The Objectivity of History
The Objectivity of History
The Objectivity of History
REFERENCES
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THTE OBJECTIVITY OF HISTORY*'
51
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52 VIRGIL HINSHAW, JR.
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THE OBJECTIVITY OF HISTORY 53
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54 VIRGIL HINSHAW, JR.
(I am not sure which), then historical truth and knowledge will only be "dy-
namic" approximations to the absolute. But here we have a posit or guess pro-
moted to the status of true philosophic world-view which, on the very account
of knowing that such a view offers, it would be impossible to validate.
Mannheim's other attempted escape is put in the question: ". . . what if it
can be shown that the accusation of relativism derives from a philosophy which
professes an inadequate conception of 'absolute' anid 'relative': a philosophy
which confronts 'truth' and 'falsehood' in a way which makes sense in the
sphere of so-called exact science, but not in history, since in the latter there are
aspects of the same subject-matter which can be regarded, not as either true or
false, but as essentially dependent on a given perspective or standpoint which
can co-exist with others?"10
This attempt takes us to our second question regarding objectivity, but first
let us briefly summarize, from our framework, what we can at this point conclude
about Mannheim's claims and Toynbee's axiom. Inquiry into the definition of
truth and knowledge-and, hence, inquiry into epistemological relativism-lies
beyond the province of history and the sciences themselves. Here the sciences
must be dogmatic and the issues concerning the very possibility of knowledge
unproblematical. Otherwise, how would the sociologist of knowledge (or
historian) ever know that (say) the thought of a given society was historically
determined? The scientist and empirical historian are properly concerned only
with what was held or believed to be true; otherwise, they become easy prey to
a genetic fallacy that invalidates even their factual claims. There remains, of
course, a substantive sociology of knowledge and history with important func-
tions of their own.
Anyone, moreover, who ascribes a metaphysical theory of truth to science (or
to history insofar as it is or relies on science) forgets its testable, confirmable,
operational or natural "realism." When pressed for justification of that ob-
jectivity which science takes for granted, even the methodologist can only reply
by appeal to "brute fact" or, after analysis, with a stipulative answer that makes
manifest the latent common sense upon which the scientist and historian build.
Methodologists sometimes speak here of the pragmatic vindication of such
basic characteristics of common sense and science. But such vindication is only
that which the Attorney General's Office might put in the form: "We regret to
inform you that we have insufficient information to warrant placing 'obj ectivity'
on our list of subversive characteristics of science, history or common sense."
We have now to consider our second question about objectivity in history,
namely, How do selection and evaluation modify the reliability of history? For
historical as well as analytical reasons, our consideration of this question will
encroach on our remarks about the two other variations on our theme-the
subject-matter and nature of history. Pragmatists have long stressed the present-
ness of history. But how can history, presumably about the past, be reliable if
it is only history of the present? ". . . all history," Dewey asserts, ". . . is, in an
inescapable sense, the history not only of the present but of that which is con-
lo Ibid., p. 93.
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THE OBJECTIVITY OF HISTORY 55
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56 VIRGIL HINSHAW, JR.
17Compare Felix Kaufmann, Methodology of the Social Sciences (New York: Oxford, 1944),
p. 211.
18 See Strong, "Fact and understanding in history," Journal of Philosophy, 44: 617-625
(1947), esp. p. 624.
19 Erwin Panofsky, Meaning in the Visual Arts (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday Anchor,
1955), esp. the Introduction, "The history of art as a humanistic discipline."
20 Arthur Child, "History as imitation," Philosophical Quarterly, 2: 193-207 (1952),
esp. pp. 193-4.
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THE OBJECTIVITY OF HISTORY 57
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58 VIRGIL HINSHAW, JR.
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