in eo consideretur duplex esse. Quia enim forma
est principium essendi, necesse est quod secundum quamlibet formam habitam,
habens aliqualiter esse dicatur”.
441
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
created ens: the created essence. The question arises: “Does Fabro’s
emphasis on the method of reducing of participated esse to Esse per
essentiam leave aside the problem of essence or imply two separate lines of
transcendental participation in a ‘double creation’ of essence and esse?”9
Insight into this problem is found at the beginning of Part Three (PC, 469-
483: not included in the French version), the concluding paragraphs of the
second section of Part Three (PC, 592-600) and in the Conclusion to the
work (PC, 629-651).
5. Metaphysical reflection and the analogy of being: In the sections
dedicated to analogy, Fabro argues that analogy is founded on participation
and is the “semantics of participation” and the “conclusive moment of
metaphysics”. Fabro holds that, for St. Thomas, the doctrine of analogy
expresses, “by means of a threefold dialectical process […], the movement
proper to our intellect in its ascension to God”10. In this section we will limit
our study to: 1) the role of analogy in the method of metaphysics as a
reductio ad unum and 2) the passage from finite to infinite being by means
of analogical discourse.
Graphically, the general structure of the metaphysical reflection
provided in PC may be represented as follows:
9
In his Nature and Creature, in the section on “The double metaphysical
reduction” (p. 185) and in the section on “Being is consequent upon form” (p. 334),
Aertsen sees the term “double creation” as problematic. A critique of Fabro’s use
of the term “double creation” is found throughout R. te Velde’s Participation &
substantiality in Thomas Aquinas.
10
C. FABRO, L’uomo e il rischio di Dio, 159. The threefold dialectical
process to which Fabro refers is St. Thomas’s via causalitatis, via remotionis and
via eminentiae.
442
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
Problem of causality
- Predicamental causality (PC, 323-355)11
- Form limits esse
Metaphysical - Esse actuates form
Reflection - Transcendental causality (PC, 355-379)12
- Creation
- Conservation
- Divine Motion
11
The division between predicamental and transcendental causality is clearer
in the French version. Participation et causalitè, “La causalitè prédicamentale
univoque”, 344-362, corresponds to Partecipazione e causalità, 323-355.
12
Participation et causalitè, “La causalité transcendantale”, 363-409,
corresponds to Partecipazione e causalità, 355-380.
13
The introduction to PC was originally published in French in 1956:
“Actualité et originalité de l’esse thomiste”, Revue Thomiste 3 (1956), 240-270 and
480-510.
443
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
14
See F. M. SLADECZEK, “Die verschiedene Bedeutungen des Seins nach des
hl. Thomas von Aquin”, Scholastik 5 (1930), 192-209 and 523-550.
15
Fabro used Sladeczek’s terminology in NMP (p. 187) to refer to the first
two stages of the development of the notion of being (ens-esse) and that these two
stages are surpassed in the third stage. According to NMP, one achieves this third
stage in the notion of esse by means of intensive metaphysical abstraction-
reflection.
16
C. FABRO, PC, 45.
17
See K. RAHNER, Geist in Welt. Zur Metaphysik der endlichen Erkenntnis
bei Thomas von Aquin, Rauch, Innsbruck-Leipsig 1939.
18
See In Boethii De Trinitate, q. 5, a. 3.
444
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
The real problem, as Fabro points out, concerns this act of being. Fabro
argues that Rahner comes only to esse in actu, and does not come to esse as
actus essendi. What is more, Rahner’s esse in actu is presented by means of
a type of abstraction and as a pre-notion (Vorgriff)21. Once again, according
to Fabro, we are faced with a reduction of esse to esse in actu:
19
See C. FABRO, PC, 46.
20
C. FABRO, PC, 46-47.
21
C. FABRO, PC, 47: “Rahner affirms that every judgment refers either
directly or indirectly to real being, or more precisely to effectual being, to ens.
Thus, instead of coming to the fundamental act, he falls back on the factual
synthesis which is ens and passes over esse. In this perspective, esse is presented
by means of an abstraction, in a type of ‘pre-notion’ (Vorgriff), which constitutes a
type of transcendental possibility of judgment in which ‘form’ is presented as the
content of the predicate of the proposition. The pre-notion concerning esse should
be grasped just as the pre-notion of concerning the ‘form’ is shown in se negatively
indeterminate. The form, which is the content of the predicate of the proposition, is
445
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
shown to be opposed to the to the concrete, like that to which judgment is related
as in se most broad, universal, since it is predicable of many possible concretes.
Thus also with esse: ‘The esse in se as esse is left to be predicated by many
singulars’. There is no doubt that esse is here to indicate the reality of the concrete
existents: it is esse in actu, the in se as real synthesis in act of the multiplicity of the
formal determinations”.
22
C. FABRO, PC, 47.
23
C. FABRO, PC, 48: “Here he develops, it seems to me, the passage to esse
as super-categorial unity in the sense of profound unity of all realty and as the
foundation from which all its possible determinations derive: in fact, thanks to esse
as “effectuality” (Wirklichsein), in the current sense, are all the essential
determinations real; for this reason, in all judgments one is going to hit the same
esse and in all judgments is also made present a knowledge of esse itself. This esse
of Rahner is entitas in the Aristotelian sense, as the abstract of ens, which he, on
the other hand, continues to deal with as esse which is the actus essendi of St.
Thomas, bringing along an equivocation that has a long history in the interpretation
of Thomism”.
24
M.-D. ROLAND-GOSSELIN, Essai d’une étude critique de la connaissance,
Introduction et première, Bibliothèque Thomiste XVII, Paris 1932.
446
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
structure of the real with the method of resolution of act (from accidental
and substantial formal act to the entitative act of esse) and resolution-
foundation of participated esse on Esse per essentiam. Thomistic
metaphysics, then, does not seek to isolate ens from real content by means
of an abstraction, but rather to reduce it to its foundation:
25
C. FABRO, PC, 50.
26
A. MARC, L’idée de l’être chez Saint Thomas et dans la Scolastique
postérieure, Archives de Philosophie, Paris 1933.
27
See C. FABRO, PC, 52.
28
C. FABRO, NMP (1950), 20.
29
The second edition of NMP (1950) also included a critique of Geiger’s
theory of participation. See C. FABRO, NMP (1950), 26-29.
447
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
30
See C. FABRO, NMP, 27.
31
C. FABRO, PC, 52.
448
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
Fabro argues against Geiger that St. Thomas holds the exact opposite
of his thesis: participation par similitude does not prescind from ontological
composition. In fact, the similarity between esse per essentiam and ens per
participationem is based on the fact that the first is simple and the latter is a
composite. According to Fabro, this point is clear from the following text of
St. Thomas:
Conformity is the convenience in one form, […]. Hence in this way something
is conformed to God which is likened to him. For it belongs to things to be said
similar in two ways. Either from the fact that they participate in one form, as
two white things in whiteness, and thus in every similarity, it is necessary to be
composed from that in which it convenes with something similar, and from that
in which they differ from this, as similitude is not unless there is a difference,
according to Boethius (uncertain reference). Hence to God nothing can be
similar or convenient or conformed, as found frequently in the sayings of the
philosophers. Or from the fact that one which participatively has the form
imitates that which essentially has it. As if the white body is said to be similar
to separated whiteness or the fiery mixed body to fire itself. And such
similiarity which places composition in one and simplicity in the other can be
of the creature to God, which are participants in goodness, wisdom and so on,
which in God is his essence32.
Fabro holds that in light of this text and others it is clear that his division of
participation into predicamental and transcendental is the primary one and
that it is foundational with respect to the “reality” of similarity. The essence
of metaphysical participation, he points out, always involves two things:
“the causal dependence of the participant on the participated (dynamic
participation) and composition of the participant with respect to the
participated (static participation) which is such per essentiam and therefore
32
In I Sent., d. 48, q. 1, a. 1: “Conformitas est convenientia in forma una,
[...]. Unde hoc modo aliquid Deo conformatur quod sibi assimilatur. Contingit
autem aliqua dici similia dupliciter. Vel ex eo quod participant unam formam, sicut
duo albi albedinem; et sic omne simile oportet esse compositum ex eo in quo
convenit cum alio simili, et ex eo in quo differt ab ipso, cum similitudo non sit nisi
differentium, secundum Boetium. Unde sic Deo nihil potest esse simile nec
conveniens nec conforme, ut frequenter a philosophis dictum invenitur. Vel ex eo
quod unum quod participative habet formam, imitatur illud quod essentialiter
habet. Sicut si corpus album diceretur simile albedini separatae, vel corpus mixtum
igneitate ipsi igni. Et talis similitudo quae ponit compositionem in uno et
simplicitatem in alio, potest esse creaturae ad Deum participantis bonitatem vel
sapientiam vel aliquid hujusmodi, quorum unumquodque in Deo est essentia”.
449
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
33
C. FABRO, PC, 56-57.
34
In I Sent., d. 8, q. 4, a. 1, contra praetera; Summa contra Gentiles, II, ch.
15; Ibid., III, ch. 65, adhuc; and Compendium Theologiae, I, 68.
35
C. FABRO, PC, 59. See I, q. 61, a. 1: Whether angels have a cause of their
esse: “It must be affirmed that angels and all that is, except God, were made by
God. God alone is His own esse; while in everything else the essence differs from
the esse, as was shown above (I, q. 3, a. 4). From this it is clear that God alone is
ens by his own essence: while all other things are entia by participation. Now
whatever is by participation is caused by what is essentially; as everything ignited
is caused by fire. Consequently the angels, of necessity, were made by God”.
36
See C. FABRO, PC, 60: “The dissociation of participation as causality
(causal dependence) from participation as composition (first of all, of essence and
esse) is opposed to the Thomistic position”.
37
C. FABRO, PC, 61.
450
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
38
C. FABRO, PC, 60.
39
See C. FABRO, PC, 62: “Esse as act of all acts, which constitutes the
ultimate objectual plane, is certainly not extraneous to either the perceptive plane
or the formal one of judgment; in a diverse way, moreover, it is their real
foundation and the ultimate metaphysical notion. But this esse cannot have a
proper and direct correspondence in either the perceptive sphere or in the formal
one and consequently not in the logical sphere of the operations of knowing: rather,
the inverse occurs; it is the point of convergence, of arrival and of foundation of all
other aspects of being in its ‘relationing’ to reality; only in this way is the
composition of essence and esse placed at the center of Thomistic metaphysics. It
is for this reason that St. Thomas continually isolates it more and more in its
absolute quality of ‘separated act’ per essentiam: this is also the reason why esse
receives the essential and distinctive qualification of first and ultimate ‘act’ such
that it is the only act that can and should exist ‘separated’ and is God himself,
obtaining thus an incomparable metaphysical position. Creatures are insofar as they
have participated esse, which is the profound act and quieting act which is
inaccessible directly both in the perceptive sphere and the formal one: it is proper
to metaphysical consideration and is exclusive to Thomistic metaphysics as we
have mentioned and for the reasons which the following study, as I hope, will
better clarify. That which is important, above all, in this introduction, was to make
every effort to dissipate as far as possible any occasion for equivocation”.
451
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
Between the first notion of ens at the dawn of knowing, and the technical one
of esse of metaphysical resolutio, there is at least a double passage: above all
from the initial confused notion of ens in general, to the methodological notion
of ens as “id quod est, quod habet esse”. Aristotle stops here, while St. Thomas
proceeds to the determination of esse as the ultimate transcendental act, which
is the proper and immediate object of divine causality41.
Once again, Fabro stresses that the method of metaphysics is resolution and
not intuition, abstraction or demonstration. Esse ut actus is apprehended
through a process a “resolution” or “foundation” whereby esse “emerges”
over all other acts (accidental act and formal act) and “emerges” in our
consciousness:
40
C. FABRO, PC, 62.
41
C. FABRO, PC, 65.
42
C. FABRO, PC, 66.
452
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
43
See C. FABRO, PC, 66: “From the synthesis implicated in the concept of
ens, two meanings of esse come forth, one as essence and formal act and the other
as actus essendi and both are most universal: in the experience of ens ut ens, there
is the immediacy of some nature in act which has esse”.
44
C. FABRO, PC, 215.
453
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
45
See C. FABRO, PC, 221-222.
46
For a critique of this point, see R. MCINERNY, “Esse ut Actus Intensivus in
the writings of Cornelio Fabro”, Proceedings of The American Catholic
Philosophical Association 38 (1964), 137-142. With regard to the determination of
ens, McInerny writes: “It is surely difficult to get hold of the exact nature of the
coincidence or identity of starting-point and point of arrival Fabro insists on”.
“Fabro tends to identify the two senses of ens commune that Aquinas is at some
454
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
pains to keep separate or, if he does not identify the two senses, Fabro suggests
some kind of identity of reference as in the quoted remark on the coincidence of
starting-point and term of metaphysical reflection. […] Fabro seems to want to
make esse commune, ens sine adiecto, the most intensive”. Secondly, McInerny
doesn’t agree with Fabro’s interpretation of the relationship between vivere and
esse in living beings. In accord with St. Thomas, Fabro interprets such perfections
as acts which follow per se from or on the form. Thirdly, “Fabro badly describes
what he is doing. In his appeal to Plato for an identification of the ‘movement’ of
thought and the ‘movement’ of being he suggests that what is first in reality must
be first in our discursive thought. The movement of metaphysics is such that it goes
from esse to esse and ends by identifying the logical and real hierarchies”.
McInerny concludes: “My central misgiving about his treatment of esse ut actus
intensivus is that, rather than retaining the proper mode of human understanding,
which is multiple, complex, analytic, discursive, as the backdrop against which
dialectical efforts to surmount these limitations can be not only corrected but,
indeed, understood, he has reduced metaphysics to a dialectic of limits”.
47
C. FABRO, PC, 221-222. Fabro holds that St. Thomas reaches the notion of
intensive esse through a confluence of Platonism and Aristotelianism: Platonic
separatism can be directed to intensive esse, which is the unique, separated,
subsisting form and constitutes the essence and definition of God; the Aristotelian
immanentism of act in the potency (for example, the soul in the body) permits the
notion of esse as participated act and, secondly, the absolute emergence of Pure
Act which is the incommunicable quality of Esse per essentiam.
455
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
twofold act: actus formalis and actus essendi48. Both acts entail an
ascending dialectic of esse. With regard to formal act: “The actus formalis
presents the ascendant movement of magis et minus in the scale of
predicamental perfection that brings us to the peak of the Summit, of the
Optimum, of the Perfect…, which is Esse (Platonic dialectic)”49. With
regard to actus essendi:
Dionysius says that, although esse itself is more perfect than life itself, and life
itself than wisdom itself, if they are considered as distinguished secundum
rationem; nevertheless, a vivens is more perfect than ens as such, because a
vivens is also an ens and a sapiens is both an ens and a living being. Although
therefore ens in se does not include vivens and sapiens, because that which
participates in esse need not participate in every mode of being; nevertheless
God’s esse includes in itself life and wisdom, because nothing of the perfection
of being can be wanting to him who is Subsisting Being Itself55.
recipiat, quia rem albam dicimus albam, sed albedinem dicimus albedinem. Non
enim quod est in causato, oportet esse in causa eodem modo, sed eminentiori; et sic
exponit dionysius, sic dicens: vivere si quis dicat vitam, aut illuminari lumen, non
recte secundum meam rationem dicit; sed secundum alium modum ista dicuntur:
quia abundanter et substantialiter ea quae sunt causatorum, prius insunt causis; et
dicit causam vitam vel lumen; causatum, vivens vel illuminatum”.
53
C. FABRO, PC, 223. These are the themes he will expound in Part Two of
PC on predicamental and transcendental causality.
54
See C. FABRO, PC, 225.
55
I, q. 4, a. 2 ad 3: “Sicut in eodem capite idem Dionysius dicit, licet ipsum
esse sit perfectius quam vita, et ipsa vita quam ipsa sapientia, si considerentur
secundum quod distinguuntur ratione, tamen vivens est perfectius quam ens
tantum, quia vivens etiam est ens; et sapiens est ens et vivens. Licet igitur ens non
457
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
The mode of signification of the names we give things is consequent upon our
mode of understanding: for names signify the concepts of our intellect […].
Now our intellect understands being according to the mode in which it finds it
in things here below from which it gathers its knowledge, and wherein being is
not subsistent but inherent. Now our reason tells us that there is a self-
subsistent being: wherefore although the term being has a signification by way
of concretion, yet our intellect in ascribing being to God soars above the mode
includat in se vivens et sapiens, quia non oportet quod illud quod participat esse,
participet ipsum secundum omnem modum essendi, tamen ipsum esse Dei includit
in se vitam et sapientiam; quia nulla de perfectionibus essendi potest deesse ei
quod est ipsum esse subsistens”.
56
See I-II, q. 2, a. 5 ad 2: “Esse simpliciter acceptum, secundum quod
includit in se omnem perfectionem essendi, praeeminet vitae et omnibus
subsequentibus, sic enim ipsum esse praehabet in se omnia subsequentia. Et hoc
modo Dionysius loquitur. Sed si consideretur ipsum esse prout participatur in hac
re vel in illa, quae non capiunt totam perfectionem essendi, sed habent esse
imperfectum, sicut est esse cuiuslibet creaturae; sic manifestum est quod ipsum
esse cum perfectione superaddita est eminentius. Unde et Dionysius ibidem dicit
quod viventia sunt meliora existentibus, et intelligentia viventi bus”.
57
See In II Sent., d. 16, q. 1, a. 2.
458
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
of its signification, and ascribes to God the thing signified, but not the mode of
signification58.
58
De Potentia, q. 7, a. 2 ad 7: “Modus significandi in dictionibus quae a
nobis rebus imponuntur sequitur modum intelligendi; dictiones enim significant
intellectuum conceptiones, [...]. Intellectus autem noster hoc modo intelligit esse
quo modo invenitur in rebus inferioribus a quibus scientiam capit, in quibus esse
non est subsistens, sed inhaerens. Ratio autem invenit quod aliquod esse subsistens
sit: et ideo licet hoc quod dicunt esse, significetur per modum concretionis, tamen
intellectus attribuens esse Deo transcendit modum significandi, attribuens Deo id
quod significatur, non autem modum significandi”.
59
De Potentia, q. 6, a. 6 ad 5: “Secundum Philosophum, etiam in causis
formalibus prius et posterius invenitur; unde nihil prohibet unam formam per
alterius formae participationem formari; et sic ipse Deus, qui est esse tantum, est
quodammodo species omnium formarum subsistentium quae esse participant et
non sunt suum esse”. See C. FABRO, PC, 227-228.
60
See C. FABRO, PC, 229: “This ‘pure intensive’ which Plato called the
separated Good and Aristotle the separated Intellect, for St. Thomas (as also and in
its own way, for Hegel) is ipsum esse subsistens. If, in fact, one sees that ens per
participationem exist, there should exist Esse ipsum (Sein selbst), as its
transcendent and immanent principle”.
459
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
61
See C. FABRO, PC, 229.
62
C. FABRO, PC, 231-232.
460
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
In his explanation of the second couplet, Fabro alludes to the way in which
the knowledge of one member enlightens the other. Our knowledge of the
existence and essence of God as Esse per essentiam constitutes the ultimate
term of knowledge and pertains to mediated knowledge, i.e., knowledge that
is obtained by demonstration per aliud. This aliud is ens per
participationem, which is finite and is the proper object of our intellect64.
This, however, does not mean that the finite is immediately qualified
by the intellect as ens per participationem in the technical sense of the term.
The technical term pertains to an ultimate determination and is based on the
reflections of metaphysical analysis. Not all knowledge is demonstrative:
the existence of the “finite” is immediately given to consciousness through
the presence of the contents of experience. Ens refers to esse just as the
concrete refers to its act. Considered from the perspective of “content”, the
esse of ens is its essence; from the perspective of “act”, it is called
“existence” (at the empirical, phenomenological level) and “esse” (as
principle and first metaphysical act of realization). In the lengthy paragraph
that follows, Fabro points out that the metaphysical determination of ens per
participationem does not have an immediate, direct reference to experience,
and is obtained in metaphysical reflection, a process of “reduction” guided
by the principle of “separated perfection”:
63
See C. FABRO, PC, 232.
64
See C. FABRO, PC, 232. Fabro refers to In Librum De Causis, lect. 6.
461
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
“resolution” of the esse of ens that St. Thomas expressed by means of the
principle of “perfectio separata”65.
65
C. FABRO, PC, 233.
66
See C. FABRO, PC, 233.
67
C. FABRO, PC, 234.
68
C. FABRO, PC, 234.
69
See C. FABRO, PC, 234.
70
C. FABRO, PC, 234. In his footnote, Fabro affirms that this is the meaning
of Aristotle’s to. ti, h=n ei=nai.
462
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
Fabro holds that the esse mentioned in texts such as In Boethii De Trinitate,
q. 5, a. 3: “Secunda vero operatio respicit ipsum esse rei”, should be
interpreted in this way. For Fabro, this esse is not directly and properly esse
as the act of the essence, but rather, as the continuation of the text
highlights, the esse that corresponds to the affirmation or negation of
something in either the formal order (judgments of essence) or the real order
(judgments of existence):
The esse in question is that of the “synthesis”, the act of every synthesis: one
affirms that to every mental synthesis (logical truth) there should correspond,
directly or indirectly, a real synthesis, given that the truth and falsity (of
judgment) expresses the relation of conformity and non-conformity: “Now,
since the truth of the intellect results from its conformity with the thing, it is
clear that in this second operation the intellect cannot truthfully abstract what is
united in reality, because the abstraction would signify a separation with regard
to the very being of the thing. For example, if I abstract man from whiteness by
saying, ‘Man is not white,’ I signify that there is a separation in reality. So if in
reality man and whiteness are not separate, the intellect will be false”71.
Therefore, we are dealing with the fact that to the esse (or non-esse) of
(logical) attribution there should correspond an esse (or non-esse) of real
belonging which is esse in actu, whatever be the plane of being, substantial or
accidental, per se or per accidens: for this reason, one distinguishes a “veritas
intellectus”, i.e, a logical truth, and a “veritas rei” or ontological truth,
according to the entire sphere of being itself72.
71
In Boethii De Trinitate, q. 5, a. 3: “Et quia veritas intellectus est ex hoc
quod conformatur rei, patet quod secundum hanc secundam operationem intellectus
non potest vere abstrahere quod secundum rem coniunctum est, quia in abstrahendo
significaretur esse separatio secundum ipsum esse rei, sicut si abstraho hominem ab
albedine dicendo: homo non est albus, significo esse separationem in re. Unde si
secundum rem homo et albedo non sint separata, erit intellectus falsus”.
72
C. FABRO, PC, 235. Fabro points out a text in which St. Thomas clarifies
that the esse to which the nexus of a judgment is related can also not be real, but
merely a mental apprehension: “Secundum Avicennam, de eo quod nullo modo est,
non potest aliquid enuntiari: ad minus enim oportet quod illud de quo aliquid
enuntiatur, sit apprehensum; et ita habet aliquod esse ad minus in intellectu
apprehendente; et ita constat quod semper veritati respondet aliquod esse; nec
oportet quod semper respondeat sibi esse in re extra animam, cum ratio veritatis
compleatur in ratione animae” (In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1 ad 5). Fabro concludes
that this concerns a real formal esse, a real functional esse, to which one can refer
in order to found the synthesis of judgment.
463
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
This esse rei is a real, formal esse and indicates the nature of the thing and
its mode of being in a global way. Fabro argues that although St. Thomas
has the real distinction in mind when he wrote these texts, it is also true that
“the distinction between the first and second operation of the intellect and
the foundation of the predicative function of judgment in a realistic
conception, like the Aristotelian, does not presupposes the admission of the
real distinction, but can stop […] at the predicamental compositions of
matter and form, substance and accidents”73. From this one can conclude
that from the distinction of the two fundamental operations of the intellect,
esse does not emerge as intensive act: “Thus, the two respective methods,
abstractio and separatio, cannot give us at this level, that concept which
expresses the ultimate and supreme determination of act”74.
c) Esse ut actus. The ultimate determination of esse must free it from
the multiplicity of meanings of being-in-act and from the meaning of
synthesis of judgment: “The ultimate reference of this multiplicity of
meanings of this ‘being-in-act’ in Thomism, and therefore the ultimate
foundation of the truth of judgment, is esse understand as act”75. Fabro
notes that only a very mature metaphysical reflection is able to clarify and
distinguish this esse from the other meanings of esse. The ens which is
accessible to the human mind, in this life, is that of ens per participationem,
i.e., ens as synolon of essence and esse. Our “intellect passes from the initial
confused notion of ens to the comprehension (by means of abstraction) of
the essences, in order to return time and time again to a more precise
73
C. FABRO, PC, 237. See In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3: “Cum in re duo sint,
quidditas rei, et esse ejus, his duobus respondet duplex operatio intellectus. Una
quae dicitur a philosophis formatio, qua apprehendit quidditates rerum, quae etiam
dicitur indivisibilium intelligentia. Alia autem comprehendit esse rei, componendo
affirmationem, quia etiam esse rei ex materia et forma compositae, a qua
cognitionem accipit, consistit in quadam compositione formae ad materiam, vel
accidentis ad subjectum”. Fabro concludes that in the text, “the act of the synthesis
of judgment corresponds and, therefore, is founded on the esse which results from
the predicamental, Aristotelian compositions” (PC, 237).
74
C. FABRO, PC, 237.
75
C. FABRO, PC, 236. In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1: “Cum autem in re sit
quidditas ejus et suum esse, veritas fundatur in esse rei magis quam in quidditate,
sicut et nomen entis ab esse imponitur; et in ipsa operatione intellectus accipientis
esse rei sicut est per quamdam similationem ad ipsum, completur relatio
adaequationis, in qua consistit ratio veritatis. Unde dico, quod ipsum esse rei est
causa veritatis, secundum quod est in cognitione intellectus”.
464
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
The definitive distinction between ens per participationem and Esse per
essentiam requires metaphysical reflection, i.e., “bringing out” the esse
which is implicit in the first grasp of ens and clarifying the confused, initial
apprehension of ens in light of the “Diremtion” between ens per
participationem and esse per essentiam. Metaphysics, then, starts from ens
commune and eventually opens up to two members: the creature as ens per
participationem and God as esse per essentiam. The problem of causality is
clarified in light of intensive esse – esse in its intensive meaning of act of all
acts and perfection of all perfections – which constitutes the resolutive
meaning of ens in quantum est ens79.
76
C. FABRO, PC, 238.
77
C. FABRO, PC, 238, n. 2. See De Potentia, q. 7, a. 2 ad 7.
78
C. FABRO, PC, 238-239.
79
See C. FABRO, PC, 204. See also, PC, 213: “The originality of Thomistic
metaphysics has its fulcrum in this ‘passage to the limit of Aristotelian functional
being’ to esse subsistens, namely in this metaphysical promotion of Aristotelian
esse formale, which is not yet, to esse reale subsistens (God) who always is and
above all is and who gives being and existence to all the other beings. […] Thus,
465
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
* * *
Thomism begins where Aristotelianism ends, insofar as, thanks to the concept of
creation, it posits that the essence is not the ultimate founding [principle] but in its
turn, is founded on esse according to a double and radical originary ‘Diremtion’”.
80
Fabro holds that a true understanding of the real distinction between
essence and actus essendi is achieved most properly at the end of metaphysical
466
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
reflection, after a determination of God as Ipsum Esse Subsistens and the creature
as ens per participationem. Therefore, I use the term “distinction” without
qualifying it as “real” and the term esse without further qualification to indicate
this intermediate state in our understanding of the real distinction. Fabro argues
that many Christian philosophers, such as Boethius, spoke of a distinction between
forma and esse without clarifying it as a real distinction or determining esse as
actus essendi.
81
For a more detailed explanation, see J. AERTSEN, Nature and Creature.
467
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
82
See I, q. 46, a. 1 ad 6: “Aliter enim est intelligendum de agente particulari,
quod praesupponit aliquid, et causat alterum, et aliter de agente universali, quod
producit totum. Sicut agens particulare producit formam, et praesupponit materiam,
unde oportet quod formam inducat secundum proportionem ad debitam materiam.
Unde rationabiliter in ipso consideratur quod inducit formam in talem materiam et
non in aliam, ex differentia materiae ad materiam. Sed hoc non rationabiliter
consideratur in Deo, qui simul producit formam et materiam, sed consideratur
rationabiliter in eo, quod ipse producit materiam congruam formae et fini”.
83
See C. FABRO, PC, 326.
84
C. FABRO, PC, 328.
468
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
85
See C. FABRO, PC, 328-329.
86
See C. FABRO, PC, 331.
87
See C. FABRO, PC, 333.
88
See BOETHIUS, Quomodo Trinitas unus Deus, ch. 2, PL, 64, 1250b.
89
C. FABRO, PC, 335.
469
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
1) Form is the formal, and not efficient, principle of esse: In this sense,
“Forma dat esse” means that the form provides the formal,
constitutive act of the essence. This takes into consideration the clear
distinction between the agent as the effective principle of esse and
the form as the formal principle of esse: “Est autem duplex causa
essendi: scilicet forma per quam aliquid actu est, et agens quod facit
actu esse”90. As the formal principle of esse in material substances,
the form gives esse to matter.
2) There is a causal dependence of participated esse on form: In this
sense, “Forma dat esse” means that there is a true, intrinsic and
derivative relationship between the form and esse as actus essendi.
The esse of the thing depends on its efficient cause insofar as it
depends on the form of the thing made91. In this case, the form acts
as the “mediator” of esse: “God makes natural esse in us by creation;
not by any agent cause, but, rather, by means of some formal
cause”92. It is through the form that the substance relates to the first
principle and that matter and ens participate in esse: “by the form the
substance is made the proper recipient of being”93.
90
In Librum De Causis, lect. 26. See C. FABRO, PC, 341: Fabro calls this
text the most complete and mature formula.
91
See De Potentia, q. 5, a. 1: “Secundum hoc ergo esse rei factae dependet a
causa efficiente secundum quod dependet ab ipsa forma rei factae”.
92
De Veritate, q. 27, a. 1 ad 3.
93
Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 55: “Per formam enim substantia fit proprium
susceptivum eius quod est esse”.
94
See C. FABRO, PC, 344-345.
470
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
This section deals with two problems: first, the relationship between
predicamental causality and transcendental causality (4.1) and, second, the
derivation of created ens from God (4.2): the first problem corresponds to
Partecipazione e causalità, 355-396 (Participation et causalité, 363-374
and 468-488)99; the second problem is mentioned or dealt with in several
texts throughout PC.
fact, Fabro’s opening lines in the subsection contrast the causality proper to
the form with God’s causality. He notes that in Aquinas’s mature writings,
the causality of form is increasingly limited to its role in the formal
determination of the essence, while the efficient derivation of participated
esse is directly referred to and reserved to God100. On the transcendental
level, esse emerges as first and absolute act, while essence falls to potency;
form, however, may be called the “metaphysical intermediary”101 in the
communication of participated esse by Esse per Essentiam102. Once again,
form is considered in two ways: as the constitutive, essential act of ens and
as the receptive principle of participated esse. Fabro argues that although St.
Thomas’s texts establish a clear distinction between the meaning of the
principle “forma dat esse” in the order of formal causality and in that of
efficient causality, the two “causal planes” (predicamental and
transcendental) correspond to one another in an “open” fashion. On the one
hand, the predicamental agent is truly the integral, productive cause of its
effect; on the other, there are real acts and perfections in the production of
the effect (such as animality, life, intelligence, esse), which are participated
though the predicamental action of the individual in the effect, but which
transcend the individual both as subject and as agent. Two questions arise
here: “Up to what point and within what limits does the predicamental
100
Fabro argues that there is a development in St. Thomas doctrine of
causality: 1) from an Avicennian-based distinction between causa fiendi and causa
essendi; 2) to a more Aristotelian causality which attributes the integral (though
derived) causality of esse to form; 3) to “a clear distinction between the formal
causality of esse which is proper to substantial form, and the efficient causality [of
esse], which, by the participation of the form, is attributed to the generator, and, by
participation proper to esse, is reserved to God” (PC, 357).
101
To confirm his interpretation of form as “metaphysical intermediary”,
Fabro quotes St. Thomas’s De substantiis separatis, ch. 8: “Invenitur igitur in
substantia composita ex materia et forma duplex ordo: unus quidem ipsius materiae
ad formam; alius autem ipsius rei iam compositae ad esse participatum. Non enim
est esse rei neque forma eius neque materia ipsius, sed aliquid adveniens rei per
formam. Sic igitur in rebus ex materia et forma compositis, materia quidem
secundum se considerata, secundum modum suae essentiae habet esse in potentia,
et hoc ipsum est ei ex aliqua participatione primi entis; caret vero, secundum se
considerata, forma, per quam participat esse in actu secundum proprium modum”.
102
De substantiis separatis, ch. 8: “Modus autem uniuscuiusque substantiae
compositae ex materia et forma, est secundum formam, per quam pertinet ad
determinatam speciem. Sic igitur res composita ex materia et forma, per suam
formam fit participativa ipsius esse a Deo secundum quemdam proprium modum”.
472
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
action produce realities and universal perfections? In what way, above all, is
the influence of the transcendental cause continued and explicated in the
predicamental cause and in what way does the latter correspond to the
former?”103 Here, the problem is now focused on how the predicamental and
transcendental planes of causality communicate with one another.
In St. Thomas’s solution, the substantial form is determined as the
proximate cause of the production of the form that is generated. At the same
time: “The emergence of the superior formalities and transcendental
perfections reveals a more profound dependence which the immediate agent
has in the superior order with respect to a more universal Cause”104. The
proximate agent and its substantial form are the cause of the effect and of all
the formalities which pertain to the effect. The proximate agent, though, is
not the cause of each formality in the same way. This can be seen in the
example Fabro proposes of the causal relationship between Peter (father)
and Paul (son): 1) as an individual agent, Peter is the cause of the individual
humanity of Paul; 2) insofar as Peter pertains to and is linked to the system
of the universal causes of the cosmos, Peter is the cause of the other
predicamental formalities (animality, corporeity…) in Paul; 3) insofar as
Peter himself receives the causality of the vivere, intelligere, and esse per
essentiam, Peter is also the cause of the transcendental perfections in Paul.
With these distinctions in mind, Fabro summarizes his proposal concerning
the correspondence between dynamic causality and the structural
constitution of a being on both the predicamental and transcendental levels:
103
C. FABRO, PC, 358.
104
C. FABRO, PC, 359.
105
C. FABRO, PC, 358-359.
473
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
Predicamental level
Compositions
Causality
(real and formal-notional)
Accidental change Substance Accidents
Causality of :
and multiplicity Individual
the substantial
Substantial change Matter Form
form :
and multiplicity Genus Species
Transcendental level
Causality Composition
Total dependence of the creature on
: Essence (Form) Esse
the Creator in being and action
106
See C. FABRO, PC, 359.
474
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
107
C. FABRO, PC, 359. Here, Fabro recalls that the participation formula is
the “definitive formula” of the principle of causality. He refers back to his 1936
article.
108
See I, q. 44, a. 1 ad 1: “Ex hoc quod aliquid per participationem est ens,
sequitur quod sit causatum ab alio”.
109
See C. FABRO, PC, 360-361: “Two planes of causality, predicamental and
transcendental are clearly distinct, inasmuch as the first is proper to the created
agent, which causes form from form, the second is reserved to God who is the
unique principle-Creator from nothing”.
110
I, q. 44, a. 2: “Antiqui philosophi paulatim, et quasi pedetentim,
intraverunt in cognitionem veritatis. A principio enim, quasi grossiores existentes,
non existimabant esse entia nisi corpora sensibilia. Quorum qui ponebant in eis
motum, non considerabant motum nisi secundum aliqua accidentia, ut puta
secundum raritatem et densitatem, congregationem et segregationem. Et
supponentes ipsam substantiam corporum increatam, assignabant aliquas causas
475
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
Then others there were who arose to the consideration of ens in quantum ens,
and who assigned a cause to things, not as these (haec), or as such (talia), but
insofar as they are entia. Therefore whatever is the cause of things insofar as
they are beings, must be the cause of things, not only according as they are
such (talia) by accidental forms, nor according as they are these (haec) by
substantial forms, but also according to all that belongs to their esse in any
way. And thus it is necessary to say that also prime matter is created by the
universal cause of beings114.
114
I, q. 44, a. 2: “Et ulterius aliqui erexerunt se ad considerandum ens
inquantum est ens, et consideraverunt causam rerum, non solum secundum quod
sunt haec vel talia, sed secundum quod sunt entia. Hoc igitur quod est causa rerum
inquantum sunt entia, oportet esse causam rerum, non solum secundum quod sunt
talia per formas accidentales, nec secundum quod sunt haec per formas
substantiales, sed etiam secundum omne illud quod pertinet ad esse illorum
quocumque modo. Et sic oportet ponere etiam materiam primam creatam ab
universali causa entium”.
115
De substantiis separatis, ch. 10: “Quanto aliqua causa est superior, tanto
est universalior, et virtus eius ad plura se extendit. Sed id quod primum invenitur in
unoquoque ente, maxime commune est omnibus. Quaecumque enim
superadduntur, contrahunt id quod prius inveniunt. Nam quod posterius in re
intelligitur, comparatur ad prius ut actus ad potentiam. Per actum autem potentia
determinatur. Sic igitur oportet ut id quod primum subsistit in unoquoque, sit
effectus supremae virtutis: quanto autem aliquid est posterius, tanto reducatur ad
inferioris causae virtutem. Oportet igitur quod id quod primum subsistit in
unoquoque, sicut in corporibus materia et in immaterialibus substantiis quod
proportionale est, sit proprius effectus primae virtutis universalis agentis.
Impossibile est igitur quod ab aliquibus causis secundis aliqua producantur in esse
non praesupposito aliquo effectu superioris agentis. Et sic nullum agens post
primum totam rem in esse producit, quasi producens ens simpliciter per se, et non
per accidens, quod est creare”.
116
See C. FABRO, PC, 363.
477
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
which every other act, both substantial and accidental, is in act117. Esse, in
this case, means actus essendi, yet is considered in a very special way: as
esse commune. As we saw earlier in Chapter One, St. Thomas holds that the
esse of the creature may be considered in four ways118. The fourth consists
in considering esse in a common way (communiter). As such, “esse
commune indicates the first actuation, i.e., the placing in act, so to speak, of
creatures in the sense that the act of esse is expanded in creatures and in
essences which it actuates according to their respective natures and degrees
of perfection”119. Participation in esse is the proper term of creation by
virtue of which creatures are in act and brought forth from nothing. This is
alluded to in the formula of De Causis, lect. 17: “Esse est per creationem,
aliae perfectiones superadditae per informationem”. For example, even
though vivere is more perfect in the formal order than esse; in the concrete
ens, esse is the act of the essence and all its accidents and perfections, thus,
esse is the actuating and foundational act with respect to which any other
aspect of ens is in potency and called “potency”. When St. Thomas writes
“Deus est causa ipsius esse communis”120, this esse commune does not refer
to “an abstract formality, nor to one, unique act of being which is common
to all beings, but is the actualitas essendi which every being obtains by
means of their own esse which is participated by God”121.
Accordingly, esse commune relates to God in three ways: 1) All
existing beings depend on esse commune, yet God does not. Moreover, esse
commune depends on God. 2) All existing beings are “contained under” esse
commune, yet God is not. Rather, esse commune is contained under his
power. 3) All existing beings participate in that which is esse, God does not.
Rather, created esse is a quaedam participation of God and a likeness to
him122.
117
See C. FABRO, PC, 363.
118
In I Sent., d. 36, q. 1, a. 3 ad 2: “Dicendum quod esse creaturae potest
quadrupliciter considerari: primo modo, secundum quod est in propria natura;
secundo modo, prout est in cognitione nostra; tertio modo, prout est in Deo; quarto
modo communiter, prout abstrahit ab omnibus his”.
119
C. FABRO, PC, 364.
120
In V De Divinis Nominibus, lect. 2, n. 658.
121
C. FABRO, PC, 365.
122
In V De Divinis Nominibus, lect. 2, n. 660: “Dicit quod ipsum esse
commune est ex primo ente, quod est Deus, et ex hoc sequitur quod esse commune
aliter se habeat ad Deum quam alia existentia, quantum ad tria: primo quidem,
quantum ad hoc quod alia existentia dependent ab esse communi, non autem Deus,
sed magis esse commune dependet a Deo; [...]. Secundo, quantum ad hoc quod
478
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
omnia existentia continentur sub ipso esse communi, non autem Deus, sed magis
esse commune continetur sub eius virtute, quia virtus divina plus extenditur quam
ipsum esse creatum; [...]. Tertio, quantum ad hoc quod omnia alia existentia
participant eo quod est esse, non autem Deus, sed magis ipsum esse creatum est
quaedam participatio Dei et similitudo ipsius”
123
In XIII De Divinis Nominibus, lect. 3, n. 989: “Unumquodque enim
inquantum est finitum et terminatum, secundum hoc habet unitatem in actu. Sed
unum quod est Deus est ante omnem finem et terminum et opposita eorum et est
causa terminationis omnium et non solum existentium, sed etiam ipsius esse. Nam
ipsum esse creatum non est finitum si comparetur ad creaturas, quia ad omnia se
extendit; si tamen comparetur ad esse increatum, invenitur deficiens et ex
praecogitatione divinae mentis, propriae rationis determinationem habens”.
124
C. FABRO, PC, 366.
125
C. FABRO, PC, 367. Fabro quotes De Veritate, q. 27, a. 2 ad 3.
126
Summa contra Gentiles, II, ch. 21: “Causa igitur propria essendi est agens
primum et universale, quod Deus est. Alia vero agentia non sunt causa essendi
479
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
form confers the actuality of all the degrees of being to the composite,
including its own determination. Therefore, even esse as the act of the
concrete is not excluded from the range of predicamental, efficient causality.
For example, in the more mature Summa Theologiae we find a text which
shows the perfect parallelism between predicamental participation-causality
and transcendental participation-causality127:
simpliciter, sed causa essendi hoc, ut hominem vel album. Esse autem simpliciter
per creationem causatur, quae nihil praesupponit: quia non potest aliquid
praeexistere quod sit extra ens simpliciter. Per alias factiones fit hoc ens vel tale:
nam ex ente praeexistente fit hoc ens vel tale”.
127
In his footnote, Fabro writes that another excellent example of the
parallelism between predicamental and transcendental participation and
composition from the static or constitutive perspective of participation is found in
Quodlibet. II, q. 2, a. 1.
128
I, q. 45, a. 5 ad 1: “Aliquod perfectum participans aliquam naturam, facit
sibi simile, non quidem producendo absolute illam naturam, sed applicando eam ad
aliquid. Non enim hic homo potest esse causa naturae humanae absolute, quia sic
esset causa sui ipsius, sed est causa quod natura humana sit in hoc homine
generato. Et sic praesupponit in sua actione determinatam materiam per quam est
hic homo. Sed sicut hic homo participat humanam naturam, ita quodcumque ens
creatum participat, ut ita dixerim, naturam essendi, quia solus Deus est suum esse,
ut supra dictum est. Nullum igitur ens creatum potest producere aliquod ens
absolute, nisi inquantum esse causat in hoc, et sic oportet quod praeintelligatur id
per quod aliquid est hoc, actioni qua facit sibi simile”.
480
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
Over time, then, St. Thomas admits that there is an effective causality
exercised by the singular (individual) agent on the concrete singular’s
(individual’s) act of being.
This is confirmed by St. Thomas’s thought on the conservation of
things by God. Conservation does not imply a new action on behalf of God,
but is rather the simple continuation of the creative act129. As we have seen,
form exists by means of the participation of esse, participated esse exists
and subsists insofar as it is received in the participating form or essence.
Fabro sustains that in this Thomistic “dialectic” of being, one attributes to
God the total causality of esse yet also confers the effective causality of all
ontological degrees (including esse) to creatures or second causes130. This
created mediation of being is founded on the immanence of form as the
formal mediator of every act (both actus essendi and operari). Fabro
summarizes this nuance in the static and dynamic orders of the formal
causality of esse as follows:
In the static order, then, the principle “forma dat esse” is valid in the strong
sense, which St. Thomas clarifies in its most mature expression: “Esse per se
results (consequitur) from the form of a creature, given the influx of God; just
as light results (sequitur) from the diaphanum of the air, given the influx of the
sun”131. Therefore between esse, the pure act per essentiam, which is God, and
esse as the created act per participationem, which is proper to the creature,
there is the mediation of the form or essential act132.
In the dynamic order, similarly if God is the First Cause not only of creation
but also of conservation, secondarily, but in the proper sense, the created
causes can also conserve esse: “It happens also that an effect depends on a
creature as to its esse”. The order of this causality is still according to the
degree of universality of the same causes: “Therefore the first cause is the
principal cause of the preservation of the effect which is to be referred to the
middle causes in a secondary way; and all the more so, as the middle cause is
higher and nearer to the first cause”133.
129
See I, q. 104, a. 1 et ad 4.
130
See C. FABRO, PC, 370.
131
I, q. 104, a. 1 ad 1: “Esse per se consequitur formam creaturae, supposito
tamen influxu Dei, sicut lumen sequitur diaphanum aeris, supposito influxu solis”.
132
C. FABRO, PC, 371.
133
C. Fabro, PC, 371. See I, q. 104, a. 2: “Invenitur etiam quod ab aliqua
creatura dependet aliquis effectus secundum suum esse. [...] Et ideo principaliter
quidem prima causa est effectus conservativa; secundario vero omnes mediae
causae, et tanto magis quanto causa fuerit altior et primae causae proximior”.
481
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
134
See C. FABRO, PC, 372.
135
See C. FABRO, PC, 373.
136
See C. FABRO, PC, 373.
137
C. FABRO, PC, 374.
138
C. FABRO, PC, 375.
139
I, q. 77, a. 1 ad 3: “Compositum autem per formam substantialem habet
esse substantialiter; per virtutem autem quae consequitur formam substantialem,
operatur. Unde sic se habet forma accidentalis activa ad formam substantialem
agentis [...], sicut se habet potentia animae ad animam”.
482
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
In this way, the principle forma dat esse has come to its ultimate metaphysical
explanation; in the transcendental order it is God alone as “Esse subsistens”
who gives esse and the creature is only receptive potency. But in the
predicamental order it is the form as limiting principle of the transcendental act
of esse that specifies it and pulls it into its orbit of contingency or necessity,
death or immortality. Thus, if in the first (transcendental) instance God alone is
the immediate principle of esse, in the second (predicamental) instance the
creature as well is called to participate in the causality of esse, both in the
sphere of formal causality as well as in efficient causality. This is what the
“created mediation” in the causality of esse consists in; this is the original
moment of Thomistic metaphysics: “God created all things immediately, but in
the creation itself he established an order among things, so that some depend
on others, by which they are secondarily preserved in being, though he remains
the principal [cause] of their conservation”143.
140
I, q. 77, a. 1 ad 4: “Forma accidentalis est actionis principium, habet a
forma substantiali. Et ideo forma substantialis est primum actionis principium, sed
non proximum”.
141
C. FABRO, PC, 377.
142
C. FABRO, PC, 378.
143
C. FABRO, PC, 393. See I. q. 104, a. 2 ad 1: “Deus immediate omnia
creavit, sed in ipsa rerum creatione ordinem in rebus instituit, ut quaedam ab aliis
dependerent, per quas secundario conservarentur in esse; praesupposita tamen
principali conservatione, quae est ab ipso”.
483
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
* * *
144
C. FABRO, PC, 394. Fabro continues: “We conclude then, by saying that
the proper terminus of predicamental causality in the processes of generation and
corruption is the form which is the first act of the corporeal essence; but we should
add that the inadequate and connoted terminus, and still specifying as ultimate act
of becoming itself, is esse. Every thing becomes in order to be able to be, and the
new being of a thing presupposes that the cause which produced it was in esse:
“Non esse non habet causam per se, quia nihil potest esse causa nisi inquantum est
ens; ens autem, per se loquendo, est causa essendi’ (I, q. 104, a. 3 ad 1). The esse
of the things subject to generation and corruption enters into the order of
predicamental reality as form and essence which bear it and of which it is act”.
484
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
145
Among those who interpret Fabro’s metaphysics of creation as implying a
“double creation” and “double participation” of essence and esse, we find J.
AERTSEN, Nature and Creature, 185 and R. TE VELDE, Participation and
Substantiality, 88-89, 146-147 and 218-225. Recently, G. Doolan has argued that
Fabro’s metaphysics holds that there is only one line of participation and that the
causal relationship between the divine ideas and the created essence should not be
called a “participation” (G. DOOLAN, Aquinas on Divine Ideas as Exemplar
Causes, 191-244).
485
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
146
In the French version, the section forms the latter part of a section entitled
“The transposition of Platonic causality” (Participation et causalité, 426-451) in
the Third Part of PC dedicated to the “Immanence of Causality”.
147
C. FABRO, PC, 259.
148
C. FABRO, PC, 259.
149
See De Veritate, q. 3, a. 2: “1) Deus per intellectum omnia operans,
omnia ad similitudinem essentiae suae producit [...]. 2) Res autem creatae non
perfecte imitantur divinam essentiam; unde essentia non accipitur absolute ab
intellectu divino ut idea rerum, sed cum proportione creaturae fiendae ad ipsam
divinam essentiam, secundum quod deficit ab ea, vel imitatur ipsam. 3) Diversae
autem res diversimode ipsam imitantur; et unaquaeque secundum proprium modum
suum, cum unicuique sit esse distinctum ab altera; et ideo ipsa divina essentia,
cointellectis diversis proportionibus rerum ad eam, est idea uniuscuiusque rei.
Unde, cum sint diversae rerum proportiones, necesse est plures esse ideas; et est
quidem una omnium ex parte essentiae; sed pluralitas invenitur ex parte diversarum
proportionum creaturarum ad ipsam”. The italics and the numbering are Fabro’s.
150
See In II Sent., d. 18, q. 2, a. 2: “Sed in divinis actio sequitur intellectum;
et ideo secundum quod diversa ab uno possunt intelligi, ita diversi effectus ab uno
immediate procedere possunt; et secundum hoc multitudo a Deo processit, prout se
intellexit ut ideam plurium, idest ut participabilem diversimoda imitatione”.
486
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
creative act in which God creates (produces) his creatures according to the
model of the divine exemplar ideas. Hence, the emphasis falls not on the
essence, the potency-principle, but rather on the production of the act-
principle, actus essendi.
In summary, Fabro’s text on the production of the principles of finite
ens refers to the divine exemplars as the “archetypes” of the substances and
essences of spiritual and material beings. Secondly, the divine essence is
said to be the principle of the infinite plurality of divine ideas. Thirdly, the
foundation of the multiplicity and diversity of creatures is found in the fact
that since there are different proportions to the divine essence in created
things, there must necessarily be a plurality of divine exemplars. Fourthly,
as an absolutely intelligent and spiritual being, God is absolutely free in his
choice to create those beings he understands as participabilities of the
perfection of his Divine Nature. Lastly, we see that in this text Fabro does
not affirm a direct line of participation between the created essence and the
divine exemplars. Further on, Fabro highlights the two roles of form and
esse as constitutive principles of finite ens and how there is a line of
participation between esse and the divine essence: “But in the transcendental
order, the form is not esse, which is actus essendi and which proceeds by
participation from God”151. Once again, no mention is made of a separate or
distinct participation between the created essence and the divine ideas.
151
C. FABRO, PC, 335.
152
Both subsections correspond to Participation et causalité, 468-488.
153
C. FABRO, PC, 379.
487
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
154
De Potentia, q. 3, a. 5 ad 2: “Ex hoc ipso quod quidditati esse attribuitur,
non solum esse, sed ipsa quidditas creari dicitur: quia antequam esse habeat, nihil
est, nisi forte in intellectu creantis, ubi non est creatura, sed creatrix essentia”.
155
See J. AERTSEN, Nature and Creature, 185 and R. TE VELDE,
Participation and Substantiality, 88-89, 146-147, 218-225: “The consequence of
Fabro’s view is a fatal separation between the categorical causality of form and the
transcendental causality with respect to being as such. If the many forms are
somehow presupposed as the diversifying recipients of the flow of being, then it
will be no long intelligible that the forms and essences of thing proceed from the
same source as their very being. If the forms of things are thought to be prior to the
common influx of being, then they must be reduced to God separately from the
common effect of being. This ‘double’ creation is exactly what Fabro proposes: he
argues that each creature in respect of its form and essence must have a ‘dérivation
propre’ in God. If the act of being is beyond the causal range of form and therefore
the exclusive effect of creation, the formal limitation which the form imposes on
being needs to be explained by a distinct derivation in God. Fabro’s strong
emphasis on the ‘real’ distinction as well as his view that form only compares to
being as limiting potency ultimately leaves the unity of God’s act of creation
unexplained” (222). “Both Fabro and Gilson stress this negative character of form
in relation to the act of being. Form, says Fabro, is the act of essence and as such
488
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
use of the term “double creation” and “distinct creation” in the French
edition of Partecipazione and Causalità156. I note, however, that in the
Italian version – which Fabro writes is more up-to-date than the French
version157 – the phrase “double creation” was replaced with “double
participation”, while the phrase “distinct creation” was left in the Italian
version.
That Fabro refers to a type of “concreation” when he uses the term
“distinct creation” can be gathered from the lines that follow in which he
says that this distinction between essence and esse in the transcendental
order has its reflection in the predicamental order. Form, in its origin, is
concreated with matter, while in the natural process of fieri, it is educed
from the potentiality of matter158. Fabro then refers to the role of the divine
exemplars as causal principles in the initial foundation of the essences,
noting that St. Thomas places the origin of all forms in God and that the
divine exemplars as causal principles are used to explain the causal terminus
of the divine action in the initial foundation of the essences159.
Later on, Fabro picks up the thread of this reflection on essence and
esse when he specifies that the fundamental character of causality is not
simply “having esse from another”, which only implies a procession from a
The resolutio of the first real, composition of the creature, and the first
foundation, then, of the first “Diremtion”, is made in the first notional duality
that our intellect makes of the divine fullness insofar as in it we consider the
content of the essence, which is the simple totality of all perfections, and its
form or act which is most actual esse: “For in God one should consider his
nature and his esse; and as his nature is the cause and exemplar of all natures,
so also his esse is the cause and exemplar of all esse. Hence knowing his
160
Fabro uses the example of the processions in the Trinity and quotes De
Potentia, q. 3, a. 13 ad 4: “Illud quod habet esse ab alio, in se consideratum, est
non ens, si ipsum sit aliud quam ipsum esse quod ab alio accipit; si autem sit ipsum
esse quod ab alio accipit, sic non potest in se consideratum, esse non ens; non enim
potest in esse considerari non ens, licet in eo quod est aliud quam esse, considerari
possit. Quod enim est, potest aliquid habere permixtum; non autem ipsum esse, ut
boetius dicit in libro de hebdomadibus. Prima quidem conditio est creaturae, sed
secunda est conditio filii Dei”.
161
See C. FABRO, PC, 385.
162
De Potentia, q. 3, a. 16 ad 12: “Creaturae vero non perfecte imitantur
suum exemplar. Unde diversimode possunt ipsu m imitari, et sic esse diversa
exemplata.”.
490
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
essence, he knows all things; so also knowing his esse he knows the esse of
each thing”163.
The problem of the production of the creature’s essence and esse, Fabro
notes, is considered at the supreme summit of metaphysical resolution, since
“the production of the creature is referred for its effective realization to an
absolutely free decree of the divine will within which the very creature is
present in the knowledge of God”164.
Further on, in Section Two of Part Three of PC deals with “the
problematic of participation”; the first subsection is entitled: “The semantics
of esse: from formal esse to actual esse” (PC 527-539) and hints the twofold
production of essence and actus essendi and how reflection on the essence
leads to esse as the source of all formal perfection in a finite ens and how
reflection on actus essendi deals with real participation of being in esse as
act of all acts.
Therefore, within this intensive esse – which is the proper object of creation –
occurs the Diremtion of the real, i.e., that which we have called the double
foundation (or twofold moment) of ens in esse: as essence (the formal
participation in esse, as fontal fullness of all perfections) and as actus essendi
(real participation of beings in esse, as act of all acts). Therefore, just as no
material or spiritual creature is, unless it is a participation of the perfection of
being, it can exist only insofar as it forms a composition with participated actus
essendi165.
163
C. FABRO, PC, 388. See In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3: “Etiam in ipso Deo est
considerare naturam ipsius, et esse eius; et sicut natura sua est causa et exemplar
omnis naturae, ita etiam esse suum est causa et exemplar omnis esse. Unde sicut
cognocendo essentiam suam, cognoscit omnem rem; ita cognoscendo esse suum
cognoscit esse cuiuslibet rei’”.
164
C. FABRO, PC, 89. See In I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 3: “Bonum habet rationem
causae finalis, esse autem rationem causae exemplaris et effectivae tantum in Deo”
165
C. FABRO, PC, 529.
166
See C. FABRO, PC, 531. In his footnote, Fabro explains his conception of
Grund should be taken to mean “foundation as act and not as mere reason and
much less as sufficient reason”.
491
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
one “beyond” (oltre) ens, but not “beyond” (al di là) esse; otherwise, this
foundation would be identified with nothing167.
* * *
167
C. FABRO, PC, 531.
168
For an analysis, summary and defense of Fabro’s work in light of R. te
Velde’s objection to “double creation” see G. DOOLAN, Aquinas on the Divine
Ideas as Exemplary Causes, 237-243.
492
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
shed light on the correspondence between participation and causality and the
use of analogy in metaphysical resolution. In the text, Fabro begins by
asking whether, in Thomistic metaphysics, primacy should be given to the
notion of esse or to the notion of participation. He answers that the
metaphysics of participation, in all its static and dynamic aspects, has its
foundation in the notion of intensive esse; yet “this same esse is articulated
as emergent act, in the various phases of this metaphysics, thanks to the
intensity and heuristic richness of the notion of participation”169. With this
premise, Fabro then precedes to the correspondence between the static-
constitutive order of ens and the dynamic-productive order of causality.
1) The static order of the constitution of ens. Fabro shows that static,
predicamental participation points towards transcendental participation –
almost as if to its metaphysical foundation. The predicamental participation
of matter-form and of substance-accidents presupposes the transcendental
composition of essence and esse170. Due to the transcendental composition
of essence and actus essendi in finite ens, there is an ontological difference
between esse and ens and a metaphysical difference between the creature
and the Creator. Essence is understood as the determination of being and
remains within the predicamental order according to genus and species. Ens,
insofar as it implies a reference to intensive, emergent esse is placed in the
transcendental order. While it is true that actus essendi, insofar as it is the
act of an essence, is finite, theoretical resolution brings the metaphysician to
the determination of the composition of finite ens and to esse ipsum as act
par excellence, as One, Simple, Infinite. With respect to this act, the
composition of essence and esse constitutes the originary Diremtion. “In
transcendental participation as composition, the totality which founds the
‘Diremtion’ of the participation is the fullness of perfection of esse as
intensive act with respect to which all other finite beings and all other
perfections – generic, specific and individual – are presented as
participations”171. Fabro concludes that: “The notional correspondence
between the various moments of the structure of the finite (participation,
composition, real dependence, analogy…) are always articulated and
sustained upon esse as intensive emergent act”172.
2) The dynamic order of the production of ens. There is a parallel
between transcendental causality and predicamental causality. Each has
169
C. FABRO, PC, 639.
170
See C. FABRO, PC, 642.
171
C. FABRO, PC, 640.
172
C. FABRO, PC, 642.
493
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
In Thomism, the situation cannot admit of dispute: the created essences are
derived from the divine essence, through the intermediary of the divine Ideas,
and therefore formally the derivation is according to the relation of
exemplarity. Every essence, then, although it is act in the formal order, is
created as potency that is actuated by participated esse which in se it receives:
its actuality is “mediated”, therefore, by esse175.
Esse is the act that constitutes the proper terminus of transcendental causality
(creation, conservation...) and it is in virtue of the direct causality of esse that
God operates immediately in every agent. Hence, the derivation of participated
esse from esse per essentiam is direct, along strictly metaphysical lines, as the
founded act from Founding Act: in fact, participated actus essendi, precisely
insofar as it is participated, is intrinsically dependent on God; but remains
always act and in act in the entire metaphysical line, once created and up to
when it will not be annihilated176.
Once again, I would argue that these texts confirm our reading of Fabro’s
texts and his proposal of a direct line of causal participation between created
173
See De Potentia, q. 3, a. 1 ad 17: “Deus simul dans esse, producit id quod
esse recipit: et sic non oportet quod agat ex aliquot praeexistenti”.
174
De Potentia, q. 3, a. 5 ad 2: “Quod ex hoc ipso quod quidditati esse
attribuitur, non solum esse, sed ipsa quidditas creari dicitur: quia antequam esse
habeat, nihil est, nisi forte in intellectu creantis, ubi non est creatura, sed creatrix
essentia”.
175
C. FABRO, PC, 643.
176
C. FABRO, PC, 643.
494
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
esse and the divine essence and a “mediated” line of causality according to a
relation of exemplarity and according to the divine ideas for the production
of the created essence. The participation proper to the created essence is that
of its participation in actus essendi.
* * *
177
In Chapter Six of this dissertation, I will look more in-depth at Fabro’s
proposal regarding transcendental causality and creation, taking into consideration
the critiques of Fabro’s proposal and additions made to it by other Thomists.
178
Fabro’s theory of analogy has been dealt with several times by other
Thomists: B. MONTAGNES, La Doctrine de l’analogie de l’être d’après saint
Thomas d’Aquin, Nauwelaerts, Louvain-Paris, 19631 (Reprinted: Les editions du
cerf, Paris 20082; English trans. The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being accoring to
Thomas Aquinas, Marquette University Press, Milwaukee 2004; J. A. SAYES,
495
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
Thomas’s doctrine of analogy, but rather only indicate the principles of such
a doctrine180.
Fabro’s exposition of analogy is somewhat repetitive as he considers
the same argument from different angles. In the exposition that follows I
summarize the content of Fabro’s theory in the following points: the role of
analogy in the metaphysical reductio ad unum (5.1); the distinction between
analogy of attribution and analogy of proportionality (5.2); the semantics of
metaphysical analogy (5.3); the metaphysical foundation of analogy (5.4).
180
See C. FABRO, PC, 499.
181
See C. FABRO, PC, 484.
182
C. FABRO, PC, 498.
183
See C. FABRO, PC, 499.
497
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
accessible to our finite intellect; the mode that they have in God is per
essentiam: “according to the infinite distance of the ‘ontological difference’
that constitutes divine transcendence”184. In light of this, the fundamental
rule of metaphysical semantics is the following: the way in which such
perfections are “possessed” is the way in which they are predicated. In
Thomism, then, we have two planes of analogy:
[2] Transcendental plane (analogy of God and the creature). God is Esse per
essentiam or esse subsistens, esse ipsum: the creature is ens per
participationem or it “has” esse per participationem. In the Thomistic
conception esse per essentiam demands the absolute fullness of
perfection in absolute simplicity (emergence of intensive esse); in the
creature having esse per participationem implies the division and the real
composition, namely, the division in the multiplicity of the created
essences of the fullness of perfection of divine esse and the composition
in every creature of their essence or perfection with the proper act of
being (esse) according to the metaphysical demand of the “Diremtion” of
being185.
184
C. FABRO, PC, 500.
185
C. FABRO, PC, 500-501.
498
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
infinite essence by the finite essences186. Rather, “esse and the pure
perfections are attributed to and predicated of God and creatures according
to an analogy of intrinsic attribution”187. Fabro explains this analogy of
intrinsic attribution in terms of participation in contrast to the analogy
proposed by Henry of Ghent and Suarez (relation of causal dependence):
Above all, it is analogy of attribution, since the first relation of ens per
participationem with respect to esse per essentiam, is of total dependence and
therefore of total reference under every aspect of reality. And, more precisely,
it is analogy of intrinsic attribution, and not purely extrinsic, and this from two
perspectives: on behalf of the creature, insofar as this “has in se” its own
participated esse, on behalf of God, insofar as the first and total cause of esse is
immanent (“present”) in every esse and sustains, by that presence, the reality of
every ens and all of its perfection188.
The Creator and the creature reduce to one, not by community of univocity, but
by community of analogy. Now, this community can be twofold: either
because some things participated in another one thing according to a prius et
posterius, like potency and act in the notion of ens, and similarly substance and
accidents; or because one receives esse and [its] ratio from the other, and this
is the analogy of the creature to the Creator: in effect, the creature does not
have esse unless it descends from the First Ens: hence it is not called “ens”
186
See C. FABRO, PC, 501.
187
C. FABRO, PC, 502.
188
C. FABRO, PC, 502.
189
C. FABRO, PC, 502.
499
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
unless insofar as it imitates the First Ens; and the same happens with wisdom
and the other things that are said of creatures190.
190
In I Sent., Prooemium, q. 1, a. 2 ad 2: “Creator et creatura reducuntur in
unum, non communitate univocationis sed analogiae. Talis autem communitas
potest esse dupliciter. Aut ex eo quod aliqua participant aliquid unum secundum
prius et posterius, sicut potentia et actus rationem entis, et similiter substantia et
accidens; aut ex eo quod unum esse et rationem ab altero recipit, et talis est
analogia creaturae ad creatorem: creatura enim non habet esse nisi secundum quod
a primo ente descendit: unde nec nominatur ens nisi inquantum ens primum
imitatur; et similiter est de sapientia et de omnibus aliis quae de creatura dicuntur”.
191
In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 2 ad 1: “Vel secundum intentionem et secundum
esse; et hoc est quando neque parificatur in intentione communi, neque in esse;
sicut ens dicitur de substantia et accidente; et de talibus oportet quod natura
communis habeat aliquod esse in unoquoque eorum de quibus dicitur, sed differens
secundum rationem majoris vel minoris perfectionis”.
500
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
192
In III Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 1 ad 3: “Duplex est similitudo creaturae ad
Deum. Una secundum participationem alicuius divinae bonitatis sicut ab eo vivente
omnia vitam participant: et sic creatura rationalis in qua invenitur esse, vivere et
intelligere, maxime Deo assimilatur; et haec similitudo requiritur ad
assumptibilitatem. Alia similitudo est secundum proportionem, ut si dicatur
similitudo inter Deum et ignem, quia sicut ignis consumit corpus, ita Deus
consumit nequitiam”. See also, De veritate, q. 2, a. 11 ad 1 and In II Sent., d. 16, q.
1, a. 2 ad 5.
193
In III Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 1 ad 3: “Sicut dicimus esse proportionem inter
materiam et formam, quia se habet in ordine, ut perficiatur materia per formam, et
hoc secundum proportionabilitatem quamdam: quia sicut forma potest dare esse, ita
et materia potest recipere idem esse: et hoc modo etiam movens et motum debent
esse proportionabilia, et agens et patiens, ut scilicet sicut agens potest imprimere
501
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
For it belongs to things to be said similar in two ways: a) Either from the fact
that they participate in one form, as two white things in whiteness, and thus in
every similarity, it is necessary to be composed from that in which it convenes
with something similar, and from that in which they differ from this, as
similitude is not unless there is a difference, according to Boethius. Hence to
God nothing can be similar or convenient or conformed, as found frequently in
the sayings of the philosophers [this is predicamental participation]. b) Or
from the fact that one which participatively has the form imitates that which
essentially has it. As if the white body is said to be similar to separated
whiteness or the fiery mixed body to fire itself. And such similiarity which
places composition in one and simplicity in the other can be of the creature to
God, which are participants in goodness, wisdom and so on, which in God is
his essence [this is transcendental participation]195.
Creatures are said to be similar to God and imitate God due to their
participation in esse. Thus, while predicamental “likeness” constitutes
univocal predication; transcendental “likeness” is explained by means of
analogy and implies the absolute transcendence of God:
aliquem effectum, ita patiens possit recipere eumdem […]. Et ideo non est
inconveniens ut hic modus proportionis inter Deum et creaturam salvetur, quamvis
in infinitum distent: et ideo possibilis est unio utriusque”.
194
C. FABRO, PC, 504.
195
C. FABRO, PC, 504-505. In I Sent., d. 48, q. 1, a. 1: “Conformitas est
convenientia in forma una, [...]. Unde hoc modo aliquid Deo conformatur quod sibi
assimilatur. Contingit autem aliqua dici similia dupliciter. Vel ex eo quod
participant unam formam, sicut duo albi albedinem; et sic omne simile oportet esse
compositum ex eo in quo convenit cum alio simili, et ex eo in quo differt ab ipso,
cum similitudo non sit nisi differentium, secundum Boetium. Unde sic Deo nihil
potest esse simile nec conveniens nec conforme, ut frequenter a philosophis dictum
invenitur. Vel ex eo quod unum quod participative habet formam, imitatur illud
quod essentialiter habet. Sicut si corpus album diceretur simile albedini separatae,
vel corpus mixtum igneitate ipsi igni. Et talis similitudo quae ponit compositionem
in uno et simplicitatem in alio, potest esse creaturae ad Deum participantis
bonitatem vel sapientiam vel aliquid hujusmodi, quorum unumquodque in Deo est
essentia”.
502
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
The likeness of the creature to God falls short of univocal likeness in two
respects. First it does not arise from the participation of one form, as two hot
things are like by participation of one heat: because what is affirmed of God
and creatures is predicated of him essentially, but of creatures, by participation:
so that a creature’s likeness to God is as that of a hot thing to heat, not of a hot
thing to one that is hotter. Secondly, because this very form of which the
creature participates falls short of the nature of the thing which is God, just as
the heat of fire falls short of the nature of the sun's power whereby it produces
heat196.
One is the likeness of the creature to the divine intellect, and thus the form
understood by God and the thing itself are homogeneous, although they have
not the same mode of being, since the form understood is only in the mind,
while the form of the creature is in the thing197.
196
De Potentia, q. 7, a. 7 ad 2: “Similitudo creaturae ad Deum deficit a
similitudine univocorum in duobus. Primo, quia non est per participationem unius
formae, sicut duo calida secundum participationem unius caloris; hoc enim quod de
Deo et creaturis dicitur, praedicatur de Deo per essentiam, de creatura vero per
participationem; ut sic talis similitudo creaturae ad Deum intelligatur, qualis est
calidi ad calorem, non qualis calidi ad calidius. Secundo, quia ipsa forma in
creatura participata deficit a ratione eius quod Deus est, sicut calor ignis deficit a
ratione virtutis solaris, per quam calorem generat”.
197
De Potentia, q. 7, a. 7 ad 6: “Inter creaturam et Deum est duplex
similitudo. Una creaturae ad intellectum divinum: et sic forma intellecta per Deum
est unius rationis cum re intellecta, licet non habeat eumdem modum essendi; quia
forma intellecta est tantum in intellectu, forma autem creaturae est etiam in re”.
503
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
There is another likeness inasmuch as the divine essence itself is the super-
eminent but not homogeneous likeness of all things. It is by reason of this latter
likeness that good and the like are predicated in common of God and creatures:
but not by reason of the former, because when we say God is good we do not
mean to define him from the fact that he understands the creature’s goodness,
since it has already been observed that not even the house in the mind of the
builder is called a house in the same sense as the house in being198.
In the first case, the likeness is of a formal nature and leaves the divine
intact and in isolation; in the second case, the relation becomes something
real and founding (causality) in the creature. It is from the latter that the
possibility of analogy arises199.
Based on this distinction between two types of likeness, Fabro argues
that the analogy of proportionality, which relates two proportions, is not the
proper and radical expression of metaphysical analogy. Proportionality
enters into the metaphysical order in order to express, not the direct
relationship between the finite and the Infinite, but rather the structural
likeness – which is proportional – that one member of the analogy has to the
other. St. Thomas writes in De Veritate:
Although there cannot be between the finite and the infinite a proportion
properly so called, yet there can be a proportionality or the likeness of two
proportions. We say that four is proportioned to two because it is the double;
but we say that four is proportionable to six because four is to two as six is to
three. In the same way, although the finite and the infinite cannot be
proportioned, they can be proportionable, because the finite is equal to the
finite just as the infinite is to the infinite. In this way there is a likeness of the
creature to God, because the creature stands to the things which are its own as
God does to those which belong to him200.
198
De Potentia, q. 7, a. 7 ad 6: “Alio modo secundum quod ipsa divina
essentia est omnium rerum similitudo superexcellens, et non unius rationis. Et ex
hoc modo similitudinis contingit quod bonum et huiusmodi praedicantur
communiter de Deo et creaturis, non autem ex primo. Non enim haec est ratio Dei
cum dicitur, Deus est bonus, quia bonitatem creaturae intelligit; cum iam ex dictis
pateat quod nec etiam domus quae est in mente artificis cum domo quae est in
materia univoce dicatur domus”.
199
See C. FABRO, PC, 506.
200
De Veritate, q. 23, a. 7 ad 9: “Finiti ad infinitum quamvis non possit esse
proportio proprie accepta, tamen potest esse proportionalitas, quae est duarum
proportionum similitudo: dicimus enim quatuor esse proportionata duobus, quia
sunt eorum dupla; sex vero esse quatuor proportionabilia, quia sicut se habeat sex
504
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
Fabro argues that this text shows that the analogy of proportionality is
formally semantic and presupposes a first, causal, primary and constitutive
analogy of attribution201.
In analogy, the co-existence of similarity and dissimilarity gives rise
to the difficulty of determining their correct relationship202. Closely
connected with this problem is the problem of the incommensurability
between the finite and infinite203. In all this, however, Fabro hastens to point
out that where there is not a “proportion” there cannot be “proportionality”.
ad tria, ita quatuor ad duo. Similiter finitum et infinitum, quamvis non possint esse
proportionata, possunt tamen esse proportionabilia; quia sicut infinitum est aequale
infinito, ita finitum finito. Et per hunc modum est similitudo inter creaturam et
Deum, quia sicut se habet ad ea quae ei competunt, ita creatura ad sua propria”.
201
See C. FABRO, PC, 507.
202
C. FABRO, PC, 507: “The dialectic or the nature of the paradoxical
function of analogy consists precisely, as we have said, in the co-existence which is
mutual and necessary belonging of similarity with dissimilarity and therefore in the
difficulty of determining the point of their entry: the difficulty is in the ‘mode’ of
transferring a univocal and definite semantics for homogeneous greatnesses, as that
of the known terms of ‘proportion’ and ‘proportionality’, to the metaphysical
sphere, which is the sphere of inequality”.
203
In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 2, a. 1 ad 6: “Quamvis finiti ad infinitum non possit
esse proportio, quia excessus infiniti supra finitum non est determinatus; potest
tamen esse inter ea proportionalitas quae est similitudo proportionum; sicut enim
finitum aequatur alicui finito, ita infinito infinitum. Ad hoc autem quod aliquid
totaliter cognoscatur, quandoque oportet esse proportionem inter cognoscens et
cognitum; quia oportet virtutem cognoscentis adaequari cognoscibilitati rei
cognitae; aequalitas autem proportio quaedam Est. Sed quandoque cognoscibilitas
rei excedit virtutem cognoscentis; sicut cum nos cognoscimus Deum, aut e
converso, sicut cum ipse cognoscit creaturas; et tunc non oportet esse proportionem
inter cognoscentem et cognitum, sed proportionalitatem tantum; ut scilicet sicut se
habet cognoscens ad cognoscendum, ita se habeat cognoscibile ad hoc quod
cognoscatur; et talis proportionalitas sufficit ad hoc quod infinitum cognoscatur a
finito, et e converso. Vel dicendum, quod proportio secundum primam nominis
institutionem significat habitudinem quantitatis ad quantitatem secundum aliquem
determinatum excessum vel adaequationem; sed ulterius est translatum ad
significandum omnem habitudinem cujuscumque ad aliud; et per hunc modum
dicimus, quod materia debet esse proportionata ad formam; et hoc modo nihil
prohibet intellectum nostrum, quamvis sit finitus, dici proportionatum ad videndum
essentiam infinitam; non tamen ad comprehendendum eam, et hoc propter suam
immensitatem.
505
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
Thus, in the strictly metaphysical field, what counts, first of all and above all,
is the “mode” of being, still more than the quality [of being] and the form
itself, such that the semantics of a metaphysics like that of St. Thomas – which
is oriented and founded on intensive, emergent esse – is shown intrinsically
reluctant to remain on the logical plane to express the structure of the real
relation and it is for this reason that it offers, where it can, analogy founded on
the causality of esse. The “surpassing” of which one speaks is related,
therefore, to esse which is incommensurable to any form, and the similarity
between God and the creature hinges, then, on the ratio or form itself205.
204
C. FABRO, PC, 508. See In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 2, a. 1 ad 7: “Duplex est
similitudo et distantia. Una secundum convenientiam in natura; et sic magis distat
Deus ab intellectu creato quam intelligibile creatum a sensu. Alia secundum
proportionalitatem; et sic est e converso, quia sensus non est proportionatus ad
cognoscendum aliquod immateriale; sed intellectus est proportionatus ad
cognoscendum quodcumque immateriale; et haec similitudo requiritur ad
cognitionem, non autem prima”.
205
C. FABRO, PC, 508. In I Sent., d. 22, q. 1, a. 1 ad 3: “Quod sapientia
creata magis differt a sapientia increata quantum ad esse, quod consistit in modo
habendi; quam floritio prati a risu hominis: sed quantum ad rationem a qua
imponitur nomen, magis conveniunt; quia illa ratio est una secundum analogiam,
per prius in Deo, per posterius in creaturis existens; et secundum talem rationem
significatam in nomine, magis attenditur veritas et proprietas locutionis, quam
quantum ad modum significandi, qui datur ex consequenti intelligi per nomen”.
206
See C. FABRO, PC, 509.
506
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
While in the first analogy the two terms are found on the same plane, and are
related to a third that is distinct to these which transcends them; in the second
analogy, one of the terms already transcends the other and the latter is related
to the former as to its proper principle and fundament and thus, also on the
semantic plane, one fulfills the reductio ad unum207.
207
C. FABRO, PC, 509. See De Potentia, q. 7, a. 7: “In the first kind of
predication the two things must be preceded by something to which each of them
bears some relation: thus substance has a respect to quantity and quality: whereas
in the second kind of predication this is not necessary, but one of the two must
precede the other. Wherefore since nothing precedes God, but he precedes the
creature, the second kind of analogical predication is applicable to him but not the
first”.
208
See C. FABRO, PC, 510.
507
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
209
C. FABRO, PC, 510.
508
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
210
See De Veritate, q. 23, a. 7 ad 9.
211
Fabro quotes De Veritate, q. 27, a. 7 ad 10: “Creatura non dicitur
conformari Deo quasi participanti eamdem formam quam ipsa participat, sed quia
Deus est substantialiter ipsa forma, cuius creatura per quamdam imitationem est
participativa; sicut si ignis similaretur calori per se separato existenti”.
212
De Potentia, q. 7, a. 7: “Diversa habitudo ad esse impedit univocam
praedicationem entis. Deus autem alio modo se habet ad esse quam aliqua alia
creatura; nam ipse est suum esse, quod nulli alii creaturae competit. Unde nullo
modo univoce de Deo creatura dicitur; et per consequens nec aliquid aliorum
praedicabilium inter quae est ipsum primum ens”.
509
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
participated thing, and thus is possessed partially and not according to every
mode of perfection”213. The notion of participation makes the notional
expansion of analogy possible, according to its twofold aspect of
dependence and structure, in conformity with the absolute emergence of act.
Participation, in fact, means both causal dependence and likeness:
In this way, the problem of analogy is intimately united to the entire orientation
of Thomistic metaphysics […] according to the tension of two convergent
couplets of act and potency (Aristotle), participant and participated (Plato):
both, as is evident, necessarily imply the “reductio ad unum”. The priority and
principality which in the Thomistic conception belongs to the analogy called
“of attribution” (proportionis) over that purely formal and consequent analogy
of proportionality is founded on the very principle of Thomism, that of the
priority of act over potency (Aristotelianism) and of act of esse over any other
act (Platonism)214.
If it is true that the cause works according to its form and, therefore,
communicates to the effect its own likeness, it is to this likeness, then, that
213
See C. FABRO, PC, 515. Summa contra Gentiles, I, ch. 32: “De Deo
autem nihil dicitur per participationem: nam omne quod participatur determinatur
ad modum participati, et sic partialiter habetur et non secundum omnem
perfectionis modum”.
214
C. FABRO, PC, 516.
215
See C. FABRO, PC, 516.
216
See C. FABRO, PC, 516.
510
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
217
C. FABRO, PC, 518.
218
See C. FABRO, PC, 517.
219
See C. FABRO, PC, 517.
220
Summa contra Gentiles, I, 34: “In huiusmodi autem analogica
praedicatione ordo attenditur idem secundum nomen et secundum rem quandoque,
quandoque vero non idem. Nam ordo nominis sequitur ordinem cognitionis: quia
est signum intelligibilis conceptionis. Quando igitur id quod est prius secundum
rem, invenitur etiam cognitione prius, idem invenitur prius et secundum nominis
rationem et secundum rei naturam: sicut substantia est prior accidente et natura,
inquantum substantia est causa accidentis; et cognitione, inquantum substantia in
definitione accidentis ponitur. Et ideo ens dicitur prius de substantia quam de
accidente et secundum rei naturam et secundum nominis rationem”.
221
De Potentia, q. 7, a. 5 ad 8: “In creaturis quaedam secundum quae Deo
similantur, quae quantum ad rem significatam, nullam imperfectionem important,
sicut esse, vivere et intelligere et huiusmodi; et ista proprie dicuntur de Deo, immo
per prius de ipso et eminentius quam de creaturis”. See also De Potentia, q. 7, a. 7
ad 2: “Similitudo creaturae ad Deum deficit a similitudine univocorum in duobus.
511
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
For this reason, our mode of understanding the pure perfections is according to
the concreteness and the diversity that the same have in the creatures, these –
also taken in their purity – are diversely presented and therefore, per se, one
does not imply the other. These imply, then, a double limit: one, by being the
acts of a particular subject (predicamental limitation); the other, by being one
distinct from the other (transcendental limitation). Then, transferring these
perfections to God, one should, first of all, present them in the purity of their
essence, and then raise then to the supreme intensity insofar as all are identified
with the divine essence which is pure esse. In the Dionysian terminology,
grasped and placed at the foundation by St. Thomas, the three moments follow
in order: via causalitatis (in God, as the first cause, are present the perfections
caused in the creatures), via negationis (…but not according to the “mode”
proper” to the creature), via eminentiae (…namely according to the “mode” of
God)223.
Primo, quia non est per participationem unius formae, sicut duo calida secundum
participationem unius caloris; hoc enim quod de Deo et creaturis dicitur,
praedicatur de Deo per essentiam, de creatura vero per participationem; ut sic talis
similitudo creaturae ad Deum intelligatur, qualis est calidi ad calorem, non qualis
calidi ad calidius. Secundo, quia ipsa forma in creatura participata deficit a ratione
eius quod Deus est, sicut calor ignis deficit a ratione virtutis solaris, per quam
calorem generat”.
222
De Potentia, q. 7, a. 7 ad 4: “Deus non comparatur creaturis in hoc quod
dicitur melior, vel summum bonum, quasi participans naturam eiusdem generis
cum creaturis, sicut species generis alicuius, sed quasi principium generis”.
223
C. FABRO, PC, 519.
512
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
The common term, in the analogy between God and creatures, refers
to a “well-defined content”, yet is only known directly in one of the
members (in the creature) and not in the other (in the Creator). This is
expressed by St. Thomas in his Commentary on Liber De causis, which
states that ens as that which participates in esse in a finite manner is
proportionate to our intellect, while God’s essence surpasses our intellect224.
“For this reason, the transferring of the term to the other member of the
analogy is done in virtue of a resolutive-attributive judgment and therefore
in the form of a transcending of predication and not of proper and direct
comprehension”225. This reference to resolutio as the way in which we grasp
esse and attribute it to God in terms of analogy should be highlighted. By
means of this resolution and judgment, we determine the divine essence as
Esse Ipsum, while admitting the limits of our mode of understanding created
perfections: “Even though the esse of the creature imperfectly represents
divine esse, and the name ‘He Who Is’ signifies this imperfectly, since it
signifies it by way of a certain concretion and composition, still he is
signified still more imperfectly by the other names”226.
In the two judgments: “the creature has esse” and “God is his esse”,
the analogy of esse implies two proportions with four terms: two distinct
subjects (creature, God) with a predicate (esse) that is both common and
distinct. In this initial, logical-semantic moment, the act and perfection in
the subject is presented in the form of proportionality. In an ulterior, second
moment, the analogy is presented in the form of intrinsic attribution and
with reference to the pure perfection that the creature has imperfectly and
that the Creator has perfectly:
When, however, the effect is not perfectly likened to the agent, as being
improportionate to the agent’s power, then the form of the effect is not in the
same degree in the agent but in a higher degree. […] Hence the forms of
224
In Librum De Causis, lect. 6: “Ens autem dicitur id quod finite participat
esse, et hoc est proportionatum intellectui nostro cuius obiectum est quod quid est
ut dicitur in III De anima, unde illud solum est capabile ab intellectu nostro quod
habet quidditatem participantem esse; sed Dei quidditas est ipsum esse, unde est
supra intellectum”.
225
C. FABRO, PC, 519-520.
226
In I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 1 ad 3: “Esse creaturae imperfecte repraesentet
divinum esse, et hoc nomen ‘qui est’ imperfecte significat ipsum, quia significat
per modum cujusdam concretionis et compositionis; sed adhuc imperfectius
significatur per alia nomina”.
513
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
things are in the divine nature as in the power that produces them, but not
according to the same degree, since no effect is equal to that power227.
227
De Potentia, q. 7, a. 1 ad 8: “Quando vero effectus non perfecte
assimilatur agenti, utpote non adaequans agentis virtutem, tunc forma effectus est
in agente non secundum eamdem rationem, sed sublimiori modo [...]. Formae ergo
rerum sunt in natura divina ut in virtute operativa, non secundum eamdem
rationem, cum nullus effectus virtutem illam adaequet”.
228
C. FABRO, PC, 521.
514
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
will remain in the intellect, which is divine goodness, which is seen in the
created goodness as the exemplar in the exemplified”229.
229
In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 2 ad 3: “Dico de bonitate, quod est una bonitas,
qua sicut principio effectivo exemplari omnia sunt bona. Sed tamen bonitas qua
unumquodque formaliter est bonum, diversa est in diversis. Sed quia bonitas
universalis non invenitur in aliqua creatura, sed particulata, et secundum aliquid;
ideo dicit Augustinus, quod si removeamus omnes rationes particulationis ab ipsa
bonitate, remanebit in intellectu bonitas integra et plena, quae est bonitas divina,
quae videtur in bonitate creata sicut exemplar in exemplato”.
230
C. FABRO, PC, 521.
231
See C. FABRO, PC, 522.
232
See C. FABRO, PC, 523.
515
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
implanted in it, and also because of the first goodness taken as the exemplar
and effective cause of all created goodness”233. Therefore, we are dealing with
overcoming the respective opposition that the analogies of proportionality and
of attribution have had, each one being taken per se; since one is the fruit of the
isolation of the Aristotelian moment (formal proportionality) from the Platonic
moment (causal attribution), while the Thomistic conception is posited [si
pone] from a superior point of view which embraces both and surpasses them:
“a) Everything is therefore called good from the divine goodness, as from the
first exemplary effective and final principle of all goodness”. b) “Nevertheless,
everything is called good by reason of the similitude of the divine goodness
belonging to it, which is formally its own goodness, whereby it is denominated
good”234. A more universally comprehensive formula of the entire problem is
presented by the Angelic Doctor at the beginning of his activity: “The notion of
truth consists in two things: in the esse of the thing and in the apprehension of
the intellectual faculty proportionate to the esse of the thing. Now, even though
both of these things, as we have said, are reduced to God as to the efficient and
exemplary cause, still every thing participates in its created being by means of
which it formally is, and every intellect participates in the light by which it
correctly judges the thing, which is certainly exemplified by the uncreated
light. The intellect has its operation in se, on which the notion of truth is
completed”235. We are dealing with – and this is the decisive point in order to
grasp the originality of the Thomistic position here – two moments, both
distinct and inseparable: “Hence I say that as there is one, unique divine esse
by means of which all things are as from the efficient, exemplary principle, and
still in diverse things, there is a diverse esse, by which the thing formally is, so
all there is one, unique truth, namely, divine truth, by which all things are true
233
De Veritate, q. 21, a. 4: “Sic unumquodque dicetur bonum sicut forma
inhaerente per similitudinem summi boni sibi inditam, et ulterius per bonitatem
primam, sicut per exemplar et effectivum omnis bonitatis creatae”.
234
I, q. 6, a. 4: “Sic ergo unumquodque dicitur bonum bonitate divina, sicut
primo principio exemplari, effectivo et finali totius bonitatis. Nihilominus tamen
unumquodque dicitur bonum similitudine divinae bonitatis sibi inhaerente, quae est
formaliter sua bonitas denominans ipsum”.
235
In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 2: “Ratio veritatis in duobus consistit: in esse rei,
et in apprehensione virtutis cognoscitivae proportionata ad esse rei. Utrumque
autem horum quamvis […] reducatur in Deum sicut in causam efficientem et
exemplarem; nihilominus tamen quaelibet res participat suum esse creatum, quo
formaliter est, et unusquisque intellectus participat lumen per quod recte de re
judicat, quod quidem est exemplatum a lumine increato. Habet etiam intellectus
suam operationem in se, ex qua completur ratio veritatis”.
516
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
as by the efficient, exemplary principle; still there are more truths in the
created things, by means of which these are said to be true formally”236.
Lastly, Fabro refers to analogy and its place along the itinerary of
metaphysical reflection. He states that the problem of analogy follows that
of the compositional structure of ens and the causal foundation of esse. The
problem is resolved by means of a reduction, the notion of participation and
the emergence of intensive esse:
Here is the outline: the mode of predicating corresponds to the mode of being
or of having; there are two modes of being for any act or form, being by
essence or being by participation, and, thus, there ought to be two modes of
predication; but, in its turn, being by participation is two-fold, namely, in the
predicamental order of species and genera and in the order of esse and its
transcendental attributes with the pure perfections. Only the latter participation
implies analogy in the strict sense238.
236
C. FABRO, PC, 523-524. In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 2: “Unde dico, quod
sicut est unum esse divinum quo omnia sunt, sicut a principio effectivo exemplari,
nihilominus tamen in rebus diversis est diversum esse, quo formaliter res est; ita
etiam est una veritas, scilicet divina, qua omnia vera sunt, sicut principio effectivo
exemplari; nihilominus sunt plures veritates in rebus creatis, quibus dicuntur verae
formaliter”.
237
C. FABRO, PC, 524.
238
C. FABRO, PC, 591.
517
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
Esse, for example, is predicated per essentiam of God alone. Predication per
participationem refers to the real composition of essence and esse in the
creature: “Whenever something is predicated of another in the manner of
participation, it is necessary that there be something in the latter besides that
in which it participates. And therefore, in any creature the creature itself
which has esse and its ipsum esse are other, and this is what Boethius says
in De Hebdomadibus, that in all that is except the first, esse and what is are
diverse”239. Thomistic analogy, Fabro writes, is concerned with and
presupposes the notion of being in both analogates. This is because the Act
of Being per essentiam created the act of being per participationem:
“Thomistic analogy, then, is founded on a content of the concept of ‘ens’ (id
quod habet esse) which is common to the analogates, which differ due to the
‘mode’ of actuating the ratio or participated formality”240.
After distinguishing predication per essentiam and predication per
participationem, St. Thomas then distinguishes two types of participation:
But it must be known that something is participated in in two ways. In one way
it is participated in as though belonging (quasi existens) to the substance of the
thing participating, as a genus is participated in by a species of it. However, a
creature does not participate in esse this way. For that which falls under its
definition is of the substance of the thing. But ens is not placed in the definition
of a creature, because it is neither a genus nor a difference. Hence, it is
participated in as something not belonging (non existens) to the thing’s
essence. And therefore, the question “Is it?” is different from the question
“What is it?”241.
239
Quodlibet. II, q. 2, a. 1: “Quandocumque autem aliquid praedicatur de
altero per participationem, oportet ibi aliquid esse praeter id quod participatur. Et
ideo in qualibet creatura est aliud ipsa creatura quae habet esse, et ipsum esse eius;
et hoc est quod Boetius dicit in Lib. De hebdomad., quod in omni eo quod est citra
primum, aliud est esse et quod est”.
240
C. FABRO, PC, 592.
241
Quodlibet. II, q. 2, a. 1: “Sed sciendum est, quod aliquid participatur
dupliciter. Uno modo quasi existens de substantia participantis, sicut genus
participatur a specie. Hoc autem modo esse non participatur a creatura. Id enim est
de substantia rei quod cadit in eius definitione. Ens autem non ponitur in
definitione creaturae, quia nec est genus nec differentia. Unde participatur sicut
aliquid non existens de essentia rei; et ideo alia quaestio est an est et quid est”.
518
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
242
C. FABRO, PC, 592. It could be argued that the text in question does not
correspond exactly to Fabro’s division between predicamental and transcendental
participation. Fabro includes the participation of substance in accidents under
“predicamental participation”; this, however, does not fall under the first member
of the division found in Quodlibet. II, q. 2, a. 1, which refers to that which belongs
to the substance and enters into its definition. Accidents fall outside (praeter) the
definition of a creature. Fabro, however, is focused mainly on contrasting the
univocal nature of predicamental participation with the analogical nature of
transcendental participation.
243
Quodlibet. II, q. 2, a. 1: “Unde, cum omne quod est praeter essentiam rei,
dicatur accidens; esse quod pertinet ad quaestionem an est, est accidens. Et ideo
Commentator dicit in V metaphysic., quod ista propositio, socrates est, est de
accidentali praedicato, secundum quod importat entitatem rei, vel veritatem
propositionis”.
244
Quodlibet. II, q. 2, a. 1: “Sed verum est quod hoc nomen ens, secundum
quod importat rem cui competit huiusmodi esse, sic significat essentiam rei, et
dividitur per decem genera; non tamen univoce, quia non eodem ratione competit
omnibus esse; sed substantiae quidem per se, aliis autem aliter”.
519
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
Fabro’s exposition of the text stops here without considering the final
lines and response to the second objection on the nature of the composition
of essence and esse, and in what manner esse is called an accidens with
respect to the substance. The final lines of St. Thomas’s text in the corpus of
the article affirm that the composition between essence and esse in creatures
is not to be understood in as a composition that results from parts of the
substance (like matter and form), but rather as a composition which results
from the substance and that which adheres to the substance245. In his
response to the second objection, St. Thomas clarifies in what sense esse is
an accidens: “Esse is an accident, not as though related accidentally to a
substance, but as the actuality of any substance”246. In this way a more
precise division of participation according to the perspective of Quodlibet.
II, q. 2, a. 1 would be:
Matter - form
Belonging to the substance Species - genus
Individual - species
Participation
Substance - accidents
Not belonging to the substance
Substance - esse
245
Quodlibet. II, q. 2, a. 1: “Si ergo in Angelo est compositio sicut ex
essentia et esse, non tamen est compositio sicut ex partibus substantiae, sed sicut ex
substantia et eo quod adhaeret substantiae”.
246
Quodlibet. II, q. 2, a. 1 ad 2: “Esse est accidens, non quasi per accidens se
habens, sed quasi actualitas cuiuslibet substantiae”.
247
I, q. 4, a. 3 ad 3: “Non dicitur esse similitudo creaturae ad Deum propter
communicantiam in forma secundum eandem rationem generis et speciei, sed
secundum analogiam tantum; prout scilicet Deus est ens per essentiam, et alia per
participationem”.
520
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
248
C. FABRO, PC, 594.
249
See Summa contra Gentiles, I, ch. 32: “Omne quod de pluribus
praedicatur univoce, secundum participationem cuilibet eorum convenit de quo
praedicatur: nam species participare dicitur genus, et individuum speciem. De Deo
autem nihil dicitur per participationem: nam omne quod participatur determinatur
ad modum participati, et sic partialiter habetur et non secundum omnem
perfectionis modum. Oportet igitur nihil de Deo et rebus aliis univoce praedicari”.
250
See Summa contra Gentiles, I, ch. 32: Quod praedicatur de aliquibus
secundum prius et posterius, certum est univoce non praedicari: nam prius in
definitione posterioris includitur: sicut substantia in definitione accidentis
secundum quod est ens. Si igitur diceretur univoce ens de substantia et accidente,
oporteret quod substantia etiam poneretur in definitione entis secundum quod de
substantia praedicatur. Quod patet esse impossibile”.
521
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
Now nothing is predicated in the same order of God and other things, but
according to prius et posterius: since all predicates of God are essential, for
He is called being because He is very essence, and good because He is
goodness itself: whereas predicates are applied to others by participation; thus
Socrates is said to be a man, not as though he were humanity itself, but as a
subject of humanity. Therefore it is impossible for any thing to be predicated
univocally of God and other things251.
Though the relation to its cause is not part of the definition of a thing caused,
still it follows, as a consequence, on what belongs to its ratio; because from the
fact that something is an ens by participation, it follows that it is caused from
something. Hence such ens cannot be without being caused, just as man cannot
be without having the faculty of laughing. But, since to be caused does not
enter into the ratio of being as such, on account of this some ens which is not
caused is found255.
On a merely logical plane one can admit a certain extrinsic character which
pertains to participated esse in the finite essence; however, on the real plane,
the essence exists due to the participated esse which is immanent to created
ens itself: “From the very fact that being is ascribed to a quiddity, not only
is the quiddity said to be but also to be created: since before it had being it
aequivocis inveniuntur. Qui quidem effectus in suis causis sunt virtute, ut calor in
sole. [...] Imitatur autem lapis Deum ut causam secundum esse, secundum
bonitatem, et alia huiusmodi, sicut et aliae creaturae”.
254
De Potentia, q. 3, a. 5 ad 1: “Licet causa prima, quae Deus est, non intret
essentiam rerum creatarum: tamen esse, quod rebus creatis inest, non potest
intelligi nisi ut deductum ab esse divino; sicut nex proprius effectus potest intelligi
nisi ut deductus a causa propria”.
255
I, q. 44, a. 1 ad 1: “Dicendum quod, licet habitudo ad causam non intret
definitionem entis quod est causatum, tamen sequitur ad ea qua sunt de eius
ratione, quia ex hoc quod aliquid per participationem est ens, sequitur quod sit
causatum ab alio. Unde huiusmodi ens non potest esse, quin sit causatum; sicut nec
homo, quin sit risibile. Sed quia esse causatum non est de ratione entis simpliciter,
propter hoc invenitur aliquod ens non causatum”.
523
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
was nothing, except perhaps in the intellect of the creator, where it is not a
creature but the creating essence”256.
The relation of dependence that the creature has on God is
“constitutive” of finite ens since it belongs to ens per participationem as
such. This relation of dependence is the “first relation” in finite being: “For
if esse is the most intimate, most profound act which at the same time
absolutely first and absolutely ultimate…, the relation that regards the origin
of the act of esse is the first and fundamental one, and it is the most intrinsic
relation in ens, as we said when speaking of the divine presence”257.
Formally, there is a infinite distance between God’s esse. This is
accompanied, though, by his immediate, profound and total presence as
First Cause: “Esse per essentiam cannot be said to be the first in the real
order, without being recognized as the first foundation of all beings: the
recognition of the universal and total dependence of the creature on the
Creator is therefore the first foundation of analogy between God and the
creature”258. In St. Thomas’s metaphysics of participation, the formula of
analogy between the creature and Creator is given based on the relationship
of dependence of the finite on the infinite:
The names predicated of God and of other things are attributed to God
according to some relation He has to those things. […] Consequently they are
predicated according to analogy, that is, according to their proportion to one
thing. For, from the fact that we compare other things with God as their first
origin, we attribute to God such names as signify perfections in other things.
This clearly brings out the truth that, as regards the assigning of the names,
such names are primarily predicated of creatures, inasmuch as the intellect that
assigns the names ascends from creatures to God. But as regards the thing
signified by the name, they are primarily predicated of God, from whom the
perfections descend to other beings259.
256
De Potentia, q. 3, a. 5 ad 2: “Ex hoc ipso quod quidditati esse attribuitur,
non solum esse, sed ipsa quidditas creari dicitur: quia antequam esse habeat, nihil
est, nisi forte in intellectu creantis, ubi non est creatura, sed creatrix essentia”.
257
C. FABRO, PC, 596.
258
C. FABRO, PC, 596.
259
Compendium Theologiae, I, ch. 27.
524
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
260
C. FABRO, PC, 597.
261
See C. FABRO, PC, 597-598.
262
C. FABRO, PC, 598.
525
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
263
C. FABRO, PC, 598.
264
See C. FABRO, PC, 599.
265
C. FABRO, PC, 599-600.
266
C. FABRO, PC, 600.
267
See C. FABRO, PC, 600.
526
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMERGENCE OF ESSE
* * *
6. Summary
529
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
530
Chapter Five
THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
1
It should be noted that the problem of atheism and its principle of
immanence as well as the problem of human freedom increasingly take center stage
during this period of Fabro’s thought.
2
C. FABRO, “L’emergenza di esse in San Tommaso” (course taught in 1981-
1982 in Perugia, recording available); “L’emergenza dell’atto di essere in S.
Tommaso e la rottura del formalismo scolastico”, in Il concetto di “Sapientia” in
San Bonaventura e san Tommaso (testi della I Settimana Residenziale di Studi
Medievali, Carini, ottobre 1981) ed Officina di Studi Medievali, Palermo 1983, 35-
54. This article was also published in Essere e Libertà (1984) as a summary of
Fabro’s thought on role of the notion of participation in Thomistic metaphysics;
“L’emergenza dell’atto nella riflessione speculativa”, in Cinquant’anni di
Magistero teologico, fs. Mons. Piolanti, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Roma 1985,
167-172; “L’emergenza dello esse tomistico sull’atto aristotelico: breve prologo,
l’origine trascendentale del problema”, in L’atto aristotelico e le sue ermeneutiche.
Atti del colloquio internazionale su l’atto aristotelico e le sue ermeneutiche
(Laterano 17-18-19 gennaio 1989), Herder, Roma 1990, 149-177.
531
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
3
C. FABRO, “La determinazione dell’atto nella metafisica tomistica”, ET,
329-350. First published in Filosofia e vita 2 (1961), 18-39. I quote from the article
in ET.
4
See C. FABRO, “La determinazione dell’atto …”, ET, 331, n. 4.
532
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
and the synthetic approach5. Fabro points out that while it is true that
Aquinas took the exterior structure of Aristotle’s metaphysics and
terminology, his metaphysics focuses on participated ens according to the
real distinction of essence and esse. This, according to Fabro, is completely
foreign to Aristotelian metaphysics. Following an analytical approach with
regard to the relationship between Aristotle and Aquinas means nothing
more than starting from the latter’s dependence on Aristotle and
subsequently verifying Aquinas’s use of Aristotle’s terminology according
to their Aristotelian meaning. The synthetic approach, on the contrary,
recognizes a shift of the metaphysical axis from Aristotelian form-essence to
the Thomistic notion of esse (actus essendi). In other words, it recognizes
that the meanings of the fundamental notions of Aristotle’s thought have
been surpassed. Consequently, starting from the Aristotelian notion of act as
form or essence is not the only way in which Thomistic esse is able to be
determined. It is also possible to move from the real distinction between
essence and esse and consequently re-dimension the Thomistic conception
of Aristotelian act. This is the synthetic approach that Fabro intends to
follow in the solution to the problem of the limitation of act6.
As we saw earlier, Aristotle’s metaphysics interprets the structure of
the real by means of act and potency and the doctrine of the four causes. For
Aristotle, act is perfection, while potency is the capacity for act such that
every limitation of act occurs by means of potency7. According to Fabro,
Aristotle holds that act is properly form (or essence); Pure Act is the pure
and perfect form as absolutely perfect Intellect or Life. Fabro concludes that
in Aristotelianism the concept of act is always found along the line of form
(or essence).
Aquinas, however, elevates esse to the level of the constitutive act of
ens and consequently, on the entitative level, he reduces form (or essence) to
5
In the article, Fabro uses the terms “analytical” and “synthetic” in a broad
sense and not in the technical sense of analytical-resolution and synthetic-
composition. From what we have seen, when used in their more technical senses,
analysis clearly holds a privileged place as it is the ascending moment of the
resolution of ens to actus essendi and of effects to causes within metaphysical
reflection. Any synthetic movement from cause to effect in metaphysics depends
on the first analytical resolution.
6
See C. FABRO, “La determinazione dell’atto…”, ET, 329-330.
7
See C. FABRO, “La determinazione dell’atto…”, ET, 330: “Per Aristotele
l’atto è perfezione ed affermazione pura per sé, mentre la potenza è capacità e
funzione di atto così che ogni limitazione non accade all’atto come atto ma
mediante la potenza”.
533
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
potency with respect to esse. Aquinas gives esse the dignity and properties
of act sic et simpliciter; form (or essence) can and should still be called act,
but always and only within its proper order.
Thus, when the determination of ens is considered in a radical way,
esse is the act of ens and form (or essence) its potency. The principles of act
– “act is prior to potency” and “act is more perfect and noble than potency”8
– are valid first and foremost with respect to esse. “Act” is predicated of the
other principles – like substantial form, essence and accidents – but always
in reference to esse. In light of the originality of Thomistic actus essendi
and of the Thomistic notion of participation, Fabro concludes that the
formal-analytic method should be abandoned and that one should pursue the
synthetic method of reduction to fundament9. In this section of the article,
Fabro does not mean “analytic” and “synthetic” as “resolution” and
“composition”. Synthetic, in this article, seems to refer indirectly to the St.
Thomas’s “emergent synthesis” or the Thomistic Aufhebung of Aristotelian
act and Platonic participation. Form, then, is act in the formal order of the
essence; in corporeal bodies, form is said to be act with respect to matter.
However, in order to be in act, form needs to be actuated by actus essendi. If
form is act in its order, it is not act per se; rather, it is in act by means of
participation in esse. This, Fabro recalls, is the fundamental meaning of the
composition of essence and esse10.
The synthetic approach to Thomistic metaphysics reveals that there is
a twofold limitation of act. This is because there is a twofold order of act
and, therefore, two participations: 1) predicamental participation which
concerns the structure of essence with respect to form; 2) transcendental
participation which concerns the constitution of ens with respect to esse11.
8
See ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, IX, 8, 1050 b 2; IX, 9, 1050 b 4.
9
See C. FABRO, “La determinazione dell’atto…”, ET, 331: “The direction of
recent studies on the notion of participation, understood as the genetic nucleus of
Thomistic speculation in its originality, seems to leave no doubt about abandoning
the analytic (systematic or formal) method in order to follow the synthetic-real one,
that is, the “reduction to fundament”.
10
See C. FABRO, “La determinazione dell’atto…”, ET, 332: “Any essence or
form is in potency and is potency with respect to esse which is the act kat’exokh,n,
this means that the form, in order to be in act, should be actuated by esse or actus
essendi; even though the essence is act in its order, it is not in act per se, but rather
is actuated [diventa in atto] by means of participation in esse. This is what the
meaning of the composition of the creature of essence and esse primarily consists
in”.
11
See C. FABRO, “La determinazione dell’atto…”, ET, 332.
534
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
a) The essence of the material substances is limited in two ways, first with
respect to the species insofar as the individuals participate in the species, and
then with respect to the genus insofar as the species participates in the genus.
b) The essence of spiritual substances is intrinsically limited as well insofar
as each one participates in a genus.
12
C. FABRO, “La determinazione dell’atto…”, ET, 332.
13
See I, q. 7, a. 2: “Aliquid praeter Deum potest esse infinitum secundum
quid, sed non simpliciter”.
14
C. FABRO, “La determinazione dell’atto…”, ET, 335.
535
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
Therefore, saying that “the essence is limited in itself” is not the same
as saying “limited by itself”. The species is limited in material individuals
by the materia signata quantitate and the accidents consequent upon this. It
is limited in itself, since it is this essence of this species. In spiritual
substances the species is a pure form and, even though it is not actuated in
individuals, it can be said, under a certain aspect, to be unlimited according
to the “first degree of predicamental participation” (the individual
participates in the species). However, it is limited according to the “second
degree of predicamental participation” (the species participates in the
genus). It is from this participation or division of perfections that the
marvelous order of the creation derives. Thus, spiritual essences are not
limited by themselves – for the pure form possesses all the perfection proper
to its species – but are limited in themselves to the degree that they express
only a particular degree of perfection and act with respect to the formal
totality of their genus. Saying that they are limited in themselves, then, does
not refer simply to the “resulting” structure of the ens in actu, but also to the
formal order itself16.
To the objection that holds that the essence is not limited, but is rather
only a limiting principle (just as the measure measures and is not measured),
Fabro answers that metaphysics is the realm of differences, of diversity in
degrees of perfection that relate to a Maximum, which functions as the
criterion of measure since it is the principle and cause of all things and the
fullness of all perfections. In the metaphysical sphere, the measure is “the
maximum et primum in quolibet genere, which in the ultimate resolution is
the First Principle itself”. Thus, in the metaphysical sphere, the essence –
every finite essence – should be called “limited” in the formal sphere itself
and the Thomistic doctrine of predicamental participation is an explicit
proof of this. The form or essence belongs to a genus (and is in a genus),
and is determined or “terminated” by means of the addition of a difference.
From the logical point of view, the genus is a formality or totality, which
contains the specific differences in potency; from the metaphysical point of
15
C. FABRO, “La determinazione dell’atto…”, ET, 336.
16
See C. FABRO, “La determinazione dell’atto…”, ET, 336-337.
536
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
17
See C. FABRO, “La determinazione dell’atto…”, ET, 337-338.
18
C. FABRO, “La determinazione dell’atto…”, ET, 341: “1) Every
composition of concepts, which are not purely synonyms, should have a real
foundation and, in the end, supposes a corresponding real composition on which to
be founded (See In IX Metaph., 9, n. 1898). 2) One thing, however, is the logical
composition, another is the real composition; thus the relation between the
respective elements is diverse: in the former the synthesis is of concepts and
supposes identity; in the latter, because it is a synthesis of real elements and
principles, it supposes the real diversity of the distinct parts. 3) Thus, while the
genus is a formality – only that in se it is still undetermined by the difference –
matter is, on the contrary, not in the metaphysical line of act which is proper to the
form, but is in an order of reality that is opposed to it and irreducible to it – without
the possibility of a direct passage. Matter is real potency, not pure possibility, and
thus, concurs with the form, which is its act, in the constitution of the corporeal
substance. It is a principle of being, but the actuality comes to it from the form”. In
a footnote Fabro writes that this is the fundamental meaning of the axiom, “forma
dat esse”, which St. Thomas elevated from the predicamental sphere to the
transcendental sphere of esse, in which esse is the primary and founding act.
537
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
In conclusion, the infinity proper to the essence of the pure forms, is only a
relative infinity, which, Fabro writes, is irrelevant in the metaphysical order
due to the two-fold participation to which every created form is subject:
formal-real (predicamental) participation of the species in a genus, actual-
real (transcendental) participation of ens in esse.
In St. Thomas’s commentary on Prop. 4 of De Causis, added insight is
found regarding the multiplicity of esse creatum and the “infinite”
characteristic of the essence of pure, spiritual forms:
19
De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 1, ad 2: “Duplex est limitatio formae. Una
quidem secundum quod forma speciei limitatur ad individuum, et talis limitatio
formae est per materiam. Alia vero secundum quod forma generis limitatur ad
naturam speciei; et talis limitatio formae non fit per materiam, sed per formam
magis determinatam, a qua sumitur differentia; differentia enim addita super genus
contrahit ipsum ad speciem. Et talis limitatio est in substantiis spiritualibus,
secundum scilicet quod sunt formae determinatarum specierum”.
20
Compendium Theologiae, I, ch. 15: “Duplex est modus quo aliqua forma
potest multiplicari: unus per differentias, sicut forma generalis, ut color in diversas
species coloris; alius per subiectum, sicut albedo. Omnis ergo forma quae non
potest multiplicari per differentias, si non sit forma in subiecto existens,
impossibile est quod multiplicetur, sicut albedo, si subsisteret sine subiecto, non
esset nisi una tantum”.
538
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
An intelligence is composed of the finite and the infinite in its being to the
extent that the nature of an intelligence is said to be infinite in its power of
being, but the very esse that it receives is finite. From this it follows that the
esse of an intelligence can be multiplied insofar as it is participated esse, for
the composition of the finite and the infinite signifies this21.
Fabro comments that, in this text, “finite” refers to esse, while “infinite”
indicates the “potentia essendi”. Forms, though, are limited in their
ontological order. Firstly, they are not limited by themselves, but rather in
themselves with respect to the virtual perfection of their own genus.
Secondly, they are limited with respect to esse. Every Thomist, Fabro says,
should agree that act is per se infinite, unlimited, etc… However, there is no
justification in the predicamental or the transcendental order to say: “Form
is act, therefore it is infinite”. For the created form or species participates in
the genus and every created ens, form and perfection participates in esse.
Fabro’s article concludes that: “All good Thomists agree that in general only
potency can limit act and that, in particular, it is the essence that limits esse,
but the essence can only limit insofar as it is limited in se, insofar as every
form is talis et talis”22. Ipsum esse, in Thomism, has been promoted to
primum metaphysicum and is truly qualified as act in a fully constitutive
sense, since all other realities, forms and perfections, fall to potency and are
its participations since they a intrinsically marked by the limit of being.
* * *
21
In Librum De Causis, lect. 4: “[I]ntelligentia est composita in suo esse ex
finito et infinito, in quantum natura intelligentiae infinita dicitur secundum
potentiam essendi; et ipsum esse quod recipit, est finitum. Et ex hoc sequitur quod
esse intelligentiae multiplicari possit in quantum est esse participatum: hoc enim
significat compositio ex finito et infinito”.
22
C. FABRO, “La determinazione dell’atto…”, ET, 350.
539
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
solves the problem of the limitation of the form by reducing form, which is
act in its proper order, to potency with respect to esse.
The nature of this reduction of form and all other formal acts and
perfections to “potency” or to “participants” is one of the more important
elements in Fabro’s method of metaphysical reflection as it involves the
notion of predicamental participation. Such reflection goes beyond a merely
logical consideration of the species-genus participation, considering it, in
this article, as a real-formal participation. Thus, the essence of a spiritual
creature is only relatively infinite (secundum quid) and belongs to a genus.
On the formal level, the essence is limited in itself – not by itself – since it
does not realize the entire virtual perfection of the genus to which it belongs.
The language of “limit” calls to mind that of “measure” and the ultimate
resolution-reduction characteristic of the Fourth Way to the First Principle,
the Maximum Ens, the Cause of all things and the fullness of all perfection.
In this way, Fabro has defended the principle of the limitation of act as one
of the pillars of the Thomistic metaphysics of esse and participation23.
23
In his Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas (1995) R. te
Velde argues that the principle “Actus non limitatur nisi per potentiam propriam”
is not a genuine Thomistic principle. He references Fabro’s argument in the
conclusion to NMP and concludes that: “According to Fabro, the essence, as a
particular degree of perfection, is limited in itself, and consequently limits the esse
with which it is composed. I am unable to see where the solution is in this answer”
(p. 151, n. 37).
24
C. FABRO, “Il fondamento metafisico della IV Via”, Doctor Communis, 19
(1965), 49-70; reprinted in ET, 387-406.
540
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
25
See C. FABRO, “Il fondamento metafisico della IV Via”, ET, 390.
26
See C. FABRO, “Il fondamento metafisico della IV Via”, ET, 391.
27
This problem was noted earlier when dealing with the critiques of Owens
and Sanmarchi of Fabro’s theory on the critical justification of the principle of
causality.
28
C. FABRO, “Il fondamento metafisico della IV Via”, ET, 396.
29
Such a methodological separation is found in the Summa contra Gentiles
and Summa Theologiae.
30
See C. FABRO, “Il fondamento metafisico della IV via”, ET, 398.
541
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
the Creator of being as such, such initial proofs for God’s existence would
no longer be sufficient31.
Instead of distinguishing three principles or moments in the Fourth
Way as he did in 1954, Fabro prefers to combine all three moments under
one principle, “the principle of the unity and emergence of act”. This is a
principle that can be said to sustain the entire procedure of the Fourth
Way32. The “principle of act” is primarily Aristotelian and is understood in
terms of the “perfection” of being which is proper to both material and
spiritual form. The “principle of unity and emergence” is Platonic and, in St.
Thomas, assumes a decisive and conclusive value in regard to the Platonic
term of “perfectio separata”, which must be unique and most perfect: “The
principle and the term of esse subsistens or per essentiam, to indicate God
or the discovery of esse as pure and primary act or as the ‘perfectio
separata’ per essentiam, is proper to St. Thomas”33.
The key to the demonstration of the Fourth Way (and creation) is the
principle of causality formulated according to the notion of participation.
Thus, Fabro dedicates the rest of the article to examining the progression of
the formulations which lead up to Summa Theologiae’s participation
formulation of the principle of causality: “From the fact that something is by
participation it follows that it is caused from another”34.
1) In Aquinas’s Commentary on the Sentences we find the principle
expressed as follows: “Everything that is imperfect in a genus arises from
31
See C. FABRO, “Il fondamento metafisico della IV via”, ET, 398: “Nella
dimostrazione della creazione certamente si fa un passo avanti rispetto alla prima
dimostrazione dell’esistenza di Dio, ma è anche chiaro che se Dio non risultasse
creatore dell’essere come tale, Dio non sarebbe Dio e quindi quelle stesse prove
iniziali non sarebbero più in sé sufficienti”.
32
See C. FABRO, “Il fondamento metafisico della IV via”, ET, 399.
33
C. FABRO, “Il fondamento metafisico della IV via”, ET, 399.
34
I, q. 44, a. 1 ad 1: “Ex hoc quod aliquid est per participationem sequitur
quod sit causatum ab alio”. See also I, q. 65, a. 1: “Si enim diversa in aliquo
uniantur, necesse est huius unionis causam esse aliquam, non enim diversa
secundum se uniuntur. Et inde est quod, quandocumque in diversis invenitur
aliquid unum, oportet quod illa diversa illud unum ab aliqua una causa recipiant;
sicut diversa corpora calida habent calorem ab igne. Hoc autem quod est esse,
communiter invenitur in omnibus rebus, quantumcumque diversis. Necesse est
ergo esse unum essendi principium, a quo esse habeant quaecumque sunt
quocumque modo, sive sint invisibilia et spiritualia, sive sint visibilia et
corporalia”.
542
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
that in which the nature of the genus is first and perfectly found to be”35.
This formulation already contains the “metaphysical emergence of act”
which is at the foundation of the Fourth Way. Fabro explains that the notion
of imperfection depends on the notion of perfection. Perfection, in turn, is
act and being-in-act. In this way, the total dependence of all things on God
is attested to the diversity and multiplicity of their perfections which reveal
that they are limited and imperfect.
The argument from St. Thomas’s Commentary on the Sentences is
considered in the Summa contra Gentiles in terms of a “structural analysis at
the level of the unity and emergence of act” in order to provide the ultimate
reason for the universal dependence of the finite on the Infinite. Fabro
highlights four formulations found in Book II, ch. 15 and tries to evidence
the notional progression of the formulations.
2) Participation according to Diremtion or metaphysical alternative:
“For whatever belongs to a thing otherwise than as such, belongs to it
through some cause, as white to a man”36. The reason is that it is impossible
for any one thing to be predicated of two things unless one of the
predications involves causality. With regard to being, it is impossible that
there are two different things, neither of which has a cause. Either both
things have being by a cause or one is the cause of the other’s being (as in
the case of God and the creature)37.
3) Proof of degrees: “That which belongs to a thing by its nature, and
not by some other cause, cannot be diminished and deficient therein” 38.
When one thing belongs to another according to a gradation of more or less,
then it does not belong through its nature alone, but through some other
cause. “Consequently that [cause] will be the cause of all [the others] in a
certain genus, to which thing the predication of that genus belongs above
all; hence that which is hottest is seen to be the cause of heat in all things
hot, and that which is maxime lucidum is the cause of all things that have
35
In II Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 2: “Constat enim quod omne quod est in aliquo
genere imperfectum, oritur ab eo in quo primo et perfecte reperitur natura generis:
sicut patet de calore in rebus calidis ab igne”.
36
Summa contra Gentiles, II, ch. 15: “Omne enim quod alicui convenit non
secundum quod ipsum est, per aliquam causam convenit ei, sicut album homini”.
37
See C. FABRO, “Il fondamento metafisico della IV via”, ET, 401.
38
Summa contra Gentiles, II, ch. 15: “Quod alicui convenit ex sua natura,
non ex alia causa, minoratum in eo et deficiens esse non potest. Si enim naturae
aliquid essentiale subtrahitur vel additur, iam altera natura erit: sicut et in numeris
accidit”.
543
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
light. Now God is maxime ens”39. Fabro notes that the formulation is more
complicated, but at the same time theoretically more rigorous than that of
the Fourth Way of the Summa Theologiae.
4) Commonness and unity of act: “The order of causes should
correspond to the order of effects…. Wherefore, as proper effects are
reduced to their proper causes, so that which is common in proper effects
should be reduced to some common cause: … Now being is common to all.
Therefore above all causes there must be a cause to which it belongs to give
being”40. The argument is taken up and studied in Chapter 16: “The more
universal an effect, the higher its proper cause… Now esse is more universal
than to be moved… It follows therefore that above the cause which acts
only by causing movement and change, there is that cause which is the first
principle of being”41. Emergence of effects, emergence of causes up to the
first effect which is Esse as first constitutive and proper Act of the First
Cause.
5) Participation formulation: “That which is said per essentiam is the
cause of all which is said to be by participation: as fire is the cause of all
fiery things insofar as likewise. God then is ens by his essence: since he is
ipsum esse. Now every other ens is ens by participation: since the ens that is
its esse cannot be but one”42. Fabro comments that this is the Platonic
39
Summa contra Gentiles, II, ch. 15: “Quod igitur alicui minus convenit
quam aliis, non convenit ei ex sua natura tantum, sed ex alia causa. Illud igitur erit
causa omnium in aliquo genere cui maxime competit illius generis praedicatio:
unde et quod maxime calidum est videmus esse causam caloris in omnibus calidis,
et quod maxime lucidum causam omnium lucidorum. Deus autem est maxime
ens”.
40
Summa contra Gentiles, II, ch. 15: “Secundum ordinem effectuum oportet
esse ordinem causarum: [...]. Unde oportet quod, sicut effectus proprii reducuntur
in causas proprias, ita id quod commune est in effectibus propriis, reducatur in
aliquam causam communem: [...]. Omnibus autem commune est esse. Oportet
igitur quod supra omnes causas sit aliqua causa cuius sit dare esse”.
41
Summa contra Gentiles, II, ch. 16: “Quanto aliquis effectus est
universalior, tanto habet propriam causam altiorem: [...]. Esse autem est
universalius quam moveri: [...]. Oportet ergo quod supra causam quae non agit nisi
movendo et transmutando, sit illa causa quae est primum essendi principium”.
42
Summa contra Gentiles, II, ch. 15: “Quod per essentiam dicitur, est causa
omnium quae per participationem dicuntur: sicut ignis est causa omnium ignitorum
inquantum huiusmodi. Deus autem est ens per essentiam suam: quia est ipsum esse.
Omne autem aliud ens est ens per participationem: quia ens quod sit suum esse non
544
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
In light of this Fabro argues that the “resolutio in esse” provides the
authentic metaphysical foundation of the formula of the Fourth Way of the
Summa Theologiae. The third line mentioned above (De Causis) constitutes
the extrema ratio as a resolutio in Unum. Such a formula is found in De
Potentia, q. 7, a. 244. Here Fabro argues that we are dealing with a rigorous
procedure: first, because the foundation of the causality of esse is the point
of arrival of St. Thomas’s philosophical historiography45; second, because
there is a convergence, based on the argument of participation, in the
speculative moments of the causality of esse and the composition of essence
and esse in the demonstration of God’s existence46.
potest esse nisi unum ut in primo ostensum est. Deus igitur est causa essendi
omnibus aliis”.
43
C. FABRO, “Il fondamento metafisico della IV via”, ET, 402.
44
De Potentia, q. 7, a. 2: “Si [aliquae causae] in aliquo uno effectu
conveniunt, ille non est proprius alicuius earum, sed alicuius superioris, in cuius
virtute agunt; [...]. Omnes autem causae creatae communicant in uno effectu qui est
esse, licet singulae proprios effectus habeant, in quibus distinguuntur. Calor enim
facit calidum esse, et aedificator facit domum esse. Conveniunt ergo in hoc quod
causant esse, sed differunt in hoc quod ignis causat ignem, et aedificator causat
domum. Oportet ergo esse aliquam causam superiorem omnibus cuius virtute
omnia causent esse, et eius esse sit proprius effectus.Et haec causa est Deus”.
45
See De substantiis separatis, ch. 9; I, q. 44, a. 2; De Potentia, q. 3, a. 5.
46
Fabro’s second point argues that the rigor of the metaphysical procedure
of the Fourth Way is also attested to by the convergence towards the argument of
participation in two other fundamental speculative moments: the causality of esse
and the composition of essence and esse. “The Prologus, which intends to
demonstrate the existence of God, makes an explicit reference to the emergence of
esse thanks to the identity of esse and essence in God, unlike the composition that
is proper to creatures” (p. 405).
545
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
47
Earlier in the article (p. 395-396) Fabro presented two similar texts, I, q.
44, a. 2 and De Potentia, q. 3, a. 5, side by side.
48
See De substantiis separatis, ch. 9: “Paulatim enim humana ingenia
processisse videntur ad investigandam rerum originem. Primo namque in sola
exteriori mutatione, rerum originem consistere homines aestimaverunt. Dico autem
exteriorem originem, quae fit secundum accidentales transmutationes. Primi enim
philosophantes de naturis, rerum fieri statuerunt nihil esse aliud quam alterari; ita
quod id quod est rerum substantia, quam materiam nominabant, sit principium
primum penitus non causatum. Non enim distinctionem substantiae et accidentis
intellectu transcendere poterant”.
49
See De substantiis separatis, ch. 9: “Alii vero aliquantulum ulterius
procedentes, etiam ipsarum substantiarum originem investigaverunt, ponentes
aliquas substantias causam sui esse habere. Sed quia nihil praeter corpora mente
percipere poterant, resolvebant quidem corporales substantias in aliqua principia,
sed corporalia, ponentes ex quibusdam corporibus congregatis alia fieri, ac si rerum
origo in sola congregatione et segregatione consisteret”.
50
See De substantiis separatis, ch. 9: “Posteriores vero philosophi ulterius
processerunt, resolventes sensibiles substantias in partes essentiae, quae sunt
materia et forma: et sic fieri rerum naturalium in quadam transmutatione posuerunt,
secundum quod materia alternatim diversis formis subiicitur”.
51
Fabro argues that the attribution to Plato and Aristotle of this mode of
causality is certainly a speculative extension of their principles according to
Aquinas’s synthetic, intensive exegesis. See De substantiis separatis, ch. 9: “Sed
ultra hunc modum fiendi necesse est, secundum sententiam Platonis et Aristotelis,
ponere alium altiorem”.
546
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
For, since it is necessary that the First Principle be most simple, this must of
necessity be said to be not as participating in esse but Ipsum esse existens. But
because subsistent esse can be only one, as was pointed out above, then
necessarily all other things under it must be as participants in esse. Therefore
there must take place a certain common resolution in all such things according
as each of them is resolved by the intellect into that which is and its esse.
Therefore, above the mode of becoming (fieri), by which something becomes
when form comes to matter, we must presuppose another origin for things
according as esse is bestowed upon the whole universe of things by the First
Being that is its own esse52.
52
De substantiis separatis, ch. 9: “Cum enim necesse sit primum principium
simplicissimum esse, necesse est quod non hoc modo esse ponatur quasi esse
participans, sed quasi ipsum esse existens. Quia vero esse subsistens non potest
esse nisi unum, sicut supra habitum est, necesse est omnia alia quae sub ipso sunt,
sic esse quasi esse participantia. Oportet igitur communem quamdam resolutionem
in omnibus huiusmodi fieri, secundum quod unumquodque eorum intellectu
resolvitur in id quod est, et in suum esse. Oportet igitur supra modum fiendi quo
aliquid fit, forma materiae adveniente, praeintelligere aliam rerum originem,
secundum quod esse attribuitur toti universitati rerum a primo ente, quod est suum
esse”.
53
Lectura super Evangelium Ioannis, Prologus: “Quidam autem venerunt in
cognitionem Dei ex dignitate ipsius Dei: et isti fuerunt Platonici. Consideraverunt
enim quod omne illud quod est secundum participationem, reducitur ad aliquid
quod sit illud per suam essentiam, sicut ad primum et ad summum; sicut omnia
ignita per participationem reducuntur ad ignem, qui est per essentiam suam talis.
Cum ergo omnia quae sunt, participent esse, et sint per participationem entia,
necesse est esse aliquid in cacumine omnium rerum, quod sit ipsum esse per suam
essentiam, idest quod sua essentia sit suum esse: et hoc est Deus, qui est
sufficientissima, et dignissima, et perfectissima causa totius esse, a quo omnia quae
sunt, participant esse”.
547
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
Nature and Creature (1988), Aertsen brings out the correlation between the
history of philosophy and the systematic order of knowing: “the historical
reason is the discursive reason”. The historical way of philosophy proceeds
as a rational discursion; it goes from the many to the one; from what is
sensible to intelligible truth. “The historical way proceeds ‘by way of
resolution’ – in De substantiis separatis, the terms ‘to resolve’ and
‘resolution’ are used a number of times. It is a reduction to the ontologically
prior. Thomas places the history of philosophy in the perspective of the
question concerning the origin of being”54.
In the process of historical “analysis”, three main phases can be
distinguished: 1) In the first stage, becoming is dealt with only as
“alteration”, for each thing becomes from a being actually existing. 2) In the
second stage, philosophers “start from a primary matter which is purely
potential. Through the coming of form to this indeterminate subject, it is
brought into act. For these substantial changes (‘generation’) they accept
more general causes, such as the oblique circle of the sun according to
Aristotle or the Ideas according to Plato”55. This stage, as I, q. 44, a. 2
brings out, remains at the level of categorical or predicamental causality.
“Generation, whereby a form comes to matter, is ‘the making of a particular
being’, which explains the becoming of a being inasmuch as it is this, ‘but
not inasmuch as it is, universally’ (non autem in quantum est ens
universaliter), because there preexisted a being that is trans-form-ed into
this being”56. 3) The third and final stage begins when some thinkers raised
themselves up to the consideration of being as being (ens in quantum est
ens)57. In this ultimate, metaphysical analysis id quod est is reduced to its
esse:
These philosophers considered the causes of things not only insofar as the
things are these beings or such beings but also insofar as they are beings. They
were the only ones to have posited that reality in its totality was brought into
being by the first being, God. Human reflection thereby definitively transcends
the categorical level of becoming, of particular causality. This procession of all
being from the universal cause is not a process of becoming, because it no
longer presupposes anything. To produce being absolutely pertains to the
54
J. AERTSEN, Nature and Creature, 198.
55
J. AERTSEN, Nature and Creature, 199.
56
J. AERTSEN, Nature and Creature, 200.
57
In this regard we can recall In Boethii De Trinitate, q. 6, a. 1, which holds
that resolutio secundum rationem ends in the consideratio entis.
548
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
essence of creation58.
Aertsen concludes his reflection by showing how the three stages in the
history of the consideration of being correspond to a threefold distinction in
the structure of being, in causality59 and in “becoming”60. Graphically, these
three stages are as follows61:
58
J. AERTSEN, Nature and Creature, 200.
59
See In VI Metaph., lect. 3: “Invenitur autem in rebus triplex causarum
gradus. Est enim primo causa incorruptibilis et immutabilis, scilicet divina; sub hac
secundo est causa incorruptibilis, sed mutabilis; scilicet corpus caeleste; sub hac
tertio sunt causae corruptibiles et mutabiles. Hae igitur causae in tertio gradu
existentes sunt particulares, et ad proprios effectus secundum singulas species
determinatae: ignis enim generat ignem, et homo generat hominem, et planta
plantam”.
60
See In VIII Phys., lect. 2, 975: “Quorum primi consideraverunt causas
solarum mutationum accidentalium, ponentes omne fieri esse alterari: sequentes
vero pervenerunt ad cognitionem mutationum substantialium: postremi vero, ut
Plato et Aristoteles, pervenerunt ad cognoscendum principium totius esse”.
61
See J. AERTSEN, “La scoperta dell’ente in quanto ente”, 41-42.
62
C. FABRO, “Il nuovo problema dell’essere e la fondazione della
metafisica”, 481.
549
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
* * *
63
C. FABRO, “Il nuovo problema dell’essere e la fondazione della
metafisica”, 481-482.
550
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
64
C. FABRO, “Notes pour la fondation métaphysique de l’être”, Revue
Thomiste 74 (1966), 214-237. Reprinted in TPM, 291-317.
65
C. FABRO, “Notes pour la fondation métaphysique de l’être”, TPM, 291.
551
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
l’Être). Ens, for St. Thomas, is immediately evident and is the quasi-
notissimum. In the first notion of ens, there is a content (quod, Was) and an
act or existential fact (Dass). However, neither the essence as object, nor
existence as realization is “consistent” by itself and without the other. Ens,
therefore, appears as a synthesis-in-act and not as the foundation66. An
ulterior step of metaphysical reflection is needed whereby the essence and
existence are founded on Being (l’Être). At the beginning of such a
reflection, this Être is not identified with God; such an understanding of the
relationship between Being and God occurs only at the end of metaphysical
reflection. In the middle stages of metaphysical reflection, we deal with esse
in the sense of “act of being” and the “act of all acts”.
Fabro first deals with the problem of how esse as act of all acts is
discovered. Fabro begins by eliminating experience, demonstration and
abstraction as possibilities:
Fabro argues that, according to St. Thomas, esse as the act of all acts is
grasped by “reduction” or resolution, which is seen as a passage of act to
act. In this resolution-passage, the Thomistic real distinction between
66
C. FABRO, “Notes pour la fondation métaphysique de l’être”, TPM, 291:
“Dans l’ens il y a un contenu, le quod (Was), et il y a un acte ou fait existentiel
(Dass). Mais ni l’un ni l’autre ne sont consistants de par soi, ni l’essence comme
objet, et par davantage l’existence comme réalisation: l’ens quant à lui est une
synthèse en acte, et par conséquent un résultat: il ne peut donc pas se présenter
comme fondement”.
67
C. FABRO, “Notes pour la fondation métaphysique de l’être”, TPM, 291-
292: “Dès lors, l’essence et l’existence seront à leur tour fondées dans l’Être. Mais
dans la réflexion, cet Être ne peut être d’abord Dieu – tout au plus le sera-t-il
seulement à la fin. La conscience doit partir de son immédiate convergence à l’être
du monde: mais qu’est alors cet acte d’être, qui est un au-delà de l’essence et de
l’existence, et cependant n’est pas Dieu ? Il doit être, cet esse, l’acte de tout acte;
mais comment le découvrons-nous ? Par expérience ou par démonstration ? Par
expérience, nous connaissons le fait de l’existence (la nôtre et celle d’autrui); par
démonstration, nous obtenons, par exemple, l’exigence de l’existence de Dieu; par
réflexion ou abstraction, nous accédons aux essences des choses”.
552
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
essentia and esse – and not the Scholastic distinction between essentia and
existential – has a central role68.
In a recent article, A. Contat comments on the passages we have just
summarized and successfully integrates them with Fabro’s earlier texts on
the metaphysical passage of the mind from an initial notion of esse to the
second “methodological-structural” notion of esse and to the third
“intensive” notion of esse. Contat asks how is it that the intellect can come
to the “notion” of a metaphysical principle – esse ut actus – which
transcends the order of the essences and, therefore, does not seem to enter
into the sphere of that which can be conceptualized. Contat’s synthesis of
Fabro’s thought and response to the problem is highly illuminating and
brings out the fact that there is a resolution into an act and correlative
potency at every stage of the itinerary of the metaphysical passage:
The solution to this problem depends on the specific epistemological status that
Fabro assigns to the procedure by means of which one rises to intensive being
as the ultimate foundation of ens. The cognitive procedures that Aquinas
inherited from Aristotle are necessary, but not sufficient, in order to accede to
such esse ut actus. By means of external experience and the judgment of
existence, one touches the existent; thanks to abstraction, one objectifies the
quiddity or essence; by means of demonstration, one affirms the existence of
God: thus one successively comes to ens commune, to the categories, to the
First Mover. This inventive itinerary should be accompanied, at every stage, by
a corresponding “reduction” or “resolution”, which makes the actuality proper
to the epistemological level, on which one finds themselves, appear, and which
evidences, by contrast, the potency correlative to such actuality. Therefore, we
are dealing with an ontological analysis, whose proper characteristic is that of
hierarchizing the instances which result from it. In this way, there is an initial
resolutio of ens in the common notion of esse commune (a), complementary to
the thing which has it; then one undertakes a methodological resolutio of ens,
within its quadripartite division, in the Aristotelian couplet of ou=sia and
evne,rgeia, interpreted by Fabro as the couplet of quidditas and esse in actu (b);
and finally, one comes to the ultimate metaphysical resolutio of ens in the
68
C. FABRO, “Notes pour la fondation métaphysique de l’être”, TPM, 292:
“D’après saint Thomas, l’esse comme actus omnium actuum est saisi, semble-t-il,
non proprement par abstraction, ce qui vaut pour les essences, mais par ‘réduction’
ou résolution, ce qui est un passage d’acte à acte. D’où la centralité en thomisme de
la distinction réelle d’essence et esse qui constitue le point de référence de la
présente étude, comme la distinction entre essentia et existentia de la scolastique
décadente s’est imposée à la problématique la plus profonde de la Kehre
heideggérienne tant contestée”.
553
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
twofold opposition between Esse subsistens and esse inhaerens, the latter of
which is esse ut actus limited by essentia, i.e., intensive being (c). In this way,
the intellect undertakes “a passage from act to act”, thanks to which one
achieves, each time, something real, moreover something most real, which
surpasses the order of the form, and is not, then, the object of a quidditative
concept, but rather the object of a “notion” which contemplates a perfection
achieved by means of a judgment69.
Towards the end of his article, Fabro attempts a clarification of his thought
on the ultimate metaphysical resolutio of ens in the opposition between
Ipsum Esse subsistens and esse inhaerens70.
In his article, Fabro is quite frank and states that it is not easy to show
the process of this “resolution”. Without explicitly referring to the work,
Fabro recalls the results of his Percezione e pensiero on the initial
manifestation of the real to our consciousness and the two “moments” of
content (essence) and act (existence). The problem of foundation of the real
is different from that of its perception, since we come to the foundation of
the content (essence), moving – by means of reflection – from the
characteristics of a being (a tree, for example), which are obtained through
experience, to the “common type” of this being (the universal essence of
“tree”)71. In the foundation of act, act as such, does not require an ulterior
foundation, but only if it is truly act. Existence, however, which is
experienced, is not simply an act; it is rather a “fact” which presents the
69
A. CONTAT, “Le figure della differenza ontologica…”, 119-120.
70
See De Potentia, q. 1, a. 1: “Ponimus ergo in Deo substantiam et esse, sed
substantiam ratione subsistentiae non ratione substandi; esse vero ratione
simplicitatis et complementi, non ratione inhaerentiae, qua alteri inhaeret”. Ibid., q.
7, a. 2 ad 7: “Modus significandi in dictionibus quae a nobis rebus imponuntur
sequitur modum intelligendi; dictiones enim significant intellectuum conceptiones,
ut dicitur in principio periher.. Intellectus autem noster hoc modo intelligit esse quo
modo invenitur in rebus inferioribus a quibus scientiam capit, in quibus esse non
est subsistens, sed inhaerens. Ratio autem invenit quod aliquod esse subsistens sit:
et ideo licet hoc quod dicunt esse, significetur per modum concreationis, tamen
intellectus attribuens esse Deo transcendit modum significandi, attribuens Deo id
quod significatur, non autem modum significandi”. In Boethii De Hebdomadibus,
lect. 2: “Id autem erit solum vere simplex, quod non participat esse, non quidem
inhaerens, sed subsistens”.
71
See C. FABRO, “Notes pour la fondation métaphysique de l’être”, TPM,
292: “Comme fondement du contenu de l’essence (…cet arbre), les caractères de
l’expérience même suffisent pour remonter (par la réflexion) au type commun
d’arbre, qui est l’essence universelle”.
554
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
73
See C. FABRO, “Notes pour la fondation métaphysique de l’être”, TPM,
309: “Il est certes vrai, précisons-le tout de suite, que saint Thomas lui aussi
reconnaît la structure dualiste du réel dans les couples de fini e Infini, matière et
forme, essence et esse, sujet et objet, créature et Créateur. Il est vrai qu’il pose
comme couronnement de l’édifice métaphysique la dépendance causale, et par le
fait même conçoit le fini et l’imparfait comme créature et l’Infini très parfait
comme Créateur ; mais la détermination originaire de la Diremtion fondamentale
de ens comme synthèse-opposition d’essentia et esse tient par elle-même et
précède, fonde même à sa manière, la résolution causale”.
74
C. FABRO, “Notes pour la fondation métaphysique de l’être”, TPM, 310.
75
See C. FABRO, “Notes pour la fondation métaphysique de l’être”, TPM,
311: “La formule dit en effet que Dieu est en toutes choses… per essentiam,
praesentiam et potentiam, et le ‘per essentiam’ se réfère – précise le saint Docteur
– à l’essence divine immanente, car celle-ci est plus présente aux choses que les
choses ne le sont à elles-mêmes, en tant qu’elle est la cause de leur esse, de leurs
facultés et de leur agir (art. 3 ad 1). Il est clair dès lors que cette immanence
transcendantale dans les choses – présence essentielle et transcendance total à la
fois – est propre à Dieu (art. 4)”.
76
See C. FABRO, “Notes pour la fondation métaphysique de l’être”, TPM,
311: “Il n’en va pas ainsi au contraire dans la conception thomiste authentique, où
cette distinction fonde le moment métaphysique constitutif tant par rapport à Dieu
556
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
not everything is clear: one could object that while esse is certainly first act,
it is so only insofar as it is conceived as a “relation” and is founded on
causal dependence. To respond to this objection, Fabro says that we should
consider the “quality” of esse in the primacy (primitivité) of the relation of
thought to being: Esse is not conceived as a “relation” by St. Thomas, but as
an act and supreme perfection. Our discovery of esse as act, he argues, is not
linear, but concentric: “The itinerary of this discovery and foundation of
esse is not linear, more geometrico, but quasi-concentric, by successive
deepened study of the first and constitutive perception which is given by
thought as such”77. In this way, Fabro ties in the theme of ens as the first
apprehension of the intellect, i.e., metaphysical reflection is not merely a
journey from one thing to another, but rather a continual, yet progressive
return to ens, which was grasped in the beginning78. Fabro outlines his
argument in three points:
1) Initial apprehension of esse within the apprehension of ens: The
implicit, yet founding perception of esse takes place in the originary
apprehension of ens: “Illud quod primo intellectus concipit quasi
notissimum et in quod omnes conceptiones resolvit est ens”79. The
notissimum is ens, as composed in act (id quod habet esse) of essence (real
and concrete) and esse (the interior act)80.
2) Explicit, indirect apprehension of esse as act: Then, there is a kind
of grasping of esse as act, which one could say is explicit, yet, at the same
time, indirect and obtained from this first apprehension. The mind is
presented with the reality of the world in act; there is a grasping of this
“being before oneself” which can be called the indirect apprehension of esse
as act, since that which qualifies the real as “presence” in act is the act of the
content, and not the content as such (the essence). This explicit, indirect
81
See C. FABRO, “Notes pour la fondation métaphysique de l’être”, TPM,
312-313.
82
See C. FABRO, “Notes pour la fondation métaphysique de l’être”, TPM,
313.
83
See C. FABRO, “Notes pour la fondation métaphysique de l’être”, TPM,
314.
558
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
* * *
One of the novelties in this article is the attention given to the role of
the demonstration of the existence of God and the latter stages of
metaphysical resolution. This involves the determination of the
84
C. FABRO, “Notes pour la fondation métaphysique de l’être”, TPM, 314.
85
See C. FABRO, “Notes pour la fondation métaphysique de l’être”, TPM,
314-315.
86
See C. FABRO, “Notes pour la fondation métaphysique de l’être”, TPM,
315: “En thomisme, au contraire, l’esse est constitutif immanent, et ainsi le rapport
de la créature au Créateur comme dépendance dans l’esse n’est pas de nature
expulsive, mais contentive au suprême degré”.
87
C. FABRO, “Notes pour la fondation métaphysique de l’être”, TPM, 316.
559
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
88
C. FABRO, “The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse and the Ground of
Metaphysics”, International Philosophical Quarterly 6 (1966), 389-427.
560
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
Put more simply, Fabro is setting the parameters within which one may
establish ens as primum cognitum of the intellect, the development of
knowledge as an “explicitation” of what is already implicit in ens and the
method of resolution as the philosophical reflection by which one both
recognizes ens as the starting point and foundation and understands the
initial development of the intellect. This initial development of the intellect
concerns the first notions, some of which are determined to be the
transcendental properties of ens qua ens – hence Fabro’s article makes
reference to the “transcendental structure” of consciousness. With this
preamble, Fabro concludes that the problem of the apprehension of ens is
key to understanding the originality of St. Thomas’s position. This
89
C. FABRO, “The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse…”, 402-403. Fabro’s lists
five requirements; I have combined the first two into one.
561
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
90
C. FABRO, “The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse…”, 404.
91
C. FABRO, “The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse…”, 407: “In the principal
text of the Thomistic doctrine we can distinguish three moments: the appearing of
ens, the all-comprehensive actuating of itself, and it intentional expansion both in
the univocal predicamental sphere and in the properly analogous transcendental
sphere. The procedure is extremely rigorous and perhaps constitutes the most dense
and formal text in the whole history of Western thought”.
92
De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1: “Dicendum, quod sicut in demonstrabilibus oportet
fieri reductionem in aliqua principia per se intellectui nota, ita investigando quid
est unumquodque; alias utrobique in infinitum iretur, et sic periret omnino scientia
et cognitio rerum. Illud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, et
in quod conceptiones omnes resolvit, est ens, ut Avicenna dicit in principio suae
metaphysicae. Unde oportet quod omnes aliae conceptiones intellectus accipiantur
ex additione ad ens. Sed enti non possunt addi aliqua quasi extranea per modum
quo differentia additur generi, vel accidens subiecto, quia quaelibet natura est
essentialiter ens”.
562
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
[1] Because ens expresses the first actuation of esse, res and the other
transcendentals, inasmuch as they follow upon ens, are in “some
manner” already contained in ens.
[2] The transcendentals do not add anything to “expand” ens, they make
explicit what is implicit in ens.
93
C. FABRO, “The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse…”, 407-408: “First of all,
the method proper to metaphysics is affirmed. It is neither analysis nor synthesis
but reductio: “Sicut in demonstrabilibus oportet fieri reductionem in aliqua
principia per se intellectui nota, ita investigando quid est unumquodque; alias
utrobique in infinitum iretur, et sic periret omnino scientia et cognitio rerum”. The
term reductio appears to be proper to St. Thomas and does not indicate so much a
merely logical process of clarification of explicative resolution (resolvit) as rather
the “return to fundament” and therefore a process of intensive and comprehensive
foundation that the rationalistic tradition in the West has completely forgotten”.
94
See C. FABRO, “The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse…”, 408.
95
See C. FABRO, “The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse…”, 409.
96
See C. FABRO, “The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse…”, 409.
563
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
Just as the movement of irradiation ens becomes explicitated, that is, expands
into the most disparate forms of knowledge in their principles and by means of
them into the various methods and conclusions that are proper to the different
sciences and kinds of knowledge, so, too, in the movement of convergence,
that is, of constitutive reflection on the foundation, the spirit, which is openness
to all by its nature, carries back the manifold principles to first principles, in
order to resolve at last the first principles themselves into the primordial
presence of ens98.
97
See C. FABRO, “The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse…”, 412:
98
C. FABRO, “The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse…”, 415. See I, q. 94, a. 2:
“Primum principium indemonstrabile est quod non est simul affirmare et negare,
quod fundatur supra rationem entis et non entis, et super hoc principio omnia alia
fundantur”.
99
C. FABRO, “The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse…”, 415.
100
Fabro’s reference the double dialectic is explained further on. In light of
Heidegger’s objections, Fabro argues for an essential and mutual
interconnectedness of the being-in-act of ens with the being-in-act of consciousness
and of consciousness with ens.
564
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
101
See C. FABRO, “The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse…”, 416-420.
102
C. FABRO, “The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse…”, 417.
103
I assume Fabro is referring to De Veritate, q. 21, a. 1: “Omnis enim
positio absoluta aliquid in rerum natura existens significat”.
104
C. FABRO, “The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse…”, 417.
105
C. FABRO, “The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse…”, 417.
565
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
106
C. FABRO, “The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse…”, 418.
107
C. FABRO, “The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse…”, 419.
108
C. FABRO, “The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse…”, 419.
566
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
In this “resolution to the ground” one must always insist on act and on the
requirement of an act that stands in itself and does not wane, and this is only
esse, unlike essence, which sinks into the predicaments and belongs to the
noetic sphere of the possible. We have thus an ascending of act to act by
perfective degrees from the predicamental to the transcendental. In the
predicamental order there is the emerging of substantial and accidental esse:
“Since ens properly signifies something being in act (esse in actu), and act
properly correlates to potency; in consequence, something is simply called ens,
accordingly as it is primarily distinguished from that which is only in
potentiality. And this is precisely each thing’s substantial being. Hence by its
substantial being, everything is called ens simply; but by any further actuality
that is added it is said to be relatively (esse secundum quid)”109. In the
ontological metaphysical order there is the emergence of the pure perfections,
such as life, wisdom and, in general, the activity of the spirit, over the material
perfections, inasmuch as the former by their belonging to the sphere of the
spirit participate more fully in esse: “Therefore, if these [life per se, wisdom
per se] which are the principles of the others, are not unless by participation in
esse, to a greater degree, those that participate in them, are not unless by
participation in esse ipsum”110.
In the transcendental order there are two moments: 1) The emergence of ens
over the other transcendentals as their principle and ground, owing to esse,
which is the act of every act and the perfection of every perfection. In this
reduction to ground, the operative principle is the emergence of act111, i.e.,
esse effectuates the transcending of act to act; 2) Esse is not only the ground
for the derivation of the transcendentals, but also the terminus of the return
of their dialectic. From this perspective one can outline a “metaphysics of
act” which, “taking from modern philosophy the requirement of radicality or
absolute emergence of the theoretical act, traces it back to the apprehension
109
I, q. 5, a. 1 ad 1: “Nam cum ens dicat aliquid proprie esse in actu; actus
autem proprie ordinem habeat ad potentiam; secundum hoc simpliciter aliquid
dicitur ens, secundum quod primo discernitur ab eo quod est in potentia tantum.
Hoc autem est esse substantiale rei uniuscuiusque; unde per suum esse substantiale
dicitur unumquodque ens simpliciter. Per actus autem superadditos, dicitur aliquid
esse secundum quid”.
110
C. FABRO, “The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse…”, 422. See In V De
Divinis Nominibus, lect. 1, n. 639: “Ergo si ista [per se vita, per se sapientia] quae
sunt principia aliorum, non sunt nisi per participationem essendi, multo magis ea
quae participant ipsis, non sunt nisi per participationem ipsius esse”.
111
See C. FABRO, “The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse…”, 422.
567
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
of ens as the all-embracing act of the presentation of the real to the mind and
the mind to itself”112.
Fabro explains this procedure of “tracing” the emergence of act to the
apprehension of ens in the last section of the article, entitled: “Radicality of
philosophical procedure concerning being”. In this regard, Fabro makes two
clarifications: 1) a clarification concerning the origin of the notion of ens; 2)
the second concerning the locus intentionalis of esse or actus essendi, i.e.,
the phase or function of the mind that grasps reality insofar as it is in act.
1) With regard to the origin of the notion of ens, Fabro notes how St.
Thomas often affirms that ens is the primum cognitum, but almost says
nothing on how the human mind grasps such a notion113. Some of St.
Thomas’s youthful texts seem to indicate that the ratio entis arises in the
mind through an abstractive process. This, Fabro argues, is insufficient for
“authentic Thomism”. Fabro’s argument is based on two fundamental
characteristics of the notion of ens. 1) First, the notion of ens is the noetic
ground of the first principles. Thus, if abstraction presupposes the notio
entis and is founded on the knowledge of the first principles, “then the
original apprehension of the notio entis, which precedes everything and is
presupposed in everything, cannot be merely the effect of abstraction in the
ordinary sense”114. 2) Secondly, the notion of ens embraces two “elements”:
essence (content) and esse (actus essendi). Because it includes both, “the
origin of the notio entis can in no wise be referred to the process which
abstracts only essence”115.
Aristotle had recognized that being is not a genus, but only because of its
extremely indeterminate content which finds its proper determination in the
categories. For St. Thomas, if we understand him correctly, ens escapes every
logical classification because, thanks to esse, it indicates the exercise in act of
reality, that is, being in act, which is for the mind the starting point and
constitutes the fundamental act of its operation. […] Insofar as the notio entis
properly includes esse as its distinguishing characteristic, it rivets and connects
consciousness of necessity to reality in act, from which, for this reason, the
mind cannot abstract. […] Just as the notio entis is a synthesis of content and
act, so also it is a certain ineffable form of “conjoint apprehension” of content
on the part of mind and of act on the part of experience: not, be it noted well,
on the part of any sort of experience, that is, not the mere fact of existence, but
112
C. FABRO, “The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse…”, 423.
113
See C. FABRO, “The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse…”, 423.
114
C. FABRO, “The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse…”, 424.
115
C. FABRO, “The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse…”, 424.
568
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
The above texts evidence two things about Fabro’s view on the
apprehension of esse: first, that the initial apprehension of esse which is
properly included in the initial apprehension of ens is different from the
knowledge of esse achieved at the end of metaphysical reflection; second,
that the term “reduction to fundament” or “resolution to ground” can refer to
either the return to ens as the foundation of the transcendentals or to the
ascension of thought through the predicamental order to the transcendental
one, where esse emerges as the act of all acts or perfection of all perfections.
2) With regard to the locus intentionalis of esse, Fabro adamantly
affirms that the grasping of reality insofar as it is in act, “stands poles apart
from abstraction and cannot be an object of abstracting reflection properly
so-called, but only of direct and immediate apprehension”117. Thomists who
attempt to resolve the question of the initial apprehension of ens as a
grasping of essence in an apprehension and a grasping of esse in judgment
invoke texts which Fabro argues does not deal with the question at hand118.
Such texts deal with the function of two operations of the intellect which
divide the two-fold content of the notion of ens, essence and actus essendi.
The notion of ens precedes both res and verum in the grounding of the
transcendentals119.
In his conclusion, Fabro expresses his hope that Thomistic
metaphysics will no longer have its center in a treatise on substance and the
categories, but instead in one concerning the transcendentals (ens, res,
unum, aliquid, verum, bonum, pulchrum). Such a theory of transcendentality
can be discovered in the profound and authentic Thomistic notion of
participation. It also means that Thomism be intensified around the tension
in ens of quod est (essentia) and esse (actus essendi). These observations, he
notes, await further development.
116
C. FABRO, “The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse…”, 424-425.
117
C. FABRO, “The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse…”, 425.
118
In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1 ad 7; In I Sent., d. 37, q. 1, a. 3; In Boethii De
Trinitate, q. 5, a. 3.
119
I assume that by referring to res, Fabro refers to essence and the role of
abstraction; by referring to verum, Fabro refers to esse and the role of “est” in a
judgment.
569
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
* * *
570
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
The apprehension of esse in ens is not something abstract and derived, but
rather, concrete and primary: not, however, in its fullness and purity, since then
we would have the direct apprehension or intuition of God who is the Esse
ipsum, [...]. According to St. Thomas we apprehend ens and not properly esse:
in ens thought esse is included as its act and just as to apprehend ambulans we
should apprehend ambulare, so also apprehending ens [...] we should
apprehend esse. Do we apprehend the esse that is implicit in ens, like ambulare
in ambulans? In my opinion, to say that it is implicit is to say too little here: as
I can apprehend (perceive) ambulans insofar as I perceive its ambulare, so I
perceive ens, perceiving esse.
With this premise, Fabro begins his explanation of the importance of our
initial apprehension of ens and divides it into five points.
1) In the first point, Fabro affirms that ens is the primum cognitum
(the first object of knowledge) and the first transcendental (the founding
beginning that illuminates all other knowledge). He recalls the De Veritate
text (q. 1, a. 1) and the roles of resolutio and additio in contrast to
Scholastic abstractio. That all other concepts of the intellect are received by
additions to ens does not refer to an extrinsic, formal determination of ens,
but rather to a process of making explicit what is implicit.
2) Ens is the primum cognitum insofar as it is knowable and also the
primum cognitum faciens conoscere. In the formalistic tradition, the first
120
C. FABRO, L’uomo e il rischio di Dio, 363-372.
571
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
121
C. FABRO, L’uomo e il rischio di Dio, 367.
122
C. FABRO, L’uomo e il rischio di Dio, 367.
123
C. FABRO, L’uomo e il rischio di Dio, 368.
572
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
therefore has need of being actuated and illuminated, i.e., being made present.
Essence is founded on esse and not vice versa, insofar as every essence is a
possibility, a modality, or rather participation of being, namely, it is a certain
determinate content to be actuated by esse. I understand that these [...]. The
apprehension of concepts in every field, the formulation of judgments and
activity of reasoning and demonstration in every intentional sphere...
necessarily come to a head in that first sparkle in consciousness of esse as act
of ens124.
124
C. FABRO, L’uomo e il rischio di Dio, 368-369.
125
C. FABRO, L’uomo e il rischio di Dio, 369.
126
See C. FABRO, L’uomo e il rischio di Dio, 369.
573
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
127
C. FABRO, L’uomo e il rischio di Dio, 370-371.
574
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
knowing subject is initially in act in the sphere of being and not in the
sphere of knowing. With respect to the object of knowing, the esse of ens is
the object of knowing, yet not as the content (essence), but rather as the
presentating of the content and, thus, like the containing act of the
content128. Fabro continues:
* * *
134
C. FABRO, “L’esse tomistico e la ripresa della metafisica”, 282.
135
C. FABRO, “L’esse tomistico e la ripresa della metafisica”, 282-283:
“While in modern thought the synthetic function of thought is always postulated
and never founded, in the Thomistic conception, according to which ens is the id
quod primo intellectus intelligit, such syntheticity is originary and constitutive for
real thought, which analyticity is reserved to formal thought, namely, to the
knowledge of contents of the essence: thus, in the first Thomistic plexus of ens as
id quod est, quod habet esse, the constitutive relation of thought is presented, in the
twofold and dialectical movement of the relation of consciousness to being and of
being to consciousness. Together, and by comparison, in the originary plexus of
ens, as id quod habet esse, the constitutive form to express the real is presented,
which is accessible to consciousness, in the duplicity of subject and act or of form
and content, which is announced already directly – even though implicitly, but
firmly – in ens as synthesis or real composition of essentia and esse as actus
essendi. Thus, it is that in Thomistic thought, unlike the formalism or essentialism
of Scholasticism and of the conscienzialismo or humanism (or anthropocentrism if
you prefer!) of modern thought, one should say that the ‘first plexus’ (of ens – id
quod habet esse) is in agreement with and is theoretically explicated in se by the
‘first nexus’ (essentia – esse, actus essendi) in that which with Hegel one call the
constitutive Diremption or syntheticity of thought”.
136
C. FABRO, “L’esse tomistico e la ripresa della metafisica”, 283.
137
C. FABRO, “L’esse tomistico e la ripresa della metafisica”, 291-292.
577
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
may be called: “the most intense or intensive plexus and, at the same time,
the most universal and constitutive nexus for the intentionality of the real or
of passing in act of consciousness”138. Fabro gathers his reflections into two
points: ens is a primum fundans for knowledge; ens is the first plexus
(content and act) and first nexus (essence and esse).
1) For St. Thomas, the apprehension of ens is presented as the primum
fundamentum fundans for knowledge. This is not merely a primum in the
psychological order, but also a primum in the order of absolute foundation:
“Primo in conceptione cadit ens, quia secundum hoc unumquodque
cognoscibile est in quantum est actu”139. Ens is also the “specificative
transcendental” for the mind: “Illud quod primo acquiritur ab intellectu est
ens et id in quo no invenitur ratio entis, non est capibile ab intellectu”140.
The primum of knowledge is “the trascendentale fundans, which is ens that
precedes both the concrete and the abstract and contains them both”141.
138
C. FABRO, “L’esse tomistico e la ripresa della metafisica”, 295. Fabro
continues: “In fact, ens is the most concrete semantic-term insofar as it indicates
the real concrete “in act” of being and the concrete is in act not in any way, but
according to the ultimate determination of concreteness which is that of having
esse: ens as that which has being, that which is plexus of essence and of act of
being as actus or virtus essendi. This point, which is the beginning of Parmenides
according to the principle that ‘without being there is no thought’, was sent back to
the shadow with the emergence given by Plato and by Aristotle to the “form” or to
the act resolved into form and essence was made, therefore, the fundament of being
(forma dat esse). The Thomistic revolution was in the promotion, of Neo-platonic
inspiration, of esse from founded to founding and, therefore, in the radical
overcoming of Platonic-Aristotelian formalism; the Thomistic position is
presented, then, emergent by the contrast of Plato-Aristotle, as the only original,
valid re-taking of the Parmenidean instance, it is the authentic “step backward”
(Schritt zurück) of Heidegger which permits a valid retaking up of metaphysics.
For that to happen it is necessary that the first plexus of ens express, at the same
time, the first nexus, or fundamental demand of knowing and the fundamental
structure of being” (295-296).
139
I, q. 5, a. 2.
140
In Librum De Causis, lect. 6.
141
C. FABRO, “L’esse tomistico e la ripresa della metafisica”, 296-297.
Further on Fabro returns to the theme of ens including both content and act: “In
fact, Thomistic ens expresses the first, integral re-taking up of the Parmenidean
instance of truth – as daring as it may seem – from within of the tension-opposition
of the transcendence of Platonic form as of the concreteness of Aristotelian act.
[…] In fact, ens reveals and satisfies the demand of the principle as beginning and
of principle as fundament: it is the absolutely indeterminate in the formal line of
578
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
2) Ens as first plexus expresses the first nexus. Fabro explains what he
means by contrasting the Scholastic and Thomistic approach to knowledge
of reality. Scholasticism which conceives valid knowledge in terms of the
pure abstraction of the universal and the foundation of such abstraction of
the essence places the primordial evidence of the first principles of identity
and non-contradiction. In Thomism, one does not stop the reductio or
resolutio in fundamentum at the abstract, first principles, but proceeds
further and founds such principles on ens. The evidence of the predicative
plexus of subject and predicate is founded on the fundament of the plexus of
act and subject in the form of ens: “Ens, in fact, which is the fundament of
all significability […] il notissimum and in quod intellectus omnes
conceptions resolvit, is, at the same time, and consequently, the sustenance
and the point of double derivation: on the one hand, of the transcendentals,
and on the other, of the first principles, or of the two constitutive moments
of the fundamental theoretical act”142. With respect to the transcendentals, I-
II, q. 55, a. 1 ad 1 states that: “Id quod cadit in intellectu est ens. Unde
unicuique apprehenso a nobis attribuimus quod sit ens, et per consequens
quod sit unum et bonum, quae convertuntur cum ente”. With respect to the
first principles, St. Thomas expresses this in a synthetic way: “That which,
before all else, falls under apprehension, is ens, the notion of which is
included in all things whatsoever a man apprehends. Wherefore the first
indemonstrable principle is that ‘the same thing cannot be affirmed and
denied at the same time’, which is based on the notion of ens and non ens:
and on this principle all others are based”143. And also in an analytical way:
Now for the purpose of making this evident it must be noted that, since the
intellect has two operations, one by which it knows quiddities, which is called
content, since it does not indicate any particular content of essence – as id quod
habet esse, can be anything, from a microbe and the infinitely small particle of
matter to the supreme dignity and reality of the spirit. But ens is also completely
determined as regards act: in fact, it means the exercise in act of the act of being
(esse) which is the act of all acts and the perfection of all perfections. Thus, by the
fact that habet esse, ens has in act all that which esse actuates, that is, everything,
namely, presupposes in act (in ens) all its determinations of the substantial form up
to the ultimate qualities and actualities of the real existent” (299).
142
C. FABRO, “L’esse tomistico e la ripresa della metafisica”, 300.
143
I-II, q. 94, a. 2: “Est ens, [id] cuius intellectus includitur in omnibus
quaecumque quis apprehendit. Et ideo primum principium indemonstrabile est
quod non est simul affirmare et negare, quod fundatur supra rationem entis et non
entis, et super hoc principio omnia alia fundantur”.
579
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
144
In IV Metaph., lect. 6, n. 605: “Ad huius autem evidentiam sciendum est,
quod, cum duplex sit operatio intellectus: una, qua cognoscit quod quid est, quae
vocatur indivisibilium intelligentia: alia, qua componit et dividit: in utroque est
aliquod primum: in prima quidem operatione est aliquod primum, quod cadit in
conceptione intellectus, scilicet hoc quod dico ens; nec aliquid hac operatione
potest mente concipi, nisi intelligatur ens. Et quia hoc principium, impossibile est
esse et non esse simul, dependet ex intellectu entis, sicut hoc principium, omne
totum est maius sua parte, ex intellectu totius et partis: ideo hoc etiam principium
est naturaliter primum in secunda operatione intellectus, scilicet componentis et
dividentis. Nec aliquis potest secundum hanc operationem intellectus aliquid
intelligere, nisi hoc principio intellecto. Sicut enim totum et partes non intelliguntur
nisi intellecto ente, ita nec hoc principium omne totum est maius sua parte, nisi
intellecto praedicto principio firmissimo”.
145
See C. FABRO, “L’esse tomistico e la ripresa della metafisica”, 301.
580
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
146
C. FABRO, “L’esse tomistico e la ripresa della metafisica”, 302.
147
C. FABRO, “L’esse tomistico e la ripresa della metafisica”, 303.
148
See C. FABRO, “L’esse tomistico e la ripresa della metafisica”, 303.
149
C. FABRO, “L’esse tomistico e la ripresa della metafisica”, 304.
581
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
In this way, Scholasticism makes the truth of Being depends on the truth of
the essence: this means that thought proceeds exclusively by synthesis and
analysis, by affirmation and negation. St. Thomas’s position is different:
150
C. FABRO, “L’esse tomistico e la ripresa della metafisica”, 304.
151
C. FABRO, “L’esse tomistico e la ripresa della metafisica”, 305.
582
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
surprising that Heidegger hasn’t noticed, perhaps even he has been betrayed by
the Suarezian-Wolffian tradition of rationalism and German enlightenment152.
With the ultimate reduction or “step backward” to “esse ipsum” as act of all
acts, thought has made the return to the fundament asked for by Heidegger, as
to its primary foundation. The process of this foundation is not by
demonstration in the proper sense, but by reduction or by the passage of act to
act: moving from the accidental actuations to the substantial formal act and
ultimately to actus essendi as the act of all acts. Here the spirit then moves to
the second foundation which is that from the participated actus essendi to Esse
per essentiam and this ultimate foundation comes by demonstration: however it
is a demonstration that has a synthetic character since it corresponds, by
elevation, to the plexus of the notion of ens on which it is founded and cannot
be analytic. The knowledge of the real is and must be, for a finite intellect like
ours – synthetic – in spite of the attempts of Hegel and Heidegger. The reality
of the finite is attested to in the plexus of ens and is not resolved in the
appearing of Being; thus, the reality of the Infinite which is Esse subsistens is
required by the nexus of the foundation of the plexus of ens, namely in the real
tension-dialectic of essentia-actus essendi which brings one from ens per
participationem to Esse per essentiam153.
152
C. FABRO, “L’esse tomistico e la ripresa della metafisica”, 305-306.
153
C. FABRO, “L’esse tomistico e la ripresa della metafisica”, 306.
583
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
essence and esse, which satisfies the demands of modern thought154. For St.
Thomas, esse as actus essendi is the first act and the principle-fundament of
every form, essence, perfection and reality in act155. While it is true that at
times St. Thomas calls the essence “esse”, this is not esse as actus essendi.
Fabro argues that no Thomistic text confuses esse with the abstract entitas:
[1] “Ipsum esse est actualitas omnium rerum”156: This phrase can be
taken to refer to esse commune in the sense that esse is the act of
“every” ens and, thus, of every form and perfection. Thus, esse
commune is the synonym of every ens and therefore of every esse
participatum in general which is, in turn, the act of finite ens insofar
as it is distinct from Esse per essentiam157.
[2] Esse as actus essendi also refers to the singular, concrete act which
is found in a real composition with the singular essence of a finite
ens.
[3] God is Ipsum Esse Subsistens or Esse per essentiam. God is not a
synolon of concrete and abstract, but rather is Pure Act, and, in the
formal sense, cannot be called “ens”. Therefore, in God, ens and
esse coincide as do essentia and esse, such that we can say God is
Ipsum Esse Subsistens and does not properly have an essence. God
is the supreme perfection as Pure Act and not the simple Totality or
sum of all perfections (essentialistic, Scholastic-Hegelian concept
of God) 158.
To account for those texts in which St. Thomas refers to God as primum ens
or maxime ens, Fabro introduces a methodological distinction between our
“notion” of God in via inventionis and in via iudicii:
154
See C. FABRO, “L’esse tomistico e la ripresa della metafisica”, 308.
155
C. FABRO, “L’esse tomistico e la ripresa della metafisica”, 308-309:
“Esse is the participated act of every reality in act, it is the transcendental
participation per excellence: metaphysics, then, becomes for St. Thomas (beyond
Plato and Aristotle) a metaphysics of the participation of ens in esse, forgotten by
the Western tradition which has battled St. Thomas no less than Parmenides, and
therefore, is actuated in ascension-passage (Uebergang) from ens-esse per
participationem to Esse per essentiam (Esse subsistens)”.
156
I, q. 4, a. 1 ad 3.
157
See C. FABRO, “L’esse tomistico e la ripresa della metafisica”, 309-310.
158
See C. FABRO, “L’esse tomistico e la ripresa della metafisica”, 310.
584
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
Fabro reiterates that it is not created esse which is resolved into essence
(fullness-totality of forms), but rather that God’s essence is resolved into his
esse:
But rather the contrary, it is essence that is resolved into esse: “Si ergo divina
essentia est aliud quam suum esse, sequitur quod essentia et esse se habeant
sicut potentia et actus” – but since God is pure act (Summa contra Gentiles, I,
ch. 16), and the “primum ens” – in the sense just explained and sense which is
clear from the entire context which proclaims God as un-participated esse –
one should admit that “…Dei esse quidditas sua sit, Dei essentia est suum esse,
ipsum divinum esse est sua essentia vel natura...”160.
159
See C. FABRO, “L’esse tomistico e la ripresa della metafisica”, 311.
160
See C. FABRO, “L’esse tomistico e la ripresa della metafisica”, 311.
585
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
* * *
161
See C. FABRO, “L’esse tomistico e la ripresa della metafisica”, 312.
162
C. FABRO, “Existence”, The New Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. V, 724.
586
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
Knowledge of esse. Some modern authors hold that the Thomistic concept of
esse, as an act of being in the strict sense, is seized by the mind in the act of
judgment or in the synthesis of subject and predicate (F. Sladeckzek, K.
Rahner, M. D. Roland-Gosselin, J. B. Lotz). They do this because they do not
distinguish between existentia as an empirical datum (essentia in actu) and esse
as a most intimate and profound constitutive principle: the first is accessible to
experience and expresses itself in the judgment, whereas the second reveals
itself only to the most advanced metaphysical reflection. Existentia, therefore,
is affirmed either through a judgment of perception that attains the present
singulars or through demonstration by means of a principle of causality or of
similarity (per signum). Essence is known by abstracting the universal from
particulars, based on an induction that is a function of the cognitive power
influenced by the intellect and above all by the principle of contradiction; thus
it expresses itself through definition and through judgment in the formal order
of “nature considered in itself.” The activity that unveils esse in Thomistic
metaphysics has a unique character and could be called a resolutio that is
proper to metaphysics. When St. Thomas attributes to simple apprehension the
knowledge of material essences through abstraction and assigns the ipsum esse
rei to the second act of the mind (In Boeth. De Trin. q. 5, a.5), he is speaking of
an esse that pertains to the ontological, logical, and phenomenological orders,
and not strictly of the esse that in God is His essence and in creatures is a
substantial act distinct from essence and the effect of God Himself163.
163
C. FABRO, “Existence”, 724.
587
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
164
C. FABRO, “Existence”, 724.
165
The term “emergence” recalls his work in Percezione e pensiero, p. 287-
292.
588
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
1.8 Summary
make explicit something that is already implicit in ens (e.g., verum as ens
intelligibile). The second aspect of “re-composition in ens” is also described
as a resolutio, especially in regard to the foundation of the first principle on
ens and non ens. Thus, the movement of “expansion” into knowledge and
science is complemented by the movement of “convergence”, bringing the
plurality of principles to their foundation on the first principles and
resolving the first principles into ens.
3) Resolution of perfection and act. Resolution, as the proper method
of Thomistic metaphysics, is specified as a dual resolution of perfection and
act. Fabro’s brief references to the resolution of the less perfect into the
more perfect call to mind the “dialectical ascension” of NMP, which moves
from the individual who participates in a species and genus to the
perfections proper to such a genus. Such perfections are “resolved” into
ipsum esse as the perfection of all perfections. The resolution of act to act
refers to the path from accidental acts and forms to substantial act and form
and from these to esse as the act of all acts. In this resolution of act, essence
(form) is reduced to a determinative and receptive potency-principle with
respect to esse. Fabro’s brief analysis of St. Thomas’s philosophical
historiography shows how metaphysics ought to progress from the
phenomenon of accidental change and the distinction between substance and
accidents through the problem of substantial change and to the problem of
creation in light of the distinction between essence and esse. St. Thomas’s
De substantiis separatis explicitly speaks of a resolution into principles
(resolution into matter and form; resolution into id quod est and esse). The
resolution of act is highlighted in Fabro’s analysis of De substantiis
separatis and the itinerary he outlines from the problem of substance-
accidents to that of essence-esse.
One of the novelties in this decade of Fabro’s thought is his argument
for the participation and the limitation of the act of the essence of spiritual
creatures. Fabro argues that Geiger’s bifurcation of Thomistic participation
into two “systems” and bestowal of priority on the participation by
similitude leads theoretically to a self-limitation of act and, therefore, to an
objection against the Thomistic real distinction between essence and esse in
creatures. For Fabro, the reduction of form and all other formal acts and
perfections to “potency” or to “participants” involves the notion of
predicamental participation. Fabro’s metaphysical reflection goes beyond a
merely logical consideration of the species-genus participation, and
considers it from the perspective of a real-formal participation. The spiritual
creature’s essence is only relatively infinite and, in effect, belongs to a
genus. On the formal level, the essence is limited in itself – not by itself –
590
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
since it does not realize the entire virtual perfection of the genus to which it
belongs. In this way, Fabro has defended the principle of the limitation of
act as one of the pillars of Thomistic metaphysics.
4) Resolution, causality and participation. Another novelty is Fabro’s
explicit distinction between the “first foundation” of ens by means of a
resolution-reduction of act to act (accidental and substantial formal acts to
actus essendi) and a “second foundation”, entailing a reduction of
participated actus essendi on Esse per essentiam. This second foundation
involves a demonstration (of the existence of Esse per essentiam), but is not
exhausted in the demonstration. In other words the Thomistic resolution or
reduction to fundament is accomplished by the convergence of Aristotelian
act and the metaphysics of participation. This reduction and comprehension
of esse within ens as participation entails the demonstration of God as First
Cause, yet should not be characterized solely as a demonstration. This is
important since the metaphysician should not reduce the creature’s esse to
its “extrinsic” relationship of causal dependence on the Creator alone. The
intrinsic nature of the transcendental, participated act of esse must be
maintained. At the same time, one should privilege what Fabro calls the
“transcendental immanence” of God’s presence per essentiam in creatures.
With this premise in mind, Fabro deals with the nature of St.
Thomas’s argumentation for a universal cause of esse, tracing the
development of such argumentation and bringing out the convergence on
the notion of participation. Fabro specifies that the Fourth Way involves a
passage from the plane of formal perfections to the real plane of causality.
This is in agreement with Fabro’s proposal of undertaking an initial, formal
resolution of all perfections to esse in metaphysics before embarking on a
real resolution of esse according to act and causality. Although there is a
pedagogical difference between the argument of the Fourth Way in the
demonstration of God’s existence and in the demonstration of creation and
the real distinction in creatures, the metaphysical content of these
demonstrations is founded on the principle of participation and concerns the
ultimate determination of ens qua ens. St. Thomas’s first formulas of the
principle of participation concern perfection-imperfection, while later
formulas concern the commonness and emergence (priority) of esse ut actus
according to the notion of participation. Fabro calls the arguments that
emphasize the commonness and priority of the act of being an authentic
resolutio in esse. The radical commonness of esse requires a common cause,
capable of producing esse from nothing. The problem of the common
causality of esse, then, involves the determination of the metaphysical
relationship between esse and ens by means of a resolution of ens into esse,
591
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
determining the creature (ens) as that which has participated esse and God
(Primum Ens) as Ipsum Esse Subsistens. Fabro holds that in metaphysical
reflection God is first seen as Primum Ens (in via inventionis) and only
subsequently as Esse Subsistens (in via resolutionis or via iudicii). As a
“resolution”, it is a more resolution of essence into esse than of esse into
essence.
5) Resolution and knowledge of esse. Fabro argues that St. Thomas
comes to his discovery of esse by means of a quasi-concentric reflection on
ens. In the apprehension of ens, the composition of essence and esse is
implicitly contained. In light of this, we see that our knowledge of esse is
not obtained simply by means of an abstraction or judgment, but rather by
means of resolution and argumentation. The apprehension of ens is the
fundamental noetic principle; it is truly a transcendental synolum and plexus
of essence and esse, including a dialectic (essentia and esse) and a reference
to the Absolute (esse participatum to Esse per essentiam). Because esse is
act and not content (essence), the metaphysical notion of actus essendi is not
obtained by an abstraction, but rather through argumentation and
“dialectical” reasoning. This argumentation either brings to light the
“originality of esse” (principle of the emergence of act; principle of
separated perfection) or the difference between the participated esse of the
creature and divine esse (principle of separated perfection; principle of
participation). Lastly, “emergence” requires to the emergence of act over act
(esse over form, esse over ens). Thus, the apprehension of esse is seen to
involve argumentation, demonstration, resolution and reduction.
To summarize this with the points made above, we can say that Fabro
considers the determination of esse ut actus as a “resolution to ground” and
as involving a movement of thought from the predicamental order
(accidental and substantial acts) to the metaphysical order of the pure
perfections and esse: Esse emerges over all other acts and perfections. In
this reduction to ground, the operative principle is the emergence of act. The
determination of the metaphysical relationship of esse to ens entails a
reduction to fundament and convergence of act and participation.
Participated esse is founded on Esse per essentiam. This moment of
comprehending esse in ens as participated, initially involves the
demonstration of God’s existence and as First Cause. The reflection,
however, is not exhausted in this demonstration or in the affirmation of an
extrinsic, causal relation of dependence. Metaphysical reflection proceeds
from beings to esse according to a reductio ad principium and resolution to
fundament. This metaphysical reflection is not characterized as a Hegelian
“leap” from beings to being, but rather as a “passage”, since esse is present
592
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
from the beginning in the originary apprehension of ens. This reaffirms the
Thomistic conception of the constitutive immanence of participated esse and
avoids the dangers inherent in the Scholastic reduction of esse to existentia
and the realm of extrinsic causality.
166
C. FABRO, “Il ritorno al fondamento. Contributo per un confronto tra
l’ontologia di Heidegger e la metafisica di S. Tommaso d’Aquino”, Sapienza 26
(1973), 265-278.
167
AA.VV., “Dibattito congressuale”, Sapienza 26 (1973), 357-432.
593
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
principles that Fabro had at the forefront of his mind. It is interesting to note
how frequent his references to resolution are and how he presents it as the
solution to the questions and problems posed by the other participants in the
debate168. First, let us consider Fabro’s paper.
Fabro first draws attention to Heidegger’s proposal of returning to the
fundament of metaphysics: “M. Heidegger, on the model of ‘essential
philosophers’ (wesentliche Denker), conceives the ‘return [or reduction] to
the fundament of metaphysics (der Rückgang in den Grund der Metaphysik)
as the task of philosophical reflection in the current epoch”169. In the end,
however, the confrontation between Thomistic metaphysics and
Heideggerian ontology reveals that there is only a thematic convergence
between Aquinas and Heidegger, and that Heidegger’s proposal is largely
unacceptable from a doctrinal standpoint170. This thematic convergence is
summarized by Fabro as follows (my numbering):
[1] In fact, we can say, first of all, that both “think back”, or follow the
regressive method of “return to foundation” (Rüchgang in den Grund)
which is proper of essential thinkers.
[2] Further, both see this foundation in the reduction to being, or by means of
the illumination of ens or being in being [essente nell’essere].
[3] As well, in both, the (knowledge of the) truth of being precedes the
(knowledge of) causal dependence, namely reality (existence) is not
identified with effectuality and the truth of reality is not founded on
causality.
[4] Consequently, both refute the (modal) distinction of essentia and
existentia and consider that it is principally responsible, on the theoretical
plane, for the forgetfulness of being and of absolute voluntarism which is
168
In his article on Fabro and the method of metaphysics as resolutio, J.
Villagrasa dedicates several pages to the debate, rightly emphasizing its polemical
character and its importance in order to grasp Fabro’s proposal: J. VILLAGRASA,
“La resolutio come metodo…”, 38-42.
169
C. FABRO, “Il ritorno al fondamento…”, 265.
170
C. FABRO, “Il ritorno al fondamento…”, 270: “We are not dealing with a
doctrinal accord between Heidegger and St. Thomas, which cannot be had on any
point, but rather with a convergence in the theme and in the basic problematic […].
We are dealing with – to use a dialectical formula – a converging divergence or a
diverging convergence, which stimulates, in our opinion, a confrontation of
extreme tension to work out a positive bringing together between Heidegger and
St. Thomas: a convergence of moments, a divergence of basic orientation and,
therefore, of prospective. More than the formulas are the problems themselves that
should guide the confrontation”.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
With these four points in mind, Fabro concludes that due to this
convergence on “returning to fundament” it is no longer possible to think
about a return (ripresa) to Thomism without taking into account the
Heideggerian “lesson” (la lezione heideggeriana).
Along with presenting the thematic convergence, Fabro’s article also
contrasts the foundational attempts of Heidegger and Aquinas and
establishes the superiority of the Thomistic proposal, which – Fabro holds –
Heidegger has either intentionally or unintentionally overlooked:
“[Heidegger] completely ignores the resolutio ad fundamentum that
Aquinas has accomplished by means of the Diremtion of esse per essentiam
(God) and ens per participationem (creature) and the discovery-position of
the concept of esse as first intensive act”172. Fabro first draws attention to
the limits inherent in Heidegger’s Sein as presence: “Therefore,
[Heidegger’s] reductio ad fundamentum is in the radical indifferentiated
both as subject (es) and as act (geben), beyond all immanence and
transcendence, in the perennial simple presence according to the ontic
demand of the plexus Sein-Seiende”173. In contrast, St. Thomas’s reductio
ends in the difference between Creator and creature and the distinction
between essence and esse in the creature: “St. Thomas’s reductio ad
fundamentum is at the exact opposite pole in the radical differentiation of
Esse per essentiam and ens per participationem which involves the radical
real distinction – in the creature – of participating essence and participated
esse, as both transcendental possibility and consequence of creation”174.
Fabro ends his paper by stating that because no one has succeeded as
Heidegger has in placing Western thought and Christian thought into a
radical crisis, it is from Heidegger, then, that the discourse on the return to
fundament should begin. However, it should also proceed in an opposite
direction (per oppositam viam), along the path trod by St. Thomas175.
171
C. FABRO, “Il ritorno al fondamento…”, 271.
172
C. FABRO, “Il ritorno al fondamento…”, 269.
173
C. FABRO, “Il ritorno al fondamento…”, 277.
174
C. FABRO, “Il ritorno al fondamento…”, 277-278.
175
See C. FABRO, “Il ritorno al fondamento…”, 278: “Nessun filosofo
contemporaneo, anzi nessun filosofo moderno, ha messo in crisi radicale il
pensiero occidentale e lo stesso pensiero cristiano come Heidegger. Per questo
allora è da Heidegger che deve partire il discorso del ritorno al fondamento: ma per
aliam, per oppositam viam”.
595
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
176
See J. VILLAGRASA, “La resolutio come metodo…”, 38-40: “Fabro, as he
did willingly and often, dared to challenge and provoke this important group of
Thomists with Heidegger. The provocation was presented in the following terms.
At the time, it is impossible to think of a true taking up of Thomism leaving aside
the task and critique offered by Heidegger: the task of philosophical reflection
consists in the reduction-resolution-return to the fundament of metaphysics; the
Heideggerian critique is legitimate; the loss of the sense of being was provoked by
the formal distinction of essentia-existentia as it was understood by the Second
Scholastic – Nominalism and Suárez in particular –, which came to modern
thought as the real identity of thought and reality. Thomas Aquinas, however,
avoids this [loss]. What is more, he was the one to realize the resolutive task
proposed by Heidegger thanks to a process which he pursued by means of the real
distinction of essentia and esse and which comes to the demonstration of the
existence of God”.
177
J. VILLAGRASA, “La resolutio come metodo…”, 40-41.
178
C. FABRO, in “Dibattito congressuale”, 393.
596
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
I did not say that ens is gotten from immediate perception, but from immediate
apprehension. From ens, thus understood, one comes to esse […] by means of a
resolutive and not abstractive process. Therefore, by a resolutive process, of a
resolution to the principle, of act to act: from accidental acts to substantial act,
from substantial act to entitative act179. Within ens there is a dialectic. Ens est id
quod habet esse, it is a composition of essence and esse: a composition that is
not immediately evident. But digging within it one comes to this ultimate
resolution180. We should work on substantial ens to arrive at being181.
I will be brief. The question is this: what is the relationship between actus
essendi and ens, creaturely being. The relationship is very simple: starting from
179
C. FABRO, in “Dibattito congressuale”, 403.
180
C. FABRO, in “Dibattito congressuale”, 407: “Entro l’ens c’è tutta una
dialettica. Ens est id quod habet esse, è composizione di essenza ed esse:
composizione che non è immediatamente evidente. Però scavando dentro si arriva a
quest’ultima risoluzione”.
181
C. FABRO, in “Dibattito congressuale”, 411.
182
See P. DELLA VALENTINA, in “Dibattito congressuale”, 419: “Al P. Fabro
chiederei: 1) C’è un rapporto tra actus essendi e l’essere heideggeriano? 2) Avendo
egli escluso sia il rapporto immediato con l’actus essendi, sia la mediazione del
concetto, a quale tipo di conoscenza bisogna riferirsi? […] 3) Come corregionale
mi permetto di esprimere un desiderio (e qui siamo fuori tema!) condiviso da molti;
Le chiederemmo una sintesi essenziale del suo pensiero, spoglia di tanti richiami
storici che rischiano di distoglierci dal fissare il nudo contenuto del Suo pensiero”.
597
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
the plexus ens, id quod habet esse, esse is the actus (essendi) of every ens; and
every ens has its own actus essendi. Such ens, though, is participated, as I said
yesterday quoting De Causis. Thus, what is the relationship between actus
essendi, interiorization, resolution? Namely, how do we come to isolate [actus
essendi]? And if we do not isolate it, how do we come to grasp, to determine –
all inadequate terms – this actus essendi?
You have attributed interiorization to me: if I said this, I take it back, since I
said to Fr. Bogliolo that I do not want that term “interiorization”. Fr. Lotz has
taken it to himself; but in the position of Fr. Lotz such a term works well, since
he pursues the entire internal process of resolutio by means of his process of
reditio completa. I, instead, am for the simple resolutio, i.e., there is ens, which
makes the existence of a nature, of a reality, present. Existence is the fact of the
synthesis of essence and act of being, placed in reality. Existence is an effect, a
result, a fact. Esse, on the other hand, is id quod et magis intimum, profundum.
The immediate, from which we should begin, is ens; and on this point I believe
the greatest metaphysicians are not very far apart. But the problem is in the
resolutio of this ens, i.e., in the determination of esse, of the act by which
something is called ens.
One last thing. You ask me for an accessible synthesis of my work: often other
friends ask me for this. Perhaps, and I hope so, that I see the occasion to write
this compendium: but the indispensible way is that of first walking with the
“essential philosophers”, of dialoguing with them and grasping, in their work,
the ultimate sense of the demand and the project of the first question183.
183
C. FABRO, in “Dibattito congressuale”, 420-421.
184
C. FABRO, “Allocuzioni introduttive al dibattito”, 357 .
598
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
mentis, because our spirituality is manifested first of all and above all by
means of the grasping of being”185.
* * *
Fabro argues that his research on participation has established that the
Thomistic notion of ens and the Thomistic notion of esse as intensive,
185
C. FABRO, in “Dibattito congressuale”, 431-432.
186
C. FABRO, “The Intensive Hermeneutics of Thomistic Philosophy (The
Notion of Participation)”, The Review of Metaphysics 27 (1974), 449-491.
Originally, “Elementi per una dottrina tomistica della partecipazione”, Divinitas 11
(1967) 559-586; reprinted in ET, 421-448. First English translation appeared in
“Participation”, New Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. X, 1042-1046.
187
C. FABRO, “The Intensive Hermeneutics…”, 450.
599
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
The notion of participation expresses the ultimate point of reference both from
the static viewpoint of the creature’s structure and from the dynamic
viewpoint of its dependence on God. This notion takes from Platonism the
idea of exemplar relationship and absolute distinction between participating
being and Esse subsistens, and from Aristotelianism the principle of real
composition and real causality at every level of participated, finite being189.
188
C. FABRO, “The Intensive Hermeneutics…”, 450.
189
C. FABRO, “The Intensive Hermeneutics…”, 469.
190
C. FABRO, “The Intensive Hermeneutics…”, 469: “To assert, as has been
done (Geiger), that Thomas holds as distinct participation by similitude (secundum
similitudinem) and participation by composition (secundum compositionem), is to
break the Thomistic synthesis at its center, which is the assimilation and mutual
subordination of the couplets of act-potency and participatum-participans in the
emergence of the new concept of esse. Such a view compromises at its root the
meaning and function of radical Diremtion of the distinction between essentia and
esse”.
600
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
191
G. LINDBECK, “Participation and Existence in the Interpretation of St.
Thomas”, Franciscan Studies, 17 (1957) 1-22 and 107-125.
192
F. WILHELMSEN, “Existence and Esse”, The New Scholasticism, 50
(1976), 20-45.
193
F. WILHELMSEN, “Existence and Esse”, 29.
194
See F. WILHELMSEN, “Existence and Esse”, 30.
195
F. WILHELMSEN, “Existence and Esse”, 31. With regard to the real
distinction, he writes: “The real distinction between essence and existence, central
– according to Fabro – to St. Thomas’ metaphysics – is known by comparing the
two ways in which any nature can exist and by thus denying (“relative separation”;
abstraction without precision) that being is identically any one of its
determinations. The priority of esse over essence is known thanks to a judgment
which insists that no nature can by prescinded (separated absolutely) from some
existing” (32).
601
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
196
See L.-B. GEIGER, “Abstraction et separation d’après Saint Thomas”,
Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques, 48 (1946), 328-329; D. J.
ROBERT, “La Metaphysique science distinct de toute autre discipline philosophique
selon saint Thomas d’Aquin”, Divus Thomas, 50 (1947), 206-223; J. OWENS, An
Elementary Christian Metaphysics, The Bruce Publishing Company, Milwaukee
1963, 96-97; R. SCHMIDT, “L’Emploi de la Separation en Metaphysique”, Revue
Philosophique de Louvain, 58 (1960), 373-393.
197
F. WILHELMSEN, “Existence and Esse”, 32, n. 28.
198
F. WILHELMSEN, “Existence and Esse”, 35.
199
F. WILHELMSEN, “Existence and Esse”, 35.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
There is one sense in which Aquinas does grant that esse is a result of the
principles of nature, and the existence he is talking about is not existence as
distinct from esse (Fabro’s thesis); it is not existence as a fact of being, itself
distinct not only from essential principles but from esse as well (Fabro’s
thesis); but precisely existence as esse, esse not as “causing itself” – a
contradiction – but esse as caused by all of the other metaphysical dimensions
going into any given ens. Esse, insists St. Thomas, is truly caused by the
principles of essence but this causality is located within the order of
specification, within the order of formal causality200.
200
F. WILHELMSEN, “Existence and Esse”, 38.
201
F. WILHELMSEN, “Existence and Esse”, 41-42: “Existence is not a
component in synthesis but is the synthesizing of the components. This esse in turn
is totally specified and determined by the principles of nature that esse ‘togethers’,
of which ‘to be’ is the very ‘gathering together’. Esse, in this formal and specific
sense of the order of specification, truly does not result from nature. It follows that
the existence known in judgment is not distinct from esse, as is a result from an
efficient cause, but is rather the ‘to be’ itself, the being of a common nature
composed with a subject of existence. Judgment is genuinely an understanding of
existence. This existence, we have argued, is the very Thomistic esse, not as
conceptualized metaphysically and thus rendered a subject of predication, but as
known directly in judgment, known not as some subsisting ‘thing’ but known
precisely as the being of what is affirmed, the existent, a being which consists in
the composing of the principles of nature. Existence as the fact of being is not a
follow-up on esse, not a consequence, but the being of things themselves. Thus is
esse known in judgment”.
202
F. WILHELMSEN, “Existence and Esse”, 43-45: “The argument advanced
in this essay can be summarized in terms of the ways in which esse is prior and
posterior to that thing of which esse is its being. Essence is posterior to esse in that,
without being, essence is nothing; essence is also posterior to being, in that the
composition in which essence consists exists, thanks to the synthesizing of the
603
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
elements of the composition, by esse. Essence is prior (in a secondary sense) in that
esse follows essence as being determined by the principles which esse both posits
and of which esse is their synthesizing activity, their unity. In this sense – and only
in this sense – is the act of being the result of essential principles; this esse is
equivalently ‘existing’ (or ‘existence’) in several of the currently accepted
meanings given the word in English; this esse – and not some ‘fifth nature’ called
‘existence’ and thought to be a result of esse – is directly known in judgments of
experience and is known as synthesizing activity in all judgments of the third
adjacent. Esse, thus, is both prior (absolutely) and posterior (relatively) to that of
which esse is being. This esse known in judgment is not known as though it were a
thing, subsisting in itself, and capable of being understood through any direct
conceptualization as is nature. […] When ‘existence’ is suppressed in favor of esse,
not on the grounds of linguistic propriety but on the grounds that ‘existence’ –
affirmed or denied of things in judgment – is somehow posterior to and not
identically the Thomistic act of being, then the foundation of Thomistic realism is
at stake. We build a metaphysics of esse as act thanks to our awareness that there is
an act in the mind that answers the act of being in the real: judgment. That act is a
direct and intellectually unmediated knowing – on the level of direct experience –
that things are. The enterprise of Thomistic metaphysics, of existential Thomism, is
the disengagement, thanks to judgments of separation, of exigencies concerning
this ‘to be’ of things. The ‘is’ of a thing when articulated metaphysically is
reasoned ‘about’; but that ‘is’ is not initially reasoned ‘to’; ‘is’ does not screen
itself behind some ‘existence’ understood as ‘emergence’ (an essence) or ‘standing
out’ (another essence). That ‘is’ is directly known, not – as insisted upon – as
subsisting thing but as – words here fail – ‘is’”.
203
F. WILHELMSEN, “Existence and Esse”, 21.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
204
Authors who sustain the “judgment of separation” proposal as the
“method of Thomistic metaphysics” (rather than as a part of the “constitution of the
object of metaphysics”) have yet to show how this method would structure
metaphysics and how it is involved in the various themes of metaphysics (the
transcendentals, analogy, creation, divine providence, exemplary causality, etc…).
205
See C. FABRO, “The Intensive Hermeneutics…”, 486.
605
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
206
Fabro’s footnote: "All things must be traced to one first principle... by
which they are coordinated." (De Potentia, q. 3, a. 6).
207
C. FABRO, “The Intensive Hermeneutics…”, 486.
208
C. FABRO, “The Intensive Hermeneutics…”, 486: “This is a kind of
transition, as well as upward movement, from the given to act and from the finite to
the Infinite. The latter is no longer considered here as a given or as contained but
rather as a giver and container, the act present in every act, the perfection of all
perfections, and consequently as an invitation for man to direct his thought and
aspirations toward the Absolute.
209
C. FABRO, “The Intensive Hermeneutics…”, 486-487.
210
C. FABRO, “The intensive Hermeneutics…”, 487-488: “The Platonic
principle of the idea or separated perfection, holds true only with regard to the esse
as the act of all acts and of all forms, which was unknown to Plato as well as to
Aristotle. This principle of separated perfection is eminently of Platonic origin and
must be integrated with the Aristotelian principle of the emergence of act. Both
principles are indeed founded on the synthetic Thomistic principle of participation.
But despite his general acceptance of the Platonic principle of separated perfection,
Thomas follows Aristotle in rejecting its application to the forms as such and,
going beyond Aristotle who does not know esse as act, applies it exclusively to
esse. Thus Esse ipsum or Esse subsistens is God himself who is the first,
immovable, and separated Principle situated, as it were, at the summit of eternity
606
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
* * *
(in arce aeternitatis). Hence God, as pure esse, is the grounding Act that is ever
present in all acts, the present that actuates every presence. Likewise, God is the
first and total cause, and he is at once both transcendent and immanent. He is
transcendent but in a way quite different from a Platonic idea; similarly he is
immanent but in a manner different from that of the Aristotelian act. He is
immanent in the sense that he is the actuating, grounding principle of being, and
not merely something accidentally contained in it. He is transcendent as the
emerging incomparable act that is beyond all space, time, and measurement, for he
is all in himself and all things are in him, from him and for him. In other words, he
is the being whom all men have called God”.
211
See G. LINDBECK, “Participation and Existence in the Interpretation of St.
Thomas”, Franciscan Studies 17 (1957) 1-22 and 107-125; F. WILHELMSEN,
“Existence and Esse”, The New Scholasticism 50 (1976), 20-45; C. GIACON, “S.
Tommaso e l’esistenza come atto: Maritain, Gilson, Fabro”, Medioevo 2 (1975), 1-
28. Also in C. GIACON, Itinerario tomistico, La Goliardica, Roma 1983, 137-165;
H. JOHN, “The Emergence of the Act of Existing in Recent Thomism”,
International Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1962), 595-620; A. DALLEDONNE,
“L’autentico “esse” tomistico e l’equivoco neoscolastico sulla “esistenza come
atto” in Carlo Giacon, Divus Thomas 80 (1978), 68-82; L. Romera, Pensar el ser.
Análisis del conocimiento del ‘Actus essendi’ según C. Fabro, Peter Lang, Bern
1994, 113-118; A. ROBIGLIO, “Gilson e Fabro - Appunti per un confronto”, Divus
Thomas (Bologna) 100 (1997), 59-76; B. MONDIN, “La conoscenza dell’essere in
Fabro e Gilson”, Euntes Docete 50 (1997), 85-115; W. HANKEY, “From
Metaphysics to History, from Exodus to Neoplatonism, from Scholasticism to
Pluralism: the Fate of Gilsonian Thomism in English-speaking North America”,
Dionysius 16 (1998), 157-188; A. CONTAT, “Le figure della differenza ontologica
nel tomismo del novecento”, Alpha Omega 11 (2008), 77-129.
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BEING AND PARTICIPATION
2.3 The new problem of being and the foundation of metaphysics (1974)
We are not dealing so much with a doctrinal accord between Heidegger and St.
Thomas, with cannot be had on any point, as with a convergence of thematic
instances and a basic problematic […]. We are dealing with, if the formula
works, a convergent divergence or divergent convergence which stimulates, in
our opinion, a confrontation of extreme tension for a positive dialectic between
Heidegger and St. Thomas: convergence of instances, divergence of
perspectives – rather than formulas, it is the problems themselves that should
guide the confrontation212.
Fabro does not agree with Heidegger’s inclusion of St. Thomas within the
forgetfulness of being characteristic of the Western philosophical tradition.
A confrontation between Heidegger and St. Thomas can be begun only by
grasping the “distance” between St. Thomas and the Scholastic tradition.
One of the major divergences between St. Thomas and Heidegger is found
in the latter’s refutation of causal dependence213.
212
C. FABRO, “Il nuovo problema dell’essere e la fondazione della
metafisica”, 475-476. Fabro then repeats in large part the four points of
convergence we saw earlier: “In fact, we can say that both “think to return”;
namely, they follow the regressive method of “returning to the foundation”
(Rückgang in den Grund) which is proper to the essential thinkers. Both see this
foundation in the reduction to being, namely, by means of the illumination of ens
or being in being [essente nell’essere]. In both the (knowledge of) the truth of
being precedes the (knowledge of) causal dependence namely, they do not identify
reality (existence) with effectuality and do not found reality on causality.
Consequently, both refute the (modal) distinction of essentia and existentia and
consider it the principal responsible for the forgetfulness of being and the absolute
voluntarism of Western nihilism”.
213
See C. FABRO, “Il nuovo problema dell’essere…”, 479: “To speak of a
‘concordance’ between St. Thomas and Heidegger doesn’t make sense, nor even
for Hegel, Kant, Spinoza and whatever other modern philosopher: those who have
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
tried, have been able to do so minding only the terms of a being-ens but omitting
the fundamental accusation in which Heidegger includes, to blame as we will see,
St. Thomas with the entire Western philosophical tradition: the forgetfulness of
being due to the distinction of essentia and existentia, as we have said. Only
showing the distance of St. Thomas from that tradition and the opposition that that
tradition has had toward St. Thomas, can one open up the passage to such a
confrontation: a confrontation, as we have said, of diverging-convergence, of
convergence in the radicality of the instances, of divergence just as radical in the
speculative prospective. This divergence has its crux in the total refutation on
behalf of Heidegger of causal dependence”.
214
C. FABRO, “Il nuovo problema dell’essere…”, 481: “St. Thomas moves
by referring ens to its principles, operating by stages, namely, from the appearing
that ens presents by means of the accidents in its essential constitution ut tale ens
(essence as synolon of matter and form, substance and accidents) to the radical
constitution of ens ut ens (of essentia and esse). Heidegger, who has brought the
modern principle of identity of being and knowing to the radical demand of
awareness of presence and absence only knows the opposition of being and non-
being (nothing). For this reason, while St. Thomas deepens esse to the fundamental
and unique act of the pure form itself and of that that is and appears in reality,
Heideggerian Sein is identified with pure appearance and non-being with
disappearance”.
609
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
215
C. FABRO, “Il nuovo problema dell’essere…”, 482-483: “In Heidegger,
we have seen, the beginning is made with the plexus ‘being is’ [l’essente è] since
‘being appears in being’ [nell’essente appare l’essere] and thus ‘being is the real’
[l’essente è il reale]. In reality, though, Heidegger agrees with Hegel since that
being of the being is identical to non-being and is therefore, by the simple (being
of) ‘appearing’. When in fact Heidegger proceeds to explain that ‘being appears in
the being’, the essence of being is this pure appearing (erscheinen) manifested
[dispiegantesi] by means of the temporality of the Dasein which is man. But while
Hegel considers being and nothing as abstract moments (of indeterminateness of
immediacy) to be overcome with the recourse (mediation) of the Infinite as
foundation and principle which is ‘at our backs’, for Heidegger being coincides
with appearing and non-being with disappearance, it is the principle and the end at
the same time in time which is without end. For this reason ‘…being is in finite
essence and is manifested only in the transcendence of the human reality (Dasein)
which is maintained outside of nothing’. For Hegel the beginning is the empty
being (of pure appearance) of immediacy and, for this reason, in this his abstraction
is identical to nothing: one deals then, here, with an apparent, provisory and
didactic beginning, to put it thus, since the real beginning is made with the
Absolute and in virtue of the Absolute which ‘is behind’ the knowing subject and
thus gives the “impulse” to the speculative reflection to reach the ultimate
foundation. For Heidegger, on the other hand, being is time as the actuating of man
in the world: thus, there is only historical, horizontal becoming which is identical
to the compresence of being and non-being in the mutual respective conditioning of
one another according to the structure of the event (Er-eignis), as we have seen.
[…] For Heidegger, there is no longer – as for any philosopher after the upheaval
which idealism has made of Kant, a problem of knowledge distinct from the
metaphysical problem: in fact, Sein und Zeit is nothing more than a transcendental
phenomenological analysis of behavior, in the sense of a complete extra-flexion of
subjectivity dissolved in the neutrality of the es gibt of the event”.
216
See C. FABRO, “Il nuovo problema dell’essere…”, 483.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
and over-emphasis of formal content, St. Thomas holds that ens is distinct
from res, in turn making explicit the distinction between act (esse) and
content (essentia). This distinction, Fabro notes, “is placed at the fundament
of the structure of metaphysics”217.
Fabro delves deeper into St. Thomas’s theory of ens as primum
cognitum and quotes St. Thomas’s Commentary on the Sentences, which
states:
That which first falls into the imagination of the intellect is ens, without which
nothing can be apprehended by the intellect, as that which first falls into the
credulitate of the intellect are the dignitates (axioms) and its principal one,
contradictories cannot simultaneously be true; hence all other [things] are
included in some way in ens, united and indistinct, as in principle218.
Fabro draws attention to the phrase, united and indistinct, stating that it
contains the entire problematic of metaphysics. In light of this, Fabro
explains the additio to ens, using the De Veritate text: one thing is the
condition (of the concept) of God which is perfect in se and cannot receive
additions; another is the condition (of the concept) of ens commune which is
without addition, yet can receive additions: “In the notion of ens this
condition – without addition – is not included; otherwise one could never
make an addition to it, since it would be against its notion; therefore, it is
common since in its notion it does not say some addition, but rather an
addition can be made to it in order to determine it to a proprium”219. For
example, “animal commune” prescinds from the determinations of
“rational” and “irrational”. In the case of ens commune, a basic principle is
217
C. FABRO, “Il nuovo problema dell’essere…”, 484.
218
In I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 3: “Primum enim quod cadit in imaginatione
intellectus, est ens, sine quo nihil potest apprehendi ab intellectu; sicut primum
quod cadit in credulitate intellectus, sunt dignitates, et praecipue ista, contradictoria
non esse simul vera: unde omnia alia includuntur quodammodo in ente unite et
indistincte, sicut in principio”.
219
In I Sent., d. 8, q. 4, a. 1 ad 1: “Ita quod non sit de ratione ejus quod fiat
sibi additio, neque quod non fiat, et hoc modo ens commune est sine additione. In
intellectu enim entis non includitur ista conditio, sine additione; alias nunquam
posset sibi fieri additio, quia esset contra rationem eius; et ideo commune est, quia
in sui ratione non dicit aliquam additionem, sed potest sibi fieri additio ut
determinetur ad proprium”.
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BEING AND PARTICIPATION
that “ens non est genus”. Furthermore, ens non dicit quidditatem, sed solum
actum essendi220.
Here we see a difference between Heidegger and St. Thomas. For
Heidegger, there is only the plexus of Seiende-Sein, where Sein means
presence of Seiende and thus its illumination. The concept of essentia, for
Heidegger, as content of ens derived from the ivde,a, is from the Platonic
separatism that Christianity assumed; existentia as founded on extrinsic
causality, derives from Christian creationism221. For St. Thomas, esse is the
act of ens and the emergence of esse is valid as the affirmation of the
consistency of reality in its immediate presentation as the truth of ens. Thus,
the semantics coincide, but the meanings of ens-esse radically diverge. For
St. Thomas, ens and esse precede and found thought and the actuation of the
mind in general. For Heidegger, the being of the human subject is its ex-
istere as transcending in the world: thus, it can be called ontological
immanentism or metaphysical monism. Heidegger stops at Sein as
appearing and presence which is resolved into the relation (Bezug) of man
and world222. For St. Thomas, ens contains a twofold reference to content
(essence) and to act (esse). While ens can be predicated of privations and
accidents, it is properly predicated of substance; substance is the proper
bearer of esse223. Unlike Aristotle, for whom the act of the substance was
the substantial form, St. Thomas sees esse as the fundamental actual
220
See In I Sent., d. 8, q. 4, a. 2 ad 2: “Ad secundum dicendum, quod ista
definitio, secundum Avicennam, non potest esse substantiae: substantia est quae
non est in subjecto. Ens enim non est genus. Haec autem negatio non in subjecto
nihil ponit; unde hoc quod dico, ens non est in subjecto, non dicit aliquod genus:
quia in quolibet genere oportet significare quidditatem aliquam, ut dictum est, de
cujus intellectu non est esse. Ens autem non dicit quidditatem, sed solum actum
essendi, cum sit principium ipsum; et ideo non sequitur: est non in subjecto: ergo
est in genere substantiae”.
221
C. FABRO, “Il nuovo problema dell’essere…”, 486.
222
See C. FABRO, “Il nuovo problema dell’essere…”, 486-487.
223
I, q. 5, a. 1 ad 1: “Nam cum ens dicat aliquid proprie esse in actu; actus
autem proprie ordinem habeat ad potentiam; secundum hoc simpliciter aliquid
dicitur ens, secundum quod primo discernitur ab eo quod est in potentia tantum.
Hoc autem est esse substantiale rei uniuscuiusque; unde per suum esse substantiale
dicitur unumquodque ens simpliciter”; In XI Metaph., lect. 3, n. 2197: “Nam ens
simpliciter, dicitur id quod in se habet esse, scilicet substantia”; In XII Metaph.,
lect. 1, n. 2419: “Nam ens dicitur quasi esse habens, hoc autem solum est
substantia, quae subsistit”.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
principle which actuates the substance224. As a term, ens is both the most
common and the most concrete: “Ens quamvis sit communissimum tamen
concretive dicitur”225.
In part three of the article Fabro deals with the “transcendental
deduction” of Thomistic ens; he divides this part according to three
instances of the foundation of knowledge: forms or essences, the
transcendentals, the first principles.
a) First, Fabro contrasts the abstraction of the content (essence) with
the apprehension of ens: “Knowledge by abstraction regards the ‘content’,
namely, the essence and it is, thus, a knowledge that demands abstractive
reflection, while the apprehension of ens is immediate and constitutes the
first step in the apprehension of the real”226. The former is limited to content
present in the abstraction (from the individuals), the latter is a global
apprehension in the subject’s first direct contact with reality: “The
knowledge of essence is of a specializing nature and supposes as support
and point of departure that of ens”227.
b) Second, Fabro deals with the transcendentals and the role of
conversio ad phantasmata in the process of knowledge:
Kant and modern thought begin with res and tend to ignore ens. We find
exactly the opposite in St. Thomas, for whom unum comes in third place,
after ens and res and is therefore doubly founded, as content in the
constitution of res and as act in the presence of the ens which is the bearer
of esse, which is the founding act.
224
See C. FABRO, “Il nuovo problema dell’essere…”, 487.
225
In Boethii De hebdomadibus, lect. 2.
226
C. FABRO, “Il nuovo problema dell’essere…”, 490.
227
C. FABRO, “Il nuovo problema dell’essere…”, 490.
228
C. FABRO, “Il nuovo problema dell’essere…”, 490.
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BEING AND PARTICIPATION
Thus, one can say that as the conversio ad phantasmata is the way of the
transcendental foundation of the truth of the content (essentia) of ens, so is the
correspondence of the property or modes of ens (the transcendentals) the way
of the clarification of the explicitation and internal growth which the real
obtains in the spiritual subject. The Diremtion of the transcendentals is not in
fact uniform, it, however, implies a distinction (remaining) within ens: this
means that ens is the indispensible and inexhaustible presupposed and
fundament, and at the same time, therefore, ens is the point of arrival of the
determinations as of the richness brought by the transcendentals229.
St. Thomas, thus, speaks of “addition” in order to indicate that all the other
conceptions of the mind are posterior to ens and therefore do nothing other
than “add” to ens in the sense of making one or other “mode” of being clear
and therefore we are always dealing with an addition – only notional, as is
obvious – which pertains and thus remains intrinsic to ens itself which holds
the unquestionable primacy of fundament. The unum which is the negatio
divisionis in ente, far from founding ens, as in modern thought, is founded on
ens and means, first of all, ens (but) insofar as it is presented undivided in se.
The “adding”, then, in which the function of the Thomistic transcendentals
consists, is founded on ens and is not founding, it is discovered in the reality of
ens and not produced231.
229
C. FABRO, “Il nuovo problema dell’essere…”, 493-494.
230
C. FABRO, “Il nuovo problema dell’essere…”, 494.
231
C. FABRO, “Il nuovo problema dell’essere…”, 494-495.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
1) The foundation and first object of knowledge is ens in the strong sense
insofar as it expresses the plexus of subject that is content (essentia) and act
(esse): ens, therefore, insofar as it bears and contains esse. Thus, it bears it and
manifests it. Ens-esse is thus to be recognized as the intentional plexus of
originary pertaining or the trascendentale fundans.
2) The static moment or analytical moment of the transcendental is indicated
by res which expresses the content of ens and by unum which expresses the
intrinsic belonging of the constitutive [principles] to ens. The derivation of
these first two transcendentals is interior to ens and is sustained by esse: it is in
view of esse, i.e., in order to be, that ens should have a content (essence) and
result from principles which belong to it.
3) The dynamic moment or expansive moment of ens with regard to its
pertinence to a spiritual subject which is actuated in knowing and willing: here
the dialectic of immanence and transcendence is actuated in various manners at
the various levels of reflection and action232.
Fabro’s last lines argue that Thomistic ens and the Thomistic
transcendentals at the antipode of the Suarezian conception, to which Kant
and Heidegger make reference.
c) Thirdly, Fabro addresses the theme of our knowledge of the first
principles. The most interesting point for our purposes is his argument
against what he calls “Kantian Neo-Scholasticism”: the position which
holds that esse is grasped only and properly by means of the copula of
judgment. They hold, on the one hand, that the being of ens is the formal
abstraction of the essence, and as the abstraction of the essence, it is
abstracted from existence. On the other hand, they hold that being as act of
existence is manifested above all and properly by the copula-function of
judgment, which is always resolved into an affirmation (or negation) of
being in a direct form with the verb “to be” and in an indirect form with
other verbs233. This interpretation is in part based on some of St. Thomas’s
232
C. FABRO, “Il nuovo problema dell’essere…”, 496-497.
233
C. FABRO, “Il nuovo problema dell’essere…”, 501.
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BEING AND PARTICIPATION
The being of predication in judgment is purely formal and functional and not
real, such that one can predicate being even of that which has no reality or
being but is pure negation or privation (mors est, bos non est leo…). The
“quality” of being of the copula depends, then, on the quality (namely, the
constitutive reality) of S and P and therefore on the reality of the relation of S
and P and here the Aristotelian principle is valid, the one that states that
(predicative) being as such does not mean anything. In formal consideration,
the seat of truth is judgment which is actuated by means of the copula is and
therefore the judgment is the operation which is the seat (function) of the
predication of being. But the “quality” of the sphere of such being should result
beforehand and elsewhere. Thus, St. Thomas writes earlier in the same context:
“Since, then, in a thing, there is its quiddity and its esse, truth is founded more
of the esse of the thing than on quiddity, as both the word ‘ens’ is taken from
esse and in this operation of the intellect grasping the esse of the thing, as it is
by some assimilation to it, is the relation of adequation completed, in which
234
See In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1 ad 7: “Cum sit duplex operatio intellectus:
una quarum dicitur a quibusdam imaginatio intellectus, quam Philosophus nominat
intelligentiam indivisibilium, quae consistit in apprehensione quidditatis simplicis,
quae alio etiam nomine formatio dicitur; alia est quam dicunt fidem, quae consistit
in compositione vel divisione propositionis: prima operatio respicit quidditatem rei;
secunda respicit esse ipsius. Et quia ratio veritatis fundatur in esse, et non in
quidditate, ut dictum est, in corp., ideo veritas et falsitas proprie invenitur in
secunda operatione, et in signo ejus, quod est enuntiatio, et non in prima, vel signo
ejus quod est definitio, nisi secundum quid; sicut etiam quidditatis esse est
quoddam esse rationis, et secundum istud esse dicitur veritas in prima operatione
intellectus: per quem etiam modum dicitur definitio vera”.
235
C. FABRO, “Il nuovo problema dell’essere…”, 502.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
consists the notion of truth. Hence I say, that the very esse of the thing is the
cause of truth, according to what it is in the cognition of the intellect”236. The
being of the copula as such has formal (existential) meaning and not real
meaning: it affirms, namely, the existence of the relation of S and P, but the
copula is in function of the reality of the subject and the relation with the
predicate: if this is real, being is real; if it is fantastic or only logical, such will
also be the meaning and value of the being of the copula. The two meanings of
esse, real and logical, are clearly distinct: “Esse is said in two ways: in one way
it means the act of being; in another it means the composition of the
proposition which the soul encounters uniting the predicate to the subject”237.
Thus, Fabro concludes that at the basis of the varied meanings that being
assumes in reflection, we find the real, fundamental meaning of esse, which,
in turn, is contained in the apprehension of the originary plexus of ens.
Part Four of the article concerns the real distinction of essentia and
actus essendi and begins with a critique of modern thought: modern thought
resolves the act of being into the relation of belonging-to (appartenenza);
the classical formula of such a radical loss of being is found in the
Scholastic distinction of essentia and existentia and is the fundament of
modern thought, from Descartes to Kant and up to Nietzsche238. The true
foundation of metaphysics, Fabro argues, needs to be anchored in the plexus
of ens and the dialectic of the transcendentals:
Without the real distinction of essentia and esse – as (of) two real, immanent
principles in ens itself – the fundament for the distinction between ens-res is
lacking, namely, of the real concrete and the formal abstract, and between ens-
unum [verum?]-bonum, namely, of the indeterminate concrete, the specified
concrete by the spiritual subject, i.e., by the knowledge (intellect), and the
determined concrete by freedom (will)239.
236
In I Sent., d. 19, q. 1, a. 1: “Cum autem in re sit quidditas ejus et suum
esse, veritas fundatur in esse rei magis quam in quidditate, sicut et nomen entis ab
esse imponitur; et in ipsa operatione intellectus accipientis esse rei sicut est per
quamdam similationem ad ipsum, completur relatio adaequationis, in qua consistit
ratio veritatis. Unde dico, quod ipsum esse rei est causa veritatis, secundum quod
est in cognitione intellectus”.
237
C. FABRO, “Il nuovo problema dell’essere…”, 502-503. I, q. 3, a. 4 ad 2:
“Esse dupliciter dicitur, uno modo, significat actum essendi; alio modo, significat
compositionem propositionis, quam anima adinvenit coniungens praedicatum
subiecto”.
238
C. FABRO, “Il nuovo problema dell’essere…”, 504.
239
C. FABRO, “Il nuovo problema dell’essere…”, 504.
617
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
240
C. FABRO, “Il nuovo problema dell’essere…”, 504.
241
C. FABRO, “Il nuovo problema dell’essere…”, 505.
242
C. FABRO, “Il nuovo problema dell’essere…”, 505.
243
C. FABRO, “Il nuovo problema dell’essere…”, 506: “Ens is the
transcendental (concrete) originary plexus which refers to the act of being (esse)
[and] which is two-fold, as we have seen, namely, as principle of determination of
a content and it is the essence and as principle of actuation as such. Namely, the
essence is the principle as realized, intrinsic content and actus essendi is the
principle as realizing, intrinsic act. Ens and esse certainly pertain to each other – as
do essentia and esse – but not according to a unbreakable and interchangeable
correspondence: in this case, one turns the phenomenological plane into the
fundamental point of reference, and being is dissolved as the actuation of pure
presentation, as the essence of being is made to emerge as Nothing from anguish.
The reckless attempt by Heideggerian Scholastics to salvage Heideggerian Sein in
Thomistic esse is a compromise, then, of the point of departure: Sein-Anwesenheit,
namely, ‘presence of consciousness’”.
618
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
The esse of Thomistic ens which makes a real composition with essentia, is not
to be confused, then, with existentia. Existentia, we affirm with all our
strength, is a term that is foreign to the semantics of Thomistic metaphysics: its
appearance with the controversy between Henry of Ghent and Giles of Rome
(esse essentiae, esse existentiae) signaled the loss of the revolutionary novelty
of Thomistic esse and the beginning of the Seinsvergessenheit, justly revealed
and deplored by Heidegger. Existentia, as already mentioned, is a fact, a
factual condition, the fact of reality and of realization (causation) of ens and it
is common, then, both to the essence and to esse, to substance and to accidents.
In this sense, summarizing the original sin of the speculative deviation of the
West, Kant was right in affirming the most serious paradox and absurd that
244
C. FABRO, “Il nuovo problema dell’essere…”, 507: “2) The primary,
Thomistic plexus of ens-esse is then, provisory and not constitutive, as it is in
Hegel and Heidegger, since it is made explicit in the real couplet of essentia-esse.
This esse is truly taken as realizing principle in the strong sense and dominating
therefore, of the essence which is the (contained) realized principle in ens: at this
metaphysical level of reflection which is able to be called fundamental reductive,
esse is the act and the essentia is the potency. Here, act and potency have the
originary Aristotelian meaning which implies the emergence of act over potency:
the primary instance of this emergence is the real composition-distinction of
essentia and esse which expresses according to St. Thomas the ultimate and
fundamental sense of the ‘ontological difference’ between ens and esse and, in the
end, between the creature and the Creator. Therefore, Heidegger errors when he
likens St. Thomas to the Scholastics who understand esse as existentia and reduce
it, thus, to causal dependence. Esse is immanent to ens as real intrinsic act to the
concrete essence which is, thus, its real potency: their interchangeable presence and
originary belonging is (in agreement) with creation. But the esse of which one
speaks is not the simple causal dependence but rather its effect that remains
intrinsic to ens, such that essential which is in composition with esse is not the
simple possible – which Heidegger with Hegel interprets as nothing – but is the
real content of ens. This is an absolutely original position fought against and
abandoned by Scholasticism and ignored by Heidegger”.
619
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
“…being is not a real predicate”. For St. Thomas, on the other hand, every
reality of truth, life, beauty, goodness… comes to a head in the esse of ens as
primary and fundamental act which is both absolute immanence (actus essendi
of ens – esse per participationem, esse commune of the creature) and absolute
transcendence (esse purum, per essentiam = God)245.
The real distinction of essentia and esse is the key to the speculative
originality of Thomism and the only radical response to the Heideggerian
demand of the “ontological difference” for the unveiling of the being of ens
which Heidegger, coherent with his immanentism, confesses is linked to the
temporal plexus of the event:
* * *
245
C. FABRO, “Il nuovo problema dell’essere…”, 507-508..
246
C. FABRO, “Il nuovo problema dell’essere…”, 510.
620
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
Thomas’s proposal is more in line with the resolution of act; yet, to some
degree, Heidegger’s proposal can be modified and adapted to account for
the “fall” from Parmenides’ ei=nai to Platonic ivde,a and Aristotelian ovusi,a
and the “fall” from Thomistic esse to Scholastic existentia. 3) Fabro again
presents his arguments against those who maintain that actus essendi is
grasped in judgment. Fabro’s position is more nuanced, distinguishing the
“presence” of esse in the initial apprehension of ens, from the determination
of esse as actus essendi in metaphysical reflection. 4) Finally, Fabro points
out that metaphysical reflection must not follow the Scholastics in a purely
extrinsic determination of esse as existentia and keep present the demands
of both the intrinsic nature of participated esse and per essentiam presence
of God in creatures.
247
C. FABRO, “L’interpretazione dell’atto in s. Tommaso e Heidegger”, in
Tommaso d’Aquino nel suo VII Centenario, Napoli 1974, 505-517.
621
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
248
See C. FABRO, “L’interpretazione dell’atto in s. Tommaso e Heidegger”,
510.
249
C. FABRO, “L’interpretazione dell’atto in s. Tommaso e Heidegger”, 511.
250
See C. FABRO, “L’interpretazione dell’atto in s. Tommaso e Heidegger”,
511. See I, q. 44, a. 1 ad 1.
251
C. FABRO, “L’interpretazione dell’atto in s. Tommaso e Heidegger”, 512.
622
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
“The priority of causality over esse is at the root of the equivocation of the
plexus of essentia-existentia of Anti-Thomistic Scholasticism and within
this equivocation modern thought moves, overturning the producing subject:
while for Scholasticism it is God the Creator, for modern thought the creator
is the human subject who knows and wills”252 . Heidegger traces this
equivocation in his analysis of the transformation of Aristotelian evne,rgeia
into actualitas in the Western, metaphysical tradition. Fabro concludes the
paragraph by pointing out how Heidegger overlooks St. Thomas:
The Platonic idea, Heidegger explains, becomes idea and this (becomes)
representation (Vorstellung). Likewise, evne,rgeia (Aristotelian) becomes
actualitas and this (becomes) reality effectuality (Wirklichkeit) – actualitas and
then becomes a synonym of existentia. Yet existentia is ex-istentia, i.e., ex-
sistere, to-be-outside or thrown-out. Heidegger is right that the plexus
actualitas-existentia does not render the meaning of energeia. It is also true that
in the cultural history of the West, being conceived as actualitas is the basis on
which its metaphysics has been built insofar as this rests on the distinction of
essentia-existentia: actualitas as existentia is distinct from essentia which is
conceived as potentia in the sense of possibilitas. Here, Heidegger switches –
and the switch shows he is not the least bit aware of the metaphysical abyss
which divides St. Thomas from the (objective) formalism of Scholasticism and
from the (subjective) formalism of modern thought – actualitas with actus, the
abstract with the concrete. Aristotle certainly speaks of the concrete act which
is the form and also St. Thomas, who elevates to esse as actus essendi which is
the act of all acts253.
252
C. FABRO, “L’interpretazione dell’atto in s. Tommaso e Heidegger”, 513.
253
C. FABRO, “L’interpretazione dell’atto in s. Tommaso e Heidegger”, 513-
514.
254
C. FABRO, “L’interpretazione dell’atto in s. Tommaso e Heidegger”, 514.
623
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
esse as esse actu, thus also confusing esse with existere like formalistic
Scholasticism. In contrast:
For St. Thomas, esse is the actual principle of ens which comes into real
composition with essentia which, for this reason – with respect to the esse that
actuates it – descends to the rank of potency, not in the formalistic sense of
possibilitas as even Heidegger continues to write, but to real content of ens
which is, thus, in act by its own actus essendi. Thus, the participated esse of the
creature is not called esse actu (ablative case) – this is actualitas as existential
– but esse (ut) actus in the nominative case. That finite ens be caused, created
that is, this – as we have seen – is an ulterior step of metaphysical reflection
and should be founded for St. Thomas on the intrinsic belonging – as
Heidegger himself correctly desires – of esse to ens255.
* * *
Fabro’s volume on Karl Rahner is divided into two parts: the first
considers Rahner’s identification of being and knowing; the second deals
with speculative consequences of this identification. Although the work
brings out many important points, I will limit my exposition to Fabro’s
thought on ens as primum cognitum.
For Rahner, the point of departure of metaphysics is man himself, and
this is due to an originary unity of being and knowing, of being and being
known257. Fabro notes that the obscurity of Rahner’s position, which holds
that we do not understand what the being of beings is, stems from the
obscurity of his starting point for metaphysics. For Fabro, metaphysics does
not begin immediately with the question of the being of beings but rather
with ens as such. It does not begin with something obscure, indeterminate,
and empty (Heglian Sein, for example), but with the intelligible plexus of
ens as that which has esse258.
Fabro opposes the Rahnerian identification of being and knowing, by
first recalling the proportional (and not direct) correspondence between the
formal-logical order and the real-metaphysical order as well as the structural
link between predicamental and transcendental participation259. Fabro
argues that the relationship of genus and species does not reveal the unity of
being (as Rahner holds), but rather its Diremtion and refers to the real
compositions of matter and form (and essence and esse) as foundation260.
Rahner’s notion of being seems to remain exclusively on a horizontal-
immanent level and is actuated for man in the form of conversio ad
phantasmata, which is for Rahner identical to the process of abstraction,
which in turn is founded on the return (reditio) of the subject to himself (in
seipsum)261. Consequently, the beginning, essence and foundation of
metaphysical reflection, for Rahner, is found in presenting the being of
being (essere dell’ente) to man insofar as this is “the actuating of the
knowing subject as interpretation and interchangeable belonging
(foundation) of sensibility and intellect”262. Sensibility is not understood by
Rahner as the quantitas of representation according to the dynamic of the
257
See C. FABRO, La svolta antropologica..., 24.
258
See C. FABRO, La svolta antropologica..., 24.
259
See C. FABRO, La svolta antropologica..., 28-29.
260
See C. FABRO, La svolta antropologica, 30.
261
See C. FABRO, La svolta antropologica, 32.
262
C. FABRO, La svolta antropologica, 33.
625
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
plexus of space and time263. This plexus has the Kantian transcendental
function of making possible the presence of the world, namely the horizon
of being. Rahner’s metaphysics, then, is not configured as a study of being
as being, but rather as an investigation of the transcendental conditions for
the appearing of every being to human consciousness. Man is formally
spirit, for Rahner, by means of his openness to the being of the world. In
this way, being is questionability, being and knowing are the same thing.
According to Fabro, Rahner places verum as the foundation of ens and
identifies it with the very esse of ens. For Aquinas, ens precedes verum,
while metaphysics resolves act into act and moves toward the fundamental
act that is esse as actus essendi264.
Rahner is seen to identify apprehension with abstraction, and, due to
his unification of sensibility and intellect, places the beginning of
knowledge in the synthesis of judgment. Aquinas, on the contrary, begins
knowledge with the composite apprehension of the dialectical plexus of ens.
The notion of ens is not posterior to the knowledge of particulars, but rather
precedes them as foundation. Rahner’s being is the anticipation of the
transcendental connection, and stems from transcendental subjectivity. What
Rahner is at pains to avoid in his proposal is the nominalistic-Suarezian
position of the material singular as primum cognitum and the idea of being
as terminus of abstractive processes265. However, Rahner goes to the other
extreme of positing a foundational pre-comprehension in reflexive
knowledge in connection to his empty formal-functional notion of being.
Through a reduction to fundament of judgment, Rahner’s being appears as a
formalization of the copula “is” in a judgment. While Rahner reduces being
to the subjective activity of consciousness, Aquinas begins with the plexus
of the real in act: ens as id quod habet esse.
After offering textual evidence for Rahner’s misinterpretation of
Aquinas, Fabro concludes the volume with an excursus that includes a brief
summary of his position on ens as primum cognitum266: the primum
cognitum is a synthetic transcendental plexus which precedes all other
knowledge and is the plexus on which all other knowledge is founded; the
apprehension of ens is the fundament of the apprehension of the
transcendentals, the first principles and all judgments; ens along with the
first principles and not esse is the proper object of metaphysics.
263
See C. FABRO, La svolta antropologica, 33.
264
See C. FABRO, La svolta antropologica, 34.
265
See C. FABRO, La svolta antropologica, 39.
266
See C. FABRO, La svolta antropologica, 142-143.
626
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
2.6 Summary
Several recurring themes are present in Fabro’s works from the 1970s,
which we can summarize as follows:
1) Reduction to fundament: In his confrontations between Heidegger
and St. Thomas, Fabro takes an increasingly critical stand towards both
Heidegger’s historiography and Heidegger’s proposal. The principal
convergence between Heidegger and St. Thomas regards their views on the
“radicality” of esse (Sein) and the determination of the task of philosophy-
metaphysics as that of a “reduction to fundament”.
2) Resolution of act: Fabro clearly refers to the method of Thomistic
metaphysics as a resolution of act and a reduction of participated esse to
Ipsum Esse Subsistens. Fabro’s resolutio is equated with “analysis” and
spoken about principally in terms of a resolution of act. The resolution of
act moves from accidental acts and forms to substantial act and form and
concludes by determining esse as actus essendi. The reduction of
participated esse to Esse per essentiam is only briefly mentioned in these
articles without any further specification. At times, resolution is simply
referred to as the metaphysical itinerary from ens to determination of esse,
the act by which something is called “ens”. At other times it is used in a
technical, Thomistic sense: “[Esse as actus essendi] has been discovered by
the strictly metaphysical method of resolution or reduction (per
resolutionem or per reductionem), as Aquinas often calls it, of accidental
predicamental acts to substantial form and of both accidental and substantial
acts to the more profound substantial act which is esse. It has also been
discovered by the method of the absolute reduction of the act of being by
participation to the esse per essentiam”267.
3) Ens as primum cognitum. Another dominant theme during this
period is the role of ens as primum cognitum. Ens is grasped initially in an
apprehension, not an abstraction. The consideration of finite ens leads the
metaphysician to the determination that “ens participat esse”. Only by
means of “reflection” on ens as a synthetic plexus (which is initially
obtained in a direct, immediate apprehension) does a distinction between
content and act emerge. Within ens there is a dialectic, a composition of
essence (content) and esse (act). One comes to esse through a process of
resolution of act to act: from accidental acts and forms to actus essendi.
4) Fabro continues his arguments presented in PC against those who
sustain that esse is grasped in judgment. He argues that there are cases in
267
C. FABRO, “The Intensive Hermeneutics…”, 486.
627
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
268
In addition to the four articles we considered, see also C. FABRO,
“Platonism, Neoplatonism, Thomism”, The New Scholasticism 44 (1970), 69-100
and “Il trascendentale esistenziale e la riduzione al fondamento. La fine della
metafisica e l’equivoco della teologia trascendentale”, Giornale critico della
filosofia italiana 52 (1973), 469-516.
269
C. FABRO, “Attualità della contestazione tomistica”, Doctor Communis,
28 (1974), 3-12.
270
C. FABRO, “Tomismo e rinnovamento della Chiesa nel mondo
contemporaneo”, Seminari e teologia 4 (1979), 5-8; “L’antropologia teologia” in
Giovanni Paolo II. Il Redentore dell’uomo, Logos, Roma 1979, 37-50; “San
Tommaso davanti al pensiero moderno” in Le ragioni del tomismo, Ares, Milano
1979, 50-59; “Tomismo essenziale e crisi dei tomismi. Nel primo centenario
dell’Enciclica Aeterni Patris”, Renovatio 15 (1980), 81-102; “Significato e
missione ecclesiale di S. Tommaso d’Aquino nel magistero di Giovanni Paolo II”,
628
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
his final article on the emergence of Thomistic esse over Aristotelian act
(3.5). These contributions are rounded off with a 1991 conference in which
Fabro spoke about the originality and emergence of esse (3.6).
274
C. FABRO, “L’emergenza dell’atto di essere in S. Tommaso e la rottura
del formalismo scolastico”, in Il concetto di “Sapientia” in san Bonaventura e san
Tommaso, Officina di Studi Medievali, Palermo 1983, 35-54. The text was first
presented in October 1981. Reprinted in “Appunti per un itinerario”, in Essere e
libertà. Studi in onore di Cornelio Fabro, Maggioli Editore, Rimini 1984, 19-42.
275
C. FABRO, “L’emergenza dell’atto di essere…”, 50.
276
See C. FABRO, “L’emergenza dell’atto di essere…”, 51.
630
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
But ens has esse for its act, which, just as it makes the essence be in act, so also
does it make it present to the created intellect insofar as it is ens (i.e., insofar as
it is real): the ratio entis, then, is the principle of intelligibility and of both
subjective and objective truth, both with respect to things to be understood or
known and with respect to us in order to permit consciousness to know them as
they are in se. Thus, the plexus of ens, which was for the Platonism of Proclus
and of Pseudo-Dionysius, the limit and the fracture for the knowledge of the
First Cause, becomes in St. Thomas the key to knowledge and the glimmer
[spiraglio] to ascend to the first Cause by means of the purifying process of
analogy279.
277
In Librum De Causis, lect. 6: “Ens autem dicitur id quod finite participat
esse, et hoc est proportionatum intellectui nostro cuius obiectum est quod quid est
ut dicitur in III de anima, unde illud solum est capabile ab intellectu nostro quod
habet quidditatem participantem esse”.
278
In Librum De Causis, lect. 6: “Omnis cognitio intellectualis vel rationalis
est entium: illud enim quod primo acquiritur ab intellectu est ens, et id in quo non
invenitur ratio entis non est capabile ab intellectu”.
279
C. FABRO, “L’emergenza dell’atto di essere…”, 53.
631
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
Theses Content
Structure and composition of finite ens:
I - VII
substance-accidents; matter-form; essence-esse
Initial apprehension of ens and foundation of knowledge
VIII - XVII
and the transcendentals
XVIII - XX;
Predicamental and transcendental participation
XXXVI - XXXVIII
XL - XLV Metaphysics of esse
Metaphysical anthropology:
XLVI - L
esse and the soul, ens and knowledge
284
J. Méndez has studied the theses extensively. See his “Las tesis de C.
Fabro”, Sapientia 39 (1984), 181-192; and his Las tesis de Cornelio Fabro,
Pontificia Università Lateranense, Roma 1990.
285
See C. FABRO, IST, 178.
633
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
finite ens. As we have seen, the articulation of the principles of the three
orders is effected by means of a resolution of act, founding accidental forms
and acts on substantial form and both of these on actus essendi:
I. Potency and act are the constitutive principles of finite ens; potency as
receptive capacity, and act as entitative act, in the various orders or planes of
reality: prime matter and substantial form in the constitution of material
essence, essence and esse as actus essendi in the entitative order, substance and
accidents in the operative order286.
II. The essence of spiritual beings is simple in the essential order, since it is
constituted by pure form; in the operative order it has the faculties of
intelligence and of will at its disposal; in the entitative order – insofar as the
created spirit is in se finite – it is composed of essence (as potency) and of
participated esse (as ultimate act); by which, all that exists in the world, both
material and spiritual, is called ens as that which as esse by participation287.
The thesis evidences how Fabro, by pointing to the finite nature of created
beings, draws out the consequence that all finite (limited and imperfect)
beings must be composed in the entitative order. In this way, the thesis
alludes to Fabro’s work on the importance of the participation argument for
the real distinction-composition between essence and participated esse.
The third thesis affirms the analogical nature of the three potency-act
compositions in finite ens. Potency and act are not “said” or predicated in
286
C. FABRO, IST, 158.
287
C. FABRO, IST, 158.
634
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
the same way in each order. The distinction of orders of reality and the
analogical nature of act and potency within the compositions allow the same
principle to be act in one order and potency in another, and begin to clarify
the role of the Aristotelian principle “forma dat esse” in St. Thomas’s
metaphysics of esse and participation:
III. The relationship of potency and act in the three compositions of matter and
form, substance and accidents, essence and esse, do not have a univocal
meaning, but rather an analogous one: prime matter is pure potency, the
substance produces its own accidents, and essence gives being. This is because
it is by means of the form, which is the constitutive act of the species or nature,
that ens is enabled to have-receive participated esse (actus essendi)288.
Thus, in the essential order, prime matter is pure potency and pure capacity
to receive form and its act from form. In this case, the act-principle
determines the potency-principle. In the operative order, the substance is not
pure potency, for it produces-determines its accidents and properly has the
act of being, in which accidents participate. Likewise the accidents
determine the substance as second acts and ulterior perfections. In the
entitative order, the essence or form is the mediating principle by which an
ens is determined to receive its actus essendi. In this case the potential-
principle determines the act-principle.
Thesis IV affirms that esse as participated actus essendi should be
referred to as the “first act” or “primary act” in finite ens in all three orders
(predicamental, operative, transcendental) and compositions (synolons).
Esse as act of all acts and perfection of all perfections, is what Fabro refers
to as “intensive act”:
IV. The esse, i.e., participated actus essendi, that with the essence constitutes
ens in act as transcendental synolon, is thus the first act both of the
predicamental synolon of matter and form in bodies, and of the operative
synolon of substance and accidents in finite beings and of the transcendental
synolon of essence and esse (actus essendi)289.
This means that the actuality (being-in-act) proper to form (formal esse or
existence), substance (subsistence) and accidents (inherence, inesse) is
founded on the act of being and is due to a participation in this act.
Consequently, something is in act to the degree that it participates in the
288
C. FABRO, IST, 159.
289
C. FABRO, IST, 159.
635
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
perfection of esse, and does not have another “source” for its perfection
other than participated esse:
V. Therefore, while in classical thought act indicates the essence and the form,
which has no origin and constitutes the proper and first esse of material beings
and also of intelligent and intelligible beings, in Thomistic thought act pertains
first of all and above all to esse, such that every form (essence, perfection) has
actuality insofar as it participates in esse290.
VI. “Ens”, therefore, is the “primary semantic term”, both in the static order
(which implies the composition of real essence with actus essendi) and in the
dynamic order as the primary foundation of the substance in operation, such
that the act of operating is by participation in the act of esse, which is the first
act of the substance291.
VII. “Ens” can be said, then, as the participle of esse, to be the “totalizing
semantic term”, insofar as it indicates the plexus of reality in its first
(fundamental) and ultimate (realized and realizing) concreteness; thus “ens” is
more concrete than “lion” and “this lion” (Simba), than “man” and “this man”
(Andrew): since only esse places in act both the essence in its precise
characteristic and the individual connotations of the same species. This is the
intensive meaning of ens which, as the omni-comprehensive, reigns over the
other determinations of the real, both categorical (essences) and transcendental
(perfections)292.
290
C. FABRO, IST, 159.
291
C. FABRO, IST, 159.
292
C. FABRO, IST, 159-160.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
VIII. Ens, then, insofar as it is the originary semantic term which indicates
“that which has the act of being”, is the semantic term of the first and ultimate
concreteness of reality in act, within which all the other determinations of the
real are actuated as its participations. Ens is the “transcendental founding”
semantic term with respect to any determination of the real: it avoids all logical
determination (of genus and species…) insofar as it is not found on the slope of
constitutive, formal concepts, but is placed as the first plexus of the first act
(esse) at the foundation of the reality of all forms and acts that constitute the
concrete in se, outside of thought and of mere possibility.
IX. Ens is the first, originary noetical plexus (primum cognitum) which is
constitutive of knowledge in the strong sense: i.e., it operates and is presented
to the confluence of all the functions of consciousness both cognitive and
tendential [tendenziali], both sensible and spiritual: for this reason, it
transcends both (sensible) intuition and (intellectual) abstraction, since it
sustains both. In the semantic term of the plexus ens the first structure of
essence (id quod) and act (esse) is distinguished: “Nomen entis imponitur ab
esse, et nomen rei a quidditate” (In I Sent., d. 25, q. 1, a. 4; cf. Ibid., d. 8, q. 1,
a. 3).
X. Ens indicates the whole in act of the real in its ultimate and proper reality in
act: esse as proper act of ens qua ens, that is, insofar as it indicates the real that
has overcome both the empty abyss of nothingness as the empty categorial
multiplicity of the possible; it is not the act revealed by thought in judgment,
but rather the act that is given to thought and that renders active [operoso] and
operating the actuating itself of thought itself in its original composition
[dirimersi] of essence and esse, and therefore of substance and operations and
of subject and perfections.
293
C. FABRO, IST, 160-161.
637
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
Theses XII, XIII and XIV establish ens as: 1) the initial, primary, noetic
plexus (XII); 2) the founding, primary, noetic plexus (XIII); and 3) the
primary veritative plexus (foundation of first principles) (XIV):
XIV. Once the mind is actuated to knowledge by the apprehension of ens as the
object which places the mind itself in act, ens is affirmed in the mind itself on
the fundament of esse which is its act. Since esse is the act of ens, ens, if it is,
must be in act: thus, the actuation of consciousness follows the presentation of
ens to consciousness. Thus, it is in virtue of the total passivity of consciousness
with respect to the positing presentation of ens that the presence in act of ens
itself is imposed on consciousness, and it should affirm it as imposing in an
absolute way. It is the principle of non-contradiction, the first principle of
knowledge, founded on the initial apprehension of ens296.
294
C. FABRO, IST, 161.
295
C. FABRO, IST, 161-162.
296
C. FABRO, IST, 162.
297
In his article, “Il nuovo problema dell’essere e la fondazione della
metafisica”, Fabro speaks of a “transcendental deduction of ens”, yet clarifies that
the term “deduction” should not be understood in a formal, logical (rationalistic)
sense.
638
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
implication on two levels (or degrees, if you prefer): the absolute plane, with
ens-essentia-aliquid-unum; and the relative plane, with verum-bonum. The
absolute attributes regard ens ut ens: by being understood as id quod est, id
quod habet esse, should be in se something real (id quod, essentia),
incommunicable determinate (aliquid), and thus, one in se (unum, undivided
and indivisible, i.e., unified and compact in se. The unification is given by esse
insofar as it is act of all acts, the most intimate act, the first and ultimate act298.
XVI. If the grasping of ens is the first and fundamental act of knowing, insofar
as it gives esse and makes it present, ens which becomes the object of knowing
is “true”: true, then, is the intellect that conforms to ens, i.e., which attests to
the content of ens (essence) and the actuality of being (esse). The originary and
founding principle of the actuation of knowing in the apprehension of ens is
thus in agreement with the absolute dependence of knowing on the givenness
[darsi] of ens itself. Thus, ens in anima, verum, is derived, i.e., founded on ens
in se which is extra animam. In other words, the veritas formalis mentis of man
depends on (should be conformed to) the real veritas entis299.
298
C. FABRO, IST, 163.
299
C. FABRO, IST, 163-164.
300
C. FABRO, IST, 164-165.
639
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
XVIII. Therefore, ens is the real plexus of essence and esse: ens is something,
namely, this thing and not another (a horse and not a stone, since it has the
essence of horse and not of stone). Thus, the essence as principle of distinction
of entia implies wherever a limitation of the perfection of esse, it is not esse
ipsum but rather “participates” in being, the first act, the act of all acts. Being-
in-act (esse actu) is found in reality, to be realized: but before being such or
such a nature (namely a perfection) and this is every determination of the real,
“participation” of being. St. Thomas says: “To participate is like taking a part,
and therefore when something receives in a particular way that which belongs
to another in a universal way it is said to participate in it”. The text continues,
illustrating univocal predicamental participation: “As man is said to participate
in animal, since it does not have the notion of animal according to all its
community; and in the same way, Socrates participates in man; and in a similar
way the subject participates in the accident and matter in form”. Shortly
afterwards, St. Thomas speaks of transcendental participation: “It is
impossible that ipsum esse participates in something according to the first two
modes […]. But ipsum esse is most common: hence it is participated in by
others, but does not participate in something else” (In lib. De Hebdomadibus,
lect. 2)301.
301
C. FABRO, IST, 165.
640
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
predicated: for the species is said to participate the genus, and the individual
the species” (Summa contra Gentiles, I, ch. 32)302.
302
C. FABRO, IST, 165-166.
303
In his article, Méndez mentions that Fabro agreed with him that “ma
anche” should be added to the thesis. See J. MÉNDEZ, “Las tesis de C. Fabro”, 186,
n. 6.
304
C. FABRO, IST, 166.
641
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
diversity, and at the same time, finds fulfillment in the reference to the primary
founding plexus of “ens” (id quod participat esse)305.
XXXVII. One can say then that the predicamental participation of the species
in the genus and of the individuals in the species is “in ascension” toward the
transcendental participation of beings (be these material or spiritual) in esse, in
the act of being as the absolutely first founding act […]. For this reason, ens in
quantum ens – or rather, the plexus of id quod habet esse – constitutes the
object of radical reflection. The participation in every level of being requires
the real composition of the participant (as subject-potency) and of participated
(act limited by potency): matter limits the form in bodies; accidents, although
operative and perfective, are limited by the form both in bodies and in spirits.
Finite ens is operans by participation and not by essence, i.e., it passes from
potency to act in action since it is composed of essence and act of being, or
rather, since it is in act by participation in esse306.
XXXVIII. As the first notional plexus is that of ens which founds and sustains
the meaning of every concept and meaning that follows, so also the first real
transcendental plexus of essence and esse (actus essendi) founds and sustains
reality both of the pure perfections and of the other acts in being and in action.
Consequently, the finite spirits (including man) are entia per participationem,
and therefore are also known by participation: “Ens means that which finitely
participates in esse, and it is this which is proportioned to our intellect, whose
object is some “that which is,” as it is said in Book 3 of On the Soul. Hence our
intellect can grasp only that which has a quiddity participating in esse” (In
Librum De Causis, lect. 6). We are intelligent by participation also in a
subjective sense, insofar as our intellect is a participation of the divine light:
305
C. FABRO, IST, 173-174.
306
C. FABRO, IST, 174.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
“man’s natural light, which is what makes him intellectual, is from God”
(Compendium theologiae, I, ch. 129)307.
XL. Esse is, per se, the act of ens that is (insofar as it is either esse ipsum and is
God, or has the act of being and is an ens as all finite realities are). In the
foundation of the actuality of ens it belongs to elevate oneself to esse as act in
Aristotle’s sense, for whom act is perfection that is in se and precedes potency
(it recalls Parmenides’ on-einai which is opposed to nothingness). Thus, ens is
the primary semantic-term with respect to one, true, and good, insofar as esse
is the primary originary act from which unity, truth, and goodness proceed. In
fact, it is in virtue of esse that the component principles of the substance
(matter and form, substance and accidents) pertain to each other in unity;
consequently, ens maintains the “truth” of its nature insofar as it has esse
(according to the level of being that belongs to it). Therefore, good and
perfection as well emerge on the foundation of ens-unum-verum, and therefore
is actuated by esse: “Non est verum quod intelligere vel velle sit nobilius quam
307
C. FABRO, IST, 174-175.
308
C. FABRO, IST, 175.
643
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
esse si secernantus ab esse: immo sic esse eo est eis nobilius” (De Veritate, q.
22, a. 6)309.
The absolute emergence of esse as act refers to God who is both Pure Act
and Esse subsistens. Act and esse are seen to mutually clarify one another:
esse is seen as primary perfection, while act is seen in its original purity as
esse. The real emergence of ens-esse affirms that it is the primum reale and
first intelligible. This is understood though a resolution to foundation:
XLI. The elevation of act to esse as first act unchains the act from the
conditioning of the potency, such that esse confers (or realizes) act in its purity
or absolute emergence, and this Esse separatum is God. It is the Aristotelian
concrete [notion] of “act” that promotes esse to first emergent metaphysical
perfection; but at the same time, the real emergence of ens-esse that realizes
the reality of act in its originary purity. Thus, the two instances of act and of
esse are complementary according to a constitutive pertaining to each other
[appartenenza], such that ens-esse is the primum reale, and for this reason is
the first intelligible in the resolution of the foundation: “illud per quod aliquid
cognoscitur per similitudinem lumen dici potest; probat autem Philosophus in
IX Metaph. [1051 a 29] quod unumquodque cognoscitur per id quod est in
actu; et ideo ipsa actualitas rei est lumen ipsius” (In Librum De Causis, prop.
6). Light, in the order or sphere of essence, is the form; in the sphere of
actuality it is esse (actus essendi), where ens is the primum cognitum as the
foundation of every difference and quality of ens and of every form and
difference of knowledge310.
309
C. FABRO, IST, 175-176.
310
C. FABRO, IST, 176.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
XLIII. Thomistic realism founds the principle of the unity of the form on the
act of the esse of ens: if matter and form (for example, body and soul) are
between themselves as potency and act, form and esse, although both are acts,
are as potency and act between each other, as well, esse and operation are as
act and act. Yet, because the orders in which they are found are diverse, the
essence, with respect to esse falls to receptive potency of actus essendi which
is participated in it. On the other hand, esse and operari are both maintained at
the level of act and are related, that is they co-pertain to each other as first act
and second act, as founding act and founded act: operari sequitur esse. So,
according to the diversity of natures (material or spiritual), one verifies the
diversity of operations: some are bound to the condition of matter, although in
diverse forms or degrees (for example, in atoms and in molecules, and finally,
in superior animals, up to the human body); others are independent of matter,
or rather, emerge over the body, such as understanding and willing, which are
properly spiritual acts312.
St. Thomas has effectively integrated the Platonic and Aristotelian couplets
in the ultimate determination of finite ens:
XLIV. The hierarchy of the real is articulated, then, within the dialectic of
participation, according to the tension of participant as potency and
participated as act. In St. Thomas, the two couplets – which in Plato and
Aristotle were opposed and excluded each other – are brought back together
and integrated with each other: “Everything participated is compared to the
311
C. FABRO, IST, 176.
312
C. FABRO, IST, 177
645
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
participant as its act. But whatever created form be supposed to subsist per se,
must have esse by participation; for ‘even life’, or anything of that sort,
participates in esse’, as Dionysius says (De Divinis Nominibus, Ch. 5). Now
participated esse is limited by the capacity of the participant; so that God alone,
Who is His own esse, is pure act and infinite. But in intellectual substances
there is composition of actuality and potentiality, not, indeed, of matter and
form, but of form and participated esse. Wherefore some say that they are
composed of that ‘whereby they are’ and that ‘which they are’; for esse itself is
that by which a thing is” (I, q. 75, a. 5 ad 4)313.
XLV. Thus, thought does not close itself in a circle (or circular movement) in
the tension of matter and form (Augustinianism), of particular and universal
(Averroism), of consciousness and self-consciousness (immanentism), but
always remains open in a movement that ascends helicoidally, from act to act:
from the formal acts in the essence, first accidental and then substantial, to
found themselves on esse, the participated transcendental in ens of every form
and nature, up to the Esse per essentiam. It is always the dialectic concerning
act as perfection: “For in a created spiritual substance there must be two
[principles], one of which is related to the other as potency is to act. This is
clear from the following. For it is obvious that the first ens, which is God, is
infinite act, as having in itself the entire fullness of being (plenitudinem
essendi), not contracted to any generic or specific nature. Hence its very esse
must not be an esse that is, as it were, put into some nature which is not its own
esse, because thus it would be limited to that nature. Hence we say that God is
His own esse” (De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 1)314.
* * *
313
C. FABRO, IST, 177. I, q. 75, a. 5 ad 4.
314
C. FABRO, IST, 178.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
315
C. FABRO, “Problematica del tomismo di scuola”, 189.
316
C. FABRO, “Problematica del tomismo di scuola”, 190.
647
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
In contrast to Maritain’s proposal, Fabro notes that ens is the object of the
absolutely first knowledge, i.e., “knowledge of the presence of the concrete
in its primary, real evidence and also in its primordial confusion: above all,
ens is anything present in sensible experience where the clearest aspect is
precisely that of givenness and imposing itself as sensible presence of
absolute affirmation, something that can be tree, house, sky to use
Maritain’s images”318.
317
C. FABRO, “Problematica del tomismo di scuola”, 192. Fabro’s text has
De Hebdomadibus instead of De Trinitate.
318
C. FABRO, “Problematica del tomismo di scuola”, 192.
648
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
The created, first act is not the form, but the participated act of esse. And since
things are known in quantum sunt in actu, the first object of knowing is not the
simplex apprehensio according to the essence, but the synthetic apprehensio or
sumplokh, according to the act of esse which is precisely the reality of absolute
act in its emergent purity and perfection. It is to this, i.e., to the concrete which
is ens, that it thus belongs to be primum cognitum which is not, then, the
simplex apprehensio of the confused essence to which the affirmation of esse
319
C. FABRO, “Problematica del tomismo di scuola”, 192.
320
C. FABRO, “Problematica del tomismo di scuola”, 194.
649
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
I – Ens constitutes the absolutely first object of our knowing: St. Thomas
does not speak of intuitio and much less of abstractio, but simply of
apprehensio which is the most obvious and immediate operation and, thus, the
most important.
II – Ens expresses the primary and total concreteness since it embraces both
act (esse) and content (essentia) in a more or less vague way or precisely
according to the psychic development of the subject.
III – Thus, ens is the founding plexus of all ulterior knowing, presupposed in
all real knowledge: as the comprehensive plexus of the real as such, always
presupposed and thus, it is a noema or a intentio stans: what one could call the
bearing plexus and axis of knowing.
IV – As such, ens is at the foundation of the genesis of the first principle
which is that of contradiction, namely, the formula of the prioritary and
absolute character of being over non-being, of affirmation over negation and in
general of the positive over the negative.
V – Thus, far from founding itself on judgment, the apprehensio entis is not
only the foundation but is the only one that can give meaning to the first
judgment or principle and with it to all the other concepts and judgments.
VI – Ens is also the originary intensive plexus which is comprehensive of
the other transcendentals, namely unum, aliquid, verum, bonum…which dilate
in se in its real structure (unum, aliquid) and with respect to the proper activity
of the spirit (verum for the intellect, bonum for the will).
VII – Therefore, if the aprehensio entis as id quod habet esse is primordial
and foundational, with the principle of contradiction, of all the other concepts
and judgments, it cannot, therefore, be attributed properly to the judgment
which supposes it, as we have seen.
VIII – Further, in this perspective, St. Thomas, clearly distinguishes ens
which is in rerum natura from verum which is proper of the reflection of the
mind: “Non ens dicitur simpliciter (…). Uno modo dicitur ens et non ens
secundum compositionem et divisionem propositionis, prout sunt idem cum
vero et falso: et sic ens et non ens sunt in mente tantum, ut dicitur in VI
Metaphys.” (In V Physic., lect. 2, n. 656).
IX – The grasping of ens-esse on behalf of the human mind is in the primary
and constitutive convergence with the sensitive sphere that operates and
321
C. FABRO, “Problematica del tomismo di scuola”, 195.
650
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
maintains contact with sensible reality which is the sphere proper to knowing
of human nature formed of body and spirit. One can assert that we are dealing
with a knowledge that is completely special and indispensable at the same
time: confused at the beginning as immediate apprehension of id quod est, of
the primary immediate reflection which is explicated together with the
knowledge of experience and with the compared reflection of the various
sciences.
X – For St. Thomas, who takes up again still in his way an original theory of
Aristotle, this first knowledge of both ens and the first concepts, and the
principle of contradiction and of the other first principles is prepared in the
sphere of the senses (both external and internal) by experimentum, which is the
operation of lived experience by means of which the intellect (and with it the
will) always remains in direct contact with reality322.
* * *
322
C. FABRO, “Problematica del tomismo di scuola”, 198-199.
323
C. FABRO, “Problematica del tomismo di scuola”, 199.
324
C. FABRO, “Problematica del tomismo di scuola”, 199.
325
See A. CONTAT, “Le figure della differenza ontologica …”, 98-115.
651
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
326
C. FABRO, “Alla ricerca della fondazione della metafisica”, Choros I, 1,
1986, 7-18.
327
See C. FABRO, “Alla ricerca della fondazione della metafisica”, 14.
328
See C. FABRO, “Alla ricerca della fondazione della metafisica”, 15.
329
See C. FABRO, “Alla ricerca della fondazione della metafisica”, 15-16:
“The renewed historiography of Scholasticism: Denifle, Ehrle, Mandonnet, Pelster,
Pelzr, Kock, Grabmann… and disciples (Théry, Simonin Meersseman) have
polarized the doctrinal climate of the 13th century, in which St. Thomas worked,
into three large schools: Augustinianism followed in the theological field by the
conservatives present especially in the Franciscan school with Alexander of Hales
and Bonaventure as their heads; Averroism dominant in the Faculty of Arts in
which Siger of Brabante emerges; and, last, but for us first, the thought of St.
Thomas which undertook a “new way” which stupefied the University of Paris as
William of Tocco reminds us in his life of the Saint. The newness of his orientation
was the emergent synthesis of the transcendence of the Idea – Platonic form – and
of act – Aristotelian form –, both, however, considered from within Christian
creation”.
652
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
St. Thomas, with the Diremption of ens into essence and esse, as actus essendi,
moves on to found the three moments of analysis, namely, a) the metaphysical
interpretation of creation as primary origin of the cosmos, b) the real
distinction of essence and esse-actus essendi and c) the articulation of analogy
as predication of plurium ad unum of intrinsic attribution. Primordial origin,
primordial composition, primordial predication according to an
interchangeable belonging in entia per participationem, both material and
spiritual331.
[1] Ens is the first intelligible object and at the same time, the primary
foundation of intelligibility: “Id quod primo cadit in intellectu est ens.
Unde unicuique apprehenso a nobis, attribuimus quod sit ens et per
consequens quod sit unum et bonum quae convertuntur cum ente” (I-II, q.
55, a. 4 ad 1). And in a preceding text with a hint at the self-consciousness
for the foundation of the derivation of the transcendentals: “Intellectus per
prius apprehendit ipsum ens, et secundatio apprehendit se intelligere ens
et tertio apprehendit se appetere ens. Unde primario est ratio entis,
secundo est ratio veri, tertio ratio boni, licet bonum sit in rebus” (I, q. 16,
a. 4 ad 2). […].
[2] The apprehension of ens is the foundation of the evidence of the first
principles and, first of all, that of contradiction: “… in qua cognitione
330
See C. FABRO, “Alla ricerca della fondazione della metafisica”, 16.
331
C. FABRO, “Alla ricerca della fondazione della metafisica”, 16.
332
C. FABRO, “Alla ricerca della fondazione della metafisica”, 16.
653
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
333
C. FABRO, “Alla ricerca della fondazione della metafisica”, 16-17.
654
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
334
See ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, A, 3, 983a 24.
335
C. FABRO, “L’emergenza dello esse tomistico…”, 159.
336
Regarding the dupliciter meaning of ens, Fabro references: 1) De ente et
essentia, ch. 1 where St. Thomas refers to ens as divided by ten categories and as
the truth of a proposition; 2) In I Sent., d. 29, q. 5, a. 1 ad 1. For tripliciter meaning
of esse, Fabro references: 1) In I Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1 ad 4: esse as quidditas vel
natura, ipse actus essentiae, and veritas propositionis; and 2) In III Sent., d. 6, q. 2,
a. 2.
655
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
Forasmuch as nature is ever directed to one thing, it follows that of one power
there is naturally one object, for instance color is the object of sight, sound of
hearing. Wherefore the intellect, since it is one power, has one natural object,
of which it has knowledge per se and naturally. And this object must be that
under which are comprised all things known by the intellect: just as under color
are comprised all colors, which are visible per se. Now this is nothing other
than ens. Therefore our intellect knows ens naturally, and whatever is
comprised per se under ens as such; and on this knowledge is based the
337
C. FABRO, “L’emergenza dello esse tomistico…”, 165.
338
C. FABRO, “L’emergenza dello esse tomistico…”, 167.
339
C. FABRO, “L’emergenza dello esse tomistico…”, 167: “Penso si debba
rispondere con la grammatica elementare che intende il participio nella sua forma
attiva come indicante l’esercizio di un atto: ente è ciò che è in atto di essere, che è
od esercita l’atto di essere. La res viene dopo poiché è ciò che ha l’atto di essere,
quindi presuppone come fondamento ontologico l’ens che la fondi.
656
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
knowledge of first principles, such as it is not the same thing to affirm and
negate, and the like340.
Ens, insofar as it is the first knowable, is also the first predicable and
thus accompanies and sustains all the predicates that can be “mediated” in
the discourse of the verb “est”. This predication is valid both for the
categories (specific forms) and the transcendentals (general forms) as an
important text of De Veritate (q. 21, a. 4 ad 4) makes clear. Having
established the ontological and theoretical priority of ens, Fabro concludes
part three of the article by affirming that just as every verb (to speak, to
write…) express an action insofar as it includes the act of being in that
action, so also every concept is meaningful insofar as it includes the concept
of ens. Yet this leaves open two questions, “What concept is ens? What does
it contain?”.
To answer these questions, part four of the article deals with the
twofold emergence of Thomistic ens-esse and begins by clarifying the
twofold emergence (priority or primacy) of ens as the participle of esse: “As
a participle form ens means being in act, and as the participle of the verb
esse, ens means the being in act of the verb esse. Thus – and this is the first
important conclusion – ens as participle of esse has a double emergence,
that common to all participles which express being in act and that which is
special to it, being the participle of esse which is the verb included in every
verb”341. Fabro notes that in Aristotle’s thought being (essere) is placed in
the figures (schemata) of the predicaments – in the functional plexus of act
and potency and in the dynamism of the four causes of becoming. In St.
Thomas’s texts, on the other hand, ens is based on esse and emerges over
essentia342. These and other texts evidence the absolute primacy of ens in
340
Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 83: “Cum natura semper ordinetur ad unum,
unius virtutis oportet esse naturaliter unum obiectum: sicut visus colorem, et
auditus sonum. Intellectus igitur cum sit una vis, est eius unum naturale obiectum,
cuius per se et naturaliter cognitionem habet. Hoc autem oportet esse id sub quo
comprehenduntur omnia ab intellectu cognita: sicut sub colore comprehenduntur
omnes colores, qui sunt per se visibiles. Quod non est aliud quam ens. Naturaliter
igitur intellectus noster cognoscit ens, et ea quae sunt per se entis inquantum
huiusmodi; in qua cognitione fundatur primorum principiorum notitia, ut non esse
simul affirmare et negare, et alia huiusmodi. Haec igitur sola principia intellectus
noster naturaliter cognoscit, conclusiones autem per ipsa”.
341
C. FABRO, “L’emergenza dello esse tomistico…”, 170.
342
See In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1; In I Sent. d. 25, q. 1, a. 4; De Veritate q. 1,
a. 1.
657
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
knowledge due to the primacy that esse as act has in reality. In fact, what is
prior in rationem “first falls into the conception of the intellect. Now the
first thing which falls into the conception of the intellect is ens; because
everything is knowable only inasmuch as it is in act […]. Hence, ens is the
proper object of the intellect, and is the primary intelligible; as sound is the
primary audible”343. Fabro concludes that just as all verbs refer to esse and
all participles refer to ens, so also all formalities and perfections refer to
esse. This formal resolution to esse as “plexus” of all perfections is
continued in a reflection on esse as act of all acts344.
After affirming this twofold emergence of intensive esse as perfection
of all perfections and act of all acts, Fabro re-affirms St. Thomas’s
speculative synthesis with regard to Platonic and Aristotelian thought. This
is done by means of the dialectic of participation and integration of
participation with act:
And thus the act of all acts and perfection of all perfections is the “qualitative
jump” past Aristotle, yet… with Aristotle. In other words, we bring the demand
of the perfection of Aristotle’s act to its ultimate explicitation. This, however,
is done by means of a new step. In fact, the ultimate theoretical foundation of
the absolute emergence of Thomistic esse is deepened in and reposes in the
dialectic of participation by means of the correspondence of potency and act
with participant and participated. Potency and act support the speculation of
343
I, q. 5, a. 2: “Illud ergo est prius secundum rationem, quod prius cadit in
conceptione intellectus. Primo autem in conceptione intellectus cadit ens, quia
secundum hoc unumquodque cognoscibile est, inquantum est actu, […]. Unde ens
est proprium obiectum intellectus, et sic est primum intelligibile, sicut sonus est
primum audibile”. See also I, q. 5, a. 2 ad 4: “Vita et scientia, et alia huiusmodi, sic
appetuntur ut sunt in actu, unde in omnibus appetitur quoddam esse. Et sic nihil est
appetibile nisi ens, et per consequens nihil est bonum nisi ens” and I, q. 5, a. 3:
“Omne enim ens, inquantum est ens, est in actu, et quodammodo perfectum, quia
omnis actus perfectio quaedam est. Perfectum vero habet rationem appetibilis et
boni, ut ex dictis patet. Unde sequitur omne ens, inquantum huiusmodi, bonum
esse”.
344
C. FABRO, “L’emergenza dello esse tomistico…”, 171: “The semantic
dominion of ens is thus uncontested and this is because esse as act is absolutely
emergent, it is the act of all acts and the perfection of all perfections, thus it is the
light and source of all evidence. Here the intensity of Thomistic reflection is at its
extreme, and has never been achieved either before or after in the history of
thought: the apogee of intensive esse as act”. Here, Fabro quotes texts from St.
Thomas which are similar to ones we have already seen (Summa Contra Gentiles,
I, 28; I, q. 4, a. 1 ad 3; Q. De anima, a. 9; I, q. 8, a. 1).
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
And now the conclusion of this double participation and thus double
emergence, not only of the act over the potency according to the classical
Aristotelian scheme, but of act over act which is the theoretical conquest of
Aquinas: ‘Therefore these (life per se, wisdom per se…) which are the
principles of the others, are not except by participation in being, further, those
things which participate in these are not except by participation in esse. And it
is clear [this is the final step] that God causes all by his very esse’348. Here, the
345
C. FABRO, “L’emergenza dello esse tomistico…”, 172-173.
346
In V De Divinis nominibus, lect. 1.
347
C. FABRO, “L’emergenza dello esse tomistico…”, 173-174.: “Therefore, a
real double participation, above all that of the (concrete) participants to the
respective form or participated participation (the formal act: living beings in
life…): it is the predicamental participation that opens up to the transcendental one;
then that of the various participations (life per se, wisdom per se…) to esse: ‘Et
similiter de omnibus aliis participantibus, quaecumque participant hoc vel illo vel
ambobus vel multis, semper invenies quod huiusmodi, licet participentur ab aliis,
tamen ipsa etiam participant ipso esse, et primo intelliguntur ut participantes esse,
quam quod sint principia aliorum, per hoc quod ab aliis participantur’ [In V De
Divinis nominibus, lect. 1, 639]”.
348
In V De Divinis nominibus, lect. 1, n. 639: “ Ergo si ista quae sunt
principia aliorum, non sunt nisi per participationem essendi, multo magis ea quae
participant ipsis, non sunt nisi per participationem ipsius esse. Et sic patet quod
Deus per ipsum esse omnia causat”.
659
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
dialectical resolution comes to its end, deepening itself in the principle, esse,
which is the principle of all principles and the act of all acts. It is true that such
as esse is foreign to both Plato and Aristotle, but is theorized on a double slope
of Plato and Aristotle which in the Thomistic interpretation converges in the
discovery of a duplex actus (essentia-forma and esse-actus essendi) and of a
duplex potentia (matter toward form and then form toward esse). It is the
formula of the Angelic Doctor’s mature speculation: “Hence in composite
things there is a two-fold act and a two-fold potency to consider. For first of all,
matter is as potency with respect to form, and the form is its act. And secondly,
if the nature is constituted of matter and form, it is as potency with respect to
esse itself, insofar as it is able to receive this”349. Act over act, emergence over
emergence, transcendental participation (in function of esse) over
predicamental participation and final affirmation of esse as first and ultimate
act350.
* * *
To conclude, the article clearly brings out the strong continuity with
his first work on participation, La nozione metafisica di participazione, and
the twofold resolution of ens by means of perfection and act. The outline is
maintained: predicamental perfections and participations open up to
transcendental ones. The resolution of perfection is complemented by the
resolution of act: all perfections first participate in esse and are reduced to
potency with respect to it as to their act. In this way, esse emerges as the
perfection of all perfections and act of all acts.
349
Q. disp. De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 1: “Unde in rebus compositis est
considerare duplicem actum, et duplicem potentiam. Nam primo quidem materia
est ut potentia respectu formae, et forma est actus eius; et iterum natura constituta
ex materia et forma, est ut potentia respectu ipsius esse, in quantum est susceptiva
eius”.
350
C. FABRO, “L’emergenza dello esse tomistico…”, 174-175.
351
Fabro’s reflections (30 April 1991) were gathered and translated into
Spanish by Elvio Fontana and published as “Nuestra patria de estudiosos es la
Verdad”, Diálogo 15 (1996), 7-23. I have translated the texts from the Spanish.
660
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
Fr Tyn presented the Thomistic tradition of the last seven centuries. The same
Thomistic tradition in which I also, as a small child, was educated – although
afterwards I escaped. In the tradition of the Thomistic school we find a couplet:
esse essentiae – esse existentiae. Esse was bifurcated into esse essentiae and
esse existentiae. No! It is not possible and if you bifurcate esse into esse
essentiae and esse existentiae, esse is converted into something common to
essence and existence; it does not emerge. On the other hand, that what is
constitutive in the thought of St. Thomas is the emergence of esse over
essentia. To emerge means to rise above, to go higher; as well, to rise above
means to dominate what is below356.
352
See C. FABRO, “Nuestra patria de estudiosos es la Verdad”, 9.
353
C. FABRO, “Nuestra patria de estudiosos es la Verdad”, 10-11.
354
See C. FABRO, “Nuestra patria de estudiosos es la Verdad”, 8 and 11.
355
C. FABRO, “Nuestra patria de estudiosos es la Verdad”, 11.
356
C. FABRO, “Nuestra patria de estudiosos es la Verdad”, 11.
357
C. FABRO, “Nuestra patria de estudiosos es la Verdad”, 18-19.
661
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
colors; ens is not scented nor colored; it has all scents and colors, since any
scent or color is real scent or color insofar as it is ens. Are we in
agreement?”358.
The emergence of esse as actus essendi, metaphysics as reductio to
foundation, foundation as Act, ens as first notion: these are some of the
cardinal points of Fabro’s metaphysical reflection. His conference is a
fitting final text in our historical overview.
4. Conclusion
These six works from the 1980s confirm the major theses of Fabro’s
work on the method of metaphysical reflection: 1) our initial grasping of ens
is not an abstraction or consequent upon judgment, but is rather, a synthetic
apprehension of ens as the originary plexus of act and content; 2) the proper
method of metaphysics is a resolution of perfection and act and reduction to
fundament; 3) the goal of metaphysics is the conclusive determination of
esse as Ipsum esse subsistens (God) and esse participatum (the creature’s
act of being); 4) This goal is obtained by a progressive metaphysical
reflection on the structure, causality and predication of being.
A general conclusion from our overview in previous chapters is that
some elements in Fabro’s early works (especially in NMP) should be
interpreted in the light of the changes or corrections made in his more
mature works. In particular, when quoting NMP, scholars should be
attentive to the nuances and differences between Fabro’s thought on how we
come to know the “ratio essendi” (ragione di essere) and how we come to
know actus essendi. One should be cautious when quoting or drawing
conclusions from texts which use the distinction between esse essentiae and
esse existentiae. Certain intuitions found in NMP are clarified in later works
and articles. For example, Fabro’s early portrayal of the general progress of
our understanding of ens-esse (initial notion, proportional notion, intensive
notion) is modified somewhat to refer, in particular, to our metaphysical
notion of esse (esse commune, esse as act of ens, esse in relation to essence;
intensive esse). As well, Fabro’s distinction in NMP between the reflection
on esse as essence and the reflection on esse as actus essendi359 is developed
in later works as a distinction between a “formal reduction-resolution-
emergence” of participated perfection and a “real reduction-resolution-
358
C. FABRO, “Nuestra patria de estudiosos es la Verdad”, 19-20.
359
See C. FABRO, NMP, 194-201.
662
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REDUCTION TO FUNDAMENT
360
See C. FABRO, “La problematica dello esse tomistico”, TPM, 106-109.
663
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
664
Chapter Six
THE METHOD OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
665
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
The textual bases for Fabro’s affirmations about resolutio are In Boethii De
Trinitate, q. 6, a. 15 and De substantiis separatis, ch. 96. The first text
develops resolutio as the method of metaphysics; the second refers to
1
C. FABRO, PC, 66.
2
C. FABRO, PC, 498. See Ibid., PC, 519-520: “For this reason, the
transferring of the term to the other member of the analogy is done in virtue of a
resolutive-attributive judgment and therefore in the form of a transcending of
predication and not of proper and direct comprehension”.
3
C. FABRO, “Existence”, 724.
4
C. FABRO, “The Intensive Hermeneutics…”, 486.
5
See C. FABRO, Metaphysica, Introductio, 32. No explanation of the precise
meaning of the term “resolutio” is found in Fabro’s NMP, and only in his
Metaphysica do we learn that the Thomistic basis for his use of the term
“resolutio” is, as we would expect, In Boethii De Trinitate, q. 6, a. 1.
6
See C. FABRO, “La problematica dello esse tomistico”, TPM, 110; “Il
fondamento metafisico della IV via”, ET, 403-404; “Il nuovo problema dell’essere
e la fondazione della metafisica”, 481-482.
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CHAPTER SIX: THE METHOD OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
7
See C. FABRO, PC, 237.
8
See C. FABRO, “Existence”, 724.
9
For an in-depth study of these points, see L. ROMERA, Pensar el ser, 100-
130. See also J. VILLAGRASA, Realismo metafísico e irrealidad, 327: “[Fabro]
niega que el ser como actus essendi sea percibido por el intelecto mediante la
intuición y atribuye al juicio un papel muy limitado en la formación de este
concepto. Critica a los tomistas – puede incluirse entre ellos a Maritain y a Gilson –
por la reducción del acto de ser al concepto de existencia adquirido en el juicio”.
10
Possibly due to oversight, not every instance of “abstraction” was changed
to “reflection”. See NMP, 135, 136, 172 and 198.
667
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
11
C. FABRO, “Existence”, 724.
12
C. FABRO, PC, 66.
13
See C. FABRO, PC, 229.
14
C. FABRO, “Notes pour la fondation métaphysique de l’être”, TPM, 291-
292.
15
See C. FABRO, “Notes pour la fondation métaphysique de l’être”, TPM,
313.
16
C. FABRO, “Notes pour la fondation métaphysique de l’être”, TPM, 314.
17
C. FABRO, “L’esse tomistico e la ripresa della metafisica”, 306.
668
CHAPTER SIX: THE METHOD OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
18
See C. FABRO, “The Intensive Hermeneutics…”, 481: “The Thomistic
notion of participation, founded in esse as supreme intensive act, makes it possible
to pass from finite to Infinite Being through analogical discourse”. Ibid., 483-484:
“Thus analogy of attribution accomplishes the ultimate ‘resolution’ of
metaphysical discourse by relating the many to the One, the diverse to the
Identical, and the composed to the Simple”.
19
See C. FABRO, PC, 504-516.
669
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
both in its expositive analysis (the forms and modes of predicamental being)
and in its conclusive synthesis (ens per participationem and esse per
essentiam)”20. Hence, for Fabro, St. Thomas’s reductio ad unum has a
twofold reference: the predicamental order of substance and accidents and
the transcendental order of creation and God. In the metaphysical reductio
ad unum which effected by means of analogy, the creature is called “ens” to
the degree that it has esse and imitates the Creator (Primum Ens).
24
C. FABRO, “Existence”, 724.
25
A possible explanation for this preference might lie in the fact that
something that is abstracted is easily subject to formalization and
conceptualization, while when we speak about “emergence” a reference is
necessarily kept to the background against which or the foundation upon which
something emerges.
26
See C. FABRO, “Il nuovo problema dell’essere e la fondazione della
metafisica”, 481-482.
671
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
For Fabro, the term “resolutio”, when taken in its metaphysical sense,
refers to the movement of reason in metaphysics from ens to esse, from an
initial notion of ens-esse to an intensive notion of esse, from the effect (ens
per participationem) to the ultimate cause and principle of all (Ipsum Esse
Subsistens). Fabro often draws attention to the role of ens as primum
cognitum in the fundament-foundation of human knowledge and the
foundation of metaphysics. In this way, Fabro characterizes metaphysical
reflection as a movement from ens to esse and from esse back to ens; or, in
other words, a movement from ens commune to intensive esse and from esse
back to entia27. The starting-point and end-point of Fabro’s resolutio are ens
and esse respectively. This is highlighted in J. Villagrasa’s article on
resolutio as the method of metaphysics according to Fabro (2001), where he
notes that Fabro’s philosophic project: “consists in bringing philosophy
back to the foundation of metaphysics, and in metaphysics, carrying out the
return or resolution of ens to its foundation, which is being, esse ut actus”28
and that, “according to Fabro, the resolution itinerary goes from ens
commune to intensive esse”29. With regard to ens as starting-point, L.
Romera notes how Fabro’s resolution to actus essendi relates to the initial,
confused apprehension of esse within ens as primum cognitum30. At a debate
27
See C. FABRO, “La problematica dell’esse tomistico”, TPM, 131.
28
J. VILLAGRASA, “La resolutio come metodo…”, 36.
29
J. VILLAGRASA, “La resolutio come metodo…”, 53.
30
L. ROMERA, Pensar el ser, 99-100: “The method (path, noetic itinerary) to
arrive to actus essendi, does not consist in an intuition, not in a demonstrative
process similar to formal thought, nor yet does knowledge of esse seem to
correspond to a peculiar and proper intellectual operation; on the contrary,
knowledge of esse is situated as the goal of a peculiar discursive process that Fabro
calls resolutive or foundational. This entire process, nevertheless, presents a direct
relationship with a certain initial apprehension. The path that the intellect runs in
his metaphysical operation begins – if one wants to be faithful to the genuine
thought of St. Thomas just as our author presents it – with a first emergence of esse
thanks to a confused apprehension linked to the primum cognitum. Afterwards, one
672
CHAPTER SIX: THE METHOD OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
inhaerens36. To this third stage belongs the notion of intensive esse, which
is obtained by means of a formal resolution of participated perfection and a
real resolution of actuating causality according to the principles of the
Fourth Way and the demonstration of creation. At the end of this final
resolution, the metaphysician understands that created ens, which receives
its being from subsistent Being, is ens per participationem and that ens per
participationem is “composed of a participant and of a participated, which
oppose one another as potency and act; thus, created ens is composed of two
co-principles, essence and the act of being, correlated as potency and act”37.
In his article, “The Problematic of Thomistic Esse” (1959), Fabro
expounds his notion of “intensive esse” more completely, determining it as
the notion of the first and ultimate act, the most perfect and most formal act,
and the most intimate and profound act38. With this notion of intensive esse,
he highlights the originality of the Thomistic passage from esse-in-actu
(existence; functional esse, formal esse) to esse ut actus and offers a
solution to the problem of subsistentia as the mode of being proper to
substance and to the problem of accidental esse (inesse)39.” The passage
from esse-in-actu to esse ut actus is effected by means of a “transcendental
reduction”, which determines God as Ipsum Esse Subsistens and the creature
as a synthesis of essence and participated esse.
With regard to Fabro’s thought on the gnoseological aspects of our
knowledge of esse, we can summarize his thought as follows. In summary,
Fabro argues for at least five stages in our knowledge of esse:
[1] Fabro specifies that the first contact with esse may be
considered as an “implicit perception” of esse in the originary (explicit)
apprehension of ens40. Fabro also uses the term “conjoint apprehension”41 to
speak about our initial experience of esse and the implicit presence of esse
36
A. CONTAT, Le figure della differenza ontologica…”, 120: “[F]inally one
comes to the ultimate metaphysical resolutio of ens into the double opposition
between Esse subsistens and esse inhaerens, the latter being esse ut actus limited
by essentia, namely intensive being”.
37
A. CONTAT, “Le figure della differenza ontologica…”, 121.
38
See C. FABRO, “La problematica dello esse tomistico”, TPM, 110-112.
39
See A. CONTAT, “Le figure della differenza ontologica…”, 125-127.
40
See C. FABRO, “Notes pour la fondation métaphysique de l’être”, TPM,
312. C. Ferraro, “La conoscenza dell’ens e dell’esse…”, 92.
41
See C. FABRO, “The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse…”, 425: “Just as the
notio entis is a synthesis of content and act, so also it is a certain ineffable form of
‘conjoint apprehension’ of content on the part of the mind and of act on the part of
experience”.
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CHAPTER SIX: THE METHOD OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
42
C. FABRO, “The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse…”, 424-425: “[T]he notio
entis is a synthesis of content and act, so also it is a certain ineffable form of
“conjoint apprehension” of content on the part of mind and of act on the part of
experience: […] the experience of the simultaneous awareness of the being-in-act
of the world in relation to consciousness and of the actuation of consciousness in
its turning to the world”.
43
C. FABRO, “The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse…”, 425.
44
See also C. FABRO, “Il nuovo problema dell’essere…” (1974), 501-503,
for a critique of the position that holds that judgment is the means by which we
grasp esse.
45
See C. FABRO, L’uomo e il rischio di Dio, 371: “Consciousness grasps the
being in act of ens and grasps its own being in act to the degree it grasps the being
of its own act of knowing: none of these [three] esse are yet the esse, which is the
profound trans-phenomenal act, but all three conspire toward it and the mind
aspires to found it in metaphysical reflection or reduction”.
46
See C. FABRO, Dall’essere all’esistente, 62-65.
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BEING AND PARTICIPATION
47
See C. FABRO, “Notes pour la fondation métaphysique de l’être”, TPM,
312-313. See C. Ferraro, “La conoscenza dell’ens e dell’esse…”, 93: “[S]i afferma
che quest’apprensione è detta indiretta, sebbene esplicita. L’afferramento indicato è
esplicito, perché se l’esse non è afferrato nella prima apprensione dell’ens, poi non
lo si potrà raggiungere mai più. Poi, è esplicito anche perché, appunto, costitutivo
dell’intelligibilità stessa dell’ente in quanto tale, che viene ‘letto’ attraverso il suo
atto, come l’uomo che canta è cantante, in quanto nominato e visto attraverso la
sua azione di cantare. Ma è indiretto, perché non è un afferramento isolato, ma
anche velato, in un certo senso, in quanto ‘mediato’ dal soggetto portante l’atto di
essere. Per questa ragione, sebbene esplicito, l’afferramento dell’actus essendi
dell’ens nell’ens è indiretto e quindi non permette, nella prima apprensione, vedere
l’emergenza propria che spetta all’esse ut actus. La determinazione (e
‘isolamento’) nozionale dell’esse pone un problema ulteriore la cu soluzione
appartiene non già all’ambito dell’esperienza diretta, ma al campo della riflessione
metafisica”.
48
In a recent article on Fabro’s theory concerning our knowledge of ens and
esse, C. Ferraro points out that in PC Fabro struggles somewhat to find a
satisfactory term to characterize correctly our grasp of esse in the initial notion of
ens and our grasp of esse at the end of metaphysical reflection. See C. FERRARO,
“La conoscenza dell’ens e dell’esse…”, 91. Commenting on PC, 65-66, Ferraro
writes: “Il testo è assai tormentato. È evidente, infatti, che Fabro non ha trovato
ancora una terminologia soddisfacente e che non riesce ad esprimere se non con dei
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CHAPTER SIX: THE METHOD OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
giri di parole quel che forse le parole finora usate non riescono a riferire. Una
‘apprensione diretta’ richiama, a quanto pare, immediatamente la nozione
d’intuizione. Tuttavia è chiaro che i principia rerum non possono essere oggetto
d’intuizione diretta per un intelletto come il nostro, che si attua in dipendenza dalla
materia quantificata e dalla sensitività”.
49
C. FABRO, PC, 66.
50
C. FABRO, PC, 66.
51
See C. FABRO, “Notes pour la fondation métaphysique de l’être”, TPM,
313.
52
See C. FABRO, “Notes pour la fondation métaphysique de l’être”, TPM,
313.
53
See C. FABRO, Dall’essere all’esistente, 65-66. On page 61 speaks of an
“experience” of esse as a “direct and proper apprehension”.
677
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
54
See 6.2.4.1 for a more in-depth look at Fabro’s formal resolution.
55
C. FABRO, “Sviluppo, significato e valore della IV Via”, ET, 379: “Thus,
the terminus of this first phase of the dialectic is of a formal, non-real character”.
56
L. ROMERA, Pensar el ser, 260: “Es decir, al actus essendi intensivo se
llega siguiendo un doble camino: el primero, centrado en la consideración del esse
en abstracto, gira en torno a la noción de esse essentiae, para alcanzar la noción de
esse maximum formale. El segundo, considerando al esse en concreto, se dirige por
la vía del acto del singular, hacia la determinación del ser come acto de todo acto;
para entonces verlo como acto propio de cualquier formalidad, come el acto más
perfecto del ente, pero que sin embardo permanece imperfecto en comparación al
ser que actúa una formalidad superior”.
57
L. ROMERA, Pensar el ser, 261.
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CHAPTER SIX: THE METHOD OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
In this section, I would like to point out six aspects of Fabro’s thought
on resolution which I think can be improved upon and further developed in
light of the work of other Thomists on resolutio and metaphysics.
First, an important contextualization is missing in Fabro’s work on
resolution, namely, the interplay between intellectus and ratio in the
progress of human knowledge62. Our intellect is discursive and moves
58
See C. FABRO, PC, 66; “Dibattito congressuale”, 403; “The Intensive
Hermeneutics…”, 486; IST, 178 (Thesis XLV).
59
J. AERTSEN, Nature and Creature, 191-201; Ibid., “La scoperta dell’ente
in quanto ente”, 41-42. R. TE VELDE, Participation and Substantiality, 134-146;
Ibid., Aquinas on God, 132-138. J. VILLAGRASA, “Creazione e actus essendi.
L’originalità della metafisica di Tommaso d’Aquino”, in Creazione e actus essendi.
Originalità e interpretazioni della metafisica di Tommaso d’Aquino, Edizioni
ART, Roma 2008, 83-137.
60
See C. FABRO, PC, 222-224.
61
See C. FABRO, PC, 508-509.
62
De Veritate, q. 10, a. 8 ad 10: “Haec autem circulatio attenditur in hoc
quod ratio ex principiis secundum viam inveniendi in conclusiones pervenit, et
conclusiones inventas in principia resolvendo examinat secundum viam iudicandi”.
The theme of intellectus and ratio in connection with resolutio is fully developed
679
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
65
See J. AERTSEN, “Method and Metaphysics…”, 408-409.
66
See J. AERTSEN, “Method and Metaphysics…”, 410.
67
See C. FABRO, “The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse…”, 407-409.
68
St. Thomas affirms in In Boethii De Trinitate, q. 6, a. 1 that resolutio
secundum rationem comes to the consideration of ens and that which belongs to
being as such (namely, the transcendentals).
69
J. AERTSEN, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, 135. Another
aspect of the problem concerns the connection, pointed out by Aertsen, between
resolutio secundum rationem and “commonness by predication” (In Boethii De
Trinitate, q. 5, a. 4) (p. 134-135).
70
A good example of the reduction of bonum to ens is found in I, q. 5, a. 1:
“Ratio enim boni in hoc consistit, quod aliquid sit appetibile, unde philosophus, in I
ethic., dicit quod bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Manifestum est autem quod
unumquodque est appetibile secundum quod est perfectum, nam omnia appetunt
suam perfectionem. Intantum est autem perfectum unumquodque, inquantum est
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BEING AND PARTICIPATION
identical secundum rem, but differ secundum rationem, meaning that the
resolutio proper to the articulation of the transcendentals is that of secundum
rationem71. In this resolutio, I do not move from one thing to another to
affirm that all being is good, but rather I find that all being is good to some
degree and that a being’s goodness is proportional to its degree of being.
With regard to the “theological foundation” of the transcendentals, the
proper method would be resolutio secundum rem as we are dealing with an
attempt to articulate the causal-participative relationship between a
creature’s goodness and God as Summum Bonum and final cause of all.
Fourthly, although Fabro was one of the few Thomists to insist on
resolutio as the method of Thomistic metaphysics in the period from 1950
to 198072, Fabro does not explicitly refer to the Thomistic distinction
between resolutio secundum rationem and resolutio secundum rem. The
first resolutio ends in the consideration of ens by means of intrinsic causes
and while the second ends in knowledge of the ultimate cause of ens qua
ens by means of extrinsic causes73. These two resolutions correspond to the
analysis of the subject of metaphysics (secundum rationem: ens qua ens)
and the attainment of the goal (secundum rem: Causa Ultima) of
metaphysics74. At best, I would argue, a quasi-distinction is present when
Fabro speaks about a first moment of metaphysical reflection which consists
in a resolution of perfection and act (intrinsic to ens) and a second moment
which consists in a reductio to fundament (extrinsic to created ens).
actu, unde manifestum est quod intantum est aliquid bonum, inquantum est ens,
esse enim est actualitas omnis rei”.
71
THOMAS AQUINAS, I, q. 5, a. 1: “Bonum et ens sint idem secundum rem,
quia tamen differunt secundum rationem”.
72
See J. VILLAGRASA, “La resolutio come metodo…”, 37: “According to
Fabro, resolutio is the proper method of metaphysics. He is aware that it is a notion
that was almost completely forgotten by the Western rationalistic tradition, which
considered it a merely logical method and ignored the richness implicit in its
medieval use. Fabro denies that such a notion refers to a merely logical procedure
(logical analysis); rather he calls it ‘a return to fundament’, a foundation in the
principle. Although resolutio is one of the most important and personal
methodological contributions of St. Thomas, in general the Thomists of the XX
Century were occupied with ‘abstraction’, ‘separation’, some with ‘reditio’ or
‘reflexio’ and, among the few that were occupied with ‘resolutio’, the principal
representative is Cornelio Fabro”.
73
See In Boethii De trinitate, q. 6, a.1.
74
See J. VILLAGRASA, “La resolutio come metodo…”, 49-52.
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CHAPTER SIX: THE METHOD OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
75
See J. VILLAGRASA, “La resolutio come metodo…”, 54.
76
J. VILLAGRASA, “La resolutio come metodo…”, 61.
77
J. VILLAGRASA, “La resolutio come metodo…”, 62. See J. AERTSEN,
“Method and Metaphysics…”, 416.
78
J. AERTSEN, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, 134-135.
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BEING AND PARTICIPATION
Ens - esse
Resolutio Secundum rationem
Transcendentals
Metaphysical
79
See I, q. 5, a. 2 ad 2: “Ens autem non importat habitudinem causae nisi
formalis tantum, vel inhaerentis vel exemplaris, cuius causalitas non se extendit
nisi ad ea quae sunt in actu”.
80
J. AERTSEN, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, 394-395.
81
J. AERTSEN, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, 394-395.
82
See J. VILLAGRASA, “La resolutio come metodo…”, 65. For his part,
Romera draws attention to how the ultimate fundament can be considered in two
ways, both insofar as it is intrinsic and insofar as it is transcendent. See L.
ROMERA, Pensar el ser, 97-98: “The Thomistic concept of actus essendi, when it is
understood in all the speculative force it has in Thomas Aquinas, is constituted in
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CHAPTER SIX: THE METHOD OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
As a fifth point for improvement, I point out that Fabro does not
develop the theme of the relationship between resolutio as method of
metaphysics and the role of separatio in the constitution of the genus
subiectum of metaphysics. I have argued that Fabro’s theory on the
constitution of metaphysics consists in a continual analysis of the terms of
movement sub ratione entis. When Fabro speaks of separatio as method of
metaphysics in his Metaphysica, he does not refer to a demonstration of the
existence of immaterial being, but rather to the procedure proper to
metaphysics of “distinguishing” (separating) the real or intentional
oppositions we encounter in metaphysical reflection (in opposition to
“abstraction”). In the Epilogue to Metaphysica, Fabro places “separatio”
within the context of the ultimate reduction of participated esse to Esse per
essentiam and not within the context of an initial demonstration of
immaterial being.
The employment of resolutio (analysis) in the constitution of the
genus subiectum of metaphysics has been elaborated on by R. te Velde and
J. Aertsen. In his Aquinas on God (2006), R. te Velde argues that resolutio
is not limited to a process within a science, but is also employed in the
transition from physics to metaphysics83. Aertsen’s Nature and Creature
the resolutive point of metaphysics, since in being as act one finds the ultimate
fundament of reality, the final objective of every investigation of first philosophy.
For our author, the ultimate (radical) fundament has a twofold perspective: on the
one hand, the fundament is the radical act of ens which constitutes it as ens
(intrinsic moment); on the other hand, the fundament refers to the first source of
this act (transcendent moment). The notion of actus essendi, in Fabro, fulfills the
twofold demand of referring to the radical act of created ens, indicating the
intrinsic and constitutive fundament of ens, and of applying to God, designating the
transcendent and causal Fundament of reality according to the most elevated
expression to which man, with his reason, is able to come (God as Ipsum esse
subsistens). This twofold metaphysical exigency is fulfilled thanks to the
application of the dialectic of participation to esse, by means of which Fabro comes
to the notion of intensive being”.
83
R. TE VELDE, Aquinas on God, 54-55: “Physics studies reality under a
particular aspect, while metaphysics proceeds to a universal consideration of being
as being by transcending the particular perspective of physics. This passing over
from physics to metaphysics happens by way of resolutio. Resolutio names the
process of reason by which the composed sensible whole, which is better known to
us, is reduced to its simple principles and causes, which are better known in
themselves. […] Physics considers being in a particular manner, as being this or
being such. By way of resolution the particular object of physics is resolved into
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the universal object of metaphysics […]. In this manner the transition of the
physical consideration of being as nature (form and matter) to the metaphysical
consideration of being as such is enacted by way of a reflection insofar as thought
comes to realize that its object of physical consideration is indeed a particular
mode of being, not coinciding with being as such”.
84
J. AERTSEN, Nature and Creature, 269-270: “The resolution of movement
towards the immobile, of multiplicity towards unity can be summed up as follows.
First, movement was reduced to the intrinsic principle and terminus: matter and
form, causes that relate to each other as potency and act. This hodology is nature.
Next, movement was reduced to the extrinsic causes: the active principle, the
agent, and the end. The end is ruled by the law of synonymy and by perpetuity.
That requires a hierarchy of movers characteristized by an increasing degree of
immobility. In this cosmic order the celestial bodies occupy a place of importance.
Their movement is reducible to an ultimate, metaphysical cause, God. In this
summary the essential coherence between nature and ontology comes to the fore.
The phenomenon of movement is to be understood from the duality of matter and
form. Both are nature. With the originality of nature corresponds a ‘first
philosophy’ which in its ontology and aitiology remains bound to this origin. In a
world realizing itself by nature, everything turns on the ‘what,’ for everything
‘revolves about the specific essence which is unchangeable. The formal cause of
being is ‘something divine’ in things. For the first principle is the Unmoved Mover,
pure form and act, which initiates the natural movement towards perfection”.
85
See J. AERTSEN, Nature and Creature, 271-278. “In the resolution of
being, certain principles of the reduction of movement are continued. Such a
continuation is possible because the analysis of movement, too, came to the
metaphysical” (p. 275).
86
See J. AERTSEN, “La scoperta dell’ente in quanto ente”, 46: “L’oggetto
della metafisica viene scoperto, non tramite dimostrazione dell’esistenza di enti
immateriali, ma tramite l’analisi continua degli enti materiali. L’ilemorfismo – la
composizione di forma e materia – può spiegare il tipo di essere che le cose
materiali possiedono ma non spiega il loro essere in quanto tale. È dunque
necessario un altro modo di considerare le cose materiali, e in questo processo si
scopre l’oggetto della metafisica. La comprensione radicale della questione
dell’origine è decisiva per la scoperta dell’ente in quanto ente. L’origine dell’ente
in quanto tale supera il livello del divenire (cambiamento, moto) in natura”.
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CHAPTER SIX: THE METHOD OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
87
See R. TE VELDE, Aquinas on God, 125-126: “In the three aspects of the
act of creation it is not difficult to recognize a reference to Aristotle’s analysis of
the manifold senses of cause. The aspect of production is unmistakably associated
with the efficient cause (causa efficiens); the distinction refers to the extrinsic
formal cause (causa exemplaris, and the couple preservation/government is related
to the final cause (causa finalis). […] Creation should be understood in the first
place as producere in esse, bringing forth into existence, or as a making (facere).
[…] The other two aspects of distinctio and conservatio/gubernatio pertain to the
way the divine agent relates to the effect. In determining the nature of the
relationship between agent and effect Thomas lets himself be guided by two
principles. First, every agent acts through a form (omne agens agit secundum
formam) and second, every agent acts for the sake of an end (omne agens agit
propter finem)”.
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688
Chapter Seven
THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
1
In order to determine Fabro’s thought on particular problems, this chapter
contains two chronological summaries of the evolution of Fabro’s thought: on the
way in which ens as primum cognitum is grasped (1.1) and on the argument for the
real distinction (3.1). It also contains a chronological summary of the principal
Thomistic theories on creation and participation (4.2.3.1).
2
See C. FABRO, “Notes pour la fondation métaphysique de l’être”, TPM,
312: “The itinerary of this discovery and foundation of esse is not linear, more
geometrico, but quasi-concentric, by successive deepened study of the first and
constitutive perception which is given by thought as such”.
3
See C. FABRO, NMP, 187-188.
4
See C. FABRO, Metaphysica, Introductio, 42-44.
5
See C. FABRO, “La problematica dello esse tomistico”, TMP, 107-109.
6
See C. FABRO, PC, 65: “Between the first notion of ens at the dawn of
knowing, and the technical one of esse of metaphysical resolutio, there is at least a
double passage: above all from the initial confused notion of ens in general, to the
methodological notion of ens as id quod est, quod habet esse. Aristotle stops here,
while St. Thomas proceeds to the determination of esse as the ultimate
transcendental act, which is the proper and immediate object of divine causality”.
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BEING AND PARTICIPATION
7
See C. FABRO, “Existence”, 723.
8
See C. FABRO, PC, 66.
9
See C. FABRO, in “Dibattito congressuale”, 403.
10
See C. FABRO, “The Intensive Hermeneutics…”, 486.
11
See C. FABRO, IST, 178, thesis XLV.
12
See C. FABRO, NMP, 197.
13
See C. FABRO, PC, 221-222.
14
C. FABRO, “La problematica dello esse tomistico”, TPM, 109.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
along the line of the participated participation, while the real reduction or
resolution ascends along the way of actuating causality”15.
A fourth, basic structure concerns the stages proper to the “real
reduction” of participated esse to Esse per essentiam: esse as actus essendi,
Fabro writes, “has also been discovered by the method of the absolute
reduction of the act of being by participation to the esse per essentiam”16.
Some of Fabro’s works outline this real reduction according to three
moments or principles:
[1] The first principle is that of the “emergence of the act” which,
based on the results of the previous stages of metaphysical
reflection, establishes that esse is the perfection of all perfections
(result of dialectical ascension and formal resolution-reduction) and
the act of all acts (result of the resolution of act).
[2] The second principle is that of “separated perfection”, which
establishes that Ipsum Esse Subsistens can only be one and is
consequently the transcendental, extrinsic cause of all other beings.
[3] The third principle is that of “participation”, which has both a
causal-dynamic and constitutive-structural expression: all other
beings depend on Ipsum Esse Subsistens and are entia per
participationem in that they are really composed of a essentia and
actus essendi.
The nature and dynamic of the reduction to Esse per essentiam is a constant
theme in Fabro’s works and is present in his early 1936 article on the
principle of causality17, Metaphysica18, his two articles on the Fourth Way19,
L’uomo e il rischio di Dio (1967)20, his 1967 article on Thomistic esse21 and
his 1974 article on participation22.
15
A. CONTAT, “Le figure della differenza ontologica…”, 120-121. See also:
L. ROMERA, Pensar el ser, 261.
16
C. FABRO, “The Intensive Hermeneutics…”, 486.
17
See C. FABRO, “La difesa critica del principio di causa, ET, 39-45.
18
See C. FABRO, Metaphysica, 226-231.
19
See C. FABRO, “Sviluppo, significato e valore della IV via”, ET, 351-385;
Ibid., “Il fondamento metafisico della IV via”, ET, 387-406.
20
See C. FABRO, L’uomo e il rischio di Dio, 369-372.
21
See C. FABRO, “L’esse tomistico e la ripresa della metafisica”, Angelicum
3 (1967), 306: “With the ultimate reduction or ‘step backward’ to ‘Esse ipsum’ as
act of all acts, thought has made the return to the foundation asked for by
Heidegger, as to its primary foundation. The process of this foundation is not by
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BEING AND PARTICIPATION
demonstration in the proper sense, but by reduction or by the passage of act to act:
moving from the accidental actuations to the substantial formal act and ultimately
to actus essendi as the act of all acts. Here the spirit then moves to the second
foundation which is that from the participated actus essendi to Esse per essentiam
and this ultimate foundation comes about by demonstration: however it is a
demonstration that has a synthetic character since it corresponds, by elevation, to
the plexus of the notion of ens on which it is founded and cannot be analytic”.
22
See C. FABRO, “The intensive hermeneutics…”, 487: “A creature has
therefore its own participated actus essendi which enters into real composition with
essence as its transcendental potency. God, on the other hand, is the esse per
essentiam or separated esse which is both transcendent and grounding. The
Platonic principle of the idea or separated perfection holds true only with regard to
the esse as the act of all acts and of all forms, which was unknown to Plato as well
as to Aristotle. This principle of separated perfection is eminently of Platonic
origin and must be integrated with the Aristotelian principle of the emergence of
act. Both principles are indeed founded on the synthetic Thomistic principle of
participation. But despite his general acceptance of the Platonic principle of
separated perfection, Thomas follows Aristotle in rejecting its application to the
forms as such and, going beyond Aristotle who does not know esse as act, applies
it exclusively to esse. Thus Esse ipsum or Esse subsistens is God himself who is the
first, immovable, and separated Principle situated, as it were, at the summit of
eternity (in arce aeternitatis). Hence God, as pure esse, is the grounding Act that is
ever present in all acts, the present that actuates every presence”.
23
An open problem in structuring Fabro’s metaphysical reflection is that of
the placement of reflection on the transcendental properties of ens. In Fabro’s
Metaphysica, the transcendentals are dealt with at the end along with the analogical
notion of being. Hence, I will deal with the transcendentals at the end. I would
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
suggest, however, that the transcendentals should be dealt with in three ways: 1)
“noetically” with ens as primum cognitum insofar as the transcendentals are the
first notions of the intellect; 2) “ontologically” after the initial demonstration of the
distinction between essence and esse in finite beings insofar as the degree of
transcendental goodness or truth of a being depends on its degree of esse; and 3)
“theologically” in the doctrine of creation insofar as the transcendentals are divine
names and are created by God, who is Summum Bonum and Prima veritas. The
theological foundation of the transcendentals establishes the lines of extrinsic
causality between Creator and the creature against the backdrop of the
metaphysical notion of participation and analogical predication.
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BEING AND PARTICIPATION
24
Several doctoral dissertations have already dealt with the theme of ens as
primum cognitum in the work of Cornelio Fabro. See L. ROMERA, Pensar el ser,
131-222. Romera’s Chapter Five is dedicated to Fabro’s thought on the nature and
content of ens as primum cognitum; Chapter Six is dedicated to the evolution of
Fabro’s thought on how we grasp ens (NMP and formal abstraction, PP and the
perception of ens, Fabro’s mature thought on apprehensio entis); Chapter Seven is
dedicated to the primum cognitum and the development of the intellect (principle of
non-contradiction, first principles, ens as intellectual habitus); Romera’s
conclusions also deal with Fabro’s thought on ens as primum cognitum (p. 330-
333). See also A. LOZANO, La primera captación intelectual como fundamento del
proceso de abstracción del universal según Santo Tomás de Aquino: una
interpretación desde Cornelio Fabro, Étienne Gilson, Jacques Maritain y Léon
Nöel, Pontificia Universitas Lateranensis, Rome 2006, 71-106; J. P. OLIVERA, El
punto de partida de la metafísica de Santo Tomás de Aquino, según Cornelio
Fabro, Pontificia Universitas Lateranensis, Rome 2007. C. FERRARO also speaks
about the evolution in Fabro’s thought on the problem in his article, “La
conoscenza dell’ens e dell’esse dalla prospettiva del tomismo essenziale”, Doctor
Angelicus 5 (2005), 75-108.
25
See C. FABRO, NMP, 136: “From the psychological point of view, we
know that the first notion that the intellect forms is that of ens, and it is a notion
evidently obtained by formal abstraction; but this is the most imperfect and
confused notion and indicates the beginning and awakening of the intellectual life”.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
this initial view of Fabro is corrected in his more mature works, NMP
already contains references to the importance of the role of perception in the
primum cognitum. Romera writes:
26
See C. FABRO, NMP, 187: “A first notion of being, that which signals the
first awakening of our intellectual faculty—it is fruit of an abstraction, quasi-
formal, from a particular perception of the concrete order”.
27
See L. ROMERA, Pensar el ser, 172-173.
28
See L. ROMERA, Pensar el ser, 173-178;
29
See C. FABRO, PC, 173: “The property of ens is that of being the first and
the last in the process of the conceptual reduction of the real, since the ratio entis is
the first ‘formality’ that founds the intelligibility of all other realities and thus has
the value of an absolute principle: ‘Sicut in demonstrabilibus oportet fieri
reductionem in aliqua principiaper se intellectui nota, ita invesigando quid est
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BEING AND PARTICIPATION
Throughout the 1960s, Fabro’s works argue for the following. First,
the apprehensio entis has both a temporal priority and a constitutive priority
over all other notions of the intellect30. There is a mutual self-giving
between consciousness and ens, which entails an intrinsic and constitutive
correspondence: “the being-in-act of consciousness as presence in act is
founded on ens […] and is present in virtue of the presentation (in act) of
the real”31.
Second, in the first notion of ens is a synthetic notion, for there is a
content (quod, Was) and an act or existential fact (Dass). Ens appears as a
synthesis-in-act and as a result – and not as the ultimate foundation32. In the
Thomistic synthesis of essentia and esse in ens, there is a nexus (synthesis)
of act and act and not of matter and form (Kant).
Third, ens is of a foundational nature since it is the transcendental of
the transcendentals or the transcendentale fundans and the foundation of the
first principles of the intellect33. For St. Thomas the first speculative and
practical principles are the ultimate foundation of (reflexive) knowledge but
these are not, however, the first (and ultimate) foundation of knowledge.
“The radical foundation or the transcendental primum, on which the first
principles have to be founded, is the immediate apprehension of ens, which
is absolutely first under all aspects and absolutely founding for all levels of
knowledge”34. Fabro contrasts the Scholastic and Thomistic approach to
knowledge of reality. Scholasticism, which conceives valid knowledge in
terms of the pure abstraction of the universal and the foundation of such
abstraction of the essence, places the primordial evidence of the first
principles of identity and non-contradiction. In Thomism, one does not stop
the reductio or resolutio in fundamentum at the abstract, first principles, but
proceeds further and founds such principles on ens35. For St. Thomas, the
apprehension of ens is presented as the primum fundamentum fundans for
knowledge. Ens is not merely a primum in the psychological order, but also
a primum in the order of absolute foundation: “Primo in conceptione cadit
ens, quia secundum hoc unumquodque cognoscibile est in quantum est
actu”36.
Fourth, there is a reference to the Absolute in the primum cognitum.
The Thomistic apprehension of ens, Fabro argues, includes a dialectical
relation between essentia and esse, and a reference to the Absolute (esse
participatum to Esse per essentiam). Esse, he writes, transcendentally
emerges over all other acts insofar as it is their foundation and actuates all
other acts. God as Esse ipsum is the real foundation of the first act of every
ens. The apprehension of ens is the primary noetical foundation of all
knowledge and, therefore, of our knowledge of God. Unlike our immediate
knowledge of the existence of material things, our knowledge of God is
mediated: “God is Esse ipsum, he cannot be said ens in the proper sense:
since God is pure Act, therefore, absolutely unlimited and for us
indeterminate, while ens is always something determinate”37.
Fifth, if abstraction presupposes the notio entis and is founded on the
knowledge of the first principles, “then the original apprehension of the
notio entis, which precedes everything and is presupposed in everything,
cannot be merely the effect of abstraction in the ordinary sense”38. Because
the notion of ens includes both essence (content) and esse (actus essendi),
“the origin of the notio entis can in no wise be referred to the process which
abstracts only essence”39.
In the 1970s, Fabro pointed out that we have a direct immediate
experience (apprehension) of ens and that reflection on ens permits a certain
content of being and act of being to emerge. Fabro also refers to the
resolution of act – a movement from accidental acts to substantial acts to
esse – as the means by which we come to know esse ut actus: “I did not say
that ens is gotten from immediate perception, but from immediate
apprehension. From ens, thus understood, one comes to esse […] by means
of a resolutive and not abstractive process. Therefore, by a resolutive
process, of a resolution to the principle, of act to act: from accidental acts to
substantial act, from substantial act to entitative act”40.
36
I, q. 5, a. 2.
37
C. FABRO, L’uomo e il rischio di Dio, 368.
38
C. FABRO, “The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse…”, 424.
39
C. FABRO, “The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse…”, 424.
40
C. FABRO, in “Dibattito congressuale”, 403.
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BEING AND PARTICIPATION
41
See C. FABRO, “Problematica del tomismo di scuola”, 187-199.
42
C. FABRO, “Problematica del tomismo di scuola”, 198.
43
C. FABRO, “Problematica del tomismo di scuola”, 198.
44
See C. FABRO, IST, 159-165.
45
See C. FABRO, La prima riforma della dialettica hegeliana, 224-242.
46
See A. CONTAT, “L’étant, l’esse et la participation selon Cornelio Fabro”,
370.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
As regards the “content” of the first notion, Fabro holds in NMP that the
initial notion of ens as id quod habet esse is a notion of minimum formal
content and maximum extension50. This does not mean that ens is a
supreme, indeterminate and empty genus. In La prima riforma della
dialettica hegeliana, Fabro ponders the paradox of ens as magis universale
et intensivum: “Certainly the plexus ens under the semantic aspect can be
called the magis universale or extensivum but it is also, paradoxically, the
magis intensivum or comprehensivum: here, in ens, comprehendere has a
dynamic sense and not a static one, like it does for the essence”51.
Turning now to the assessment of Fabro’s theory, there seems to be
some confusion regarding Fabro’s theory about ens as primum cognitum and
47
See A. CONTAT, “L’étant, l’esse et la participation selon Cornelio Fabro”,
371.
48
See A. CONTAT, “L’étant, l’esse et la participation selon Cornelio Fabro”,
371.
49
L. ROMERA, Pensar el ser, 144-145.
50
See C. FABRO, NMP, 193.
51
C. FABRO, La prima riforma della dialettica hegeliana, 232-240.
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BEING AND PARTICIPATION
our grasping of esse within that initial cognitum. In his Medieval Philosophy
and the Transcendentals (1996), Jan Aertsen considers three positions on
our initial knowledge of ens as primum cognitum. Fabro is included in the
second position, along with Gilson. According to Aertsen, this position
holds that the conception of ens cannot be the result of abstraction52. He
writes: “In both [Fabro and Gilson] the fact that Thomas’s notion of being
(ens) possesses a certain duality plays an important role: it signifies ‘that
which has being’ (id quod habet esse) or ‘what is’ (quod est)”. Aertsen’s
placement of Gilson and Fabro together is perplexing, since the two
proposals of Gilson and Fabro are strikingly different53. Regarding Fabro,
Aertsen summarizes: “If the notion of being, Fabro argues, includes in itself
two elements, namely, essence or content and the act of being, this notion
cannot be the effect of ‘ordinary’ abstraction, which abstracts only essence.
The origin of the notion of being requires a form of ‘conjoint abstraction’ of
content on the part of the mind and of act on the part of experience”54.
Further on, Aertsen holds that neither Fabro’s position nor that of the others
in question is correct. Aertsen’s judgment of Fabro, however, could stem
from an incomplete reading of Fabro’s work on the problem. Fabro’s
solution, in my opinion, actually seems to be in agreement with Aertsen’s
proposal: ens is initially “apprehended” and not “abstracted”.
Aertsen points out that St. Thomas “clearly affirms that the concept of
being belongs to simple apprehension” and that this stands in contrast to
“the contention of ‘Existential Thomism’ that the concept of being is a
judgment or proposition”55. Three points should be mentioned in this regard:
52
See J. AERTSEN, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, E.J. Brill,
Leiden 1996, 175: “We find this view in two most distinguished scholars of
Thomism in our century, Cornelio Fabro and Etienne Gilson”.
53
See L. ROMERA, Pensar el ser, 113-118; 126-130. “Es tan neta la
separación entre el conocimiento del esse y la primera operación, que el filósofo
francés [Gilson] considera que ya en el primum cognitum se ejerce un juicio, por
medio del cual se capta el esse del ens” (116). “La crítica de Cornelio Fabro a
dichas posturas se desarrolla en dos momentos: en el primero, se clarifica el ser que
se da en la estructura predicativa; en el segundo momento vuelve sobre el texto de
Santo Tomás [In Boethii De Trinitate, q. 5, a. 3] para especificar el significado que
tiene el término esse allí” (p. 127); B. MONDIN, “La conoscenza dell’essere in
Fabro e Gilson”, Euntes Docete, 50 (1997), 85-115; A. ROBIGLIO, “Gilson e Fabro.
Appunti per un confronto”, Divus Thomas (B) 17 (1997), 59-76.
54
J. AERTSEN, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, 175. Aertsen
refers to Fabro’s article, “The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse…” (1966).
55
J. AERTSEN, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, 179.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
first, the article which Aertsen refers to is only one of Fabro’s many texts on
the problem of how ens as primum cognitum is grasped; second, while
Fabro says that ens as primum cognitum is not obtained by abstraction, he
does not affirm that it is obtained by judgment; third, Fabro affirms that ens
is not abstracted by the intellect, yet he also affirms, as does Aertsen, that
ens is apprehended by the intellect.
To my knowledge, the most extensive research into Fabro’s position
on the apprehension of ens as primum cognitum is found in L. Romera’s
Pensar el ser (1994). Romera’s summary of Fabro’s theory and Romera’s
conclusions can be gathered under four headings: 1) the apprehension of
ens; 2) the role of perception in the formation of the primum cognitum; 3)
the relationship esse-ens in the primum cognitum; 4) Romera’s assessment
of Fabro’s position.
1) The apprehension of ens. For Fabro, the first notion of the intellect,
ens, is obtained, not by means of an “abstraction”, but rather by means of an
“apprehension”. Judgment is not involved in the process of the apprehension
of the first notion. If necessary, one can speak of a “conjoint apprehension”
which refers to the “apprehension” of essence (content) and an “experience”
of esse (act). In the words of Romera:
The primum cognitum is a plexus of content (essence) and act, which one can
express with the formula id quod habet esse. It is not the mere apprehension of
a form or of the most general formality, or directly knowing actus essendi as
such. It is rather a plexus that includes a duality. From this we gather that the
understanding is not initially of forms (simplex apprehensio), while in a second
moment it will affirm existence (in judgment). On the contrary, it grasps in its
origin the plexus of formal content (minimal) and of act, of actuation, of
insertion in reality. As a participle, our author sustains that ens says act, the
being in act of esse. This means that already in the first knowledge we have
know – although in a confused way – the act of being; not insofar as it is
properly act (as resolutive metaphysical notion of the real), but yes insofar as
to the actual character of the real insofar as it is real. The understanding is not,
we insist, initially formal, in order to later come to the real as such in a second
moment; the intellect comes to the notion of the real from the beginning56.
Ens is the initial and founding, primary noetic plexus and the
foundation of all knowledge, science and judgments57. Ens is the first object
of our intellectual knowledge:
56
L. ROMERA, Pensar el ser, 331-332.
57
See C. FABRO, IST, 161-162.
701
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
For Fabro, following the doctrine of St. Thomas, ens constitutes the absolutely
first object of our knowledge58. The character of first is specified as a primum,
not only psychological, but also critical-ontological59. Thus, we are dealing
with a first not only in the analytical order, in the sense that analyzing any
object one ultimately finds the notion of ens; but also of a first, both on the
psychological plane – since it is the first that comes to our intellect, it is the
unveiling and awakening of our mind60 – and on the critical-ontological plane,
since it is the fundament to which the critical problem remits and the basis of
openness of the mind to reality, on which the metaphysical problem is
sustained and has meaning61.
Fabro explains in Problematica del tomismo di scuola (1983), that the first
object of intellectual knowledge refers to knowing things that are in act. To
this corresponds, not a simple abstraction according to the essence, but
rather a synthetic apprehension according to the act of being. This is an
apprehension since it is something immediate and of an intellectual nature;
it is synthetic since it embraces both act and content. It is something vague
in the beginning, yet becomes clearer according to the psychic development
of the subject62.
2) The role of perception in the formation of the primum cognitum:
Fabro’s mature works emphasize two aspects of our knowledge of the
primum cognitum: he denies that this knowledge is of the order of abstract
essences; he accentuates the relationship that this knowledge has with the
concrete singular and its grasping of the concrete singular as an existent in
act63: “Because it is the first knowledge and by making reference to the real
as real and to the act that this has, the primum cognitum maintains a direct
relationship with the grasping of the concrete. The primum cognitum is not
an ‘abstract notion’ situated next to other abstract essences. Nor does it
correspond to judgment. The grasping of ens is neither an abstraction, nor
an intuition; it is rather a simple and synthetic apprehension (of content and
act) which is had thanks to the primary and constitutive convergence of the
sensible and the intelligible. It is an intellectual apprehension, prepared for
58
See C. FABRO, “Problematica del tomismo di scuola”, 198.
59
See C. FABRO, PC, 173.
60
See C. FABRO, NMP, 187.
61
L. ROMERA, Pensar el ser, 135.
62
See L. ROMERA, Pensar el ser, 178.
63
See L. ROMERA, Pensar el ser, 186.
702
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
64
L. ROMERA, Pensar el ser, 332.
65
See L. ROMERA, Pensar el ser, 179.
66
See L. ROMERA, Pensar el ser, 179.
67
See L. ROMERA, Pensar el ser, 180.
68
See L. ROMERA, Pensar el ser, 182: “Resumiendo, en el primum cognitum
captamos el algo y el existir, ambos inmediatamente, aunque de forma confusa. Tal
captación ambivalente se hace por el mismo material que presenta la sensibilidad,
el experimentum que preparan el sentido común y la cogitativa, dándose aquí esa
continuidad entre las dos esferas de nuestro conocimiento. De tal forma el
conocimiento sensible es el fundamento para el conocimiento de la esencia y de la
existencia, aunque no lo sea del mismo modo”.
69
See L. ROMERA, Pensar el ser, 182-183. Romera is summarizing Fabro’s
exposition found in PP, 380-382.
703
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
experience is only of esse in actu and not of esse ut actus”70. Esse, as act, is
grasped in ens71.
3) Esse and ens: With regard to the grasping of esse within this
primum cognitum, Romera notes that in contrast to other Thomists who
focus knowledge of esse on a particular operation (third degree of
abstraction, judgment, intuition, etc.), Fabro articulates the knowledge of
esse in two moments: as grasped in the primum cognitum and as known in
the metaphysical ascension proper to the method of resolutio72.
4) Assessment: Romera’s conclusions on Fabro’s theory of ens as
primum cognitum are the following. First, Fabro’s awareness of the
importance of the argument concerning the primum cognitum was most
likely heightened in his dialogue with Hegel and Heidegger, since the way
that ens is understood determines our understanding of the relationship
between consciousness and being. Based on a correct understanding of ens
as primum cognitum, the initial, empty Hegelian Sein and the justification of
his dialectic are shown to be insufficient. As well, from this understanding,
the perplexities and difficulties in Heideggerian question about Sein-Seiende
can be avoided, and, in a certain sense, be made meaningful and properly
focused73.
Secondly, an analysis of Fabro’s thought manifests an evolution in his
conception of the primum cognitum. The initial framework, present in his
first works, is open to the risks of formalism, especially since the
terminology is not clear and some concepts are still in the process of being
defined. In Fabro’s mature works, Fabro stresses the “actual aspect” (not the
formal aspect) of the primum cognitum and its reference to reality. Romera
calls this evolution a “maturing”, rather than a change in the essentials74.
Thirdly, in Fabro’s theory, there are some points which need to be
improved upon. Romera stresses the principal one: the lack of precision and
clarity when dealing with the gnoseological nature of the primum cognitum.
Fabro’s theory deals adequately with sensible knowledge, perception and
conversio ad phantasmata, yet lacks a more detailed study on the nature and
70
L. ROMERA, Pensar el ser, 183.
71
See L. ROMERA, Pensar el ser, 184. Phenomenological reflection obtains
an initial knowledge of existence by distinguishing between essential content and
existence; knowledge of esse as first act is obtained by means of metaphysical
reflection.
72
See L. ROMERA, Pensar el ser, 329.
73
See L. ROMERA, Pensar el ser, 330.
74
See L. ROMERA, Pensar el ser, 331.
704
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
75
L. ROMERA, Pensar el ser, 186.
76
See L. ROMERA, Pensar el ser, 215.
77
C. FABRO, “The Transcendentality of ens-esse…”, 419.
705
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
78
See C. FABRO, Metaphysica, Introductio, 42.
79
C. FABRO, PC, 234.
80
C. FABRO, PC, 233.
81
C. FABRO, La prima riforma della dialettica hegeliana, 231.
82
C. FABRO, PP, 395: “Thus, in the object of perception we should
distinguish the subject or essence and the act of being (esse): the perception of
reality is the perception of an essence exercising its act of being. The foundation of
the perception of reality consists in justifying the apprehension of ens as a
synthesis of essence and esse”.
706
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
of being of the thing (act). Given this duality of subject and act one can
perceive “something-in-act”, for no object is perceptible unless it is not
perceived as something-in-act. Although content and act are united, this
does not imply identity: one thing is knowing what an object is, another is
knowing that it exists. Therefore, even phenomenologically, some sort of
split between essence and existence is inevitable83.
One perceives the existent when a certain phenomenological
determination of essence and existence is realized. This determination is the
primordial condition for a reflection that brings one to a rational system of
reality84. Considered phenomenologically, then, esse is only a fact.
Absolutely speaking, however, esse is something more profound and more
intimate than the essence and the value of ontological entity depends more
on the esse than on the essence. Thus, we see that phenomenology remains
outside of metaphysics or in the atrium of metaphysics, yet cannot be totally
excluded from it. Metaphysical classifications have a definite content to the
degree that they are based on phenomenological classifications; hence, the
value of metaphysics depends, for us, on the nature of the correspondence
between phenomenological content and metaphysical content85. Ontological
determinations arise from the analogous, phenomenological determinations
and proceed step-by-step with them.
The very possibility of metaphysics is linked to the interchangeable
subordination of experience and reflection; for metaphysical reflection
builds on the data of experience. Perception and phenomenology deal with
“that which is”; phenomenological reflection reveals a duality in ens of
subject and the fact of being in act. The judgment of perception affirms the
unification of essence and being, yet not their identity. The fact that essence
and existence have irreducible notional contents brings one to the position
of the duality. However, neither perception nor phenomenology considers
the relationship between essence and esse, this consideration is reserved to
metaphysics. Considered phenomenologically, esse is only a fact.
Considered metaphysically, esse is revealed to be something more profound
and intimate to the thing than its essence. Metaphysics progresses by means
83
C. FABRO, PP, 396: “The fact that essence and existence have an
irreducible notional content brings one to the position of the duality; the fact that
they are one for the other impedes that the duality becomes dualism and
isolationism, since it affirms the integration”.
84
See C. FABRO, PP, 397-399.
85
See C. FABRO, PP, 400.
707
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
In Metaphysica, Fabro clearly states that the first problem dealt with
in and by philosophical reflection is that of multiplicity, change and
movement. In fact, the cause of metaphysical wonder is that of the
phenomena of change and multiplicity86. Change and multiplicity must be
considered as expressions or manifestations of being, must be explained and
must be given a solid foundation. Phenomenological reflection affirmed
that: “within being, there are things that change and things that remain the
same; some things determine the thing in an absolute way in knowledge,
others in an accidental way; some things pertain to being as intrinsic
constitutive [principles], others come and go as properties without ens itself
changing”87. Based on this, being (ens) was first divided into predicaments
according to the “reductive” method: “the mobile and the accidental reduce
to something previous as the imperfect to the perfect. For an accident is
imperfect: and movement is the act of the imperfect”88.
Elements of this philosophical, yet pre-metaphysical stage are dealt
with by Fabro in both NMP and in Metaphysica. In an attempt to structure
this stage, however, we are confronted with two problems:
86
See C. FABRO, Metaphysica, Liber primus, 58.
87
C. FABRO, Metaphysica, Liber primus, 63.
88
De Potentia, q. 8, a. 1 ad 9: “Mobile et accidens reducuntur ad aliquid
prius sicut imperfectum ad perfectum. Nam accidens imperfectum est, et similiter
motus est imperfecti actus”.
708
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
89
C. FABRO, Metaphysica, Liber primus, 118: “In this way, the division of
being in act and potency investigates and penetrates with greater depth the anterior
division of finite being, in substance and accident, and brings categorial being to
the light of being as being. Substance which has accidents is composed of act and
potency and is shown to be finite, dependent, participated and created. For this
reason, by means of potency and act one realizes the transition to the constitution
of metaphysics”.
90
See C. FABRO, NMP, 155-164.
709
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
91
See C. FABRO, NMP, 157.
92
See C. FABRO, Metaphysica, Liber primus, 65.
93
C. FABRO, Metaphysica, Liber primus, 65.
94
C. FABRO, Metaphysica, Liber primus, 96.
95
See C. FABRO, Metaphysica, Liber primus, 103.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
act96. With regard to the reduction of active potency to act, Fabro concludes:
“the metaphysical reduction of potencies concludes in act. This principle,
which, on the one hand closes the phenomenological process of reduction,
on the other hand, opens the analysis of ens qua ens, be this in the order of
being or of action97. The analysis of movement, then, has effectively
established the priority of act over potency: “Everything that passes from
potency to act requires a preceding act in the agent, by which it is reduced to
act”98.
Predicamental participation. Fabro’s exposition of predicamental
participation in NMP99 moves from the logical participations and problem of
multiplicity to the real composition of matter and form; second, from the
solution of matter as principle of individuation to the problem metaphysical
contrariety (magis et minus); and, third, from the magis et minus of formal
perfection to their foundation in esse. By means of metaphysical reflection,
one seeks a real foundation for the logical-formal participations of
individual-species and species-genus in the proportional correspondence
that can be established between these participations and the real
compositions of matter-form and subject-accidents. One establishes that
there is multiplicity when there is an opposition of contrariety: contrariety is
the opposition proper to those things which have the same subject in
common; it is this opposition, which leads to the notion of real participation.
While physical contrariety concerns movement and the opposition of the
principles of movement; metaphysical contrariety concerns being and the
opposition of magis et minus perfection in the order of being. A magis et
minus can be seen in physical contrariety only when the terms of movement
are considered sub ratione entis.
96
See In IX Metaph., lect. 1, n. 1777: “Haec autem potentia reducitur ad
primam potentiam activam, quia passio ab agente causatur. Et propter hoc etiam
potentia passiva reducitur ad activam”.
97
See C. FABRO, Metaphysica, Liber primus, 111.
98
In IX Metaph., lect. 8, n. 1866: “Id enim, quod exit de potentia in actum,
requirit actum praecedentem in agente, a quo reducitur in actum”.
99
See C. FABRO, NMP, 143: “By ‘predicamental participation’ I intend that
in which both terms of the relation, participated and participant, remain in the field
of finite ens and substance (predicaments). In the Commentary to De
Hebdomadibus, two modes of this are recalled: one that is notional-formal and one
that is real; and each of these modes has been presented under two forms: A = the
species participated in the genus and the individual in the species; B = Matter
participates in the Form and the subject (the substance) participates in the
accident”.
711
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
The theme of how we discover ens qua ens or how the genus
subiectum of metaphysics is constituted is dealt with three times by Fabro
and in an indirect fashion. First, in NMP, Fabro characterized the passage to
metaphysics as the passage from physical contrariety to metaphysical
contrariety: “At the same time [movement] can be considered from a more
vast and comprehensive point of view: namely, not only on the physical
plane as a succession of contraries, but on the metaphysical plane of being,
as a succession of ‘more’ or ‘less’ perfect, according to the ontological
intensity of perfection”100. Physical contrariety concerns the opposition of
two terms in relation to movement, while ‘metaphysical’ contrariety
concerns the distinction between the contraries according to a ‘magis et
minus’ in the order of being101. This “magis et minus appears solely when
the terms of movement on the physical plane pass to the metaphysical plane
and are considered ‘sub ratione entis’, and it is in this way that one can
speak of a ‘magis et minus’ even in relation to (physical movement)”102.
Magis et minus expresses different degrees of realization of the same form,
which is communicated or participated to various subjects according to
varying intensive degrees of perfection. Metaphysical contrariety is found in
every creature and understood as a gradation of perfection in the formal
order and in reference to the supreme ratio of being.
Second, in Metaphysica, Fabro refers to the problem of passing to the
metaphysical notion of being in Metaphysica’s Introduction with regard to
100
C. FABRO, NMP, 161.
101
See C. FABRO, NMP, 161.
102
C. FABRO, NMP, 162.
712
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
the problem of how we grasp the “initial metaphysical notion of ens” (ens
commune):
The problem is addressed once again towards the conclusion to Book One
of Metaphysica, in which Fabro proposes that the metaphysical reduction of
potencies to act closes the phenomenological process of reduction and opens
up to an analysis of ens qua ens105. This metaphysical reduction was
described as follows:
Passing from potency to act, potency is the capacity of act or the “not-being”
such an act as act. Thus, there is an opposition of contradiction: to be capable
of having or being able to receive and being or having something. If the
opposition is in the real order, the distinction is real; if the opposition is in the
logical order (genus and difference) the opposition is of reason, but with the
indirect foundation of some distinction or real composition. In this way, the
division of being in act and potency investigates and penetrates with greater
depth the anterior division of finite being, in substance and accident, and brings
categorial being to the light of being as being. Substance which has accidents is
composed of act and potency and is shown to be finite, dependent, participated
and created. For this reason, by means of potency and act one realizes the
transition to the constitution of metaphysics106.
103
C. FABRO, Metaphysica, Introductio, 43.
104
C. FABRO, Metaphysica, Introductio, 44.
105
See C. FABRO, Metaphysica, Liber primus, 111.
106
C. FABRO, Metaphysica, Liber primus, 118.
713
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
107
C. FABRO, “La problematica dello esse tomistico”, TPM, 107.
714
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
108
See C. FABRO, “La difesa critica …”, ET, 40.
109
See C. FABRO, PC, 238.
110
See C. FABRO, NMP, 138: “While the confused being of ordinary
reflection is the point of departure for thought, and the proportional notion of being
is the formal object of metaphysics, which determines the position and the
development of the problems, this ultimate notion of Being, signals like a terminus
of metaphysical induction, which, at the same time, poses ulterior problems”.
111
C. FABRO, “La problematica dello esse tomistico”, TPM, 108.
112
See A. CONTAT, “Le figure della differenza ontologica…”, 118.
715
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
113
See M. PANGALLO, “L’itinerario metafisico di Cornelio Fabro”, 19: “In
the Fabrian interpretation of causality as ‘dynamic’ participation creation is able to
be understood and explained, philosophically, in light of the metaphysical notion of
(transcendental) participation. But it is necessary to avoid that the argument falls
into a vicious circle, namely, one needs to avoid that on the one hand participation
leads to the truth of creation and, on the other, that, in its turn, one can speak of
participation only after having admitted the doctrine of creation. Fabro is not
always very clear about this [my italics]: nevertheless it appears evident that
creation is an important achievement, even a philosophical one, of Christian
thought and that the point of departure, in order to come to speak of creation, is the
recognition of the existence of finite beings, that are not entirely being, but rather
possesses – or participate in – the act of being (or are in the act of being”. It is in
this way that Fabro holds to be able to show the analytic nature of the principle of
causality and thus that he intends to rise to the truth of creation, by means of (but
not starting from) the notion of contingentia. Thus, the itinerary outlined by Fabro
is following: finite beings participate being; among finite beings, some are
contingent beings; that which is contingent depends in some way on another; this
other is cause, which does not depend on another: namely, it is the uncaused cause
that causes all being and all beings (the last point refers to the Second Way)”.
114
See M. PANGALLO, L’essere come atto nel tomismo essenziale di
Cornelio Fabro, 148.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
This [esse] is the actuality of all things and their forms, it relates to these not
as something receiving, but as received by all. Hence, the formal act
“essence”, and the entitative act “existence” relate to one another as potency
and act. And, as we saw above, because act is not limited except by potency,
then the entitative act in contingent beings, to be limited, should be limited by
its potency, i.e., by the formal act, by essence; but as we saw, for this a real
distinction is necessary, therefore essence and esse are really distinguished118.
115
See D. TWETTEN, “Really Distinguishing Essence from Esse”,
Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics 6 (2006), 81, n. 88.
116
C. FABRO, Principii causalitati necessitas..., 2.
117
C. FABRO, Principii causalitati necessitas..., 59-60.
118
C. FABRO, Principii causalitati necessitas..., 64: “Ipsa est actualitas
omnium rerum et ipsarum formarum, relate ad quae non se habet ut recipiens
aliquid, sed potius ut receptum ab omnibus. Unde, actus formalis “essentia”, et
actus entitativus “existentia”, ad invicem se habent ut potentia et actus. Atqui ex
nuper dictis constat actus non limitari nisi per potentiam, ergo actus entitativus in
717
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
Thus, in 1931, Fabro holds that esse and essence are really distinct, yet does
not seem to grasp fully the distinction between existence as the “result” or
“fact” of being and esse as an intrinsic, constitutive principle.
Fabro’s paper on the principle of causality in 1934 shows important
progress in his view of the arguments for the real distinction. In the
conclusions which were published in 1936, Fabro deals with the theme of
“composition” and how the notion of composition demands an “author”.
The composition formula of the real distinction certainly provides a
foundation for the relation of dependence: a composite being shows that it is
constituted by actual and potential principles, since if it were per se
sufficient, it would have to be pure act. However, in a composition, the real
duality of principles points towards the fact that reality arises through the
realization of a unity within a diversity: being is possible insofar as it is a
“realized” unity. In a composite being, this unity is the unity of a
multiplicity, a unity which is effected though participation. Thus, the
principle of causality based on composition, from the point of view of its
foundation, refers to another principle. The principle of causality based on
participation is superior to the principle based on composition since it is
applicable to both the static-structure of reality (composition) and the
dynamic-causality of reality (causal dependence)119. Fabro, then, does not
deny the value of composition in arguing for the principle of causality, but
subordinates it to the arguments based on participation.
In an article entitled “Un itinéraire de saint Thomas”120 (1938), Fabro
deals specifically with St. Thomas’s arguments for the real distinction and
his own position that participation is the best way to argue for the
distinction. In NMP, Fabro classifies St. Thomas’s texts on the real
distinction into five groups121. This classification is followed by a summary
of De ente et essentia, in which three arguments for the real distinction are
entibus contingentibus, limitatis proinde, limitari debet per suam potentiam i.e. per
actum formalem, per essentiam; sed ut vidimus, ad hoc oportet distinctio realis,
ergo essentia et esse realtiter distinguunter”.
119
See C. FABRO, “La difesa critica… “, ET, 34.
120
See C. FABRO, “Un itinéraire de saint Thomas: L’établissement de la
distinction réelle entre essence et existence”, Revue de Philosophie, 4 (1939), 285-
310; reprinted in ET, 89-108. See also: “Circa la divisione dell’essere in atto e
potenza secondo san Tommaso”, Divus Thomas, 42 (1939), 529-552; reprinted in
ET, 109-136.
121
Fabro’s classification depends heavily on N. DEL PRADO, De veritate
fundamentali philosophiae christianae, Ex Typis Consociationis Sancti Pauli,
Freiburg 1911.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
made, and Summa contra Gentiles, II, ch. 52, in which seven arguments are
made. First, Fabro’s classification:
122
C. FABRO, NMP, 208-211.
123
See M. PANGALLO, L’essere come atto…, 35.
124
See M. PANGALLO, L’essere come atto…, 36.
719
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
125
See M. PANGALLO, L’essere come atto…, 36.
126
See C. FABRO, NMP, 211-214.
127
See C. FABRO, NMP, 214-215 and 218.
128
See M. PANGALLO, L’essere come atto…, 38. The phrase ratio propter
quid is used by Fabro in NMP, 233 in reference to the quarta ratio of De
substantiis separatis, ch. 8. Fabro writes: “It is in the response to the ‘quarta ratio’
that participation is invoked, as usual, as the ratio propter quid of the composition
of essence and the act of being, in substitution to the composition of matter and
form, and with which the creature is sufficiently distinguished from God”.
129
See C. FABRO, NMP, 235.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
130
M. PANGALLO, L’essere come atto…, 48.
131
C. FABRO, Metaphysica, Liber secundus, 231.
132
See D. TWETTEN, “Really Distinguishing Essence from Esse”, 81, n. 88:
“Notice the evolution in Fabro’s thought and expression on this issue. In his 1939
article on the Real Distinction, he defends both what he calls the ‘logico-
metaphysical argument’ of the First stage of De ente 4, and the two ‘metaphysical
arguments’ of the Second and Third Stage; Fabro, ‘Un itinéraire,” 94-97. In the
1950 revision of La nozione metafisica, 217-22, 243-44, Fabro still distinguishes
Aquinas’ two logical arguments (De ente 4, First Stage, and the ‘Genus argument’)
from two early metaphysical arguments (De ente 4, Second and Third Stages),
though the logical arguments must not be taken to stand on their own (ibid. 219);
but Fabro favors Aquinas’ third and subsequently developed mode of metaphysical
argument, couched in Participation, such as is offered in the last argument of SCG
2.52. In 1954, Fabro highlights the centrality of the three moments of the ‘dialectic
of participation’ for Aquinas’ metaphysics of the creature, within which dialectic
the argument through participation becomes for Aquinas the exclusive way to
demonstrate the Real Distinction; Fabro ‘Sviluppo della IV via’, 368-69”.
721
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
Also, in this period Fabro rejects the use of existentia to refer to esse as a
constitutive principle and argues this point extensively in PC133.
In his summary of the evolution of Fabro’s thought on the real
distinction after PC, Twetten points out that the role of the “God to
creatures argument” for the real distinction is unclear in Fabro’s thought.
Fabro seems to oscillate between placing it at the center of his argument for
the real distinction and leaving it aside134. The other oscillation regards the
role of the Biblical revelation of God as “I Am Who Am”. Fabro’s mature
thought seems to indicate that in philosophy, the notion of creation is
founded on esse and not the other way around135. Twetten concludes that
133
See D. TWETTEN, “Really Distinguishing Essence from Esse”, 81-82, n.
88: “By contrast, Participation et causalité in 1960 does not speak of ‘an
argument’ or ‘demonstration’ for the Real Distinction, except in reference to
Aquinas’ original Avicennian reasoning; see Participation et Causalité, 216, 625.
[…] In this final stage Fabro takes existentia to be a term of anti-Thomistic origin,
foreign to the semantics of Thomistic metaphysics, whose appearance in Henry of
Ghent and Giles of Rome is a landmark in the ‘forgetfulness of being’ lamented by
Heidegger”.
134
See D. TWETTEN, “Really Distinguishing Essence from Esse”, 82, n. 90.
“Sometimes Fabro suggests that he does not intend to reduce his approach to the
Real Distinction to a simple “God to Creatures Argument,” even when he accepts
such an argument (Fabro, La nozione metafisica, 192-205, 243-44; Participation et
causalité, 35, 76, 83, 198-202); yet, insofar as his ‘resolution’ begins from pure act,
which is identified with esse, which therefore must exist and must exist separately
and uniquely, the identification of this esse with God is natural (See ibid. 198-208;
“La problematica dello esse,” 109-10). Elsewhere Fabro is explicit about the “God
to Creatures” approach: Cornelio Fabro, “Elementi per una dottrina tomistica della
partecipazione,” in Esegesi tomistica, 421-48, at 433, reprinted from Divinitas 11
(1967): 559-86; Cornelio Fabro, Introduzione a san Tommaso: La metafisica
tomista e il pensiero moderno, 2nd ed. (Milan, 1997), 89-90 (the 1st ed. appeared
in 1983). Observe, though, that Participation et causalité focuses not on the Real
Distinction, but on the emergence of ‘esse as act’ and on the subsequent dynamic
causality and semantics in Aquinas’ thought. Fabro’s most thorough account of the
‘foundation’ of the Real Distinction at the final stage of his own development is
found in “Notes pour la fondation métaphysique de l’etre,” where he explicitly
does not appeal to God at the moment of the ‘foundation’, but only subsequently in
completing the causal account; Fabro, ‘Notes pour la fondation métaphysique de
l’etre’, 291-93, 309-14”.
135
See D. TWETTEN, “Really Distinguishing Essence from Esse”, 82, n. 91:
“It does not contradict Fabro’s position to add that the ‘first moment’ of Thomist
metaphysics is the Aristotelian concept of act; for, the ultimate foundation of the
722
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
Fabro’s argument involves establishing esse as act and seeing the essence as
having this act by participation. The varying intensity of the diverse
participations in esse as act make it possible to establish the real distinction.
This type of argumentation is much more solid than the logical or formal
argument (whether or not something exists is not included in its definition)
in which case esse is seen more as “existence” rather than a constitutive
principle136. Twetten summarizes Fabro’s argument for the real distinction in
the larger context of metaphysics as follows: “Similarly, Fabro denies that
the Real Distinction can be known through intuition, judgment, or
deduction. It is reached only in a dialectical analysis that starts from the
intensive act of being which is also identifiable with God”137.
In slight contrast to Twetten’s reading (that Fabro denies that the other
arguments are valid for proving the real distinction), an interesting
theoretical-speculative solution to the problem of Fabro’s arguments for the
real distinction is found in the conclusion to A. Contat’s article on the
ontological difference in twentieth-century Thomism. Contat notes that
while most are in agreement that the difference between the determination
of ens and its actuality is “preannounced” in the moment when thought
reflects on its first object (ens), the real question hinges on the
epistemological place in which one comes to the certainty of the real
composition between essence and esse in finite ens:
newly emergent esse ut actus versus the potency of essence is the Platonic notion
of Participation; Fabro, Introduzione a san Tommaso, 85, 91. Giacon criticizes
Fabro’s acceptance of a biblical origin and of a ‘God to Creatures’ approach in his
account of the Real Distinction; Carlo Giacon, ‘S. Tommaso e l’esistenza come
atto: Maritain, Gilson, Fabro,’ in Giacon, Itinerario tomistico (Rome, 1983), 137-
65, at 162-63. Late Fabro seems to have changed his position, insisting that
Aquinas differs from previous Christian thought in that the evidence of the event of
creation for him is founded on esse as act, rather than vice versa; Fabro, ‘Intorno al
fondamento dell’essere,’ in Graceful Reason: Essays in Ancient and Medieval
Philosophy Presented to Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R., ed. L. Gerson (Toronto, 1983),
229-37, at 237”.
136
See D. TWETTEN, “Really Distinguishing Essence from Esse”, 82, n. 91:
“In any event, Fabro’s account of the Real Distinction turns on his establishing that
there is an esse as act containing all things intensively at a transcendental level,
whereas essences at the predicamental level have this act only by Participation. The
intensivity of esse is what makes it possible to establish the Real Distinction,
whereas all other accounts take esse in a ‘logical’ or ‘formal’ sense as containing
merely the minimal base of what makes something to be (existence)”.
137
D. TWETTEN, “Really Distinguishing Essence from Esse”, 81-82.
723
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
When one reflects on the initial notion of ens, one is certain only of an alterity
between a determination that one can conceptualize as form, and an actuality
which transcends the plane of form, without yet being able to establish what
both the determination and the actuality are, and, hence, much less what is the
real extent [portata] of their distinction138.
138
A. CONTAT, “Le figure della differenza ontologica…”, 234.
139
See A. CONTAT, “Le figure della differenza ontologica…”, 236-238.
140
A. CONTAT, “Le figure della differenza ontologica…”, 238.
724
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
141
In Librum De Causis, lect. 26. See C. FABRO, PC, 341.
142
See De Veritate, q. 27, a. 1 ad 3.
143
See Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 55.
144
See C. FABRO, PC, 354.
145
C. FABRO, “La problematica dello esse tomistico”, TPM, 104.
725
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
emergence of esse ut actus over existentia (esse in actu) and form was one
of the original achievements of St. Thomas’s speculation:
148
C. FABRO, NMP, 190.
149
C. FABRO, NMP, 190.
150
C. FABRO, NMP, 190.
151
See C. FABRO, NMP, 191: “The ultimate term of the formal resolution of
the essence is therefore the ‘formal being’ that IS, without any limitation to genus
or species; it is the Being that is without determinations”.
152
C. FABRO, NMP, 191.
153
In III Sent., d. 30, q. 1, a. 2: “In omnibus illud quod est commune,
vehementius est: sed illud quod est proprium plura complectitur actu; et perfectio
communis est in hoc quod se extendit ad illa quae complectitur proprium, ut genus
perficitur per additionem differentiae: sicut esse vehementius inhaeret quam vivere
et tamen vivere aliquid complectitur actu, quod esse non habet nisi in potentia;
unde perfectio esse est secundum quod se extendit ad vitam”.
727
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
Act, but rather as the formal, absolute fullness of every perfection154, as esse
maximum formale, the plexus of all formal and transcendental
perfections155.
This stage of metaphysical reflection is “formal” in character since we
have not in fact proved that ipsum esse really exists. The demonstration of
the existence of Ipsum Esse Per Se Subsistens, Fabro notes, belongs to an
ulterior stage of metaphysical reflection, which is carried out according to
efficient, exemplary and final causality. This passage from the formal
resolution of perfection to the real reduction to God implies a change in the
notion of participation: “Participation is no longer a mere notional or
conditional relationship of intelligibility, but a real relationship of threefold
causality – exemplary, efficient and final –, according to a total dependence
of the creature on the Creator” 156.
The Fourth Way (1954). Fabro again deals with the “formal resolution
of the essence” in his 1954 article on the Fourth Way. Fabro first determines
the nature of the dialectical comparison of perfections found according to a
magis et minus. In brief, the perfections are not considered within their own
“spheres”, but rather in reference to being:
All the qualities, forms, species, genera, pure perfections... can be considered
with respect to a magis et minus not per se, in the strict sphere of their own
sphere, but insofar as they are referred to being, insofar, that is, that they are
considered as forms, modes, degrees of the perfection of being and in being.
Esse, the perfection of the actuality of being, is the founding reference for this
entire dialectic. And this because being is the primary act, the act of all acts
and the perfection of all perfections – both predicamental and transcendental –
which is, at the same time, the most simple and universal act, as well as the
most intense157.
154
See C. FABRO, NMP, 197.
155
See C. FABRO, NMP, 198.
156
C. FABRO, NMP, 194.
157
C. FABRO, “Sviluppo, significato e valore della IV via”, ET, 376.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
here comes about in function of the predicamental perfections which permit the
gradation of forms and thus determine the “metaphysical contrariety” of the
essences within a genus or among the different genera according to magis et
minus, for example, beauty, life, knowledge, etc158.
A second passage is that which regards the same pure perfections, but not,
though, between them and not with respect to a magis et minus, but rather
within the same precise ratio of the same perfection which is per se a formal –
and not real – actuality with respect to esse, and is thus considered as a
“participation” in it. It is due, then, to the notion of “intensive esse”, taken
from Pseudo-Dionysius, which gives the ultimate foundation to the Thomistic
dialectic of participation and permits the closure or absolute fulfillment in the
Absolute of the foundation of esse. As one can speak of a predicamental
participation for the perfections and accidental and univocal actualities, within
the species and genera, so can we call “transcendental participation” that of the
pure and analogous perfections with respect to esse which founds them and
transcends them: “But whatever created form be supposed to subsist per se, it
is necessary that it participate in esse; for life itself, or anything of that sort,
participates in esse itself, as says Dionysius”159.
For Fabro, then, the first stage of the Fourth Way is formal in character yet
virtually implies the real foundation on God, as efficient and exemplary
cause of all being160. Included in this first stage is the formal resolution of
perfection. Fabro explains as follows:
158
C. FABRO, “Sviluppo, significato e valore della IV via”, ET, 377.
159
C. FABRO, “Sviluppo, significato e valore della IV via”, ET, 377. I, q. 75,
a. 5 ad 4: “Quaecumque autem forma creata per se subsistens ponatur, oportet quod
participet esse, quia etiam ipsa vita, vel quidquid sic diceretur, participat ipsum
esse, ut dicit Dionysius”.
160
See C. FABRO, “Sviluppo, significato e valore della IV via”, ET, 379:
“The only formality to which in its originary metaphysical position it belongs to
reality is esse, precisely because all that is, both in the formal order as in the real
one in whatever way it is, participates in esse, since the intensive act of esse is at
the same time, as we have seen, the first act and the fullness of perfection. The
conclusion of this first stage that ‘if there exist entia per participationem, there
should exist the esse per essentiam…’ is rigorous since only the esse which is per
essentiam, subsists per se”.
729
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
This means that all the aspects of act and of perfection which are variously
dispersed and participated in other formalities and perfections, therefore, also
in different references to the origin and foundation of the forms and perfections
in question, are found unified in intensive esse and cannot be otherwise: insofar
as esse is “id quod est formalissimum omnium”, the formal resolution is already
the foundation of the causal dependence of beings per participationem, in the
primum which is esse per essentiam, in the maximum, since the formal
foundation, here, virtually implies every real foundation and this in virtue of
intensive esse161.
Dionysius says that, although esse itself is more perfect than life itself, and life
itself than wisdom itself, if they are considered as distinguished secundum
161
C. FABRO, “Sviluppo, significato e valore della IV via”, ET, 382.
162
C. FABRO, “La problematica dello esse tomistico”, TPM, 108.
163
C. FABRO, “La problematica dello esse tomistico”, TPM, 109.
164
See C. FABRO, PC, 221.
165
C. FABRO, PC, 222.
166
C. FABRO, PC, 222.
730
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
167
I, q. 4, a. 2 ad 3: “Sicut in eodem capite idem Dionysius dicit, licet ipsum
esse sit perfectius quam vita, et ipsa vita quam ipsa sapientia, si considerentur
secundum quod distinguuntur ratione, tamen vivens est perfectius quam ens
tantum, quia vivens etiam est ens; et sapiens est ens et vivens. Licet igitur ens non
includat in se vivens et sapiens, quia non oportet quod illud quod participat esse,
participet ipsum secundum omnem modum essendi, tamen ipsum esse Dei includit
in se vitam et sapientiam; quia nulla de perfectionibus essendi potest deesse ei
quod est ipsum esse subsistens”.
168
See I-II, q. 2, a. 5 ad 2: “Esse simpliciter acceptum, secundum quod
includit in se omnem perfectionem essendi, praeeminet vitae et omnibus
subsequentibus, sic enim ipsum esse praehabet in se omnia subsequentia. Et hoc
modo Dionysius loquitur. Sed si consideretur ipsum esse prout participatur in hac
re vel in illa, quae non capiunt totam perfectionem essendi, sed habent esse
imperfectum, sicut est esse cuiuslibet creaturae; sic manifestum est quod ipsum
esse cum perfectione superaddita est eminentius. Unde et Dionysius ibidem dicit
quod viventia sunt meliora existentibus, et intelligentia viventibus”.
169
See L. ROMERA, Pensar el ser, 282: “Todo el proceso comparativo que
lleva a la aparición de la formalidad absoluta se limita a un simple expediente de
clarificación conceptual (lógica) si dicho esse subsistens no existe de hecho”.
731
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
174
See C. FABRO, NMP, 334: “The entire book Q (IX) of the Metaphysics is
dedicated to the development of the theory of act and potency, to their mutual
relations of priority, of real dependence, etc. There Aristotle resolutely affirms the
absolute priority of ens-in-act, since this is sufficient and perfect per se and can
move and perfect insofar as it is in potency, while it would be absurd that being-in-
potency could precede being-in-act in an absolute fashion, and be the ultimate
reason for the latter. Potency can have a certain priority, though limited, only in the
physical order, where the predicamental agents always operate on a pre-existent
subject—that is, presupposing a subjective potency which is matter”.
175
See C. FABRO, PP, 298.
176
See C. FABRO, PP, 380: “Thomistic ‘emergence’ is founded—if I am not
wrong—on the notion of participation, which in metaphysics supposes the real
transcendence of the participated with respect to the participant and its causal
immanence under the form of influence for the dynamic aspect and under the form
of similitude for the static one. In the predicamental order, then, this makes us see
beings order in a scaled progression, of which every inferior degree retains in se, in
an adumbrate way, something of the perfection of the immediately superior degree,
according to the Dionysian metaphysics that St. Thomas incorporated into
Aristotelianism”.
177
See C. FABRO, PP, 602-608.
733
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
178
C. FABRO, “Sviluppo, significato e valore della IV via”, ET, 363: “The
priority of act over potency is at the basis of Aristotle’s metaphysics and expresses
the absolute precedence that belongs to the perfect over the imperfect and over the
mere capacity of being. St. Thomas took the metaphysical emergence of esse over
every form and every act from the Neo-platonic speculation which he was able to
deepen in above all in his later years, as we have stated: this means that esse is the
act par excellence – the actuality of every other form or reality – such that every
other form, perfection or particular reality is found to be in a state of ‘potency’ with
respect to esse, in this ultimate metaphysical resolution of that which is
nevertheless presented as imperfect and finite”.
179
See C. FABRO, “La problematica dello esse tomistico”, TPM, 109.
734
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
180
In Librum De Causis, lect. 18 : “Quia ergo intelligere praesupponit vivere
et vivere praesupponit esse, esse autem non praesupponit aliquid aliud prius; inde
est quod primum ens dat esse omnibus per modum creationis. Prima autem vita,
quaecumque sit illa, non dat vivere per modum creationis, sed per modum formae,
id est informationis; et similiter dicendum est de intelligentia”.
181
In I Sent., d. 2 q. 1 a. 1 ad 1: “Quamvis bonitates participatae in creaturis
sint differentes ratione, tamen habent ordinem ad invicem et una includit alteram et
una fundatur super altera; sicut in intelligere includitur vivere, et in vivere
includitur esse; et ideo non reducuntur in diversa principia, sed in unum”.
182
C. FABRO, “La problematica dello esse tomistico”, TPM, 106.
183
See C. FABRO, PC, 224-225: “The ‘passage to the limit’ from ens to esse
embraces the entire itinerary of magis et minus in the sphere of the esse essentiae
and culminates in the absolute position of Esse separatum; in this way the
emergence of esse is actuated by means of the intensification of ens with its real
formal perfections”.
184
C. FABRO, PC, 328.
735
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
matter”185. Fabro also clarifies the correspondence between being and act
according to the principle of the emergence of act: “The act which is in the
identity of itself coincides with being, the act which is participated is the
constitutive principle of being (ut quo) in ens according to the order to
which it pertains: this is the very formula of the principle of the emergence
of act”186.
Within the structure of created being, esse as actus essendi emerges
over form: even if the form be subsistent (like that of an angel), is said to be
potency and in potency with respect to esse187. With respect to God:
185
C. FABRO, PC, 351.
186
C. FABRO, PC, 351.
187
C. FABRO, PC, 636: “St. Thomas, and he alone, proclaims the absolute
emergence of esse as act of all acts and of all forms: [there are] then forms and acts
which ‘fall’ into the condition of potency or the receptive “capacity” of the act of
being. (See Div. Nom. c. v, lect. 1, n. 635). As form precedes matter and transcends
it, so also esse which is the act and perfection of the essence precedes and
transcends the form and essence of which it is the act: esse is the primary emergent
Act and thus can be assumed as the highest determination of God (Esse subsistens,
Esse ipsum...).
188
C. FABRO, PC, 500-501.
189
C. FABRO, PC, 524.
736
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
upon, analogy of attribution”. This means that esse does not pertain to the
creature (ens per participationem) except by participation in the Creator
(Esse per essentiam) and “that esse does not belong to accident (ens
secundum quid) otherwise than by participation in substance (ens
simpliciter)”. Fabro concludes that esse is the intensive, emergent act since
it is the constitutive act (and actuating act) of ens.
Another key text to understanding Fabro’s use of the term
“emergence” is found in his 1967 New Catholic Encyclopedia entry on
“Existence”. He refers to the apprehension of esse as a type of “dialectical
emergence” and explains both terms. Act “emerges” as a first principle and
foundation”: “[The apprehension of esse] is a ‘dialectical’ kind of
knowledge to the extent that esse as such is act and not content; thus the
apprehension of esse occurs ‘by emergence,’ whereby the concept of act is
approached as a first principle and foundation, and so reveals the ultimate
stage of agreement between intellect and reality”190.
The last text that helps us understand Fabro’s use of “emergence” and
the “principle of the emergence of act” is found in his 1989 article on “The
Emergence of Thomistic esse over Aristotelian Act”. He writes that
Aristotle’s discovery or intuition of the “primacy (emergence) of act over
potency” is one of the greatest in Western thought. He then clarifies the
meaning of the term “emergence”:
190
C. FABRO, “Existence”, 724.
191
C. FABRO, “L’emergenza dello Esse tomistico…”, 151.
192
C. FABRO, “L’emergenza dello esse tomistico…”, 174
737
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
193
I, q. 44, a. 1 ad 1: “Ex hoc quod aliquid per participationem est ens,
sequitur quod sit causatum ab alio”.
194
C. FABRO, “La difesa critica…”, ET, 41.
195
See De Potentia, q. 3, a. 5, ad 1: “Esse quod rebus creatis inest, non
potest intelligi, nisi ut deductum ab esse divino”. See also C. FABRO, “La difesa
critica…”, ET, 41.
196
In II Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 2: “Constat enim quod omne quod est in aliquo
genere imperfectum, oritur ab eo in quo primo et perfecte reperitur natura generis:
sicut patet de calore in rebus calidis ab igne”.
197
Summa contra Gentiles, II, ch. 15: “Omne enim quod alicui convenit non
secundum quod ipsum est, per aliquam causam convenit ei, sicut album homini”.
198
Summa contra Gentiles, II, ch. 15: “Quod alicui convenit ex sua natura,
non ex alia causa, minoratum in eo et deficiens esse non potest. Si enim naturae
aliquid essentiale subtrahitur vel additur, iam altera natura erit: sicut et in numeris
accidit”.
739
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
199
Summa contra Gentiles, II, ch. 15: “Secundum ordinem effectuum oportet
esse ordinem causarum: [...]. Unde oportet quod, sicut effectus proprii reducuntur
in causas proprias, ita id quod commune est in effectibus propriis, reducatur in
aliquam causam communem: [...]. Omnibus autem commune est esse. Oportet
igitur quod supra omnes causas sit aliqua causa cuius sit dare esse”.
200
Summa contra Gentiles, II, ch. 16: “Quanto aliquis effectus est
universalior, tanto habet propriam causam altiorem: [...]. Esse autem est
universalius quam moveri: [...]. Oportet ergo quod supra causam quae non agit nisi
movendo et transmutando, sit illa causa quae est primum essendi principium”.
201
Summa contra Gentiles, II, ch. 15: “Quod per essentiam dicitur, est causa
omnium quae per participationem dicuntur: sicut ignis est causa omnium ignitorum
inquantum huiusmodi. Deus autem est ens per essentiam suam: quia est ipsum esse.
Omne autem aliud ens est ens per participationem: quia ens quod sit suum esse non
potest esse nisi unum ut in primo ostensum est. Deus igitur est causa essendi
omnibus aliis”.
202
C. FABRO, “Sviluppo, significato e valore della IV via”, ET, 365.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
separated esse that is the end of the Fourth Way: God as esse per
essentiam”. Fabro finds the principle stated in Thomistic texts such as the
following: “Just as it is impossible to understand that there are many
separate whitenesses, but if there were ‘whiteness’ apart from every subject
and recipient, there would be but one whiteness, so it is impossible to have
an Ipsum Esse Subsistens unless there is but one”203.
While duly recognizing the Platonic background of the principle,
Fabro also holds that St. Thomas transformed the principle in that it is not
applied to form as such but to esse alone: “This principle of separated
perfection is eminently of Platonic origin and must be integrated with the
Aristotelian principle of the emergence of act. Both principles are indeed
founded on the synthetic Thomistic principle of participation. But despite
his general acceptance of the Platonic principle of separated perfection,
Thomas follows Aristotle in rejecting its application to the forms as such
and, going beyond Aristotle who does not know esse as act, applies it
exclusively to esse. Thus Esse ipsum or Esse subsistens is God himself who
is the first, immovable, and separated Principle situated, as it were, at the
summit of eternity (in arce aeternitatis)”204.
The consequence of the principle of separated perfection is that all
other natures and forms outside of God (Esse per essentiam) are seen as
entia per participationem. To exemplify this “tension” between Esse per
essentiam and entia per participationem, St. Thomas turns to the examples
of the sun that illuminates the air (Plato), of fire that heats bodies (Aristotle),
of pure whiteness which is participated in various subjects (St. Thomas’s
own example): “If a form or nature is totally separate and simple, there
cannot be a multitude in it: as if whiteness were totally separate, there would
only be one”205.
The principle of separated perfection, is invoked in many of Fabro’s
works. One of the first instances is found in Metaphysica, where Fabro
expounds on the principle as follows:
203
De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 1: “Hoc autem non potest dici de aliquo alio:
sicut enim impossibile est intelligere quod sint plures albedines separatae; sed si
esset albedo separata ab omni subiecto et recipiente, esset una tantum; ita
impossibile est quod sit ipsum esse subsistens nisi unum tantum”.
204
C. FABRO, “The Intensive Hermeneutics…”, 487-488.
205
In Liber De Causis, lect. 4: “Si aliqua forma vel natura sit omnino
separata et simplex, non potest in ea cadere multitudo, sicut, si aliqua albedo esset
separata, non esset nisi una: nunc autem inveniuntur multae albedines diversae
quae participant albedinem”.
741
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
This principle is founded on the notion of act itself and expresses its ultimate
“emergence” over form and also over any potency. Act is something ultimate in
its genus and, therefore, also unique, because every act is defined and exists by
the presence and possession of itself. Thus, everything that is act “per
essentiam” does not depend on another in its order, nor needs to being or form
a composite with another, but rather is and consists in itself. Thus, only one
Pure Act exists, which is pure Esse: God. […] Consequently, the remaining
things after this one, first and simple, are not such per essentiam but only per
participationem, insofar as they receive that perfection in some potentiality to
which that perfection per se is limited and in which, in some way, falls from its
metaphysical purity206.
206
C. FABRO, Metaphysica, Liber secundus, 228-229”.
207
C. FABRO, PC, 233.
208
C. FABRO, “Sviluppo, significato e valore della IV via”, ET, 378.
742
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
And if one should consider the order of things, he will always find that that
which is the maximum is the cause of the esse of those things are after it; just
as fire which is hottest, is the cause of heat in other elementary bodies. Now
the First Principle which we call God is maxime ens. For in the order of things,
we cannot proceed to infinity, but must come to something highest; because it
is better to be one than to be many. But that which is better in the universe,
must necessarily be because the universe depends on the essence of God’s
goodness. Therefore the primum ens must of necessity be the cause of being
for all216.
Fabro concludes his exposition of the Fourth Way, highlighting the three
consequent moments to the principle of separated perfection: 1) creation as
the total dependence of the creature on God; 2) the real distinction and the
fundamental difference of the creature from God; 3) analogy as the
fundamental semantics which expresses the relationship of the creature to
God217.
214
C. FABRO, “Sviluppo, significato e valore della IV via”, ET, 381.
215
In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 2. See I, q. 6, a. 4: “Sic ergo unumquodque dicitur
bonum bonitate divina, sicut primo principio exemplari, effectivo et finali”; Summa
contra Gentiles III, 65 “Esse autem cuiuslibet rei est esse participatum: cum non sit
res aliqua praeter Deum suum esse, ut supra probatum Est. Et sic oportet quod ipse
Deus, qui est suum esse, sit primo et per se causa omnis esse”.
216
De substantiis separatis, ch. 9: “Si quis ordinem rerum consideret,
semper inveniet id quod est maximum causam esse eorum quae sunt post ipsum;
sicut ignis, qui est calidissimus, causa est caliditatis in ceteris elementatis
corporibus. Primum autem principium, quod Deum dicimus, est maxime ens. Non
enim est in infinitum procedere in rerum ordine, sed ad aliquid summum devenire,
quod melius est esse unum quam plura. Quod autem in universo melius est, necesse
est esse, quia universum dependet ex essentia bonitatis eius; necesse est igitur
primum ens esse causam essendi omnibus”.
217
See C. FABRO, “Sviluppo, significato e valore della IV via”, ET, 382-383:
“We can recognize then that the Fourth Way, interpreted by means of the dialectic
744
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
of the Thomistic notion of the intensive act of esse, is the ultimate theoretical proof
and the most formal proof of the existence of God: it is not surprising then that the
Thomistic text of the Johannine Prologue, that we have chosen as the most
complete formula of our way, embraces and founds, at the same time, the total
dependence of the creature on God (creation) and the fundamental difference of the
creature from God (the real distinction of essence and esse) as well as the
fundamental semantics to express the relation of the creature to God (analogy)”.
218
C. FABRO, “Il fondamento metafisico della IV via”, ET, 399.
219
I, q. 44, a. 1 ad 1: “Ex hoc quod aliquid est per participationem sequitur
quod sit causatum ab alio”.
220
Summa contra Gentiles, II, ch. 15: “Quod per essentiam dicitur, est causa
omnium quae per participationem dicuntur: sicut ignis est causa omnium ignitorum
inquantum huiusmodi. Deus autem est ens per essentiam suam: quia est ipsum esse.
Omne autem aliud ens est ens per participationem: quia ens quod sit suum esse non
potest esse nisi unum ut in primo ostensum est. Deus igitur est causa essendi
omnibus aliis”.
221
C. FABRO, “Il fondamento metafisico della IV via”, ET, 402.
745
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
For, since it is necessary that the First Principle be most simple, this must of
necessity be said to be not as participating in esse but as itself being esse. But
because subsistent esse can be only one, as was pointed out above, then
necessarily all other things under it must be as participating in esse. Therefore
there must take place a certain common resolution in all such things according
226
C. FABRO, PC, 629-630. See In I Metaph., lect. 10, n. 154: “Quod enim
totaliter est aliquid, non participat illud, sed est per essentiam idem illi. Quod vero
non totaliter est aliquid habens aliquid aliud adiunctum, proprie participare dicitur.
Sicut si calor esset calor per se existens, non diceretur participare calorem, quia
nihil esset in eo nisi calor. Ignis vero quia est aliquid aliud quam calor, dicitur
participare calorem”.
227
C. FABRO, “Sviluppo, significato e valore della IV via”, ET, 367.
228
De substantiis separatis, ch. 8: “Ipsum igitur esse per se subsistens est
unum tantum. Impossibile est igitur quod praeter ipsum sit aliquid subsistens quod
sit esse tantum. Omne autem quod est, esse habet. Est igitur in quocumque, praeter
primum, et ipsum esse, tanquam actus; et substantia rei habens esse, tanquam
potentia receptiva huius actus quod est esse”.
747
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
as each of them is reduced by the intellect into that which is and its esse.
Therefore, above the mode of coming to be, by which something becomes
when form comes to matter, we must presuppose another origin for things
according as esse is bestowed upon the whole universe of things by the First
Being that is its own esse229.
229
De substantiis separatis, ch. 9: “Sed ultra hunc modum fiendi necesse est,
secundum sententiam Platonis et Aristotelis, ponere alium altiorem. Cum enim
necesse sit primum principium simplicissimum esse, necesse est quod non hoc
modo esse ponatur quasi esse participans, sed quasi ipsum esse existens. Quia vero
esse subsistens non potest esse nisi unum, sicut supra habitum est, necesse est
omnia alia quae sub ipso sunt, sic esse quasi esse participantia. Oportet igitur
communem quamdam resolutionem in omnibus huiusmodi fieri, secundum quod
unumquodque eorum intellectu resolvitur in id quod est, et in suum esse. Oportet
igitur supra modum fiendi quo aliquid fit, forma materiae adveniente,
praeintelligere aliam rerum originem, secundum quod esse attribuitur toti
universitati rerum a primo ente, quod est suum esse”.
230
For a summary of the debate and the some of the positions, see G.
ROCCA, Speaking the Incomprehensible God, CUA Press, Washington DC 2004,
282-283, n. 95: “Geiger thinks there are two separate systems of participation in
Aquinas: participation by composition and participation by similitude in the
hierarchy of beings (pp. 77-217, 223-307), but Fabro thinks Aquinas only teaches
the former kind, which is based on the distinction between essence and existence in
creatures (Nozione, pp. 20-23; Participation, pp. 63-73). Te Velde leans to Fabro’s
more unity view but criticizes his theory of participation by composition because it
invariably implies an essence that must “exist” somehow before it is composed
with esse; referring to Aquinas’ account of God’s seamless creative act, te Velde
argues for just one type of participation in Aquinas, which is grounded in the real
748
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
234
See L.-B. GEIGER, La participation dans la philosophie de S. Thomas
d’Aquin, Paris, Vrin 1942. For a helpful summary of Geiger’s thought see chapter
seven, “L.-B. Geiger, Participation and the Essence of Being”, of H. John’s The
Thomist Spectrum, pages 108-122. I will follow John’s summary closely in my
exposition.
235
L.-B. GEIGER, La participation dans la philosophie…, 27-28.
236
L.-B. GEIGER, La participation dans la philosophie…, 28-29.
237
See L.-B. GEIGER, La participation dans la philosophie…, 29: “The
distinction between the two types of participation and the two systems derived
from it does not, then, concern the presence or the absence either of composition or
of formal hierarchy. It concerns the role in the system which is accorded to
composition. If composition explains limitation, we have participation by
composition. A fortiori, this will be the case if composition alone is considered. If
limitation is naturally anterior to composition, although it may imply the latter,
even necessarily, as its consequence, then we are dealing with participation by
formal hierarchy”.
238
G. DOOLAN, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas as Exemplar Causes, 203. See
L.-B. GEIGER, La participation dans la philosophie…, 301.
239
L.-B. GEIGER, La participation dans la philosophie…, 342-398.
750
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
240
L.-B. GEIGER, La participation dans la philosophie…, 52.
241
See L.-B. GEIGER, La participation dans la philosophie…, 60.
242
H. JOHN, The Thomist Spectrum, 115.
243
See H. JOHN, The Thomist Spectrum, 115.
244
L.-B. GEIGER, La participation dans la philosophie…, 60, n. 3.
245
H. JOHN, The Thomist Spectrum, 116.
246
C. FABRO, “La metafisica tomista della partecipazione come sintesi di
classicismo e cristianesimo”, in Filosofia e Cristianesimo (Atti del II convegno
Italiano di studi filosofici Cristiani, 4-6 Settembre 1946), Marzorati, Milano 1947,
183-184.
751
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
Frankly, this fear appears exaggerated to me, since the Thomistic position on
this point is of a marvelous completeness and coherence: as the predicamental
formalities are limited in the individuals by way of matter, so the
transcendental formalities – and esse before all of them – are limited by the
essences that come to be actuated. Essence remains that which is, limited in
itself in its ontological degree of being: it is not the essence that is limited in its
composition with esse – since it is already as a degree of perfection –, but esse
itself which is limited and with esse, so is ens. Therefore not every form as
such and insofar as it is form is limited and composed, although every limited
ens should be composed in the order precisely in which it is presented as
limited. It is not surprising, then, that Fr. Geiger is not favorable toward my
defense of “predicamental participation” […]: but if one admits – as one
should admit, if one does not want to fall into nominalistic and suarezian
extrinsicism – that every multiplication is not a simple empirical fact, but
involves a metaphysical situation, and therefore that the multiplication – even
univocal – involves real limitation and composition247.
In PC, Fabro once again critiques Geiger’s position and observes that
Geiger’s proposal raises serious doubts about the Thomistic principle that
states that “an act is only limited in its order by a corresponding potency”
and that “act is not self-limiting”. St. Thomas’s texts on participation and
“likeness”, he holds, do not seem to indicate two different systems of
participation but rather a correspondence between similarity and
composition. Participation par similitude is always found in conjunction
with and never independent from participation par composition. In short,
247
C. FABRO, NMP, 28-29.
752
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
248
See In I Sent., d. 48, q. 1, a. 1.
249
C. FABRO, PC, 56-57.
250
C. FABRO, PC, 643: “Created essences are derived from the divine
essence, through the intermediary of the divine Ideas, and therefore formally the
derivation is according to the relation of exemplarity. Every essence, then, although
it is act in the formal order, is created as potency that is actuated by participated
esse which in se it receives: its actuality is ‘mediated’, therefore, by esse”. See also
PC, 595: “According to the twofold transcendental participation, both with regard
to the essence and to esse, there is also a twofold moment of analogy; one formal
by imitation of the divine form, and another that is real by derivation of divine
causality”.
753
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
intellect by imitation of the divine idea and the similitude of the creature to
God’s nature by participation in esse251.
In a 1961 article – which complements and completes some of the
results of NMP and PC – Fabro develops the theme of the “principle of the
limitation of act”. In brief, the article argues that, for St. Thomas, although
the form is not limited by itself, it can and should be said to be limited in
itself, even at the formal level. Throughout the article, Fabro calls attention
to the importance of predicamental participation and, in particular, the
participation of the species in a genus. This is because the form can be said
to be limited in itself since it does not realize the entire virtual perfection of
the genus to which it belongs252.
Shortly after the publication of PC, J. M. Artola published his doctoral
dissertation on Creación y participación. La participación de la naturaleza
divina en las criaturas según la filosofía de Santo Tomás de Aquino
(1963)253. Artola’s dissertation deals with the creature’s participation in the
divine nature according to efficient, exemplary and final causality. It is
worthwhile to consider Artola’s work at length because Fabro did not
investigate exemplary and final causality to the degree that Artola did and
because there is a strong affinity between the thought of Fabro and Artola
on esse.
Artola considers the creature’s participation in the divine nature
according to efficient causality in Chapter Three of his work. God, he
writes, is the “causa essendi” of creatures: the effects that proceed from
divine causality receive their existence (esse) from God; within this esse, all
other formal perfection is included254. What the creature receives and
251
See De Potentia, q. 3, a. 4 ad 9; ibid., q. 7, a. 7 ad 6.
252
See C. FABRO, “La determinazione dell’atto…”, ET, 335-338. Fabro
argues that spiritual essences are not limited by themselves—for the pure form
possesses all the perfection proper to its species—but are limited in themselves to
the degree that they express only a particular degree of perfection and act with
respect to the formal totality of their genus.
253
J. M. ARTOLA, Creación y participación. La participación de la
naturaleza divina en las criaturas según la filosofía de santo Tomás de Aquino,
Publicaciones de la Institución Aquinas, Madrid 1963. Artola notes in a footnote to
the introduction that the dissertation was defended on February 14, 1961 and does
not take into account works published in the meantime. I assume he is referring in
particular to Cornelio Fabro’s Partecipazione e causalità.
254
See J. M. ARTOLA, Creación y participación, 84. Further on, Artola
writes: “Creation and participation are two concepts which express a common
reality from different points of view. Everything that the creature has is something
754
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
participates in is not God himself, but rather a “reality” that comes from
God. God produces his effects by communicating something that is his, yet,
nevertheless, is not himself255. The dependence of the creature on the
Creator is translated, ontologically, into a relation256.
In Chapter Four, Artola deals with the way in which creatures
participate in the divine nature by means of exemplary causality and,
therefore, with the relationship between the exemplar cause (the divine idea
or divine exemplar) and its effect257. As an extrinsic formal cause, the
exemplar cause cannot be said to give being (esse) in the same way that the
intrinsic formal cause gives being. Rather, between the exemplar idea and
the exemplified reality, there is “a certain convenience in a form” since the
effect is an imitation of the exemplar258. In intellectual agents, the exemplar
prescribes the form which the action of the agent intends to introduce in the
effect. In his investigation of what the exemplar cause communicates to the
effect, Artola notes that we frequently find passages in St. Thomas’s work
which hold that the exemplified reality participates in a likeness of the
exemplar259. “Likeness” implies a communication in the form (I, q. 4, a. 3)
and the varying degrees of this communication give rise to different degrees
of likeness (specific, generic or analogical). Here, Artola introduces the
distinction between the exemplar idea260 and the reality to which the idea
refers261. Properly speaking, the exemplar cause refers to the former, to the
exemplar idea, and to the imitation produced in the effect. In this way, the
exemplar idea is the rule and measure of the beings produced in its
imitation262. The divine nature is the exemplar of all creatures insofar as
there is an analogical, imperfect likeness between God’s nature and
received from the creating cause. However, in this reception what is received is
something that pertains to the Creator. Setting aside a monist solution, one needs to
explain this pertaining by means of an imperfect formal assimilation of the creature
to the Creator and, consequently, by means of an existential dependence”.
255
See J. M. ARTOLA, Creación y participación, 94-95.
256
See J. M. ARTOLA, Creación y participación, 95-97. Artola argues that
this relation is not a predicamental accident.
257
See J. M. ARTOLA, Creación y participación, 99-126.
258
See J. M. ARTOLA, Creación y participación, 107.
259
See J. M. ARTOLA, Creación y participación, 108. Artola mentions I, q.
6, a. 4; I, q. 9, a. 1; De Potentia, q. 3, a. 4 ad 9; Ibid., q. 3, a. 16 ad 14 (here, Artola
has ad 15).
260
See De Veritate, q. 3, a. 1.
261
See Quodlibet. IV, q. 1, De Potentia, q. 7, a. 7 ad 6.
262
See J. M. ARTOLA, Creación y participación, 109.
755
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
Nevertheless, one should not deduce from this ultimate twofold consideration
of the creature a twofold participation, placing it in correlation with the twofold
aspect of the divine essence and intellect. We are dealing with aspects, not
separate processes. The synthesis and complementarity of aspects is given to us
by St. Thomas in the following words: “But every creature has its own proper
species, according to which it participates in some way in a likeness of the
divine essence” (I, q. 15, a. 2)265. Comparing this text to the former, we see that
the species – the “forma equi” – is in God as “ratio intellecta” yet should
ultimately be deduced from the divine essence as its likeness, even if it is a
very remote likeness. There can be nothing in the divine intellect which does
not proceed from the very essence of God. The “forma equi” is nothing but a
particular form of life whose “ratio” is formally in the divine essence as the
text itself states. Thus, there is no place for positing the existence of a twofold
participation by way of exemplar causality. The one, unique participation may
be considered from the point of view of the absolute perfection from which it
proceeds or from the degree or mode in which the absolute perfection is
263
See J. M. ARTOLA, Creación y participación, 117.
264
See In I Sent., d. 36, q. 2, a. 2 ad 2: “Non enim eodem modo est in Deo
forma equi et vita; quia forma equi non est in Deo nisi sicut ratio intellecta; sed
ratio vitae in Deo est non tantum sicut intellecta, sed etiam sicut in natura rei
firmata”.
265
“Unaquaeque autem creatura habet propriam speciem, secundum quod
aliquo modo participat divinae essentiae similitudinem”.
756
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
Participation in a
→ participation in divine idea
species: “horse”
Creature
Participation in a
→ participation in divine nature
perfection: “esse”
Participation in a adequation to
→
species: “horse” a divine idea
Participation
Participation in a
Creature in the divine
perfection: “esse” imitation of
nature
(according to the → divine
measure of the essence
specific form)
266
J. M. ARTOLA, Creación y participación, 122-123.
757
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
267
See J. M. ARTOLA, Creación y participación, 130-131.
268
See J. M. ARTOLA, Creación y participación, 133: “Con esto resulta
patente que no se puede simplificar, come hace Geiger, la doctrina de la
participación por composición ligándola a una concepción que parece no ver otro
género de principios receptores que los puramente materiales. Quien lea la
recensión de textos tomistas presentada por Fabro—y que no reproducimos para no
alargarnos excesivamente—advertirá con toda claridad que para Santo Tomás la
participación lleva consigo composición”.
269
See J. M. ARTOLA, Creación y participación, 133-134.
270
See J. M. ARTOLA, Creación y participación, 165.
271
See J. M. ARTOLA, Creación y participación, 168.
758
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
272
J. M. ARTOLA, Creación y participación, 214.
273
See J. M. ARTOLA, Creación y participación, 219.
759
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
rest in the end. One possible drawback to Artola’s exposition is that he does
not respond directly to the problem of the limitation of the form-essence or
the role of the exemplar cause in the limitation of the created form-essence.
Continuing our overview, Fabro, in a 1967 article which summarizes
his interpretation of Thomistic participation, reiterates his critique of
Geiger’s division of participation: “To assert, as has been done (Geiger),
that Thomas holds as distinct participation by similitude (secundum
similitudinem) and participation by composition (secundum compositionem),
is to break the Thomistic synthesis at its center, which is the assimilation
and mutual subordination of the couplets of act-potency and participatum-
participans in the emergence of the new concept of esse”274. At the same
time, Fabro added a paragraph about the way in which a “participation by
similitude” may be affirmed in created ens. He writes: “To the extent that
participation allows one to conceive the created universe in the complexity
of its natures as a reflection of divine ideas or exemplars, one may speak of
participation by similitude (per similitudinem) in the transcendental order
according to a relation of dependence of the finite on the Infinite”275. Once
again, for Fabro, the similitude of creation to the divine ideas or the divine
nature is due to the participation of the creature in actus essendi and the
creature’s dependence on God as efficient, exemplary and final cause of all
things.
In a 1984 article entitled, “Thomas Aquinas and Participation”, John
Wippel attempted a synthesis of the theories of Geiger and Fabro276. After
explaining what Aquinas means by participation in general and by
participation of beings in esse and what esse creatures participate in, Wippel
seeks to establish whether the limited character of finite beings is due to
participation by composition (Fabro) or to participation by similitude
(Geiger). Wippel concedes to Fabro that composition is necessary to
account for the limitation of esse within a given entity277. Geiger, he writes,
has no need to fear that appeal to participation by composition might lead to
the positing of a pre-existing subject or essence, independent of God
awaiting for esse to be created and poured into it. With regard to the essence
274
C. FABRO, “Elementi per una dottrina tomista della partecipazione”, ET,
435; English translation: “The Intensive Hermeneutics…”, 469.
275
C. FABRO, “Elementi per una dottrina tomista della partecipazione”, ET,
440; “The Intensive Hermeneutics…”, 476.
276
See J. WIPPEL, “Thomas Aquinas and Participation”, in Idem. (ed.),
Studies in Medieval Philosophy, CUA Press, Washington DC 1984, 117-158.
277
J. WIPPEL, “Thomas Aquinas and Participation”, 156.
760
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
If a given being has this essence principle rather than any other, this is because
its essence imitates its appropriate divine idea and depends upon it as upon its
formal exemplar cause. A divine idea is nothing but a given way in which God
understands himself as capable of being imitated by a creature. Hence the
essence of any creature is an expression of a particular way in which the divine
idea can be imitated and in fact is imitated. At this point it seems that
participation by composition goes hand in hand with causal dependency, not
only in the order of efficient causality but also in the order of formal or
exemplary causality. In other words, participation by composition, as it is
expressed in the intrinsic structure of any created entity, receives its final
explanation in the order of extrinsic causality by leading one to recognize God
not only as the efficient cause but as the formal or exemplar cause of every
participant. And this it seems to me, is to bring in the element of participation
by assimilation or formal hierarchy, as Geiger would have it. In sum, both
composition and assimilation or imitation are involved in Thomas’s
explanation of the participated structure of creatures278.
[T]he reduction of ens goes beyond the horizon of the “whatness”, or nature of
that which is, to the esse of creaturely being, while the reduction of “the true”
establishes the natural determination in an exemplary manner in the divine
intellect. In connection with these reductions, the analysis of “that which is”
and the analysis of “that which is true” proceed via two different forms of
participation280. The first concerns the actuality (esse) of that which is; the
second concerns the being “what,” the formality (essence). The first is marked
by an inner multiplicity, the composition of subject (essentia) and ‘esse’. This
composition entails as a consequence that being is limited. The second is
278
J. WIPPEL, “Thomas Aquinas and Participation”, 156-157.
279
See J. WIPPEL, “Thomas Aquinas and Participation”, 157-158.
280
L.-B. GEIGER, La participation…, 26-29.
761
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
281
J. A. AERTSEN, Nature and Creature, 184-185.
282
J. AERTSEN, Nature and Creature, 185.
283
See J. AERTSEN, Nature and Creature, 136-140 and 185-186. The
Thomistic texts that Aertsen refers to are De Potentia, q. 3, a. 5 ad 2 and Ibid., q. 3,
a. 1 ad 17.
284
J. AERTSEN, Nature and Creature, 187.
285
See T. TYN, Metafisica della sostanza, 813-835.
286
See T. TYN, Metafisica della sostanza, 825: “Se è vero che limitazione
formale e composizione costituiscono due tipi realmente diversi di partecipazione
(e qui ha ragione il Geiger), è anche vero che entrambi sono inseparabilmente uniti
nella partecipazione/analogia dell’ente (e questa è la buona ragione su cui si fonda
il Fabro)”.
287
See T. TYN, Metafisica della sostanza, 899.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
Both the created essence and being derive entirely from the First Cause of
every ens, but in diverse lines of causality (formal-exemplar, efficient-final)
and, consequently according to two types of participation: one, the fundament
of attribution, which relates the finite essences to the Essence identical to
ipsum esse; the other, on the basis of proportionality, which diffuses the act of
being to the subsistent essences (substances) making them emerge from
nothing. The first is of a formally limiting nature (formal hierarchy), the other,
on the contrary, is of a clearly compositive type (actuation of a potential
substrate). Thus, being is related to its Cause by means of the essence in which
it is inserted and the essence is related to its supreme Exemplar by means of the
being which is participates in. In both cases, the relationship is mediated and
thus, accidental-predicamental289.
In essence, like Geiger, Tyn seeks to account for the limitation of the
essence by means of a participation by similitude, which has priority over
participation by composition. Unlike Fabro, who links composition and
dependence with analogy of attribution and similitude with analogy of
proportionality, Tyn prefers to connect similitude to attribution and
composition to proportionality.
In the 1990s we find two authors who critique both Fabro and Geiger
and offer alternative participation theories: Rudi te Velde and Javier Pérez
Guerrero. In Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas (1995), te
Velde argues strongly against the need to distinguish different kinds of
participation in Aquinas’s account of creation290. For te Velde, positing two
participations would break the unity of the creative act. Consequently, te
Velde feels the need to reinterpret the principle forma dat esse and
“overcome” Fabro’s distinction-separation of the predicamental causality of
form from God’s transcendental causality.
In the Introduction to Part Two of his work, te Velde summarizes the
positions of Geiger and Fabro and the synthesis attempted by Wippel. Te
Velde holds that Fabro seems little aware of the problem posed by the
288
T. TYN, Metafisica della sostanza, 923.
289
T. TYN, Metafisica della sostanza, 924.
290
See R. TE VELDE, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, x.
763
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
limitedness of the receiving essence291. He notes that all three authors “feel
compelled, in some way or another, to assume a double participation, one
according to which the essence has actual being, and another which
accounts for the formal determination of the created essence in itself as a
partial likeness of the divine essence”292. He concludes that the assumption
of a double participation does not really solve the problem of the
“metaphysical other” and instead such an assumption denies the unity of the
act of creation. Against Geiger, te Velde maintains that “the multiplied
similitude in creatures does not reside in the formal order of essences as
such; the structure of the similitude is such that it includes a negation with
regard to the identity of essence and esse in God and in this way it is
internally characterized by the composition which defines each creature as
effect of God”293.
In Chapter Eight, te Velde argues that Fabro’s position tends to reduce
the two distinct principles to a prior distinctness in God; this results in Fabro
speaking of a double creation. Fabro’s position leads te Velde to question
one of the principles defended by Fabro, namely, the principle that states
291
See R. TE VELDE, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas,
89: “Composition plays a more prominent part in the interpretation of Fabro.
According to him, it is the real distinction between essence and esse which
primarily explains the plurality and diversity of beings. He calls the participation
owing to which a plurality of finite beings proceeds from the infinite esse per
essentiam of God the ‘transcendental participation’. Transcendental participation is
based on the real composition in creatures between essence and the act of esse.
Through a primordial distinction (Fabro calls it a Diremption) of what is one and
the same in God each creature is constituted as a being by participation, in which
the full perfection of being is received and limited by a really distinct essence. It
remains unclear to what extent this limitation by composition already presupposes
the limitedness of the receiving essence. Fabro seems little aware of the problem
which this involves. Being a certain degree of perfection, says Fabro, the essence is
already limited in itself, and limits by itself the act of being which it receives by
creation. Although act in the formal order, the essence is created as potency to be
actualized by the participated esse. Here, in all clarity, the problem of the
‘metaphysical other’ comes to the fore. It seems as if the essence must already be
limited in itself in order to limit the act of being which it receives. So the essence is
created as potency and subsequently endowed with actuality. But what is the sense
of a double limitation, and accordingly a double origin of a created being in God?
The real issue is avoided here”.
292
R. TE VELDE, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, 90.
293
R. TE VELDE, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, 95.
764
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
Te Velde notes further on that the real issue in Fabro’s interpretation is the
nature of the potentiality which must be present in things. While Fabro
294
R. TE VELDE, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, 151.
295
R. TE VELDE, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, 221-
222.
296
See De substantiis separatis, ch. 8: “Quia igitur materia recipit esse
determinatum actuale per formam...”; De anima, q. un., a. 10: “forma dat esse et
speciem”.
297
R. TE VELDE, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, 222.
298
R. TE VELDE, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, 223.
765
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
stresses the negative character of form in relation to the act of being, he also
holds that form, as the act of essence, is something positive. His final
judgment is that “Fabro’s view of the relationship between form as the act
of essence and as the receiving principle of esse remains unclear and
confusing”299.
In response to te Velde’s position, I note that in a 1998 article J.
Wippel defends at length the Thomistic axiom that “unreceived act is
unlimited”. In the article, Wippel notes that te Velde “denies that according
to Thomas the act of being (esse) is limited by a receiving principle”300.
After a survey of several of St. Thomas’s texts on the principle, Wippel
concludes – in contrast to te Velde’s position – that: “Aquinas did accept
and use the principle that unreceived act is unlimited and that, where one
finds limited instances of act, one must account for this by appealing to a
principle that receives and limits it”301. Wippel concludes his article drawing
attention to Fabro’s work on the notion of intensive esse: “Simply
considered in itself, esse includes nothing but actuality and perfection, the
total power of being. It is actually so realized in that unique case where it
subsists apart from any receiving subject, that is, in God. In every other case
it is received by a subject that simultaneously limits it, thereby preventing it
from being realized in its unlimited fullness”302. Appealing exclusively to an
extrinsic cause to account for the limitation of act is insufficient: “[St.
Thomas] is convinced that a distinct intrinsic limiting principle is also
299
R. TE VELDE, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, 225.
There is an important distinction that appears to be missing in te Velde’s
interpretation of Fabro: namely, Fabro’s distinction between esse in actu and esse
ut actus. As we have seen, this distinction is important in the interpretation of St.
Thomas’s texts on esse and could account for one of the texts that te Velde quotes
in order to critique Fabro’s theory: De substantiis separatis, ch. 8: “Matter receives
actual determinate esse through the form”. For Fabro, form does not produce actus
essendi, yet may be said to give esse-in-actu to matter. See A. CONTAT, Le figure
della differenza ontologica…”, 240: “In realtà ‘l’effetto della forma’ al quale si
allude è l’essere in atto dell’ente (esse in actu), ossia il suo fatto di essere; ma non
può essere il suo essere in quanto atto (esse ut actus), cioè l’atto di essere
propriamente detto. La mediazione della forma legittima pienamente questa
distinzione proposta da Cornelio Fabro: attuata dall’atto di essere, la forma o
essenza sostanziale lo trasmette all’ente secondo l’intensità che gli ha fissato, ed in
questo senso l’essere attuale di tale ente proviene pure dalla sua forma specifica”.
300
J. WIPPEL, “Thomas Aquinas and the Axiom…”, 535.
301
J. WIPPEL, “Thomas Aquinas and the Axiom…”, 556.
302
J. WIPPEL, “Thomas Aquinas and the Axiom…”, 564.
766
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
required, in order to account for the limitation of that which is not self-
limiting”303. In The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas (2000), J.
Wippel once again takes into account te Velde’s work, but notes that te
Velde mistakenly understands the limiting role of form. In no way, Wippel
argues, does a created essence (temporally) pre-exist its esse:
It seems to me, however, that both Geiger and te Velde have failed to see that
here Thomas is applying in an appropriately adapted way the adage that causes
can be causes of one another simultaneously according to different causal lines,
or in this case, that principles can be mutually dependent on one another
according to different lines of dependency, and that priority in the order of
nature does not necessarily imply priority in the order of time. Thus, while the
act of being actualizes the corresponding essence principle of a given entity
and makes that entity actually exist, simultaneously the essence principle
receives and limits the act of being. Neither pre-exists as such apart from the
other, and each enjoys its appropriate priority in the order of nature (not in the
order of time) with respect to its particular ontological function within a given
entity304.
311
See J. PÉREZ GUERRERO, La creación como asimilación a Dios, 143:
“Participation by composition is not what explains, in this way, the existence of the
likeness between God and creatures”. In his footnote, Pérez sustains that Fabro
falls into a vicious circle by founding likeness on participation: “the creature
participates in its cause exclusively according to the notion of likeness”.
312
J. PÉREZ GUERRERO, La creación como asimilación a Dios, 143-144.
313
J. PÉREZ GUERRERO, La creación como asimilación a Dios, 188-189:
Participated being is created being, given that uncreated being is unparticipated;
however, at the same time, the participated is that which is participated in and,
therefore, must be uncreated: in other words, participation cannot be used to
articulate the created and uncreated order.
769
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
essence limits created being: said another way, it debilitates created being, in
such a way that this limitation presupposes the created nature of being and is
not identified with it314.
Pérez adds that he is not arguing against the real composition of being and
essence in the creature but rather that the Thomistic tradition hasn’t been
able to articulate the real distinction in a coherent way along with the
fundamental idea contained in the notion of creation: being originated by
God ex nihilo. The traditional position, explains the relationship between
creation and the real distinction as a duality of participated perfection and
participating subject and understands the participated perfection as
transcendentally the same as the imparticipated or divine perfection. For
Pérez, this position is inadequate315.
Pérez concludes that when St. Thomas speaks of participation in
divine being, he does not mean that there is a receiving subject that limits a
participated form, but rather that participation-in-something should be taken
in the sense of assimilation-to-something316. In this way, assimilation is
fundamental and not merely a corollary. Creatures do “receive” from God,
yet we cannot think of this receiving in terms of a duality of recipient-
received. Rather, according to Pérez, we are dealing with a pure assimilation
as an active reception which does not suppose change in that which receives
nor the composition recipient-received317. Created perfection is not
something received by the creature which is previously found in God; the
creature receives from God by assimilating to Him, in such a way that
receiving and assimilating coincide. According to Pérez, creation is not
understood by St. Thomas as a diffusion of divine perfection, as a
descending moment, but rather as an elevation. In the end, created
perfection and divine perfection are analogous perfections, in that analogy is
something that deals with order: it is the creature that is really ordered to
God.
In response to Pérez, four points in Fabro’s defence can be made.
First, there is a marked tendency, after Wippel’s article on participation
(1984), to reduce Fabro’s theory of participation to “participation by
composition”. As we have seen, however, in Fabro’s interpretation of
Thomistic participation, “composition” is just one aspect of transcendental
314
J. PÉREZ GUERRERO, La creación como asimilación a Dios, 189.
315
See J. PÉREZ GUERRERO, La creación como asimilación a Dios, 190.
316
See J. PÉREZ GUERRERO, La creación como asimilación a Dios, 190.
317
See J. PÉREZ GUERRERO, La creación como asimilación a Dios, 187.
770
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
318
See C. FABRO, PC, 470-483. I, q. 8, a. 3: “Sic ergo est in omnibus per
potentiam, inquantum omnia eius potestati subduntur. Est per praesentiam in
omnibus, inquantum omnia nuda sunt et aperta oculis eius. Est in omnibus per
essentiam, inquantum adest omnibus ut causa essendi, sicut dictum est”.
771
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
and the nature of the creature’s imitation of-assimilation to God are only
summarily mentioned in Fabro’s work. In general, however, Fabro would
probably respond to Pérez’s theory that participation as exemplarity-
imitation-similitude-assimilation is present to a greater degree in St.
Thomas’s early works and is subordinate to participation as causal
dependence and as composition in his more mature works.
Finally, we come to Gregory Doolan, who dedicates Chapter Six of
his Aquinas on the Divine Ideas as Exemplar Causes (2008) to
“Participation and the Divine Exemplars”. In it we find one of the most
complete summaries of exemplary causality according to St. Thomas and an
enlightening explanation of Fabro’s interpretation of the derivation of
essence and esse in the act of creation. Doolan starts by explaining the
respective divisions of participation made by Fabro and Geiger and also
Wippel’s synthesis. Wippel, he notes, introduced an important distinction
between speaking about the participation of creatures in esse commune, in
their own actus essendi and in esse subsistens (God). According to Wippel,
each of the three participations corresponds to the third mode of
participation between effect and cause as found in In De Hebdomadibus,
lect. 2319. With respect to participation in esse subsistens, St. Thomas
commonly adds that such participation is by similitude or imitation320. This
means that every finite being which has a participated likeness to or
similitude of that divine esse, has its own intrinsic actus essendi, which is
efficiently caused in it by God. In his reconciliation of Fabro and Geiger,
Wippel adopts and slightly alters Geiger’s terminology. Against Geiger and
te Velde, Wippel agrees with Fabro that composition is needed to account
for the limitation of esse in finite beings and that Geiger has an
unsatisfactory view of the composition of essence and esse (reducing it in a
sense to the compositions proper to matter and form or subject and
accident). To account for the origin and limitation of the created essence
319
I am not convinced by Wippel’s reduction of participation in esse to the
third mode. The first mode seems to correspond (analogously) to the creature’s
participation in esse commune, the second to the creature’s participation in actus
essendi (again analogously) and the third to the creature’s participation in divine
esse (analogical cause). S. Brock also has doubts about Wippel’s position; see
Brock’s“Harmonizing Plato and Aristotle on Esse: Thomas Aquinas and the De
hebdomadibus”, 486.
320
See G. DOOLAN, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas…, 201-207.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
Through the exemplarism of the divine nature, then, the finite being receives
its total entity as a being, both its essence and its esse, for in imitating that
exemplar, the finite being imitates the absolute perfection that is being itself
(ipsum esse). By contrast, through the exemplarism of the divine ideas, the
finite being receives only its essence; for in imitating that exemplar, the finite
being imitates but one limited mode of being (esse). Contrary to Geiger’s
position, then, the distinction between absolute perfection and mode of being is
an adequate real distinction in creatures. Indeed, this distinction forms the
foundation of the very distinction between essence and esse in any finite
being323.
Doolan points out that this is, in essence, the position of Fabro, who speaks
of the derivation of the created essence and the transcendental perfections of
creatures in terms of Diremtion and according to two modes of
exemplarism324. While the two modes of divine exemplarism may be
distinguished as regards their formal content and what they exemplify,
neither is the cause of its effect apart from the causality of the other325.
With these premises, Doolan comes to one of his main arguments:
according to St. Thomas, creatures do not participate in the divine ideas.
Doolan offers three reasons for this conclusion. First, the divine ideas that
are exemplars are ideas of individuals. Thus, the essence of each finite being
is exemplified by its own divine idea: the idea of Socrates is the exemplar of
321
See G. DOOLAN, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas…, 207-210.
322
See G. DOOLAN, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas…, 217.
323
G. DOOLAN, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas…, 222.
324
See G. DOOLAN, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas…, 222-223.
325
G. DOOLAN, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas…, 227-228: “This is because
created essence cannot be created without an act of being and because an act of
being that is created must be limited by a created essence. Or put in terms of
participation, there must be a finite essence that participates in the likeness of the
divine nature in order for an act of being to be received”.
773
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
326
G. DOOLAN, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas…, 228.
327
G. DOOLAN, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas…, 229.
328
G. DOOLAN, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas…, 230.
329
G. DOOLAN, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas…, 233.
330
See G. DOOLAN, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas…, 233. De Veritate, q. 2, a.
5: “Sed similitudo rerum quae est in intellectu divino, est factiva rei; res autem,
sive forte sive debile esse participet, hoc non habet nisi a Deo; et secundum hoc
similitudo omnis rei in Deo existit quod res illa a Deo esse participat”.
774
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
331
J. WIPPEL, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 177-194.
332
C. FABRO, PC, 647; Participation et causalité, 635.
333
G. DOOLAN, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas…, 237.
334
See G. DOOLAN, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas…, 237.
335
C. FABRO, PC, 643; Participation et causalité, 630; “Elementi per una
dottrina…”, ET, 438; “The Intensive Hermeneutics…”, 474: “[C]reated essences
stem from the divine essence through divine Ideas, and this derivation is formally
by way of exemplarity. Furthermore every essence, although an act in the formal
order, is created as potency to be actualized by the participated esse which it
receives, so that its actuality is ‘mediated’ through the esse”.
336
G. DOOLAN, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas…, 238.
775
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
Doolan concludes that, strictly speaking, for St. Thomas, the similitude
between created essence and idea does not involve the essence participating
in the idea; thus, we should not speak about a participation in the divine
ideas. A real or ontological participation involves both a receiver and a
received principle. Created essence receives an act of being, but there is
nothing ontologically prior to receive that essence itself. Doolan writes:
Although created essence does not participate in its exemplar idea, the finite
being (ens) of which it is a principle does participate in a likeness of the
exemplar that is the divine nature. Through such participation, the created
essence receives and limits esse. This limitation, however, is dependent upon
the ontologically prior formation of the divine idea that determines the created
essence’s limited mode of being. Thus, while the divine nature is imitable in
itself, a finite being actually imitates it only because God knows his nature as
imitable and wills it actually to be imitated337.
The mode of being of the created essence, then, is “determined by its divine
idea, but its actuality is determined by the participation of the finite being
(ens) in a likeness of the divine nature. […] As the exemplar causes of
created essence, the divine ideas are the causes of a principle of potency that
requires a principle of act; as the exemplar cause of the act of being, the
divine nature is the cause of an act that requires a principle of limitation”338.
As to the question of priority, according to the intentional order, the
causality of the divine ideas is prior to that of the divine nature since the
divine ideas determine the mode of being of the created essence; according
to the order of reality, the exemplarism of the divine nature is prior to that of
the divine ideas because it makes that essence actually to exist339. Doolan
holds that the created essence, its accidents and other formal perfections,
may be termed participations, but only as participations of the likeness of
the divine essence and not as participations in the divine ideas340.
* * *
337
G. DOOLAN, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas…, 242.
338
G. DOOLAN, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas…, 243.
339
See G. DOOLAN, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas…, 243.
340
Throughout his exposition, Doolan refers to the fact that by proposing one
line of participation between the created ens and the divine nature, the objections of
R. te Velde can be effectively answered.
776
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
341
Another possibility is that Fabro is somehow referring to his distinction
between predicamental participation and transcendental participation.
777
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
Participation Limitation
Participation by similitude (assimilation)
God’s causal action is not limited by the
is fundamental and irreducible to
Pérez
778
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
esse from God; according to exemplary their species, a measure given by the
causality it refers creature’s imitation of form. Esse is the ultimate perfection of
the divine essence and adequation to a beings and the first perfection of beings.
divine idea; according to final causality Esse receives nothing from the form, but
it refers to the motion or tendency of rather is limited by it.
things to the ultimate end or to the
effect’s partial possession of the end.
Through the exemplarism of the divine
nature, the finite ens receives both its
essence and its esse; through the The created essence is formally
exemplarism of the divine ideas, the assimilated to its divine idea through
Doolan
finite being receives only its essence. itself and really assimilated to its divine
Creatures do not “participate” in the idea through its act of being. The divine
divine ideas. Created ens participates in a idea determines the created essence’s
likeness of the exemplar of the divine limited mode of being. The created
nature. Because a creature receives an essence receives and limits esse.
act of being it participates in the divine
nature by assimilation.
Created esse is received, limited and
There are not two “systems” of determined by the created essence.
participation, but rather two types of Created essences derive from the divine
participation: transcendental-analogical essence by the intermediary of the divine
and predicamental-univocal; compos- Ideas according to a relationship of
Fabro
779
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
(subject-form) and participation in actus essendi and the third mode (effect-
cause) and participation in esse divinum. Second, I hold that Doolan’s
interpretation of the role of the divine ideas as exemplar causes is
substantially correct. Fabro’s intuitions gain both rigor and clarity in
Doolan’s work on participation and exemplary causality. In this regard, I
also find Artola’s distinction between adequation to the divine idea and
imitation of the divine nature helpful. A future study will have to develop
the relationship between the predicamental participation of the individual in
a species and genus and the mediatory role of the divine ideas and the divine
exemplars. Lastly, the incorporation of a reflection on final causality and
participation would complete the theory expounded by Fabro. Here, Artola’s
work on participation in the divine nature according to final causality offers
some initial contributions to such a study.
At this point, we can consider anew the structure of created ens as ens
per participationem. I will limit my considerations to the role of the created
essence in the structure and composition of finite ens. The theme of
subsistence and inherence as the modes of being of the substance and the
accidents will be touched on briefly at the end of section 5.3.
Several authors have brought attention either directly or indirectly to
Fabro’s thought on the role of the created essence: in 1974, W. Norris
Clarke contrasted his interpretation of Fabro’s view of essence (as the
“limiting subject” of esse) with his own view of essence as an “intrinsic
negative principle”; in his book The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas
Aquinas (2000), J. Wippel critiques Clarke’s view and proposes the essence-
principle in finite ens as “relative non-being”; and in a 2008 article, A.
Contat properly expounds Fabro’s view of essence, highlighting why it is
not a purely negative principle and in what sense it is a limiting principle of
actus essendi. A look at their discussion will help us determine more
precisely Fabro’s thought on the role of the created essence in the structure
of finite ens.
In a 1974 conference, at which Fabro presided, W. Norris Clarke
focused his lecture and subsequent article on a “dispute within Thomism”
over the role of the essence in the doctrine of the real distinction. He asks:
“Is the essence a positive or a negative limiting principle?”342. Clarke holds
342
See W. N. CLARK, “The Role of Essence Within St. Thomas’ Essence-
Existence Doctrine: Positive or Negative Principle? A Dispute Within Thomism”,
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
contribution of its own but merely limits or ‘contracts’, as St. Thomas says,
what would otherwise be the per se plenitude of existence down to a
particular limited mode or level or degree”347. All positivity and perfection
is on the side of the act of being. Essence only provides the intrinsic
negative limiting principle. What results is a limited mode or act of
existence, which reflects the limitation of God’s own perfection thought up
in a determinate divine idea of a possible limited imitation of his own
infinite plenitude. “That which exists in this conception would no longer be
the essence as positive subject, which would have existence, but rather the
limited act of existence itself, which would be the subject. Finite beings
would thus be finitized-acts-of-existence, not essences which have
existence”. One advantage in this “thin” conception of essence, Clarke
holds, is that stress is laid not of the real composition of two positive
principles, but rather on the limited participation in esse. Finite being is a
partial affirmation through the positive principle of esse and a partial
negation through the negative principle of essence. “The principle of
essence as pure intrinsic limit constitutes the finitized act of existence as a
new subject in its own right”348. In this “thin” conception of essence, the
characterization of a “real composition” in finite being is shown to be a
secondary technical device used to explain the basic notion of limited
participation in esse.
Two things should be mentioned here. First, Clarke’s characterization
of Fabro’s view of essence as “limiting subject” is somewhat mistaken.
Clarke rightly says that that Fabro holds that the essence is a limiting
principle in a substance, yet, at the same time, Fabro also holds that the
“subject” of the composition is ens, namely, the substance which has the act
of being349. Secondly, Clarke’s position, in my opinion, goes too far in
347
W. N. CLARK, “The Role of Essence…”, 112.
348
W. N. CLARK, “The Role of Essence…”, 113.
349
See C. FABRO, Metaphysica, Liber secundus, 212-215 and 231; Ibid.,
“Essenza”, Enciclopedia Cattolica, vol. 5: “Se l’ente è il concreto sussistente che
esiste o che ha l’atto di l’essere, l’essenza è la speciale ‘natura’ che quest'atto fa
esistere. L'essenza esprime nel suo contenuto una ‘partecipazione’ della infinita
perfezione della divina natura; essa determina ad ogni essere il proprio posto nella
gerarchia degli esseri; ne fonda, dirige e attua le rispettive possibilità di sviluppo”;
Ibid., “Sussistenza”, Enciclopedia Cattolica, vol. 11, 1598: “Per precisare la
terminologia, si può quindi distinguere: a) l’essenza o natura, ch’è il costitutivo
formale di una qualsiasi cosa; b) la ‘sostanza prima’ cioè l’individuo reale o
‘ipostasi’ o ‘supposito’ che è la realtà concreta esistente nella sua sufficienza
ontologica (See Quodl., II, q. 2, a. 2, c); c) la sussistenza dice l’attualità di detta
782
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
I would like to emphasize the point that for Aquinas essence is not to be
identified with absolute nonbeing or nothingness. Because essence is not
identical with the act of being of a given entity, it may be described as relative
nonbeing. But this is not to imply that it enjoys no formal or positive content in
itself. According to Aquinas’s metaphysics, an essence can never be realized as
such apart from its corresponding act of being (esse) within a given substantial
entity. Strictly speaking, it is neither essence nor the act of being that exists as
such in finite beings; it is rather the concrete subject or substance which exists
by reason of its act of being. This same concrete subject is what it is by reason
of its essence. This presupposes that the essence principle has its own formal
content, and is an intrinsic constituent of the existing entity. This being so, here
I would like to distance my understanding of essence as nonbeing from certain
recent interpreters of Aquinas who have so emphasized this aspect of essence
that they would reduce it to nothing but a given mode of existence351.
[O]n the contrary, the entire reality of the essence comes to it from esse as
intensive act. This does not mean that the essence is a pure potency, on par
with prime matter, but rather that its actuality is a received actuality, and
consequently, in a sense which is not used often, a ‘second’ actuality with
respect to that of esse. Fabro does not contest that essence is destined to specify
esse, such that ens is such or such quiddity; but rightly underscores that such
specification is not an actuation, and that, rather, it should be considered as a
delimitation, by which the intensity of esse is quasi-enclosed within a certain
measure. Fabro supports this doctrine, of capital importance in his view,
largely with two commentaries by Aquinas on neo-Platonic authors and, more
generally, with his mature works354.
In the conclusion of his article, Contat once again takes up the Fabrian
conception of essence, this time in reference to the principle “forma dat
352
J. WIPPEL, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 192. Wippel’s
footnote states that: “This also seems to be a fundamental weakness in Geiger’s
attempt to assign priority to participation by similitude or formal hierarchy over
participation by composition” (Ibid., n. 41).
353
For Fabro, even prime matter is positive. See his “The Problem of Being
and the Destiny of Man”, TPM, 161: “Prime matter (and potency in general) is not
pure non-being, but belongs to being as a component part which is real and
intrinsically positive”.
354
A. CONTAT, “Le figure della differenza ontologica…”, 123.
784
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
esse” and draws attention to the two ways of considering the essence (in se
as a potential principle and as formal act):
In reality, “the effect of the form” to which one alludes is the being-in-act of
ens (esse in actu), or rather its fact of being; but it cannot be its being as act
(esse ut actus), namely the act of being properly speaking. The mediation of
the form fully legitimates this distinction proposed by Cornelio Fabro: actuated
by the act of being, the substantial form or essence transmits it to ens according
to the intensity that it has fixed, and in this sense, the actual being of such an
ens also comes from its specific form. Resolving the components of ens into
the act of being, one can and should integrate, in this way, the formal causality
of the essence. There are, then, two possible views of the essence: considered
in itself, it is only the potential principle which limits the expansion of being,
in ens, to a fixed degree of specification which does not occur until the
substance exists; considered, on the other hand, as actuated by the act of being,
the essence is the formal act which, in corporeal substances, actuates, in turn,
prime matter, and which then demands the properties that are necessary to the
suppositum thus instituted in order to operate. Under the first aspect – which is
irreal – the essence is a potency; under the second aspect, it is in act, but it is
only in virtue of the act of being355.
* * *
355
A. CONTAT, “Le figure della differenza ontologica…”, 240.
785
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
In the synthesis that is ens, esse is the more formal principle, or the act par
excellence, and this on two distinct levels. In the predicamental sense esse is
the activation of essence, which itself is related to esse as potency (De
Potentia, q. 7, a. 2 ad 9). In the transcendental sense, to the extent that any
356
“Dibattito congressuale”, Sapienza 26 (1973), 372: L. Bogliolo: “Al P.
Fabro. Lei usa molto questa espressione: essere intensivo. Non si potrebbe usare
altro termine; direi interiore. Di conseguenza si può dire che l’atto d’essere è
l’interiorità di ogni interiorità? Il termine intensivo, senz’altra precisazione, non è
immediatamente perspicuo”.
357
C. FABRO, “Dibattito congressuale”, 373-374.
786
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
other act or perfection presupposes and is founded on esse, the latter is the
actualization of every act and the perfection of all perfections (Summa Theo. I,
q. 4, a. 1 ad 3; I-II, q. 2, a. 5 ad 2). Esse is, therefore, the primary act, the
simplest, most formal, most intimate, and most immediate (De anim. 1 ad 17,
9; De Veritate, q. 23, a. 4 ad 7; Summa Theo. I, q. 8, a. 1; Summa Contra
Gentiles, 1, 23). Consequently, as primary and absolute perfection, in itself
including and transcending all perfections, esse is the most appropriate of all
the names that can be attributed to God, or better – in light of the teaching on
analogy – the least inappropriate (In I Sent. d. 8, q. 1, a. 3; De Potentia q. 2, a.
1; Summa Theo. q. 12, a. 2). Thus understood, esse is the proper effect of God
and indicates the radical production of creation that affects not only becoming
but primary matter itself and pure spiritual substances (Comp. Theo. 1, 68;
Summa Contra Gentiles 3, 66). This can be called the “intensive notion” of
esse, as distinguished from the notion of existentia of the formal-predicative
kind of Aristotle and the formal-causal (extrinsic) kind of the Augustian-
Avicennian tradition358.
“Intensive esse” is the first or primary act359 and the ultimate act360; the most
perfect361 and the most formal act in se362; and the most intimate and
profound act363. Esse is first act because the other acts pertain to it; it is the
ultimate act because it is the act of ens and embraces both substantial and
accidental principles:
358
C. FABRO, “Existence”, 723.
359
De Veritate, q. 23, a. 4 ad 7: “Esse non dicit actum quis it operatio
transiens in aliquid extrinsecum temporaliter producendum, sed actum quasi
primum”.
360
Q. D. De Anima, a. 6 ad 2: “Ipsum esse est actus ultimus qui participabilis
esta b omnibus; ipsum autem nihil participat; unde si sit aliquid quod sit ipsum esse
subsistens, sicut de Deo dicimus, nihil participare dicimus”.
361
I, q. 4 a. 1 ad 3: “Ipsum esse est perfectissimum omnium, comparatur
enim ad omnia ut actus. Nihil enim habet actualitatem, nisi inquantum est, unde
ipsum esse est actualitas omnium rerum, et etiam ipsarum formarum. Unde non
comparatur ad alia sicut recipiens ad receptum, sed magis sicut receptum ad
recipiens. Cum enim dico esse hominis, vel equi, vel cuiuscumque alterius, ipsum
esse consideratur ut formale et receptum, non autem ut illud cui competit esse”.
362
I, q. 7, a 1: “Illud autem quod est maxime formale omnium, est ipsum
esse”.
363
I, q. 8, a. 1: “Esse autem est illud quod est magis intimum cuilibet, et quod
profundius omnibus inest, cum sit formale respectu omnium quae in re sunt”.
787
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
For Fabro, the intensive notion of esse expresses esse as the emergent
plexus of all perfections, God as Ipsum Esse Subsistens, and the created,
participated actus essendi of the creature:
As the third and ultimate [notion], we have the ‘intensive notion’ of esse, […]
as such [esse] expresses the absolute perfection and emergent plexus of all
perfections which, in this way, reveal the participations in esse itself. This
notion is the point of arrival and the conclusion of the entire Thomistic
speculation which determines the ‘metaphysical nature’ (essence!) of God as
pure esse (esse per essentiam, esse imparticipatum) and the creature as ens
(esse per participationem)365.
364
C. FABRO, “La problematica dello esse tomistico”, TPM, 114.
365
C. FABRO, “La problematica dello esse tomistico”, TPM, 108.
366
C. FABRO, “La problematica dello esse tomistico”, TPM, 110: “Ed è in
questa risoluzione che scaturisce nel tomismo – in seguito cioè alla determinazione
dello esse come atto intensivo e di Dio ch’è lo esse subsistens cioè separatum
ovvero l’attuazione dell’esse nella sua pienezza e purezza formale – la
determinazione risolutiva della creatura come ens per participationem mediante la
composizione reale di essenza ed esse participatum ovvero adhaerens come ‘actus
substantiae’”.
788
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
Although the term esse intensivum does not appear in the works of St Thomas,
it expresses with admirable accuracy his notion of being as the exhaustive and
comprehensive plenitude of the existential perfection of things. It has been
coined by Cornelio Fabro after Aquinas’ phrase albedo intensive infinita,
which is used to illustrate the presence of a perfection in a cause which
constitutes the essence and fullness of that perfection, in contrast to its limited
participation by an effect.368 It indicates the infinite intensity and simple
fullness which precedes dispersion and division throughout any multiplicity.
This is a pervasive background motif in both Dionysius and Aquinas: the cause
possesses the perfection more eminently than that which had it as received. The
effect is present virtually, i.e. according to a greater power; its perfection is
contained more intensely in the source. Following from this is the pre-eminent
presence of all perfections within the comprehensive plenitude of Being and,
more originally and profoundly, their unlimited presence in absolute, infinite
divine Being. Cornelio Fabro is the exponent of St Thomas whose work has
contributed most to an appreciation of this aspect of Aquinas’ original vision of
being369.
At the same time, O’Rourke notes that Fabro could have benefited more
from the notion of virtus essendi370. As St. Thomas’s texts evidence, the
367
C. FABRO, “Existence”, 724.
368
Here F. O’Rouke quotes De Veritate, q. 29, a. 3: “Si enim intelligatur
corpus album infinitum non propter hoc albedo intensive infinita erit, sed solum
extensive, et per accidens”. This distinction between intensive and extensive
corresponds to that between virtualis and dimensiva”.
369
F. O’ROURKE, Pseudo-Dionysius & the Metaphysics of Aquinas, E.J.
Brill, Leiden 1992, 155.
370
F. O’ROURKE, Pseudo-Dionysius & the Metaphysics of Aquinas, 166:
“Since esse is what is most efficacious within each thing, grounding and
789
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
terms “intensive white” and “intensive heat” are used in the argument that
Ipsum Esse Subsistens cannot be but one371. Therefore, all other beings are
composed of esse as act and substance as receptive potency. St. Thomas
writes:
For there can be only one being which is ipsum esse; just as some form, if it
should be considered by itself, can be only one. That is why the things which
are diverse in number are one in species because the nature of the species
considered in itself is one. Just as therefore it is one according to the
consideration of it while it is being considered, so it would be one according to
esse if it existed or subsisted per se. The same argument applies to the genus in
relation to species, until we reach the ipsum esse which is most common. There
is therefore only one esse subsisting through itself. Hence it is impossible that
other than it, there should be something which is esse alone. Now everything
that is, has esse. Therefore in every being other than the first, there is present
both ipsum esse as the act, and the substance of the thing having esse as a
potency receptive of the act that is esse372.
actualising its every perfection, it is, in the light of this passage, most appropriate
to speak of the intensity of the act of being at the inner heart of the individual, and
of the comprehensive infinity of its existential intensity within Ipsum Esse
Subsistens. From the many texts and varied contexts in which Aquinas elaborates
the notions of virtual quantity, denoting the intensity of action and existential and
formal perfection, we can conclude that it is both valid and enlightening to speak of
the virtual intensity of being, and of virtus essendi as the intensive power or
perfection of being. Cornelio Fabro does not seem to have exploited the wide
wealth of texts by Aquinas on virtual quantity and the connection between virtus
and intensity. Perhaps this is not all too surprising since it is indeed only en passant
that Aquinas himself makes explicit the identity between ‘virtual’ and ‘intensive’
quantity”.
371
See C. FABRO, “La problematica dello esse tomistico”, 217: Heat: I, q. 4,
a. 2: “God is ipsum esse per se subsistens: Consequently, He must contain within
himself the whole perfection of being. For it is clear that if some hot thing has not
the whole perfection of heat, this is because heat is not participated in its full
perfection; but if this heat were self-subsisting, nothing of the virtue of heat would
be wanting to it. Since therefore God is subsisting being itself, nothing of the
perfection of being can be wanting to Him”. Whiteness: I, q. 44, a. 1: “Now it has
been shown above (q. 3, a. 4) when treating of the divine simplicity that God is the
essentially self-subsisting Being; and also it was shown (q. 11, a. 3, a. 4) that
subsisting being must be one; as, if whiteness were self-subsisting, it would be one,
since whiteness is multiplied by its recipients. Therefore all beings apart from God
are not their own being, but are beings by participation”.
372
De substantiis separatis, ch. 8.
790
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
373
See A. CONTAT, “Le figure della differenza ontologica…”, 125; C.
FABRO, “La problematica dello esse tomistico”, TPM, 119.
374
C. FABRO, “The Intensive Hermeneutics…”, 482.
375
C. FABRO, “The Intensive Hermeneutics…”, 483.
376
I note that in 1983, during a course entitled, “L’emergenza dell’essere”,
(audio version in the archives of the Cultural Institute of Cornelio Fabro), Fabro
laments the fact that he did not draft a Thomistic Science of Logic that would have
dealt with the development of the human intellect and the doctrine of the
transcendentals.
791
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
apprehension. The first way is concerned with the properties of ens qua ens
that are attributed to every ens according to the mode and degree of its
nature. The second way considers the divisions of ens according to diverse
modes and oppositions, such as the division of ens into the categories, act
and potency, essence and the act of being. While the categories contract ens
in some way, the transcendentals are said to broaden ens by making explicit
what is implicitly contained in ens.
Accordingly, the transcendentals are like interior expansions of ens
and are derived from ens by negation and relation. Unum expresses ens as
its negation or determination, while verum and bonum are perfective: verum
is ens that perfects according to the notion of the species; bonum perfects
according to being (De veritate, q. 21, a. 1). The transcendentals are
convertible with ens according to the suppositum, yet according to reason or
to the intention that are distinct.
Like his Metaphysica, Fabro’s Partecipazione e causalità considers
only three transcendentals, unum, verum and bonum. He argues that the
movement or dialectic that the transcendentals impress upon ens is notional
and not real377. This seems to mean that the dialectic proper to the
development of the transcendentals is unlike the method by which ens is
divided into the categories of substance and accidents and the resolution by
which the real distinction between essence and the act of being is discovered
and ultimately founded. According to Fabro, the notional progress proper to
the transcendentals concerns the comprehension of the concept of ens and
not the perfection of esse: “The transcendentals are concepts and not
perfections: this is because they intensify the concept of ens and are not the
perfections of things”378. With this, Fabro does not deny that the
transcendentals are founded ontologically on the perfection of the act of
being. He is only stressing that the additions of the transcendentals are
conceptual and not real. In fact, the notional additions of the transcendentals
are said to be internal to ens qua ens and are presented as “reduplications”:
unum, for example, implies a negation or privation of multitude or division
and, as such, is positive since it is a negation of something that can be
considered as a negation. The second reduplication is verum (ens referred to
knowing), the third is bonum (ens referred to the appetite)379. According to
Fabro, the Diremtion380 of the transcendentals presupposes the Diremtion of
377
See C. FABRO, PC, 218.
378
C. FABRO, PC, 219.
379
See C. FABRO, PC, 219.
380
See Chapter One, 4.4.2, “Fabro’s use of the Hegelian term Diremtion”.
792
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
ens-esse and the real composition and deals with composite ens in reference
to its “notional intensification” by the transcendentals381. Fabro holds that in
the second Diremtion, the transcendentals “qualify” ens by expressing
something that the term “ens” does not; the additions of the transcendentals
are notional extensions and not real limitations. In this intensification, ens is
shown to have a conceptual superiority over verum and bonum insofar as it
follows from the perfection of actus essendi382.
The third text of Fabro, written in 1966, calls for a complete re-
dimensioning of Thomistic metaphysics in light of the transcendentals:
Unlike the previous texts, more attention is given to the transcendental res:
in fact, the division of the categories (as content of ens) is seen as a
Diremtion of res. The categories remain in the area of “content”384. In
contrast, the transcendentals are considered as a Diremtion of ens: an
interior dividing up (expressed as additio or intentional expansion of ens)
and recomposing within the original comprehensive intentional unity of ens
(expressed as reductio to the fundament of ens)385. The transcendental
sphere is generated by a twofold position: ens in se (absolutely considered)
and ens in ordine ad aliud (ens considered in relation to another).
381
C. FABRO, PC, 219: “This is the fundamental ‘Diremtion’ of esse, from
the logical-formal level of the semantic relationship between participle (in the two-
fold verbal and substantive form) and the verb, it passes to the metaphysical level
to express the fundamental dialectical tension of esse and the primary composition
of finite ens. In the second ‘Diremtion’ we deal with ens, thus composed, regarding
its ‘supposition’ (significability) with respect to the collateral terms of unum,
verum, bonum which express its interior growth and represent its ‘notional
intensification’”.
382
C. FABRO, PC, 221. See De Veritate, q. 21, a. 2: “Ipsum igitur esse habet
rationem boni. Unde sicut impossibile est quod sit aliquid ens quod non habeat
esse, ita necesse est ut omne ens sit bonum ex hoc ipso quod esse habet; quamvis
etiam et in quibusdam entibus multae aliae rationes bonitatis superaddantur supra
suum esse quo subsistunt”.
383
C. FABRO, “The Transcendentality of ens-esse …”, 426.
384
C. FABRO, “The Transcendentality of ens-esse …”, 410.
385
See C. FABRO, “The Transcendentality of ens-esse…”, 408-409.
793
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
Like the other transcendentals, res follows upon ens and is in “some
manner” already contained in ens. In the determination of res as content of
ens, Aquinas announces the real distinction between esse as act and essence
as content or subject of the act of being386. Unum and multa (aliquid) are
considered as following a dialectic of negation, while verum and bonum
follow a dialectic of relation (ordo unius ad alterum). Fabro reiterates that in
this articulation of the transcendentals, ens is the activating ground of the
whole intentional order. Ens is the transcendental of the transcendentals, it is
the transcendentalizing one387. Ens emerges over the other transcendentals
as their principle and ground owing to esse, the act of every act and the
perfection of every perfection388.
The fourth text, an article from 1974, argues that Kant and modern
thought in general begin with res, ignore ens, and give precedence to unum
insofar as the unity of the object comes from the thinking subject. In
contrast, Aquinas places unum in third place, after ens and res. This means
that unum has a twofold foundation: “as content in the constitution of res
and as act in the presence of ens as bearer of esse which is the founding
act”389. At this point, Fabro once again introduces the term Diremtion to
speak about the transcendental deduction or articulation of ens:
392
C. FABRO, “Il problema dell’essere e la fondazione della metafisica”, 494.
393
C. FABRO, IST, 163.
795
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
Ens Bonum
Res Verum
Unum Aliquid
394
C. FABRO, PC, 646-647.
796
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
Substance Accidents
:
Subsistence Inherence
Unlike Hegel, for whom the essence only constitutes a “negative moment”
in the dialectic of being, St. Thomas conceives the essence on the fundament
of creation of being ex nihilo. Thus, for St. Thomas, the essence is a
positive-negative insofar as it expresses the mode and degree of
participation of being and expresses it positively thanks to the derivation by
“imitation” of the divine Ideas396. Once again, Fabro re-affirms a real
derivation and participation of esse and a formal or mediated derivation of
the essence. For St. Thomas, nothingness does not directly enter into the
395
See C. FABRO, PC, 646-647.
396
See C. FABRO, PC, 647.
797
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
dialectical constitution of the finite, but rather only indirectly due to the
finite nature of the essence. This is not a negation, but rather a “limit”. The
finite is ens, yet is neither esse itself or nothing. To the degree ens distances
itself from nothing, it indicates Esse as Other and it does this by means of
the positive-negative moment of the essence. “It is this moment of the
essence, which relates principally to the static analogy of proportionality,
which is expressed in the tension of similitude-dissimilitudo according to the
principle of the vertical ‘fall’ of being, which is, at the same time, the multi-
form expansion of the inexhaustible divine fullness”397. In conclusion:
397
C. FABRO, PC, 648.
398
C. FABRO, PC, 648.
399
See C. FABRO, PC, 648.
798
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
Through his notion of intensive esse and the consequent distinction between
esse and essence in creatures, Thomas not only duly emphasizes the
“difference” between esse and ens, but he also succeeds in making God’s
“presence” in creatures more active and meaningful than in the panentheistic
theories of Dionysius, Avicenna, Eckhart, Cusanus, Spinoza, and Hegel.
Whereas in these latter theories God as Being is the Act of the essences, in
Thomas’ view God as Esse per essentiam is the principle and actuating cause
of esse per participationem, which is the proper, actuating act of every real
essence403.
400
C. FABRO, PC, 648.
401
I, q. 6, a. 4: “Sic ergo unumquodque dicitur bonum bonitate divina, sicut
primo principio exemplari, effectivo et finali totius bonitatis. Nihilominus tamen
unumquodque dicitur bonum similitudine divinae bonitatis sibi inhaerente, quae est
formaliter sua bonitas denominans ipsum”.
402
See C. FABRO, PC, 649.
403
C. FABRO, PC, 649.
799
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
dependence of the former on the latter. Secondly, there is the aspect of the
presence of Esse per essentiam in the participated ens-esse due to his “total
causality” and his “coming down to” and “intertwining” into created being
itself. “The Thomistic formula, per essentiam, per potentiam, per
praesentiam, expresses most effectively, along with the presence of the
Absolute in created beings, the highest degree of dependence of the finite on
the Infinite”404.
In the Thomistic conception of the finite, it is the essence which
“distinguishes” ens from esse. Essence is the principle of the “Diremtion
and thus constitutes the “difference” of beings from Being: “thus the
relationship of God to the essence as such is that of Exemplar Cause and,
therefore, remains at an infinite distance”405. In contrast, the relationship
between esse per essentiam and esse participatum is of an immediate
“belonging” (appartenenza) of act to Act, “where the ‘difference’ of the
participation does not distance the two, but rather brings them closer: this,
moreover, accomplishes the fall of the Absolute into the finite which is the
divine presence as into the fundament of the reality of the essence itself and,
therefore, as in the ‘Fundament of the fundament’, closing the circle of
Being itself”406. Once again, Fabro reiterates the exemplary causal
relationship between the created essence and the divine ideas and the direct,
causal relationship between participated esse and divine esse.
Conclusion: composition, causality, analogy. Unlike the notion of
participation, it is possible to distinguish between predicamental and
transcendental analogy only in a very restricted sense. Predicamental
analogy, in this case, is limited to the relationship between substance and
accidents; transcendental analogy to the relationship of creatures to their
Creator. The term “predicamental analogy”, though, is almost contradictory
since it is the predicamental order which constitutes the sphere of formal
univocity. “Predicamental participation is therefore, strictly speaking,
confined to univocity: the genus is actualized in the species by means of the
specific difference, the individuals of the same species possess the same
specific constitutive characteristics, and what distinguishes them is their
individual notes”407. From the formal point of view, the notion applies in an
equal (univocal) fashion to the two members and this is in contrast to the
analogous notion, which is predicated of one primarily and of others in a
404
C. FABRO, PC, 649.
405
C. FABRO, PC, 650.
406
C. FABRO, PC, 650.
407
C. FABRO, PC, 650. See Summa contra Gentiles, I, ch. 32.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
Thus, when seen from this metaphysical aspect of reality, Peter and Paul
participate unequally in human nature, that is, each one shares humanity in his
own way, inasmuch as each one, as previously seen, has a different esse: “The
reason for this is that, since two things must be considered in a being, namely,
its nature or quiddity and its esse, there must be in all univocal things a
community of nature but not of esse, for any one esse is only in one thing.
Hence human nature is not in two men according to the same esse. Hence also
whenever a form signified by name is esse itself, there can be no question of
univocity, for even being is not predicated univocally”408. For this reason we
have defended the analogy of being with respect to individual singulars as
within its normal scope since being as such cannot be but individual and
singular. Thus predicamental participation functions as an intermediary and a
notional bond between formal univocity and real analogy. It should always
remain clear that the “passage to the limit” from the predicamental sphere to
the transcendental one is operated uniquely by means of the reference to
intensive emergent esse, which is the only “transcendental medium”409.
Thus, however thought develops, it should always refer to esse, as to its act and
foundation.
Esse is the intensive emergent act, since it is the constitutive act of ens in act.
Esse ipsum is the proper constitutive of God, from which creation, divine
conservation and motion in creatures precede.
408
In I Sent., d. 35, q. 1, a. 4: “Hujus ratio est, quia cum in re duo sit
considerare: scilicet naturam vel quidditatem rei, et esse suum, oportet quod in
omnibus univocis sit communitas secundum rationem naturae, et non secundum
esse; quia unum esse non est nisi in una re; unde habitus humanitatis non est
secundum idem esse in duobus hominibus: et ideo quandocumque forma significata
per nomen est ipsum esse, non potest univoce convenire, propter quod etiam ens
non univoce praedicatur”.
409
C. FABRO, PC, 650-651.
801
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
From the four references to esse, one can gather the basic structure of
Fabro’s metaphysical reflection: 1) problem of the structure of esse and the
principle of the emergence of act; 2) the demonstration of the existence of
God according to the Fourth Way and determination of God’s essence
according to the principle of separated perfection; 3) the explanation of
creation and the participative structure of created beings; and 4) the analogy
of being as the semantics of participation and conclusive moment of
metaphysical reflection.
Fabro’s theory of analogy was assessed briefly by B. Montages in his
doctoral dissertation, La doctrine de l’analogie de l’être d’après Saint
Thomas D’Aquin (1963)411. Montagnes praises Fabro’s interpretation of the
Thomistic doctrine of analogy as follows:
But of all the recent works devoted to the Thomist doctrine of analogy, the
most satisfactory is that of C. Fabro; for he shows precisely the metaphysical
import of this theory. Participation, causality, and analogy are three aspects
under which philosophy approaches being – the first two, concerning the
reality itself of being, the third relating to the concepts by which being is
represented. Thus analogy is presented by the author as the semantics of
participation412.
410
C. FABRO, PC, 651.
411
I quote from the recent English translation: B. MONTAGNES, The
Doctrine of the Analogy of Being according to Thomas Aquinas, Marquette
University Press, Milwaukee 2004.
412
B. MONTAGNES, The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being..., 9.
802
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
413
See B. MONTAGNES, The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being..., 9.
414
See B. MONTAGNES, The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being..., 10.
415
See C. FABRO, “Nuovi orizzonti dell’analogia tomistica”, Bulletin
Thomiste 9 (1964), 193-204; reprinted in ET, 407-419. I will quote from ET.
416
B. MONTAGNES, The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being…, 36: “Hence, in
[St. Thomas’s] earliest works, one cannot separate participation from imitation, nor
distinguish […] analogy of imitation and analogy of participation. Both the one and
the other designate the same formal relation which ties beings to God and gathers
them in unity”.
417
See B. MONTAGNES, The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being…, 34-35:
“The Sentences puts the imitation of God by created beings in the foreground and
emphasizes participation by likeness; later on in Thomas the communication of
being will be presented primarily as a production of created being by God’s
efficient causality. Of course, the texts, conforming to the axiom of likeness omne
agens agit sibi simile, never radically separate exemplarity from efficient
causality”. See C. FABRO, “Nuovi orizzonti dell’analogia tomista”, ET, 409.
418
See Summa contra Gentiles, II, ch. 53; I, q. 75, a. 5 ad 4.
803
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
That is why the axiom of similarity – omne agens agit sibi simile – is no longer
the primary axiom but is connected with one still more fundamental, that of the
actuality of the agent: omne agens agit in quantum actu est. In short, the
primacy of act and the priority of efficient causality go hand in hand.
Exemplarity does not disappear; it is subordinated to efficiency. In sum,
participation is presented as the communication of act to a subject in potency.
The act is communicated by a productive causality that assimilates the effect to
the agent. The act received is limited by the potency that receives it (and
gradually, sine the potency is not unique). Finally, the participating subject is
composed of the act received and the receptive potency420.
For Montagnes, the reason behind the shift in St. Thomas’s thought lies in
the fact that, in his Commentary on the Sentences, St. Thomas presents
causality as the communication of a form, whereas in later works he
presents causality as a communication of act421. Montagnes holds that the
two different orientations found in St. Thomas’s works imply a difference in
emphasis given either to exemplarity or to efficiency. The causalities are not
mutually exclusive, nor did St. Thomas first choose one over the other.
“Nevertheless, though he never separated the two causalities, one has to
recognize that he first puts the notion of form in the foreground and that
later on the notion of act becomes fundamental422.
After establishing the shift from participation by likeness to
participation as productive causality and intrinsic possession of a perfection,
Montagnes turns, in Chapter Two, to the transcendental analogy of being
and, in particular, to the predication of the divine names. Montagnes
discerns three different and progressive solutions to the problem: that of the
Sentences, that of De Veritate and that of the later works such as Summa
contra Gentiles, De Potentia and the Summa theologiae.
419
B. MONTAGNES, The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being…, 40.
420
B. MONTAGNES, The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being…, 40.
421
B. MONTAGNES, The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being…, 43.
422
See B. MONTAGNES, The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being…, 43.
804
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
423
B. MONTAGNES, The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being…, 68-69.
424
B. MONTAGNES, The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being…, 70.
425
B. MONTAGNES, The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being…, 70: “In
summary, predicamental analogy and transcendental analogy are treated separately
as in the Sentences, no longer by appealing to two sorts of analogy of relation, but
by applying the analogy of relation exclusively to the predicamental level and the
analogy of proportion to the transcendental level. Nevertheless, the reason why
analogy by reference to a primary instance is set aside from the relation of beings
805
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
[1] The first problem is that there is no likeness of beings to God in virtue
of a common form received secundum magis et minus. De Veritate
rejects direct likeness and substitutes it with proportional likeness.
Later works hold that the likeness of beings to God does not depend
upon participation of a common form and that the form participated by
the creature is not identical to the divine perfection. Divine perfection
is communicated only in a deficient way and this prevents “univocity
while laying the foundation for the analogy of relation: what God is by
essence, beings receive by participation”427.
[2] The second problem holds that between the finite and the infinite there
is no direct determinate relation. De Veritate holds that there is not
“proportio” between the finite and infinite, but rather
to God does no longer lie, as it was in the Sentences, merely in the fact that being
would be prior to and simpler than God, but rather in the fact that such an analogy
involves a direct relationship to the primary instance; Thomas believes that, by
admitting a relation of this sort, one can no longer safeguard the divine
transcendence. Without saying it, Thomas thus adopts a new position which
contradicts what he had held in the Sentences, since he eliminates participation by
likeness; for analogy by imitation he substitutes analogy of proportion. At the
transcendental level, the analogy of relation is useless, because it would diminish
the distance that separates beings from God”. See C. FABRO, “Nuovi orizzonti
dell’analogia tomista”, ET, 412.
426
B. MONTAGNES, The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being…, 71.
427
B. MONTAGNES, The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being…, 75.
806
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
428
I, q. 12, a. 1 ad 4.
429
B. MONTAGNES, The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being…, 75.
430
See I, q. 8, a. 1 ad 3.
431
B. MONTAGNES, The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being…, 77.
432
B. MONTAGNES, The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being…, 78.
807
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
433
See C. FABRO, “Nuovi orizzonti dell’analogia tomistica”, ET, 416.
434
B. MONTAGNES, The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being…, 88.
435
See B. MONTAGNES, The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being…, 160-161.
436
See C. FABRO, “Nuovi orizzonti dell’analogia tomistica”, ET, 415.
808
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
The unity of order which gathers beings [les êtres] together is based both upon
the real unity of that which is perfection, which is Ipsum esse, and upon the
intrinsic communication of its perfection to the participants. The real
composition of the latter is not ruled out, since there is no limitation without
composition, but it is subordinated, since composition is the necessary but not
sufficient condition of limitation. Created beings are similar to divine being in
virtue of the relations of efficient and formal causality and the sum of those
437
See C. FABRO, “Nuovi orizzonti dell’analogia tomistica”, ET, 416.
438
See C. FABRO, “Nuovi orizzonti dell’analogia tomistica”, ET, 418.
439
See C. FABRO, “Nuovi orizzonti dell’analogia tomistica”, ET, 417.
440
See C. FABRO, “Nuovi orizzonti dell’analogia tomistica”, ET, 417.
441
See C. FABRO, “Nuovi orizzonti dell’analogia tomistica”, ET, 418: “Mais
cette spécification intervient dans la ligne formelle, ou par rapporta u contenu de
l’être et non dans l’ordre de la réalité”.
809
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
Fabro holds that this text shows that Montagnes does not grasp esse as
emergent act. Fabro accuses Montagnes of the same fault he finds in Geiger:
ambiguity concerning the notion of esse as actus essendi, the principle of
the limitation of act by potency and the “nature” of the real distinction
between essence and esse.
* * *
442
B. MONTAGNES, The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being…, 161.
443
A. CONTAT, “Le figure della differenza ontologica…”, 245.
810
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICAL REFLECTION
in turn, in act: there are two levels of esse in actu in the concrete
suppositum, that of the substance, and that super-added of each individual
accident. Seen ‘from above’, the accident is a form that is posterior to the
substantial form, which gives the unique actus essendi an added intensity
and specification to that of the essence, but is subordinated to it”444.
444
A. CONTAT, “Le figure della differenza ontologica…”, 245-246.
811
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
812
CONCLUSION
1
See A. CONTAT, “Le figure della differenza ontologica…”, 119-120.
813
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
Individual - species
Univocal
Species - genus
Particular - universal
Analogical: creatures - esse commune
3
By “contextualized reading” I mean an interpretation that takes into
consideration the nature of the work quoted and the problem the text addresses. Is
the text a “synthetic text” from a Summa? Is it a “commentary” which modifies the
meaning of the original text or offers an interpretation that goes beyond the text at
hand? Is it a “Questiones disputatae”, where St. Thomas often adopts a more
speculative and technical approach?
4
See In Boethii De Hebdomadibus, lect. 2.
5
See Quodlibet. II, q. 2, a. 2
820
CONCLUSION
822
CONCLUSION
823
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
* * *
826
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The bibliography contains only those works that were consulted for or
used in the dissertation. It is divided as follows: 1. Works by Cornelio
Fabro; 2. Doctoral dissertations, books and articles on or that refer to
Cornelio Fabro and his metaphysics; 3. Works by St. Thomas Aquinas; 4.
Other works consulted.
1.1 Books
Posthumous:
1.2 Articles
828
BIBLIOGRAPHY
829
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
832
BIBLIOGRAPHY
833
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
834
BIBLIOGRAPHY
2. Works on Fabro
835
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
836
BIBLIOGRAPHY
837
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
838
BIBLIOGRAPHY
839
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
840
BIBLIOGRAPHY
841
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
842
BIBLIOGRAPHY
843
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
846
BIBLIOGRAPHY
—“St. Thomas and the Distinction between Form and esse in Caused
Things”, Gregorianum 80 (1999), 353-370.
—Form and Being. Studies in Thomistic Metaphysics, CUA Press,
Washington DC 2006.
DOLAN, E., “Resolution and Composition”, Laval Théologique et
Philosophique 6 (1950), 9-62.
ELDERS, L., The Metaphysics of Being of St. Thomas Aquinas in a Historical
Perspective, E.J. Brill, Leiden 1993.
FAY, T., “Participation: The transformation of Platonic and Neo-platonic
thought in the metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas”, Divus Thomas 76
(1973), 50-64.
GONZÁLEZ, A.L., “Thomistic Metaphysics: Contemporary Interpretations”,
Anuario Filosófico 39 (2006), 401-437.
HART, C., “Participation and the Thomistic Five Ways”, The New
Scholasticism 26 (1952), 267-282.
KLUBERTANZ, G., “The Problem of the Analogy of Being”, The Review of
Metaphysics 10 (1957), 553-579.
KOTERSKI, J., “The Doctrine of Participation in Thomistic Metaphysics”, in
D. HUDSON and D. MORAN (eds.), The Future of Thomism, University
of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame 1992, 185-196.
MORENO, A., “The Subject, Abstraction, and Methodology of Aquinas’
Metaphysics”, Angelicum 61 (1984), 580-601.
OWENS, J., “Knowing Existence”, The Review of Metaphysics 29 (1976),
670-690.
PASCUAL, R., “Lo separado como el objeto de la metafísica”, Alpha Omega
1 (1998), 217-242.
PRIETO, L., “Suárez, crocevia della filosofia tra medioevo e modernità”
Alpha Omega 9 (2006), 3-38.
—“Francisco Suárez e Tommaso d’Aquino”, in J. VILLAGRASA (ed.),
Neotomismo e Suarezismo. Il confronto di Cornelio Fabro, Ateneo
Pontificio Regina Apostolorum, Roma 2006, 91-136.
REGIS, L.-M., “Analyse et synthèse dans l’œuvre de saint Thomas”, in
A.A.V.V., Studia Mediaevalia in honorem P. R.J. Martin, De Temple,
Brugis 1948, 303-330.
REICHMANN, J., “Logic and the Method of Metaphysics”, The Thomist 29
(1965), 341-395.
—“Immanently Transcendent and Subsistent esse: A Comparison”, The
Thomist 38 (1974), 332-369.
847
BEING AND PARTICIPATION
848