1

65.7 (Certiorari 7) order of dismissal. CA held in favour of the

Joaquin Ga, Jr., Judith Ga Gadnanan And Jesusa respondents. CA noted that respondents erred in filing
Ga Esmaña, Vs. Spouses Antonio Tubungan And a petition for certiorari before the trial court when they
Rosalinda Tubungan And Norberto Ga assailed the validity of the COSLAP. According to the
G.R. No. 182185, September 18, 2009, YNARES- appellate court, respondents should have directly filed
SANTIAGO, J the petition with the Court of Appeals, and not the trial
Petition For Review On Certiorari court. Nevertheless, the appellate court held that
suspension of the rules on appeal was warranted,
ER: Petitioner filed a Complaint for Recovery of considering that the determination of respondents'
Property and Ownership of a parcel of land before the substantive rights over the disputed lot far outweighs
COSLAP. It ruled in petitioner’s favour. Respondents any procedural lapse that may have been committed. It
filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Preliminary also held that COSLAP had no jurisdiction over the
Injunction, Quieting of Title and Damages with Prayer case.
for Temporary Restraining Order before the Regional Due to respondents' procedural lapse,
Trial Court, which dismissed the petition on the ground petitioners contend that the COSLAP decision had
that COSLAP is a co-equal body. Respondents later become final and executory.
filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA, which ruled ISSUE: W/N the appellate court erred in relaxing the
in their favour. It ruled that although respondents rules on appeal considering its findings that
should have filed the petition for certiorari before the respondents failed to avail of the proper remedy before
CA, nevertheless COSLAP decision could not attain the appropriate court from the adverse decision of the
finality because it lack jurisdiction. COSLAP
SC: The CA is correct. In Sy v. COSLAP, if Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy due to HELD: NO, CA is correct.
grave abuse of discretion it should have been brought
to the CA. In this case, while respondents availed of In Sy v. Commission on the Settlement of
the correct remedy, they sought the same from the Land Problems, the Court held that all appeals from
wrong court (RTC). This mistake would have rendered orders, resolutions or decisions of the COSLAP should
the assailed COSLAP decision final and executory, be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the
were it not for its patent nullity and invalidity because Rules of Court. If a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the case, making its is the prescribed remedy due to grave abuse of
decision void. A nullity is correctible only through a discretion or lack of jurisdiction, the same should also
petition for certiorari. A petition for certiorari that seeks be brought to the Court of Appeals, as the said court
the nullification of a void judgment cannot be cannot be bypassed without running afoul of the
dismissed for timeliness as the same does not doctrine of judicial hierarchy. In this case, respondents
prescribe. A judgment issued by a quasi-judicial body did not timely appeal the COSLAP decision to the
without jurisdiction is void. It can never become final Court of Appeals via Rule 43, and instead filed a
and executory, hence, an appeal is out of the question. petition for certiorari under Rule 65, although with the
Regional Trial Court, a body that is co-equal with the
FACTS: COSLAP. Only later did they file a petition for certiorari
Petitioner Joaquin Ga, Jr. filed a Complaint for with the appellate court assailing the trial court's
Recovery of Property and Ownership of a parcel of dismissal of their petition.
land, known as Assessor's Lot No. 117, against In other words, while respondents availed of the
respondent Norberto Ga before the COSLAP. The correct remedy, they sought the same from the
complaint was subsequently re-filed by petitioner wrong court. This mistake would have rendered the
Joaquin's daughters. COSLAP rendered judgment assailed COSLAP decision final and executory, were it
declaring petitioner Joaquin and his heirs as the lawful not for its patent nullity and invalidity.
owners of the disputed lot. A nullity is correctible only through a petition for
Norberto, together with the Tubungans filed a certiorari. A petition for certiorari that seeks the
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Preliminary nullification of a void judgment cannot be
Injunction, Quieting of Title and Damages with dismissed for timeliness as the same does not
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order before the prescribe. A judgment issued by a quasi-judicial
Regional Trial Court, which dismissed the petition. It body without jurisdiction is void. It can never
held that it had no jurisdiction to nullify the COSLAP become final and executory, hence, an appeal is
decision, as the same would be an interference with a out of the question.
co-equal and coordinate body. In the instant case, COSLAP had no jurisdiction over
Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari the subject matter of petitioners' complaint. The
before the Court of Appeals assailing the trial court's disputed lot was not shown to be public land and the
 2
nature of the dispute is not among those which fall adequate remedy in the course of law. Since a
under the jurisdiction of the COSLAP. Executive Order motion for reconsideration is generally regarded
No. 561 enumerates the instances when COSLAP as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, the
may exercise adjudicatory functions. failure to first take recourse to is usually regarded
As stated earlier, a void judgment can never be final as fatal omission. But Bancommerce invoked
and executory and may be assailed at any time. It is certain recognized exceptions to the rule. In this
thus clear that the Court of Appeals did not err in case, the records amply show that
taking cognizance of respondents' petition for certiorari Bancommerce’s action fell within the recognized
as the judgment of the COSLAP could not have exceptions to the need to file a motion for
attained finality. In other words, the failure of reconsideration before filing a petition for
respondents to properly appeal from the COSLAP certiorari.First, the filing of a motion for
decision before the appropriate court was not fatal to
reconsideration would be redundant. Second, an
urgent necessity for the immediate resolution of
the petition for certiorari that they eventually filed with
the case by the CA existed because any further
the Court of Appeals. The latter remedy remained
delay would have greatly prejudiced
available despite the lapse of the period to appeal from
Bancommerce. The Sheriff had been resolute and
the void COSLAP decision. relentless in trying to execute the judgment and
dispose of the levied assets of Bancommerce.
65.8 (Certiorari 8) FACTS:
BANK OF COMMERCE vs. RADIO PHILIPPINES In late 2001 the Traders Royal Bank
NETWORK, INC., INTERCONTINENTAL (TRB) proposed to sell to petitioner Bank of
BROADCASTING CORPORATION, and BANAHA W Commerce (Bancommerce) for ₱10.4 billion its
BROADCASTING CORPORATION, THRU BOARD banking business consisting of specified assets
OF ADMINISTRATOR, and SHERIFF BIENVENIDO and liabilities. Bancommerce agreed subject to
S. REYES, JR., Sheriff, Regional Trial Court of prior Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas' (BSP's)
Quezon City, Branch 98 approval of their Purchase and Assumption (P &
G.R. No. 195615, April 21, 2014, ABAD, J A) Agreement. BSP approved that agreement
subject to the condition that Bancommerce and
ER: TRB and Bancommerce entered into a TRB would set up an escrow fund of P5O million
Purchase and Assumption Agreement, whereby with another bank to cover TRB liabilities for
Bancommerece acquired TRB’s specified assets contingent claims that may subsequently be
and liabilities, excluding liabilities arising from adjudged against it, which liabilities were
judicial actions which were to be covered by the excluded from the purchase. TRB placed ₱50
BSP-mandated escrow of ₱50 million (placed in million in escrow with Metrobank to answer for
by TRB at Metrobank). In a case, SC ordered those claims and liabilities that were excluded
TRB to pay respondents RPN et.al damages of from the P & A Agreement and remained with
P9M. But, RPN filed a Supplemental Motion for TRB. Accordingly, the BSP finally approved such
Execution where they described TRB as "now agreement.
Bank of Commerce" based on the assumption In the case of TRP v Radio Phil Network,
that TRB had been merged into Bancommerce. SC ordered TRB to pay respondents actual
RTC ruled in RPN’s favour. CA affirmed the RTC damages of ₱9,790,716.87. RPN, et al.filed a
with modification, by deleting the phrase that motion for execution against TRB before RTC
there is merger between TRB and Bancommerce. QC. But rather than pursue a levy in execution of
However, RTC still issued alias writ of execution the corresponding amounts on escrow with
on the premise that the CA Decision allowed it to Metrobank, RPN, et al. filed a Supplemental
execute on the assets. Bancommerce sought Motion for Execution where they described TRB
reconsideration of RTC order, but RTC issued as "now Bank of Commerce" based on the
assailed ordering the sheriff to garnish assumption that TRB had been merged into
Bancommerce monies. Bancommerce Bancommerce. Bancommerce denied the merger.
immediately elevated the RTC Order to the CA RTC issued an Order granting and issuing
via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to assail the writ of execution to cover any and all assets of
the Orders. The CA dismissed the petition TRB, "including those subject of the
outright for the supposed failure of Bancommerce merger/consolidation in the guise of a Purchase
to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed and Sale Agreement with Bank of Commerce,
order. and/or against the Escrow Fund established by
SC: Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court TRB and Bank of Commerce with the
provides that a petition for certiorari may only be Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company."
filed when there is no plain, speedy, and This prompted Bancommerce to file a
petition for certiorari with the CA. CA denied the
 3
petition. The CA pointed out that the Decision of parte, depriving it of an opportunity to object; and
the RTC was clear in that Bancommerce was not d) the issues raised were purely of law.
being made to answer for the liabilities of TRB, In this case, the records amply show that
but rather the assets or properties of TRB under Bancommerce’s action fell within the recognized
its possession and custody. CA modified the exceptions to the need to file a motion for
Decision of the RTC by deleting the phrase that reconsideration before filing a petition for
the P & A Agreement between TRB and certiorari.
Bancommerce is a farce or "a mere tool to First. The filing of a motion for
effectuate a merger and/or consolidation between reconsideration would be redundant since
TRB and BANCOM." (note: CA affirmed RTC but actually the RTC’s August 18, 2010 Order
with modification) amounts to a denial of Bancommerce motion for
RPN, et al. filed with the RTC a motion to reconsideration of the February 19, 2010 Order
cause the issuance of an alias writ of execution which granted the application for the issuance of
against Bancommerce based on the CA Decision. the alias writ.
The RTC granted the motion on the premise that Significantly, the alias writ of execution itself, the
the CA Decision allowed it to execute on the quashal of which was sought by Bancommerce
assets that Bancommerce acquired from TRB two times (via a motion to quash the writ and a
under their P & A Agreement. supplemental motion to quash the writ) derived its
Bancommerce sought reconsideration of existence from the RTC’s Order. Another motion
the RTC Order considering that the CA Decision for reconsideration would have been superfluous.
actually declared that no merger existed between The RTC had not budge on those issues in the
TRB and Bancommerce. preceding incidents. There was no point in
RTC issued the assailed Order denying repeatedly asking it to reconsider.
Bancommerce pleas and, among others, directing Second. An urgent necessity for the
the release to the Sheriff of Bancommerce’s immediate resolution of the case by the CA
"garnished monies and shares of stock or their existed because any further delay would have
monetary equivalent. greatly prejudiced Bancommerce. The Sheriff
Bancommerce immediately elevated had been resolute and relentless in trying to
the RTC Order to the CA via a petition for execute the judgment and dispose of the levied
certiorari under Rule 65 to assail the Orders. assets of Bancommerce. Indeed, the Sheriff
The CA dismissed the petition outright for the started garnishing Bancommerce’s deposits in
supposed failure of Bancommerce to file a other banks.
motion for reconsideration of the assailed Further, the Sheriff forcibly levied on
order. Bancommerce’s Lipa Branch cash on hand
ISSUE: W/N the CA gravely erred in holding that amounting to ₱1,520,000.00 and deposited the
Bancommerce had no valid excuse in failing to same with the Landbank. He also seized the
file the required motion for reconsideration of the bank’s computers, printers, and monitors, causing
assailed RTC Order before coming to the CA the temporary cessation of its banking operations
HELD: YES in that branch and putting the bank in an
Direct filing of the petition for certiorari by unwarranted danger of a run. Clearly,
Bancommerce Bancommerce had valid justifications for
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides skipping the technical requirement of a
that a petition for certiorari may only be filed when motion for reconsideration.
there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy OTHER ISSUE: (Corporation Law)
in the course of law. Since a motion for Whether or not the CA gravely erred in failing to
reconsideration is generally regarded as a plain, rule that the RTC’s Order of execution against
speedy, and adequate remedy, the failure to first Bancommerce was a nullity because the CA
take recourse to is usually regarded as fatal Decision of December 8, 2009 in CA-G.R. SP
omission. 91258 held that TRB had not been merged into
But Bancommerce invoked certain recognized Bancommerce as to make the latter liable for
exceptions to the rule. It had to forego the filing of TRB’s judgment debts.—YES
the required motion for reconsideration of the Indubitably, it is clear that no merger took place
assailed RTC Order because a) there was an between Bancommerce and TRB as the
urgent necessity for the CA to resolve the requirements and procedures for a merger
questions it raised and any further delay would were absent. A merger does not become
prejudice its interests; b) under the effective upon the mere agreement of the
circumstances, a motion for reconsideration constituent corporations. All the requirements
would have been useless; c) Bancommerce specified in the law must be complied with in
had been deprived of its right to due process order for merger to take effect. Section 79 of the
when the RTC issued the challenged order ex Corporation Code further provides that the merger
 4
shall be effective only upon the issuance by the amount of just compensation may the remedy of
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of a prohibition become available. Moreover, the case is
certificate of merger. Here, Bancommerce and premature because the LGC requires an ordinance for
TRB remained separate corporations with distinct expropriation not a mere resolution.
corporate personalities. FACTS:
The transaction between TRB and Bancommerce Sps Yusay owned a parcel of land, half of their
was neither a merger nor a de facto merger (as land they used as their residence, and the rest they
argued by dissenting Justices) but a mere "sale of rented out to nine other families. Allegedly, the land
assets with assumption of liabilities,". was their only property and only source of income.
Dissenting opinions argued that the CA’s The Sangguniang Panglungsod of
modification of the RTC Order merely deleted an Mandaluyong City adopted Resolution No. 552,
opinion there expressed and not reversed such Series of 1997, to authorize then City Mayor Benjamin
order.
S. Abalos, Sr. to take the necessary legal steps for the
However, it should be the substance of the CA’s
expropriation of the land of the petitioners for the
modification of the RTC Order that should control,
purpose of developing it for low cost housing for the
not some technical flaws that are taken out of
context. Clearly, the RTC’s basis for holding less privileged but deserving city inhabitants.
Bancommerce liable to TRB was its finding Notwithstanding that the enactment of
that TRB had been merged into Resolution No. 552 was but the initial step in the City’s
Bancommerce, making the latter liable for exercise of its power of eminent domain granted under
TRB’s debts to RPN, et al. Since it has been Section 19 of the LGC , the petitioners became
concluded that there is no merger, there’s no alarmed, and filed a petition for certiorari and
basis for making Bancommerce liable. prohibition in the RTC, praying for the annulment of
Resolution No. 552 due to its being unconstitutional,
B.PROHIBITION confiscatory, improper, and without force and effect.
65.9 (Prohibition #1) The City countered that Resolution No. 552 was a
SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY vs. COURT OF mere authorization given to the City Mayor to initiate
APPEALS, CITY MAYOR and CITY COUNCIL OF the legal steps towards expropriation, thus case is
MANDALUYONG CITY premature.
G.R. No. 156684 ; April 6, 2011;BERSAMIN, J. The RTC at first ruled in favor of the City and
Appeal dismissed the petition for lack of merit, opining that
ER: Sps Yusay owned a parcel of land. Sangguniang certiorari did not lie against a legislative act of the City
Panglusod of Mandaluyong adopted Resolution 552 Government, because the special civil action of
authorizing Mayor Abalos to take the necessary legal certiorari was only available to assail judicial or quasi-
steps for expropriation of the land. Sps Yusay filed judicial acts done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
petition for certiorari and prohibition in the RTC, with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
praying for the annulment of Resolution No. 552. The excess of jurisdiction; that the special civil action of
City countered that the case is premature. RTC at first prohibition did not also lie under the circumstances
dismissed the petition opining that certiorari does not considering that the act of passing the resolution was
lie against a city’s legislative act, but it later reversed not a judicial, or quasi-judicial, or ministerial act. But
its decision and held that Resolution 552 is null and RTC later reversed its decision, thus declaring
void. Resolution 522 as null and void.
SC: Certiorari does not lie to assail the issuance of City appealed to the CA. CA ruled in favour of the City
a resolution by the Sanggunian Panglungsod. based on presumption of regularity.
Resolution No. 552 is a legislative and policy-making ISSUE: W/N the action for certiorari and prohibition
act, not a judicial or quasi-judicial function. commenced by the petitioners in the RTC was a
Furthermore, there can be no abused of discretion in proper recourse of the petitioners.
expressing its opinion or sentiment. Prohibition does HELD: NO
not lie against expropriation. Aside from the fact that 1. Certiorari does not lie to assail the issuance of a
the Resolution is not a judicial function, there is a bar resolution by the Sanggunian Panglungsod
for prohibition against expropriation. This bar against For certiorari to prosper, therefore, the petitioner must
prohibition comes from the nature of the power of allege and establish the concurrence of the following
eminent domain as necessitating the taking of private requisites, namely:
land intended for public use, and the interest of the (a) The writ is directed against a tribunal,
affected landowner is thus made subordinate to the board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
power of the State. Only when the landowners are not judicial functions;
given their just compensation for the taking of their (b) Such tribunal, board, or officer has acted
property or when there has been no agreement on the without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
 5
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or necessitating the taking of private land intended
excess of jurisdiction; and for public use, and the interest of the affected
(c) There is no appeal or any plain, speedy, landowner is thus made subordinate to the power
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the State. Once the State decides to exercise its
of law power of eminent domain, the power of judicial review
Based on the foregoing, certiorari did not lie against becomes limited in scope, and the courts will be left to
the Sangguniang Panglungsod, which was not a part determine the appropriate amount of just
of the Judiciary settling an actual controversy involving compensation to be paid to the affected landowners.
legally demandable and enforceable rights when it Only when the landowners are not given their just
adopted Resolution No. 552, but a legislative and compensation for the taking of their property or
policy-making body declaring its sentiment or opinion. when there has been no agreement on the amount
Nor did the Sangguniang Panglungsod abuse its of just compensation may the remedy of
discretion in adopting Resolution No. 552. To prohibition become available.
demonstrate the absence of abuse of discretion, it is Here, however, the remedy of prohibition was not
well to differentiate between a resolution and an called for, because the case is premature considering
ordinance. No rights can be conferred by and be that only a resolution expressing the desire of the
inferred from a resolution, which is nothing but an Sangguniang Panglungsod to expropriate the
embodiment of what the lawmaking body has to say in petitioners’ property was issued.
the light of attendant circumstances. In simply
expressing its sentiment or opinion through the 65.10 (Prohibition 2)
resolution, therefore, the Sangguniang Panglungsod in FRANCISCO Q. AURILLO, JR., vs. NOEL RABI, and
no way abused its discretion, least of all gravely, for its THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 9, Tacloban
expression of sentiment or opinion was a City,
constitutionally protected right. G. R. No. 120014 - November 26, 2002- CALLEJO,
Moreover, Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local SR., J
Government Code) required the City to pass an Petition For Review On Certiorari
ordinance, not adopt a resolution, for the purpose of ER: Rabi was arrested without a warrant for violation
initiating an expropriation proceeding. of PD 1866. The Public Prosecutor recommended the
2. Prohibition does not lie against expropriation dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause,
The function of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful however, Regional State Prosecutor Aurillo order the
and oppressive exercise of legal authority and to conduct of a new preliminary investigation. Upon
provide for a fair and orderly administration of justice. knowing of such action when he received the
The writ of prohibition is directed against proceedings subpoena, Rabi filed with the RTC of Tacloban City a
that are done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or petition for prohibition with prayer for a temporary
with grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction.
or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order, but it
ordinary course of law. The petitioner must further failed to resolve the matter of writ of preliminary
allege in the petition and establish facts to show that injunction, instead asked the parties to submit their
any other existing remedy is not speedy or adequate. memoranda. Nevertheless, the assistant regional state
A remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will prosecutor continued with his preliminary investigation
promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects and thereafter, filed an Information against Rabi . The
of that judgment and the acts of the tribunal or inferior trial court nullified the preliminary investigation of I.S.
court. No. 95-043 by the Office of the Regional State
The rule and relevant jurisprudence indicate that Prosecutor and the Information filed with the RTC
prohibition was not available to the petitioners as a against Rabi.
remedy against the adoption of Resolution No. 552, for SC: RTC did not commit any error in nullifying not only
the Sangguniang Panglungsod, by such adoption, was the preliminary investigation but also the Information.
not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial The RTC is possessed of residual power to restore the
functions, but only expressing its collective sentiment parties to their status before Aurillo proceeded with the
or opinion. preliminary investigation, and grant in favor of the
Verily, there can be no prohibition against a procedure aggrieved party such other relief as may be proper.
whereby the immediate possession of the land under Jurisprudence has it that prohibition will give complete
expropriation proceedings may be taken, provided relief not only by preventing what remains to be done
always that due provision is made to secure the but by undoing what has been done. Although the
prompt adjudication and payment of just compensation general rule is that a writ of prohibition issues only to
to the owner. . This bar against prohibition comes restrain the commission of a future act, and not to
from the nature of the power of eminent domain as undo an act already performed, where anything
 6
remains to be done by the court, prohibition will give investigation of I.S. No. 95-043 by the Office of the
complete relief, not only by preventing what remains to Regional State Prosecutor and the Information
be done but by undoing what has been done filed with the RTC against Rabi. It also ordered
FACTS: Aurillo to pay moral damages, exemplary damages an
Noel Rabi was arrested without a warrant of attorneys fees.
arrest and charged in the Office of the City Prosecutor ISSUE: W/N the Information filed by Aurillo against
of Tacloban City with violation of PD No. 1866 Rabi with the RTC for violation of PD 1866 may be
(possession of unlicensed firearm). The matter was nullified by said court
docketed as I.S. No. 95-043. Public Prosecutor HELD:YES
Zenaida Camonical Isidro conducted an inquest Aurillo argues that although the RTC had issued a
investigation of the case and issued a resolution Temporary Restraining Order, the same had lapsed
recommending that the case be dismissed for lack of without the court issuing any preliminary injunction.
probable cause. There was thus no legal bar for the Office of the
However, Regional State Prosecutor Regional State Prosecutor to proceed with and
Francisco Aurillo, Jr. decided to assume jurisdiction terminate the preliminary investigation and thereafter
over the case and to order the conduct of a new to file the Information against private respondent even
preliminary investigation thereof. He issued a Regional while the petition for prohibition was still pending
Memorandum Order to the City Prosecutor of before the RTC.
Tacloban City directing him to elevate to his office the The pendency of the special civil action for
complete records of I.S. No. 95-043. Aurillo designated prohibition before the trial court did not interrupt
the assistant regional state prosecutor to conduct the the investigation in I.S. No. 95-043. It goes without
new preliminary investigation. The City Prosecutor of saying, however, that in proceeding with the
Tacloban complied with the order of Aurillo, the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043 and
Assistant Regional State Prosecutor issued a terminating the same, Aurillo did so subject to the
subpoena notifying Rabi of the preliminary outcome of the petition for prohibition. In this case,
investigation. the RTC granted the petition of Rabi, declared Aurillo
When served with the subpoena, Rabi was bereft of authority to take over the preliminary
aghast at the sudden turn of events. On the same date investigation of I.S. No. 95-043 and nullified the
his counsel filed with the RTC of Tacloban City a preliminary investigation conducted by Aurillo as well
petition for prohibition with prayer for a temporary as the Information thereafter filed by him. The RTC is
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction, he possessed of residual power to restore the parties
alleged that the a regional state prosecutor was vested to their status before Aurillo proceeded with the
only with administrative supervision over the city preliminary investigation, and grant in favor of the
prosecutor and had no power to motu proprio review, aggrieved party such other relief as may be proper.
revise, or modify the resolution of the city prosecutor. Jurisprudence has it that prohibition will give
Thus, he averred that Aurillo acted without jurisdiction complete relief not only by preventing what
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess remains to be done but by undoing what has been
or lack of jurisdiction. Rabi thus prayed that, pending done. The Court has authority to grant any
resolution of his plea for a writ of preliminary appropriate relief within the issues presented by
injunction, a temporary restraining order be issued to the pleadings of the parties:
enjoin Aurillo. Generally, the relief granted in a prohibition proceeding
The RTC issued a Temporary Restraining is governed by the nature of the grievance proved and
Order, enjoining and prohibiting Aurillo and all others the situation at the time of judgment. Although the
acting for and in his behalf from taking over and general rule is that a writ of prohibition issues only
conducting a new preliminary investigation of I.S. No. to restrain the commission of a future act, and not
95-043 until the court shall have resolved the motion to undo an act already performed, where anything
for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. remains to be done by the court, prohibition will
RTC failed to resolve the matter of writ of give complete relief, not only by preventing what
preliminary injunction. Instead, the RTC issued an remains to be done but by undoing what has been
order directing the parties to file their respective done. Under some statutes, the court must grant the
memoranda Nevertheless, the assistant regional appropriate relief whatever the proceeding is called if
state prosecutor continued with his preliminary facts stating ground for relief are pleaded. Although
investigation of I.S. No. 95-043. Thereafter, with prohibition is requested only as to a particular
Aurillos approval, he filed with the RTC an Information matter, the court has authority to grant any
against Rabi for violation of PD 1866. appropriate relief within the issues presented by
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Rabi. the pleadings. If the application for prohibition is too
The trial court nullified the preliminary broad, the court may mould the writ and limit it to as
 7
much as is proper to be granted. In the exercise of its ER: While, Bautista holds the office of the SolGen, he
jurisdiction to issue writs, the court has, as a was designated by the President as acting member of
necessary incident thereto, the power to make such the COMELEC, he intend to exercise both functions.
incidental order as may be necessary to maintain its Petitioner contend that the designation is unlawful
jurisdiction and to effectuate its final judgment. The because there is no vacancy to begin with and in
court may retain jurisdiction of the cause to enable it to addition, the petitioner cannot hold both office at the
make an appropriate order in the future, even though same time. Thus, petitioner prayed for issuance of writ
the petition for a writ of prohibition is dismissed. of prohibition commanding the respondent Solicitor
Hence, the RTC did not commit any error in nullifying General to desist from acting as acting member of the
not only the preliminary investigation by the Office of COMELEC.
the Regional State Prosecutor in I.S. No. 95-043 for SC: Prohibition will not lie to determine the title of a de
want of authority but also the Information approved by facto judicial officer, since its only function is to prevent
Aurillo and filed with the Regional Trial Court. a usurpation of jurisdiction by a subordinate court. The
OTHER ISSUES proper remedy should be in the nature of quo
1. W/N the petition filed by Rabi with the RTC warranto. In the case at bar, however, the
was premature; -YES respondent's designation to act temporarily a member
As a general rule, the aggrieved party is mandated to of the Commission on Elections is unlawful and as
first exhaust all administrative remedies before filing a such no one is entitled now to the office and a party
judicial action for redress from acts of administrative who is not entitled to the office may not institute quo
bodies or offices in the performance of their quasi- warrant proceedings, and the respondent as Solicitor
judicial functions; otherwise, said action may be General, the only other party who may institute the
dismissed for prematurity. However, the principle is not proceedings, would not proceed against himself. It is
without exceptions. The present case calls for the incumbent upon and the duty of this Court to grant a
exception. It is because time is of the essence, where remedy, which is prohibition to prevent the exercise of
judicial intervention was imperative, and Aurillo acted powers.
without authority and with grave abuse of discretion FACTS:
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when he On 9 November 1949, while the respondent
took over motu proprio the preliminary investigation. held, as he still holds, the office of Solicitor General of
2. W/N Aurillo is empowered to motu proprio take the Philippines, the President designated him as acting
over and conduct a preliminary investigation of I.S member of the Commission on Elections, and on that
No. 95-043 –NO same date the respondent took the oath of office and
Aurillos reliance on Section 8, paragraph (b) of PD proceeded to assume and perform the duties of the
1275 is misplaced. Said law provides that a regional office; that at the time of the respondent's designation
state prosecutor exercises immediate administrative he had not resigned from the office of Solicitor General
supervision.Supervision is different from control. In this of the Philippines nor does he intend to do so but
case, when Aurillo motu proprio took over the continues to exercise all the powers and duties of the
preliminary investigation, he exercised not only last mentioned office.
administrative supervision but control over the city It is contended that such designation invalid,
prosecutor in the performance of the latters quasi- illegal, and unconstitutional, because there was on 9
judicial functions November 1949 no vacancy in the Commission on
3. W/N Aurillo is liable for damages and Elections, for the acceptance, approval, or granting of
attorneys fees to Rabi.—NO the application for retirement filed by Commissioner
The fact is that the RTC did not issue any writ of Francisco Enage on such date constitutes or amounts
preliminary injunction enjoining Aurillo from proceeding to abuse of discretion and was done in bad faith by the
with the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043. President and therefore null and void; and because
Aurillos act of proceeding with the preliminary Commissioner Enage is entitled to leave and until after
investigation of I.S. No. 95-043 and of filing the the expiration of such leave he does not cease to be a
Information were not in disregard of the authority of the member of the Commission on Elections. In addition,
RTC, but were done in the belief that, absent any membership in the Commission is a permanent
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary constitutional office with a fixed tenure, and therefore,
injunction, he was authorized to do so. no designation of a person or officer in an acting
capacity could and can be made; because a member
65.11 (Prohibition 3) of the Commission cannot at the same time hold any
THE NACIONALISTA PARTY vs. FELIX ANGELO other office; and because the respondents as Solicitor
BAUTISTA, Solicitor General of the Philippines General belongs to the executive department and
G.R. No. L-3452;December 7, 1949; PADILLA, J cannot assume the powers and duties of a member in
the Commission.
 8
The respondent contends that his designation Extraordinary Legal Remedies," High on this point
is lawful and valid, not only because the power to says:
appoint vested in the President includes the power to Thus, when the legislature have, by an unconstitutional
designate, but also because it is expressly so provided statute, referred to a body of judges the determination
in Commonwealth Act No. 588; and that the offices of the validity of a statute concerning the liability of the
held by him, one permanent and the other temporary, state upon bonds issued in aid of railways, prohibition
are not incompatible. will lie to prevent such body from acting upon the
Petitioner now prays that after due hearing a matters thus submitted. So when an act of legislature
writ of prohibition issue commanding the respondent delegates to a judge powers partly judicial and partly of
Solicitor General to desist forever from acting as acting a legislative character, as regards the determination of
member of the Commission on Election under the petitions for the incorporation of villages, the act being
designation rendered to him by President Quirino on held unconstitutional because assuming to
November 9, 1949 unless he is legally appointed as delegate legislative powers to a court or judicial
regular member of the said Commission on Elections body, prohibition will lie to prevent the exercise of
ISSUE: W/N writ of prohibition is the proper remedy in the powers thus conferred.
this case OTHER ISSUES:
HELD:YES · The position of the Commissioner is vacant
Strictly speaking, there are no proceedings of the because Commissioner Enage filed an application
Commission on Elections in the exercise of its judicial for retirement without filing for leave.
or ministerial functions, which are being performed by · By the very nature of their functions, the
it or without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with members of the Commission on Elections must be
grave abuse of its discretion. The only basis for the independent. That independence and impartiality
petition is that the designation of the respondent as may be shaken and destroyed by a designation of
temporary member of the Commission on Elections is a person or officer to act temporarily in the
illegal and invalid because it offends against the Commission on Elections. It would be more in
Constitution. This special civil action as our Rule call it, keeping with the intent, purpose and aim of the
or this extraordinary legal remedy following the framers of the Constitution to appoint a
classical or chancery nomenclature, is in effect to test permanent Commissioner than to designated,
the validity or legality of the respondent's designation tested by the nature and character of the
in a temporary capacity as member of the Commission functions he has to perform in both offices, but
on Elections pending the appointment of a permanent in the broad sense there is an incompatibility,
member or Commissioner. It is in the nature of a quo because his duties and functions as Solicitor
warranto, and as such it may only be instituted by the General require that all his time be devoted to
party who claims to be entitled to the office. The their efficient performance.
authorities and decisions of courts are almost
unanimous that prohibition will not lie to determine 65.12 (Prohibition 4)
the title of a de facto judicial officer, since its only MARCELO ENRIQUEZ v. HIGINIO B. MACADAEG,
function is to prevent a usurpation of jurisdiction Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
by a subordinate court In the case at bar, however, MELITON YBURAN, and THE PHILIPPINE
as we have found that the respondent's designation to NATIONAL BANK
act temporarily a member of the Commission on G.R. No. L-2422. September 30, 1949. REYES, J
Elections is unlawful because it offends against the Petition For A Writ Of Mandamus
provision of the Constitution creating the Commission ER: In a civil case, Yburan filed a suit before RTC
on Elections, the dismissal of the petition would deny Cebu to declare himself as owner of a real property
and deprive the parties that are affected by such located in Negros Oriental. Enriquez moved to
designation of a remedy and relief, because no one is dismissed the case on the ground of improper venue.
entitled now to the office and a party who is not The motion having been denied, Enriquez filed the
entitled to the office may not institute quo warrant present petition for mandamus to compel the
proceedings, and the respondent as Solicitor General, respondent judge to dismiss the action.
the only other party who may institute the proceedings, SC: The venue is improperly laid and the motion to
would not proceed against himself. In these dismiss should be granted. However, when a motion to
circumstances, it is incumbent upon and the duty dismiss on the ground of improper venue is
of this Court to grant a remedy. There are cases erroneously denied, mandamus is not the proper
involving a situation similar to the one under the remedy for correcting the error. It being a case where a
consideration wherein it was ruled that the remedy judge is proceeding in defiance of the Rules of Court
of prohibition may lie. In his treatise entitled " by refusing to dismiss an action which should not be
maintained in his court, the remedy is prohibition. But,
 9
the petition for mandamus may be treated as While the petition is for mandamus, the same may well
prohibition in the interest of a speedy administration of be treated as one for prohibition by waiving strict
justice. adherence to technicalities in the interest of a speedy
administration of justice pursuant to section 2, Rule 1,
FACTS: Rules of Court.
The civil case in question is for the recovery of a piece
of real property situated in Negros Oriental, the C.MANDAMUS
complaint alleging that the said property had been 65.13 (Mandamus 1)
bought by Yburan at an execution sale but that, NEMESIO M. CALIM vs. THE HONORABLE JESUS
notwithstanding the sale, the judgment debtor, as F. GUERRERO, THE HONORABLE EMILIO A.
supposed owner of said property, subsequently GONZALEZ III, THE HONORABLE ADORACTION A.
mortgaged the same to the Philippine National Bank AGBADA, in their respective capacities as Deputy
and refused to surrender possession thereof to Ombudsman for Luzon, Director and Graft
Yburan, whereupon, the latter brought suit (Yburan v Investigation Officer II, THE HONORABLE
Enriquez) before RTC Cebu to have himself declared ROBERTO J. ACOBA, Vice-Mayor, Siniloan,
owner of said property and placed in possession Laguna, PAUL SIMON Z. GO, HOMER R.
thereof. Before filing their answer, the Enriquez in that SERRANO, FELIPE A. EM, ELIGIO R. DE LEON,
case moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the FELIPE V. CASTRO, GAUDENCIO C. SALAY,
ground, among others, that, as the action concerned ANDRES V. QUINTERO, HECTOR A. MANEJA,
title to and possession of real estate situated in Negros SEDFREY B. REALEZA, all members of the
Oriental, venue was improperly laid in the Court of Sangguniang Bayan, Siniloan, Laguna
First Instance of Cebu. The motion having been G.R. No. 156527; March 5, 2007; CHICO-NAZARIO,
denied, Enriquez filed the present petition for J
mandamus to compel the respondent judge to Petition for Mandamus
dismiss the action. ER: Calim operates Eastern Laguna Tours in
ISSUE:W/N mandamus is the proper remedy Siniloan. However, the private respondents
HELD: NO. It is prohibition. (members of the Sanggunian) recommended the
Rule 5 (old rule) requires that actions affecting title to cancellation of his business permits. Calim filed a
or recovery of possession of real property be complaint with the Office of the Deputy
commenced and tried in the province where the Ombudsman for Luzon for violation of Anti-Graft
property lies, while Rule 8, provides that defendant
and Corrupt Practices Act and Sec 5 of RA 6713.
For the matter of RA 6713 violation, the
may, within the time for pleading, file a motion to
respondents failed to reply with Calim’s request to
dismiss the action when "venue is improperly laid." As
clarify the basis for the cancellation of his permit.
the action sought to be dismissed affects title to and
The Ombudsman admonished the private
the recovery of possession of real property situated in respondents for such failure, with a stern warning
Oriental Negros, it is obvious that the action was that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with
improperly brought in the Court of First Instance of more severely. Calim filed this Petition for
Cebu. The motion to dismiss was therefore proper and Mandamus before the SC to compel the
should have been granted. Ombudsman to file an Information against the
respondents.
But, while the respondent judge committed a SC: Mandamus will not issue to control or review
manifest error in denying the motion, mandamus the exercise of discretion of a public officer where
is not the proper remedy for correcting that error, the law imposes upon said public officer the right
for this is not a case where a tribunal "unlawfully and duty to exercise his judgment in reference to
neglects the performance of an act which the law any matter in which he is required to act. The
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office" discretion to prosecute or dismiss a complaint
or "unlawfully excludes another from the use and filed before it is lodged in the Office of the
enjoyment of a right." (Section 3, Rule 67, Rules of Ombudsman itself. Furthermore, Calim availed
Court.) It is rather a case where a judge is the wrong remedy, jurisprudence provides that
proceeding in defiance of the Rules of Court by Rule 43 should be the remedy for Ombudsman’s
refusing to dismiss an action which would not be decisions on administrative disciplinary cases,
maintained in his court. The remedy in such case and Petition for Certiorari for criminal cases,
is prohibition (section 2, Rule 67), and that remedy is
neither provides for mandamus,
FACTS:
available in the present case because the order
Calim operates Eastern Laguna Tours and
complained of, being merely of an interlocutory nature,
Tourist Services in Siniloan, Laguna. Private
is not appealable.
respondents are the vice mayor and councillors of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Siniloan. Calim filed a
 10
Complaint-Affidavit with the Office of the Deputy Calim filed the instant Petition for
Ombudsman for Luzon against private Mandamus, seeking to compel the public
respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of respondents to file the appropriate information for
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise violation of Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 6713,
known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against private respondents Sangguniang Bayan
and Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 6713. members of Siniloan, Laguna. According to him,
Calim alleged that he was given a mayor’s the Complaint was for a criminal offense, and not
permit from the municipal government of Siniloan, simply a case of administrative misfeasance.
Laguna, for his tours and tourist services (note: Calim was not satisfied with mere
business but when he applied for registration he admonishment)
was advised to register as Eastern Laguna Tours ISSUE: W/N the Ombudsman can be compelled
instead of Mabuhay Tours, which was his first by mandamus to file an Information against the
priority. The Sangguniang Bayan due to a letter- private respondents
complaint filed against Eastern Tours issued a HELD: NO
Kapasiyahan Blg 81 and unanimously It is elementary that mandamus applies as a
recommended the cancellation of the municipal remedy only where petitioner’s right is founded
license and permit issued to Eastern Laguna clearly on law and not when it is doubtful. A writ of
Tours and Tourist Services. Thus, the operations mandamus can be issued only when petitioner’s
of his business ceased, thereby, causing him legal right to the performance of a particular act
injury, and giving unwarranted benefits and which is sought to be compelled is clear and
advantage to his competitor, Van on the Run. The complete. A clear legal right is a right which is
president of Van on the Run is Felipe Castro, who indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a
was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of matter of law. Mandamus, therefore, is employed
Siniloan, Laguna, and one of the private to compel the performance, when refused, of a
respondents herein. ministerial duty, this being its chief use and not a
Sanggunian contended that there was discretionary duty.
nothing irregular in the issuance of Kapasiyahan Mandamus will not issue to control or review the
Bilang 81, as the same was merely a request to exercise of discretion of a public officer where the
the municipal mayor for cancellation of the law imposes upon said public officer the right and
mayor’s permit after a finding on their part that duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any
the petitioner violated the terms and conditions matter in which he is required to act.
set in the permit. Essentially, what petitioner attacks in the instant
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Petition for Mandamus is the order of the Office of
Luzon issued a resolution recommending the the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, in
dismissal of petitioner’s Complaint for lack of admonishing the private respondents. The case
probable cause. The recommendation was partakes of an administrative disciplinary nature.
approved by the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, Herein, petitioner was not able to establish his
Jesus F. Guerrero. entitlement to a writ of mandamus. Petitioner fails
Upon Calim’s reconsideration the Office of to demonstrate that he has a clear legal right to
the Deputy Ombudsman issued a Joint Order. compel the public respondents to file a criminal
While dismissing the complaint for violation of information against the private respondents.
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 for lack of Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court will not
probable cause, it however acknowledged that it interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise of his
committed a reversible error in not taking investigatory and prosecutory powers without
consideration of the charge for the violation of good and compelling reasons to indicate
Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 6713. Ruling on otherwise. The discretion to prosecute or dismiss
the matter, the Deputy Ombudsman found that a complaint filed before it is lodged in the Office of
there was no justification on private respondents’ the Ombudsman itself. To compel the
part in ignoring to reply to petitioner’s letter within Ombudsman to further pursue a criminal case
the prescribed time, as specified in Republic Act against the private respondents, as petitioner
No. 6713, and, hence, admonished the private would have it, is outside the ambit of the courts.
respondents for such failure, with a stern warning A graver reason that impels this court to reject
that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with petitioner’s plea is the mode taken by petitioner in
more severely. (note: Sanggunian did not reply to elevating the case to this court. In the case of
Calim’s letter requesting to clarify basis for Fabian v. Desierto, this court ruled that appeals, if
cancelling his permit, so Ombudsman availing, from decisions of the Office of the
admonished them. The Ombudsman refused to Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases
accept private respondents reason for failure to should be brought to the Court of Appeals under
reply is due to computer problems) the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Meanwhile, the Court in Kuizon v. Ombudsman
 11
instructed that petitions for certiorari questioning Petitioners then waited for respondent’s resolution
the Ombudsman’s orders or decisions in criminal on the parties’ respective formal offers of
cases should be filed in the Supreme Court and evidence, but there was none. This prompted
not the Court of Appeals. This is the prevailing petitioners to file a Motion to Set Date for the
rule. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, in Simultaneous Filing of Memorandum by Each Party.
admonishing the private respondents, deemed Respondent, however, did not act on petitioners’
the matter to be one in the nature of an motion. On December 12, 2002, Edilberto R.
administrative disciplinary case. The petitioner, in Feliciano, one of those charged with petitioners, filed a
filing the instant Petition for Mandamus before Motion for Early Resolution expressing alarm over the
this Court, took a route that is antagonistic to “inaction of the Office of the Ombudsman,” and praying
prevailing rules and jurisprudence. (note: criminal that the cases be resolved immediately considering
cases-Ombudsman-Petition for Certiorari; that all the evidence have been formally offered and
administrative disciplinary cases-Rule 43, thus,
the parties’ arguments have been submitted. Despite
petitioner availed the wrong remedy of
all these and petitioners’ repeated personal follow-
mandamus)
ups, still, respondent failed to resolve the cases.
65.14 (Mandamus 2)
ALFREDO R. ENRIQUEZ, GENER C. ENDONA, and On March 24, 2006, or six (6) years from the filing of
RHANDOLFO B. AMANSEC vs. OFFICE OF THE the complaints- affidavits and more than four (4)
OMBUDSMAN years after the parties formally offered their
G.R. Nos. 174902-06, February 15, 2008, evidence on January 29, 2002, petitioners filed a
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. Motion to Dismiss all the cases against them as
Petition For Mandamus respondent’s “inordinate delay” constitutes a violation
ER: FFIB,Ombudsman filed complaints against of their constitutional right to a speedy disposition of
petitioners with administrative and criminal offenses. their cases. Significantly, complainant FFIB, despite
However, years later, the Ombudsman failed to notice, did not interpose any objection to
resolve the case. More than four (4) years after the petitioners’ motion to dismiss. Yet, the cases have
parties formally offered their evidence on January 29, remained unresolved.
2002, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss all the
cases against them as respondent’s “inordinate delay” Owing to respondent’s “stubborn inaction,” petitioners
constitutes a violation of their constitutional right to a filed the present petition for mandamus, invoking their
speedy disposition of their cases. Yet, the case constitutional right to a speedy disposition of their
remained unresolved. Petitioners filed the present cases. Petitioners pray that the Office of the
petition for mandamus, invoking their constitutional Ombudsman, respondent, be ordered to dismiss the
right to a speedy disposition of their cases. The administrative and criminal cases against them.
Ombudsman averred that mandamus cannot be Respondent maintains that it did not violate petitioners’
resorted to because it is a discretionary function. right to a speedy disposition of their cases; that
SC: Although mandamus is proper only in ministerial petitioners cannot resort to the remedy of mandamus
function, SC held that if the questioned act was done because dismissing the administrative and criminal
with grave abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or cases against them involves respondent’s exercise of
palpable excess of authority, the writ will be issued to discretion; and that respondent did not act with grave
control the exercise of such discretion. Likewise, abuse of discretion for failing to resolve the cases.
mandamus is a proper recourse for citizens who seek ISSUE: Whether the petition for mandamus is an
to enforce a public right and to compel the appropriate remedy.
performance of a public duty, most especially when HELD: YES
mandated by the Constitution. In this case, respondent Mandamus is the Appropriate Remedy
acted with grave abuse of discretion for failing to
resolve the case for 8 years. Ordinarily, a petition for a writ of mandamus is proper
FACTS: to compel the public official concerned to perform a
On May 9, 2000, the Fact-Finding and Intelligence ministerial act which the law specifically enjoins as a
Bureau (FFIB), Office of the Ombudsman, filed with duty resulting from an office, trust or station. However,
the Administrative Adjudication Bureau, same Office, it is inaccurate to say that the writ will never issue to
separate Complaints-Affidavits of even date, charging, control the public official’s discretion. Our
among others, herein petitioners with administrative jurisprudence is replete with exceptions to that rule.
and criminal offenses (violation of Code of Conduct, Thus, this Court held that if the questioned act was
Anti-Graft, and Administrative Code), in connection done with grave abuse of discretion, manifest injustice
with the bidding of the Land Titling Computerization or palpable excess of authority, the writ will be issued
Project of the LRA. to control the exercise of such discretion. Likewise,
 12
mandamus is a proper recourse for citizens who seek SC: CA erred in issuing the writ. Recognized in this
to enforce a public right and to compel the jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be
performance of a public duty, most especially when used to enforce contractual obligations. Generally,
mandated by the Constitution. Thus, a party to a case mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract
may demand expeditious action from all officials who rights, and will not lie against an individual unless
are tasked with the administration of justice. some obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-
public duty is imposed. To preserve its prerogative
Under the undisputed facts before us, we hold that character, mandamus is not used for the redress of
respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by failing to public. Moreover, an important principle followed in the
resolve the administrative and criminal cases against issuance of the writ is that there should be no plain,
petitioners even to this day, or a period of almost eight speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
(8) years from the filing of their complaints- affidavits. law other than the remedy of mandamus being
Other Issue: invoked. In the instant case, the Court, without
Whether respondent violated petitioners’ constitutional ascertaining whether the obligation is in the nature of a
right to a speedy disposition of their cases.—YES public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of
When the Constitution enjoins respondent to “act mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee
promptly” on any complaint against any public officer because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate
or employee, it has the concomitant duty to speedily remedy in the ordinary course of law, which is Rule 76.
resolve the same. But respondent did not act FACTS:
promptly or resolve speedily petitioners’ cases. The Alleging that his father passed away and left a
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman holographic will, which is now in the custody of
requires that the hearing officer is given a definite petitioner Uy Kiao Eng, his mother, respondent Nixon
period of “not later than thirty (30) days” to resolve Lee filed a petition for mandamus with damages before
the case after the formal investigation shall have the RTC of Manila, to compel petitioner to produce the
been concluded.[21] Definitely, respondent did not will so that probate proceedings for the allowance
observe this 30-day rule. thereof could be instituted. Allegedly, respondent had
already requested his mother to settle and liquidate the
Here, respondent did not resolve the administrative patriarch’s estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their
and criminal cases against petitioners although the respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so
investigation of the said cases had long been without any justifiable reason.
terminated when the latter formally offered their Uy moved to dismissed and denied that she
evidence way back on January 29, 2002. In fact, was in custody of the original holographic will and that
due to respondent’s inaction, petitioners, on March 24, she knew of its whereabouts. She, moreover, asserted
2006 or more than four (4) years from January 29, that photocopies of the will were given to respondent
2002. Significantly, this motion was never resisted and to his siblings, further Uy contended that
by complainant FFIB. Nonetheless, respondent respondent should have first exerted earnest efforts to
did not even bother to act on the motion. Likewise, amicably settle the controversy.
it did not inform petitioners why the cases remain After the presentation and formal offer of
unresolved. respondent’s evidence, petitioner demurred,
contending that her son failed to prove that she had in
65.15 (Mandamus 3) her custody the original holographic will. In addition,
UY KIAO ENG vs. NIXON LEE the pieces of documentary evidence did not prove or
G.R. No. 176831; January 15, 2010; NACHURA, J. disprove that she unlawfully neglected the
Petition For Review On Certiorari Under Rule 45 performance of an act which the law specifically
ER: Lee filed a Petition for mandamus to compel his enjoined as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
mother, Uy, to produce the holographic will of his station, for the court to issue the writ of mandamus.
father allegedly in Uy’s possession. Uy denied that she RTC at first denied the demurrer, but later
has the custody of the will, and alleged that Lee and granted it.
his siblings have its photocopies. After Lee’s The CA initially denied the appeal for lack of
presentation of evidence, Uy demurred, contending merit. It ruled that the writ of mandamus would issue
that the pieces of documentary evidence failed to only in instances when no other remedy would be
prove his custody of the will and such won’t suffice to available and sufficient to afford redress, in this case
enjoin a duty to issue the writ of mandamus. RTC Lee has Rule 76. However, upon reconsideration, it set
ruled in Uy’s favour. However, the CA upon aside its earlier ruling, issued the writ and ordered the
reconsideration issued the writ and ordered Uy to production of the will.
produce the will.
 13
Uy now contends in the main that the petition invoked. In other words, mandamus can be issued only
for mandamus is not the proper remedy and that the in cases where the usual modes of procedure and
testimonial evidence used by the appellate court as forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief.
basis for its ruling is inadmissible. Although classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in issuing the writ of equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally
mandamus controlled by equitable principles. Indeed, the grant of
HELD: YES the writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law court.
of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily
the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, ascertaining whether the obligation involved here—the
or board, or to some corporation or person requiring production of the original holographic will—is in the
the performance of a particular duty therein specified, nature of a public or a private duty, rules that the
which duty results from the official station of the party remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by
to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law. respondent Lee because there lies another plain,
This definition recognizes the public character of the speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be course of law. Let it be noted that respondent has a
resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production
performance of duties in which the public has no of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules of
interest. Court, however, does not prevent him from instituting
The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to probate proceedings for the allowance of the will
compel an official to do anything which is not his duty whether the same is in his possession or not (Rule 76).
to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the
applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. 65.16 (Mandamus 4)
Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in Hilarion M. Henares, Jr., Victor C. Agustin, Alfredo
substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt L. Henares, Daniel L. Henares, Enrique Belo
exists, although objection raising a mere technical Henares, And Cristina Belo Henares Vs. Land
question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the Transportation Franchising And Regulatory Board
case is meritorious. As a rule, mandamus will not lie in And Department Of Transportation And
the absence of any of the following grounds: Communications
[a] that the court, officer, board, or person against G.R. No. 158290; October 23, 2006; Quisumbing, J
whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the Petition for a Writ of Mandamus
performance of an act which the law specifically ER: Petitioners filed this case for the issuance of a writ
enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; of mandamus commanding respondents LTFRB, and
or DOTC to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use
[b] that such court, officer, board, or person has compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel, in
unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and order to counter the detrimental effects of emissions
enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled. from PUVs. The SolGen states the mandamus is not
Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the the proper remedy because it is only available in a
principle that mandamus cannot be used to ministerial act. Further, RA 8749, which petitioners
enforce contractual obligations. Generally, invoke does not even mention the existence of CNG as
mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private alternative fuel and avers that unless this law is
contract rights, and will not lie against an individual amended to provide CNG as alternative fuel for PUVs,
unless some obligation in the nature of a public or the respondents cannot propose that PUVs use CNG
quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is not as alternative fuel.
appropriate to enforce a private right against an SC: The writ should not be issued. For the issuance of
individual. The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the the writ of mandamus it is essential to the issuance of
execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal
obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating right to the thing demanded and it must be the
to the public and to the government; hence, it is called imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act
a prerogative writ. To preserve its prerogative required. Mandamus is available only to compel the
character, mandamus is not used for the redress doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty.
of private wrongs, but only in matters relating to Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents
the public. LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor
Moreover, an important principle followed in the vehicles to use CNG. Further, mandamus will not
issuance of the writ is that there should be no plain, generally lie from one branch of government to a
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither
law other than the remedy of mandamus being is inferior to the other
 14
enjoins as a duty; (2) in case any corporation, board or
FACTS: person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an
of mandamus commanding respondents LTFRB, and office, trust, or station; and (3) in case any tribunal,
DOTC to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use corporation, board or person unlawfully excludes
compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel. another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office
Citing statistics on the high growth and low to which such other is legally entitled; and there is no
turnover in vehicle ownership in the Philippines, other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
including diesel-powered vehicles, two-stroke engine ordinary course of law.
powered motorcycles and their concomitant emission In University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
of air pollutants, petitioners attempt to present a the Court said:
compelling case for judicial action against the bane of “On the part of the petitioner, it is essential to the
air pollution and related environmental hazards. issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a
Petitioners allege that the particulate matters (PM) clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be
have caused detrimental effects on health, the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the
productivity, infrastructure and the overall quality of act required. It never issues in doubtful cases. While it
life. may not be necessary that the duty be absolutely
To counter the detrimental effects of expressed, it must however, be clear…. The writ
emissions from PUVs, petitioners propose the use of neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply
CNG. According to petitioners, CNG is a natural gas a command to exercise a power already possessed
comprised mostly of methane which although and to perform a duty already imposed.”
containing small amounts of propane and butane, is Petitioners invoked the provisions of the Constitution
colorless and odorless and considered the cleanest and the Clean Air Act, although admitting that both are
fossil fuel because it produces much less pollutants general mandates that do not specifically enjoin the
The Solicitor General, for the respondents, use of any kind of fuel, particularly the use of CNG,
states the mandamus is not the correct remedy, there is an executive order implementing a program on
explains that in contrast to a discretionary act, a the use of CNG by public vehicles, which is EO 290.
ministerial act, which a mandamus is, is one in which Under the Clean Air Act it is the DENR that is tasked to
an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, set the emission standards for fuel use and the task of
in a prescribed manner, in obedience to a mandate of developing an action plan. As far as motor vehicles are
legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his concerned, it devolves upon the DOTC and the
own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of an LTFRB.
act done. Regrettably, however, the plain, speedy and adequate
The Solicitor General also notes that nothing remedy herein sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ of
in Rep. Act No. 8749 that petitioners invoke prohibits mandamus commanding the respondents to require
the use of gasoline and diesel by owners of motor PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is
vehicles. It does not even mention the existence of available only to compel the doing of an act
CNG as alternative fuel and avers that unless this law specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there
is amended to provide CNG as alternative fuel for is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB
PUVs, the respondents cannot propose that PUVs use and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to
CNG as alternative fuel. The Solicitor General also use CNG. At most the LTFRB has been tasked by
adds that it is the DENR that is tasked to implement E.O. No. 290 "to grant preferential and exclusive
Rep. Act No. 8749 and not the LTFRB nor the DOTC Certificates of Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises
Petitioners contend that respondents failure to to operators of NGVs based on the results of the
recognize CNG and compel its use by PUVs as DOTC surveys."
alternative fuel while air pollution brought about by the Further, mandamus will not generally lie from one
emissions of gasoline and diesel endanger the branch of government to a coordinate branch, for
environment and the people, is tantamount to neglect the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the
in the performance of a duty which the law enjoins. other. The need for future changes in both legislation
ISSUE: W/N mandamus should be issued against and its implementation cannot be preempted by orders
respondents to compel PUVs to use CNG as from this Court, especially when what is prayed for is
alternative fuel procedurally infirm.
HELD:NO
Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, 65.17 (Mandmus 5)
mandamus lies under any of the following cases: (1) Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa Manila
against any tribunal which unlawfully neglects the Railroad Company Credit Union, Inc. Vs. Manila
performance of an act which the law specifically Railroad Company
 15
G.R. No. L-25316; February 28, 1979; FERNANDO, payments to the obligations of employees in favor of
J their credit unions, then, the law would have so
Appeal expressly declared.”
ER: The lower court dismissed the petitioner’s Respondent agrees that there is nothing in
mandamus petition. Petitioner contends that under the said provision from which it could be implied that it
provisions of Rep. Act 2023, the loans granted by gives top priority to obligations of the nature of that
credit union to its members enjoy first priority in the payable to petitioner, and that, therefore, respondent
payroll collection from the respondent's employees' company, in issuing the documents which establish the
wages and salaries. The appellate court ruled that the order of priority of payment out of the salaries of the
mandatory character of Rep. Act 2023 is only to employees did not violate the above-quoted Section 62
compel the employer to make the deduction of the of Republic Act 2023.
employees' debt from the latter's salary and turn this ISSUE: W/N the lower court erred in dismissing the
over to the employees' credit union but this mandatory mandamus petition
character does not convert the credit union's credit into HELD: NO
a first priority credit. The applicable provision of Republic Act No. 2023
SC: SC agrees with the appellate court. RA 2023 quoted earlier, speaks for itself. There is no ambiguity.
provides no ambiguity that first priority is not given. As thus worded, it was so applied. Petitioner-appellant
Clearly, then, mandamus does not lie. Kapisanan was cannot therefore raise any valid objection. For the
unable to show a clear legal right. The very law on lower court to view it otherwise would have been to
which he would base his action fails to supply any alter the law. That cannot be done by the judiciary.
basis for this petition. Only specific legal rights may be Clearly, then, mandamus does not lie. Kapisanan
enforced by mandamus if they are clear and certain. If was unable to show a clear legal right. The very
the legal rights are of the petitioner are not well law on which he would base his action fails to
defined, clear, and certain, the petition must be supply any basis for this petition. "Man-damus is
dismissed. the proper remedy if it could be shown that there was
FACTS: neglect on the part of a tribunal in the performance of
Kapisanan seek a reversal of the decision of an act, which specifically the law enjoins as a duty or
the lower court dismissing their mandamus an unlawful exclusion of a party from the use and
petition relying on what it considered to be a right enjoyment of a right to which he is entitled. The
granted by Section 62 of the Republic Act No. 2023, opinion continued in this wise:"According to former
more specifically the first two paragraphs (basically Chief Justice Moran," only specific legal rights may
authorizes the member of the co-operative to sign an be enforced by mandamus if they are clear and
agreement authorizing his employer to deduct from his certain. If the legal rights are of the petitioner are
wages the amount of debt the member owes to the co- not well defined, clear, and certain, the petition
operative) Kapisanan contends that under the above must be dismissed.
provisions of Rep. Act 2023, the loans granted by
credit union to its members enjoy first priority in the
payroll collection from the respondent's employees'
wages and salaries.
The decision of the appellate court provides:
“There is nothing in the provision of Rep. Act 2023
hereinabove quoted which provides that obligation of
laborers and employees payable to credit unions shall
enjoy first priority in the deduction from the employees'
wages and salaries. The only effect of Rep. Act 2023 65.18
is to compel the employer to deduct from the salaries STAR SPECIAL WATCHMAN AND DETECTIVE
or wages payable to members of the employees' AGENCY, INC., CELSO A. FERNANDEZ and
cooperative credit unions the employees' debts to the MANUEL V. FERNANDEZ, Petitioners,
union and to pay the same to the credit union. In other vs.
words, the mandatory character of Rep. Act 2023 is PUERTO PRINCESA CITY, MAYOR EDWARD
only to compel the employer to make the deduction of HAGEDORN and CITY COUNCIL OF PUERTO
the employees' debt from the latter's salary and turn PRINCESA CITY, Respondents.
this over to the employees' credit union but this G.R. No. 181792 April 21, 2014
mandatory character does not convert the credit PETITION: Petition for mandamus
union's credit into a first priority credit. If the legislative EMERGENCY RECIT:
intent in enacting pars. 1 and 2 of Sec. 62 of Rep. Act Petitioners were the owners of two (2) parcels
2023 were to give first priority in the matter of of land located in Puerto Princesa City. One of the lots
 16
(Lot 7) was taken and used by the national fully paid. The ₱1 million monthly payment was further
government as a road right-of-way leading to the reduced to ₱500,000.00.
military camp established in Puerto Princesa City. Pursuant thereto, respondents initially appropriated the
Petitioners filed an action for Payment of Just amount of ₱2 million representing the initial payment of
Compensation. RTC br 78 ruled in favor of petitioners petitioners’ claim. On May 10, 1996, however, Celso
and ordered respondents to pay them just Fernandez wrote a letter informing respondents that
compensation. A writ of execution was issued. after petitioners received the amount of ₱2 million from
Respondents initially paid but was unable to pay for them in February 1996, there were no more payments
the following months. Petitioners filed a complaint received for the months of March, April and May 1996.
before the RTC-Br. 223 against respondents for Records show that the total negotiated amount of ₱12
collection of unpaid just compensation, including million was already fully paid and received by
interests and rentals. RTC Br 23 ruled in favor of petitioners on the basis of the certification issued by
petitioners and a writ of execution was issued. then City Treasurer of Puerto Princesa, Rogelio L.
Petitioners wrote a letter to the Commission On Audit Hitosis. Nevertheless, on November 27, 2001,
(COA) requesting that it order respondents to pay petitioners filed a complaint before the RTC-Br. 223
petitioners the amount adjudged in the decision of the (Civil Case No. Q-01-45668) against respondents for
RTC-Br. 223 but was denied by COA stating that it had collection of unpaid just compensation, including
no jurisdiction over the matter as the case was already interests and rentals, in accordance with the RTC-Br.
in the execution stage. Hence, petitioners filed petition 78 Decision.
for mandamus. The RTC-Br. 223 rendered its decision in favor of
The Supreme Court held that the petition for petitioners. A writ of execution was issued. On
mandamus was improper. An important principle February 14, 2006, petitioners filed a motion to declare
followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should respondents in indirect contempt of court for their
be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the failure to comply with the RTC-Br. 223 decision despite
ordinary course of law other than the remedy of the issuance of a writ of execution against them.
mandamus being invoked. Considering that the COA Petitioners’ motion was denied by the RTC-Br. 223
still retained its primary jurisdiction to adjudicate ruling that government funds may not be subjected to
money claim, petitioners should have filed a petition execution and levy, or to garnishment, unless there
for certiorari with this Court pursuant to Section 50 of was a corresponding appropriation law or ordinance.
P.D. No. 1445. Hence, the COA's refusal to act did not On May 7, 2007, petitioners wrote a letter to the
leave the petitioners without any remedy at all. Commission On Audit (COA) requesting that it order
FACTS: respondents to pay petitioners the amount adjudged in
Star Special Watchman and Detective the decision of the RTC-Br. 223 but was denied by
Agency, Inc., Celso A. Fernandez and Manuel V. COA stating that it had no jurisdiction over the matter
Fernandez (petitioners) were the owners of two (2) as the case was already in the execution stage.
parcels of land located in Puerto Princesa City. The Undaunted, petitioners filed similar complaints against
national government established a military camp in respondents before the Office of the Deputy
Puerto Princesa, known as the Western Command. Ombudsman for Luzon and to the Office of the
One of the lots (Lot 7) of the petitioners was used as a Undersecretary of the Department of Interior and Local
road right-of-way leading to the military camp. Government.
In view of the encroachment, petitioners filed an action ISSUE:
for Payment of Just Compensation against Puerto Whether or not the remedy of mandamus is proper to
Princesa City, Mayor Edward Hagedorn and the City compel herein respondents to comply with the
Council of Puerto Princesa City (respondents). november 18, 2003 decision of the regional trial court
On July 22, 1993, the RTC-Br. 78 rendered a decision of quezon city, branch 223 and pay herein petitioners
(RTC-Br. 78 Decision) in favor of petitioners ordering of the judgment debt stated therein, plus the interests
the defendant Puerto Princesa City to pay them. A writ until fully paid
of execution was issued which directed respondents to RULING:
satisfy the money judgment. The total money judgment NO.
amounted to ₱16,930,892.97 as of October 1995. In Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals it was
Nonetheless, sometime in November 1995, petitioner held that where a municipality fails or refuses, without
Celso A. Fernandez and respondents’ legal counsel, justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final money
Atty. Rocamora, met and agreed to reduce the money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of
judgment to ₱12,000,000.00, subject to the condition the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the
that respondents would pay the amount of ₱2 million in enactment and approval of the necessary
February 1996 and, thereafter, ₱1 million monthly until appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding
disbursement of municipal funds therefore.
 17
In the case of Spouses Ciriaco and Arminda Ortega v. Hence, the COA's refusal to act did not leave the
City of Cebu: The writ is a proper recourse for citizens petitioners without any remedy at all.
who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is DENIED.
performance of a public duty, most especially when
the public right involved is mandated by the
Constitution. As the quoted provision instructs,
mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board, 65.19
officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance JOSEPH OMAR O. ANDAY A, Petitioner, v. RURAL
of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from BANK OF CABADBARAN, INC., DEMOSTHENES P.
an office, trust or station. An important principle ORAIZ and RICARDO D. GONZALEZ, Respondents.
followed in the issuance of the writ is that there G.R. No. 188769, August 03, 2016
should be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy EMERGENCY RECIT:
in the ordinary course of law other than the Andaya bought from Chute 2,200 shares of
remedy of mandamus being invoked. stock in the Rural Bank of Cabadbaran for P220,000.
Regarding final money judgment against the Chute requested the bank to register the transfer and
government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, issue new stock certificates in favor of Andaya. The
the legal remedy is to seek relief with the COA bank eventually denied the request. It reasoned that he
pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular 10- had a conflict of interest, as he was then president and
2000 dated October 25, 2000. Considering that a writ chief executive officer of the Green Bank of Caraga, a
of execution was already issued by RTC-Br. 223, the competitor bank. It also maintained that Chute should
remedy of petitioners is to follow up their claim with the have first offered her shares to the other stockholders,
COA. Petitioners rightfully did so, but the COA erred in as agreed upon during the 2001 stockholders' meeting.
not acting on the claim. Consequently, Andaya instituted an action for
Petitioners did file their Formal Money Claim with the mandamus and damages against the Rural Bank of
COA, but the latter, through its Legal and Adjudicating Cabadbaran; its corporate secretary, Oraiz; and its
Office-Local, wrote a letter, dated July 17, 2007, legal counsel, Gonzalez. Petitioner sought to compel
stating that it could not act upon petitioners’ request them to record the transfer in the bank's stock and
because it would encroach upon the prerogatives of transfer book and to issue new certificates of stock in
the RTC and the case was already in the execution his name. RTC denied the complaint stating that
stage. The COA was of the position that it had no petitioner Andaya had no legal standing to file petition
proper legal standing and jurisdiction anymore. for mandamus.
It is the opinion of this Court that COA should have The Supreme Court held that Andaya has
acted on the formal request of petitioners. It is clear legal standing to file petition for mandamus because
from Sections 26 and 49 of P.D. No. 1445 otherwise he was able to prove that he is a bona fide transferee
known as the Government Auditing Code of the of the shares. As the transferee of the shares,
Philippines that the COA has the authority and power petitioner stands to be benefited or injured by the
to settle "all debts and claims of any sort due from or judgment in the instant petition, a judgment that will
owing to the Government or any of its subdivisions, either order the bank to recognize the legitimacy of the
agencies and instrumentalities." This authority and transfer and petitioner's status as stockholder or to
power can still be exercised by the COA even if a deny the legitimacy thereof.
court’s decision in a case has already become final FACTS:
and executory. In other words, the COA still retains its Andaya bought from Chute 2,200 shares of
primary jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim even after the stock in the Rural Bank of Cabadbaran for P220,000.
issuance of a writ of execution. Chute duly endorsed and delivered the certificates of
More importantly, Section 50 of PD 1445 states that stock to Andaya and, subsequently, requested the
the party aggrieved by any decision, order or ruling of bank to register the transfer and issue new stock
the Commission on Audit may within thirty days from certificates in favor of the latter. Andaya also
his receipt of a copy thereof appeal on certiorari to the separately communicated with the bank's corporate
Supreme Court in the manner provided by law and the secretary, respondent Oraiz, reiterating Chute's
Rules of Court. When the decision, order, or ruling request for the issuance of new stock certificates in
adversely affects the interest of any government petitioner's favor.
agency, the appeal may be taken by the proper head A few days later, the bank's corporate
of that agency. secretary wrote Chute to inform her that he could not
Considering that the COA still retained its primary register the transfer. He explained that under a
jurisdiction to adjudicate money claim, petitioners previous stockholders' Resolution, existing
should have filed a petition for certiorari with this stockholders were given priority to buy the shares of
Court pursuant to Section 50 of P.D. No. 1445. others in the event that the latter offered those shares
 18
for sale (i.e., a right of first refusal). He then asked bona fide transferee who is able to establish a clear
Chute if she, instead, wished to have her shares legal right to the registration of the transfer. This legal
offered to existing stockholders. He told her that if no right inherently flows from the transferee's established
other stockholder would buy them, she could then ownership of the stocks.
proceed to sell her shares to outsiders. In transferring stock, the secretary of a corporation
Respondent Gonzalez (bank’s legal counsel) acts in purely ministerial capacity, and does not try to
informed Andaya that the latter’s request had been decide the question of ownership.The duty of the
referred to the bank’s board of directors for evaluation. corporation to transfer is a ministerial one and if it
Andaya responded by reiterating his earlier request for refuses to make such transaction without good cause,
the registration of the transfer and the issuance of new it may be compelled to do so by mandamus.
certificates of stock in his favor. Citing Section 98 of Consequently, transferees of shares of stock are real
the Corporation Code, he claimed that the purported parties in interest having a cause of action for
restriction on the transfer of shares of stock agreed mandamus to compel the registration of the transfer
upon during the 2001 stockholders' meeting could not and the corresponding issuance of stock certificates.
deprive him of his right as a transferee. He pointed out We also rule that Andaya has been able to establish
that the restriction did not appear in the bank's articles that he is a bona fide transferee of the shares of stock
of incorporation, bylaws, or certificates of stock. of Chute. In proving this fact, he presented to the RTC
The bank eventually denied the request of the following documents evidencing the sale: (1) a
Andaya. It reasoned that he had a conflict of interest, notarized Sale of Shares of Stocks showing Chute's
as he was then president and chief executive officer of sale of 2,200 shares of stock to petitioner; (2) a
the Green Bank of Caraga, a competitor bank. It also Documentary Stamp Tax Declaration/Return (3)
maintained that Chute should have first offered her Capital Gains Tax Return; and (4) stock certificates
shares to the other stockholders, as agreed upon covering the subject shares duly endorsed by Chute.
during the 2001 stockholders' meeting. The existence, genuineness, and due execution of
Consequently, Andaya instituted an action for these documents have been admitted and remain
mandamus and damages against the Rural Bank of undisputed. There is no doubt that Andaya had the
Cabadbaran; its corporate secretary, Oraiz; and its standing to initiate an action for mandamus to compel
legal counsel, Gonzalez. Petitioner sought to compel the Rural Bank of Cabadbaran to record the transfer of
them to record the transfer in the bank's stock and shares in its stock and transfer book and to issue new
transfer book and to issue new certificates of stock in stock certificates in his name. As the transferee of the
his name. shares, petitioner stands to be benefited or injured by
The RTC issued a Decision dismissing the the judgment in the instant petition, a judgment that will
complaint ruling that Andaya had no standing to either order the bank to recognize the legitimacy of the
compel the bank to register the transfer and issue transfer and petitioner's status as stockholder or to
stock certificates in his name. It explained that he had deny the legitimacy thereof.
failed "[to show] that the transfer of subject shares of This Court further finds that the reliance of the RTC on
stock [was] recorded in the stock and transfer book of Ponce case in finding that petitioner had no cause of
[the] bank or that [he was] authorized by [Chute] to action for mandamus against the defendant bank was
make the transfer. misplaced. In Ponce, it was held that without the
Consequently, Andaya directly filed with this registration of the transfer, the alleged transferee could
Court a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari not yet be recognized as a stockholder who is entitled
assailing the RTC Decision on pure questions of law. to be given a stock certificate. In contrast, at the crux
ISSUE: of this petition are the registration of the transfer and
Whether Andaya, as a transferee of shares of the issuance of the corresponding stock certificates.
stock, may initiate an action for mandamus Requiring petitioner to register the transaction before
compelling the Rural Bank of Cabadbaran to record he could institute a mandamus suit in supposed
the transfer of shares in its stock and transfer book, as abidance by the ruling in Ponce was a palpable error. It
well as issue new stock certificates in his name. led to an absurd, circuitous situation in which Andaya
RULING: was prevented from causing the registration of the
The petition is partly meritorious. transfer, ironically because the shares had not been
It is already settled jurisprudence that the registration registered.
of a transfer of shares of stock is a ministerial duty on On whether the writ of mandamus should issue:
the part of the corporation. Aggrieved parties may then accordingly, a writ of mandamus to enforce a
resort to the remedy of mandamus to compel ministerial act may issue only when petitioner is able to
corporations that wrongfully or unjustifiably refuse to establish the presence of the following: (1) right clearly
record the transfer or to issue new certificates of stock. founded in law and is not doubtful; (2) a legal duty to
This remedy is available even upon the instance of a perform the act; (3) unlawful neglect in performing the
 19
duty enjoined by law; (4) the ministerial nature of the rule is that the motion for reconsideration is an
act to be performed; and (5) the absence of other indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary resort to the special civil action for certiorari under Rule
course of law. 65 of the Rules of Court. None of the exceptions to this
Respondents primarily challenge the mandamus suit general rule is present in the case, hence the petition
on the grounds that the transfer violated the bank must be dismissed.
stockholders' right of first refusal and that petitioner FACTS:
was a buyer in bad faith. Both parties refer to Section On January 1, 1993, Petitioner Causing
98 of the Corporation Code to support their arguments. assumed office as the Municipal Civil Registrar of
It must be noted that Section 98 applies only to close Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo. On May 28, 2010, Mayor Biron
corporations. Hence, before the Court can allow the issued Memorandum No. 12, Series of 2010 which
operation of this section in the case at bar, there must reads “ Exigencies of service so requiring, you
first be a factual determination that respondent Rural (petitioner Causing) are hereby detailed at the Office of
Bank of Cabadbaran is indeed a close corporation. the Municipal Mayor effective upon receipt of this
There needs to be a presentation of evidence on the Order and shall likewise receive direct orders from the
relevant restrictions in the articles of incorporation j undersigned as to particular functions our office may
and bylaws of the said bank. From the records or the require from time to time”.
RTC Decision, there is apparently no such In view of the foregoing issuances by Mayor Biron,
determination or even allegation that would assist this Causing filed the complaint-affidavit dated June 8,
Court in ruling on these two major factual matters. 2010 in the Office of the Regional Election Director,
With the foregoing, the validity of the transfer cannot Region VI, in Iloilo City, claiming that Office Order No.
yet be tested using that provision. These are the 12 dated May 28, 2010 issued by Mayor Biron ordering
factual matters that the parties must first thresh out her detail to the Office of the Municipal Mayor, being
before the RTC. made within the election period and without prior
After finding that petitioner has legal standing to initiate authority from the COMELEC, was illegal and violative
an action for mandamus, the Court now reinstates the of Section 1, Paragraph A, No. 1, in connection with
action he filed and remands the case to the RTC to Section 6 (B) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8737,
resolve the propriety of issuing a writ of mandamus. Series of 2009.
The resolution of the case must include the In his counter-affidavit, Mayor Biron countered that the
determination of all relevant factual matters in purpose of transferring the office of Causing was to
connection with the issues at bar. closely supervise the performance of her functions
after complaints regarding her negative behavior in
dealing with her co-employees and with the public
65.20 transacting business in her office had been received;
ELSIE S. CAUSING, Petitioner, that as the local chief executive, he was empowered to
vs. take personnel actions and other management
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HERNAN D. prerogatives for the good of public service; that
BIRON, SR., Respondents. Causing was not being stripped of her functions as the
G.R. No. 199139 September 9, 2014 Municipal Civil Registrar; that she was not transferred
EMERGENCY RECIT: or detailed to another office in order to perform a
On May 28, 2010, Mayor Biron issued different function; and that she was not demoted to a
Memorandum No. 12, Series of 2010 which detailed lower position that diminished her salary and other
Petitioner Causing at the Office of the Municipal benefits.
Mayor. Causing filed the complaint-affidavit in the On September 9, 2011, the COMELEC En Banc
Office of the Regional Election Director claiming that affirmed the findings and recommendation of PES
Office Order No. 12, being made within the election Doronilla, observing that Mayor Biron did not transfer
period and without prior authority from the COMELEC, or detail Causing but only required her to physically
was illegal and violative of Section 1, Paragraph A, No. report to the Mayor’s office and to perform her
1, in connection with Section 6 (B) of COMELEC functions thereat; and that he did not strip her of her
Resolution No. 8737, Series of 2009. COMELEC En functions as the Municipal Civil Registrar, and did not
Banc dismissed the complaint of Causing. Causing deprive her of her supervisory functions over her staff.
filed a petition for certiorari. Mayor Brion argued that Hence, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari. Mayor
the petition for certiorari should be dismissed because Biron insists that the petition for certiorari should
petitioner failed to file a motion for reconsideration in be dismissed because of the petitioner’s failure to
the COMELEC. file a motion for reconsideration in the COMELEC,
The Supreme Court held that the petition for and because of her failure to attach copies of equally
certiorari should be dismissed. The well-established important documents pertinent to the case
 20
ISSUE: herein. Hence, Causing should have filed the motion
Whether or not the petition for certiorari should for reconsideration, especially because there was
be dismissed because of the petitioner’s failure to file a nothing in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that
motion for reconsideration in the COMELEC. precluded the filing of the motion for reconsideration in
RULING: election offense cases.
YES. Accordingly, the petition must be dismissed.
Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution states that
unless otherwise provided by the Constitution or by *Additional ruling: Mayor Biron’s acts did not violate
law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission the Omnibus Election Code and the COMELEC
may be brought to the Court on certiorari by the Resolution
aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of a copy The only personnel movements prohibited by
thereof. For this reason, the Rules of Court(1997) COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 were transfer and
contains a separate rule(Rule 64) on the review of the detail. Transfer is defined in the Resolution as "any
decisions of the COMELEC and the Commission on personnel movement from one government agency to
Audit. Rule 64 is generally identical with certiorari another or from one department, division, geographical
under Rule 65, except as to the period of the filing of unit or subdivision of a government agency to another
the petition for certiorari, that is, in the former, the with or without the issuance of an appointment;" while
period is 30 days from notice of the judgment or final detail as defined in the Administrative Code of 1987 is
order or resolution sought to be reviewed but, in the the movement of an employee from one agency to
latter, not later than 60 days from notice of the another without the issuance of an appointment.
judgment, order or resolution assailed. Having acquired technical and legal meanings, transfer
The well-established rule is that the motion for and detail must be construed as such. Obviously, the
reconsideration is an indispensable condition movement involving Causing did not equate to either a
before an aggrieved party can resort to the special transfer or a detail within the contemplation of the law if
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules Mayor Biron only thereby physically transferred her
of Court. The filing of the motion for reconsideration office area from its old location to the Office of the
before the resort to certiorari will lie is intended to Mayor "some little steps" away. We cannot accept the
afford to the public respondent the opportunity to petitioner’s argument, therefore, that the phrase "any
correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by transfer or detail whatsoever" encompassed "any and
way of re-examination of the legal and factual aspects all kinds and manner of personnel movement,"
of the case. including the mere change in office location.
The rule is not absolute, however, considering that Mayor Biron’s act of transferring the office space of
jurisprudence has laid down exceptions to the Causing was rooted in his power of supervision and
requirement for the filing of a petition for certiorari control over the officials and employees serving in his
without first filing a motion for reconsideration, namely: local government unit, in order to ensure the faithful
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the discharge of their duties and functions. His explanation
court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions that he transferred Causing’s work station from her
raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly original office to his office in order to closely supervise
raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the her after his office received complaints against her
same as those raised and passed upon in the lower could not be justly ignored. Verily, she thereafter
court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the continued to perform her tasks, and uninterruptedly
resolution of the question, and any further delay would received her salaries as the Municipal Civil Registrar
prejudice the interests of the Government, or of the even after the transfer to the Office of the Mayor.
petitioner, or the subject matter of the petition is
perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a
motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where
the petitioner was deprived of due process, and there
is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal
case, relief from an order ofarrest is urgent, and the
granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a
nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the
proceeding was ex parteor in which the petitioner had 65.21
no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by
is one purely oflaw or public interest is involved. the NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION,
A perusal of the circumstances of the case shows that Petitioner,
none of the foregoing exceptions was applicable vs.
 21
SPOUSES ROGELIO LAZO and DOLORES LAZO, the GAR. Respondent Rogelio Lazo brought to NIA’s
Respondents. attention Resolution No. He specifically asked for the
G.R. No. 195594 September 29, 2014 implementation of the GAR recommendations and the
PETITION: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule payment of just compensation for the entire buffer
45 zone involving an aggregate area of 14,381 sq. m.,
EMERGENCY RECIT: more or less.
Respondents spouses Lazo voluntarily sold to When respondents’ demands were not acted
the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) a portion of upon, they decided to file a complaint for just
Monte Vista for the construction of an open irrigation compensation with damages against NIA on January
canal. They engaged the services of Engr. Donno G. 31, 2008.11 Prior to the filing of an Answer,
Custodio, who later came up with a Geohazard respondents filed an Amended Complaint with
Assessment Report (GAR) to minimize the possible application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and
adverse effects of the NIA irrigation canal. Resolution preliminary injunction.
No. 34 adopted the recommendations contained in the On September 17, 2008, the trial court granted
GAR. Respondents filed a complaint for just respondents’ application for preliminary injunction.
compensation with damages against NIA and Defendant is hereby enjoined from continuing further
subsequently filed petition for prelim injunction. RTC construction works on the irrigation canal. Further,
granted respondent’s application for prelim injunction. defendant is ordered to comply with Resolution No. 34,
RTC issued supplemental order fixing the injunction Series of 2006 of the Sangguniang Bayan of the
bond in the amount of THREE MILLION PESOS Municipality of Bantay Ilocos Sur, adopting the
(Php3,000,000.00). Petitioner directly filed a petition recommendations of the GAR.
for certiorari before the CA without moving for Two days later, the trial court issued a
reconsideration of the two orders. Supplement to the Order of September 17, 2008 fixing
The Supreme Court held that the petition for the injunction bond in the amount of THREE MILLION
certiorari was proper. The case falls on one of the PESOS (Php3,000,000.00).
exceptions to the general rule that a motion for Without moving for a reconsideration of the
reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before a two Orders, petitioner directly filed a petition for
petition for certiorari may lie. In particular, the assailed certiorari before the CA. Eventually, the CA dismissed
Orders of the trial court are patent nullity for having the petition and affirmed the challenged Orders of the
been issued in excess of its jurisdiction. Also, the trial court on October 22, 2010.
questions raised in the certiorari proceedings are the ISSUE:
same as those already raised and passed upon in the Whether the facts of this case justified
lower court; hence, filing a motion for reconsideration petitioner’s immediate resort to the court of appeals
would be useless and serve no practical purpose. without filing a motion for reconsideration of the
There is likewise an urgent necessity for the resolution assailed orders of the trial court.
of the question and any further delay would prejudice RULING:
the interests of the Government. YES, the petition for certiorari is proper.
FACTS: A petition for certiorari may be given due course
Respondents spouses Rogelio Lazo and notwithstanding that no motion for reconsideration was
Dolores Lazo are the owners and developers of Monte filed in the trial court. The general rule is that a motion
Vista Homes (Monte Vista), a residential subdivision for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before a
located in Barangay Paing, Municipality of Bantay, petition for certiorari may lie, its purpose being to grant
Ilocos Sur. Sometime in 2006, they voluntarily sold to an opportunity for the court a quo to correct any error
the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) a portion of attributed to it by a re-examination of the legal and
Monte Vista for the construction of an open irrigation factual circumstances of the case. However, the rule is
canal that is part of the Banaoang Pump Irrigation not absolute and jurisprudence has laid down the
Project (BPIP). Subsequently, respondents engaged following exceptions when the filing of a petition for
the services of Engr. Donno G. Custodio, who later certiorari is proper notwithstanding the failure to file a
came up with a Geohazard Assessment Report motion for reconsideration: (a) where the order is a
(GAR), finding that ground shaking and channel bank patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
erosion are the possible hazards that could affect the jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the
NIA irrigation canal traversing Monte Vista. He certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and
recommended specific constructions to minimize the passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as
said effects. those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c)
On December 22, 2006, the Sangguniang where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of
Bayanof Bantay, Ilocos Sur approved Resolution No. the question and any further delay would prejudice the
34, which adopted the recommendations contained in interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the
 22
subject matter of the petition is perishable; (d) where, effect, belatedly sought a reconsideration of the Orders
under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration dated September 17, 2008 and September 19, 2008
would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of before the trial court.
due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) The Contention is without merit. It appears from the
where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest pleadings that petitioner honestly sought clarification
is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial from the trial court the meaning of the writ it issued. To
court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the refresh, when the trial court granted respondents’
lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) application for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the injunction on September 17, 2008 it enjoined petitioner
petitioner had no opportunity to object; and, (i) where from continuing further construction works on the
the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest irrigation canal located inside Monte Vista and ordered
is involved. it to comply with Resolution No. 34, which adopted the
We cannot but agree with petitioner that this case falls GAR recommendations. As petitioner pointed out, the
within instances (a), (b), (c), (d), and (i) above- injunction order does not authorize respondents to
mentioned. As will be elucidated in the discussion close or block the irrigation canal, the construction of
below, the assailed Orders of the trial court are which was, as alleged, already completed prior to the
patent nullity for having been issued in excess of issuance of the Order. In filing the Manifestation and
its jurisdiction. Also, the questions raised in the Motion, petitioner was just protecting its property
certiorari proceedings are the same as those rights, claiming that it is already the owner of the
already raised and passed upon in the lower court; land where the irrigation canal was constructed by
hence, filing a motion for reconsideration would be virtue of the negotiated sale that transpired prior to
useless and serve no practical purpose. There is the institution of this case. According to petitioner,
likewise an urgent necessity for the resolution of the respondents previously blocked the irrigation canal and
question and any further delay would prejudice the it was only through the initiative and efforts of the
interests of the Government. In its petition and affected farmers that the same was removed. Faced
memorandum filed before the CA, petitioner in fact with another threat of closure, it only exercised its legal
noted that the BPIP is intended to cater the year-round right to seek affirmative relief from the trial court.
irrigation needs of 6,312 hectares of agricultural land
in Bantay, Caoayan, Magsingal, San Ildefonso, San 66.1
Vicente, Sto. Domingo, Sta. Catalina, and Vigan in ERNESTO CAMPOS and FLORENCIO OROC,
Ilocos Sur. Even Resolution No. 34 recognizes this. petitioners-appellants,
Public interest is actually involved as the targeted vs.
increase in agricultural production is expected to uplift ESTEBAN DEGAMO and FELINO PALARCA,
the farmers’ standard of living. Lastly, the issue raised respondents.
– that is, under the antecedent facts, whether the trial G.R. No. L-18315 September 29, 1962
court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting EMERGENCY RECIT:
respondents’ prayer for preliminary prohibitory and Petitioners Campos and Oroc were elected as
mandatory injunction despite the mandate of R.A. No. Councilor 1 and 2, respectively in the Municipality of
8975 – is one purely of law. Carmen, Agusan. Respondents Degamo and Palarca
As for the issue on payment of docket fees, records were elected as Mayor and Vice Mayor, respectively.
show that petitioner timely filed its motion for extension Petitioners filed a petition for quo warranto against
of time to filea petition on March 2, 2011.37 The respondents. RTC dismissed the petition. Petitioners
petition, however, was not docketed because the directly elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
required fees were not paid based on petitioner’s belief The Supreme Court held that the petition for
that it is exempt therefrom. Nonetheless, payment was quo warranto cannot prosper. Assuming that it is made
immediately made the following day, March 3, 2011.38 under the Revised Election Code, it violates Section
The tardiness of petitioner is excusable since no 173 wherein it provides that the petition for quo
significant period of time elapsed. warranto should be filed by any registered candidate
Finally, respondents argue that the filing of a for the same office, within one week after the
Manifestation and Motion dated March 25, 2011 by proclamation of his election, by filing a petition for quo
petitioner with the trial court should be considered as warranto. Petitioners Campos and Oroc were not
an act of forum shopping. They assert that the prayer registered candidates for the offices of mayor and vice-
to admonish them from closing or blocking the mayor, and the quo warranto was not filed within one
irrigation canal that traverses their property is week after the proclamation of the persons sought to
tantamount to asking the trial court to lift the injunction be ousted. Even assuming that it is an ordinary quo
order. Respondents contend that instead of pleading warranto petition under the Rules of Court, it will still
for a restraining order from this Court, petitioner, in not prosper because petitioners-appellants Campos
 23
and Oroc, having been candidates and elected for the Whether or not the petition for quo warranto
office of councilors and not for the office of mayor and filed by petitioners will propser
vice-mayor, they are not the proper parties to institute RULING:
the present action. NO.
FACTS: Under the theory that the present action for
In the election of November, 1959, petitioners quo warranto comes under the provisions of the
Ernesto Campos and Florencio Oroc were elected and Revised Election Code, its filing violates section 173
proclaimed councilor No. 1 and councilor No. 2, thereof which provides that when a person who is not
respectively, of the municipality of Carmen, Agusan. eligible is elected to a provincial or Municipal Office,
on December 7, 1959, respondents Esteban Degamo his right to the Office may be contested by any
and Felino Palarca were proclaimed Mayor and Vice registered candidate for the same office, within one
Mayor, respectively, of the said municipality, week after the proclamation of his election, by
notwithstanding the protest and request that the filing a petition for quo warranto.
proclamation be suspended on the ground that the Petitioners Campos and Oroc were not
Board of Canvassers used in their canvass for election registered candidates for the offices of mayor and vice-
in Precinct 6, the election return coming from the mayor, and the quo warranto was not filed within one
Provincial Treasurer's Office, inspite of the fact that the week after the proclamation of the persons sought to
copy of election return in the hands of the municipal be ousted - the respondents herein. The proclamation
treasury of Carmen was available; that there was no of the respondents was made on December 7, 1959,
valid canvass for the offices of Mayor and Vice Mayor and the present quo warranto complaint was filed on
effected and the respondents could not legally occupy September 27, 1960, about a year later.
the said positions. On the assumption that the present action is
Petitioner made verbal demands upon presented as an ordinary quo warranto case (Rule 68,
respondents to stop forming the duties and functions Rules of Court), same can not also prosper.
of said offices, but respondents denied and refused, Malimit and Acain who claimed to be entitled
thereby making the public believe they were the lawful to the offices of mayor and vice-mayor, respectively,
officials of said municipality. Petitioners, therefore, are not parties herein. The complaint must likewise
prayed (a) that a writ quo warranto be issued ousting allege that plaintiffs were duly elected to such
and excluding respondents Degamo and Palarca from positions. Where the office in question is an elective
the office of mayor and vice-mayor of Carmen, one, the complaint must show that the plaintiff was
respectively; and that they be declared entitled to said duly elected thereto (Luna vs. Rodriguez, 38 Phil. 401;
offices and placed forthwith possession thereof. Acosta vs. Flor, 5 Phil. 18). Petitioners-appellants
As affirmative defenses, respondents claimed Campos and Oroc, having been candidates and
that (1) the petition was filed outside the reglementary elected for the office of councilors and not for the
period; (2) there was no sufficient cause of action; (3) office of mayor and vice-mayor, they are not the
the petitioners had no legal personality or authority to proper parties to institute the present action.
file the present case; 4) the court had no jurisdiction Moreover, there being a pending case for quo warranto
over the petition and the petitioners; (5) there was a before this court (G.R. No. L-17850 footnote No. 1,
pending case of the same nature and of substantially supra) filed by Malimit and Acain against the same
the same allegations against the respondents, before Degamo and Palarca, for the office of mayor and vice-
the same court; and (6) the respondents took their mayor of Carmen, respectively, the filing of the case at
oaths of office and performed their respective duties bar was premature and the cause of action had not as
starting January 1, 1960. yet accrued.
The lower court rendered a decision stating
that the petition for quo warranto cannot prosper
because it fails to state a cause of action, the
petitioners not being entitled to the positions of mayor
and vice mayor of the municipality of Carmen, Agusan,
inasmuch as there is at present pending before the 66.2
Supreme Court a case of quo warranto over these two ABRAHAM C. SISON
positions filed by Jose Malimit and Vicente Acain vs.
against the herein respondents Esteban Degamo and HON. EPI REY PANGRAMUYEN, Commissioner of
Felino Palarca. Civil Service; GERONIMO LIPUMANO, Mayor,
Petitioners appealed directly to the Supreme Olongapo City; ALFREDO D. OCAMPO, Officer-in-
Court on purely questions of law. Charge, Civil Service, Regional Office No. 3, San
ISSUE: Fernando, Pampanga; and EUREKA F.
 24
MALIWANAG, Assistant City Assesor, Olongapo of the Commission of Civil Service touching on the
City, basis for determining the hierarchical relationships of
G. R. No. L-40295 July 31, 1978 positions, and, therefore, are not necessarily
EMERGENCY RECIT: controlling.
Respondent Maliwanag was appointed as As already stated, the appointment in
Assistant City Assessor of Olongapo City on controversy was made on November 23, 1973 and
November 23, 1973. Petitioner opposed appointment respondent Maliwanag assumed office on the strength
contending that he should have been appointed thereof, albeit she claims she has not been paid her
because he was the next in rank. Regional Director of salary. On the other hand, the petition herein was filed
CSC affirmed appointment of Maliwanag. Petitioner only on March 13, 1975, clearly more than one year
filed petition denominated as certiorari and quo after the pretended right of petitioner to hold the
warranto before the SC. The Supreme Court held that office in question arose. This single circumstance
the petition cannot prosper because the appointment has closed the door for any judicial remedy in his
was made on November 23, 1973 while the petition favor.
herein was filed only on March 13, 1975, clearly more Petitioner contends in regard to this point that Section
than one year after the pretended right of petitioner to 16 of Rule 66 invoked by private respondent refers to
hold the office in question arose. This single actions of quo warranto and since his petition is also
circumstance has closed the door for any judicial for certiorari and mandamus, said rule is inapplicable.
remedy in his favor. Such contention is not correct. As earlier noted in this
FACTS: decision, the allegations supporting petitioner's cause
Petitioner was the Chief Deputy Assessor or causes of action boil down to no more than the
exercising, according to his allegation, immediate removal of respondent Maliwanag from the position to
administrative control and supervision over respondent which she has been appointed in order to be replaced
Maliwanag, who was Senior Deputy Assessor. by him, with a new appointment in his favor.
Respondent Mayor Lipumano appointed Maliwanag as Necessarily, the ouster of Maliwanag by quo warranto
Assistant City Assessor of Olongapo City on has to be based on a nullification of her appointment,
November 23, 1973. Petitioner opposed said which petitioner seeks, albeit unnecessarily, by
appointment inasmuch as he has superior educational certiorari. His ultimate remedy, therefore, is quo
and appropriate civil service eligibilities to those of said warranto. Besides, even if it could be also viewed
respondent, the appointment aforementioned as mandamus, it is already settled that his latter
extended to the latter by respondent City Mayor is remedy prescribes also after one year. And it is of
illegal and contrary to law being violative of the rule of no avail to petitioner that during the intervening period
next-in-rank. Petitioner maintains that upon the of more than one year, he was seeking relief from the
promotion of the Assistant City Assessor to the corresponding administrative authorities. The resort to
position of City Assessor, he, petitioner, instead of such administrative remedy does not abate the period
respondent Maliwanag should have been appointed for the judicial action.
thereto.
Regional Director and commissioner of Civil 66.3
Service affirmed the appointment of Maliwanag. MR MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO VS. MENDEZ
was dismissed. Hence, petitioner filed petition G.R. No. 103702 December 6, 1994
denominated as certiorari and quo warranto before the EMERGENCY RECIT:
Supreme Court. On August 20, 1959, EO 353 by President
ISSUE: Garcia was issued creating the municipal district of
Whether or not the petition will propser San Andres, Quezon, by segregating from the
RULING: municipality of San Narciso of the same province, the
NO. barrios of San Andres, Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy,
The Commissioner of Civil Service who is Camflora and Tala along with their respective sitios.
primarily charged with the administration of the Civil On 05 June 1989, the Municipality of San Narciso filed
Service Law and rules and regulations, absent, as in a petition for quo warranto against the officials of the
this case, convincing showing of palpable error or Municipality of San Andres. The petition sought the
grave abuse of discretion. After all as We see it, declaration of nullity of Executive Order No. 353 and
petitioner rests his case mostly on the Organization prayed that the respondent local officials of the
Chart and the position description or CSC Form No. Municipality of San Andres be permanently ordered to
122-D of respondent Maliwanag, prepared by refrain from performing the duties and functions of their
petitioner himself, which do not carry the approval of respective offices. RTC dismissed the petition for lack
the Mayor, as Department Head, contrary to of cause of action.
requirement of Memorandum Circular No. 5, S. 1963
 25
The SC held that the petition cannot prosper adding that "whatever defects (were) present in the
because EO 353 creating the municipal district of San creation of municipal districts by the President
Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only pursuant to presidential issuances and executive
after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that orders, (were) cured by the enactment of R.A. 7160,
the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to otherwise known as Local Government Code of 1991."
challenge the legality of the executive order. In the In an order, dated 17 January 1992, the same court
meantime, the Municipal District, and later the denied petitioner municipality's motion for
Municipality, of San Andres, began and continued to reconsideration.
exercise the powers and authority of a duly created Hence, this petition "for review on certiorari."
local government unit. In the same manner that the ISSUE:
failure of a public officer to question his ouster or the Whether or not the petition will propser
right of another to hold a position within a one-year RULING:
period can abrogate an action belatedly filed, so also, NO.
if not indeed with greatest imperativeness, must a quo The special civil action of quo warranto is a
warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a "prerogative writ by which the Government can call
political subdivision be timely raised. Public interest upon any person to show by what warrant he holds a
demands it. public office or exercises a public franchise." When the
FACTS: inquiry is focused on the legal existence of a body
On 20 August 1959, President Carlos P. politic, the action is reserved to the State in a
Garcia, issued Executive Order No. 353 creating the proceeding for quo warranto or any other credit
municipal district of San Andres, Quezon, by proceeding. It must be brought "in the name of the
segregating from the municipality of San Narciso of the Republic of the Philippines" and commenced by the
same province, the barrios of San Andres, Mangero, Solicitor General or the fiscal "when directed by the
Alibijaban, Pansoy, Camflora and Tala along with their President of the Philippines ". Such officers may, under
respective sitios. By virtue of Executive Order No. 174, certain circumstances, bring such an action "at the
dated 05 October 1965, issued by President Diosdado request and upon the relation of another person" with
Macapagal, the municipal district of San Andres was the permission of the court. The Rules of Court also
later officially recognized to have gained the status of allows an individual to commence an action for quo
a fifth class municipality beginning 01 July 1963. warranto in his own name but this initiative can be
On 05 June 1989, the Municipality of San done when he claims to be "entitled to a public office
Narciso filed a petition for quo warranto against the or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
officials of the Municipality of San Andres. The petition another." While the quo warranto proceedings filed
sought the declaration of nullity of Executive Order No. below by petitioner municipality has so named only the
353 and prayed that the respondent local officials of officials of the Municipality of San Andres as
the Municipality of San Andres be permanently respondents, it is virtually, however, a denunciation of
ordered to refrain from performing the duties and the authority of the Municipality or Municipal District of
functions of their respective offices. Petitioner San Andres to exist and to act in that capacity.
municipality argued that the officials of the Municipality Executive Order No. 353 creating the
or Municipal District of San Andres had no right to municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20
exercise the duties and functions of their respective August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30)
offices that rightfully belonged to the corresponding years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San
officials of the Municipality of San Narciso. Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the
In their answer, respondents asked for the executive order. In the meantime, the Municipal
dismissal of the petition, averring, by way of affirmative District, and later the Municipality, of San Andres,
and special defenses, that since it was at the instance began and continued to exercise the powers and
of petitioner municipality that the Municipality of San authority of a duly created local government unit. In
Andres was given life with the issuance of Executive the same manner that the failure of a public officer
Order No. 353, it (petitioner municipality) should be to question his ouster or the right of another to
deemed estopped from questioning the creation of the hold a position within a one-year period can
new municipality and that considering the petition to be abrogate an action belatedly filed, so also, if not
one for quo warranto, petitioner municipality was not indeed with greatest imperativeness, must a quo
the proper party to bring the action, that prerogative warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority
being reserved to the State acting through the Solicitor of a political subdivision be timely raised. Public
General. interest demands it.
In its Order of 02 December 1991, the lower court
dismissed the petition for lack of cause of action on Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a complete
what it felt was a matter that belonged to the State, nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional
 26
delegation of legislative power, the peculiar Sereno therefrom. Sereno contends that an
circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer impeachable officer may only be ousted through
a choice other than to consider the Municipality of San impeachment, citing Section 2 of Article XI of the
Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its Constitution
own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that The SC held that quo warranto is proper. Quo
of a de facto municipal corporation. Conventional warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public
wisdom cannot allow it to be otherwise. official may be availed of when the subject act or
At the present time, all doubts on the de jure omission was committed prior to or at the time of
standing of the municipality must be dispelled. Under appointment or election relating to an official’s
the Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986) qualifications to hold office as to render such
apportioning the seats of the House of appointment or election invalid. Acts or omissions,
Representatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity being a
the Municipality of San Andres has been considered to continuing requirement but nonetheless committed
be one of the twelve (12) municipalities composing the during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or
Third District of the province of Quezon. Equally validly elected official cannot be the subject of a quo
significant is Section 442(d) of the Local Government warranto proceeding, but of impeachment if the public
Code to the effect that municipal districts "organized official concerned is impeachable and the act or
pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or to
and which have their respective sets of elective disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if
municipal officials holding office at the time of the otherwise.
effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered FACTS:
as regular municipalities." From 1986 to 2006, Sereno served as a member of the
All considered, the de jure status of the faculty of the University of the Philippines-College of
Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon Law. While being employed at the UP Law, or from
must now be conceded. October 2003 to 2006, Sereno was concurrently
employed as legal counsel of the Republic in two
international arbitrations known as the PIATCO cases,
and a Deputy Commissioner of the Commissioner on
Human Rights.
The Human Resources Development Office of UP (UP
HRDO) certified that there was no record on Sereno’s
file of any permission to engage in limited practice of
profession. Moreover, out of her 20 years of
employment, only nine (9) Statement of Assets,
Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) were on the records
of UP HRDO. In a manifestation, she attached a copy
of a tenth SALN, which she supposedly sourced from
the “filing cabinets” or “drawers of UP”. The
Ombudsman likewise had no record of any SALN filed
by Sereno. The JBC has certified to the existence of
one SALN. In sum, for 20 years of service, 11 SALNs
were recovered.
66.4 On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as Associate
REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, represented by Justice. On 2012, the position of Chief Justice was
SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA v. MARIA declared vacant, and the JBC directed the applicants
LOURDES P.A. SERENO, to submit documents, among which are “all previous
G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018 [J. Tijam, En Banc] SALNs up to December 31, 2011” for those in the
* Hi Guys, 100+ pages itong case, hindi kaya ng 2 government and “SALN as of December 31, 2011” for
pages digest kaya lampas two pages to sorry ☹ those from the private sector. The JBC announcement
EMERGENCY RECIT: further provided that “applicants with incomplete or out-
The OSG, invoking the Court’s original of-date documentary requirements will not be
jurisdiction under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the interviewed or considered for nomination.” Sereno
Constitution in relation to the special civil action under expressed in a letter to JBC that since she resigned
Rule 66, the Republic, through the OSG filed the from UP Law on 2006 and became a private
petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of practitioner, she was treated as coming from the
quo warranto to declare as void Sereno’s appointment private sector and only submitted three (3) SALNs or
as CJ of the SC and to oust and altogether exclude her SALNs from the time she became an Associate
 27
Justice. Sereno likewise added that “considering that occurit regi (“no time runs against the king”) or
most of her government records in the academe are prescription does not operate against the government.
more than 15 years old, it is reasonable to consider it The State has a continuous interest in ensuring that
infeasible to retrieve all of those files,” and that the those who partake of its sovereign powers are
clearance issued by UP HRDO and CSC should be qualified. Even assuming that the one-year period is
taken in her favor. There was no record that the letter applicable to the OSG, considering that SALNs are not
was deliberated upon. Despite this, on a report to the published, the OSG will have no other means by which
JBC, Sereno was said to have “complete to know the disqualification.
requirements.” On August 2012, Sereno was Moreover, OSG maintains that the SC has jurisdiction,
appointed Chief Justice. citing A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC which created a permanent
On August 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, tasked to
by Atty. Larry Gadon against Sereno, alleging that investigate complaints involving graft and corruption
Sereno failed to make truthful declarations in her and ethical violations against members of the SC and
SALNs. The House of Representatives proceeded to contending that this is not a political question because
hear the case for determination of probable cause, and such issue may be resolved through the interpretation
it was said that Justice Peralta, the chairman of the of the provisions of the Constitution, laws, JBC rules,
JBC then, was not made aware of the incomplete and Canons of Judicial Ethics.
SALNs of Sereno. Other findings were made: such as OSG seeks to oust Sereno from her position as CJ on
pieces of jewelry amounting to P15,000, that were not the ground that Sereno failed to show that she is a
declared on her 1990 SALN, but was declared in prior person of proven integrity which is an indispensable
years’ and subsequent years’ SALNs, failure of her qualification for membership in the Judiciary under
husband to sign one SALN, execution of the 1998 Section 7(3), Article VIII of the Constitution. According
SALN only in 2003 to the OSG, because OSG failed to fulfill the JBC
On February 2018, Atty. Eligio Mallari wrote to the requirement of filing the complete SALNs, her integrity
OSG, requesting that the latter, in representation of remains unproven. The failure to submit her SALN,
the Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding which is a legal obligation, should have disqualified
against Sereno. The OSG, invoking the Court’s Sereno from being a candidate; therefore, she has no
original jurisdiction under Section 5(1), Article VIII of right to hold the office. Good faith cannot be
the Constitution in relation to the special civil action considered as a defense since the Anti-Graft and
under Rule 66, the Republic, through the OSG filed the Corrupt Practices Act (RA No. 3019) and Code of
petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
quo warranto to declare as void Sereno’s appointment Employees (RA No. 6713) are special laws and are
as CJ of the SC and to oust and altogether exclude thus governed by the concept of malum prohibitum,
Sereno therefrom. wherein malice or criminal intent is completely
Capistrano, Sen. De Lima, Sen. Trillianes, et. al., immaterial.
intervened. Sereno then filed a Motion for Inhibition Sereno contends that an impeachable officer may only
against AJ Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and be ousted through impeachment, citing Section 2 of
Leonardo-De Castro, imputing actual bias for having Article XI of the Constitution, and Mayor Lecaroz v.
testified against her on the impeachment hearing Sandiganbayan, Cuenca v. Hon. Fernan, In Re: First
before the House of Representatives. lndorsement from Hon. Gonzales, and Re: Complaint-
OSG argues that the quo warranto is an available Affidavit for Disbarment Against SAJ Antonio T.
remedy because what is being sought is to question Carpio. Sereno contends that the clear intention of the
the validity of her appointment, while the impeachment framers of the Constitution was to create an exclusive
complaint accuses her of committing culpable violation category of public officers who can be removed only by
of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust while in impeachment and not otherwise. Impeachment was
office, citing Funa v. Chairman Villar, Estrada v. chosen as the method of removing certain high-ranking
Desierto and Nacionalista Party v. De Vera. OSG government officers to shield them from harassment
maintains that the phrase “may be removed from suits that will prevent them from performing their
office” in Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution functions which are vital to the continued operations of
means that Members of the SC may be removed government. Sereno further argues that the word
through modes other than impeachment. “may” on Section 2 of Article XI only qualifies the
OSG contends that it is seasonably filed within the penalty imposable after the impeachment trial, i.e.,
one-year reglementary period under Section 11, Rule removal from office. Sereno contends that the since
66 since Sereno’s transgressions only came to light the mode is wrong, the SC has no jurisdiction.
during the impeachment proceedings. Moreover, OSG Sereno likewise argues that the cases cited by OSG is
claims that it has an imprescriptible right to bring a quo not in all fours with the present case because the
warranto petition under the maxim nullum tempus President and the Vice President may, in fact, be
 28
removed by means other than impeachment on the 2. Whether the Court should grant the motion for the
basis of Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution inhibition of Sereno against five Justices
vesting in the Court the power to be the “sole judge” of Main Issues:
all contests relating to the qualifications of the 3. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and
President and the Vice-President. There is no such give due course to the instant petition for quo warranto.
provision for other impeachable officers. Moreover, on 4. Whether Sereno may be the respondent in a quo
the rest of the cases cited by the OSG, there is no warranto proceeding notwithstanding the fact that an
mention that quo warranto may be allowed. impeachment complaint has already been filed with the
Sereno also argues that since a petition for quo House of Representatives.
warranto may be filed before the RTC, such would 5. Whether Sereno, who is an impeachable officer,
result to a conundrum because a judge of lower court can be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding,
would have effectively exercised disciplinary power i.e., whether the only way to remove an impeachable
and administrative supervision over an official of the officer is impeachment.
Judiciary much higher in rank and is contrary to 6. Whether to take cognizance of the quo warranto
Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII of the Constitution which proceeding is violative of the principle of separation of
vests upon the SC disciplinary and administrative powers
power over all courts and the personnel thereof. 7. Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the
Sereno likewise posits that if a Member of the SC can ground of prescription
be ousted through quo warranto initiated by the OSG, 8. Whether the determination of a candidate’s
the Congress’ “check” on the SC through eligibility for nomination is the sole and exclusive
impeachment would be rendered inutile. function of the JBC and whether such determination.
Furthermore, Sereno argues that it is already time- partakes of the character of a political question outside
barred. Section 11, Rule 66 provides that a petition for the Court’s supervisory and review powers;
quo warranto must be filed within one (1) year from the 9. Whether the filing of SALN is a constitutional and
“cause of ouster” and not from the “discovery” of the statutory requirement for the position of Chief Justice.
disqualification. 10. If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative,
Moreover, Sereno contends that the Court cannot whether Sereno failed to file her SALNs as mandated
presume that she failed to file her SALNs because as by the Constitution and required by the law and its
a public officer, she enjoys the presumption that her implementing rules and regulations
appointment to office was regular. OSG failed to 11. If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative,
overcome the presumption created by the certifications whether Sereno filed SALNs are not filed properly and
from UP HRDO that she had been cleared of all promptly.
administrative responsibilities and charges. Her 12. Whether Sereno failed to comply with the
integrity is a political question which can only be submission of SALNs as required by the JBC
decided by the JBC and the President. 13. If answer to the twelfth issue is in the affirmative,
Regarding her missing SALNs, Sereno contends that whether the failure to submit SALNs to the JBC voids
the fact that SALNs are missing cannot give rise to the the nomination and appointment of Sereno as Chief
inference that they are not filed. The fact that 11 Justice;
SALNs were filed should give an inference to a pattern 14. In case of a finding that Sereno is ineligible to hold
of filing, not of non-filing. the position of Chief Justice, whether the subsequent
nomination by the JBC and the appointment by the
The intervenors argue that it is not incumbent upon President cured such ineligibility.
Sereno to prove to the JBC that she possessed the 15. Whether Sereno is a de jure or a de facto officer.
integrity required by the Constitution; rather, the onus HELD:
of determining whether or not she qualified for the post Anent the first issue: The intervention is improper.
fell upon the JBC. Moreover, submission of SALNs is Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not
not a constitutional requirement; what is only required originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a
is the imprimatur of the JBC. The intervenors likewise litigant therein for a certain purpose: to enable the third
contend that “qualifications” such as citizenship, age, party to protect or preserve a right or interest that may
and experience are enforceable while “characteristics” be affected by those proceedings. The remedy of
such as competence, integrity, probity, and intervention is not a matter of right but rests on the
independence are mere subjective considerations. sound discretion of the court upon compliance with the
first requirement on legal interest and the second
ISSUES: requirement that no delay and prejudice should result.
Preliminary issues: The justification of one’s “sense of patriotism and their
1. Whether the Court should entertain the motion for common desire to protect and uphold the Philippine
intervention Constitution”, and that of the Senator De Lima’s and
 29
Trillanes’ intervention that their would-be participation
in the impeachment trial as Senators-judges if the Anent the third issue: A quo warranto petition is
articles of impeachment will be filed before the Senate allowed against impeachable officials and SC has
as the impeachment court will be taken away is not jurisdiction.
sufficient. The interest contemplated by law must be The SC have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and
actual, substantial, material, direct and immediate, and RTC to issue the extraordinary writs, including quo
not simply contingent or expectant. Moreover, the warranto. A direct invocation of the SC’s original
petition of quo warranto is brought in the name of the jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed when there
Republic. It is vested in the people, and not in any are special and important reasons therefor, and in this
private individual or group, because disputes over title case, direct resort to SC is justified considering that the
to public office are viewed as a public question of action is directed against the Chief Justice. Granting
governmental legitimacy and not merely a private that the petition is likewise of transcendental
quarrel among rival claimants. importance and has far-reaching implications, the
Court is empowered to exercise its power of judicial
Anent the second issue: There is no basis for the review. To exercise restraint in reviewing an
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to inhibit in impeachable officer’s appointment is a clear
the case. renunciation of a judicial duty. an outright dismissal of
the petition based on speculation that Sereno will
It is true that a judge has both the duty of rendering a eventually be tried on impeachment is a clear
just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner abdication of the Court’s duty to settle actual
completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as controversy squarely presented before it. Quo
to his integrity. However, the right of a party to seek warranto proceedings are essentially judicial in
the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does character – it calls for the exercise of the Supreme
not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial Court’s constitutional duty and power to decide cases
and independent in handling the case must be and settle actual controversies. This constitutional duty
balanced with the latter’s sacred duty to decide cases cannot be abdicated or transferred in favor of, or in
without fear of repression. Bias must be proven with deference to, any other branch of the government
clear and convincing evidence. Those justices who including the Congress, even as it acts as an
were present at the impeachment proceedings were impeachment court through the Senate.
armed with the requisite imprimatur of the Court En To differentiate from impeachment, quo warranto
Banc, given that the Members are to testify only on involves a judicial determination of the eligibility or
matters within their personal knowledge. The mere validity of the election or appointment of a public
imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for official based on predetermined rules while
inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis. impeachment is a political process to vindicate the
There must be acts or conduct clearly indicative of violation of the public’s trust. In quo warranto
arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with proceedings referring to offices filled by appointment,
the stigma of bias or partiality. Sereno’s call for what is determined is the legality of the appointment.
inhibition has been based on speculations, or on The title to a public office may not be contested
distortions of the language, context and meaning of collaterally but only directly, by quo warranto
the answers the Justices may have given as sworn proceedings. usurpation of a public office is treated as
witnesses in the proceedings before the House. a public wrong and carries with it public interest, and
Moreover, insinuations that the Justices of the SC are as such, it shall be commenced by a verified petition
towing the line of President Duterte in entertaining the brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines
quo warranto petition must be struck for being through the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor.
unfounded and for sowing seeds of mistrust and The SolGen is given permissible latitude within his
discordance between the Court and the public. The legal authority in actions for quo warranto,
Members of the Court are beholden to no one, except circumscribed only by the national interest and the
to the sovereign Filipino people who ordained and government policy on the matter at hand.
promulgated the Constitution. It is thus inappropriate to
misrepresent that the SolGen who has supposedly met Anent the fourth issue: Simultaneous quo warranto
consistent litigation success before the SG shall proceeding and impeachment proceeding is not forum
likewise automatically and positively be received in the shopping and is allowed.
present quo warranto action. As a collegial body, the Quo warranto and impeachment may proceed
Supreme Court adjudicates without fear or favor. The independently of each other as these remedies are
best person to determine the propriety of sitting in a distinct as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable
case rests with the magistrate sought to be rules pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal, and
disqualified. (4) limitations. Forum shopping is the act of a litigant
 30
who repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in public trust.” The provision uses the permissive term
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all “may” which denote discretion and cannot be
substantially founded on the same transactions and construed as having a mandatory effect, indicative of a
the same essential facts and circumstances, and all mere possibility, an opportunity, or an option. In
raising substantially the same issues, either pending in American jurisprudence, it has been held that “the
or already resolved adversely by some other court, to express provision for removal by impeachment ought
increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision not to be taken as a tacit prohibition of removal by
if not in one court, then in another. The test for other methods when there are other adequate reasons
determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or to account for this express provision.”
more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights The principle in case law is that during their
or causes of action, and reliefs sought. The crux of the incumbency, impeachable officers cannot be criminally
controversy in this quo warranto proceedings is the prosecuted for an offense that carries with it the
determination of whether or not Sereno legally holds penalty of removal, and if they are required to be
the Chief Justice position to be considered as an members of the Philippine Bar to qualify for their
impeachable officer in the first place. On the other positions, they cannot be charged with disbarment.
hand, impeachment is for respondent’s prosecution for The proscription does not extend to actions assailing
certain impeachable offenses. Simply put, while the public officer’s title or right to the office he or she
Sereno’s title to hold a public office is the issue in quo occupies. Even the PET Rules expressly provide for
warranto proceedings, impeachment necessarily the remedy of either an election protest or a petition for
presupposes that Sereno legally holds the public office quo warranto to question the eligibility of the President
and thus, is an impeachable officer, the only issue and the Vice-President, both of whom are impeachable
being whether or not she committed impeachable officers
offenses to warrant her removal from office. Further, that the enumeration of “impeachable
Moreover, the reliefs sought are different. respondent offenses” is made absolute, that is, only those
in a quo warranto proceeding shall be adjudged to enumerated offenses are treated as grounds for
cease from holding a public office, which he/she is impeachment, is not equivalent to saying that the
ineligible to hold. Moreover, impeachment, a enumeration likewise purport to be a complete
conviction for the charges of impeachable offenses statement of the causes of removal from office. If other
shall result to the removal of the respondent from the causes of removal are available, then other modes of
public office that he/she is legally holding. It is not ouster can likewise be availed. To subscribe to the
legally possible to impeach or remove a person from view that appointments or election of impeachable
an office that he/she, in the first place, does not and officers are outside judicial review is to cleanse their
cannot legally hold or occupy. appointments or election of any possible defect
Lastly, there can be no forum shopping because the pertaining to the Constitutionally-prescribed
impeachment proceedings before the House is not the qualifications which cannot otherwise be raised in an
impeachment case proper, since it is only a impeachment proceeding. To hold otherwise is to allow
determination of probable cause. The impeachment an absurd situation where the appointment of an
case is yet to be initiated by the filing of the Articles of impeachable officer cannot be questioned even when,
Impeachment before the Senate. Thus, at the moment, for instance, he or she has been determined to be of
there is no pending impeachment case against foreign nationality or, in offices where Bar membership
Sereno. The process before the House is merely is a qualification, when he or she fraudulently
inquisitorial and is merely a means of discovering if a represented to be a member of the Bar.
person may be reasonably charged with a crime.
Anent the sixth issue: The Supreme Court’s exercise of
Anent the fifth issue: Impeachment is not an exclusive its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is not
remedy by which an invalidly appointed or invalidly violative of the doctrine of separation of powers.
elected impeachable official may be removed from The Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over an action
office. for quo warranto involving a person who would
The language of Section 2, Article XI of the otherwise be an impeachable official had it not been
Constitution does not foreclose a quo warranto action for a disqualification, is not violative of the core
against impeachable officers: “Section 2. The constitutional provision that impeachment cases shall
President, the Vice-President, the Members of the be exclusively tried and decided by the Senate. Again,
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional the difference between quo warranto and
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed impeachment must be emphasized. An action for quo
from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, warranto does not try a person’s culpability of an
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, impeachment offense, neither does a writ of quo
graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of warranto conclusively pronounce such culpability. The
 31
Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over quo warranto Section 2 of Rule 66 provides that “the Solicitor
proceedings does not preclude Congress from General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the
enforcing its own prerogative of determining probable President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint
cause for impeachment, to craft and transmit the or otherwise he has good reason to believe that any
Articles of Impeachment, nor will it preclude Senate case specified in the preceding section can be
from exercising its constitutionally committed power of established by proof must commence such action.” It
impeachment. may be stated that ordinary statutes of limitation, civil
However, logic, common sense, reason, practicality or penal, have no application to quo warranto
and even principles of plain arithmetic bear out the proceeding brought to enforce a public right. There is
conclusion that an unqualified public official should be no limitation or prescription of action in an action for
removed from the position immediately if indeed quo warranto, neither could there be, for the reason
Constitutional and legal requirements were not met or that it was an action by the Government and
breached. To abdicate from resolving a legal prescription could not be plead as a defense to an
controversy simply because of perceived availability of action by the Government.
another remedy, in this case impeachment, would be That prescription does not lie in this case can also be
to sanction the initiation of a process specifically deduced from the very purpose of an action for quo
intended to be long and arduous and compel the entire warranto. Because quo warranto serves to end a
membership of the Legislative branch to momentarily continuous usurpation, no statute of limitations applies
abandon their legislative duties to focus on to the action. Needless to say, no prudent and just
impeachment proceedings for the possible removal of court would allow an unqualified person to hold public
a public official, who at the outset, may clearly be office, much more the highest position in the Judiciary.
unqualified under existing laws and case law. Moreover, the Republic cannot be faulted for
For guidance, the Court demarcates that an act or questioning Sereno’s qualification· for office only upon
omission committed prior to or at the time of discovery of the cause of ouster because even up to
appointment or election relating to an official’s the present, Sereno has not been candid on whether
qualifications to hold office as to render such she filed the required SALNs or not. The defect on
appointment or election invalid is properly the subject Sereno’s appointment was therefore not discernible,
of a quo warranto petition, provided that the requisites but was, on the contrary, deliberately rendered
for the commencement thereof are present. obscure.
Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if it relates to the
qualification of integrity, being a continuing Anent the eighth issue: The Court has supervisory
requirement but nonetheless committed during the authority over the JBC includes ensuring that the JBC
incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly complies with its own rules.
elected official, cannot be the subject of a quo Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides
warranto proceeding, but of something else, which that “A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created
may either be impeachment if the public official under the supervision of the Supreme Court.” The
concerned is impeachable and the act or omission power of supervision means “overseeing or the
constitutes an impeachable offense, or disciplinary, authority of an officer to see to it that the subordinate
administrative or criminal action, if otherwise. officers perform their duties.” JBC’s absolute autonomy
from the Court as to place its non-action or improper·
Anent the seventh issue: Prescription does not lie actions beyond the latter’s reach is therefore not what
against the State. the Constitution contemplates. What is more, the
The rules on quo warranto provides that “nothing JBC’s duty to recommend or nominate, although
contained in this Rule shall be construed to authorize calling for the exercise of discretion, is neither absolute
an action against a public officer or employee for his nor unlimited, and is not automatically equivalent to an
ouster from office unless the same be commenced exercise of policy decision as to place, in wholesale,
within one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the JBC process beyond the scope of the Court’s
the right of the petitioner to hold such office or position, supervisory and corrective powers. While a certain
arose”. Previously, the one-year prescriptive period leeway must be given to the JBC in screening aspiring
has been applied in cases where private individuals magistrates, the same does not give it an unbridled
asserting their right of office, unlike the instant case discretion to ignore Constitutional and legal
where no private individual claims title to the Office of requirements. Thus, the nomination by the JBC is not
the Chief Justice. Instead, it is the government itself accurately an exercise of policy or wisdom as to place
which commenced the present petition for quo the JBC’s actions in the same category as political
warranto and puts in issue the qualification of the questions that the Court is barred from resolving.
person holding the highest position in the Judiciary. With this, it must be emphasized that qualifications
under the Constitution cannot be waived or bargained
 32
by the JBC, and one of which is that “a Member of the integrity does not persuade considering that RA 6713
Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, and RA 3019 are malum prohibitum and not malum in
integrity, probity, and independence. “Integrity” is se. Thus, it is the omission or commission of that act
closely related to, or if not, approximately equated to as defined by the law, and not the character or effect
an applicant’s good reputation for honesty, thereof, that determines whether or not the provision
incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to has been violated. Malice or criminal intent is
sound moral and ethical standards.” Integrity is completely immaterial.
likewise imposed by the New Code of Judicial Conduct
and the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Anent the tenth issue: Sereno chronically failed to file
Court has always viewed integrity with a goal of her SALNs and thus violated the Constitution, the law,
preserving the confidence of the litigants in the and the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Judiciary. Hence, the JBC was created in order to In Sereno’s 20 years of government service in UP Law,
ensure that a member of the Supreme Court must be a only 11 SALNs have been filed. Sereno could have
person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and easily dispelled doubts as to the filing or nonfiling of
independence. the unaccounted SALNs by presenting them before the
Court. Yet, Sereno opted to withhold such information
Anent the ninth issue: The filing of SALN is a or such evidence, if at all, for no clear reason. The
constitutional and statutory requirement. Doblada case, invoked by Sereno, cannot be applied,
Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution states that “A because in the Doblada case, there was a letter of the
public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of head of the personnel of the branch of the court that
office and as often thereafter as may be required by the missing SALN exists and was duly transmitted and
law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, received by the OCA as the repository agency. In
liabilities, and net worth.” This has likewise been Sereno’s case, the missing SALNs are neither proven
required by RA 3019 and RA 6713. “Failure to comply” to be in the records of nor was proven to have been
with the law is a violation of law, a “prima facie sent to and duly received by the Ombudsman as the
evidence of unexplained wealth, which may result in repository agency. The existence of these SALNs and
the dismissal from service of the public officer.” It is a the fact of filing thereof were neither established by
clear breach of the ethical standards set for public direct proof constituting substantial evidence nor by
officials and employees. The filing of the SALN is so mere inference. Moreover, the statement of the
important for purposes of transparency and Ombudsman is categorical: “based on records on file,
accountability that failure to comply with such there is no SALN filed by [Sereno] for calendar years
requirement may result not only in dismissal from the 1999 to 2009 except SALN ending December 1998.”
public service but also in criminal liability. Section 11 of This leads the Court to conclude that Sereno did not
R.A. No. 6713 even provides that non-compliance with indeed file her SALN.
this requirement is not only punishable by
imprisonment and/or a fine, it may also result in For this reason, the Republic was able to discharge its
disqualification to hold public office. burden of proof with the certification from UP HRDO
Because the Chief Justice is a public officer, she is and Ombudsman, and thus it becomes incumbent
constitutionally and statutorily mandated to perform a upon Sereno to discharge her burden of evidence.
positive duty to disclose all of his assets and liabilities. Further, the burden of proof in a quo warranto
According to Sereno herself in her dissenting opinion proceeding is different when it is filed by the State in
in one case, those who accept a public office do so that the burden rests upon the respondent.
cum onere, or with a burden, and are considered as In addition, contrary to what Sereno contends, being
accepting its burdens and obligations, together with its on leave does not exempt her from filing her SALN
benefits. They thereby subject themselves to all because it is not tantamount to separation from
constitutional and legislative provisions relating government service. The fact that Sereno did not
thereto, and undertake to perform all the duties of their receive any pay for the periods she was on leave does
office. The public has the right to demand the not make her a government worker “serving in an
performance of those duties. More importantly, while honorary capacity” to be exempted from the SALN
every office in the government service is a public trust, laws on RA 6713.
no position exacts a greater demand on moral Neither can the clearance and certification of UP
righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a HRDO be taken in favor of Sereno. During the period
seat in the Judiciary. when Sereno was a professor in UP, concerned
Noncompliance with the SALN requirement authorized official/s of the Office of the President or the
indubitably·reflects on a person’s integrity. It is not Ombudsman had not yet established compliance
merely a trivial or a formal requirement. The contention procedures for the review of SALNs filed by officials
that the mere non-filing does not affect Sereno’s and employees of State Colleges and Universities, like
 33
U.P. The ministerial duty of the head of office to issue The JBC required the submission of at least ten
compliance order came about only on 2006 from the SALNs from those applicants who are incumbent
CSC. As such, the U.P. HRDO could not have been Associate Justices, absent which, the applicant ought
expected to perform its ministerial duty of issuing not to have been interviewed, much less been
compliance orders to Sereno when such rule was not considered for nomination. From the minutes of the
yet in existence at that time. Moreover, the clearance meeting of the JBC, it appeared that Sereno was
are not substitutes for SALNs. The import of said singled out from the rest of the applicants for having
clearance is limited only to clearing Sereno of her failed to submit a single piece of SALN for her years of
academic and administrative responsibilities, money service in UP Law. It is clear that JBC did not do away
and property accountabilities and from administrative with the SALN requirement, but still required
charges as of the date of her resignation. substantial compliance. Subsequently, it appeared that
Neither can Sereno’s inclusion in the matrix of it was only Sereno who was not able to substantially
candidates with complete requirements and in the comply with the SALN requirement, and instead of
shortlist nominated by the JBC confirm or ratify her complying, Sereno wrote a letter containing
compliance with the SALN requirement. Her inclusion justifications why she should no longer be required to
in the shortlist of candidates for the position of Chief file the SALNs: that she resigned from U.P. in 2006
Justice does not negate, nor supply her with the and then resumed government service only in 2009,
requisite proof of integrity. She should have been thus her government service is not continuous; that her
disqualified at the outset. Moreover, the JBC En Banc government records are more than 15 years old and
cannot be deemed to have considered Sereno eligible thus infeasible to retrieve; and that U.P. cleared her of
because it does not appear that Sereno’s failure to all academic and administrative responsibilities and
submit her SALNs was squarely addressed by the charges.
body. Her inclusion in the shortlist of nominees and These justifications, however, did not obliterate the
subsequent appointment to the position do not estop simple fact that Sereno submitted only 3 SALNs to the
the Republic or this Court from looking into her JBC in her 20-year service in U.P., and that there was
qualifications. Verily, no estoppel arises where the nary an attempt on Sereno’s part to comply. Moreover,
representation or conduct of the party sought to be Sereno curiously failed to mention that she did not file
estopped is due to ignorance founded upon an several SALNs during the course of her employment in
innocent mistake U.P. Such failure to disclose a material fact and the
concealment thereof from the JBC betrays any claim of
Anent the eleventh issue: Sereno failed to properly integrity especially from a Member of the Supreme
and promptly file her SALNs, again in violation of the Court.
Constitutional and statutory requirements . Indubitably, Sereno not only failed to substantially
Failure to file a truthful, complete and accurate SALN comply with the submission of the SALNs but there
would likewise amount to dishonesty if the same is was no compliance at all. Dishonesty is classified as a
attended by malicious intent to conceal the truth or to grave offense the penalty of which is dismissal from
make false statements. The suspicious circumstances the service at the first infraction. A person aspiring to
include: 1996 SALN being accomplished only in 1998; public office must observe honesty, candor and faithful
1998 SALN only filed in 2003; 1997 SALN only compliance with the law. Nothing less is expected.
notarized in 1993; 2004-2006 SALNs were not filed Dishonesty is a malevolent act that puts serious doubt
which were the years when she received the bulk of upon one’s ability to perform his duties with the
her fees from PIATCO cases, 2006 SALN was later on integrity and uprightness demanded of a public officer
intended to be for 2010, gross amount from PIATCO or employee. For these reasons, the JBC should no
cases were not reflected, suspicious increase of longer have considered Sereno for interview.
P2,700,000 in personal properties were seen in her Moreover, the fact that Sereno had no permit to
first five months as Associate Justice. It is therefore engage in private practice while in UP, her false
clear as day that Sereno failed not only in complying representations that she was in private practice after
with the physical act of filing, but also committed resigning from UP when in fact she was counsel for the
dishonesty betraying her lack of integrity, honesty and government, her false claims that the clearance from
probity. The Court does not hesitate to impose the UP HRDO is proof of her compliance with SALNs
supreme penalty of dismissal against public officials requirement, her commission of tax fraud for failure to
whose SALNs were found to have contained truthfully declare her income in her ITRs for the years
discrepancies, inconsistencies and non-disclosures. 2007-2009, procured a brand new Toyota Land Cruiser
worth at least P5,000,000, caused the hiring of Ms.
Anent the twelfth issue: Sereno failed to submit the Macasaet without requisite public bidding, misused
required SALNs as to qualify for nomination pursuant P3,000,000 of government funds for hotel
to the JBC rules. accommodation at Shangri-La Boracay as the venue of
 34
the 3rd ASEAN Chief Justices meeting, issued a TRO Neither will the President’s act of appointment cause to
in Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the qualify Sereno. Although the JBC is an office
Philippines v. COMELEC contrary to the Supreme constitutionally created, the participation of the
Court’s internal rules, manipulated the disposition of President in the selection and nomination process is
the DOJ request to transfer the venue of the Maute evident from the composition of the JBC itself.
cases outside of Mindanao, ignored rulings of the
Supreme Court with respect to the grant of An appointment is essentially within the discretionary
survivorship benefits which caused undue delay to the power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only
release of survivorship benefits to spouses of condition that the appointee should possess the
deceased judges and Justices, manipulated the qualifications required by law. While the Court
processes of the JBC to exclude then SolGen, now AJ surrenders discretionary appointing power to the
Francis Jardeleza, by using highly confidential President, the exercise of such discretion is subject to
document involving national security against the latter the non-negotiable requirements that the appointee is
among others, all belie the fact that Sereno has qualified and all other legal requirements are satisfied,
integrity. in the absence of which, the appointment is
susceptible to attack.
Anent the thirteenth issue: Sereno’s failure to submit to
the JBC her SALNs for several years means that her Anent the fifteenth issue: Sereno is a de facto officer
integrity was not established at the time of her removable through quo warranto
application The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an
The requirement to submit SALNs is made more office is ineligible therefor is that his presumably valid
emphatic when the applicant is eyeing the position of appointment will give him color of title that confers on
Chief Justice. On the June 4, 2012, JBC En Banc him the status of a de facto officer. For lack of a
meeting, Senator Escudero proposed the addition of Constitutional qualification, Sereno is ineligible to hold
the requirement of SALN in order for the next Chief the position of Chief Justice and is merely holding a
Justice to avoid what CJ Corona had gone through. colorable right or title thereto. As such, Sereno has
Further, the failure to submit the required SALNs never attained the status of an impeachable official
means that the JBC and the public are divested of the and her removal from the office, other than by
opportunity to consider the applicant’s fitness or impeachment, is justified. The remedy, therefore, of a
propensity to commit corruption or dishonesty. In quo warranto at the instance of the State is proper to
Sereno’s case, for example, the waiver of the oust Sereno from the appointive position of Chief
confidentiality of bank deposits would be practically Justice.
useless for the years that she failed to submit her
SALN since the JBC cannot verify whether the same
matches the entries indicated in the SALN.

Anent the fourteenth issue: Sereno’s ineligibility for

lack of proven integrity cannot be cured by her
nomination and subsequent appointment as Chief
Justice.
Well-settled is the rule that qualifications for public
office must be possessed at the time of appointment
and assumption of office and also during the officer’s
entire tenure as a continuing requirement. The
voidance of the JBC nomination as a necessary
consequence of the Court’s finding that Sereno is
ineligible, in the first place, to be a candidate for the
position of Chief Justice and to be nominated for said
position follows as a matter of course. The Court has
ample jurisdiction to do so without the necessity of
impleading the JBC as the Court can take judicial
notice of the explanations from the JBC members and
the OEO. he Court, in a quo warranto proceeding,
maintains the power to issue such further judgment
determining the respective rights in and to the public
office, position or franchise of all the parties to the
action as justice requires.
 35
67.1 necessity must exist for the taking thereof for the
THE CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellant, proposed uses and purposes. Necessity within the
vs. rule that the particular property to be expropriated
THE ARRELANO LAW COLLEGES, INC., must be necessary does not mean an absolute but
defendant-appellee. only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as
G.R. No. L-2929 February 28, 1950 would combine the greatest benefit to the public with
EMERGENCY RECIT: the least inconvenience and expense to the
RA 267 provides that cities and municipalities condemning party and property owner consistent with
are authorized to contract loans from Reconstruction such benefits.
Finance Corporation for the purpose of purchasing or The land in question has cost the owner P140,000.
expropriating homesites within their territorial The people for whose benefit the condemnation is
jurisdiction and reselling them at cost to residents. The being undertaken are so poor they could ill afford to
court below ruled that this provision empowers cities to meet this high price, unless they intend to borrow the
purchase but not expropriate and so dismissed the money with a view to disposing of the property later for
present action, which seeks to condemn several a profits. Cheaper lands not dedicated to a purpose so
parcels of land situated in Legarda St. Manila. worthy as a school and more suited to the occupants'
The Supreme Court held that there was no needs and means, if really they only want to own their
showing of necessity for condemnation of the several own homes, are plenty elsewhere the defendant not
parcels of land to justify expropriation. The land in only has invested a considerable amount for its
question has cost the owner P140,000. The people for property but had the plans for construction ready and
whose benefit the condemnation is being undertaken would have completed the project a long time ago had
are so poor they could ill afford to meet this high price, it not been stopped by the city authorities.
unless they intend to borrow the money with a view to
disposing of the property later for a profits
FACTS:
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 267 provides:
Cities and municipalities are authorized to contract
loans from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation,
the Philippine National Bank, and/or other entity or
person at the rate of interest not exceeding eight 67.2
percent per annum for the purpose of purchasing or EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY,
expropriating homesites within their respective petitioner,
territorial jurisdiction and reselling them at cost to vs.
residents of the said cities and municipalities. HON. CEFERINO E. DULAY, in his capacity as the
The court below ruled that this provision empowers Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Cebu,
cities to purchase but not to expropriate lands for the Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, and SAN ANTONIO
purpose of subdivision and resale, and so dismissed DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
the present action, which seeks to condemn, for the Elena M. Cuevas for respondents.
purpose just stated, several parcels of land having a G.R. No. L-59603 April 29, 1987
combined area of 7,270 square meters and situated on EMERGENCY RECIT:
Legarda Street, City of Manila. The four parcels of land which are the subject
ISSUE: of this case is where the Mactan Export Processing
Whether or not the necessity for Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed.
condemnation is shown to justify the expropriation. Private respondent in which these lands are registered
RULING: under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the
NO. government without reaching the agreement as to the
The SC is inclined to believe that Act No. 267 compensation. Respondent Judge then issued an
empowers cities to expropriate as well as to purchase order for the appointment of the commissioners to
lands for homesites. The word "expropriating," taken determine the just compensation. It was later found out
singly or with the text, is susceptible of only meaning. that the payment of the government to Private
But this power to expropriate is necessarily subject to Respondent would be P15 per square meter, which
the limitations and. The National Government may not was objected to by the petitioner contending that under
confer its instrumentalities authority which itself may PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair
not exercise. A stream can not run higher than its and according to the fair market value declared by the
source. owner of the property sought to be expropriated or by
To authorize the condemnation of any particular land the assessor whichever is lower. Such objection and
by a grantee of the power of eminent domain, a the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were
 36
denied, and hearing was set for the reception of the just compensation through commissioners; and that
commissioner’s report. EPZA then filed this petition for the compensation must not exceed the maximum
certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent amount set by P.D. No. 1533.
from further hearing the case. The trial court denied the MR of petitioner. The
The SC held that PD 1533 is void and petitioner flied this present petition for certiorari and
unconstitutional. The decree constitutes impermissible mandamus with preliminary restraining order, enjoining
encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to the trial court from enforcing the order and from further
render this Court inutile in a matter which under the proceeding with the hearing of the expropriation case.
Constitution is reserved to it for final determination. The petitioner maintains that the respondent judge
The valuation in the decree may only serve as a acted in excess of his jurisdiction and with grave abuse
guiding principle or one of the factors in determining of discretion in denying the petitioner's motion for
just compensation but it may not substitute the court's reconsideration and in setting the commissioner's
own judgment as to what amount should be awarded report for hearing because under P.D. No. 1533, which
and how to arrive at such amount. The determination is the applicable law herein, the basis of just
of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a compensation shall be the fair and current market
judicial function. value declared by the owner of the property sought to
FACTS: be expropriated or such market value as determined
On January 15, 1979, the President of the by the assessor, whichever is lower. Therefore, there
Philippines, issued Proclamation No. 1811, reserving is no more need to appoint commissioners as
a certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in prescribed by Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court
the City of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu for the and for said commissioners to consider other highly
establishment of an export processing zone by variable factors in order to determine just
petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). compensation.
The proclamation included four (4) parcels of land ISSUE:
owned and registered in the name of the private Whether or not Sections 5 to 8, Rule 67 of the
respondent. The petitioner, therefore, offered to Revised Rules of Court had been repealed or deemed
purchase the parcels of land from the respondent. The amended by P.D. No. 1533 insofar as the appointment
parties failed to reach an agreement regarding the sale of commissioners to determine the just compensation
of the property. is concerned. Stated in another way, is the exclusive
The petitioner filed a complaint for expropriation with a and mandatory mode of determining just compensation
prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession against in P.D. No. 1533 valid and constitutional?
the private respondent, to expropriate the aforesaid RULING:
parcels of land pursuant to P.D. No. 66, as amended, NO.
which empowers the petitioner to acquire by The Court is constrained to declare the
condemnation proceedings any property for the provisions of the Decrees on just compensation
establishment of export processing zones, in relation unconstitutional and void and accordingly dismiss the
to Proclamation No. 1811, for the purpose of instant petition for lack of merit.
establishing the Mactan Export Processing Zone. The method of ascertaining just compensation
On October 21, 1980, the respondent judge issued a under the decrees constitutes impermissible
writ of possession authorizing the petitioner to take encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to
immediate possession of the premises. At the pre-trial render this Court inutile in a matter which under the
conference, the respondent judge issued an order Constitution is reserved to it for final determination.
stating that the parties have agreed that the only issue Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding
to be resolved is the just compensation for the the court technically would still have the power to
properties. The respondent judge then issued an determine the just compensation for the property,
order appointing certain persons as following the applicable decrees, its task would be
commissioners to ascertain and report to the court relegated to simply stating the lower value of the
the just compensation for the properties sought to property as declared either by the owner or the
be expropriated. assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be
On June 19, 1981, the three commissioners submitted useless for the court to appoint commissioners under
their consolidated report recommending the amount of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the need to
P15.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable satisfy the due process clause in the taking of private
value of just compensation for the properties. The property is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and that a judicial proceeding was not had before the
Objection to Commissioner's Report on the grounds actual taking. However, the strict application of the
that P.D. No. 1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 of decrees during the proceedings would be nothing short
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of of a mere formality or charade as the court has only to
 37
choose between the valuation of the owner and that of the provisional compensation mentioned in the 1997
the assessor, and its choice is always limited to the Rule is deposited. Thus, in the instant case the trial
lower of the two. The court cannot exercise its court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
discretion or independence in determining what is just granted the NPC’s Motion for the issuance of the Writ,
or fair. despite the absence of hearing on the amount of the
We are convinced and so rule that the trial provisional deposit.
court correctly stated that the valuation in the decree FACTS:
may only serve as a guiding principle or one of the Robern is the registered owner of a parcel of
factors in determining just compensation but it may land, which the National Power Corporation is seeking
not substitute the court's own judgment as to what to expropriate. The property forms part of a proposed
amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such low-cost housing project. On June 6, 1997, NPC filed a
amount. A return to the earlier well-established Complaint for Eminent Domain against Robern.
doctrine, to our mind, is more in keeping with the Instead of filing an answer, petitioner countered
principle that the judiciary should live up to its mission with a Motion to Dismiss, alleging (a) that the action
"by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights." did not have the approval of the NPC board of
The determination of "just compensation" in directors; (b) that Nemesio S. Cañete, who signed the
eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The verification and certification in the Complaint, was not
executive department or the legislature may make the the president, the general manager or an officer
initial determinations but when a party claims a specifically authorized under the NPC charter (RA
violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that 6395); (c) that the choice of property to be
private property may not be taken for public use expropriated was improper, as it had already been
without just compensation, no statute, decree, or intended for use in a low-cost housing project, a public
executive order can mandate that its own purpose within the contemplation of law; and the
determination shall prevail over the court's choice was also arbitrary, as there were similar
findings. Much less can the courts be precluded properties available within the area.
from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed Before this Motion could be resolved, NPC
compensation. filed a Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Possession. In
We, therefore, hold that P.D. No. 1533, which its Order of August 13, 1997, the trial court denied the
eliminates the court's discretion to appoint petitioner's Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner filed an MR
commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of but was dismissed by the trial court in its order on
Court, is unconstitutional and void. To hold otherwise September 11, 1997.
would be to undermine the very purpose why this On September 22, 1997, petitioner filed a
Court exists in the first place. Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of September
11, 1997, arguing among others that Section 15-A of
RA 6395 was virtually “amended” when Cañete was
67.3 allowed to verify and sign the certificate of non-forum
ROBERN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, shopping in regard to the Complaint for expropriation
petitioner, vs. JUDGE JESUS V. QUITAIN, Regional filed by NPC. Without awaiting the outcome of the
Trial Court of Davao City, Br. 15; and NATIONAL Motion for Reconsideration, NPC filed a Motion to
POWER CORPORATION, respondents. Implement the Writ of Possession. On September 19,
G.R. No. 135042. September 23, 1999 1997, in spite of petitioner’s opposition, the trial court
PETITION: Petition under Rule 45 issued a Writ of Possession.
EMERGENCY RECIT: The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the
NPC filed complaint for Eminent Domain trial court. The CA ruled that the verification and
against Robern. Robern countered with a Motion to certification of the Complaint by someone other than
Dismiss. RTC denied MTD. Robern filed MR. Before the president or the general manager of NPC was not
the MR could be resolved, Robern filed a Motion for a fatal jurisdictional defect. Also, the issuance of the
the Issuance of a Writ of Possession which was Writ of Possession was proper in view of NPC’s
granted by the RTC. The CA upheld the decision of compliance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules
the RTC. of Civil Procedure, by depositing with the Philippine
The SC held that the issues raised by the National Bank an amount equivalent to the assessed
petitioner are affirmative defenses that should be value of the disputed property. Lastly, certiorari was
alleged in an answer, since they require presentation not the proper remedy, as the Order sustaining the
of evidence aliunde. Hence, petitioner should have right to expropriate the property was not final and could
filed an answer instead of an MTD. The Court also still be appealed by the aggrieved party. The
held that the trial court's issuance of the Writ of availability of appeal ruled out certiorari
Possession is ministerial under Rule 67, Sec 2, once ISSUES:
 38
1. Were there valid grounds to dismiss the Complaint? of the government. Under the old rule, the hearing of
2. Was the Writ of Possession validly issued, the motion and the presentation of evidence followed.
considering that the trial court had not conducted any However, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
hearing on the amount to be deposited? no longer requires such extraordinary motion to
RULING: dismiss.
1. NO. To be exact, the issues raised by the petitioner are
In this case, the questioned verification stated that affirmative defenses that should be alleged in an
Atty. Cañete was the acting regional legal counsel of answer, since they require presentation of
NPC at the Mindanao Regional Center in Iligan City. evidence aliunde. Section 3 of Rule 67 provides that
He was not merely a retained lawyer, but an NPC in- “if a defendant has any objection to the filing of or the
house counsel and officer, whose basic function was allegations in the complaint, or any objection or
to prepare legal pleadings and to represent NPC- defense to the taking of his property,” he should
Mindanao in legal cases. As regional legal counsel for include them in his answer. Naturally, these issues will
the Mindanao area, he was the officer who was in the have to be fully ventilated in a full-blown trial and
best position to verify the truthfulness and the hearing. It would be precipitate to dismiss the
correctness of the allegations in the Complaint for Complaint on such grounds as claimed by the
expropriation in Davao City. As internal legal counsel, petitioner. Dismissal of an action upon a motion to
he was also in the best position to know and to certify dismiss constitutes a denial of due process if, from a
if an action for expropriation had already been filed consideration of the pleadings, it appears that there
and pending with the courts. are issues that cannot be decided without a trial of the
Next, petitioner asserts that NPC had no legal case on the merits.
standing to file the expropriation case, because the Inasmuch as the 1997 Rules had just taken effect
Complaint did not allege that its board of directors had when this case arose, we believe that in the interest of
authorized its filing. It added that under Section 6, RA substantial justice, the petitioner should be given an
6395, only the board was vested with the corporate opportunity to file its answer to the Complaint for
power to sue and be sued. The contention is without expropriation in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67 of
merit. the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Under Rule 67, Section 1, it does not require that the
Complaint be expressly approved by the board of 2. YES.
directors of a corporation. In any event, such Under SEC. 2. of Rule 67: Upon the filing of the
authorization is a factual issue that can be threshed complaint or at any time thereafter and after due notice
out during the trial. to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to
Petitioner avers that the Complaint should be take or enter upon the possession of the real property
dismissed, because the subject property was already involved if he deposits with the authorized government
committed to be used in a low-cost housing project. depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value
We disagree. Petitioner's argument in this case is of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by
premised on the old rule. Before the 1997 such bank subject to the orders of the court.
amendment, Section 3 of Rule 67 allowed a defendant In the present case, although the Complaint for
“in lieu of an answer, [to] present in a single motion to expropriation was filed on June 6, 1997, the Motion for
dismiss or for other appropriate relief, all of his the Issuance of the Writ of Possession was filed on
objections and defenses to the right of the plaintiff to July 28, 1997; thus, the issuance of the Writ is covered
take his property xxx.” A motion to dismiss was not by the 1997 Rules. As earlier stated, procedural rules
governed by Rule 15 which covered ordinary motions. are given immediate effect and are applicable to
Such motion was the required responsive pleading actions pending and undetermined at the time they are
that took the place of an answer and put in issue the passed; new court rules apply to proceedings that take
plaintiff's right to expropriate the defendant's property. place after the date of their effectivity. Therefore,
Any relevant and material fact could be raised as a Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
defense in a condemnation proceeding, such as that Procedure, is the prevailing and governing law in this
which tended to show that (1) the exercise of the case.
power to condemn was unauthorized, or (2) there was With the revision of the Rules, the trial court's issuance
cause for not taking defendant’s property for the of the Writ of Possession becomes ministerial, once
purpose alleged in the petition, or (3) the purpose for the provisional compensation mentioned in the 1997
the taking was not public in character. Rule is deposited. Thus, in the instant case the trial
This old rule found basis in the constitutional court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
provisions on the exercise of the power of eminent granted the NPC’s Motion for the issuance of the Writ,
domain, which were deemed to be for the protection of despite the absence of hearing on the amount of the
the individual property owner against the aggressions provisional deposit.
 39
that pursuant to Sec. 4 of RA No. 8974, they are
entitled to 100% of the value of the subject property
based on the current relevant zonal valuation made by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), which at the
time was pegged at ₱700.00 per square meter. Thus,
67.4. SPOUSES MARIAN B. LINTAG and ANGELO
petitioners prayed that NPC be directed to pay
T. ARRASTIA, represented herein by Attorney-in-
₱5,635,000.00 for the subject property.
Fact REMEDIOS BERENGUER LINTAG v.
The RTC issued an Order directing the NPC to
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION
comply with RA No. 8974. The court held that RA No.
(G.R. No. 158609, July 27, 2007, NACHURA, J.)
8974 is procedural in nature, and, thus, may be given
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
retroactive effect. On appeal, CA declared that RA No.
8974 cannot be applied retroactively since an initial
Emergency Recit:
Petitioners are the registered owners of a property covered deposit had already been made and possession of the
by (TCT) No. T 24855. Respondent National Power subject property had already been obtained by NPC.
Corporation (NPC) filed a Complaint for Eminent Domain Moreover, the CA held that the retroactive application
against petitioners in order to acquire an easement of a right of said law would impose a greater burden on the part
of way over a portion of the said property. On November 7, of the State where none had existed before. It would
2000, Republic Act (RA) No. 8974 entitled "An Act To inflict substantial injury to a substantive right. Finally,
Facilitate The Acquisition Of Right-Of-Way, Site Or Location the CA opined that RA No. 8974 itself made no
For National Government Infrastructure Projects And For mention of retroactivity.
Other Purposes" was approved. Petitioners filed a Motion
Petitioners contend that the Government's
asking the RTC to direct the NPC to comply with RA No.
8974. Petitioners asseverated that pursuant to Sec. 4 of RA deliberate delay of payment of just compensation is the
No. 8974, they are entitled to 100% of the value of the evil sought to be remedied by RA No. 8974; that
subject property based on the current relevant zonal despite the issuance of Administrative Order (AO) No.
valuation made by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), 50 and NPC Resolution No. 98-184, NPC never had
which at the time was pegged at ₱700.00 per square meter. the intention of making prompt payment of just
NPC counters that RA No. 8974 is not a remedial statute compensation; and that just compensation does not
that can be given retroactive effect, and submits that Sec. 4 only mean correct determination of the amount to be
thereof is a substantive provision. SC held that held that RA paid but also the prompt payment thereof. On the other
No. 8974 is a substantive law. Expropriation of lands
hand, NPC through the Office of the Solicitor General
consists of two stages: The first is concerned with the
determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the (OSG) counters that RA No. 8974 is not a remedial
power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in statute that can be given retroactive effect, and
the context of the facts involved in the suit. The second submits that Sec. 4 thereof is a substantive provision
phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the as it vests substantive rights; that the legislature did
determination by the court of "the just compensation for the not intend RA No. 8974 to have retroactive application
property sought to be taken." This is done by the court with
the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. It Issues:
is only upon the completion of these two stages that 1. W/N CA committed a reversible error when it
expropriation is said to have been completed. The process is
declared that RA No. 8974 cannot be applied
not complete until payment of just compensation.
retroactively because it is a substantive law and
not a remedial statute
Facts:
2. Assuming for the sake of argument that RA
Marian Berenguer-Lintag and Angelo T.
No. 8974 is not retroactive, how should the
Arrastia (petitioners) are the registered owners of a
petitioners be promptly paid just compensation?
property with an area of 80,001 square meters,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T
Ruling:
24855
No. The petition is bereft of merit. Petitioners'
On December 4, 1996, respondent National
first ground must fail.
Power Corporation (NPC) filed a Complaint for
In the case of Republic v. Gingoyon, this Court
Eminent Domain against petitioners in order to acquire
held that RA No. 8974 is a substantive law, to wit:
an easement of a right of way over a portion of the
It likewise bears noting that the
said property, consisting of 8,050 square meters. After
appropriate standard of just
the deposit of the initial assessed value of the subject
compensation is a substantive matter.
property amounting to ₱2,468.09 with the Philippine
It is well within the province of the
National Bank, the RTC, upon an ex-parte motion of
legislature to fix the standard, which it
NPC, ordered the issuance of a Writ of Possession on
did through the enactment of Rep. Act
the subject property. The RTC issued an Order
No. 8974.
appointing three (3) new Commissioners to appraise
It is a well-entrenched principle that statutes,
the value of the subject property.
including administrative rules and regulations, operate
On November 7, 2000, Republic Act (RA) No.
prospectively unless the legislative intent to the
8974 entitled "An Act To Facilitate The Acquisition Of
contrary is manifest by express terms or by necessary
Right-Of-Way, Site Or Location For National
implication.
Government Infrastructure Projects And For Other
In the application of RA No. 8974, the Court finds no
Purposes" was approved. Petitioners filed a Motion
justification to depart from this rule. First, RA No. 8974
asking the RTC to direct the NPC to comply with RA
is a substantive law. Second, there is nothing in RA
No. 8974. In the said motion, petitioners asseverated
No. 8974 which expressly provides that it should have
 40
retroactive effect. Third, neither is retroactivity Commissioners on the rationale that the respondents
necessarily implied from RA No. 8974 or in any of its had never challenged its right to expropriate their
provisions. Unfortunately for the petitioners, the properties subject of the suit. The trial court, even as it
silence of RA No. 8974 and its Implementing Rules on found the aforementioned motion meritorious, deferred
the matter cannot give rise to the inference that it can action on the petitioner’s prayer for an order of
be applied retroactively. expropriation and instead set the same motion for
As to petitioners' second ground, the parties may be hearing. Petitioners argued that the issuance of an
guided by the following principles. order of expropriation is proper citing Section 4, Rule
Expropriation of lands consists of two 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and adding
stages: The first is concerned with the determination that where a defendant in an expropriation case raises
of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of only the issue of just compensation, the court "should
eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the forthwith enter an order of expropriation. SC held that
context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an payment of just compensation is not a condition sine
order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of qua non to the issuance of an order of expropriation. In
condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful expropriation proceedings, it is the transfer of title to
right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the land expropriated that must wait until the indemnity
the public use or purpose described in the complaint, is actually paid
upon the payment of just compensation to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint
x x x. Facts:
The second phase of the eminent domain Petitioner Republic, through the Toll
action is concerned with the determination by the court Regulatory Board, sought to widen the Balintawak Toll
of "the just compensation for the property sought to be Plaza which would necessarily affect two (2) parcels of
taken." This is done by the court with the assistance of land registered under the names of herein respondents
not more than three (3) commissioners x x x.27 Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation (Phil-
It is only upon the completion of these two Ville, for brevity) and Sy Chi Siong and Co., Inc.
stages that expropriation is said to have been Petitioner filed a complaint for expropriation before the
completed. The process is not complete until payment Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City for the
of just compensation. Accordingly, the issuance of the acquisition of the 2 parcels of land. Petitioner
writ of possession in this case does not write finis to deposited with the Land Bank of the Philippines the
the expropriation proceedings. To effectuate the amount of Two Million Three Hundred Eleven
transfer of ownership, it is necessary for the NPC to Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (₱2,311,200.00),
pay the property owners the final just compensation representing the total zonal value of the properties
RTC must bear in mind that it is the value of under expropriation. Thereafter, it filed with the court a
the land at the time of the taking or at the time of the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession. Petitioner
filing of the complaint, whichever came first, not the filed a Motion for Issuance of Order of Expropriation
value of the land at the time of the rendition of and Appointment of Commissioners on the rationale
judgment which should be considered. In this case, that the respondents had never challenged its right to
where the institution of an expropriation action expropriate their properties subject of the suit. The trial
preceded the taking of the subject property, just court, even as it found the aforementioned motion
compensation is based on the value of the land at the meritorious, deferred action on the petitioner’s prayer
time of the filing of the complaint. This is provided by for an order of expropriation and instead set the same
the Rules of Court, the assumption of possession by motion for hearing on March 7, 2005 "so that the
the expropriator ordinarily being conditioned on its parties may nominate the commissioners who will
deposit with the National or Provincial Treasurer of the ascertain and report to the court the just compensation
amount equivalent to the value of the property as for the aforementioned properties
provisionally ascertained by the court having Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial
jurisdiction of the proceedings. Reconsideration of the above Order, arguing that since
the case had been set for hearing on March 7, 2005 for
the nomination of the commissioners and necessarily
for the conduct of hearing for the determination of just
67.5. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, compensation, "it is proper that an order of
represented by the TOLL REGULATORY BOARD expropriation be forthwith issued before such
vs. PHIL-VILLE DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING determination of just compensation proceeds," citing,
CORPORATION and SY CHI SIONG AND CO., INC. as basis therefor, Section 4, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules
(G.R. No. 172243, June 26, 2007, GARCIA, J.) of Civil Procedure, and adding that where a defendant
in an expropriation case raises only the issue of just
Emergency Recit compensation, the court "should forthwith enter an
Petitioner Republic, through the Toll order of expropriation.
Regulatory Board, sought to widen the Balintawak Toll RTC denied the motion holding that just
Plaza which would necessarily affect two (2) parcels of compensation of the subject properties must first be
land registered under the names of herein determined and paid before the Court can issue an
respondents Phil-Ville Development and Housing order of expropriation. CA affirmed
Corporation (Phil-Ville, for brevity) and Sy Chi Siong
and Co., Inc. Petitioner filed a Motion for Issuance of Issue:
Order of Expropriation and Appointment of
 41
W/N a final determination of just compensation in an 67.6. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
expropriation proceedings must first be made before REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
an order of expropriation may be issued by the court WORKS AND HIGHWAYS vs. FAR EAST
ENTERPRISES, INC., ARSOL MANAGEMENT
Ruling: CORPORATION,* MARIA CHRISTINA C.
BERNASCONI, JORGE C. BERNASCONI, RENE C.
No. There are two (2) stages in every action BERNASCONI, REGINA B. TUASON, CHRISTIAN C.
for expropriation. Petitioner Republic is correct in BERNASCONI, MARTIN C. BERNASCONI, JAIME C.
saying that an order of expropriation denotes the end BERNASCONI and CHRISTINA MARIE C.
of the first stage of expropriation. Its end then paves BERNASCONI
the way for the second stage – the determination of (G.R. No. 176487, August 25, 2009, CHICO-
just compensation, and, ultimately, payment NAZARIO, J.)
Because an order of expropriation merely
determines the authority to exercise the power of Emergency Recit
eminent domain and the propriety of such exercise, its The Republic represented by the Secretary of the
issuance does not hinge on the payment of just Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), filed a
compensation. After all, there would be no point in Complaint for Eminent Domain before the Regional Trial
determining just compensation if, in the first place, the Court of Nasugbu, Batangas against Far East Enterprises,
Inc. (Far East), Arsol Management Corporation (Arsol), and
plaintiff’s right to expropriate the property was not first the Bernasconis. The trial court ordered petitioner to comply
clearly established. and manifest its compliance with the guidelines of Section 12
During the first stage, if the defendant had of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act
denied or objected to the plaintiff's right to expropriate, No. 8974. The trial court issued a Resolution dated 17 June
a hearing would have been held to decide upon 2002 ordering the plaintiff to make the additional deposit of
whether the land was private, and whether the ₱425.00 per square meter for the properties of the movants
purpose was, in fact, public.However, once the before the order to possess and writ of possession issue.
objections and defenses against the right of the The appellate court found that the trial court did not act with
plaintiff to expropriate are overruled, an order of grave abuse of discretion. SC made it clear that Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 8974 lists the relevant standards that are to
expropriation may issue. With all the more reason be considered in determining just compensation for and not
must this be so when, as in this case, there is no classification of lands, as petitioner would like us to believe.
contest or objection by either of the herein To clarify, the payment of the provisional value as a
respondents as to the petitioner’s right to expropriate prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of possession differs
After the trial court determined the right of from the payment of just compensation for the expropriated
petitioner to condemn the subject properties for the property. While the provisional value is based on the current
expansion and rehabilitation of the North Luzon relevant zonal valuation, just compensation is based on the
Expressway, the first stage of the expropriation prevailing fair market value of the property
proceedings should have been properly terminated
with the issuance of an order of expropriation declaring Facts:
that petitioner has the right to take the properties.
To stress, payment of just compensation is not The Republic of the Philippines, represented
a condition sine qua non to the issuance of an order of by the Secretary of the Department of Public Works
expropriation. In expropriation proceedings, it is the and Highways (DPWH), filed a Complaint for Eminent
transfer of title to the land expropriated that must wait Domain before the Regional Trial Court of Nasugbu,
until the indemnity is actually paid. This is made all the Batangas against Far East Enterprises, Inc. (Far East),
more clear when note is taken of the second Arsol Management Corporation (Arsol), Maria Christina
paragraph of Section 4, Rule 67, supra, which states C. Bernasconi, Jorge C. Bernasconi, Rene C.
that the defendant may appeal from the order of Bernasconi, Regina B. Tuason, Christian C.
expropriation by filing a record on appeal, which Bernasconi, Martin C. Bernasconi, Jaime C.
appeal does not prevent the court from determining Bernasconi and Christina Marie C. Bernasconi
the just compensation to be paid. (Bernasconis).
The complaint alleged that to enable the
Further, a perusal of Section 5, Rule 67 bolsters this plaintiff to construct the Ternate-Nasugbu Tali
point: Batangas Road, it is both necessary and urgent for
Section 5. Ascertainment of plaintiff to acquire portions of the parcels of land
Compensation. - Upon the rendition of the owned by the defendants
order of expropriation, the court shall appoint The trial court ordered petitioner to comply and
not more than three (3) competent and manifest its compliance with the guidelines of Section
disinterested persons as commissioners to 12 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
ascertain and report to the court the just Republic Act No. 8974, within ten days from receipt
compensation for the property sought to be thereof, before it would issue an order for petitioner to
taken. x x x take possession of the affected properties. Petitioner
Clearly, it is after the rendition of the order of filed its Compliance and Motion for Issuance of Order
expropriation that the court shall appoint and Writ of Possession.
commissioners to ascertain the just compensation for Both Far East and the Bernasconis claimed
the property sought to be taken. that petitioner intentionally and wantonly disregarded
and misled the trial court by stating that their properties
 42
were classified as agricultural to justify the deposit it certifications should be primarily resolved first by the
made administrative agency whose expertise relates therein.
The trial court ordered petitioner to correct its To clarify, the payment of the provisional value
zonal valuation with respect to Far East and the as a prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of
Bernasconis and to make the corresponding deposit possession differs from the payment of just
therefor. It found that the amounts deposited as compensation for the expropriated property. While the
regards Far East and the Bernasconis were not provisional value is based on the current relevant zonal
sufficient because these were based on a zonal valuation, just compensation is based on the prevailing
valuation of ₱75.00 per square meter. It said that the fair market value of the property. As the appellate court
deposit should be based on ₱500.00 per square explained:
meter, because the subject lands were residential The first refers to the preliminary or provisional
lands. As to Arsol, the trial court found the deposit of determination of the value of the property. It serves a
petitioner at ₱75.00 per square meter was correct double-purpose of pre-payment if the property is fully
The trial court issued a Resolution dated 17 expropriated, and of an indemnity for damages if the
June 2002 ordering the plaintiff to make the additional proceedings are dismissed. It is not a final
deposit of ₱425.00 per square meter for the properties determination of just compensation and may not
of the movants before the order to possess and writ of necessarily be equivalent to the prevailing fair market
possession issue. Petitioner filed a Petition for value of the property. Of course, it may be a factor to
Certiorari with the Court of Appeals be considered in the determination of just
The Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. compensation.
72425 rendered its decision dismissing, for lack of Just compensation, on the other hand, is the
merit, the petition filed by petitioner DPWH. The final determination of the fair market value of the
appellate court found that the trial court did not act with property. It has been described as "the just and
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the
of jurisdiction in ordering petitioner to make the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the
additional payment of ₱425.00 per square meter for expropriation." Market values, has also been described
the subject properties of Far East and the Bernasconis in a variety of ways as the "price fixed by the buyer
before the issuance of the order to take possession, and seller in the open market in the usual and ordinary
and the writ of possession course of legal trade and competition; the price and
value of the article established as shown by sale,
Issue: public or private, in the ordinary way of business; the
In paying a property owner 100% of the value fair value of the property between one who desires to
of a property based on the current relevant zonal purchase and one who desires to sell; the current
valuation of the BIR for the purpose of an issuance of price; the general or ordinary price for which property
a writ of possession, under which classification of the may be sold in that locality
expropriated property should petitioner, as the
implementing agency, be required to make such
payment? 67.7. CITY OF ILOILO represented by HON. JERRY
P. TREÑAS, City Mayor vs. HON. LOLITA
Ruling: CONTRERAS-BESANA, Presiding Judge, Regional
We agree with petitioner that the courts have Trial Court, Branch 32, and ELPIDIO JAVELLANA
judicial discretion to determine the classification of (G.R. No. 168967, February 12, 2010, DEL
lands, because such classification is one of the CASTILLO, J)
relevant standards for the assessment of the value of Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
lands, subject of expropriation proceedings. It is one
factor that the courts consider in determining just Emergency Recit
compensation. The determination of just compensation In an expropriation case filed by petitioner
is a function addressed by the courts of justice and against private respondent (Javellana), the plaintiff was able
may not be usurped by any other branch or official of to take possession of two parcels of land owned by Javellana
the government. However, we would like to make it for the purpose of making the said lots the site for Lapaz
High School. On May 17, 1983, a writ of possession was
clear that Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8974 lists the issued to plaintiff after it allegedly made a deposit of P
relevant standards that are to be considered in 40,000. Private respondent found out that the amount of Php
determining just compensation for and not 40,000 was not deposited. Javellana filed a complaint for
classification of lands, as petitioner would like us to Recovery of Possession, Fixing and Recovery of Rental and
believe. Damages. RTC then issued an order (2003 order) which
In the case before us, the lands in question nullified the 1983 order, ordering the petitioner to
had long been (almost 20 years) reclassified as immediately deposit the 10% of the just compensation. This
residential before the instant case was filed. All those was amended six months later, changing the reckoning point
years, no one questioned the ordinance reclassifying from the time of the filing of the complaint to the date of the
issuance of this order. SC held that an order of
the lands. If petitioner would like to have the condemnation or dismissal is final, resolving the question of
reclassification of the lands involved changed to whether or not the plaintiff has properly and legally exercised
agricultural, the just and reasonable way of doing it is its power of eminent domain. Once the first order becomes
to go to the municipal council -- not the courts – that final and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority to
enacted the ordinance and to ask that the lands be expropriate and its public use can no longer be questioned.
reclassified again as agricultural. Technical matters Just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the
such as zoning classifications and building
 43
taking, which usually coincides with the commencement of public purpose.32 Either order will be a final order that
the expropriation proceedings. may be appealed by the aggrieved party.
An order of condemnation or dismissal is final,
resolving the question of whether or not the plaintiff
Facts: has properly and legally exercised its power of eminent
In an expropriation case filed by petitioner domain. Once the first order becomes final and no
against private respondent (Javellana), the plaintiff appeal thereto is taken, the authority to expropriate
was able to take possession of two parcels of land and its public use can no longer be questioned.
owned by Javellana for the purpose of making the said Javellana did not bother to file an appeal from
lots the site for Lapaz High School. On May 17, 1983, the May 17, 1983 Order which granted petitioner’s
a writ of possession was issued to plaintiff after it Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession and which
allegedly made a deposit of the amount of the value of authorized petitioner to take immediate possession of
the said lots (Php 40,000). the Subject Property. Thus, it has become final, and
On April 2000, private respondent found out the petitioner’s right to expropriate the property for a
that the amount of Php 40,000 was not deposited by public use is no longer subject to review. On the first
the petitioner when he tried to withdraw the said question, therefore, SC ruled that the trial court gravely
amount (as proved by a certification issued by the erred in nullifying the May 17, 1983 Order
PNB). When no amicable resolution and a negotiated In a long line of cases, SC have constantly
sale was successful, he (Javellana) filed a complaint affirmed that:
for Recovery of Possession, Fixing and Recovery of x x x just compensation is to
Rental and Damages. He alleged that since he was be ascertained as of the time of the
not compensated for the expropriation of his property, taking, which usually coincides with
the possession by the plaintiff was illegal. This the commencement of the
argument was opposed by the petitioner, claiming that expropriation proceedings. Where the
Javellana can no longer file an action for the recovery institution of the action precedes entry
of the possession of the lots since the same was into the property, the just
already utilized for public use, therefore can only compensation is to be ascertained as
demand for the payment of just compensation. of the time of the filing of the complaint
The RTC then issued an order (2003 order) We stress, however, that the City of Iloilo
which nullified the 1983 order, ordering the petitioner should be held liable for damages for taking private
to immediately deposit the 10% of the just respondent’s property without payment of just
compensation after determining the value of the compensation. In Manila International Airport Authority
property at the time the complaint was filed. This was v. Rodriguez,43 the Court held that a government
amended six months later (2004 order), changing the agency’s prolonged occupation of private property
reckoning point from the time of the filing of the without the benefit of expropriation proceedings
complaint to the date of the issuance of this order. A undoubtedly entitled the landowner to damages
motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner,
arguing that there was no legal basis for its issuance.
This was denied by the trial court, ruling that since no 67.8. APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO
deposit was made, the reckoning point for the PLANTATION, INC vs. LAND BANK OF THE
determination of the fair market value of the property PHILIPPINES
should be the date of the issuance of the order. (G.R. No. 164195, October 12, 2010, BRION,
Petitioner assailed the aforementioned orders J.)
claiming that the trial court gravely abused its
discretion in overturning the 1983 order which was Emergency Recit:
already final and executory, and that the just Apo Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation,
compensation for the expropriation should be based Incorporated were owners of 5 parcels of land in Davao.
on the fair market value of the property at the time of These companies voluntarily offered to sell their lands to the
the taking or at the time of the filing of the complaint. Department of Agriculture pursuant to RA 6657 or the
Private respondent argued that there was no error Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. The parties were not
committed by the trial court, and that the said orders able to come into agreement as to the price of the lands in
were subject to amendment and nullification at the question. Thus, the petitioners brought the matter to before
court’s discretion. the DAR Adjudication Board to determine just compensation.
Pending the determination of the just compensation, the
government deposited P26M and P45M to Apo Fruits
Issues:
Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc., respectively. DAR also
registered said lands in the name of the Republic of the
1. Does an order of expropriation become final?
Philippines and distributed the same to farmers under CARP.
2. What is the correct reckoning point for the
Three years passed but DARAB failed to render decision on
determination of just compensation?
the valuation of land and determination of just compensation.
Ruling: Hence, petitioners filed a complaint for the determination of
just compensation before the Regional Trial Court of Davao,
Expropriation proceedings have two stages. which rendered decision in favor of AFC and HPI. RTC ruled
The first phase ends with an order of dismissal, or a that the purchase price of the land should be higher than
determination that the property is to be acquired for a what was initially offered by DAR, considering the permanent
 44
improvements on AFC’s and HPI’s lands. SC held that when income the landholdings would have earned had they
the LBP took the petitioners’ landholdings without the not immediately been taken from the petitioners. From
corresponding full payment, it became liable to the this point of view, the December 19, 2007 Resolution
petitioners for the income the landholdings would have deleting the award of 12% interest is not only patently
earned had they not immediately been taken from the and legally wrong, but is also morally unconscionable
petitioners. LBP is liable to pay legal interest of 12% counted for being grossly unfair and unjust.
from December 9, 1996, the time of the taking until June 30, The constitutional limitation of "just
2013. compensation" is considered to be the sum equivalent
to the market value of the property, broadly described
Facts: to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the
On 12 October 1995, petitioners (AFC & HPI) usual and ordinary course of legal action and
voluntarily offered to sell (VOS) their respective competition or the fair value of the property as between
registered tracks of land to the government. On 16 one who receives, and one who desires to sell, it fixed
October 1996, they were notified by the PARO of the at the time of the actual taking by the government.
acquisition and valuation of P86.9M (AFC) and Thus, if property is taken for public use before
P164.5M (HPI) to which petitioners rejected for being compensation is deposited with the court having
very low. Accordingly, the respondent bank deposited jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must
P26.4M (AFC) and P45.5M (HPI) to petitioners’ bank include interests on its just value to be computed from
account which they withdrew after. On 9 December the time the property is taken to the time when
1996, titles over the lands were cancelled and new compensation is actually paid or deposited with the
ones were issued in the name of the Republic. court. In fine, between the taking of the property and
When DARAB failed to act for three years on the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to
the petitions for determination and payment of just place the owner in a position as good as (but not
compensation, petitioners filed the petitions with RTC better than) the position he was in before the taking
Tagum. On 25 September 2001, it fixed the amount of occurred.
just compensation and an interest at market rate The award of interest is intended to
computed from the taking of the properties (9 compensate the property owner for the income it would
December 1996). When the respondent moved for have made had it been properly compensated for its
reconsideration, the RTC modified its ruling on 5 property at the time of the taking. It is imposed in the
December 2001 fixing the interest at 12% per annum nature of damages for delay in payment which, in
from the time the complaint was filed until finality of the effect, makes the obligation on the part of the
decision. government one of forbearance to ensure prompt
On 6 February 2007, the Third Division of SC payment of the value of the land and limit the
affirmed RTC decision but, upon motion for opportunity loss of the owner.
reconsideration, it was modified on 19 December 2007 In LBP v. PH-Agro Industrial Corporation
deleting the 12% interest due on the balance of just (2017), the SC ruled that “the requirement of the law is
compensation. All parties moved for reconsideration of not satisfied by the mere deposit with any accessible
the modified ruling but was denied. On 16 May 2008, bank of the provisional compensation determined by it
Entry of Judgment followed. Notwithstanding the Entry or by the DAR, and its subsequent release to the
of Judgment, petitioners still filed a motion to admit the landowner after compliance with the legal
Second Motion for Reconsideration and motion to refer requirements set forth by R.A. No. 6657.”
the second motion to Court En Banc. In the present case, LBP merely deposited the
The Court En Banc accepted the referral. But amount of 3,814,053.53Php as initial payment of the
on 4 December 2009, it denied the petitioners’ second just compensation. The RTC's valuation in its decision
motion for reconsideration on the ground that the as just compensation for the subject property is
motion runs counter to the immutability of final 149,783,000.27Php. There is a staggering difference
decisions and that it has no reason to recognize the between the initial payment made by the LBP and the
case as an exception to the immutability principle. amount of the just compensation due to Apo. It should
Thus, petitioners filed the present motion for be noted that the subject property has already been
reconsideration to reconsider its 4 December 2009 taken by the government on December 9, 1996.
Resolution arguing among others that the principle of Thus, LBP is liable to pay legal interest of 12%
immutability of judgment does not apply. LBP, on the counted from December 9, 1996, the time of the taking
other hand, contends that the principle of immutability until June 30, 2013. Thereafter, or beginning July 1,
applies to the case. 2013 until fully paid, the just compensation shall earn
6% legal interest in accordance with Bangko Sentral
Issue: ng Pilipinas Monetary Board Circular No. 799, Series
Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to of 2013
the interest on the just compensation? More than the stability of our jurisprudence,
the matter before us is of transcendental importance to
Ruling: the nation because of the subject matter involved –
Yes. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is agrarian reform, a societal objective that the
granted. government has unceasingly sought to achieve in the
In the context of this case, when the LBP took past half century. This reform program and its
the petitioners’ landholdings without the corresponding objectives would suffer a major setback if the
full payment, it became liable to the petitioners for the government falters or is seen to be faltering, wittingly
or unwittingly, through lack of good faith in
 45
implementing the needed reforms. Truly, agrarian
reform is so important to the national agenda that the In 2004, NAPOCOR filed a Manifestation and
Solicitor General, no less, pointedly linked agricultural Motion to Discontinue Expropriation Proceedings,
lands, its ownership and abuse, to the idea of
informing that the parties failed to reach an amicable
revolution.
agreement; that the property sought to be
expropriated was no longer necessary for public
purpose because of the intervening retirement of the
67.9. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, transmission lines installed on the respondents’
represented by the NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION vs. HEIRS OF SATURNINO Q. property; that because the public purpose for which
BORBON, AND COURT OF APPEALS such property would be used thereby ceased to exist,
(G.R. No. 165354,January 12, 2015,BERSAMIN J.) the proceedings for expropriation should no longer
continue, and the State was now duty-bound to return
Emergency Recit the property to its owners; and that the dismissal or
The National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR)
entered into a private property owned by respondents discontinuance of the expropriation proceedings was in
Borbon in order to construct and maintain transmission accordance with Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of
lines for its Power Transmission Project. NAPOCOR Court.
then filed for expropriation of an easement of right of
way over a portion of the said property. However, Issue:
during the pendency of the appeal, NAPOCOR filed a
motion to discontinue the expropriation proceedings,
that the property sought to be expropriated was no Whether or not the expropriation proceedings should
longer necessary for public purpose, that because the be discontinued or dismissed pending appeal
public purpose ceased to exist, the proceedings for
expropriation should no longer continue, and the State
Ruling:
was now duty-bound to return the property to its
owners; and that the dismissal or discontinuance of
the expropriation proceedings was in accordance of Yes. The dismissal of the proceedings for
the Rules of Court. SC held that the dismissal of the expropriation at the instance of NAPOCOR is proper,
proceedings for expropriation at the instance of but in pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of
NAPOCOR is proper, but in pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 67 Court, the dismissal or discontinuance of the
of the Rules of Court, the dismissal or discontinuance
proceedings must be upon such terms as the court
of the proceedings must be upon such terms as the
court deems just and equitable. deems just and equitable. It is important to note the
power of eminent domain. The right of eminent
Facts: domain is the “ultimate right of the sovereign power to
appropriate, not only the public but private property of
NAPOCOR, a government owned and all citizens within the territorial sovereignty, to public
controlled corporation, entered into a property located
purpose.” However, this right cannot be exercised in
at Batangas City to construct and maintain
transmission lines. Saturnino Boboron’s heirs, the an unlimited manner for it has two mandatory
herein respondents, owned the property which was requirements in the Government’s exercise of owner of
registered under Transfer Certificate Title No. T-9696 eminent domain, namely: (1) that it is for a particular
of the Registry of Deeds of Batangas. public purpose; and (2) the just compensation be paid
to the property owner.
NAPOCOR filed a complaint of expropriation in
the RTC Batangas City seeking for an easement of
Public use, in common acceptation, means
right of way over a portion of the property. They
“use by the public.” However, the concept has
contended that they had negotiated with the
expanded to include utility, advantage or productivity
respondents for the acquisition of the easement but
for the benefit of the public. “Public use” has now
they had failed to reach any agreement and that it
been held to be synonymous with “public interest,”
was willing to pay an amount representing the
“public benefit,” and “public convenience.”
assessed value of the portion of the land sought to be
expropriated.
It is essential that the element of public use of
The respondents answered with a motion to the property be maintained throughout the
dismiss and stated that they never had a negotiation proceedings for expropriation. The Court has observed
with NAPOCOR and that the entry was done without in Metropolitan Water District v. De los Angeles:
their consent in the process and even destroyed some
of trees, transmission posts and wood poles; that the It is not denied that the purpose of
area being expropriated only covered the portion the plaintiff was to acquire the land in
directly affected by the transmission lines. question for public use. The fundamental basis
 46
then of all actions brought for the proceedings. The court of origin shall treat the case as
expropriation of lands, under the power of if originally filed as an action for damages.
eminent domain, is public use. That being
true, the very moment that it appears at any 67.10. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v.
stage of the proceedings that the HEIRS OF ANTONINA RABIE, REPRESENTED BY
expropriation is not for a public use, the action ABRAHAM R. DELA CRUZ
must necessarily fail and should be dismissed, (G.R. No. 210218, August 17, 2016, CARPIO, J)
for the reason that the action cannot be Petition for Review On Certiorari
maintained at all except when the
Emergency Recit: NAPOCOR filed a complaint for
expropriation is for some public use. That
expropriation for the acquisition of Rabies’ land.
must be true even during the pendency of the
appeal or at any other stage of the NAPOCOR disagree with the amount of just
proceedings. If, for example, during the trial in compensation that the RTC granted. It filed an MR,
the lower court, it should be made to appear and after 7 days from receipt of its denial Rabies filed a
to the satisfaction of the court that the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. NAPOCOR
expropriation is not for some public use, it filed a Notice of Appeal, so the RTC transmit the
would be the duty and the obligation of the records to the CA. The trial court then set for hearing
trial court to dismiss the action. And even respondents' Motion for Execution Pending Appeal and
during the pendency of the appeal, if it should then issued an order granting it. NAPOCOR was
be made to appear to the satisfaction of the informed by LBP of the Notice of Garnishment.
appellate court that the expropriation is not
SC: The trial court still has jurisdiction to resolve a
for public use, then it would become the duty
motion for discretionary execution, but discretionary
and the obligation of the appellate court to
dismiss it. execution does not apply to eminent domain
proceedings, and the judge committed grave abuse of
The retirement of the transmission lines discretion when it failed to specify and discuss any
necessarily stripped the expropriation proceedings of good reason required for granting execution pending
the element of public use. To continue with the appeal. NAPOCOR funds being government
expropriation proceedings despite the definite properties, cannot be levied via a writ of execution
termination of the public purpose of the project would pursuant to a final judgment, then the trial court
result in the rendition of an invalid judgement in likewise cannot grant discretionary execution
favour of the expropriator due to the absence of the
pending appeal.
essential element which is public use.
FACTS:
Accordingly, due to the fact that NAPOCOR NAPOCOR filed a complaint for
entered the property without consent and without expropriation before the RTC against Heirs of Rabie
paying the compensation to the respondents, as well for the acquisition of the 822-square meter portion a
as to the damages it caused considering that in the residential lot located in Lumban, Laguna to be used
installation of transmission lines, there were fruit trees as access road for the Caliraya Hydro Electric Power
and plants damaged, the Court grants the motion to Plant. Rabies filed their Verified Answer claiming that
discontinue the proceedings subject to the conditions the just compensation should be P1,250,700 based on
mentioned. BIR zonal value of P1,000/sqm. NAPOCOR deposited
with the Land Bank the amount of P411,000
In the view of the discontinuance of the
(P500/sqm).
proceedings and return of the property to the
Rabies filed a Motion to Withdraw deposit
respondents, there is no need to pay just
compensation to the respondents because their which the RTC granted. NAPOCOR filed a Motion to
property would not be taken by NAPOCOR. Instead, Issue Order of Expropriation. However, NAPOCOR
the said agency must compensate the respondents for opposed the Commissioner’s Report, which
the disturbance of their property rights form the time nevertheless became the basis of RTC for grant of just
they entered the property, until the time of restoration compensation and the order for payment of lease from
of the possession by paying to them actual or other the time of occupation in 1940.
compensatory damages. Compensation now must be NAPOCOR filed a Motion for Reconsideration
understood as the actual lost as the result of the of the Order. However, the trial court denied the motion
damaged resources such as the plants and crops
in an Order dated 30 April 2013 which was received by
destroyed by NAPOCOR. Considering that the dismissal
NAPOCOR on 23 May 2013 and by respondents on 15
of the expropriation proceedings is a development
occurring during the appeal, the Court now treats the May 2013. On 22 May 2013, respondents filed a
dismissal of the expropriation proceedings as Motion for Execution Pending Appeal.
producing the effect of converting the case into an NAPOCOR filed its Comment/Opposition and
action for damages. For that purpose, the Court its Notice of Appeal and Record on Appeal. RTC gave
remands the case to the court of origin for further due course to NAPOCOR's Notice of Appeal and
 47
directed the transmittal of the records of the case to established jurisprudence that government
the Court of Appeals. The trial court set for hearing properties are exempt from execution. What
respondents' Motion for Execution Pending Appeal cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.
and then issued an order granting it.
NAPOCOR was informed by LBP of receipt of (note :State cannot be sued without its consent thus,
Notice of Garnishment. NAPOCOR file with the CA a garnishment cannot be made on government funds,
petition for certiorari, but it dismissed the petition. there’s a need for a law. Thus, trial court cannot do so
ISSUE: W/N NAPOCOR’s funds may be garnished by grant of discretionary execution pending appeal.)
through a Motion for Execution for Pending Appeal
Ruling: Lastly, the trial court also committed grave
abuse of discretion when it failed to specify and
NO. The trial court still has jurisdiction to discuss any good reason required for granting
resolve a motion for discretionary execution, but execution pending appeal.
discretionary execution does not apply to eminent Execution pending appeal requires the
domain proceedings, and the judge committed grave observance of the following requisites: (a) there must
abuse of discretion when it failed to specify and be a motion therefor by the prevailing party; (b) there
discuss any good reason required for granting must be a good reason for issuing the writ of
execution pending appeal. execution; and (c) the good reason must be stated in a
special order.
Execution pending appeal, also called The execution of judgment pending appeal
discretionary execution under Section 2(a), Rule 39 of is an exception to the general rule and must,
the Rules of Court, is allowed upon good reasons to therefore, be strictly construed. So, too, it is not to
be stated in a special order after due hearing. be availed of and applied routinely, but only in
extraordinary circumstances.
In this case, the motion for execution pending In this case, the trial court granted the motion
appeal was filed by respondents seven days after their for execution pending appeal based on "good reasons
receipt of the trial court's order denying the motions for as stated in the motion," without identifying and
reconsideration filed by both parties. Clearly, discussing any of these alleged good reasons. . The
respondents filed the motion for execution pending trial court should have expressed clearly and distinctly
appeal before the lapse of the period to file an appeal, the facts and law on which the order granting the
which is fifteen days from notice of the order denying motion for execution pending appeal was based, but it
the motion for reconsideration. Therefore, the trial did not. Without such finding, the allegations in the
court still had jurisdiction when respondents filed their motion for execution pending appeal remain as
motion for execution pending appeal. allegations.
Further, prior to transmittal of the records of
the case, the trial court does not lose jurisdiction over
the case and in fact, may issue an order for execution 67.11. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
pending appeal. HEIRS OF LORENZO TAÑADA AND EXPEDITA
EBARLE,
However, the universal rule that where the (January 11, 2017, G.R. No. 170506, LEONARDO-
DE CASTRO, J.)
State gives its consent to be sued by private parties
(Petition for review under Rule 45)
either by general or special law, it may limit claimants
action only up to the completion of proceedings Emergency Recit:
anterior to the stage of execution and that the power of The heirs were owners of parcels of land that
the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since were included in the land reform program. The Land
government funds and properties may not be seized Bank put a value of 223,837 and 192,610 on the
under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such subject lands. The heirs alleged that the value was too
low. The RTC then valued the land as 150,000 per
judgments, is based on obvious considerations of
hectare. SC held that the just compensation for the
public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be said properties must be governed by the valuation
covered by the corresponding appropriation as factors under Section 17 of Republic Act No.
required by law. 6657.Ppursuant to the rule-making power of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under Section
Thus, NAPOCOR funds being government 49 of Republic Act No. 6657, the enumerated factors
were translated into a formula that was outlined in DAR
properties, cannot be levied via a writ of execution
Administrative Order No. 17, series of 1989, as
pursuant to a final judgment, then the trial court amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 03, series
likewise cannot grant discretionary execution of 1991, and as further amended by DAR
pending appeal, as it would run afoul of the Administrative Order No. 06, series of 1992
 48
from any government financing institution on the said
Facts: land, if any
Pursuant to the rule-making power of the
Respondents, the Heirs of Lorenzo Tañada Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under Section
and Expedita Ebarle, are the owners of several parcels 49 of Republic Act No. 6657, the enumerated factors
of land situated in Gabon, Abucay, Bataan, covered by were translated into a formula that was outlined in DAR
TCT Nos. T-8483 and T-12610. The record shows that Administrative Order No. 17, series of 1989, as
sometime in 1988, the aforesaid parcels of land were amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 03, series
placed under the land reform program of the of 1991, and as further amended by DAR
government. It was determined that 16.7692 hectares Administrative Order No. 06, series of 1992
from TCT No. T-8483 and 13 hectares from TCT No. There shall be one basic formula for the
T-12610 would be included in the program. P valuation of land covered by VOS or CA regardless of
etitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) the date of offer or coverage of the claim: LV = (CNI x
valued the properties to be taken at ₱223,837.29 for 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)
16.7692 hectares and ₱192,610.16 for 13 hectares or Where: LV = Land Value, CNI =Capitalized Net
a total of ₱416,447.43. Dissatisfied with this valuation Income, CS = Comparable Sales and MV = Market
for being unreasonably and unconscionably low, Value per Tax Declaration
respondents instituted the summary administrative The above formula shall be used if all the three
proceedings for the preliminary determination of just factors are present, relevant, and applicable.
compensation in 1992 and 1993. Al. When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV
Neither the Department of Agrarian Reform are applicable, the formula shall be: LV = (CNI x 0.9) +
(DAR) nor petitioner presented any witness to refute (MV x 0.1)
the evidence presented by respondents. Instead, they A2. When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and
offered documentary exhibits to show how, in MV are applicable, the formula shall be: LV = (CS x
adherence to DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
of 1992, they arrived at the valuation of the just A3. When both the CS and CNI are not present and
compensation for the subject parcels. only MV is applicable, the formula shall be: LV = MV x
The trial court acting as a Special Agrarian 2
Court (SAC) rendered the assailed July 13, 1999 The Court En Banc held in the recent case of
Decision which favored the respondents in this case Alfonso v. Land Bank of the Philippines18:
and pegged the value of the lots in question at fifteen For clarity, we restate the
pesos per square meter or P-150,000.00 per hectare body of rules as follows: The factors
A motion for reconsideration was listed under Section 17 of RA 6657
subsequently filed by petitioner but this was denied by and its resulting formulas provide a
the trial court. Dissatisfied with the adverse judgment, uniform framework or structure for the
petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. computation of just compensation
Respondents, in turn, opposed the petition on which ensures that the amounts to be
the ground that petitioner's valuation based on the paid to affected landowners are not
formula in DAR Administrative Order No. 06, series of arbitrary, absurd or even contradictory
1992, may not supplant the valuation of the SAC, to the objectives of agrarian reform.
which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals Until and unless declared invalid in a
proper case, the DAR formulas
Issue: partake of the nature of statutes,
Whether or not the trial court utilized the which under the 2009 amendment
correct method in fixing the just compensation due to became law itself, and thus have in
respondents' parcels of land which have been their favor the presumption of legality,
subjected to land reform proceedings under Republic such that courts shall consider, and
Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform not disregard, these formulas in the
Law of 1988 determination of just compensation for
properties covered by the CARP.
Ruling: When faced with situations which do
No. Since there is no dispute that the subject not warrant the formula's strict
properties are qualified for coverage under the application, courts may, in the
agrarian reform law, the just compensation for the said exercise of their judicial discretion,
properties must be governed by the valuation factors relax the formula's application to fit the
under Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657. factual situations before them, subject
When handling just compensation cases, the only to the condition that they clearly
trial court acting as a SAC should be guided by the explain in their Decision their reasons
following factors: (1) the acquisition cost of the land; (as borne by the evidence on record)
(2) the current value of the properties; (3) its nature, for the deviation undertaken. It is thus
actual use, and income; (4) the sworn valuation by the entirely allowable for a court to allow a
owner; (5) the tax declarations; (6) the assessment landowner's claim for an amount
made by government assessors; (7) the social and higher than what would otherwise
economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the have been offered (based on an
farmworkers, and by the government to the property; application of the formula) for as long
and (8) the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured
 49
as there is evidence on record incapable of pecuniary estimation and jurisdiction lies
sufficient to support the award. with the Regional Trial Court
It is apparent from the foregoing that both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals did not observe the Issue:
valuation factors under Section 17 of Republic Act No. Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of
6657 as translated into a basic formula in DAR discretion in dismissing the foreclosure cases filed with
Administrative Order No. 06, series of 1992, without a it on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
well-reasoned justification for the deviation as Ruling:
supported by the evidence on record. This is in clear No. The RTC exercises exclusive original
violation of the express mandate of both the law and jurisdiction in civil actions where the subject of the
jurisprudence concerning the determination of just litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. It also
compensation of land subjected to coverage by the has jurisdiction in civil cases involving title to, or
agrarian reform law. For this reason, the valuation possession of, real property or any interest in it where
made by the trial court cannot be upheld and must be the assessed value of the property involved exceeds
struck down as illegal. P20,000.00, and if it is below P20,000.00, it is the first
level court which has jurisdiction. An action "involving
title to real property" means that the plaintiffs cause of
68.1. ALONA G. ROLDAN v. SPOUSES CLARENCE action is based on a claim that he owns such property
I. BARRIOS AND ANNA LEE T. BARRIOS, or that he has the legal right to have exclusive control,
ROMMEL MATORRES, AND HON. JEMENA possession, enjoyment, or disposition of the same.
ABELLAR ARBIS, IN HER CAPACITY AS It is worthy to mention that the essence of a
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 6, REGIONAL TRIAL contract of mortgage indebtedness is that a property
COURT, AKLAN has been identified or set apart from the mass of the
(G.R. No. 214803, April 23, 2018, PERALTA, J.) property of the debtor-mortgagor as security for the
Petition for certiorari payment of money or the fulfillment of an obligation to
answer the amount of indebtedness, in case of default
Emergency Recit in payment.15Foreclosure is but a necessary
Alona G. Roldan filed an action for foreclosure of consequence of non-payment of the mortgage
real estate mortgage against respondents spouses Clarence indebtedness.16 In a real estate mortgage when the
I. Barrios and Anna Lee T. Barrios and respondent Romel D. principal obligation is not paid when due, the
Matorres. RTC issued an order dismissing the complaint for mortgagee has the right to foreclose the mortgage and
lack of jurisdiction it appearing from the complaint that the
assessed value of the property mortgaged is only
to have the property seized and sold with the view of
P13,380.00 and the instant cases being a real action, the applying the proceeds to the payment of the
assessed value of the property determines the jurisdiction. obligation.17 Therefore, the foreclosure suit is a real
Petitioner in her Motion argued that foreclosure of real estate action so far as it is against property, and seeks the
mortgage is an action incapable of pecuniary estimation and judicial recognition of a property debt, and an order for
jurisdiction lies with the Regional Trial Court. SC held that as the sale of the res.
foreclosure of mortgage is a real action, it is the assessed As foreclosure of mortgage is a real action, it is
value of the property which determines the court's the assessed value of the property which determines
jurisdiction. Considering that the assessed value of the the court's jurisdiction. Considering that the assessed
mortgaged property is only P13,380.00, the RTC correctly
found that the action falls within the jurisdiction of the first
value of the mortgaged property is only P13,380.00,
level court. er Section 33(3) of BP 129 as amended. the RTC correctly found that the action falls within the
jurisdiction of the first level court. er Section 33(3) of
Facts: BP 129 as amended.
Petitioner Alona G. Roldan filed an action for Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary
foreclosure of real estate mortgage against estimation are those for specific performance, support,
respondents spouses Clarence I. Barrios and Anna or foreclosure of mortgage or annulment of judgment;
Lee T. Barrios and respondent Romel D. Matorres. also actions questioning the validity of a mortgage,
She alleged that defendants borrowed from plaintiff the annulling a deed of sale or conveyance and to recover
sum of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos the price paid and for rescission, which is a counterpart
(P250,000.00), Philippine Currency, payable within the of specific performance.
period of one (1) year. To secure the prompt and full While actions under Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are
payment of the principal and interest, defendants also incapable of pecuniary estimation, the law
made and executed on October 13, 2008 a Deed of specifically mandates that they are cognizable by the
Real Estate Mortgage in favor of plaintiff upon a parcel MTC, METC, or MCTC where the assessed value of
of land and improvements thereon the real property involved does exceed P20,000.00 in
RTC issued an order dismissing the complaint Metro Manila, or P50,000.00, if located elsewhere. If
for lack of jurisdiction it appearing from the complaint the value exceeds P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 as the
that the assessed value of the property mortgaged is case may be, it is the Regional Trial Courts which have
only P13,380.00 and the instant cases being a real jurisdiction under Sec. 19(2).
action, the assessed value of the property determines
the jurisdiction.
Petitioner in her Motion argued that 68.2. REHABILITATION FINANCE CORPORATION
foreclosure of real estate mortgage is an action vs. ALTO SURETY and INSURANCE COMPANY,
INC
(G.R. No. L-14303, March 24, 1960, BARRERA, J.)
 50
This notwithstanding, the RFC executed an
Emergency Recit: affidavit consolidating ownership on the purchased
Eustaquio Palma executed a first property, stating therein that the period of redemption
mortgage in favor of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation had expired without the debtor or any lien-holder
(RFC), and subsequently, with the consent of the RFC, a thereon exercising said right of redemption or
second mortgage over the same property, in favor of Alto repurchase. This affidavit, together with the deed of
Surety & Insurance Company, Inc. (Alto). Upon default, RFC
foreclosed the mortgage extrajudicially. Six months later,
sale evidencing its (RFC's) purchase of the property at
mortgagor Palma, transferred and conveyed all his rights, public auction which RFC was able to secure the
title and interest in the mortgaged property to the spouses cancellation of
Anacleto Trinidad and Rosa S. de Trinidad, the assignees Palma’s TCT, and the issuance of a new title in its
assuming the obligation of paying the repurchase price of name (T.C.T. No. 1155). The second mortgage in favor
the auctioned property. RFC executed an affidavit of Alto, however, was carried and annotated at the
consolidating ownership on the purchased property. RFC back of the new title.
sought to cancel the annotation alleging that with the RFC sought to cancel the annotation alleging
consolidation and transfer to it as the first mortgagee of the that with the consolidation and transfer to it as the first
mortgagee's rights on the property, the junior
encumbrancer's lien on the same property had ceased. SC
mortgagee of the mortgagee's rights on the property,
held that Section 112 authorizes only alterations which do the junior encumbrancer's lien on the same property
not impair rights recorded in the decree, or alterations which, had ceased.
if they do prejudice such rights, are consented to by all Alto opposed the petition contending that with
parties concerned or alterations to correct obvious mistakes. the execution of the Deed of Resale between RFC and
An interest in the mortgaged property acquired subsequent the spouses Anacleto Trinidad and Rosa S. de
to the (first) mortgage may be divested or barred only by Trinidad, assignees of the mortgagor, the mortgaged
making the holder thereof a party to the proceedings to property had been completely released from the first
foreclose. mortgage and the second mortgage had been
automatically transformed into a first lien on the
Facts: property. RTC denied the petition for cancellation. RFC
appealed to the Court of Appeals. The case reached to
Eustaquio Palma is an owner of a parcel of SC via certiorari and pure questions of law are raised.
land in Camarines Sur. He used such land in
executing a first mortgage to secure a loan of P20, ISSUE:
000.00, in favor of the Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation (RFC), and subsequently, with the W/N the annotation of the second mortgage in favor of
consent of the RFC, a second mortgage over the the oppositor on the back of TTCT No. 1155 was made
same property, in favor of Alto Surety & Insurance in accordance with law
Company, Inc. (Alto). Both mortgages were duly
registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds and RULING:
annotated.
Upon failure of the mortgagor to settle the YES. The court a quo acted correctly in
P20, 000.00 loan on its maturity, RFC foreclosed the denying the petition to cancel the annotation of the
mortgage extrajudicially under Act 3135 as authorized second mortgage at the back of the title. SC held that
in the deed of mortgage and the property was sold in the relief afforded by Section 112 of the Land
public auction under the direction of the Provincial Registration Act may only be allowed if "there is a
Sheriff in favor of mortgagee RFC as the highest unanimity among the parties, or there is no adverse
bidder. claim or serious objection on the part of any party in
Six months later, mortgagor Palma, interest; otherwise, the case becomes controversial
transferred and conveyed all his rights, title and and should be threshed out in an ordinary case.
interest in the mortgaged property to the spouses
Anacleto Trinidad and Rosa S. de Trinidad, the Section 112 authorizes only alterations which
assignees assuming the obligation of paying the do not impair rights recorded in the decree, or
repurchase price of the auctioned property. Within the alterations which, if they do prejudice such rights, are
year of redemption, the assignee-spouses and the consented to by all parties concerned or alterations to
RFC executed a "Deed of Resale" whereby the correct obvious mistakes. The proceedings provided in
mortgaged property was resold and reconveyed in the Land Registration Act being summary in nature,
favor of the "redemptioners, their heirs, assignees and they are inadequate for the litigation of issues properly
successors in interest". However, instead of paying the pertaining to ordinary civil actions, thus, questions
whole redemption price, only P5,500 was paid on hand involving ownership of or title to a real property, or
and the sum of P21,505.11, balance of the total relating to the validity or cancellation or discharge of a
indebtedness including 6% interest was agreed to be mortgage should properly be ventilated in an ordinary
paid in ten annual amortizations. proceeding."
Alto, as junior encumbrancer, wrote the RFC
inquiring as to the actual status of the property subject There is another reason why the petition must
to redemption. RFC advised Alto that the auctioned be denied. Granting arguendo that the extrajudicial
property had already been sold to the Trinidad foreclosure proceeding instituted by the RFC is proper
spouses "under a deed of redemption on the and justified, since the junior encumbrancer was
installment plan". admittedly not notified thereof, the foreclosure of the
first mortgage cannot be considered to have
 51
terminated or extinguished the rights of said junior ex parte motion with the Court of First Instance of
encumbrancer over the property. Tarlac, for the confirmation of the sale in his favor. On
An interest in the mortgaged property March 22, 1944, the court issued the following order:
acquired subsequent to the (first) mortgage may be "As prayed for in the motion for confirmation of the
divested or barred only by making the holder thereof a Sheriff’s sale dated October 9, 1943, of lots Nos. 784
party to the proceedings to foreclose. and 1146 of the cadastral survey of Concepcion
While as a general rule, the junior executed by the Provincial Sheriff of Tarlac in favor of
encumbrancer is not a necessary party to a suit to Bernardo Tiglao, pursuant to the order of execution
foreclose by a senior mortgagee, it is always proper entered herein, the said sale is hereby APPROVED.’"
and prudent to join him as a defendant, both to give an
opportunity to defend and to extinguish his right of On May 7, 1948, the plaintiff filed with the
redemption. Court of First Instance of Tarlac a motion for the
When a senior mortgagee forecloses and issuance of a writ of possession. The defendant filed
becomes the purchaser at his own foreclosure sale, an opposition alleging (1) that the judgment of March
but the holder of a subsequent mortgage or other 24, 1943, is null and void, because the defendant’s
subordinate interest has not been joined or has been former counsel had no special authority to settle the
eliminated from the proceeding, equity will keep the case in the manner stated in said judgment, and (2)
senior mortgage alive against the subsequent that the sheriff’s sale was not legally confirmed,
encumbrance and the senior mortgagee will be entitled because the defendant was not given notice of the
to an action de novo to reforeclose the mortgage as to motion for confirmation or its hearing. On June 30,
the omitted persons. 1948, the court granted plaintiff’s motion for the
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed issuance of a writ of possession. The defendant filed
from denying the first mortgagee's petition to cancel on July 7, 1948, a motion for reconsideration and
the annotation of the second mortgage at the back of under date of September 9, 1948, a motion invoking
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1155, is hereby moratorium under Republic Act No. 342 and praying
affirmed, without prejudice to the proper adjudication, that all proceedings be suspended. In its order of
in an appropriate ordinary action, of the respective October 12, 1948, the Court of First Instance of Tarlac
rights of the parties herein as a result of the execution denied the motion for reconsideration. The defendant
of the Deed of Resale, Exhibit J. The petitioner- appealed.
appellant shall pay the costs. It is so ordered
Issues:

1. W/N the trial court erred in sustaining the order

68.3 BERNARDO TIGLAO vs. ENGRACIO confirming the sheriff's sale and in issuing the
BOTONES corresponding writ of possession in favor of the
(G.R. No. L-3619, October 29, 1951, PARAS, C.J.) appellee.
2. W/N the trial court erred in not suspending the
Emergency Recit proceedings because of the Moratorium Law
Upon motion of the plaintiff, the Court of First (Republic Act No. 342).
Instance of Tarlac on July 20, 1943, ordered the
issuance of a writ of execution. Accordingly, on Ruling:
October 9, 1943, the provincial sheriff sold at public
auction the mortgaged properties to the plaintiff as the 1. Under section 3 of rule 70 of the Rules of
highest bidder. On May 7, 1948, the plaintiff filed with Court, the sale of mortgaged property" when
the Court of First Instance of Tarlac a motion for the confirmed by an order of the court . . . shall
issuance of a writ of possession. The defendant filed operate to divest the rights of all the parties to the
an opposition alleging (1) that the judgment of March action and to vest their rights in the purchaser,
24, 1943, is null and void, because the defendant’s subject to such rights of redemption as may be
former counsel had no special authority to settle the allowed by law." The effect of confirmation was
case in the manner stated in said judgment, and (2) more elaborately explained in the case of
that the sheriff’s sale was not legally confirmed, Raymundo vs. Sunico:
because the defendant was not given notice of the "As the title to mortgaged real property
motion for confirmation or its hearing. SC held that does not vest in the purchaser until
notice and hearing of motion for confirmation are after the confirmation of the sale, he
essential to the validity of the order of confirmation, not has, prior to that time, no right to the
only to enable the interested parties to resist the possession of such property, and no
motion but also to inform them of the time when their legal cause of complaint against the
right of redemption is cutoff. defendants, who remain in
possession, exercising the rights of
Facts ownership. On the other hand, the
Upon motion of the plaintiff, the Court of First mortgagors have no means, until the
Instance of Tarlac on July 20, 1943, ordered the confirmation of compelling the
issuance of a writ of execution. Accordingly, on purchaser to comply with the terms of
October 9, 1943, the provincial sheriff sold at public the sale. Should the mortgagors
auction the mortgaged properties to the plaintiff as the attempt to compel a purchaser to pay
highest bidder. On March 7, 1944, the plaintiff filed an in his money, an answer on the part of
 52
the purchaser to the effect that the judgment debtor whose property has been sold is
sale had not been confirmed would be not in debt for the redemption money. He could not
sufficient. The confirmation operates be required by action to redeem. Hence, he is not
to divest the title out of the former entitled to invoke the suspension."
owner and to vest it in the purchaser.
It is at this time when the rights or title 68. 4. GOVERNMENT SERVICE
passes, and not before. Sales of INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), petitioner, vs.
mortgaged real estate should be more THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ILOILO,
strictly scrutinized than ordinary sales BRANCH III, ILOILO CITY and NELITA M. VDA.
under execution. In the former the DE BACALING & MARIA TERESA INTEGRATED
title, as we have said, passes to the DEVELOPMENT, Respondent
purchaser upon confirmation by the G.R. No. L-45322. July 5, 1989. Griño-Aquino, J.
court, and the defendant or debtor has Appeal by Certiorari
no right to redeem within the statutory
period granted in cases ordinary EMERGENCY RECIT: Spouses Bacaling obtained
execution sales. In some of the States a loan from GSIS which was secured by a real
of the American Union there are estate mortgage over a 4 parcels of land. For
statutes permitting the mortgagor to failure to pay the loan, GSIS filed a complaint for
redeem after the foreclosure sale has extrajudicial foreclosure, which was granted by the
been confirmed. There is no such court. The lots were sold at a public auction with
privilege extended to him by statute in GSIS as the higest bidder. MITDC tried to redeem
the Philippine Islands. The right of the the property but the redemption was declared null
mortgagor and those claiming under and void by the court. Almost 3 years after the
him to redeem for mortgagee is court had annulled MTDIC’s redemption, the latter
extinguished by the foreclosure when filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion was
the same has been properly made. granted by the trial court and MTIDC was granted
But, up to the time of confirmation the a period of 1 year after the finality of the decision
title remains in the mortgagor." to redeem the properties. On appeal, the period of
In said case this Court held that a hearing "is a redemption was reckoned from the date of the
very essential part of those proceedings because the decision instead of the the date of finality of the
hearing gives the interested parties an opportunity to said decision. The SC held that no such right of
lay before the court their reasons why the sale should redemption exists in case of judicial foreclosure of
or should not be confirmed, and it is the result of this a mortgage if the mortgagee is not the PNB or a
hearing which diverts the title if the sale is confirmed. bank or banking institution. In such a case, the
In the cases of La Urbana vs. Belando, 54 foreclosure sale when confirmed by an order of the
Phil. 930, and Anderson vs. Reyes, 54 Phil. 944, it was court, ... shall operate to divest the rights of all the
held, following the decision in Grimalt vs. Velasquez parties to the action and to vest their rights in the
that after the sale of mortgaged property and before its purchaser.' Since the GSIS is not a bank or
confirmation, the court may still grant the judgment banking institution, its mortgage is covered by the
debtor an opportunity to pay the amount of the general rule that there is no right of redemption
judgment. In other words, until a sheriff's sale is validly after the judicial foreclosure sale has been
confirmed, the judgment debtor may exercise a right of confirmed.
redemption.
Notice and hearing of motion for confirmation FACTS: In 1957, the spouses Ramon and Nelita
are therefore essential to the validity of the order of Bacaling were granted a real estate loan of
confirmation, not only to enable the interested parties P600,000 by the GSIS for the development of the
to resist the motion but also to inform them of the time Bacaling-Moreno subdivision. To secure the
when their right of redemption is cutoff. repayment of the loan, a real estate mortgage was
In the case at bar, the lower court undoubtedly executed on the four lots owned by the spouses.
had acquired jurisdiction over theforeclosure The spouses failed to pay the amortizations, thus,
proceedings but, in confirming the sheriff's sale without the GSIS filed a complaint for extrajudicial
the essentialrequisite as to notice of the motion for foreclosure of the mortgage before the CFI of
confirmation, it exceeded its power, with the result that Iloilo. Ramon Bacaling died during the pendency of
the order of confirmation is null and void. the case. The CFI ruled in favor of GSIS.
Mrs.Bacaling failed to pay the judgment debt within
2. No. The foreclosure judgment had long 90 days. As a result, the mortgaged lots were sold
become final. By his motion for confirmation of the at public auction (1961) with GSIS as the highest
sheriff's sale and his motion for a writ of bidder. The GSIS then filed a motion for
possession, the appellee sought to recover, not a confirmation of the sale of the property and further
monetary obligation, but the properties sold to him asked for a deficiency judgment.
at public auction. What was held in Barrozo vs.
Macaraeg, 46 Off. Gaz., 4932, is decisive against In 1972, Respondent Maria Teresa Integrated
appellant's position. "The debt moratorium merely Development Corporation (MTIDC), as alleged
prohibited the enforcement by action of the debts assignee of the mortgagor’s “right of redemption”
therein included; and inthis case no one is filed a “Motion to exercise right of redemption”,
attempting to force anybody to pay his debt. The which was granted by the trial court. A check was
 53
delivered by MTIDC to GSIS as payment of the foreclosure sale, and the confirmation retroacts to
redemption price, but the same was dishonored. the date of the sale (Binalbagan Estate, Inc. vs.
Thus, the CFI declared the redemption of Gatuslao, et al., 74 Phil. 128). Only foreclosure of
respondent MTIDC as null and void. mortgages to banking institutions (including the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation) and those
In 1975, respondent Nelita Bacaling filed a made extrajudicially are subject to legal
motion to reopen the case so she could prove the redemption, by express provision of statute, and
inadequacy of the price of the sale of the the present case does not come under exceptions.
mortgaged property. The trial court denied the said
motion. In the same year (1975), or 14 years after To repeat, no such right of redemption
the foreclosure sale (1961) and almost 3 years exists in case of judicial foreclosure of a
after the court had annulled MTDIC’s redemption mortgage if the mortgagee is not the PNB or a
(1973), the latter filed a motion for reconsideration. bank or banking institution. In such a case, the
The motion was granted by the trial court and foreclosure sale when confirmed by an order of the
MTIDC was granted a period of 1 year after the court, ... shall operate to divest the rights of all the
finality of the decision to redeem the properties. parties to the action and to vest their rights in the
On appeal, the period of redemption was reckoned purchaser.' There then exists only what is known
from the date of the decision instead of the the as the equity of redemption. This is simply the
date of finality of the said decision. right of the defendant mortgagor to extinguish the
mortgage and retain ownership of the property by
The GSIS appealed the decision on the paying the secured debt within the 90-day period
ground that the court may not extend the period of after the judgment becomes final, in accordance
redemption pf the property. with Rule 68, or even after the foreclosure sale but
prior to its confirmation. (Limpin vs. Intermediate
ISSUE: W/N after the judicial foreclosure of a real Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70987, September 29,
estate mortgage and confirmation of the sale, the 1988.)Since the GSIS is not a bank or banking
trial court may grant, or fix another period for the institution, its mortgage is covered by the
redemption of the foreclosed property by the general rule that there is no right of redemption
assignee of the mortgagor’s equity of redemption. after the judicial foreclosure sale has been
confirmed. Hence, Judge Numeriano Estenzo
RULING: NO. exceeded his jurisdiction and acted with grave
Section 3 of Rule 68 states that abuse of discretion in granting the respondent,
SEC. 3. Sale of mortgaged property; effect. — MTIDC, another one-year period to redeem the
When the defendant, after being directed to do Bacaling properties over the opposition of
so as provided in the last preceding section, petitioner GSIS as mortgagee- purchaser thereof
fails to pay the principal, interest, and costs at at the public sale.
the time directed in the order, the court shall
order the property to be sold in the manner
and under the regulations that govern sales of
real estate under execution. Such sale shall 68.5. EPIFANIO CRUZ and EVELINA
not affect the rights of persons holding prior CRUZ, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE
encumbrances upon the property or a part APPELLATE COURT, CALIXTRO O.
thereof, and when confirmed by an order of ADRIATICO, RUFINO J. SANTIAGO and
the court, it shall operate to divest the GODOFREDO VALMEO, respondents.
rights of all the parties to the action and to G.R. No. 72806. January 9, 1989 Regalado, J
vest their rights in the purchaser, subject
to such rights of redemption as may be EMERGENCY RECIT: Private respondent sued
allowed by law. petitioners for the judicial foreclosure of the
mortgaged properties. A compromise agreement
In a long line of decisions of the Supreme was reached whereby the parties agreed that upon
Court, the consistent interpretation of Rule 68 is failure of herein petitioners to pay the sums agreed
that there is no right of redemption from a upon, the private respondents herein would be
judicial foreclosure sale after the confirmation entitled to a writ of execution. For failure to comply
of the sale, except those granted by banks or with the said agreement, private respondent
banking institutions as provided by the moved for a writ of execution and the mortgaged
General Banking Act. In mortgage properties were sold to private respondent as the
foreclosures, the rights of the mortgagee and highest bidder. Petitioners argue that the judgment
persons holding under him are cut off by the on compromise was null and void because it
sale when duly confirmed, and with them the denied them of their equity redemption under
equity of redemption. The reason for that holding Sec.2 of Rule 68 of the ROC. The SC held that the
is that the right of redemption being purely dispositions of Section 2 of Rule 68 clearly cannot
statutory, and there being no statute conferring apply in this case since the parties therein had
that right, it does not exist. specifically agreed on the amounts to be paid,
when they should be paid and the effects of non-
When the foreclosure sale is validly confirmed payment or violation of the terms of their
by the court, title vests upon the purchaser in the agreement. Therefore, by virtue of the compromise
 54
agreement, the petitioners thereby waived their so However, the aforesaid procedure cannot
called equity of redemption and the case was be of substantial application to, and can be
necessarily removed from the operation of Section modified by, a valid agreement of the parties,
2, Rule 68 insofar as its provisions are such as in the compromise agreement subject of
inconsistent with the judgment on compromise. and constituting the basis for the judgment on
compromise rendered in Civil Case No. 7418-M of
FACTS: Petitioners Epifanio and Evelina Cruz the RTC of Bulacan, as hereinbefore stated. The
mortgaged certain properties to private dispositions of Section 2 of Rule 68 clearly
respondents who eventually sued them for non- cannot apply since the parties therein had
payment and for the judicial foreclosure of specifically agreed on the amounts to be paid,
aforementioned mortgages under Rule 68 of the when they should be paid and the effects of
Rules of Court. A compromise agreement was non-payment or violation of the terms of their
reached and this became the basis of the agreement.
Judgment on Compromise issued by the RTC of
Bulacan. Paragraph 3 of the agreement provided Paragraph 5 lucidly provides that, upon the
that upon failure of herein petitioners to pay the happening of the aforesaid contingency
sums agreed upon, the private respondents herein contemplated therein, private respondent
would be entitled to a writ of execution. Godofredo Valmeo shall be entitled to a writ of
execution directing the foreclosure of all the
Petitioners failed to comply with certain mortgages subject matter of said litigation.
provisions of the agreement. As a result, private Ineluctably, therefore, the petitioners herein
respondent moved for a writ of execution. The thereby waived their so called equity of
mortgaged properties were foreclosed upon in an redemption and the case was necessarily
auction sale and were purchased by the private removed from the operation of Section 2, Rule
respondents as the highest bidder. The sale was 68 insofar as its provisions are inconsistent
later judicially confirmed. with the judgment on compromise.

True, the
procedural requirement in Section 2 grants a
Petitioners argue that the aforestated substantive right to the mortgagor, consisting of
judgment on compromise was null and void ab the so-called equity of redemption, which after the
initio because it allegedly "denied them their equity ordinary adversarial course of a controverted trial
of redemption under Sec. 2, Rule 68 of the Rules of a case may not be omitted in the relief to be
of Court, by not allowing the petitioners to pay 'into awarded in the judgment therein. 9 The same,
court within a period of not less than 90 days from however, may be waived, as already
the date of the service of said order,' and that it is demonstrated.
only if the petitioners default in said payment that
the property should be sold to pay the judgment Hence, as correctly observed by the respondent
debt. court:
(1) Re the 'equity of redemption'. It is true
that under Rule 68 of the Rules of Court, the
ISSUE: W/N Rule 68 is applicable debtor-mortgagor is allowed a period of 90 days
within which to pay his debt, to prevent
RULING: NO. foreclosure, but this right, to Our mind was
Section 2 of Rule 68 of the Rules of Court impliedly waived when the parties signed the
provides: compromise agreement, which was later embodied
Sec. 2. Judgment on foreclosure for payment or in the Judgment. The agreement in effect says that
sale. — If upon the trial in such action the court
upon breach of the same (and this fact is not
shall find the facts set forth in the complaint to be
true, it shall ascertain the amount due to the plaintiff disputed), foreclosure should be resorted to. The
upon the mortgage debt or obligation, including agreement was clear that payment had to be made
interest and costs, and shall render judgment for within the stipulated period. It would be absurd to
the sum so found due and order the same to be say that after said stipulated period, petitioners
paid into court within a period of ninety (90) days would still be given an additional 90-day period for
from the date of the service of such order, and that the 'equity'. Had petitioners intended still an
in default of such payment the property be sold to exercise in 'equity', they should have insisted on a
realize the mortgage debt and costs.
 clarificatory provision in the agreement.

The procedure outlined therein obviously

refers to the situation where a full-blown trial, with
the introduction of evidence is entailed, such that 68.6. SPS. MIGUEL S. KHO and JUANITA
the trial court has to thereafter determine whether KHO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
the allegations in the complaint have been proved, BANCO FILIPINO, respondents.
then ascertain the total amount due to the plaintiff, G.R. No. 83498. October 22, 1991 Paras, J.
and thereafter render judgment for such amount
with an order for the payment thereof in EMERGENCY RECIT: Petitioners obtained a loan
accordance with the prescription of the from Banco Filipino which was secured by a REM.
aforequoted section, sans the agreement of the For failure to pay the loan, Banco Filipino
parties on those particulars. extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged and
 55
acquired the property as the highest bidder in the
auction sale. 10 days before the end of the
redemption period, petitioners filed a complaint for
the annulment of the specific performance with 68.7. BLANCA CONSUELO ROXAS,
preliminary injunction which was granted by the petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RURAL
RTC. The SC held that the issuance of injunction BANK OF DUMALAG, INC., respondents.
was improper. During and after the period of G.R. No. 100480 May 1, 1993 Nocon, J
redemption, the purchaser at the foreclosure sale Petition for Review on Certiorari
is entitled as of right to a writ of possession,
regardless of whether or not there is a pending EMERGENCY RECIT: Petitioner executed a
suit for annulment of the mortgage or the special power of attorney authorizing Manuel
foreclosure itself. Hence, an injunction to prohibit Roxas to apply for an agricultural loan and to
the issuance of the writ of possession is entirely execute a REM to secure said loan in favor of the
out of place. Rural Bank of Dumalag. The REM was foreclosed
for failure to pay the loan, and the property was
FACTS: Petitioners, Spouses Miguel and Juanita sold to private respondent. Petitioner then filed a
Kho, constituted a real estate mortgage over a complaint for cancellation of the foreclosure of the
parcel of land in Cebu in favor of private REM and the annulment of the auction sale. The
respondent Banco Filipino to guarantee a loan trial court ruled in favor of petitioner and held that
granted them by the bank. Unfortunately, the Kho the auction sale was null and void since the notice
spouses defaulted in the payment of some was not posted in atleast 3 conspicuous places in
amortizations. Thus, Banco Filipino extrajudicially the barrio and for the failure of the sheriff who
foreclosed the mortgage. Banco Filipino conducted the sale to accomplish the required
purchased the property as the highest bidder, and affidavit. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC.
the certificate of sale was then registered on June The SC held that the auction sale is null and void
17, 1982. The petitioners had until June 17,1983 because the notice was not posted in atleast 3
within which to redeem the property. conspicuous places in the barrio which is not in
compliance with Sec. 5 of RA 720. Furthermore,
In the meantime, the foreclosed property was the same section provides that proof of publication
leased to third persons and the rentals were shall be accomplished by an affidavit of the sheriff
remitted monthly by petitioners to respondent or officer conducting the foreclosure sale. In this
bank. 10 days before the end of the redemption case, the sheriff executed a certificate of posting,
period, petitioners filed a complaint for the “ which is not the affidavit required by law.
Annulment of specific performance with
preliminary injunction etc.” against Banco Filipino FACTS: Petitioner Blanca Roxas executed a
before the RTC of Cebu. This was granted by the special power of attorney appointing her brother,
RTC. Respondent bank then filed an Urgent the late Manuel Roxas, as her attorney-in-fact for
Motion to Lift Injunction, which was denied by the the purpose of applying for an agricultural loan
RTC. On appeal, the CA reversed the orders of with private respondent Rural Bank of Dumalag.
the RTC. Manuel then executed a real estate mortgage over
a land petitioner owned, to be used as collateral
ISSUE: W/N the issuance of injunction by the trial for the said loan. Private respondent foreclosed
court was proper ** the real estate mortgage for failure to pay the loan.
The land was sold to private respondent as the
RULING: NO. (Sobrang ikli nung ruling. Ito na yung buong highest bidder in the public auction. For failure to
sinabi) exercise the right of redemption, private
respondent consolidated its ownership over the
The law and jurisprudence are clear that both land.
during and after the period of redemption, the
purchaser at the foreclosure sale is entitled as of Petitioner then filed a complaint for
right to a writ of possession, regardless of whether cancellation of foreclosure of mortgage and
or not there is a pending suit for annulment of the annulment of the auction sale on the ground that
mortgage or the foreclosure itself (without Manuel Roxas never informed her of the approval
prejudice of course to the eventual outcome of of the loan. Furthermore, she argues that the
said case). Hence, an injunction to prohibit the foreclosure did not comply with the requirement of
issuance of the writ of possession is entirely out of giving written notice to all possible redemptioners.
place (See Act 3135) On the other hand, private respondent argues that
petitioner was duly notified of the foreclosure and
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for auction sale since notice to Manuel Roxas, her
lack of merit. The assailed decision of respondent agent, was notice to the principal, and that the
Court of Appeals lifting the writ of preliminary sheriff duly posted copies of the notice of
injunction is hereby AFFIRMED. Let this case be foreclosure sale in conspicuous public places
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Cebu before the actual auction sale.
City, Branch XIV for further proceedings on Civil
Case CEB-759. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of
petitioner. It held that the notice was not posted
 56
in at least 3 most conspicuous places in the spouses with lots as security (Lot 2A- Sps. Perez,
barrio, and that there was no affidavit of the Lot 2B- Sps. Relova). Monzon was indebted to
sheriff who conducted the sale. Thus, the Coastal Lending which foreclosed the property due
auction sale was declared as null and void. On to the non-payment of Monzon’s 3.4 million debt.
appeal, the CA reversed the trial court and held Addio was the highest bidder in the sale. There
that Section 5 of RA 720 does not require personal was an excess of 1.6 M from Addio’s payment of
notification to the mortgagor in case of foreclosure 5M. The Spouses contend that they should be
and that there was substantial compliance with the given the residue as stated in Rule 68, Sec 4. The
requirements of the said sale. residue money is with Atty. Luna (clerk of court).
The SC held that the spouses do not have cause
ISSUE: W/N the auction sale is null and void of action against Atty. Luna. The present case
involves Extrajudicial Foreclosure (Act 3135) and
RULING: YES. not Rule 68’s judicial foreclosure. Unlike Rule 68,
It is settled doctrine that failure to publish notice of which governs judicial foreclosure sales, neither
auction sale as required by the statute constitutes Act No. 3135 as amended, nor A.M. No. 99-10-05-
a jurisdiction defects with invalidates the sale. 0 grants to junior encumbrancers the right to
Even slight deviations therefrom are not allowed. receive the balance of the purchase price. Case is
remanded back to trial court to check if motion for
Section 5 of R.A. No. 720, as amended by R.A. injunction is to be treated as complaint for
No. 5939, provides that notices of foreclosure collection of money.
should be posted in at least three (3) of the most
conspicuous public places in the municipality FACTS: Respondents, Spouses James and Maria
and barrio where the land mortgaged is Rosa Relova and the spouses Bienvenido and
situated. Eufracia Perez, filed an initiatory pleading
captioned as a Petition for Injunction against Atty.
In the case at bar, the Certificate of Posting which Ana Liza Luna, Clerk of Court of Branch 18 of the
was executed by the sheriff states that he posted RTC of Tagaytay City, and herein petitioner
three (3) copies of the notice of public auction sale Teresita Monzon. Respondents alleged that
in three (3) conspicuous public places in the Monzon executed a promissory note in favor of the
municipality of Panay, where the subject land was spouses Perez which was secured by a lot in
situated and in like manner in Roxas City, where Tagaytay City, denominated as Lot No. 2A. Later
the public auction sale took place. It is beyond on, Monzon executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
dispute that there was a failure to publish the over the said parcel of land in favor of the spouses
notices of auction sale as required by law. Section Perez. Respondents also claim that Monzon
5 provides further that proof of publication shall be executed another promissory note, this time in
accomplished by an affidavit of the sheriff or favor of the spouses Relova which was secured by
officer conducting the foreclosure sale. In this a lot in Tagaytay, denominated as Lot No. 2B.
case, the sheriff executed a certificate of Similarly, Monzon later on executed a Deed of
posting, which is not the affidavit required by Conditional Sale over said parcel of land in favor of
law. The rationale behind this is simple: an the spouses Relova.
affidavit is a sworn statement in writing. Strict
compliance with the aforementioned provisions is The Coastal Lending Corporation
mandated. We, therefore, cannot sustain the view extrajudicially foreclosed the entire property of
of respondent court that there was substantial Monzon, including the portions mortgaged and
compliance with Section 5 of R.A. No. 720, as subsequently sold to respondents. According to
amended, with respect to the affidavit of posting the Petition for Injunction, Monzon was indebted to
by the sheriff and the non-posting of the required the Coastal Lending Corporation in the total
notice in the barrio where the land mortgaged is amount of P3,398,832.35. The winning bidder in
situated. Instead, We declare the foreclosure and the extrajudicial foreclosure, Addio Properties Inc.,
public auction sale of the subject land void. paid the amount of P5,001,127.00, thus leaving a
P1,602,393.65 residue. According to
respondents, this residue amount, which is in
68.8 TERESITA MONZON, Petitioner, vs. the custody of Atty. Luna as Branch Clerk of
SPS. JAMES & MARIA ROSA NIEVES RELOVA Court, should be turned over to them pursuant
and SPS. BIENVENIDO & EUFRACIA PEREZ, to Section 4, Rule 68 of the Revised Rules of
Respondents. vs ADDIO PROPERTIES, Civil Procedure. Monzon, in her Answer, claimed
INC.,Intervenor. that the Petition for Injunction should be dismissed
G.R. No. 171827 September 17, 2008 Chico- for failure to state a cause of action. Monzon
Nazario, J. likewise claimed that respondents could no longer
Petition for Review on Certiorari ask for the enforcement of the two promissory
notes because she had already performed her
EMERGENCY RECIT: Spouses Relova and Perez obligation to them by dacion en pago as evidenced
filed a petition for injunction against Mozon and by the Deed of Conditional Sale and the Deed of
Atty. Luna (Clerk of Court). They alleged that Absolute Sale.
Monzon issued promissory notes to the respective
 57
The RTC, citing the absence of petitioner and lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage
her counsel on said hearing date despite due or deed of trust under which the property is
notice, allowed the ex parte presentation of sold, may redeem the same at any time within
the term of one year from and after the date of
evidence by respondent. Consequently, the RTC
the sale; and such redemption shall be governed by
rendered a Decision in favor of respondents. The the provisions of sections four hundred and sixty-
CA dismissed the appeal by petitioner stating that four to four hundred and sixty- six,[14] inclusive, of
petitioner cannot now complain that she was the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as these are
denied due process when she was given ample not inconsistent with this Act.
opportunity to defend and assert her interests in
the case. Even if, for the sake of argument, Rule 68 is to
be applied to extrajudicial foreclosure of
ISSUE: W/N the Petition for injunction failed to mortgages, such right can only be given to second
state a cause of action
mortgagees who are made parties to the (judicial)
HELD: YES. foreclosure. While a second mortgagee is a
proper and in a sense even a necessary party to a
Section 4, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court, which is proceeding to foreclose a first mortgage on real
the basis of respondent’s alleged cause of action property, he is not an indispensable party,
entitling them to the residue of the amount paid in because a valid decree may be made, as between
the foreclosure sale, provides as follows: the mortgagor and the first mortgagee, without
SEC. 4. Disposition of proceeds of sale.—The regard to the second mortgage; but the
amount realized from the foreclosure sale of the consequence of a failure to make the second
mortgaged property shall, after deducting the costs
of the sale, be paid to the person foreclosing the mortgagee a party to the proceeding is that the lien
mortgage, and when there shall be any balance of the second mortgagee on the equity of
or residue, after paying off the mortgage debt redemption is not affected by the decree of
due, the same shall be paid to junior
foreclosure.
encumbrancers in the order of their priority, to
be ascertained by the court, or if there be no such
encumbrancers or there be a balance or residue A cause of action is the act or omission by
after payment to them, then to the mortgagor or his which a party violates the right of another. A cause
duly authorized agent, or to the person entitled to it. of action exists if the following elements are
However, Rule 68 governs the judicial present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
foreclosure of mortgages. Extra-judicial whatever means and under whatever law it arises
foreclosure of mortgages, which was what or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the
transpired in the case at bar, is governed by named defendant to respect or not to violate such
Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118. We right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of
have three different types of sales, namely: an such defendant violative of the right of plaintiff or
ordinary execution sale, a judicial foreclosure sale,
constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant
and an extrajudicial foreclosure sale. An ordinary
execution sale is governed by the pertinent to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an
provisions of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court on action for recovery of damages. In view of the
Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments. foregoing discussions, we find that respondents
Rule 68 of the Rules, captioned Foreclosure of do not have a cause of action against Atty. Ana
Mortgage, governs judicial foreclosure sales. On Liza Luna for the delivery of the subject
the other hand, Act No. 3135, as amended by Act
amounts on the basis of Section 4, Rule 68 of
No. 4118 applies in cases of extrajudicial
foreclosure sales of real estate mortgages. the Rules of Court, for the reason that the
foregoing Rule does not apply to extrajudicial
Unlike Rule 68, which governs judicial foreclosure of mortgages.
foreclosure sales, neither Act No. 3135 as
amended, nor A.M. No. 99-10-05-0 grants to
junior encumbrancers the right to receive the AS TO EFFECTS OF DEFAULT (Baka tanungin ni
Dean)
balance of the purchase price. The only right Despite the fact that Monzon was not declared in
given to second mortgagees in said issuances is default by the RTC, the RTC nevertheless applied
the right to redeem the foreclosed property the effects of a default order upon petitioner under
pursuant to Section 6 of Act No. 3135, as Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. Failure to
amended by Act No. 4118, which provides: file a responsive pleading within the reglementary
period, and not failure to appear at the hearing, is
the sole ground for an order of default, except the
Sec. 6. Redemption. In all cases in which an failure to appear at a pre-trial conference wherein
extrajudicial sale is made under the special power
hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successors
the effects of a default on the part of the defendant
in interest or any judicial creditor or judgment are followed, that is, the plaintiff shall be allowed to
creditor of said debtor, or any person having a present evidence ex parte and a judgment based
 58
thereon may be rendered against the defendant annulment of the mortgage or of the extrajudicial
(§5, Rule 18). Also, a default judgment may be foreclosure. Furthermore, the SC held that the
rendered, even if the defendant had filed his respondent judge did not err in denying the
answer, under the circumstance in §3(c), Rule 29. consolidation of the cases because consolidation
should be denied when prejudice would result to
The effects of default are followed only in three any of the parties or would cause complications,
instances: (1) when there is an actual default for delay, prejudice, cut off, or restrict the rights of a
failure to file a responsive pleading; (2) failure to party. In this case, The rights of the respondents
appear in the pre-trial conference; and (3) refusal would be prejudiced if the petition for issuance of
to comply with modes of discovery under the the writ of possession were to be consolidated with
circumstance in Sec. 3(c), Rule 29. the complaint for nullification of the REM,
especially since it had already adduced its
We agree with petitioner that such failure to evidence.
attend, when committed during hearing dates for
the presentation of the complainant’s evidence, FACTS: Petitioners, Spouses Salvador and Feliza
would amount to the waiver of such defendant’s De Vera secured a loan from BPI Family Savings
right to object to the evidence presented during Bank which was secured by a real estate
such hearing, and to cross-examine the witnesses mortgage over their property in Guiguinto,
presented therein. However, it would not amount Bulacan. When petitioners failed to pay the loan,
to a waiver of the defendant’s right to present BPI filed a petition for the extrajudicial foreclosure
evidence during the trial dates scheduled for the of the real estate mortgage. The property was sold
reception of evidence for the defense. It would be to BPI as the highest bidder in the auction, and title
an entirely different issue if the failure to attend of to the property was transferred in its name.
the defendant was on a hearing date set for the Petitioners filed a complaint for the nullification of
presentation of the evidence of the defense, but the real estate mortgage. Respondent also filed an
such did not occur in the case at bar. Ex-parte petition for writ of possession with the
RTC of Bulacan and impleaded the petitioners.
Petitioners then filed an urgent motion to suspend
68.9 SPOUSES SALVADOR F. DE VERA and the proceedings to await the resolution of their
FELIZA V. DE VERA, petitioners, vs. HON. complaint for nullification of the REM or for the
GUILLERMO P. AGLORO, Presiding Judge, consolidation of the 2 cases.
RTC – Branch 83 Malolos, Bulacan and BPI
FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC., respondents. The trial court denied the motion of petitioners
G.R. No. 155673 January 14, 2005 and held that it is its ministerial duty to issue the
Callejo,Sr., J writ of possession in favor of a purchaser at public
Petition for Review on Certiorari auction, and that such duty could not be defeated
by the pendency of a civil case, in this instance the
EMERGENCY RECIT: Petitioners obtained a loan complaint for nullification of the REM. The CA also
from BPI which was secured by a real estate denied petitioners’ petition for certiorari. It held that
mortgage over a land in Bulacan. For failure to pay since the subject parcel of land was not redeemed
the loan, BPI filed a petition for the extrajudicial within one (1) year from the registration of the
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. The extrajudicial foreclosure sale, it follows that the
property was sold to BPI. Petitioners filed a bank, as purchaser thereof, acquired an absolute
complaint for the nullification of the real estate right to the writ of possession. It emphasized that
mortgage. Respondent also filed an Ex-parte the land registration court has the ministerial duty
petition for writ of possession with the RTC of to issue the writ of possession upon mere motion,
Bulacan and impleaded the petitioners. Petitioners conformably to Section 7, Act No. 3135, as
then filed an urgent motion to suspend the amended.
proceedings to await the resolution of their
complaint for nullification of the REM or for the ISSUES:
consolidation of the 2 cases. The trial court denied 1. W/N the CA erred in not suspending the
petitioners’ motion. The CA also denied proceedings in the Ex-parte petition for
petitioners’ petition for certiorari. The SC held that writ of possession because of the
there was no need for the court to suspend the pendency of petitioners’ complaint for the
proceedings merely and solely because the
nullification of the real estate mortgage
petitioners filed a complaint in the RTC for the
nullification of the real estate mortgage. First, the 2. W/N the 2 cases should be consolidated
petition for issuance of a writ of possession is not
an ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party RULING:
"sues another for the enforcement of a wrong or 1. NO, the CA did not err.
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress First. An ex parte petition for the issuance of a
of a wrong." . Hence, there is no necessity of possessory writ under Section 7 of Act No.
giving notice to the petitioners. Second, the right of 3135 is not, strictly speaking, a "judicial
the purchaser to have possession of the subject process" as contemplated in Article 433 of the
property would not be defeated notwithstanding Civil Code. It is a judicial proceeding for the
the pendency of a civil case seeking the
 59
enforcement of one’s right of possession as nullification of the REM is an ordinary civil
purchaser in a foreclosure sale. It is not an action and adversarial in character. The rights
ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party of the respondent in the petition for issuance
"sues another for the enforcement of a wrong of the writ of possession would be prejudiced
or protection of a right, or the prevention or if the said case were to be consolidated with
redress of a wrong." No notice is needed to the complaint for nullification of the REM,
be served upon persons interested in the especially since it had already adduced its
subject property. Hence, there is no necessity evidence.
of giving notice to the petitioners since they
had already lost all their interests in the Second. The matter of whether or not
property when they failed to redeem the consolidation is proper has certainly become
same. moot and academic. The RTC had already
issued an order granting the writ of
Second. As a rule, any question regarding the possession in favor of the respondent herein,
validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure and declared that the latter had already been
cannot be a legal ground for refusing the placed in actual possession of the property.
issuance of a writ of execution. The right of
the purchaser to have possession of the
subject property would not be defeated 68.10. SPOUSES GODOFREDO V.
notwithstanding the pendency of a civil case ARQUIZA and REMEDIOS D. ARQUIZA,
seeking the annulment of the mortgage or of petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
the extrajudicial foreclosure. Indeed, under EQUITABLE PCIBANK, respondents.
G.R. No. 160479 June 8, 2005. Callejo, Sr. J.
Section 8 of Act No. 3135,41 even if the
Petition for Review on Certiorari
mortgagor files a petition assailing the writ of
possession granted to the buyer and the sale EMERGENCY RECIT: Petitioners obtained a loan
at public auction within 30 days from the from Equitable PCIBank which was secured by a
issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the REM over a parcel of land. Petitioners failed to pay
buyer at public auction of the property, and the loan and the mortgage was extrajudicially
the court denies the same, the buyer may foreclosed and the property was sold to Equitable
appeal the order of denial. However, the PCIBank as the highest bidder. Petitioners then
buyer at public auction remains in possession filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the
of the property pending resolution of the REM and foreclosure sale while Equitable
PCIBank moved for the issuance of Writ of
appeal. We have consistently ruled that it is
Possession which was granted by the Court.
the ministerial duty of the court to issue writ of Petitioners argue that petition for the issuance of
possession in favor of the purchaser in a the writ of possession should have been dismissed
foreclosure sale. The trial court has no for failure to attach a certification against forum
discretion on this matter. shopping and that they should be protected in their
possession over the subject property pending the
2. NO, it should not be consolidated. resolution of their complaint for the declaration of
Consolidation is aimed to obtain justice with nullity. The SC held that the ex parte petition for
the least expense and vexation to the the issuance of a writ of possession filed by the
litigants. The object of consolidation is to respondent is not an initiatory pleading. Thus, the
certification against forum shopping is not
avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against
required. Furthermore, it held that there is no litis
oppression or abuse, prevent delays and save pendentia in this case since the petition of the
the litigants unnecessary acts and expense. Equitable PCIBank for a writ of possession was
Consolidation should be denied when not an ordinary action. Any order or decision of the
prejudice would result to any of the parties or RTC in the petition for issuance of writ of
would cause complications, delay, prejudice, possession is not determinative of the merits of the
cut off, or restrict the rights of a party. petitioners’ complaint for declaration of nullity of
promissory note,REM, and foreclosure sale
In the present case, the trial court acted in the
exercise of its sound judicial discretion in FACTS: Petitioners, Spouses Godofredo and
Remedios Arquiza obtained a loan from private
denying the motion of the petitioners for the
respondents Equitable PCIBank, which was
consolidation of the 2 cases. secured by a real estate mortgage (REM) over a
parcel of land in Quezon City. When petitioners
First. The proceedings in the petition for the defaulted in the payment of their loan, Equitable
issuance of a writ of possession is not, strictly PCIBank filed a petition for extrajudicial
speaking, a judicial process and is a non- foreclosure of the REM. A public auction was held,
litigious proceeding; it is summary in nature. and the land was sold to Equitable PCIBank as the
In contrast, the action in the complaint for highest bidder. The property was not redeemed
 60
during the redemption period, thus, Equitable It bears stressing that Section 7 of Act No. 3135,
PCIBank consolidated its ownership over the as amended by Act No. 4118, specifically provides
subject property. The petitioners then filed a that the buyer at public auction may file a verified
complaint for the declaration of nullity of the petition in the form of an ex parte motion.
promissory note, real estate mortgage and the
foreclosure sale. Meanwhile, Equitable PCIBank 2. NO. The requisites of litis pendentia are the
filed an Ex-Parte Petition for the issuance of a writ following: (a) identity of parties, or at least such as
of possession. Instead of acting on the petition representing the same interests in both actions; (b)
and receiving evidence ex parte, the RTC set the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
case for hearing. Subsequently, it issued a Writ of relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the
Possession. The CA affirmed the RTC decision. identity of the two cases such that judgment in
one, regardless of which party is successful, would
Petitioner argues that the ex-parte petition for amount to res judicata in the other. And one
the issuance of the writ of possession should have element of res judicata is that the judgment or
been dismissed for failure to attach a certification order must be on the merits of the case.
against forum shopping. In addition, it contends
that they are legally entitled to be protected in their The petition of the Equitable PCIBank for a writ
possession over the subject property pending the of possession was not an ordinary action. Any
resolution of their complaint for the declaration of order or decision of the RTC in the petition for
nullity of the promissory note, real estate issuance of writ of possession is not
mortgage, and foreclosure sale. For its part, the determinative of the merits of the petitioners’
private respondent contends that the requirement complaint for declaration of nullity of
for the filing of a certificate of non-forum shopping promissory note,REM, and foreclosure sale.
is not applicable, considering that the ex parte Well established is the rule that after the
motion for the issuance of a writ of possession is consolidation of title in the buyer’s name for failure
not an initiatory pleading. It submits that litis of the mortgagor to redeem, the writ of possession
pendentia does not exist because there is no becomes a matter of right. Its issuance to a
identity of the issues and the reliefs prayed for purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure is merely
between the present case and petitioners’ a ministerial function. The issuance of the writ of
complaint. Hence, forum shopping cannot likewise possession being a ministerial function, and
exist. summary in nature, it cannot be said to be a
judgment on the merits, but simply an incident in
ISSUES: the transfer of title. Hence, a separate case for
1. W/N the petition for issuance of writ of annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale
possession is an initiatory pleading and cannot be barred by litis pendentia or res judicata
therefore requires a certification against
forum shopping
68.11 HELEN E. CABLING, assisted by
2. W/N the case falls under litis pendencia
her husband ARIEL CABLING, Petitioner, vs.
JOSELIN TAN LUMAPAS, as represented by
RULING: NORY ABELLANES, Respondent
1. NO. The certification against forum G.R. No. 196950 June 18, 2014. Brion, J
shopping is required only in a complaint or Petition for Review on Certiorari
other initiatory pleading. The ex parte petition
for the issuance of a writ of possession filed EMERGENCY RECIT: Petitioner acquired the
by the respondent is not an initiatory pleading. subject property in an extrajudicial foreclosure
Although the private respondent denominated its sale. She then filed an application for the issuance
pleading as a petition, it is, nonetheless, a motion. of a writ of possession which was granted by the
What distinguishes a motion from a petition or RTC. Respondent then filed a Motion for Leave of
other pleading is not its form or the title given by Court for Intervention as party defendant with
the party executing it, but rather its purpose. The urgent motion to hold the implementation of the
office of a motion is not to initiate new litigation, writ on the ground that the subject property was
but to bring a material but incidental matter arising sold to her by the judgment debtor pursuant to a
in the progress of the case in which the motion is Deed of Conditional sale. The RTC recalled the
filed. A motion is not an independent right or previously issued writ of possession. The CA
remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the affirmed the RTC. Petitioner argues that
progress of a cause. It relates to some question respondent’s possession is not in the concept of
that is collateral to the main object of the action an owner because in a conditional sale, ownership
and is connected with and dependent upon the is retained by the seller until the fulfillment of a
principal remedy. An application for a writ of positive suspensive condition. The SC held that
possession is a mere incident in the the rule is that in the extrajudicial foreclosure of
registration proceeding. Hence, although it real estate mortgages under Act No. 3135 (as
was denominated as a "petition," it was in amended), the issuance of a writ of possession is
substance merely a motion. ministerial upon the court after the foreclosure sale
and during the redemption period when the court
may issue the order for a writ of possession upon
 61
the mere filing of an ex parte motion and the matter of course, without need of a bond or of a
approval of the corresponding bond. As an separate and independent action, after the lapse of
exception, Section 33 of Rule 39 of the Rules of the period of redemption, and after the
Court provides that the possession of the property consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a
shall be given to the purchaser or last new TCT in the purchaser’s name.
redemptioner unless a third party is actually
holding the property in a capacity adverse to the There is, however, an exception to the rule.
judgment obligor. In the present case, the Under Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,
respondent cannot be said to possess the subject which is made applicable to extrajudicial
property by adverse title or right as her possession foreclosures of real estate mortgages, the
is merely premised on the alleged conditional sale possession of the property shall be given to the
of the property to her by the judgment purchaser or last redemptioner unless a third party
debtor/mortgagor. The execution of a contract of is actually holding the property in a capacity
conditional sale does not immediately transfer title adverse to the judgment obligor. Thus, the court’s
to the property to be sold from seller to buyer. obligation to issue an ex parte writ of possession in
favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial
FACTS: Petitioner Helen Cabling was the highest foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial when
bidder in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale over a there is a third party in possession of the property
property located in Olongapo City. Title to the claiming a right adverse to that of the judgment
property was duly transferred to petitioner. debtor/mortgagor. We emphasize that the
Petitioner filed an Application for the Issuance of a exception provided under Section 33, Rule 39
Writ of Possession which was granted and issued of the Rules of Court contemplates a situation
by the RTC. Respondent Joselin Lumapas then in which a third party holds the property by
filed a Motion for Leave of Court for Intervention adverse title or right, such as that of a co-
as party defendant with urgent motion to hold the owner, tenant or usufructuary, who possesses
implementation of the writ pf possession. She the property in his own right, and is not merely
alleged that the subject property was sold to her the successor or transferee of the right of
by Aida Ibabao, the property’s registered owner possession of another co-owner or the owner
and judgment debtor in the extrajudicial of the property.
foreclosure sale, pursuant to a Deed of
Conditional sale. In the present case, the respondent cannot be
said to possess the subject property by
The RTC recalled and rendered ineffective the adverse title or right as her possession is
writ of possession issued to petitioner. merely premised on the alleged conditional
Considering that the respondent was not a party to sale of the property to her by the judgment
the extrajudicial foreclosure, the RTC held that she debtor/mortgagor. The execution of a contract
cannot be ousted of her possession by a mere ex- of conditional sale does not immediately
parte motion for the issuance of a possessory writ, transfer title to the property to be sold from
and that the petitioner must now resort to the seller to buyer. In such contract, ownership or title
appropriate judicial process in order to recover the to the property is retained by the seller until the
foreclosed property. The CA affirmed the RTC’s fulfillment of a positive suspensive condition which
decision. is normally the payment of the purchase price in
the manner agreed upon. In the present case, the
Petitioner argues that respondent’s Deed of Conditional Sale between the respondent
possession is not adverse to that of the judgment (buyer) and the subject property’s registered
debtor/mortgagor. Neither is possession in the owner (seller) expressly reserved to the latter
concept of an owner because in a conditional sale, ownership over the property until full payment of
ownership is retained by the seller until the the purchase price, despite the delivery of the
fulfillment of a positive suspensive condition, that subject property to the respondent. It likewise
is, the full payment of the purchase price. appears from the records that no deed of
absolute sale over the subject property has
ISSUE: W/N the exception under Section 33 of been executed in the respondent's favor. Thus,
Rule 39 (unless a third party is actually holding the the respondent's possession from the time the
property in a capacity adverse to the judgment subject property was "delivered" to her by the
obligor) is applicable in the present case seller cannot be claimed as possession in the
concept of an owner, as the ownership and title
RULING: NO. to the subject property still then remained with
The well-settled rule is that in the extrajudicial the seller until the title to the property was
foreclosure of real estate mortgages under Act No. transferred to the petitioner in March 2009. In
3135 (as amended), the issuance of a writ of order for the respondent not to be ousted by the ex
possession is ministerial upon the court after the parte issuance of a writ of possession, her
foreclosure sale and during the redemption period possession of the property must be adverse in that
when the court may issue the order for a writ of she must prove a right independent of and even
possession upon the mere filing of an ex parte superior to that of the judgment debtor/mortgagor.
motion and the approval of the corresponding
bond. The writ of possession also issues as a
 62
68.12. JUANITO M. GOPIAO, Petitioner, vs.
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO., Petitioner posits that the RTC/CA gravely
Respondent abused its discretion when it failed to recognize his
G.R. No. 188931 July 28, 2014. Peralta, J. right as a third party adverse possessor. He
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 explains that while the issuance of a writ of
possession after a foreclosure sale is ministerial, it
EMERGENCY RECIT: Respondent purchased ceases to be a ministerial duty of the court if there
parcels of land in Pampanga and filed a petition is a third party holding the property adversely to
for the issuance of a writ of possession, which was the judgment debtor. He claims that since he has
granted by the RTC. A notice to vacate was been in possession of the subject properties by
served on Green Asia Construction (represented virtue of a Deed of Sale executed by the Spouses
by spouses legaspi) which prompted petitioner Legaspi in his favor, the RTC exceeded its powers
Gopiao to file an affidavit of third party claim and in denying its intervention.
to stop the implementation of the writ of
possession. Petitioner alleged that he is the owner ISSUE: W/N the CA gravely abused its discretion
of the subject properties by virtue of a deed of sale
executed by the spouses legaspi in his favor. The RULING: NO.
RTC denied the motion for intervention. Petitioner A writ of possession is a writ of execution
argues that while the issuance of a writ of employed to enforce a judgment to recover the
possession after a foreclosure sale is ministerial, it possession of land. It commands the sheriff to
ceases to be a ministerial duty of the court if there enter the land and give its possession to the party
is a third party holding the property adversely to entitled under the judgment. Under Sections 6 and
the judgment debtor. The SC held that it is a well 7 of Act 3135, as amended by Act 4118, a writ of
established rule that the issuance of a writ of possession may be issued in favor of a purchaser
possession to a purchaser in a public auction is a in a foreclosure sale of a real estate mortgage
ministerial function of the court, which cannot be either (1) within the one-year redemption period,
enjoined or restrained, even by the filing of a civil upon the filing of a bond; or (2) after the lapse of
case for the declaration of nullity of the foreclosure the redemption period, without need of a bond. It is
and consequent auction sale. The foregoing rule, a well-established rule that the issuance of a writ
however, admits of a few exceptions, one of which of possession to a purchaser in a public auction is
is when a third party in possession of the property a ministerial function of the court, which cannot be
claims a right adverse to that of the debtor- enjoined or restrained, even by the filing of a civil
mortgagor. In the present case, the exception is case for the declaration of nullity of the foreclosure
not applicable because petitioner’s possession of and consequent auction sale.
the subject properties is questionable. Petitioner
failed to substantiate his possession with sufficient The foregoing rule, however, admits of a
evidence. The Deed of Absolute Sale relied upon few exceptions, one of which is when a third
by petitioner was not notarized, unregistered, and party in possession of the property claims a
essential details such as the tax account numbers right adverse to that of the debtor-mortgagor,
of the interested parties and the names of the as this Court has time and again upheld in
witnesses are missing. numerous cases, consistent with Section 33 of
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. As such, petitioner
FACTS: Respondent Metropolitan Bank & Trust claims that since the following rulings squarely
purchased parcels of land in Pampanga. apply to the instant case, the writ of possession
Respondent then filed a Petition for the Issuance should not be enforced against him.
of Writ of Possession of Real Properties, which
was granted by the RTC. A Notice to Vacate was Petitioner cited the cases Heirs of the Late
served on Green Asia Construction, represented Domingo Nicolas vs Metropolitan Bank, Dayot vs
by Spouses Renato and Delia Legaspi. Upon Shell Chemical Company, and PNB vs CA. While
learning of the notice to vacate, petitioner Juanito the facts of the foregoing rulings are similar to that
Gopiao filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim and a of the instant case, there remains one crucial
very urgent motion for intervention and to recall or difference: the certainty of possession. In all three
stop the implementation of the writ of possession, cases cited by the petitioner, the fact that the
alleging that he is in actual possession and is the subject property was actually in the possession of
owner of the properties by virtue of a deed of sale the adverse third party is undisputed. In contrast,
executed by the spouses legaspi in their favor petitioner’s possession of the subject properties in
dated 1995. this case is questionable. Petitioner failed to
substantiate his possession with sufficient
The trial court denied the motion for evidence. On its face, the Deed of Absolute Sale
intervention on the ground that it was filed late relied upon by petitioner is neither complete nor in
since the sale was executed 23 years ago. The due form. It was not notarized, unregistered, and
CA also dismissed petitioner’s petition for certiorari essential details such as the tax account numbers
on the ground that petitioner failed to prove the of the interested parties and the names of the
due execution and authenticity of the document. witnesses are missing. Petitioner even failed to
The CA also ruled that Metropolitan Bank is a prove the due execution and authenticity of the
mortgagee in good faith. document. To cast more doubt on petitioner’s
 63
claim of possession, the RTC and CA are in filed a motion to dismiss, but it was denied on the
agreement as to the fact that respondent Bank ground that the right of the petitioner to be placed
found no occupants in the subject properties when in absolute possession of the subject property was
it inspected the same before approving the loan a consequence of her right of ownership and that
applied for by the Spouses Legaspi. Verily, the petitioner cannot be deprived of said possession
exception cannot be made to apply in the instant being now the registered owner of the property.
case as petitioner failed to establish his actual Petitioner’s petition for issuance of writ of
possession of the same. possession was granted by the RTC.

68.13 FE H. OKABE, Petitioner, vs. The CA reversed the RTC’s decision and held that
ERNESTO A. SATURNINO, Respondent. that although it may be true that by virtue of the
G.R. No. 196040 August 26, 2014. Peralta,J contract of sale, petitioner obtained the same
Petition For Review On Certiorari under Rule 45 rights of a purchaser-owner and which rights she
derived from erstwhile mortgagee turned owner
EMERGENCY RECIT: Respondent obtained a PNB, this does not mean that the right to file an
loan from PNB. For failure to pay the loan, PNB ex-parte motion for a writ of possession under Act
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and the 3135 had also been transferred to the petitioner.
property was sold to PNB. Without taking Such a special right is granted only to purchasers
possession of the property, PNB sold the land to in a sale made under the provisions of Act 3135.
Petitioner. Petitioner filed a petition for issuance of
writ of possession which was granted by the RTC. ISSUE: W/N in the case at bar, an ex-parte
The CA reversed the RTC’s decision and held that petition for the issuance of a writ of possession
although petitioner obtained the same rights of a was the proper remedy of the petitioner in
purchaser-owner and which rights she derived obtaining possession of the subject property.
from mortgagee turned owner PNB, this does not
mean that the right to file an ex-parte motion for a HELD: NO.
writ of possession under Act 3135 had also been
transferred to the petitioner. Under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, the purchaser or
the mortgagee who is also the purchaser in the
The SC held that the ex-parte petition for the foreclosure sale may apply for a writ of possession
issuance of a writ of possession was not the during the redemption period, upon an ex-parte
proper remedy of the petitioner in obtaining motion and after furnishing a bond.
possession of the subject property. It ruled that it
is PNB, if it was the purchaser in the foreclosure Furthermore, in the case of Spouses Marquez vs
sale, or the purchaser during the foreclosure sale, Spouses Alindog, it was held that
who can file the ex-parte petition for the issuance the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute
owner of the property purchased if it is not redeemed
of writ of possession during the redemption period, during the period of one year after the registration of the
but it will only issue upon compliance with the sale. As such, he is entitled to the possession of the said
provisions of Section 7 of Act No. 3135. If the property and can demand it at any time following the
purchaser is a third party who acquired the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance
to him of a new transfer certificate oftitle. The buyer can in
property after the redemption period, a hearing
fact demand possession of the land even during the
must be conducted to determine whether redemption period except that he has to post a bond in
possession over the subject property is still with accordance with Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended.
the mortgagor or is already in the possession of a No such bond is required after the redemption period if the
property is not redeemed. Possession of the land then
third party holding the same adversely to the
becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as confirmed
defaulting debtor or mortgagor. If the property is in owner. Upon proper application and proof of title, the
the possession of the mortgagor, a writ of issuance of the writ of possession becomes a ministerial
possession could thus be issued. Otherwise, the duty of the court.
remedy of a writ of possession is no longer
available to such purchaser, but he can wrest Here, petitioner does not fall under the
possession over the property through an ordinary circumstances of the aforequoted case and the
action of ejectment. provisions of Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as
amended, since she bought the property long after
FACTS: Respondent Ernesto Saturnino and his the expiration of the redemption period. Thus, it is
wife obtained a loan with the Philippine National PNB, if it was the purchaser in the foreclosure
Bank (PNB) which was secured by a parcel of land sale, or the purchaser during the foreclosure
in Makati. For failure to pay the loan, PNB sale, who can file the ex-parte petition for the
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. Since the issuance of writ of possession during the
property was not redeemed during the redemption redemption period, but it will only issue upon
period, consolidation of ownership was inscribed compliance with the provisions of Section 7 of
in the title. Without taking possession of the Act No. 3135.
property, PNB sold the land to petitioner Fe
Okabe. It is but logical that Section 33, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court be applied to cases involving
Petitioner filed an ex-parte petition for issuance of extrajudicially foreclosed properties that were
writ of possession over the property. Respondent bought by a purchaser and later sold to third-party-
 64
purchasers after the lapse of the redemption such mistakes or omissions will be fatal to the
period. The remedy of a writ of possession, a validity of the notice, and also to the sale made
remedy that is available to the mortgagee- pursuant thereto. In this case, the errors pointed
purchaser to acquire possession of the foreclosed out by respondents appear to be harmless. There
property from the mortgagor, is made available to was no intention to mislead. The amount
a subsequent purchaser, butonly after hearing and mentioned in the notice did not indicate a collusion
after determining that the subject property is still in between the sheriff who conducted the sale and
the possession of the mortgagor. Unlike if the the respondent bank. Notably, the mentioned
purchaser is the mortgagee or a third party during amount of ₱96,870.20 refers to the mortgage
the redemption period, a writ of possession may indebtedness not the value of the property. As
issue ex-parte or without hearing. In other words, regards the designation of Guellerma Malabanan
if the purchaser is a third party who acquired as the mortgagor, the erroneous designation of an
the property after the redemption period, a entity as the mortgagor does not invalidate the
hearing must be conducted to determine notice of sale.
whether possession over the subject property
is still with the mortgagor or is already in the FACTS: Respondent spouses David and
possession of a third party holding the same Consuelo Castro contracted 2 loans from
adversely to the defaulting debtor or Prudential bank. The first loan (P100,000) was
mortgagor. If the property is in the possession of secured by a real estate mortgage (REM) over a
the mortgagor, a writ of possession could thus be property located in Quezon City, while the second
issued. Otherwise, the remedy of a writ of loan (P55,000) was secured by a REM over
possession is no longer available to such parcels of land in Laguna. The loan remained
purchaser, but he can wrest possession over the unpaid and ballooned to P290,205 and P96,870
property through an ordinary action of ejectment. respectively. Hence, Prudential Bank, through
counsel, filed 2 separate petitions for foreclosure
of the mortgage. In their first petition, Prudential
68.14. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE Bank admitted that through inadvertence, the
ISLANDS (formerly Prudential Bank) Petitioner, photocopies of the first two pages of the REM
vs. SPOUSES DAVID M. CASTRO and covering the properties in Laguna were mixed and
CONSUELO B. CASTRO, Respondents attached to the photocopies of the last two pages
G.R. No. 195272 January 14, 2015 of the REM covering the Quezon City property.
Perez, J. Thus, in the Notice of Sheriff’s Sale, the name
Petition for Review on Certiorari "Guellerma Malabanan rep. by her AIF David M.
Castro" appeared as mortgagor while the amount
EMERGENCY RECIT: Respondent spouses of mortgaged indebtedness is ₱96,870.20. The
obtained 2 loans from Prudential Bank. The 1st real property described therein however is the
loan was secured by a REM over a property in QC Quezon City property. The Quezon City property
while the 2nd loan was secured by a REM over was sold to Prudential Bank as the highest bidder.
parcels of land in Laguna (owned by Guellerma
Malabanan). Respondents failed to pay the loan, In their complaint, Spouses Castro alleged that
thus, Prudential Bank filed 2 separate petitions for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the property was
foreclosure of the mortgage. In the Notice of null and void since the property foreclosed is not
Sheriff’s Sale, the name "Guellerma Malabanan one of the properties covered by the REM
rep. by her AIF David M. Castro" appeared as executed by Guellerma Malabanan which was the
mortgagor while the amount of mortgaged basis of the Notice of Sheriff’s Sale which was
indebtedness is ₱96,870.20. The real property posted and published. On the other hand,
described therein however is the QC property. The Prudential Bank argues that the spouses were fully
QC property was sold to Prudential Bank as the aware that the Quezon City property was to be
highest bidder. Respondents argue that the foreclosed and that the spouses should have
extrajudicial foreclosure of the property was null noticed the clerical and harmless inadvertence in
and void since the property foreclosed is not one the preparation of the petition and alerted the
of the properties covered by the REM executed by sheriff since they were notified of the sale.
Guellerma Malabanan. The trial court upheld the
validity of the sale, but the decision was reversed The trial court ruled in favor of Prudential Bank and
by the CA. The SC held that the errors in the held that there was no substantial defect on the
Notice of Sheriff’s Sale do not invalidate the notice published and posted notice of Sheriff’s Sale since
and render the sale and the certificate of such sale the notice did not render the spouses uninformed
void. Notices are given for the purpose of securing of the nature of the property to be sold. On appeal,
bidders and to prevent a sacrifice of the property. the CA reversed the ruling of the trial court and
If these objects are attained, immaterial errors and held that the erroneous designation of Guellerma
mistakes will not affect the sufficiency of the Malabanan as mortgagor, instead of David, did not
notice; but if mistakes or omissions occur in the affect the validity of the notice. With respect to the
notices of sale, which are calculated to deter or amount of the mortgaged indebtedness however, it
mislead bidders, to depreciate the value of the noted that the discrepancy vis-a-visthe actual
property, or to prevent it from bringing a fair price, amount owed by Spouses Castro is so huge that it
can hardly be considered immaterial. It opined that
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declaring a small amount of indebtedness in the clarification from the sheriff's office. Instead, he let
petition for extrajudicial foreclosure and in the the public auction run its course and belatedly
notice of sheriff’s sale would effectively depreciate objected to the sale.
the value of the property.

ISSUE: W/N the errors in the Notice of Sheriff’s

Sale invalidate the notice and render the sale and
the certificate of such sale void.

RULING: NO.
Foreclosure proceedings have in their favor, the
presumption of regularity, and the party who seeks
to challenge the proceedings has the burden of
evidence to rebut the same. In this case,
respondent failed to prove that Prudential Bank
has not complied with the notice requirement of
the law.

The object of a notice of sale is to inform the

public of the nature and condition of the property
to be sold, and of the time, place and terms of the
sale. Notices are given for the purpose of securing
bidders and to prevent a sacrifice of the property.
If these objects are attained, immaterial errors and
mistakes will not affect the sufficiency of the
notice; but if mistakes or omissions occur in the
notices of sale, which are calculated to deter or
mislead bidders, to depreciate the value of the
property, or to prevent it from bringing a fair
price,such mistakes or omissions will be fatal to
the validity of the notice, and also to the sale made
pursuant thereto. The mistakes and omissions
referred to in the above-cited ruling which would
invalidate notice pertain to those which: 1) are
calculated to deter or mislead bidders, 2) to
depreciate the value of the property, or 3) to
prevent it from bringing a fair price.

The errors pointed out by respondents appear to

be harmless. There was no intention to mislead,
as the errors in fact did not mislead the bidders as
shown by the fact that the winning registered bid
of ₱396,000.00 is over and above the real amount
of indebtedness of ₱209,205.05. As correctly
observed by the trial court, the amount mentioned
in the notice did not indicate a collusion between
the sheriff who conducted the sale and the
respondent bank. Notably, the mentioned amount
of ₱96,870.20 refers to the mortgage
indebtedness not the value of the property.

As regards the designation of Guellerma

Malabanan as the mortgagor, the erroneous
designation of an entity as the mortgagor does not
invalidate the notice of sale. The notice rule was
complied with when the Notice of Sheriff’s Sale
was published in Philippine Recorder, a national
newspaper of general circulation once a week for
three consecutive weeks or on 29 July, 5 and 12
August 1996. There is much significance in the
fact that David admitted on the witness stand that
he knew that there was an application for
foreclosure on their Quezon City property but the
REM used as basis or the foreclosure covered the
Laguna properties. Upon learning this information,
he should have registered his objection or sought