G.R. No.

208062, April 07, 2015

SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INC. AND PULSE ASIA,

INC., Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

This resolves the Petition1 for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 64, in
relation to Rule 65, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure praying that
respondent Commission on Elections' Resolution No. 96742dated April 23,
2013 be nullified and set aside and that the Commission on Elections be
permanently enjoined from enforcing the same Resolution, as well as
prosecuting Social Weather Stations, Inc. and Pulse Asia, Inc. for violating it
or otherwise compelling compliance with it.3

Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) Resolution No. 9674 directed Social

Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS) and Pulse Asia, Inc. (Pulse Asia), as well as
"other survey firms of similar circumstance"4 to submit to COMELEC the
names of all commissioners and payors of all surveys published from February
12, 2013 to April 23, 2013, including those of their "subscribers." 5

SWS and Pulse Asia are social research and public polling firms. Among their
activities is the conduct of pre-election surveys.6

As recounted by SWS and Pulse Asia, on February 15 to February 17, 2013,

SWS conducted a pre-election survey on voters' preferences for senatorial
candidates. Thereafter, it published its findings.7The following question was
asked in the survey:

Kung ang eleksyon ay gaganapin ngayon, sino ang pinakamalamang ninyong

iboboto bilang mga SENADOR ng PILIPINAS? Narito ang listahan ng mga
kandidato. Paki-shade o itiman po ang naaangkop na oval katabi ng pangalan
hg mga taong pinakamalamang ninyong iboboto. Maaari po kayong pumili ng
hanggang labindalawang (12) kandidato.

(LIST OF CANDIDATES OMITTED)

If the elections were held today, whom would you most probably vote for
as SENATORS of the PHILIPPINES? Here is a list of candidates. Please
shade the oval beside the name of the persons you would most likely vote for.
You may choose up to twelve (12) candidates.
(LIST OF CANDIDATES OMITTED)8 (Emphasis in the original)

On March 20, 2013, Representative Tobias M. Tiangco (Tiangco), Secretary-

General of the United Nationalist Alliance (UNA), wrote Atty. Esmeralda Ladra,
Director of COMELEC's Law Department.9 In his letter,10 Tiangco asked
COMELEC to "compel [SWS] to either comply with the directive in the Fair
Election Act and COMELEC Resolution No. 9[6]1[5] and give the names or
identities of the subscribers who paid for the [pre-election survey conducted
from February 15 to February 17, 2013], or be liable for the violation thereof,
an act constitutive of an election offense."11

Tiangco recounted that on February 28, 2013, he wrote to SWS requesting,

among others, that he "be furnished the identity of persons who paid for the
[pre-election survey conducted from February 15 to February 17, 2013] as
well as those who subscribed to it."12 Sometime in March 2013, SWS
supposedly replied to Tiangco, "furnishing [him] with some particulars about
the survey but [without] disclosing] the identity of the persons who
commissioned or subscribed to the survey."13

Acting on Tiangco's letter and on the COMELEC Law Department's

recommendation, the COMELEC En Bane issued the Order14 dated April 10,
2013 setting the matter for hearing on April 16, 2013. The same Order
directed SWS to submit its Comment within three (3) days of receipt.15 On
April 12, 2013, Pulse Asia received a letter from COMELEC "requesting its
representative to attend the COMELEC hearing on 16 April 2013." 16

SWS and Pulse Asia recounted that during the hearing, COMELEC Chairman
Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. (COMELEC Chairman Brillantes) stated that the
proceeding was merely a clarificatory hearing and not a formal hearing or an
investigation.17

On April 23, 2013, COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution No. 9674. The
entire dispositive portion of this Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commis[s]ion RESOLVED, as it hereby

RESOLVES, to DIRECT the SWS, Pulse Asia and other survey firms of similar
circumstance to submit within three (3) days from receipt of this Resolution
the names of all commissioners and payors of surveys published from
February 12, 2013 to the date of the promulgation of this Resolution for
copying and verification by the Commission. The submission shall include the
names of all "subscribers" of those published surveys. Such information/data
shall be for the exclusive and confidential use of the Commission;
RESOLVED FURTHER, that all surveys published subsequent to the
promulgation of this Resolution must be accompanied by all the information
required in Republic Act no. 9006, including the names of commissioners,
payors and subscribers.

This resolution shall take effect immediately after publication.

A violation of these rules shall constitu[t]e an election offense as provided in

Republic Act no. 9006, or the Fair Election Act.18 (Emphasis in the original)

As basis for Resolution No. 9674, COMELEC cited Article IX-C, Section 2(1)19 of
the 1987 Constitution and Sections 5.1 to 5.320 of Republic Act No. 9006,
otherwise known as the Fair Election Act, as implemented by COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615.21

SWS and Pulse Asia alleged that following the issuance of Resolution No. 9674
and as of their filing before this court of the present Petition, they had not
been furnished copies of Resolution No. 9674.22(They emphasized that while
a certified true copy of this Resolution was attached to their Petition, this was
a copy which they themselves secured "for the purpose of complying.with the
requirement that Rule 65 petitions must be accompanied by a certified true
copy of the assailed order or resolution[.]"23)

In the letter24 dated April 30, 2013, SWS and Pulse Asia informed COMELEC
Chairman Brillantes that they had not received a copy of Resolution No. 9674.
They also articulated their view that Resolution No. 9674 was tainted with
irregularities, having been issued ultra vires (i.e., in excess of what the Fair
Election Act allows) and in violation of the non-impairment of contracts clause
of the Constitution. They also expressed their intention to bring the matter
before this court on account of these supposed irregularities. Thus, they
requested that COMELEC defer or hold in abeyance Resolution No. 9674's
enforcement.25

On May 8, 2013, the COMELEC Law Department issued a Notice26 to SWS (and
also to Pulse Asia) directing it to furnish COMELEC with a list of the names of
all "commissioners, subscribers, and payors of surveys published from
February 12, 2013 until April 23, 2013."27 SWS was warned that failure to
comply with the Notice shall constitute an election offense punishable under
the Omnibus Election Code.28

On July 1, 2013, COMELEC issued a Subpoena29 notifying SWS and Pulse Asia
that a Complaint "for violation of Section 264[,] par. 1 and 2 of the Omnibus
Election Code30 in relation to R.A. 9006"31 was filed against them. (This was
docketed as E.O. Case No. 13-222). They were also directed to appear and to
submit their counter-affidavits and other supporting documents at the hearing
set on August 6, 2013.32

SWS and Pulse Asia maintained that before receiving the Subpoena, they were
never informed that a criminal case had been filed against them. They added
that they were never furnished copies of the relevant criminal Complaint.33

On July 26, 2013, petitioners Social Weather Stations, Inc. and Pulse Asia,
Inc. filed the present Petition.34 They assail Resolution No. 9674 as having
been issued ultra vires. They are of the position that Resolution No. 9674, in
requiring the submission of information on subscribers, is in excess of what
the Fair Election Act requires.35 Likewise, they, assert that Resolution No.
9674 transgresses the Fair Election Act in making itself executory immediately
after publication.36 Moreover, they claim that it violates the non-impairment
of contracts clause of the Constitution,37 and was enforced in violation of their
right to due process (as they were charged with its violation despite not having
been properly served with copies of the complaint filed against
them).38 Petitioners pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction in the interim.39

In this court's July 30, 2013 Resolution,40 COMELEC was required to file a
Comment on the Petition. In the same Resolution, this court issued a
temporary restraining order "enjoining the enforcement of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9674 with respect to submission of the names of regular
subscribers but not to the submission of (1) the names of specific subscribers
for the limited period of February 12, 2013 to April 23, 2013 who have paid a
substantial amount of money for access to survey results and privileged
survey data; and (2) the names of all commissioners and payors of surveys
published within the same period."41

On October 10, 2013, COMELEC filed its Comment.42 On February 12, 2014,
petitioners filed their Joint Reply.43

In this court's February 18, 2014 Resolution,44 the present Petition was given
due course, and the parties were directed to file their memoranda. Petitioners
complied on May 16, 201445 and COMELEC on June 25, 2014.46

For resolution are the following issues:

First, whether Resolution No. 9674 is invalid in that it requires the disclosure
of the names of "subscribers" of election surveys;

Second, whether the rights of petitioners to free speech will be curtailed by

the requirement to submit the names of their subscribers;
Third, whether Resolution No. 9674, insofar as it compels petitioners to submit
the names of their subscribers, violates the constitutional proscription against
the impairment of contracts (Article II, Section 10);

Fourth, whether at the time petitioners were required by COMELEC to reveal

the names of the subscribers to their election surveys, Resolution No. 9674
was already in force and effect; and

Lastly, whether COMELEC deprived petitioners of due process of law when it:

a) failed to provide them with a copy of Resolution No. 9674 and the criminal
complaint for an election offense; and

b) refused to specify the election offense under which they were being
prosecuted.

We sustain the validity of Resolution No. 9674. The names of those who
commission or pay for election surveys, including subscribers of survey firms,
must be disclosed pursuant to Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act. This
requirement is a valid regulation in the exercise of police power and effects
the constitutional policy of "guarantee[ing] equal access to opportunities for
public service[.]"47Section 5.2(a)'s requirement of disclosing subscribers
neither curtails petitioners' free speech rights nor violates the constitutional
proscription against the impairment of contracts.

However, it is evident that Resolution No. 9674 was promulgated in violation

of the period set by the Fair Election Act. Petitioners were also not served a
copy of Resolution No. 9674 with which they were asked to comply. They were
neither shown nor served copies of the criminal Complaint subject of E.O. Case
No. 13-222. Petitioners' right to due process was, thus, violated.

Petitioners assail Resolution No. 9674's requirement of submission of names

of subscribers, including those who did not commission or pay for a specific
survey or cause its publication, for being ultra vires. They maintain that the
Fair Election Act "as it was written by Congress covers only those who
commission or pay for a particular election survey, and requires disclosure of
their names only when that particular survey is published."48 From this, they
add that COMELEC exceeded its authority — "creating] an election offense
where there was none before"49 — in considering as an election offense any
violation of Resolution No. 9674.

COMELEC, for its part, insists on the "wide latitude of discretion"50 granted to
it in the performance of its constitutional duty to "[e]nforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election[.]"51 It adds that
"as the specialized constitutional body charged with the enforcement and
administration of election laws,"52 its contemporaneous construction of
Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act is "entitled to great weight and
respect."53 Citing the supposed legislative intent of Section 5.2 as
"broaden[ing] the subject of disclosure,"54 COMELEC claims that Section
5.2(a) "draws no distinction between the direct payors and the indirect payors
of the survey."55 It adds that requiring the disclosure of survey subscribers
addresses the requirement of reporting election expenditures by candidates
and political parties, thereby helping COMELEC check compliance with this
requirement.56

Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act, read in a manner consistent not only
with its text but also with the purpose for which it, along with the Fair Election
Act, was adopted, sustains COMELEC's position.

Republic Act No. 9006 was adopted with the end in mind of "guarantee[ing]
or ensuring] equal opportunity for public service"57 and to this end, stipulates
mechanisms for the "supervision] or regulation of] the enjoyment or utilization
of all franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication or
information[.]"58 Hence, its short title: Fair Election Act.

Situated within the constitutional order, the Fair Election Act provides means
to realize the policy articulated in Article II, Section 26 of the 1987
Constitution to "guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service[.]"
Article II, Section 26 models an understanding of Philippine political and
electoral reality. It is not merely hortatory or a statement of value. Among
others, it sums up an aversion to the perpetuation of political power through
electoral contests skewed in favor of those with resources to dominate the
deliberative space in any media.

Apart from making real Article II, Section 26's constitutional policy, the Fair
Election Act represents the legislature's compliance with the requirement of
Article XIII, Section 1: "Congress . . . give[s] highest priority to the enactment
of measures that. . . reduce . . . political inequalities ... by equitably diffusing
wealth and political power for the common good."59

Moreover, the constitutional desire to "guarantee equal access to

opportunities for public service"60 is the same intent that animates the
Constitution's investiture in COMELEC of the power to "supervise or regulate
the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of
transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or
information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary."61

Specific provisions in the Fair Election Act regulate the means through which
candidates for elective public office, as well as political parties and groups
participating in the party-list system, are able to make themselves known to
voters, the same means through which they earn votes.

Section 3 permits the use of lawful election propaganda.62 Section 4 regulates

published or printed, and broadcast election propaganda.63 Section 6 governs
access to media time and space.64 Sections 7 and 8 provide for COMELEC's
competencies (i.e., affirmative action, and the so-called "COMELEC Space"
and "COMELEC Time") that enable it to equalize candidates' exposure to
voters.65 Section 9 regulates venues for the posting of campaign
materials.66 Section 10 provides for parties' and candidates' right to
reply.67 Section 11 requires media outlets to make available the use of their
facilities for election propaganda at discounted rates.68

The Fair Election Act also governs published surveys during elections.

Section 5.1 defines election surveys-as "the measurement of opinions and

perceptions of the voters as regards a candidate's popularity, qualifications,
platforms or a matter of public discussion in relation to the election, including
voters' preference for candidates or publicly discussed issues during the
campaign period[.]" Sections 5.2 and 5.3 provide regulations that facilitate
transparency with respect to ' election surveys. Section 5.4 69 is no longer in
effect, having been declared unconstitutional in this court's May 5, 2001
Decision in Social Weather Stations and Kamahalan Publishing Corp. v.
COMELEC.70 Section 5.571 pertains to exit polls.

Section 5.2 enumerates the information that a person publishing an election

survey must publish along with the survey itself:

5.2 During the election period, any person, natural as well as juridical,
candidate or organization who publishes a survey must likewise publish the
following information:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

a. The name of the person, candidate, party or. organization

who commissioned or paid for the survey;
b. The name of the person, polling firm or survey organization
who conducted the survey;
c. The period during which the survey was conducted, the
methodology used, including the number of individual
respondents and the areas from which they were selected,
and the specific questions asked;
 d. The margin of error of the survey;
e. For each question for which the margin of error is greater
than that reported under paragraph (d), the margin of error
for that question; and
f. A mailing address and telephone number, indicating it as an
address or telephone number at which the sponsor can be
contacted to obtain a written report regarding the survey in
accordance with Subsection 5.3. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 5.3 facilitates the inspection, copying, and verification not only of an
election survey but also of the raw data used as bases for its conclusions:

5.3 The survey together with raw data gathered to support its conclusions
shall be available for inspection, copying and verification by the COMELEC or
by a registered political party or a bona fide candidate, or by any COMELEC-
accredited citizen's arm. A reasonable fee sufficient to cover the costs of
inspection, copying and verification may be charged.

As with all the other provisions of the Fair Election Act, Section 5 is a means
to guarantee equal access to the deliberative forums essential to win an
elective public office. Any reading of Section 5 and of its individual
components, such as Section 5.2(a), cannot be divorced from this purpose.

The inclusion of election surveys in the list of items regulated by the Fair
Election Act is a recognition that election surveys are not a mere descriptive
aggregation of data. Publishing surveys are a means to shape the preference
of voters, inform the strategy of campaign machineries, and ultimately, affect
the outcome of elections. Election surveys have a similar nature as election
propaganda. They are expensive, normally paid for by those interested in the
outcome of elections, and have tremendous consequences on election results.

II

Views vary on the precise extent to which surveys or "polls" shape voter
preferences, if at all.

Election surveys have been critiqued for amplifying the notion of an election
as a "horse race"72 and for reducing elections to the lowest common
denominator of percentage points or a candidate's erstwhile share in the vote
market rather than focusing on issues, principles, programs, and platforms.

Several possible, albeit conflicting, effects of surveys on voter behavior have

been postulated:
First, there is the bandwagon effect where "electors rally to support the
candidate leading in the polls."73 This "assumes that knowledge of a popular
'tide' will likely change voting intentions in [favor] of the frontrunner, that
many electors feel more comfortable supporting a popular choice or that
people accept the perceived collective wisdom of others as being enough
reason for supporting a candidate."74

Second, there is the underdog effect where "electors rally to support the
candidate trailing in the polls."75 This shift can be motivated by sympathy for
the perceived underdog.76

Third, there is the motivating effect where "individuals who had not
intended to vote are persuaded to do so,"77 having been alerted to the fact of
an election's imminence.78

Fourth, there is also the demotivating effect where "voters abstain from
voting out of certainty that their candidate or party will win[.]" 79

Fifth, there are reports of a behavior known as strategic voting where

"voting is influenced by the chances of winning[.]"80

Lastly, there is also the theory of a free-will effect where "voters cast their
ballots to prove the polls wrong[.]"81

Election surveys published during election periods create the "politics of

expectations."82 Voters act in accordance with what is perceived to be an
existing or emerging state of affairs with respect to how candidates are faring.

Of the six (6) effects, the bandwagon effect has a particular resonance and
has been of concern. Surveys, or opinion polls, "by directly influencing
individual-level support . . . , can be self-fulfilling prophecies and produce
opinion cascades."83 "[A] poll's prediction may come to pass not only because
it measures public opinion but also because it may influence public opinion."84

The bandwagon effect is of particular concern because of the observed human

tendency to conform. Three (3) mechanisms through which survey results
may induce conformity have been posited:

(1) normative social influence, or people's desire to adopt the majority

position in order to feel liked and accepted or believe they are on the winning
team;

(2) informational social influence, or people learning from the 'wisdom of

crowds' via social proof because they 'believe that others' interpretation of an
ambiguous situation is more accurate . . . and will help [them] choose an
appropriate course of action'; and

(3) people resolving cognitive dissonance by switching to the side they infer
is going to win based on the poll.85cralawlawlibrary

Likewise, it has been argued that the bandwagon effect is but the obverse of
the so-called false-consensus effect or false-consensus bias:

The bandwagon effect, a form of conformity, is the mirror image of the false
consensus effect, where people misperceive that their own behaviors and
attitudes are more popular than they actually are. In the political domain, one
mechanism underlying the false consensus effect is wishful thinking - people
gaining utility from thinking their candidate is ahead or their opinions are
popular.86

The bandwagon effect induced by election surveys assumes even greater

significance in considering the health of a democracy.

Integral to our appreciation of democracy is the recognition that democracy is

fundamentally deliberative. It is rooted in the exchange and dialogue of ideas.
Accordingly, free expression, not least of all from the minority and from those
who do not conform, i.e., those who dissent and criticize, is indispensable:

Proponents of the political theory on "deliberative democracy" submit that

"substantial, open, [and] ethical dialogue is a critical, and indeed defining,
feature of a good polity." This theory may be considered broad, but it definitely
"includes [a] collective decision making with the participation of all who will
be affected by the decision." It anchors on the principle that the cornerstone
of every democracy is that sovereignty resides in the people. To ensure order
in running the state's affairs, sovereign powers were delegated and individuals
would be elected or nominated in key government positions to represent the
people. On this note, the theory on deliberative democracy may evolve to the
right of the people to make government accountable. Necessarily, this
includes the right of the people to criticize acts made pursuant to
governmental functions.

Speech that promotes dialogue on public affairs, or airs out grievances and
political discontent, should thus be protected and encouraged.

Borrowing the words of Justice Brandeis, "it is hazardous to discourage

thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression
breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety
lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed
remedies."

In this jurisdiction, this court held that "[t]he interest of society and the
maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs."
This court has, thus, adopted the principle that "debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide open . . . [including even] unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials."87cralawlawlibrary

However, "conformity pressures can suppress minority opinion."88 The

bandwagon effect conjures images of an impregnable majority, thereby
tending to push farther toward the peripheries those who are already
marginalized. Worse, the bandwagon effect foments the illusion of a
homogenous monolith denying the very existence of those in the minority.
This undermines the "normative conceptions of democracy"89 substituting the
democratic dialogue with acquiescence to perceived or projected orthodoxy.

Surveys, far from being a passive "snapshot of many viewpoints held by a

segment of the population at a given time,"90 can warp existing public opinion
and can mould public opinion. They are constitutive. Published election
surveys offer valuable insight into public opinion not just because they
represent it but more so because they also tend to make it.

Appreciating this tendency to both entrench and marginalize is of acute

relevance in the context of Philippine political reality. This is the same reality
that our policymakers, primarily the framers of the Constitution, have seen fit
to address.

III

The constitutional dictum to "guarantee equal access to opportunities for

public service"91 and (even more specifically and explicitly) to "prohibit
political dynasties"92 does not exist in a vacuum.

Politics in the Philippines has been criticized as "a lucrative means of self-
aggrandizement."93 Ours is an exclusive system that perpetuates power and
provides sanctuary to those who have already secured their place. Traditional
Filipino politics connotes elite families that, with the state, are "engaged in a
reciprocal relationship that constantly defines and redefines both."94 As
recounted by Alfred McCoy, this reciprocal relationship, typified by rent-
seeking (i.e., "taking advantage of their access to state privileges to expand
proprietary wealth"95), is a vicious cycle propagated for as long as the
Philippines has been a republic: "The emergence of the Republic as a weak
postcolonial state augmented the power of rent-seeking political families — a
development that further weakened the state's own resources."96

The Philippines, as it emerged in the wake of Ferdinand Marcos' presidency

and the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, saw the "celebritification" 97 of
political office. On the legislature and studying emerging contrasts in the
composition of its two chambers — the Senate and the House of
Representatives — it has been noted:

The old political families, however are not as strong in the Senate as they are
in the House. This could be read, if not as a total repudiation by voters of
family power, then at least as an attempt by them to tap other sources of
national leadership. Celebrities and military and police officers have emerged
as alternatives to traditional politicians. It could be that these new men and
women have captured the popular imagination or that they are more in tune
with the public pulse. But their emergence could very well be seen as an
indication of the paucity of choices: Political parties, for one, have not
succeeded in proffering a wider range of options to an electorate weary of
trapos.98

This celebritification nurtures misleading notions of an enhanced or healthier

democracy, one that opens avenues to a crop of political leaders not belonging
to oligarchic families. Viewed critically however, this is nothing more than a
pipe dream. New elites now share the political stage with the old. The tension
between two contrary tendencies actually serves to preserve the status quo
of elitism — an expanded elitism perhaps, but elitism no less. To evoke a
truism, "the more things change, the more they stay the same":

But the "celebritification" of the Senate can also be interpreted as the

democratization of an exclusive body once reserved only for the very rich, the
politically experienced, and the intellectually brilliant. In a sense, the bar of
entry has been lowered, and anyone with national renown can contest a seat
in a chamber once famous for sharp debates and polysyllabic peroration.

The main criterion for a Senate seat is now name recall. This is where
celebrities have the edge even over older political families with bankable
names. . . .

. . . .

The diminishing clout of old families in the Senate—and their continued

dominance in the House—shows the push and pull of two contrary tendencies.
The first tendency is toward the new: The importance of name recall in
national elections taking place in a media-inundated environment makes it
easier for movie and media personalities, and harder for old-style politicians,
to be elected. The second tendency is veering toward the old: At the district
level, trapo-style patronage and machine politics remain deeply entrenched,
giving political families the edge in elections."99

Thus, where once there was elitism solely along lines of kinship — Alfred
McCoy's so-called "anarchy of families" — now there is also elitism demarcated
by name recall, populist projection, and media exposure, arguably, an
"anarchy of celebrities."

Certainly, it is not the business of this court to engage in its own determination
of the wisdom of policy. Nevertheless, having to grapple with the tasks of
adjudication and interpretation, it has become necessary to bring to light the
intent that underlies the disputed statutory provision, as well as the
constitutional regime and social context, in which this provision is situated.

To reiterate, the inclusion of published election surveys in a statute that

regulates election propaganda and other means through which candidates
may shape voter preferences is itself telling of the recognition that published
election surveys, too, may influence voter preferences. This inclusion is
similarly telling of a recognition that, left unregulated, election surveys can
undermine the purposes of ensuring "fair" elections. These recognitions are
embedded in the Fair Election Act; they are not judicial constructs. In
adjudicating with these' as bases, this court is merely adhering to the
legislative imperative.

IV

It is necessary that the Fair Election Act be appreciated for what it is: a
mechanism for ensuring equality. The Fair Election Act is a means to effect
the "necessary condition" to a genuine democratic dialogue, to realizing a
deliberative democracy. The concept of this "necessary condition" was
previously considered by this court in Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC:100

In his seminal work, Repressive Tolerance, philosopher and social theorist

Herbert Marcuse recognized how institutionalized inequality exists as a
background limitation, rendering freedoms exercised within such limitation as
merely "protecting] the already established machinery of discrimination." In
his view, any improvement "in the normal course of events" within an unequal
society, without subversion, only strengthens existing interests of those in
power and control.

In other words, abstract guarantees of fundamental rights like freedom of

expression may become meaningless if not taken in a real context. This
tendency to tackle rights in the abstract compromises liberties. In his words:
Liberty is selfi-determination, autonomy—this is almost a tautology, but a
tautology which results from a whole series of synthetic judgments. It
stipulates the ability to determine one's own life: to be able to determine what
to do and what not to do, what to suffer and what not. But the subject of this
autonomy is never the contingent, private individual as that which he actually
is or happens to be; it is rather the individual as a human being who is capable
of being free with the others. And the problem of making possible such a
harmony between every individual liberty and the other is not that of finding
a compromise between competitors, or between freedom and law, between
general and individual interest, common and private welfare in an established
society, but of creating the society in which man is no longer enslaved by
institutions which vitiate self-determination from the beginning. In other
words, freedom is still to be created even for the freest of the existing
societies.

Marcuse suggests that the democratic argument — with all opinions presented
to and deliberated by the people — "implies a necessary condition, namely,
that the people must be capable of deliberating and choosing on the basis of
knowledge, that they must have access to authentic information, and that, on
this basis, their evaluation must be the result of autonomous thought'." He
submits that "[different opinions and 'philosophies' can no longer compete
peacefully for adherence and persuasion on rational grounds: the 'marketplace
of ideas' is organized and delimited by those who determine the national and
the individual interest."

A slant toward left manifests from his belief that "there is a 'natural right' of
resistance for oppressed and overpowered minorities to use extralegal means
if the legal ones have proved to be inadequate." Marcuse, thus, stands for an
equality that breaks away and transcends from established hierarchies, power
structures, and indoctrinations. The tolerance of libertarian society he refers
to as "repressive tolerance."101

What is involved here is petitioners' freedom of speech and of expression, that

is, to publish their findings. More specifically, what is involved here is their
right to political speech, that which "refers to speech 'both intended and
received as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue,' 'foster[ing]
informed and civic-minded deliberation."102

The nature of the speech involved, as well as the Fair Election Act's purpose
of ensuring political equality, calls into operation the equality-based approach
to weighing liberty to express vis-a-vis equality of opportunities. As explained
in Diocese of Bacolod:103
In an equality-based approach, "politically disadvantaged speech prevails over
regulation[,] but regulation promoting political equality prevails over speech."
This view allows the government leeway to redistribute or equalize 'speaking
power,' such as protecting, even implicitly subsidizing, unpopular or dissenting
voices often systematically subdued within society's ideological ladder. This
view acknowledges that there are dominant political actors who, through
authority, power, resources, identity, or status, have capabilities that may
drown out the messages of others. This is especially true in a developing or
emerging economy that is part of the majoritarian world like ours.

. . .

The scope of the guarantee of free expression takes into consideration the
constitutional respect for human potentiality and the effect of speech. It
valorizes the ability of human beings to express and their necessity to relate.
On the other hand, a complete guarantee must also take into consideration
the effects it will have in a deliberative democracy. Skewed distribution of
resources as well as the cultural hegemony of the majority may have the effect
of drowning out the speech and the messages of those in the minority. In a
sense, social inequality does have its effect on the exercise and effect of the
guarantee of free speech. Those who have more will have better access to
media that reaches a wider audience than those who have less. Those who
espouse the more popular ideas will have better reception than the subversive
and the dissenters of society. To be really heard and understood, the
marginalized view normally undergoes its own degree of struggle.

The traditional view has been to tolerate the viewpoint of the speaker and the
content of his or her expression. This view, thus, restricts laws or regulation
that allows public officials to make judgments of the value of such viewpoint
or message content. This should still be the principal approach.

However, the requirements of the Constitution regarding equality in

opportunity must provide limits to some expression during electoral
campaigns.104

The required judicial temperament in appraising speech in the context of

electoral campaigns which is principally designed to endorse a candidate, both
by candidates and / or political parties, on the one hand, and private citizens,
on the other, has thus been articulated:

Thus clearly, regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made

by candidates or the members of their political parties or their political parties
may be regulated as to time, place, and manner. This is the effect of our
rulings in Osmeña v. COMELEC and National Press Club v. COMELEC.
Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by persons
who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party
which are, taken as a whole, principally advocacies of a social issue that the
public must consider during elections is unconstitutional. Such regulation is
inconsistent with the guarantee of according the fullest possible range of
opinions coming from the electorate including those that can catalyze candid,
uninhibited, and robust debate in the criteria for the choice of a candidate.

This does not mean that there cannot be a specie of speech by a private citizen
which will not amount to an election paraphernalia to be validly regulated by
law.

Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it

reaches into speech of persons who are not candidates or who do not speak
as members of a political party if they are not candidates, only if what is
regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has for its principal
object the endorsement of a candidate only. The regulation (a) should be
provided by law, (b) reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective
of enhancing the opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering the
primacy of the guarantee of free expression, and (d) demonstrably the least
restrictive means to achieve that object. The regulation must only be with
respect to the time, place, and manner of the rendition of the message. In no
situation may the speech be prohibited or censored on the basis of its content.
For this purpose, it will not matter whether the speech is made with or on
private property.105 [Emphasis in the original]

Concededly, what is involved here is not election propaganda per se. Election
surveys, on their face, do not state or allude to preferred candidates. As a
means, election surveys are ambivalent. To an academician, they are an
aggrupation of data. To a journalist, they are matters for reportage. To a
historian, they form part of a chronicle. Election surveys thus become
unambiguous only when viewed in relation to the end for which they are
employed. To those whose end is to get a candidate elected, election surveys,
when limited to their own private consumption, are a means to formulate
strategy. When published, however, the tendency to shape voter preferences
comes into play. In this respect, published election surveys partake of the
nature of election propaganda. It is then declarative speech in the context of
an electoral campaign properly subject to regulation. Hence, Section 5.2 of
the Fair Election Act's regulation of published surveys.

We thus proceed to evaluate Resolution No. 9674's requirement of disclosing

the names of subscribers to election surveys in light of the requisites for valid
regulation of declarative speech by private entities in the context of an election
campaign:

First, the text of Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act supports the inclusion
of subscribers among those persons who "paid for the survey[.]"106 Thus,
Resolution No. 9674 is a regulation finding basis in statute.

COMELEC correctly points out that in Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act,
those who "commissioned" and those who "paid for" the published survey are
separated by the disjunctive term "or."107 This disassociates those who
"commissioned" from those who "paid for" and identifies them as alternatives
to each other.108 Section 5.2(a) thus requires the disclosure of two (2) classes
of persons: "[first,] those who commissioned or sponsored the survey; and
[second,] those who paid for the survey."109

The second class makes no distinction between those who pay for a specific
survey and those who pay for election surveys in general. Indeed, subscribers
do not escape the burden of paying for the component articles comprising a
subscription. They may pay for them in aggregate, but they pay for them just
the same. From the text of Section 5.2(a), the legislative intent or regulatory
concern is clear: "those who have financed, one way or another, the
[published] survey"110 must be disclosed.

Second, not only an important or substantial state interest but even a

compelling one reasonably grounds Resolution No. 9674's inclusion of
subscribers to election surveys. Thus, regardless of whether an intermediate
or a strict standard is used, Resolution No. 9674 passes scrutiny.

It is settled that constitutionally declared principles are a compelling state

interest:

Compelling governmental interest would include constitutionally declared

principles. We have held, for example, that "the welfare of children and the
State's mandate to protect and care for them, as parens patriae, constitute a
substantial and compelling government interest in regulating . . . utterances
in TV broadcast."111

Here, we have established that the regulation of election surveys effects the
constitutional policy, articulated in Article II, Section 26, and reiterated and
affirmed in Article IX-C, Section 4 and Article XIII, Section 26 of the 1987
Constitution, of "guarantee[ing] equal access to opportunities for public
service[.]"112
Resolution No. 9674 addresses the reality that an election survey is formative
as it is descriptive. It can be a means to shape the preference of voters and,
thus, the outcome of elections. In the hands of those whose end is to get a
candidate elected, it is a means for such end and partakes of the nature of
election propaganda. Accordingly, the imperative of "fair" elections impels
their regulation.

Lastly, Resolution No. 9674 is "narrowly tailored to meet the objective of

enhancing the opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering the
primacy of the guarantee of free expression"113 and is "demonstrably the least
restrictive means to achieve that object."114

While it does regulate expression (i.e., petitioners' publication of election

surveys), it does not go so far as to suppress desired expression. There is
neither prohibition nor censorship specifically aimed at election surveys. The
freedom to publish election surveys remains. All Resolution No. 9674 does is
articulate a regulation as regards the manner of publication, that is, that the
disclosure of those who commissioned and/or paid for, including those
subscribed to, published election surveys must be made.cralawlawlibrary

VI

Petitioners harp on what they claim to be Section 5.2(a)'s "plain meaning" and
assert that there is no room to entertain COMELEC's construction of Section
5.2(a).115

It has been said that "[a] cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when
the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for
construction or interpretation. There is only room for application."116

Clarifications, however, are in order.

First, verba legis or the so-called plain-meaning rule applies only when the
law is completely clear, such that there is absolutely no room for
interpretation. Its application is premised on a situation where the words of
the legislature are clear that its intention, insofar as the facts of a case demand
from the point of view of a contemporary interpretative community, is neither
vague nor ambiguous. This is a matter of judicial appreciation. It cannot apply
merely on a party's contention of supposed clarity and lack of room for
interpretation.

This is descriptive of the situation here.

Interestingly, both COMELEC and petitioners appeal to what they

(respectively) construe to be plainly evident from Section 5.2(a)'s text: on the
part of COMELEC, that the use of the words "paid for" evinces no distinction
between direct purchasers and those who purchase via subscription schemes;
and, on the part of petitioners, that Section 5.2(a)'s desistance from actually
using the word "subscriber" means that subscribers are beyond its
contemplation.117 The variance in the parties' positions, considering that they
are both banking on what they claim to be the Fair Election Act's plain
meaning, is the best evidence of an extant ambiguity.

Second, statutory construction cannot lend itself to pedantic rigor that

foments absurdity. The dangers of inordinate insistence on literal
interpretation are commonsensical and need not be belabored. These dangers
are by no means endemic to legal interpretation. Even in everyday
conversations, misplaced literal interpretations are fodder for humor. A
fixation on technical rules of grammar is no less innocuous. A pompously
doctrinaire' approach to text can stifle, rather than facilitate, the legislative
wisdom that unbridled textualism purports to bolster.118

Third, the assumption that there is, in all cases, a universal plain language is
erroneous. In reality, universality and uniformity of meaning is a rarity. A
contrary belief wrongly assumes that language is static.

The more appropriate and more effective approach is, thus, holistic rather
than parochial: to consider context and the interplay of the historical, the
contemporary, and even the envisioned. Judicial interpretation entails the
convergence of social realities and social ideals. The latter are meant to be
effected by the legal apparatus, chief of which is the bedrock of the prevailing
legal order: the Constitution. Indeed, the word in the vernacular that describes
the Constitution — saligan — demonstrates this imperative of constitutional
primacy.

Thus, we refuse to read Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act in isolation.
Here, we consider not an abstruse provision but a stipulation that is part of
the whole, i.e., the statute of which it is a part, that is aimed at realizing the
ideal of fair elections. We consider not a cloistered provision but a norm that
should have a present authoritative effect to achieve the ideals of those who
currently read, depend on, and demand fealty from the
Constitution.cralawlawlibrary

VII

We note with favor COMELEC's emphasis on the "wide latitude of

discretion"119 granted to it in the performance of its constitutional duty to
"[e]nforce and administer all laws arid regulations relative to the conduct of
an election[.]"120 But this is with the caution that it does not reach "grave
abuse of discretion[.]121

Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy v. COMELEC122 had the following to

say regarding factual findings made by COMELEC, an independent
constitutional organ:

[T]he rule that factual findings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed
by courts of justice except when there is absolutely no evidence or no
substantial evidence in support of such findings should be applied with greater
force when it concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution
intended to place the COMELEC—created and explicitly made independent by
the Constitution itself—on a level higher than statutory administrative
organs.123

Proceeding from this, we emphasize that this norm of deference applies not
only to factual findings. This applies with equal force to independent
constitutional organs' general exercise of their functions. The constitutional
placing of independent constitutional organs on a plane higher than those of
administrative agencies created only by statute is not restricted to
competence in fact-finding. It extends to all purposes for which the
Constitution created them.

We reiterate, however, that our recognition of this deferential norm is made

with caution. This rule of deference does not give independent constitutional
organs, like COMELEC, license to gravely abuse their discretion. With respect
to rule-making, while the wisdom of "subordinate legislation" or the rule-
making power of agencies tasked with the administration of government is
acknowledged, rule-making agencies are not given unfettered power to
promulgate rules. As explained in Gerochi v. Department of Energy,124 it is
imperative that subordinate legislation "be germane to the objects and
purposes of the law and that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in
conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law."125 A regulation that
purports to effect a statute but goes beyond the bounds of that statute is ultra
vires; it is in excess of the rule-making agency's competence. Thus, it is void
and ineffectual.

This is not the case here. There is no grave abuse of discretion. Resolution
No. 9674 serves a constitutional purpose and works well within the bounds of
the Constitution and of statute.cralawlawlibrary

VIII

Petitioners argue that Resolution No. 9674 constitutes a prior restraint in that:
Resolution No. 9674 makes it an election offense for a survey firm not to
disclose the names of subscribers who have paid substantial amounts to them,
even if ihe survey portions provided to them have not been published. 1'his
requirement is unduly burdensome and onerous and constitutes a prior
restraint on the right of survey firms to gather information on public opinion
and disseminate it to the citizenry.

. . . If Resolution No. 9674 is allowed to stand, survey firms will no longer be

able to operate because they will not have enough clients and will not be
financially sustainable. COMELEC will finally be able to do indirectly what it
could not do directly, which is to prohibit the conduct of election surveys and
the publication or dissemination of the results to the public.126

Petitioners' assertions are erroneous.

Chavez v. Gonzales127 explained the concept of prior restraint as follows:

Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other

forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination.
Freedom from prior restraint is largely freedom from government censorship
of publications, whatever the form of censorship, and regardless of whether it
is wielded by the executive, legislative or judicial branch of the government.
Thus, it precludes governmental acts that required approval of a proposal to
publish; licensing or permits as prerequisites to publication including the
payment of license taxes for the privilege to publish; and even injunctions
against publication. Even the closure of the business and printing offices of
certain newspapers, resulting in the discontinuation of their printing and
publication, are deemed as previous restraint or censorship. Any law or official
that requires some form of permission to be had before publication can be
made, commits an infringement of the constitutional right, and remedy can
be had at the courts.128 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

The very definition of "prior restraint" negates petitioner's assertions.

Resolution No. 9674 poses no prohibition or censorship specifically aimed at
election surveys. Apart from regulating the manner of publication, petitioners
remain free to publish election surveys. COMELEC correctly points out that
"[t]he disclosure requirement kicks in only upon, not prior to, publication."129

In any case, the requirement of disclosing subscribers is neither unduly

burdensome nor onerous. Prior to the promulgation of Resolution No. 9674,
survey firms were already understood to be bound by the requirement to
disclose those who commissioned or paid for published election surveys.
Petitioners have been complying with this without incident since the Fair
Election Act was enacted in 2001. After more than a decade of compliance, it
is odd for petitioners to suddenly assail the disclosure requirement as unduly
burdensome or onerous.

Petitioners' claim that "[i]f Resolution No. 9674 is allowed to stand, survey
firms will no longer be able to operate because they will not have enough
clients and will not be financially sustainable"130 is too speculative and
conjectural to warrant our consideration. The assumption is that persons who
want to avail of election survey results will automatically be dissuaded from
doing so when there is a requirement of submission of their names during the
campaign period. This is neither self-evident, nor a presumption that is
susceptible to judicial notice. There is no evidence to establish a causal
connection.

Petitioners' free speech rights must be weighed in relation to the Fair Election
Act's purpose of ensuring political equality and, therefore, the speech of others
who want to participate unencumbered in our political spaces. On one hand,
there are petitioners' right to publish and publications which are attended by
the interests of those who can employ published data to their partisan ends.
On the other, there is regulation that may effect equality and, thus, strengthen
the capacity of those on society's margins or those who grope for resources
to engage in the democratic dialogue. The latter fosters the ideals of
deliberative democracy. It does not trump the former; rather, it provides the
environment where the survey group's free speech rights should
reside.cralawlawlibrary

IX

Petitioners argue that Resolution No. 9674 violates Article III, Section 10 of
the 1987 Constitution.131They claim that it "unduly interferes with [their]
existing contracts . . . by forcing [them] to disclose information that, under
the contracts, is confidential or privileged."132

For its part, COMELEC argues that "[t]he non-impairment clause of the
Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes sought to be achieved by the
government."133 It adds that "[petitioners' existing contracts with third parties
must be understood to have been made in reference to the possible exercise
of the COMELEC's regulatory powers."134

It is settled that "the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment... is limited

by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health,
safety, morals and general welfare."135 "It is a basic rule in contracts that the
law is deemed written into the contract between the parties." 136 The
incorporation of regulations into contracts is "a postulate of the police power
of the State."137

The relation of the state's police power to the principle of non-impairment of

contracts was thoroughly explained in Ortigas and Co. V. Feati Bank:138

[W]hile non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is

not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police
power, i.e., "the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people."
Invariably described as "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of
powers" and "in a sense, the greatest and most powerful attribute of
government," the exercise of the power may be judicially inquired into and
corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there
having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable
constitutional guarantee. As this Court held through Justice Jose P. Bengzon
in Philippine Long Distance Company vs. City of Davao, et al. police power "is
elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions; it is not confined
within narrow circumscriptions of precedents resting on past conditions; it
must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life." We were even
more emphatic in Vda. de Genuino vs. The Court of Agrarian Relations, et al,
when We declared: "We do not see why public welfare when clashing with the
individual right to property should not be made to prevail through the state's
exercise of its police power."139 (Citations omitted)

This case does not involve a "capricious, whimsical, unjust or

unreasonable"140 regulation. We have demonstrated that not only an
important or substantial state interest, but even a compelling one anchors
Resolution No. 9674's requirement of disclosing subscribers to election
surveys. It effects the constitutional policy of "guarantee[ing] equal access to
opportunities for public service"141 and is impelled by the imperative of "fair"
elections.

As a valid exercise of COMELEC's regulatory powers, Resolution No. 9674 is

correctly deemed written into petitioners' existing contracts.

Parenthetically, the obligations of agreements manifested in the concept of

contracts are creations of law. This right to demand performance not only
involves its requisites, privileges, and regulation in the Civil Code or special
laws, but is also subject to the Constitution. The expectations inherent in a
contract may be compelling, but so are the normative frameworks demanded
by law and the provisions of the Constitution.cralawlawlibrary

X
Petitioners point out that Section 13 of the Fair Election Act provides that
"[r]ules and regulations promulgated by the COMELEC under and by authority
of this Section shall take effect on the seventh day after their publication in at
least two (2) daily newspapers of general circulation." In contrast, Resolution
No. 9674 provides that it "shall take effect immediately after
publication."142 Thus, they assert that Resolution No. 9674's effectivity clause
is invalid. From this, they argue that Resolution No. 9674 has not taken effect
and cannot be enforced against them or against other persons.143

COMELEC counters that Section 13 of the Fair Election Act's provision that
rules shall take effect "on the seventh day after their publication" applies only
to Resolution No. 9615, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the
Fair Election Act, and not to Resolution No. 9674, which "merely enforces
Section 26144 of Resolution No. 9615."145

Noting that Resolution No. 9674 was nevertheless published in the Philippine
Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star both on April 25, 2013, COMELEC adds
that, in any case, "the lapse of the seven-day period from the date of its
publication has rendered the instant issue moot and academic."146

It is COMELEC which is in error on this score. Section 13 of the Fair Election

Act reads:

Section 13. Authority of the COMELEC to Promulgate Rules; Election Offenses.

- The COMELEC shall promulgate and furnish all political parties and
candidates and the mass media entities the rules and regulations for the
implementation of this Act, consistent with the criteria established in Article
IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution and Section 86 of the Omnibus Election
Code (Batas Pambansa Bldg. 881).

Rules and regulations promulgated by the COMELEC under and by authority

of this Section shall take effect on the seventh day after their publication in at
least two (2) daily newspapers of general circulation. Prior to effectivity of said
rules and regulations, no political advertisement or propaganda for or against
any candidate or political party shall be published or broadcast through mass
media.

Violation of this Act and the rules and regulations of the COMELEC issued to
implement this Act shall be an election offense punishable under the first and
second paragraphs of Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas
Pambansa Bldg. 881). (Emphasis supplied)

Resolution No. 9615 is denominated "Rules and Regulations Implementing

Republic Act No. 9006, otherwise known as the 'Fair Election Act', in
connection to [sic] the 13 May 2013 National and Local Elections, and
Subsequent Elections[.]"

The only conceivable reason that would lead COMELEC to the conclusion that
it is only Resolution No. 9615 (and not the assailed Resolution No. 9674) that
needs to comply with the requirement of Section 13 of the Fair Election Act is
Section 13's use of the phrase "rules and regulations for the implementation
of this Act[.]" That is, since Resolution No. 9615 is the Resolution which, by
name, is called the "Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No.
9006," COMELEC seems to think that other rules named differently need not
comply.

It is an error to insist on this literal reasoning.

Section 13 applies to all rules and regulations implementing the Fair Election
Act, regardless of how they are denominated or called. COMELEC's further
reasoning that what Resolution No. 9674 intends to implement is Resolution
No. 9615 and not the Fair Election Act itself is nothing but a circuitous denial
of Resolution No. 9674's true nature. COMELEC's reasoning is its own
admission that the assailed Resolution supplements what the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of the Fair Election Act provides. Ultimately, Resolution
No. 9674 also implements the Fair Election Act and must, thus, comply with
the requirements of its Section 13.

Accordingly, Resolution No. 9674 could not have become effective as soon as
it was published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star on April
25, 2013. Taking into consideration the seven-day period required by Section
13, the soonest that it could have come into effect was on May 2, 2013.

This notwithstanding, petitioners were not bound to comply with the

requirement "to submit within three (3) days from receipt of this Resolution
the names of all commissioners and payors of surveys published from
February 12, 2013 to the date of the promulgation of this Resolution[.]" 147 As
shall be discussed, COMELEC's (continuing) failure to serve copies of
Resolution No. 9674 on petitioners prevented this three-day period from even
commencing.cralawlawlibrary

XI

Petitioners point out that they were never served copies of Resolution No.
9674. Thus, they claim that this Resolution's self-stated three-day period
within which they must comply has not begun to run and that COMELEC's
insistence on their compliance violates their right to due process. They add
that COMELEC has also failed to provide them with copies of the criminal
complaint subject of E.O. Case No. 13-222 for which the Subpoena dated July
1, 2013 was issued against them.

COMELEC, however, insists that "[petitioners were given fair notice of the
Resolution"148 in that:

[t]he-Notice dated 08 May 2013 sent to and received by petitioners not only
makes reference to the Resolution by its number and title but also indicates
its date of promulgation, the two newspapers of general circulation in which it
was published, it date of publication, and, more important [sic], reproduces
in full its dispositive portion[.]149

COMELEC adds that, in any case, petitioners were "able to secure a certified
true copy of the [assailed] Resolution."150 On the filing of a criminal complaint,
COMELEC asserts that attached to the Subpoena served on petitioners was a
copy of Resolution No. 13-0739 of the COMELEC En Bane which "provides a
verbatim reproduction of the Memorandum of the Director of the Law
Department detailing petitioners' failure to comply with the assailed
Resolution and of the Memorandum of Commissioner [Christian Robert S.] Lim
submitting the matter for the appropriate action of the COMELEC en bane."151

COMELEC relies on infirm reasoning and reveals how, in criminally charging

petitioners, it acted arbitrarily, whimsically, and capriciously, and violated
petitioners' right to due process.

By its own reasoning, COMELEC admits that petitioners were never actually
served copies of Resolution No. 9674 after it was promulgated on April 23,
2013. It insists, however, that this flaw has been remedied by service to
petitioners of the May 8, 2013 Notice which reproduced Resolution No. 9674's
dispositive portion.

Dismembering an official issuance by producing only a portion of it (even if

the reproduced portion is the most significant, i.e., dispositive, portion) is not
the same as serving on the concerned parties a copy of the official issuance
itself. Petitioners may have been informed of what the dispositive portion
stated, but it remains that they were never notified and served copies of the
assailed Resolution itself. In Resolution No. 9674's own words, compliance
was expected "within three (3) days from receipt of this Resolution[,]"152 not
of its partial, dismembered, reproduction.

Not having been served with copies of Resolution No. 9674 itself, petitioners
are right in construing the three-day period for compliance as not having
begun to run. From this, it follows that no violation of the requirement "to
submit within three (3) days from receipt of this Resolution the names of all
commissioners and payors of surveys published from February 12, 2013 to
the date of the promulgation of this Resolution[.]"153 could have been
committed. Thus, there was no basis for considering petitioners to have
committed an election offense arising from this alleged violation.

It is of no consequence that the May 8, 2013 Notice warned petitioners that

failure to comply with it "shall constitute an election offense punishable under
the first and second paragraphs of Section 264 of the Omnibus Election
Code."154 It is true that the Omnibus Election Code has been in force and effect
long before Resolution No. 9674 was promulgated; nevertheless, the
supposed violation of the Omnibus Election Code rests on petitioners' alleged
non-compliance with Resolution No. 9674. This is a matter which, as we have
demonstrated, is baseless, the three-day period for compliance not having
even commenced.

It is similarly inconsequential that petitioners were subsequently able to obtain

certified true copies of Resolution No. 9674. Petitioners' own diligence in
complying with the formal requirements of Rule 65 petitions filed before this
court cannot possibly be the cure for COMELEC's inaction. These certified true
copies were secured precisely to enable petitioners to assail COMELEC's
actions, not to validate them. It would be misguided to subscribe to
COMELEC's suggestion that petitioners' diligence should be their own undoing.
To accede to this would be to effectively intimidate parties with legitimate
grievances against government actions from taking the necessary steps to
comply with (formal) requisites for judicial remedies and, ultimately, prevent
them from protecting their rights.

COMELEC's error is compounded by its failure to provide petitioners with

copies of the criminal complaint subject of E.O. Case No. 13-222. COMELEC
has neither alleged nor proven that it has done so. Per its own allegations, all
it did was serve petitioners with the May 8, 2013 Notice and the July 1, 2013
Subpoena.

These facts considered, it was not only grave error, but grave abuse of
discretion, for COMELEC to pursue unfounded criminal charges against
petitioners. In so doing, COMELEC violated petitioners' right to due process.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED in that COMELEC

Resolution No. 9674 is upheld, and respondent Commission on Elections
is ENJOINED from prosecuting petitioners Social Weather Stations, Inc. and
Pulse Asia, Inc. for their supposed violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 9674
in respect of their non-submission of the names of all commissioners and
payors, including subscribers, of surveys published during the campaign
period for the 2013 elections.