Dixon, 'Abd Al-Ameer (1969) - The Umayyad Caliphate, 65-86/684-705: (A Political Study)

UNIVERSITY OF L O N D O N
SOAS
THE U M A Y Y A D CALIPHATE 6 5 -8 6 /6 8 4 -7 0 5
(A PO LITICAL STUDY)
by
f Abd A l-Am eer 1 Abd Dixon
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philoso]
August 1969
ProQuest N um ber: 10731674
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2.
ABSTRACT
This thesis is a political study of the Umayyad Caliphate during
the reign of f Abd a I -M a lik ibn M arwan, 6 5 -8 6 /6 8 4 -7 0 5 . The first
chapter deals with the p o litic a l, social and religious background of ‘ Abd
a l- M a lik , and relates this to his later policy on becoming caliph.
Chapter II is devoted to the ‘ A lid opposition of the period, i . e .
the revolt of al-M u kh tar ibn Abi ‘ Ubaid al-T h aq a fi, and its nature, causes
and consequences.
The ‘ Asabiyya(tribal feuds), a dominant phenomenon of the Umayyad
period, is examined in the third chapter. An attempt is made to throw
light on its causes, and on the policies adopted by ‘ Abd a l-M a lik to contain
it.
The fourth chapter is concerned with the c iv il war between Abd
a l-M a lik and Ibn a l-Z u b a ir. The underlying factors leading the people of
a l-H ija z to support Ibn a l-Z u b a ir are examined, to elucidate the nature of
the Zubairid opposition movement in general.
Chapter V deals with the revolts of Ibn al-Jaru d , and of the Zanj;
the insurrection of the Azd in ‘ Uman; and the far more dangerous revolt of
‘ Abd al-Rahman ibn al-A sh‘ ath. These revolts are compared to see if they spring
from similar discontents, and whether they are in response to the policies of
al -H a jja j.
Chapter V I treats the K harijite movement, which reached its height
of activity in this period, in its political aspect, as a source of opposition
to ‘ Abd a l-M a lik 's caliphate. The minor, scattered revolts are described
as w ell as the better-known major K h a rijite revolts. This chapter also
examines the link between the revolt of M u ta rrif ibn a l-M u g h ira , and the
movement of Shabib ibn Y azid and the Kharijites in general.

ACK N OW LED GEME NTS
In the first place I should like to express my deepest gratitude to
my supervisor, Professor Bernard Lewis, to whose invaluable learned
guidance, help and encouragement throughout all the years of my study, I
owe a great deal*
I am also greatly indebted to Miss Susan W allis for her help in
translating some French and German Works; and to M r* A* A I.K h a tib for
making some Arabic books available to me*
Thanks are also due to the staff of the libraries of S. O , A . S ., the
British Museum, the Senate House, the India O ffice and the Royal Asiatic
Society for their ready help.
I should also like to thank the libraries of Ayasofya, Ahmet III,
Istanbul; a l-Z a h ir iy a , Damascus; the Bodleian, Oxford; the Chester
Beatty, D ublin; the Bibliotheque N a tio n a le, Paris and Stiftung Preuss
Kulturbesitz, Tubingen, for providing me with photographs of different
manuscripts.
F in ally , I thank my family and a ll my friends, for their unfailing
support and encouragement.
A . A . Dixon
5.
ABBREVIATIONS
Sources
A ‘ laq. A I- A ‘ laq a i-N a fis a , by Ibn Rusta.
Adyan. Bay an a I-A d yan , by Abu 'l- M a ‘ a ll.
Agh. Kitab al-A g h a n i, by A bu'l-Faraj al-lsbahanT.
Akhbar. Akhbar a l - ‘ Abbas wa W ild ih i, (anonymous).
Akhbqr Igbahan. Dhikr Akhbar Isbahan, by Abu N u ‘ aim.
Anidi. A l-M u ’ta lif w a M -M u k h ta lif.. . , by a l-A m id i.
/Amalt. A l-A m a li, by a l- Z a jja ji.
Ansab. Ansdb al-A shraf, by al-Baladhuri.
Arab. N ihayaf a l-A ja b fi M a^rifat Ansab a l - ‘ Arab, by Qalqashand’i,
‘ Asakir. Tahdhjb al-TarikJi a l-K a b ir& Tarikh Dimashq, by Ibn ‘ Asakir.
A th ar. Al-Atjhcir ai-B aqiya ‘ An al-Q urun a l-K h a lly a , by al-B iruni.
Azkawl Kashf al-Ghumina a l-J a m i‘ li Akhbar al-U m m a, by Sirhan

ibn Sa‘ Td a!-Azkaw T.
Azmina. A l“Azmina w a 'I-A m k in a , by a l-M a rz u q i.
Azraqi. Akhbclr M e cca , by A l-A z ra q i.
Bagh. Al-Farq b a in a 'I-F ira q , by ‘ Abd a l-O a h ir al-Baghdadi.
Bakri . M u ‘ jam ma Ista jam , by al-B akri.
Bakkar. Jamharat Nasab Quraish, by a l-Z u b a ir ibn Bakkar.
Barradi. A l-Jaw ah ir cil-M untagat, by al-B arradi.
Batriq. A l-T a rikh al-M q jm u ‘ ‘ A la :l-T ab qiq, by Sa‘ id ibn al-B atriq.
6.
Bayan. Al-Bayan w a'I Tabyin, by a l-J a l? iz.
Bay asi • A t-IM am BiM-ljurub q l-W a g H a fi âdr'I-lslcim , by al Bayasi.
BadJ . Al-Bad* w a'I T a rik li, by al-M aqdisi.
Bidaya. A l-B idaya w a'I N ih a y a , by Ibn Kathir.
Bughya. Bughyat a l-T a la b , by Ibn a M Adtm;
Buldan. Kitab al-BuJdan, by a l- Y a ‘ qubi.
Dhahabi. Tarikh a l-ls la m wa Tabaqat a I -Mash ah ir w a !l - ‘ Alam, by al-Dhahabi
Dinawari. A l-A khbar a l-T iw a l, by a l-D in aw ari.
D uw al. Duwal al-lslam , by al-D hahabi.
Fakh A l-F akh ri fil Adab a l-§u ltan iyya , by Ibn al-J iq ta q a .
Fis al A l-Fi$al fil M ila l w a 'I-N ih a l, by Ibn Hazm.
Futuh. Futufci al-B uldan, by al-Baladhuri.
Ghurar. Ghurar a l-S iy a r, (anonymous).
H adhif. Hadhif min Nasab Quraish, by M u ’ arrij al-Sadusi.
Hamadani. Kitab al-B uldan, by Ibn al-Faqih al-H am adaini.
Hay aw an. Kitab a l-tja y a w a n , by a l-J a h iz .
H ilya . Ijily a t q l-A w liy a * , by Abu N u ‘ aim.
fju r. A l-H u r al - ‘ In, by Nashwan a l-H im y ari.
Ibn Khurdadhaba. Kitab a l-M a s a lik , by Ibn Khurdadhaba.
Ibn Isfandiyar. Tarikh-i Tabaristan, by Ibn Ufandiyar.
Imama. Al-lm am a w a'I-S iyasa, (attributed to Ibn Q u taib a).
Im ta*. A l-lm tq ‘ w a 'l-M u *anqsa, by al-T aw h id l.

7.
Inafa. M a ’ athir a l-!n a fa fi M a ‘ alim a l-K h jla fa , by Oalqashandi.
‘ Ibar. A I - ‘ Ibar, by Ibn Khaldun.
i Ibri . Tarikh Mukhtasar a l-D u w a l, by Ibn al —€ Ib ri.

\,
-5"
CL
A i-M q d a l-F a rid , by Ibn * Abd Rabih.

•
Irshad. Kitab al-Irshad, by a l-M u fid .
I§aba. A l-I$aba fi Tcmyiz al-§ah ab a, by Ibn H ajar.
1st akhri.
_#_jiwyaii A l-M asa lik w a 'I-M a m a lik , by al-lstakh ri.
Isti* ab. A M s ti^ a b fi M a ‘ rifat al-Asîab, by ibn ‘ Abd al-B ar.
Jafis. Al —J al is a l-§ a lih a !-K a fT ,. . . , by a l- M u ‘ afa al-N ahraw ani,
JahshiyarT. A l-W u za ra ’ w a 'I-K u tta b , by al-Jahshiyari.
Jamharat. Jamharat Ansab a I - ‘ Arab, by Ibn Hazm.
Jumahi.
•
Tabaqaf Fuhui al-Shu* a ra *, by Ibn Sallam al-JumahT.
Kam il. A l-K am il fiM -T a rik h , by Ibn a l-A th ir.
K indi. Kitab al-U m ara? (Wulat)^ wa Kitab al-Q u ^ lat, by a l—K indi•
K jff . Kitab al-Fu tub , by Ibn A ‘ tham a l-K u fi.
Kutub'i. c Uyun al-T aw arikh, by Ibn Shakir al-K u tu b l.
K hitat. K h itat, by a l-M a q riz i.
K hizana. Khizanat al—Adab, by ( Abd a l-Q a d ir al-Baghdadi.
K h u lafa9 . Tarikh a l-K h u la fa *, (anonymous).
Khulani. TarFkh D ariyya, by al-K h u lan i.
Lata’
*
if. Lata’ if a l- M a ‘ a rif, by al-Tha* a lib i.
Lisan, Lisan a l-M iz a n , by Ibn H ajar.

8.
Lub. Lub al-Lubab, by al-S u yu ti,
Lubab. Lub al-Lubab fi Tahdhib cJ-Ansab, by Ibn a l-A th ir.
M a f ad. N a s a b M a f ad w a'I-Y em en a l-K a b ir, by Ibn a l-K a lb i.
M a tf anu Kitab a l-M a^ an i a l-K a b ir, by Ibn Q u taib a,
M a carif. A l-M a ( arif, by Ibn Q utaiba.
Mahasin. Al-Mafciasin w a'I-A d d ad , by a l-J a h iz .
M a fatih . M afatih a l - ( Ulum, by al-K haw arizm i.
M a i at i.*
A l-Tanbih w a'I-R ad ( Ala Ahl a l-A h w a ’ w a 'I-B id a *, by a l-M a la t
Maqal at. M aqalat al-lslam iyyin , by ai-A sh‘ ari.
Masa lik . Kitab al-M a s a lik w a 'I-M a m a lik , by Ibn Hawqal.
M ashahir. Mashahir ‘ USama* al-Amsar, by al —Bust!-
M ila l. A l-M ila l w a'I-N ifcm i/ by al-ShahrastanT.
M ir* at. M ir* at a l-Z am an , by Ibn a l-J a w z i.
Mu bar rad. A I-.K am il fi'l-L u g h a , by al-M ubarrad.
Muhabbar.
— —
Kitab al-M uhabbar, by Ibn IJabTb.
MuqhtalTn. Asma* al-M ug htalin min al-A shraf, by Ibn HabTb.
M u tf jam, Mu* jam al-B uldan, by Yaqut al-H am aw i.
Mukhtasar. Al -Mukhtasar fi Akhbar al-Bashar, by A b u 'l-F id a.
Munammaq. Al-Munammaq fi Akhbar Quraish, by Ibn Habib.
Muntakhgbcit. Muntakhabat fi Akhbar ai-Yem en, by Nashwan a l-H im y ari.
Muntazam , AI*Muntazam fi *1-Tarikh^, by Ibn a l-J a w z i*

O’ 'v
Muqadima. A I-M uqadim a, by Ibn Khaldun,
9*
Muqaddist. Afcsan al-Tagasim fi M a *rifa t a l-A g a lim , by al-Muqaddis i.
Muqaffa* * TaiTkh al-B atariga al-M is riy y a , by Ibn al-M u q affa* (Severus).
Mu rtada, Tabaqat a l-M u * ta z ila , by Ibn al-M u rta d a .
M uruj. Muruj al-D hah ab, by al-M as* udT
N aqa?id* N aq a?id JarTr waM-Farazdaq, by Abu * Ubaida.
Nasab. Jamharat a i-N a s a b , by Ibn a l-K a lb i.
N aw bakhti. Firaq al-Sh7*q, by al “ Naw bakhti.
N lhaya. A l-N ih a y q fi G harib a l-H a d ith / by Ibn al-A th ir.
N iz a * » A i-N iz a * w a 'I Takhasum Baina Banu Umayya wa Banu Hashim,
by a l-M a q riz i.
- /
N u w airi. N ih a t a l-A ra b fi Funun g l-A dab , by a l-N u w a iri.
Qgba* 11, M u k h ta lif al-G a b a * il wa Mu* ta lifih a , by Ibn Habib.
Qud at. Akhbar a l-Q u d a t, by W a k l*.
R ijal. M a *rifa t a l-R ija l, by al-Kashshi.
Sabi.
9 Rusum Par a l-K h ila fa , by a l-S a b i.
S a 'd . Kitab al-Tabaqat a l-K a b ir, by Ibn Sa*d.
Sam* g n i. Kitab al-A nsab, by al-Sam *ani.
Shadharat. Shadharat al-Dhqhab fi Akhbar man Dhahab, by Ibn al* Imad.
Shams. Shams1!-* Ulum wa Pawa* K alam 'l-* Arab m in'l-K ulu m ,
by Nashvan a l-H im y a ri.
Sharh. Sharh Nahj al-B alaahq. by Ibn A bi'l-H adTd.
§ina* atain. Kitab al-S ina* atain, by Abu H ilal a l-* Askar i.
SFra. Sirat a l- N a b i, by Ibn Hisham.

10.
S irafi. Akhbar a i-N a h w iy y in al-Ba^riyyln, by a i-S ira fi.
Siyar. Kitab a 1-S iy a r, by al-Shammakhi.
Sub(j. §ubh a l- A 4 sha, by Qalqashandi.
Sufi.
♦
Adab a l-K a tib , by al -Suli".
Sistan. Tarikh-i Sistan, (anonymous).

■ j
Shu4 ara’ . A l-S h i 4 r w a !i-Shu 4 a ra *, by Ibn Q utaiba.
Suyut i. Tarikh a l-K h u la fa ’ , by al-Suyuti.
Tab. TarTkh al-Rusui w a 'I-M u lu k , by Muhammad ibn Jarir a!-Tabar7.
TahdhTb. Tahdhib al-Tahdhib, by Ibn IJajar.
Tanbih. Al-Tanbih w a 'I-ls h ra f, by a l-M a s 4 udi.
Tusi.
•
Fihrist Kutub a l-S h i 4 a , by al-Tusi,
Usd. U sd .al-G h ab a fi Tamyyiz al-Jah ab a, by Ibn a l-A th ir.
4 Uyun. tfUyun al-A kh b ar, by Ibn Q utaib a.
W aqidi. A l-M a g h a z i/ by al-W a q id i.
Y a 4 qubi. Tarikh., by a l- Y a 4qubi.
Zubda. Zubdat a l-H a la b , by l b n a l- 4 Adim.
Z u b a id i. Tabaqat al-N abw Jyyin w a'I-Lughaw iyyin, by a l-Z u b a id i.
ZubairT. Nasab Quraish, by Mus 4 ab a l-Z u b a iri.

11.
Periodicals
A IO C . A ll India O rien tal Conference.
A IU O N . Annali Institute O rien tale di N a p o li.
AJSL* American Journal of Semetic Languages and Literature.
ANSM . American Numismatic Society Museum.
AO. Archiv O rie n ta ln i.
AU PTC FD . Ankara University D il V e Tarih-Cografya Fakultesi Dergisi.
BSOAS. Bulletin of the School of O riental and A frican Studies.
BZ. Byzantinische Zeitschrift.
P I. Der Islam.
POP. Pumbarton Oaks Papers.
EAW. East and West.
1C. Islamic C ulture.
IR. Islamic Review.
JA . Journal Asiatique.
JA O S . Journal of the American O riental Society.
JBBRAS. Journal of the Bombay Branch of the RoyalAsiatic Society.
JESHO. Journal of the Economic and Social History of the O rie n t.
JSS. Journal of Semetic Studies.
JUP. Journal of the University of Peshawar.
JW H. Journal of the World History.
M l. M a ja la t al-M ajm a* a l-* llmi a l-* Iraqi.
M IA . M a ja la t al-M ajm a* a l-* llmi a l-* A rabi.

12.
MKAB. M a ja la t Kuliyyat al - Ad ab - Baghdad.
MKAC. M a ja la t Kuliyyat a l-A d a b -C a iro .
MKSB. M a ja la t Kuliyyat al-Shari* a-Baghdad.
MM. Melanges Maspero.
MPV. Macdonald Presentation Volume.
MS O S . Mitthelungeu des Seminars fur Orientalische Spracheu.
M TH , Melanges Taha Husain.
NC. Numismatic C h ro n icle.
NLA. N acata Lugal Armagani.
PBA. Proceeding of the British Academy.
PPHC. Proceeding of the Pakistan History Conference.
RC1. Revue Coloniale Internationale.
RE I. Revue des Etudes Islamique.
RL. Rendiconti............ .. dei Lincei.
RN. Revue Numasmatique.
RO. Rocznik O rientalistyczny.
RSO. Rivista degli Studi O rie n ta l!.
SL Studia Islamica.
S ll. Studies in Islam.
SNR. Schweizerische Numismatische Rundschau.
W O I. The World of Islam.
ZDM G. Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft.
ZH P V . Dr. Z a kir Husain

•
Presentation Volume.
13 .
C O N TEN TS Page
ABSTRACT 2
A CK N O W LED G EM EN TS 4
ABBREVIATIONS 5
D IA G RA M S H O W IN G THE O P P O S IT IO N TO
‘ ABD A L -M A L IK 15
IN T R O D U C T IO N : SURVEY OF THE SOURCES 16
CHAPTER I THE LEGACY OF THE EARLY YEARS 37
a) ‘ Abd a l-M a lik 's early life
b) His p o litic a l, social and religious back

ground, and its effect on his later policies
on becoming caliph
c) ‘ Abd a l-M a lik 's attitude towards wine

and songs
CHAPTER II THE ‘ A LID O P P O S ITIO N (THE REVOLT O F

AL-M UKHTAR B. ABl ‘ UBAID A L -T H A Q A F I) 64
CHAPTER III ‘ ABD A L -M A L IK 6. M A R W A N A N D THE

‘ ASABIYYA
CHAPTER IV THE C IV IL WAR 219
a) ‘ Abd al -M a i ik and Mus'ab b. a l-Z u b a ir
b) ‘ Abd a !-M a lik and ‘ Abdallah ibn al-Zubair
c) A l-J u fra
d) The Revolt of ‘ Amr b, Sa‘ id
e) Relations with the Byzantine Empire
CHAPTER V OTHER O P P O S IT IO N M O V E M E N TS 252
a) The Revolt of ‘ Abdallah b. al-Jarud

b) The Revolt of the Zanj in Ba§ra
c) The Insurrection of the Azd in ‘ Uman
d) The Revolt of ‘ Abd a I-Ragman b. al-A sh'ath
*
14.
Page
CHAPTER V I THE KHARIJITE O P P O S ITIO N 296
a) A l-N a jd a t
b) A l-A za riq a
c) Al^Sufritya: Salih b. Musarrih and Shabib
b. Y azid al-Shaibani
d) The Ibadiyya.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 346
a) Sources
b) Modern Works
c) Periodical Publications/ etc.

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16.
IN T R O D U C T IO N
SURVEY OF THE SOURCES
Since most of the extant sources dealing with our period have come
down to us from the time of the * Abbasids, ^ those inveterate enemies of
the Umayyads, it is extremely d iffic u lt to do justice to the Umayyad cause:
it gets scarce sympathy from an historical tradition which was the product
of the period following their fa ll from power. Apart from the pious
caliph , *Umar II, a ll the Umayyads are represented as irreligious and
frivolous. The anti-Um ayyad historians exploited to the utmost the fact
that the Umayyads were the immediate successors of the Orthodox Caliphs,
and judged them by the same standards; they disregarded the fact that a
vast empire like that of the Umayyads could not be administered by the
. 2
same prim itive methods as in the early years of the C aliphate.
However, there are slight traces of a less unsympathetic tradition
3
in the Syrian sources found in Christian writings, as w ell as in scattered
1. Two books only are said to have come to us from the Umayyad
period. The first is called "K itab al-SaqTfa", attributed to
SalTm ibn Q ais (d .90 A .H . )7 published Iby al-H ayd ariyya Press,
N a ja f. See N . A . Dawud, Nasjj^ at al-SbTf a al-Im am iyya,
p p .2 2 -23 * The second book is "Kitcib a ]-Z u h d “ by Asad ibn Musa
al-UmawT (d. 133 A . H . ). This work is still in manuscript form in
Berlin, no. 1553. See Brockelmann, Geschzichte der Arabischen,
Literatur, S. I . , p . 257, & p .3 5 1 ; Mcckensen, Arabic Books ancT
Libraries in the Umayyad Period, Part I, p . 250, in AJSL, v o l.52,
1936.
2. Arnold, The C aliphate, p. 26, London, 1965.
3. W ellhausen, The Arab Kingdom and its F a ll, p . x i v f f . , Beirut, 1963.

17*
narratives in the general histories of Islam. O nly by considering these can
one attempt to reconstruct a more balanced picture of the Umayyad
caliphate under which "Islam had established itself as a universal religion."^
For the period under consideration our sources are annals, literature,
local histories, geographies, religious literature, coins and inscriptions.
In each chapter of this study is provided a comparison of the different
narratives with some c ritic al remarks, and attention has been drawn to the
fact that the later sources simply repeat and re-e d it the information pro
vided by the earlier sources. Their major value is in clarifyin g points which
remain obscure in the earlier sources. There remains only to provide a
quick survey of the basic and major sources used in this study, with special
emphasis on those not previously accessible to historians of the Umayyad
period.
- 3 «
1. K halifa ibn K h ayyat, Shabab (d .2 4 0 /8 5 4 -5 ), a Basran historian and
traditionist. His Tarikh_ represents the oldest annals of the history of Islam
4
that have survived. It begins with the first year of H ijra and ends with the
1• E. I. ^# (Umayyads).
2. Kister, Notes on the Papyrus Text about Muhammad's Campaign against

the Banff a l-N a ^ tr , p p .2 3 3 -6 , A O , 32, 1964; idem, Notes on the
Account of the Shura appointed by * Umar B. a l-K h a tta b , pp. 3 2 0 -6 ,
JS S , IX , no. 2,“ 964.
3. Two editions of both the TarTkh and the Tabaqat of K halifa are
available* The first is edited 'by S. Zakkffr and published in Damascus,
1966-7. The second is edited by A . aM U m arT and published in N a ja f
and Baghdad, 1967. Being a study of Khalifa's works as w ell as editing
them, tKe Iraqi edi tion is more useful in that it contains an important
introduction and valuable notes.
4. A M AFT, in his introduction to the Tarikh of K haltfa, p. 11.
18.
year 2 3 0 /8 4 4 -5 . Being himself a traditionist as were his father and grand
father, Khalifa adopted the method of the traditionists in his TarTkh by
quoting a chain of authorities. For the Umayyad period and more especially
for the reign of ‘ Abd a l-M a lik , K halifa quotes a chain of authorities con
taining among others, ‘ Awana ibn al-H akam , A bu'l-Y aqdS n, Ibn al-Kati'bT,
Abu ‘ Ubaida, al-M ad a* in", al-Asm a‘ T, Ibn ‘ Ayyash and his grandfather,
K h alifa. Some of the narratives in the iTarTkh

•1
are, in fa ct, Umayyad, such
as that of a l-M u h a lia b ibn Abi Sufra", reported on the authority of Ibn
‘ Ayyash, predicting ‘ Abd a l-M a lik 's future as caliph because of his piety
and fam ily connections. ^ W hile Khalifa deals very briefly with the Sh_i‘ i
revolts during ‘Abd a l-M a lik 's reign, such as al-Tawabun and the movement
- 2
of a l-M u k h ta r, he shows great interest in the revolt of Ibn a I -Ash( ath, wh ich
3
he reports on the authority of A bu'l-Y aqdan. The latter is a great
4 -
sympathiser of the Umayyads. K halifa also gives us important information
about the revolt of ‘ Amr b. Sa‘ id al-Ashdaq, from which we can learn
5
some of the terms of agreement between him and ‘ Abd a l-M a lik . Moreover,
1. TarTkh, I, r p1p1 .2 5 7 -8 .
2. Ib id ., I, p p .258, 259, 260.
3. J b id ., I , p p .27 9-2 90.
4. A I - ‘ Umari in his introduction to the Tabaqat of KhalTfa, p .22.
5. TarTkh, I, p. 263.
19.
apart from this moderate Umayyad sympathy revealed in the Tarikh, it is
an invaluable source for the lists of governors, Q adis, ch ief of police
and directors of the Diwans, with which K halifa concludes the account
of the reign of each caliph; the list of the Qurra* who participated in
the revolt of Ibn ai-A sh*ath is also of outstanding value. ^
In his Jabaqat, K halifa gives both the patrilineal and m atrilineal
genealogy of each person, also mentioning his place of residence, his
travels, the date of his death, and his participation in the conquests and
campaigns, as w ell as the administrative post he occupied, especially if
he was a Q adi or a governor. In addition to this important information,
the Jabaqat contains valuable information on the Kh_iTat of al-Basra. Thus
both the Tarikh and the Tobaqat are indispensible sources for the early
history of Islam.
2. A l-M a 'a r if by Ibn Q utaiba ‘ Abdallah ibn Muslim al-D in aw ari
(d .2 7 6 /8 8 9 ). This work has an encyclopaedic character, and contains
important information on ‘ Abd a l-M a lik 's reign. It provides material on
the early life of ‘ Abd a l- M a lik , as w ell as giving a short account of the
major events of his reign. Like Jahshiyari, Ibn Q utaiba does not mention
his authorities in his account of ‘ Abd a l-M a lik 's reign.
1. Ib id ., 1, p p .28 6 -2 8 8 .
20 .
3. A b u 'l-‘ Abbas, Ahmad ibn Yahya al-Baladhuri (d .2 7 9 /8 9 2 ), one
of the most useful Arabic historians. His Ansab al-A shraf is a rich and
valuable source for the history of the Umayyad period: over a third of
the manuscript, which contains 1227 folios, is devoted to the Umayyad
history, of which 130 folios are concerned with ‘ Abd a l- M a lik , with
another sizeable chapter of 40 folios on a l—lîaj ja j. ^ To this should be
- 2
added the long chapters on Ibn a l-Z u b a ir and on a l-M u k h ta r. What is
more important than the length of the chapters is their qu ality as history:
Baladhuri is one of the few to deal objectively with the Umayyads.
His basic authorities on this period are: Hisham ibn Muhammad a l -
Kalbi and his son ‘ Abbas, M adaM ni, Abu M ikh n af, ‘ Awana ibn al-Hakam
and W aqidi. The narratives of Abu M ik h n af and ‘ Awana are reported by
al-B aladhuri: to have reached him through Hisham ibn a l-K a lb i and his son,
'Abbas. Baladhuri does not, however, mention Abu M ikhnaf's sources of
information, beyond referring to them by such phrases as oj or

* 3 — .
. This shows either that Baladhuri used the w riting of Abu
M ikhn af d irectly or via Ibn a l-K a lb i, or that the writings of previous
historians were w ell established by Baladhuri's tim e.^
See the introduction of the Jerusalem edition of Ansab al-A shraf, 1936.
See Ansab, V , pp. 188-379 and pp. 204-269.
Ib id ., IV , i i , pp. 155-157 & V , p p .21 8-2 20.
Introduction of Ansab al-A shraf, Jerusalem, 1936; D uri, Bafcith fi

Nash*at ‘ j|m al-TarTkh ‘ Inda 1! - ‘ Arab, p .4 9 , Beirut, 1960.
21.
Concerning ‘ Awana's narratives in the Ansab, they can be easily
detected by their brief, non-continuous character. Interestingly enough,
in dealing with the revolt of ‘ Amr ibn Sa‘ id a I -Ashdaq, Baladhuri mentions
four different narratives but omits that of ‘ Awana reported in Jabari. ^
This was no doubt due to the fact that ‘ Awana clearly takes the side of
‘ Abd a l-M a lik in this revolt, and his account contains references to the
idea of "Jabr". It seems that ‘ Awana was not an objective enough source
t 2
for so conscientious an historian as Baladhuri.
The most often quoted authority in a I-Ansab for the reign of ‘ Abd
a l-M a lik is M a d a M n i. In contrast to Jabari, wbo quotes M adaM ni only

im ***
on events concerning Basra and the Eastern provinces, Baladhuri uses him
for many different events in varying places: thus showing Baladhuri*s
superior wisdom of making greater use of a reliable source.
N ext to M adaM ni, Waqidi was the most frequently quoted source
used by Baladhuri. Most of the quotations in his name are in the form of
short reports. He is a particularly important authority on the fa ll and death
3
of Ibn a l-Z u b a ir. The fact that a l- H ija z , the centre of Ibn al-Z u b a ir's
»
activities , was the birth place and home town of W aqidi, is significant in
this respect.
1. Ansab, IV , i i , pp. 138-146.
2. J a b ., II, p p .7 8 3 -7 8 9 .
3. Ansab, V , p p .35 5 -3 7 4 .
A comparison of Tabari's text with the information given by
Baladhuri*s Ansab clearly shows the latter's superiority. Baladhuri takes
pains to give a complete picture of the Kharijite opposition under ‘ Abd a l -
M a lik , and pays great attention to the tribal feuds which were a dominating
factor of the reign. On the other hand, Tabari neglects important events
such as the revolt of Ibn al-Jarud and of the Zanj in Basra, and is imprecise
on the nature of the revolt of M u tarrif ibn a l-M a g h ira , among other things.
In his Futub al-Buldan Baladhuri furnishes indispensibie information
on the administrative aspects of the conquered provinces, dealing with
such issues as taxation, the introduction of Arabic money and of Arabic
as an o ffic ia l language throughout the Empire. M oreover, Futub al-Buldan
contains scattered historical information which, taken with the adminis
trative accounts, gives a more coherent picture of our period.
4. A l-A kh bar a l-J iw a l, by Abu IJanifa Ahmad ibn Dawud al-D inaw ari
(d. 2 8 2 /8 9 5 ). In his treatment of the Umayyad period, al-D in aw ari
devotes most attention to the p o litical and religious movements in the

]
eastern part of the Empire. As far as the reign of ‘ Abd a l-M a lik ibn
Marwan is concerned, he concentrates on the revolt of a l-M u k h ta r, the
wars of the Azariqa and the revolt of Ibn al-Ash ‘ ath* He has a strong
tendency to exaggerate the role of the mawali in the revolt of ai-M u k h ta r,
and he went as far as to represetnt the war between Mus ‘ ab ibn a l-Z u b a ir
2 -
1. E. I. f (al -D fnaw ari).
23 .
and al -M ukhtar as a war between Arab and Persian. ^ His pro-mawali
attitude is probably due to both his Persian origins, arid to the sources he
u tiliz e d , which were mainly Persian. Sim ilarly, his account of the
revolt of Ibn al~Ash‘ ath is inaccurate and misleading and is unconfirmed
by other sources. He believed the revolt to have been started in Kufa as
a result of propaganda by Ibn al-A sh‘ ath among the Ourra* and religious
3
men. However, some of his work is historically valuable, as for example,
4
his accounts of the revolt of ‘ Amr ibn Sa‘ id a I -Ashdag, and the A zairqa.
These two accounts complement, and are confirmed by, other sources. As
a final comment on a l-D in a w a ri, I should mention that he has no critic al

5
attitude to his sources, nor does he name them.
5. A l- Y a ‘qubi, Ahmad ibn Abi Y a 'q u b (d .2 8 4 /8 9 7 ), Arab historian
and geographer.^ His account of this period is concise and reveals a
moderate p ro -' A lid sympathy, which sometimes turns anti-Um ayyad. For
example, when dealing with the accession of ‘ Abd a l-M a lik to the throne,
a l- Y a ‘ qubi mentions that his two grandfathers were expelled by the
1. a I-Akhbar a i-T iw a l, pp. 296, 298, 3 0 0-3 02, 306 and especially p. 310.
2 - „
^ / (al-D inaw ari).
3. See Chapter V , p. 2 7 0 .
4. a I-Akhbar a l-J iw a l, pp. 2 8 5-2 89, 2 9 4-2 95.
5. Ibid. , p . 298.
E. I . ^, (a l-Y a ‘ qubT)*
24.
Prophet,^ and he also reports the tradition which considered ‘ Abd
2 - -r
a l-M a lik as much a tyrant as the Pharaoh. A l-Y a ‘ qubi also shows
himself strongly against a l-H a jja j in describing his policy in both al -
3
ija z and Iraq. M oreover, his p ro -‘ A lid feelings led him to repeat
some of the an ti-Z ub airid tradition, especially when the relationship
between Ibn al—Zubair and Ibn a l-H a n ifiy y a and Ibn ‘ Abbas was not
4
cordial. Another occasion when he was an ti-Z u b airid was in his report
ing of the massacre which Mus‘ ab inflicted on the Shi‘ i supporters of
- 5
al-M u k h ta r: he portrays this as "one of the most memorable betrayals
of the 'aman1. "
However, despite his obvious distortions, some of his information
is original and valuable: for example, on the underlying economic factors^
governing the support the Medinese gave to Ibn a l-Z u b a ir; the troubles
7
in Khurasan; and the lists of governors and theologians he provides at the
1. Tarikh, II, p. 320.
2. Ib id ., p .336. See Also Mushakalata l-N a s li Zamdnihim, p. 18*
3. Torikh, II,p p .3 2 5 ,3 2 6 ;Mushakalat a l-N a s liZamanihim, p. 18.
4. TarTkh, II, p p .3 1 1 -3 1 3 , 320.
5. Ib id ., p .315.
6. Ibid. , pp. 2 9 7 -8 .
7. Ib id ., p p .3 2 0 -3 2 4 , 330,
end of the account of each caliph. From the list of authorities he gives
at the beginning of the second volume of his Tarikh , one can detect
1
that some of them were actually cAbbasid. This throws some light on his
- 2
flattering accounts of Ibn ( Abbas during our period.
6 . Tarikh aURusul w a'1-M uluk by Abu Ja* far Muhammad ibn Jarir
a l-T a b a ri, (d .3 1 0 /9 2 3 ), the most detailed and comprehensive collection
of narratives on the Caliphate in general. In dealing with the Umayyad
period, he concentrates largely on events in Iraq and the eastern provinces,
which can be explained by the fact that these areas, being the centre of
opposition to the Umayyads, were the scene of the most interesting events:
the history of the Umayyads is, in fact, the history of Iraq and the East.
As a traditionist, Tabari strongly emphasises his chain of authority, and
3
abstains from criticising their contents. Therefore, some general remarks
on Tabari's authorities are of special importance in this connection. For ( Abd
a l-M a lik 's reign, Tabari's authorities a re : Abu M ik h n af, * Awana ibn a l -
H akam , M a d a'in i and W aqidi, The most prominent among them is Abu
M ik h n af, on whose authority almost all the affairs of Iraq, and more especially
1. D uri, Bqhth ft N asj/at e ilm al-Tarikh * Indo *J-f A rab, p. 52.
2. TarTkh, H, p .3 1 3 .
3. D uri, The Iraq School of History to the Ninth Century - a Sketch,

p . 53 in Historians of the M iddle East, ed. M .P . Holt and B, Lewis,
O xford, 1964.
w.
of Kufa, are reported. On the whole, Abu Mikhnaf*s narratives are
unbiased, although in some of them appears a sympathy for the Al ids,
and for Iraq and Kufa; and occasionally, he glorifies the A zd, his own
tribe. ^
W hile Abu M ik h a f is Tabari's authority on Iraqi affairs, * Aw ana
ibn al-H akam was the one on whose authority are reported Umayyad and
Syrian affairs. Like Abu M ik h af's, ‘ Awana's narratives are handed down
by Hisham ibn a l-K a lb i, but Tabari mentions no chain of authority for this.
* Awana is quoted only four times throughout the period of ( Abd a l-M a lik 's
reign, each time for events in Syria, one of them concerned with the inner
circles of the Umayyad fam ily. ‘ Awana is quoted in dealing with the army
sent by Marwan ibn al-H akam (at the end of his reign) under f Amr b.
Sa( id al-Ashdaq against Ibn a l-Z u b a ir; the army of Hubaish ibn D ulja sent
against H ija z , and fin a lly , the revolt of ‘ Amr ibn Sa‘ id al-Ashdaq and his
2
murder by 4 Abd a l- M a lik . Some of 4 Awana*s accounts use the concept of
"Jabr" (predestination) in public affairs, propagated by the Umayyads.
Examples of this are his mention of the wife of K a‘ b al-A hbar predicting
that * Amr would die; and the story of when 4Amr saw s Uthman in a dream,
3
who clothed him in his own shirt.
1. T a b ., II, p p .4 9 7 -5 7 6 , 7 0 7 -1 4 ; D uri, The Iraq School of History to the

N inth Century, a Sketch, p .4 9 , in the Historians of the M iddle East, ed.
M . P.Holt and B. Lewis, London, 1964.
2. T a b ., II, pp. 576, 5 7 8 -9 , 6 4 2 -3 , 7 8 4 -9 6 .

3. T a b ., II, p p .784-7 96.
22 .
In dealing with events in Basra and Khurasan, Tabari depends
exclusively on the narrative of Mada* in i, an indisputed authority on the
events in these two areas. Mada* ini's narrative has come down to us most
frequently through ‘ Umar b. Shabba. The latter is, like Mada* in i, a
Basran and greatly interested in the history of his native city and of
Khurasan. ^ M ada’ ini is a trustworthy man, and “his accuracy has been
2
confirmed by modern investigation." However, in some of his narratives,
such as those on the tribal feud in Khurasan following Y azid's death, and on
3
Musa ibn ‘ Abdallah b. Khazim, he relies noticeably on tribal traditions
and legends.
A ll the quotations from W aqidi, except for one which deals with
‘ Abd a l-M a lik 's attempt to depose his brother ‘ Abd a l- A z iz from the
succession to the throne, are concerned with the affairs of Ibn a l-Z u b a ir in
- 4
a l-H ija z and his brother Mus ‘ ab in Basra. W aqidi's accounts, generally
speaking, are not partisan, but at times he shows Zubairid leanings, such
- 5
as in the war between M u•s ‘ ab ibn a l-Z u b a ir and a i-M u kH1h ta r. There is,r
1. P ella t, C . , Le M ilie u Basrien et laFormation deG a h iz , p. 14, n o .3 .
2. G ib b , H .R ., Studies on the C iv iliza tio n of Islam, p. 115.
3. T a b ., II, pp. 1145-1164; 489.
4. T a b ., II, p p .7 4 8 -9 , 78 1 -3 , 7 9 6 -7 , 8 0 4 -6 , 8 2 9 -8 3 1 , 844-852.
5. T a b ., II, p p .8 4 7 -9 .
28 .
however, no evidence to confirm Ibn al-N ad im 's accusation of 6A lid
partisanship. ^
7. Abu Muhammad, Aljmad ibn A ‘ tham a l-K u fi a l-K in d i (d .3 1 4 /9 2 6 ),
2
the author of Kitab al-Futub* The first volume of ai-Fu tuh , which contains
270 folios, begins with the caliphate of ‘ Uthman ibn ‘ A ffan and ends with
the revolt of al-M u kh tar ibn Abi ‘ Ubaid al-Thaqafi 6 6 /6 8 5 . The second
volume consisting of 278 folios, continues the account of al-M ukhtar *s
revolt and ends with the suppression of Babak's revolt in the reign of a l-
3
M u ‘ tasim 2 1 8-2 27. As it is only available in manuscript and until
recently unknown, a l-K u fi's Futub has not been u tilized previously in the
study of the Umayyad period. Ibn A ‘ tham's authorities are given in the
introductory paragraph to the first volume asM adaM ni, W aqidi, Zuhri,
Abu M ikh n af and Hisham ibn a l-K a ib i, as w ell as others of lesser importance.
!■ Fihrist, p. 144; see also introduction to K itab a l-M a g h a zi of a l -

W a q id i, Oxford, 1966, p. 18.
2. Brockelmann, op. c i t . , I, p. 150; Supp., 1, p. 220. However,

judging from the statement made by Ibn A ‘ tham in his list of
authorities, whoch makes him a contemporary of a l-M a d a ’ ini
(d ,2 2 5 /8 4 0 ), D r. M .A . Sha‘ ban regards him as belonging to the
2 n d -3 rd / 8 th-9th centuries. See The Social and P olitical Background
of the ‘ Abbasid Revolution in Khurasan, P h .D . Thesis, Harvard, p p « V H I-
X I I I , and E. T. , (ibn A ‘ tham a l-K u fi).
3. Two editions of this work are in oourse of preparation, one by

D r. M .A . Shctban and the other by al-M aym an i.
4. It is rather d iffic u lt to account for the assertion of Professor A . N .

Kurat that many of Ibn A'tham 's authorities are unknown. See Abu
Muhammad Ahmad b. A ctKam a l-K u ff‘s Kitab al-Futub and its
importance concerning the Arab conquest in cenfraT Asia and the
Khazars, p. 277, AU DTCFD, V I I , 1949.
29 .
However, Ibn A ‘ tham combined all these traditions in one single narrative,
and for this reason, he did not refer to his authorities in the course of
the book.
Kufi's Futub is one of the most important sources for the revolt of
al-M u k h ta r. He shows very clearly that it was the Southern tribes (Yemenites)
who played the decisive role in the revolt, rather than the m awali.^ His
account throws much light on the disputed matter of the relationship between
- 2
Ibn a l-Z u b a ir and al-M u k h ta r. One should point out here that al-Futuh
contains no mention whatsoever of the Khashabiyya, the Kaisaniyya and the
"Kursi", which were so characteristic of al-M ukhtar's revolt: perhaps this
is due to his sympathies towards the A!ids and al-M u kh tar leading him to
"hush up" the discrediting extremist wing of the movement. Al-Futu.b
is also one of the major sources for the history of the Arabs in Khurasan
during the reign of ‘ Abd a l- M a lik , and provides useful material on such
provinces as Arminya, and on Arab-Byzantine relations, some of which
3
cannot be found in the other sources.
However, Ibn A ‘ tham shows a strong ‘ A lid bias whenever the
4 .
Al ids are mentioned in the events of ‘ Abd a l-M a lik 's caliphate.
1. Kufi , I, fols. 246a-270b? and II, fols. la -2 9 b .
2. Ib id ., I, fols. 236b, 261b.
3. Ib id, I, fols. 245b; II, fols. 58a-60b, 7 2 a -b , 116a-129a.
4. Ibid, 1, fols. 187b, 19 0 a-b , J93a-b, 204a, 207b, 213b, 220b-221b;

II, fols. 12a, 20a, 29b, 31a, 56 a-b .
30.
Fin ally, his accounts reveal rather bitter feelings against a l j a j ,
. 2
as w ell as some measure of glorification of his tribe, Kinda.
8 . Abu f Abdallah Muhammad ibn ‘ Adbus ai-Jahshiyari (d *3 3 1 /
- 3
942), the author of ql-W uzara* waM-Kuttab* This work, which mainfy
deals with administrative matters, contains valuable information on political
affairs. Its importance for the reign of *Abd a l-M a lik lies not only in the
administrative account it provides, but also the information given on *
‘ Asabiyya and on the policies of a l-H a jja j in Iraq; the latter reveals an a n ti-
4
H ajjaj bias. On the whole, Jahshiyari's account is brief, and he does not
mention his authorities in the period concerned.
9. A l-M a s ‘u d i, Abu'l-Hasan ‘ AM ibn al-Husain (d .3 4 5 /9 5 6 ), a

* *
renowned historian and scholar of the fourth century. Out of the thirty five
works which he claimed to have w ritten, only Muruj al-D hahab and a l -
t - 5
Tanbih w a 'I-ls h ra f survive.
...j-..... ..............- -rr —r -
In his Muruj al-D hahab, he expresses a strong
1. K uf!, II, fols. 53b -54a, 57b, U 3 b -1 1 5 b .
2. Ib id, I, fo l. 242b.
c , 1 / , , . - - V
• (Jahshiyari).
4. Jahshiyari, p p .4 2 , 43.
5. It is doubtful that the published book entitled Akhbar al-Zam an

wa ma Abadahu'l-HadaHian (Cairo 1938) is the same Akhbar a l -
Zaman as Mas^ Odi's: for not only do the contents of this published
volume not agree with a l-M a s ^ d V s references to his own work,
but it also differs in its style from M as'udi's* Another treatise
ascribed to a l-M a s ‘ udi is Ithbat a l-W a s iy y a liHlmam ‘ Al? ibn
Abi T a lib , published in N a ja f by al-M uktab a al-M urtadaw iyya.
It is regretted that I was unable to get access to this work. See
N .A , Dawud, Nash?at al-S h H q al-lm am iyya, Bibliography.
34 .
pro-‘ A lid sympathy. Mas‘ u d i‘s information on the ‘ Al ids is reported

„ 1
on the authority of men with Shi‘ Ite inclinations. Moreover, in his
assessment of ‘ Abd a l-M a lik 's personality, a l-M a s ‘ udi quotes verbatim
from a l- Y a ‘ q u b i‘s essay on the caliph, entitled Mushakalat a l-N a s U
—. 2
zamanihim, without acknowledging his source. In his lengthy chapter on
- t . 3
a l- H a jja j, M as‘ udi portrays him most unfavourably^ here again, reports
on the authority of men like al-M in q a ri and ibn ‘ A lisha, who are known to
? . 4 - T
have had ShI‘ ite leanings. One can also find in Mas 4 udi's Muruj
clear anti-Um ayyad feelings. Examples of this are when he reports the death
of al-Hasan ibn ‘ A li, and his account dBthe battle of a l-H a rra , and the
- . 5
death of M u ‘ awiya II.
M as‘ udi seems to have been interested in anecdotes and legends
current at the tim e, which he reports to us in his M u ru j. This, rather than
6
serving "to impair the trustworthiness of the accounts", is more an indication
of the social and intellectual life of some of the people of the time.
However, a l-M a s ‘ udi in his Muruj provides us with valuable
1. See M u ru j, V , pp. 179, 1 8 4-5 , 196, 219, 2 2 7 -9 .
2. Compare 55 , V , p. 210, and Mushakalat, p. 18.
3. M u ru j, V , p p .288-360; p .382.
4. ]b id ., V , p p .3 2 6 -8 , 3 3 1 -6 , 3 3 8 -9 , 343; also p p .2 9 0 -3 0 2 .
5. Jlbid., V , p p .7 9 -8 1 , 167, 169.
6. F. O m ar, The ‘ Abbasid C aliphate, p .35. (Unpublished Ph.D . Thesis,

London, 1 9 67.)
32 .
information on al-M ukhtar's relationships w ith Ibn a l-Z u b a ir; with both
Ibn al-H a n a fiy y a and Ibn ‘ Abbas; and with 4 Al i ibn al-H usain. ^ This
?2
information, together with that given by Balodhuri helps us to a better
understanding of these otherwise obscure proceedings. Another important
point revealed in a I-M uruj is the reason for the support given by southern
Arabs to Marwan in the battle of M arj Rahit, and also the treason of ‘ Umair
- 3
ibn al-H ubab in the battle of Khazir. This information throws much light
on tribal conflicts during the reign of ‘ Abd a l-M a lik Ibn M arwan.
In M as‘ udi's Tanbih, which is a "resum6 of his previous works",
we find fresh and important information: the date of the battle of Khazir,
Ibn al-A sh‘ a th '$ adoption of the titles of a l-G a h ta n i and Nasir a l-M u ’m inin,
the list of the "K uttab", "H ajibs", and Oadis at the end of the account of
4 - - -
each caliph. It is interesting that a l-M a s ‘ udi makes it clear in his Tanbih
that he had seen some Umayyad sources, which he criticised as being biased
- - - 5
and anti-Hashim ite (Talbids and ‘ Abbasids).
10. K itab al-A ghani by A b u 'l-F araj al-l$bahani, ‘ A li ibn al-Husain
(d. 3 5 6 /9 6 6 -7 ), Arab historian, litterateur and po et.^ Although this work
1* M u ru j, V , pp. 17 0-3 , 1 7 6 -9 , 184-190.
2. See Chapter II, p. / ( f of this thesis.
3. M u ru j, V , p p .2 0 0 -1 , 223.
4. Tahbih, p p .31 3, 314.
5. Ib id . , p p .335, 336.
6 . E. \?t (Abu11-Fanaj al -Is bahani
33 .
primarily deals with the one hundred songs chosen by order of the caliph
Harun al-Rashid, it gives abundant material on p o litic a l, administrative
and social life in the period concerned. N ext to Baiadhuri's Ansab,
Kitab al-A ghani is the most important source for the tribal feuds of 4 Abd
a l-M a lik 's reign, ^ which he reports on the authority of a l-M a d a 'in i, ‘ Umar
ibn Shabba and Abu ‘ Ubaida. 4 Abd a l-M a lik 's court life and his attitude
- - 2
towards songs and wine are reported in the Kitab a l-A g h a n i. He gives
information on political events, such as the war between 4 Abd a l-M a lik and
3
Mus4ab ibn a l-Z u b a ir; and also useful facts on 4 Abd a l-M a lik 's governors
- - 4
in a l-H ija z and Khurasan. A bu 'l-F araj very often states his authorities,
T . 5
but as he is a Shi4 ite , some of his accounts should be considered with care,
as, for instance, that on 4 Abd a l-M a lik 's attitude towards singing.
7
11. The Christian (Syriac) sources. These are a ll, with the exception
of only tw o, late sources which repeat the accounts of the early Arab
historians. Where they do more than repeat, in providing original information^
1. Agh,., V I I , p p .176-7; X I, p p .5 7 -63 ; X V II, p p .1 1 1 -6 .
2. See N . 4 A k e l, Studies in the Social History of the Umayyad Period9

(Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, London, 1960), pp. 3 0 6-3 16.
3. Agh. , X V II, pp. 161-4.
4. Ib id ., Ill, p p .10 0, 102, 107, 110, 113, 1 2 3 ;v o l.X , p .6 1 ;

v o l.X III, p . 56.
5. 4 A k e I, op. c it . , pp. 15-16; E. l / , (Abu'l-Faraj al-lsbahani).
6 . A g h ., II, p p .8 6 -8 . On the authenticity of this account, see

Chapter I, p.t>Z. of this thesis.
7. Dinoysius, Chronique de Denys de Tell M a h re, translated by J. B.

Chabot, Paris, 1895; Sa 4 7d ibn BatrTq, al-Tarikh a l-M a jm u 4 ~
34.
their work is unreliable as far as the major political events of the time
are concerned, since it is the product of *’a minority community isolated
from the courts of kings and princes"^ by its political in feriority. N e v e r
theless, there are areas in which the Christian sources can prove useful,
in matters concerning the administration of Christians in the Muslim world,
especially their taxation (Jizya and Kharaj); as by-product of this, they
give information on the general administrative practices of the caliphate.
They are also useful sources for Arab-Byzantine relations. More specially
for our period, they are useful in providing a non-hostile view of the
Umayyads, to act as corrective to the more biased ( Abbasid sources.
12. Literary Works: the most important of these are the Diwans of poets
such as Ibn Qais al-Ruqayyat, A 'sha Hamdan, Suraqa al-B a riq i, a l-A k h ta l,
Jarir and al-Farazdaq. N ext to these Diwans come N aq a, id Jarir w a‘1-
Farazdaq and N aq a’ id Jarir w a 'I-A k h ta l. These poetical works which are
contemporary with the events, are important in that they contain verses
relating to many political events, such as the eA.sabiyya, the c iv il war between
*Abd a l-M a lik and Ibn a l-Z u b a ir, the campaign against the Byzantines, the
ss 4 A la 'I-T a b q iq , Beirut, 1909; Ibn al-M u q affa* , Tarikh al-B atariqa

a l-M ig riy y q , C airo, 1943; Ib n a M lb r i , Tarikh Mukhtasar a l-D u w a l,
Beirut, 1890; idem, The Chronography of Gregory Abu*l Faraj, ed. and
trans. by E .A , W allis Bridge, Oxford, 1932; Chronique de M ich el le
Syrian, ed. J.B . Chabot, Brussels, 1963; Theophanes, Chronographya,
M ig n e , 1857.
t. J .B . Segal, Syriac Chronicles, p . 251, in Historians of the M id dle East,
ed. B. Lewis and M . P. H o lt, Oxford, 1964; N oldeke, Zur Geschichte
der Araber im 1 . J a h rh .d ,H . aus Syrischen O u e lle n , p p .7 6 -9 8 , Z D M G ,
2 9 , 1876; idem, Zur Geschichte der C m aijden, p p .6 8 3 -9 1 , Z D M G 7 "53", 1901.
35.
K harijite opposition and the revolt of ‘ Abd al-Rahman ibn a I -Ash* ath.
They can be used to confirm the accounts of the historical sources.
]
13. Religious Literature (Heresiography): most of these books are late
and deal mainly with the sects, their origins and development. As most of
them are written by Sunni authors, concerned with the theological aspect
of the sects, with examining their heresies and errors: thus they are biased
sources. Even those written by K harijite or Shi‘ i authors are prejudiced
against any sect other than their own.
However, they do contain sporadic historical information on the
K harijite wars, the origin of various sects such as al-Khashabiyya and al -
Kaisaniyya, and their connection with the revolt of al-M u k h ta r; they also
te ll us of the nature of the la tte rls support in Kufa. But even so, these
heresiographies are often confusing to use, since being late sources, they
sometimes muddle the names of persons and places.
14. Coins and Inscriptions: the coins are important in providing con
firmation for the written sources, as w ell as new information for the period
1. N aw bakhti, Firaq a l-S h i‘ a, Istanbul, 1931, N a ja f, 1959; a l- A h ( ari,

M aqalat al-IslamiyyYn, Istanbul, 1930; a 1- M a l o t i al-Tanbth w a ‘T-Rqd
‘ A la Ah I a l-A h w a ?w a 'l-B id a <, Istanbul, 1936; al-Baghdadf, al-Farq
baina 1!-F ira q , C airo, 1910; Ibn Hazm , al-Fiâl F iM -M ila ! w a 'I-N ih a l,
C airo, 1317-20; al»$hahrastani, a l- M ila l w a 'I- N ih a l; Leipzig, 1923,
C airo, 1951; Bar rad?, a I -Jaw ah ir a l-M u n taq at, C airo, 1884; Shammakhi,
Kitab a l-S iy a r, C airo, 1884.
36 .
in question; for example, that ‘ Abd a l-M a lik called himself K haflfatu'llah
(the caliph of God)^ on the coins he minted» This information cannot be
found in the w ritten sources. The fact that the K harijite ‘ AHyya ibn
al-Aswad struck coins in Kirman, is confirmed by the coins that survived

2
from that year 7 2 /6 9 1 .
The inscriptions on buildings provide important information on the
date of construction, or restoration and the name of the caliph responsible^
it is from the inscription on the Dome of the Rock that we know that ‘ Abd
a l-M a lik was its original builder, since the date of the inscription survived
to prove false the attempt to credit it to the ‘ Abbasid caliph a i-M a ?mun.
1. C u riel, Arabo-Sassanids Money, V I I I , p .32 8, f'CRN, 6 e series, 1966.
2. M ile s , Some New Light on the History of Kirman, p. 90, W O I, 1959.

CHAPTER I
THE LEGACY OF THE EARLY YEARS
There is much information in the sources, particularly in the late
ones, on the early life of ‘ Abd a l-M a lik ibn Marwan; but since much of
this information is repeated from legends and myths, it is d iffic u lt to form
a very satisfactory idea of his personality or of how his early life influenced
his later policy on becoming caliph . Y et only by adopting a critical and
analytical approcah to the sources, is it possible to c la rify fact from
fictio n .
According to one account^ he was born in the year 2 3 /6 4 3 ;

2
according to another, it was 2 6 /6 4 6 . As for the month, it is agreed on
as being Ramadan, though no exact day is given. His birth-place is

F c
mentioned by K halifa ibn Khayyat as the house (Dar) of his father Marwan
T 3
in M edin a. It is said that he was prematurely born, which led some of his
critics to give this assertion evil connotations, implying the weakness of
1. K halifa ibn K hayyat, Tarikh, I, p . 293; Ansab, X I, p. 264; T a b ., II,

p. 1173 (citing MadqMnt); Ghurar, fols. 81 -8 2 ; ‘ Iqd, IV ,
p p .39 9, 421; ‘ Asakir, X , fo l. 254a; TahdhTb, IV , p .423 (quoting
KhalTfa). However, another account in t a b . , I, p. 2671, gives the
year 2 2 .
2. Sa‘ d, V , p. 166; T a b ., II, p. 1173 (citing W aqidi); K am il, IV , p .411

‘ Asdkir, X , fo l. 254a; TahdhTb, V I, p .423 (quoting Ibn Sa‘ d);
SuyutT, p. 143.
3. TarTkh, I, p . 293.
38 .
his claim , vis-a-vis his riv a l, for the Caliphate. ^ His father was the
caliph Marwan ibn al-Hakam ibn A b i'l- ‘ As ibn Umayya ibn ‘ Abd
2 -
Shams ibn ‘ Abd M anaf ibn Qusayy. His mother was ‘ A 9 isha bint
M u ‘ dwiya ibn al-MughTra ibn A b i'l- ‘ As ibn Umayya ibn ‘ Abd Shams
3
ibn ‘ Abd M anaf. His “Kunya" was A buM -W alid, his favourite son
and successor.^ Since the ‘ Abbasids were the first to adopt regnal
titles, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik like the rest of the Umayyad caliphs had no t it le ,
"Leqab". Some late historians have ascribed the practice to the Umayyad
5
caliphs and even aduced specific titles to them. However, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik
was called , as a nickname, "the one who squeezes water from a stone"
1. Bayan, I, p .!7 7 ;A b s a b , X I, p. 152; Ghurar, fo l. 82; ‘ Iqd, IV ,p p .3 1 -3 2 ;

§ i n a ‘ a t a i n , pp. 15-16; K h u lafa*, II, folT 97b; ‘ Asakir, X , fol. 163a;
Kam il, IV , p. 158; TahdhTb,~ I , p .423; SuyutT, p. 144.
2. Sa*d, V , p . 165; K halifa ibn K hayyat, Tabaqat, p . 240; Ansab, X I,

p. 151; T a b ., II, p.TT73; ‘ Iqd, IV , p .398; BatrTq, V I I , p . 3 9 ; ‘ Asakir,
X , Fol."252b; K a m il, lV 7p 731 4; Biddya, IX" p. 16; Inafa, I, p. 126;
Dhahab, p. 27; Tahdhib, V I , p .422, Suyutt, p. 134.
3. Sa‘ d, V , p. 165; ZubairT, p .399; K halifa ibn Khayyat , Tabaqat, p .240;

Bakkar, p .421; Ansdb, X I, p. 151; Y a ‘ qubT, IT7 p. 320; T a b ., II, p. 1173
‘ Iqd, IV , p .399; BatrTq, V I I , p .39; Tanbih, p .312; K h u lafa *, II, fol.
9 7 b .; Jamharat, p . 8 0 ; K am il, IV , p .413; Bidaya, IX , p .62; Indfa,
I , p . 1 2 6 ; TahdhTb, V I , p . 4 2 3 .
4. K halifa ibn Khayyat, Tabaqat, p . 240; M a ’d rif, p. 155; T a b ., II,

p. 1173; ‘ i q d ~ V , p .398 rfa n b T h , p .312; K h u M a ’ , l l / f o l . 97a;
‘ Asakir, X , fo l. 252b; KamTI, IV , p .413; Biddya, IX , p .61; Tahdhib,
V I , p .422.
5. Tanbih, p p .3 3 5 -7 ; MafatTh, p. 105; Subh/ V , p .4 7 7 f f .; indfa, I, p . 2 2 ;

Some modern writers have been misled by this point and ascribed to
‘ Abd a l-M a lik the title of al-M uw affaq bi A m ir'lah. See A b u 'l-N a s r,
‘ Abd a I-/Vial ik ibn M arw an, p. 252, Beirut, 1962.
39 .
(Rashh a l - H aja r), on the grounds of his alleged miserliness. ^ There
is reason for thinking that such an allegation was unfounded since there
was a tendency among Muslim historians to call 'miser1, any caliph
who, through e fficie n c y, kept a tight rein on expenditure. His son
the Caliph Hisham and the ‘ Abbasid Caliph a I-Mansur were also called
mean where objective sources would describe them as efficien t financiers.
The generous way in which ‘ Abd a l-M a lik rewarded victorious generals
returning from campaigns, and patronized poets and religious men, shows
that he did not have that aversion to parting with money which is the
2
sign of a mean man. And could it be that ‘ Abd a l-M a lik 's opponents
called him 'miser' to counter his own accusation of Ibn a l-Z u b a ir: "he
3
has every qualification for a caliph were it not for his miserliness"?
When he was only ten years old he witnessed the storming of the
house of the Caliph ‘ Uthman ibn ‘ Affan in M edina, in which the caliph
1. M a ‘ a rif, p. 155; Ansab, X I, p . 152 (citing W aqidi); Y a ‘ qubi, II,

p . 335; Mushakalat a l-N a s li Zamanihim, p. lb ; M u ru j, V , p .210;
Bad*, V I , p .26; A a h ., X V , p. 156; K h u lafa *, II, fo l. 97b; K am il,
IV , p .415; Sharif, I, p . 53, N ihaya, III, p .315; Mukhtasar, I, p . 20;
Suyuti, p. 15?. "
2. Sa‘ d , IV , p .4 0 , V , p . 171 (citing W aqidi); pp. 171 -2 ; Mafcasin,

pp. 9 -1 0 ; Ansab, X I, pp. 167-8 (citing ‘ Awana); ‘ Iqd, I , pp. 2 9 4 -5 ;
p p .3 6 0 -1 ; M u ru j, p. 253, p p .3 8 0 -1 ; Agh . , V I I I , pp. 29 -3 0 (citing
a l-Z u b a ir ibn Bakkar); ‘ Asakir, V I I , p .375.
3. Ansab, X I, p. 18 (citing M ada’ in i); Y a ?qubi, li, p . 327; T a b ., II,

pTTT76.
was k ille d . ^ N o wonder that this event had a lasting effect on him, as
clearly shown in the distrust expressed in his address to the people of
2
Medina after he became caliph. This early mistrust was further
aggravated by the attitude of the people of M edina towards the Umayyads
in general. In the year 6 3 /6 8 2 , the Medinese expelled the Umayyads

3
from their city and revolted against the Caliph Y azid I . 1Abd a l-M a lik
lived through this event and was one of those expelled. The Medinese
hostile attitude reached its culmination in the support they gave to Ibn
4
a l-Z u b a ir against ( Abd a l-M a lik himself. Wellhausen rightly pointed
out that 1 Abd a l-M a lik seems to have borne this history of anti-Umayyad
feeling in M edina in mind in his choice of governors for the c ity .
When the Caliph ( Uthman appointed his father fKatlb* in M ed in a,
1. Sa‘ d , V , p. 166; Bayan, II, p. 171 (citing M a d a 'in i); Ansab, X I,

p. 190 (citing Mada Trn); T a b ., II, p. 1173 (citing W aqidt); Bidaya,
IX , p .62.
2. Sa‘ d , V , p. 172 (citing W aqidi); Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh , I,

p . 270; Ansab, X I , pp. 1 7 7 -8 , Y a*q u b i, II, p p .3 2 6 -7 ; M uruj, V ,
p p .2 8 1 -2 ; Agh. , IV , p . 53 (citing a l-Z u b a ir,ib n Bakkar); Kam il,
IV , p .317; Bidaya, IX , p .64.
3» S a*d, V , p. 166 (citing W aidi); K halifa ibn Khayyat , Tarikh, I,

p . 228; Irnama,!, pp. 172-3; Ansdb, V , pp. 126-7 (citing M ada’ inT)
T a b ., II, p p .4 0 5 -6 (citing Abo M ikhnaf); A g h ., I, pp. 13-4 (citing
M a d a’ im ); K am il, IV , p p .9 5 -6 ; pp. 119-20; Bidaya, IX , p .63.
4. The Arab Kingdom and its F a ll, p .215, C alcu tta, 1927, and
Beirut, 1963.
41 .
‘ Abd a l-M a lik acted as his secretary in the Diwan of a l-M e d in a . ^ As
governor of al-B ah rain for the Caliph ‘ Uthman, Marwan appointed his son,
2
‘ Abd a l-M a lik to the governorship of H ajar.
Under M u ‘ aw iya, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik continued to hold offices. When
Z aid ibn Thabit d ied, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik succeeded him as 'K a tib 1 of the
_ - 3
Diwan of a f-M e d in a . In the year 4 2 /6 6 2 , he was at the head of the troops
of M edina in the caliph's naval campaign against the Byzantines, in
4
which he distinguished himself.
During the caliphate of Y azid I, he became more involved in the
politics of the tim e! in the year 6 1 /6 8 0 the Caliph Y azid I tried to reconcile
Ibn a l-Z u b a ir and the people of a l-H ija z by sending a mission headed by
Ibn ‘ Idah al-A sh‘ a ri. in M edina on their way to M e c c a , they met M arw an,
1. T a b ., II, p . 837; ( lqd, IV , p. 164; K h jla fa *, II, fo l. 10a.

• i i' i ■" < i ■ i
M a *a rif, p. 155; Ansab, X I, p. 152 (citing Waq rdi); Bad’ , V I,

p. 2 6.
3 . M a ?a r if, p. 155; Ansab, X I, p. 152 (citing W a q id i); Bad* , V I ,

p725I
4. Sa‘ d , V , p. 166; Khalifa ibn K hayyat, Tarikh, I, p. 196 (who gives

the year 50); Ibn ‘""Abd al-H akam , Futulj Ifrtqiya w a'I-A ndalus,
p p .5 6 -5 8 ; A g h ., X I I , p . 95 (citing ‘ Umar b. Shabba); M u ‘ jam , III,
pp. 1 0 7-8 ; Ibn al-A b b a r, a l-lju H a t a l-$ a y a ra ?, p. 383; Bidaya, IX ,
p .63 (quoting K h alifa). The date given by Ibn ‘ Abd al-ljakam and
Ibn al-A bbar is 34. This seems unconvincing since at this time he
would be only eleven years old.
42 ,
who sent his two sons ‘ Abd a l-M a lik and ‘ Abd a l - ‘ A ziz with them.
‘ Abd a l-M a lik and his brother on their father's instructions recited
certain verses in front of Ibn a l-Z u b a ir encouraging him to be more
firm and not to yield to the demands of Y a z id . ^ Marwan was at this
time supporting Ibn a l-Z u b a ir against Y a z id , not through any genuine
friendship, but as an expression of his discontent at M u ‘ awiya's intro -
2
duction of the hereditary principle, so resented by the ‘ Arabs. When
Y azid's negotiations with Ibn a l-Z u b a ir and the people of a l-H ija z
failed,the Umayyads were expelled from M edina by the rebels; ‘ Abd a l -
3
M a lik had to leave the town with his father. On their w ay, they met
the Syrian army which Y azid had sent against Ibn a l-Z u b a ir, under the
command of Muslim ibn ‘ Uqba a l-M u rri. Marwan and his son ‘ Abd a l -
M a lik joined the Syrian army and came back to M edin a. When Muslim
ibn ‘ Uqba asked for information concerning the position of the town and
its defences, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik gave him the exact details required, for which
4
he received the admiration and the respect of the leader. This was followed
1. T a b ., II, p p .3 9 7 -8 (citing a l-Z u h ri); K h u la fa *, II, fo l. 8 8 a;

Biddya, V I I I , p . 212; E. I , (al-H arra). W . M u ir says that ‘ Abd
a l-M a lik accompanied his father Marwan in the negotiations with
Ibn a l-Z u b a ir in this mission in M ecca; see The C alip hate, p . 355
Beirut, 1963. However, it should be remarked here that there is no
evidence that Marwan had taken direct part in these negotiations.
2. ‘ Uyun, I, p. 277.
3. Sa‘ d , V , pp. 166-7 (citing W aqidi); K halifa ibn K h ayyat, Tarikh,
I, p . 228; Ansab, V , pp. 126-7 (citinglviaddMnT); J a b ., II, p p .4 0 5 -6
(citing Abu M ikh n af).
4. Sa‘ d, V , pp. 166-7 (citing WaqidT); T a b ., II,p p .4 1 0 -1 2 (citing Abu

M ikhn af); Khulafa’ , II, fo l. 89a; K am il, IV , p p . 9 5 - 6 ; FakhrT, p . 112 .
43.
by the battle of a l-H a rra , D h u l-H ajja 6 3 / August 683, which ended in a
complete defeat for the Medinese.
During the short Caliphate of his father MPrwan, (6 4 -6 5 /6 8 3 -6 8 4 ),
‘ Abd a l-M a lik held two offices, at least nominally. A l-M a d a ’ ini says
that he received the governorship of Palestine, but he remained in Damascus,
and sent Rawh ibn Zinbaâl-Judhami as his deputy there. ^ In the year
6 5 /6 8 4 , when his father Mrawan left Damascus and went to wrest Egypt
from the control of Ibn a l-Z u b a ir, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik was his deputy in the
cap ital. All these references to his early office-holding suggest that the
choice of ‘ Abd a l-M a lik to succeed to the caliphate from among his brothers
was because of his political ab ility and his knowledge of state-craft and
provincial administration. His gradual advance in holding important posts
at quite an early age, by caliphs other than his father, shows this political
fla ir, and his later successes also bear witness to his ab ilities. During the
reigns of M u ‘ awiya and his son Y a z id , stories about ‘ Abd a l-M a lik 's lik e li
hood of succession to the throne have been told to us* Most of these stories
are either Umayyad propaganda or in the form of myths, found mainly in
the late sources; in both cases, their authenticity is suspect. To mention
but some, there is a story which makes a l-M u h alla b ibn Abi Sufra predict
‘ Abd a l-M a lik 's future as caliph because of his piety and family connections.
1. Ansa b, V , pp. 149-50.
2. jb id ., V , pp. 148-49.
3. K h a lifa ibn K hayyat, Tarikhr I, p p .257-8 (citing Ibn ‘ Ayyash).

44.
The C ali ph ‘ Uthman according to another account, is supposed to have
put his head cloak (burnu§) over the boy's head, saying that he could see
A b u 'I-‘ As reborn in ‘ Abd a l-M a lik .^ Finally, the Caliph Y azid is
2
recorded as having prophesied that ‘ Abd a l-M a lik would be caliph.
In the same w ay, we also find in the sources statements and sayings
tellin g of ‘ Abd a l-M a lik 's a b ility and strong personality. In his list of
men claimed by the Umayyads as rare in their '^Ra^y11 and "Tadbir"

_ 3 „
(management), a l-J a h iz included ‘ Abd a l-M a lik . A I-M ad a *in i says
that though M u ‘ awiya was the more flexible as a p o litician (ahlam), yet
4
‘ Abd a l-M a lik was the more resolute (ahzam). ‘ Abd a l-M a lik is also
considered among the three statesmen of the Umayyad dynasty, together
- . - 5
with M u ‘ awiya and Hisham. However, the proof of ‘ Abd a l-M a lik 's
abilities is not to be found in these stories, but by examining his achieve
ments in the p o litical and administrative fields.
To turn now to ‘ Abd a l-M a lik 's accession to the throne, one should
go back to the circumstances of his father's succession, since these are crucial to
an understanding both of ‘ Abd a l-M a lik 's accession and of such later
developments as the revolt of ‘ Amr ibn Sa‘ id al-A shdaq.^ Following the
1. Ansab, V , p. 140, (citing ‘ Awarw).
2. Ib id ., X I , pp. 161-2 (citing M ada’ in i); Futufc, p . 35 (citing M ada’ inT);

M u ru j, V , pp. 155-6.
3. Rasa*il, p . 93 (ed. Sandubi).

4. ‘ Iqd, IV , p . 401,
5. M u ru j, V , p .497 (citing M ada‘ inT andal-H aytham ),
6. See Chapter IV , p. 2.2.
death of Caliph Y azid I, and according to the agreement reached at a l -
Jabiya between the leaders of the Umayyad family and their supporters,
Marwan was proclaimed caliph on the condition that his successors would
T - 1
be Khalid ibn Y azid ib n M u ‘ awiya and ‘ Amr ibn Sa‘ id al-Ashdaq, After
the battle of M arj Rahit (64/683) between Marwan and the supporters of
Ibn a l-Z u b a ir, which ended with a complete defeat for the latter, Marwan
realised that he had gained his title by right of conquest. Consequently,
he planned to exclude Khalid and ‘ Amr from the succession, Khalid was
as yet too young to be caliph, and Marwan further obstructed his chances
2
of succession by making a politic marriage with Khalid *s mother. In the
same year he died, at the age of 63 , having meanwhile nominated his son
‘ Abd a l-M a lik to succeed him, with his second son ‘ Abd a l - ‘ A ziz next in
line of succession; this was in answer to the claims of ‘ Amr ibn Sa‘ id that
3
he would be the next caliph , because of the agreement of a l-J a b iy a . The
new succession was declared in the year 6 5 /6 8 4 , and was made effective by
- 4
the help of the Kalbite leader Wassan ibn M a lik ibn Bahdal and people paid
1. Imama, II, pp. 12-3; Y a ‘ qubi, II, p p .3 0 4 -5 ; T a b ., II, p .476 (citing

‘ Awana).
2. Tab.,ll,p.577 (citing WaqidT), p p .5 7 7 -8 ; C hejne, Succession to the
Rule in Islam, p . 35 , Lahore, 1960.
3. ha Iff a ibn K h a yya t, Tarikh, I, p. 257, Imama, 11, p. 13; Ansab, V ,

pp. 149-50 (citing M adaM ni); X I, pp. 164-5 (citing Mada* inf); Y a ‘ qubT,
II, p .306; T a b ., II, p . 576 (citing ‘ Awana); M u ru j, V , p p .2 0 5 -6 ;
K am il, IV ,*p p . 156-7; Bidaya, V I I I , p p .255,"2507T X , p .6 2 ;
Suyuft, p . 143; Chejne, op. c it. , p p .3 1 -2 .
4. T a b ., II, p . 576 (citing ‘ Awana).
46 ,
homage to the nominees as such. It seems that Marwan had seen in this
agreement the safest way to keep the caliphate in his line and to put
an end to the rivalry of the many claimants to the throne among the
Umayyads themselves. He had learned his lesson from what followed the
2 ?
death of M u *a w iya II* On the other hand, < Amr ibn Sa* id found in it
3
a breach of oath and - as we shall see - rebelled against ( Abd a l-M a lik .
As for the date of 6 Abd a l-M a lik 's succession, it is almost unanimously
4
given as Ramadan 6 5 / April 685. His death has also been unanimously
5
agreed on as occurring in Shawwal 86 /O c to b e r 7 0 5 , so that he reigned for
twenty one years.
1. Ansab, V , p p .149-50 (citing M ada*ini); Y a'qubT, I I , p .306; T a b ., II,

p .5 7 6 .(citing i Awana); Kam il, IV , p . 156.
2. D un , Mugadima ff Tartkh $adr al-Islam , p . 6 7 , Beirut, 1961.
3. See Chapter IV , p ,2 2 £t£j:.
4. Sa‘ d , V , p .30; K halifa ibn K hayyat,TarTkh,| 7p , 2 5 7 j k h & a rlf, p .155; Ansab,

V , p . 159 (citing"al-Haytham TFV a * qu ibt, 11, p . 321; T a b ., II, p . 577;
Ghurar, fo l. 79; * Iqd, IV , p . 399; BatrTq, V I I , p . 39; M u ru j, V , p . 209;
KtndT, I, p p .4 8 -9 ; Bad*, V I , p . 26; K h u lafa*, II, fo l. 97a; K am il, IV ,
p. 158; * Asakir, X , fo l! 257; e IbrT, p. 193; FakhrT, p. 110; Mukhta$ar, I,
p . 205; Bidaya, V I I I , p . 260; Indfa, I, p. 127; PFTahab, p . 27;
Shadharflt, 'f, p., 73. However, DtnawarT mentions the year 6 6 , (Akhbar,
p .294)"; BaiadhurT gives RabT'l (Ansab, X I, p. 151); Mas* udt gives Rajab
(Tanbth, p .3 T 2 ).
5. S a*d , V , pp. 174-5 (citing W aqidt); Khalifa ibn K hayyaf, Tarikh, I,

p. 293; Ibn * Abd al-H aka m , op. c it. , p . 8 6 ; M a *g rif, p. 156; Ansab,
X I, pp. 152-264; DtnawarT, p .328; Ya*qub7, I I , p . 335; T a b ., II, p . 1172,
(citing Waqidt and Abu M a*shar), 1173 (citing M ad a’ int); Ghurar,
fols. 7 9 -8 0 ; c Iqd, IV , p .420; Tanbth, p . 316; M u ru j, V , p . 210; Kindt,
II, p .58; Bad*, V I , p . 27; K h u lafa*, fo l. 97b; * Asakir, X , fols. 257ar
266a; Kam il, IV , p .4 1 1 ; *lbrT, p. 194; Mukhtasar, I, p . 209; DhahabT, ill,
p . 236; Biddya, IX , p p .6 8 -9 ; * Ibar, III, p. 1 2 8 / Inafa, 1, p. 128;
Tahdhtb, V I , p .4 2 3 ; SuyutT, p 7 l4 4 ; Shadharat, I, p . 97.
47 .
It is generally accepted that * Abd a l-M a lik during his early life
was very pious, indulged little in pleasure, and showed a deep interest
in religious studies. In M edina where he was born and reared, there were
two intellectual climates. The first was that of Q u r’anic study, and
more especially, study of the HadTth. The second was the field of poetry,
songs and music. He chose the former and thus was educated in a religious
atmosphere. Although there is much evidence and information of * Abd a l -
M a lik's early p iety, leaving no doubt that he did display great interest
in religion, yet here again one should be aware of myths or propaganda.
An example of such is the account in K halifa ibn Khayyat's TarTkh, ^ on the
authority of a l-M u h a lla b b. Abi Sufta, (first Zubairid and then Umayyad
sympathiser), which depicts * Abd a l-M a lik as one of the G u rra’ (Readers
of the Q u r’ an). Another is the account of A bu'l-Yaqdan reported by
Baladhuri, which says that * Abd a l-M a lik took great painS to be sure
that the money on his privey purse, used for paying the dowries of his
2
wives, did not come from any corrupt practices or unjust extortion. More
reliable seems the account of Ibn S a*d, that * Abd a l- M a lik used to sit
with theologians and men of religion who taught him the tradition of the
3
Prophet, though he paid little attention to narrating what he learnt.
1. I, p. 258.
2. Ansab, X I , p. 195.
3. S a*d, V , p . 167.
48 .
The author of al-lmarog w a'I Slyasa states that * Abd a l-M a lik was known
to have been truthful, of good reputation, and knowledgeable and strict

] « « 2
in his religion. Waqidi regards him as aM uhaddith (Traditionist), on
the authority of ‘ Uthman ibn ‘ A ffan, Abu Huraira and Abu Sa‘ id a l -
Khud ri. We are also told that prior to his caliphate he was so involved
in praying and reciting the Q u r’ an in the Mosque of M e d in a , that he was
- 3
nicknamed “the pigeon of the mosque” (yamamat a l-M a s jid ). It is also
reported that, because of his piety and scrupulousness, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik
4
did not accompany his father in the battle of M arj Rahit 6 4 /6 8 3 . This
account is attested by the fact that we do not hear any account of him in
this b a ttle , w hile the name of his brother ‘ Abd a ! - ‘ A z iz is occasionally

5
reported. It is against this religious background that one might proceed
to examine ‘ Abd a l-M a lik 's policies after he became caliph.
As is the case with almost all the able and e ffic ie n t caliphs, the
hostile sources tend to under-emphasise ‘ Abd a l-M a lik 's significant
achievements and stress any minor events that they can use to discredit him,
1. Imama, II, p. 13.
2. Ansab, X I, p. 152.
3. Ib id ., X I , p . 1 6 3 ; ‘ Iqd, II, p. 350; Khulafa’ , II, fo l. 97a;

FakhrT. p. 110; NuwairT, IV , p. 115.
4. Abu Tammam, N aqa’ i j JarTr w a'I-A kh t.al, p. 21; Ansab, X I, p. 136

(citing al-Haythqm ibn ‘ AdT).
5. T a b ., II, p. 279 (citing Abu M ikhn af).

49 .
He was accused of being a mean, treacherous and blood-thirsty person.
G iven the fact that his religious background and early piety was w ell
established, no wonder therefore that the sources tried to depict him
as having a complete change of face after becoming a caliph, turning
his back on his early religious way of life . Modern scholars, such as
Wellhausen for exam ple, accept this interpretation; and Wellhausen says
"certainly from that time onwards, he subordinated everything to p o f I c y . . . ,,
It is true that ‘ Abd a l-M a lik at times was forced to act according to the
po litical situation in which he found himself, and this sometimes seems to
conflict with his previous religious ideals, but this must not be overstressed.
I shall try here to examine how far ‘ Abd a l-M a lik 's actions during his
caliphate were coloured by his religious background and his continuing
religious faith .
A crucial point to be discussed is the siege of M ecca and the
storming of a l- K a ‘ ba, because these were used most to discredit him -
especially since ‘ Abd a l-M a lik himself had previously been so shocked
when M ecca was besieged and the K a‘ ba was stormed under an earlier
caliph. ^
O p. c i t . , p . 215.
2. Sa‘ d , V , p. 167; KhalTfa ibn K hayyat, Tartkh, I, p. 224; Ansab,

V , p .360 (citing W3qidi“) ; X I , p .43 (citing W aqidt); p. 164 (citing
M ad a’ inT); K am il, IV , p . 95; FakhrT, p. 1 10; S uyutt, p. 145.
There is no doubt that the storming of a l-K a * ba did take place
and that 6 Abd a l-M a lik did consent to it , but it seems this can still be
reconciled to his religious beliefs. Firstly, there is evidence that he
was extremely unwilling to send an army to the holy places of M ecca and
M edina. It is reported^ that when a l-H a jja j ibn Yusuf al-Thaqafi was
dispatched by ( Abd a l-M a lik at the head of a Syrian army against
6 Abdallah ibn a l-Z u b a ir, he made a l- T a ’ if and not M ecca his residence,
t 2
on the caliph's orders. Al-Baladhuri makes this point even clearer,
stating that a l-H a jja j did not approach M edina nor the road leading to it.
He took the way of al-Rabadha on his way to al~Ta?if. Tabari says that
a l-H a jja j went by the way of Iraq, deliberately avoiding M edina and the
M edina road. This last piece of information is also repeated by Ibn a l-
A thir . 4
It is also interesting to mention here what instructions e Abd a l-M a lik
gave a l-H a jja j on sending him to a l-H ija z to fight e Abdallah ibn a l-Z u b a ir.
? 5
According to Baiadhuri and Ibn A‘ tham, al-Haytham ibn al-Aswad
1* imamq, II, p. 24; D inaw ari, p . 319; K u fi, II, fo l. 52b; < Iqd, IX ,
p .4 1 4 ;M u r u j, V , p. 254.
2. Ansab , V , p . 357 (citing W aqidi); X I, p . 38(citing W aqidi).
3. Jab, II, p . 829 (citing W aqidi).
4. Kam il, IV , p . 284.
5. Ansab, V , p p .3 5 7 -8 (citing *A w a n a );X I, p p .3 9 -4 0 (citing ( Aw ana)

KofT, II, fols. 52b-53a.
51 .
ql-N akhcî previously came to 4 Abd a l-M a lik and said, " O commander
of the fa ith fu l, order this Thaqifite youth (Ghulam) to respect the K a 4 ba,
not to desecrate its sanctity, nor to touch a single stone of its sacred w alls,
nor to disturb even the birds that roost there; order him only to block the
mountain passes (Shi4 ab) and the tunnels (Anfaq) to M e cca , to isolate Ibn
a l-Z u b a ir until either he dies of hunger or leaves M ecca dethroned".
4 Abd a l-M a lik acted on this advice on his orders to a l- H a jja j, instructing
him to avoid the shrine (al-Haram ) and to reside in a l- T a ‘if. These
instructions show the respect the caliph had for the holy shrine.
This avoidance of the holy places by 4 Abd a I - M a lik ’s armies has
been interpreted as a tactical move, but this view is not borne out by the
facts. For 4 Abd a l-M a lik had already sent Tariq ibn 4 Amr and ordered
him to station somewhere between Ay la and W a d i'l-Q u ra , with the
instructions to check the activities of Ibn a l-Z u b a ir’s governors, to protect
the land lying between his camp and Syria, and fin a lly , to cope with any
1
situation that might develop. Would it not be more advantageous, from
the m ilitary point of view ,for a l-H a jja j to join Tariq ibn 4 Amr, to re-inforce
his army and use M edina as a base from which he could advance against
Ib n -a l-Z u b a ir? This is almost exactly what happened later, when Tariq
ibn 4Amr was given the orders to enter M edin a, to drive out the governor of
1. Ansab, V , p . 356; X I, p . 36; 4 Asakir, V i i , p .40 (citing K halifa ibn

K hayyat & lb n S a 4 d); K am il, IV , p . 284; 4 Ibar, III, p p .87^5.
52.
Ibn a l-Z u b a ir and to advance from there towards M ecca to join A l-H jja j.^
The question this provokes is, why 4 Abd a l-M a lik gave such orders
a year later when he was not prepared to do so e a rlie r, when it was equally
strategic for him to advance from /v\edina on M ecca? Could the answer be
that 4 Abd a l-M a lik by this time was aware that 4 Abdallah ibn a l-Z u b a ir
was exploiting the sanctity of the holy cities for po litical ends, banking on
the fact that 4 Abd a l-M a lik could not attack them without provoking Muslim
reaction? And also 4 Abd a l-M a lik realized that 4 Abdallah ibn al-Zu bair's
occupation of the holy shrine was threatening to divide the unity of Islam,
since 4 Abd a l-M a lik 's supporters were prevented from performing pilgrimage,
and even more fundamentally, since it is impossible to have two caliphs in
Islam. In this light we can say that whereas religious motivations
originally prevented 4 Abd a l-M a lik from attacking M edin a or M ecca,
eventually they very w ell have led him on to such an attack.
Turning now to the actual event of the storming of a l- K a 4 ba, religious
motives can even here be traced in 4 Abd a l-M a lik 's action. Having recon
ciled himself to the political and religious necessity of besieging
4Abdallah ibn al-Z u b air's stronghold, it appears that, in giving his orders,
to a l-H a jja j to storm the Ka 4 ba, he took into consideration that part of
the building which was not in existance during the Prophet's lifetim e, and
1. Sa 4 d , V , p. 169 (citing W aqidi); K halifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, I, p . 265;

Ansab, V , p . 357;(citing WaqidT);"5n, p .42 (citing W aqidi); G u dat, I,
p. i 24; T a b ., II, p . 830 (citing W agidt); K am il, IV , p p .2 8 4-5 .
53 .
therefore not traditionally sacred, having been built by his rival Ibn a l-
Zubair. Evidence supporting the view that 4 Abd a l-M a lik respected the
original building appears in the account of the fourth century geographer
? 1
Muqaddisi, a native of Jerusalem. He reports that "When a l-H aj j aj
came to M ecca, ibn a l-Z u b a ir took refuge in the shrine (Haram). Con
sequently, a l-H a jja j ordered a catapult to be set up on the mount of Abu
Gubais, which was to storm only that additional part of the shrine which
Ibn a l-Z u b a ir had b u ilt. The men in charge of the catapult followed this
instruction and stormed that part of the building known as a l-H a tim ".
- - 2
This same information we find in the book of another geographer, Yaqut,
who seems to have received it from Muqaddisi's book; but this, however,
does not reduce the importance of this report, even if it does not confirm
it.
it is very significant that immediately after 4 Abdallah ibn a l-Z u b a ir
was k ille d , 4 Abd a l-M a lik ordered a l-H a jja j to tear down all the innovations
to a l- K a 4ba built by Ibn a l-Z u b a ir, and to restore the original form of the
3
building as it stood in the lifetim e of the Prophet.
1. Muqaddisi, p p .7 4 -5 .
2. M u 4 jam , IV , p. 284.
3. K halifa ibn K h a y y a t, TarTkh, I, p . 268; A zraq i, I, p. 137; M a 4 arif,

p .1 5 6 ; FutuBT p p .2 6 -7 ; Ansab, X I, p p .6 7 -8 (citing WaqicFTj;
DTnawart, I, p *29 6, Y a 4 qubl^ II, p*325; HamadanT, p . 20; A 4 lQq,
p .30; T a b ., II, p . 854; KufT, II, fol* 55b;M u ru j, V , pp. 192-4;
M u 4 jam , IV , p . 284; Kam il, IV , p . 296; M ir * a t , V I , fo l. 8 a ;
Mukhtasar, I, p. 208; Dhahabl, II, p. 365; III, p. 115; Bid ay a , IX ,
pp. 2 -3 ; 4 Ibar, III , p p .8 8 -9 ; Muqadima, pp. 6 2 3 -5 .
The poet Jarir wrote of th is:- “You restored the house of God
as it was at the time of the Prophet, you corrected what the sons of a i -
Zubair had corrupted."
Another example of 4 Abd a l-M a lik 's care for religion is his action
in building the Dome of the Rock (Qubbat al-Sakhra). There is no doubt
that 4 Abd a l-M a lik ibn Marwan was its builder, and the attempt to credit
it to the 4 Abbasid caliph a l- M a Jmun could not disguise this, since the
date of erection escaped the alteration; it stands a firm witness to 4 Abd
a l-M a lik as its original builder.
According to a statement in Y a 4 qubi's T a u kh . repeated by Sa 4 id
- 2
ibn Batriq, ibn a l-J a w zi and Ibn Kathir, the reason for the erection of
the Dome of the Rock was 4 Abd a l-M a lik 's attempt to keep the Syrians at
home in order not to be won by his political rival 4 Abdallah ibn a l-Z u b a ir
in M e cca . The latter tried to u tiliz e the obligation of pilgrimage to
defame and slander 4 Abd al M a lik and the Umayyads. When the people
complained at being prevented from performing their religious duty, 4 Abd
a l-M a lik invoked the tradition which permits the pilgrimage to the Aq§a
. 3
Mosque, on the authority of a i-Z u h ri. G oldziher accepted this state
ment, and maintained that a ll the traditions, whether in favour or not, of
1. N a g a 'ld , I, p .4 8 6 .
2. Y a 4 qubi, II, p .311; B atriq, V I I , p .39; M ir ya t, V I , fo l. lb ;

Bidaya, V I I I , p . 280.
3. M u hammed anisch Studien, II, pp. 3 5 -7 , H a lle , 1890.

55 .
the religious importance of Jerusalem were no more than weapons in the
war between 4 Abd a l-M a lik and his rival Ibn a l-Z u b a ir. Wellhausen
refers to the erection of the Dome of the Rock and says that 4 Abd a l -
M a lik was trying to put Jerusalem In the place of M e c c a , a plan he
1
abandoned as soon as he overcame his riv a l. H itti follows the same line
and accepts the view that the aim was to divert the pilgrimage from
2
M ecca to Jerusalem. The critical study of G o itein has shown that
Ya*qubi*s report is not trustworthy, because of his Shi 4 ite leanings; and
that the assertion that 4 Abd a l-M a lik tried to divert the pilgrimage from
3
M ecca to Jerusalem is not supported by third century Muslim historians.
Furthermore, as proved by J .W . Hirschberg, the traditions concerning
Jerusalem did not originate in 4 Abd a U M a lik ’s tim e, but went back to
an earlier d ate, since beliefs and legends of the sanctity of Jerusalem were
4
current among the inhabitants of Palestine and Syria. A l-Z u h ri, on
whose authority 4 Abd a l-M a lik is alleged to have invoked the tradition
permitting pilgrimage to Jerusalem, appears to have been at this time
1. op. c it . , p. 214.
2. History of the Arabs, p .220, New Y o rk, 1964.
3. The Historical Background of the Erection of theDome of the Rock, p. 104,

JA O S , 7 0 , 1950, idem. Studies in Islamic History and Institutions,
pp. 1 3 6 -7 , Leiden, 1966.
4. The Sources of Muslim Traditions Concerning Jerusalem, p .317, RO,

X V I I, 1953. ”
56.
very young and unknown to the caliph or to the inhabitants of Syria
generally,^
Since Syria was an ex-Byzantine province, there is no doubt
that the Muslims there had seen the imperial Byzantine monuments, for
example, the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, and possibly they were
very highly impressed by them. Therefore, the erection of the Dome of
the Rock can be interpreted as showing 4 Abd a l-M a lik 's consideration for
the feelings of his Syrian subjects and their wish to em ulate, to the glory
■" 2
of Islam, the religious monuments they saw around them. That the Dome
of the Rock was inspired by religious motives appears to be confirmed by
the fact that it continued to be one of the most exalted holy places in
Islam after M ecca and M edin a, even after 4Abd a l-M a lik had overcome
his p o litical rival 4 Abdallah ibn al—Zubair. In the light of this, it would
seem unlikely that 4Abd a l-M a lik would ever have thought of substituting
Jerusalem for M ecca; since each of them has its special importance in
the eyes of Muslims.
Another example of 4 Abd a l-M a lik trying to extend the glory of
Islam through building in Syria is his attempt to add the Church of St. John
1. D m , a l-Z u h r!, pp. 1 0 -1 1 , BSOAS,X IX , 1957; Nasb’at 4llm al-Tarfkb

4 Inda1! - 4 Arab, p. 99.
2. Muqaddisi, p. 159; G o itein , op. c i t . , p. 108; Lambert, Les Crigines

de la Mosqu6e et L*Architecture Religieus des Omeiyades, p . 61 , S I,
V I , 1956; M .S . Briggs, Architecture, p . 160, in The Legacy of IsTsm,
ed. by Th. Arnold & G uillaum e, London, 1960; H .A .R . G ib b ,
Studies on the C iv iliza tio n of Islam, p . 51, London, 1962.
57 .
1
in Damsacus to the mosque beside it. He failed to achieve this, but
the attempt alone gave him the support of the pious men and increased
his popularity.
We can also trace religious influence in some aspects of 4 Abd
a l-M a lik 's foreign policy: as soon as he was secure enough at home to
turn his attention to an aggressive foreign po licy, he continued the
previous struggle with the Byzantines, by waging the Jihad against the
2
infidels almost every year. This served the double purpose of, on
the one hand fu lfillin g the most important religious duty of the caliph
in the eyes of Muslims and, on the other hand,keeping the Syrian army
up to the mark through its continual experience of war.

3
Baladhuri informs us that 4 Abd a l-M a lik also wished his sons to
be as interested in the Q u r’an and Traditions as he was himself; when he found
the tradition of the campaigns of the Prophet in the form of a book in the
hands of some of his sons, he ordered it to be burnt and advised his sons to
read the Q u r’ an, and to know the Sunna of the Prophet in order to act in
accordance with it.
Other accounts as well as these show that contrary to his critics1
accusations, he did not lose his interest in religious studies and theological
1. Futufr, p . 125; Batriq, V I I , p .39; Wellhausen, op. c it . , p»216.
2. A khtal, D iw an, pp. 2 0 -21 ; Khalfifa ibn K h a yya t, TdrTkh, I,

pp. 3 4 4 -8 0 .
3. Ansab, X I, p. 172 (citing a l-Z u h ri).

58 .
questions on becoming caliph , nor did he lose contact with theologians
1
and men of rel igion. He surrounded himself with a group of theologians
including such men as Qabisa ibn Dhuâib, f Urwa ibn a l-Z u b a ir, Raja?
ibn Haywa, a l-$ h a *b i, and others. To those who were outside Damascus
2
in M edina he continued to send handsome presents and gifts. He also
carried on a correspondence with al-Hasan al-B asri, a famous theologian
of the tim e, about theological questions, such as free w ill and pre-
3 4
destination. We are also told that in one of i Abd a l-M a lik 's per
formances of pilgrimage, he sent for the eldest Sheikh from Khuzaâ,
another Sheikh from Quraish and a third from Banu Tamim, and ordered
them to renew the 11 Ansab " of al-H aram , following the practice of the
Prophet and his companions, like the caliph s Umar I, * Uthrnan ibn
( Affan and M u ‘ awiya I.
1. Tab. , I, p. 1104 (citing WaqidT); p. 1180, 1284, 1634, 1770.

t
2. Saf d , V , i i , p .40 , p. 171 (citing W a g M l); M ia *a rif, pp. 197-8 .
3. Risalat Mukatabat { Abd a l-M a lik ibn Marwan w a'l Hasan ibn
A b i‘l-Hasan al-Ba$rf, fols, 1-13; R itter, Studies Zur Geschichfe
der Islamischen Formmigkeit, p p .6 6 -8 2 , D l, X X I, 1933;
Obermann, Political Theory in Early Islam, pp. 132-6 2, JA O S , 55,
1935; M urtada, pp. 19-20; M ila l, p p .6 6 -7 .
4. WaqidT, M aghazt, II, p .8 4 2 ;K u fT , II, fo l. 55b.

5 9,
With such accounts, it is obvious that a fair examination of the facts
does not reveal * Abd a l-M a lik as turning his back on religion when he
succeeded to the caliphate.
Other evidence which has been used to support the view of ( Abd a l-
M a lik's v o lte-fac e on becoming caliph, are stories of his predilection
for wine and songs. It is essential to note here that there is no single
reference in the sources which can be taken as indicating that c Abd a l-
M a lik used to drink and listen to songs before he became caliph. On the
other hand, several statements and stories suggest that he developed these
habits during his caliphate; but these are contradictory and some of them
unreliable.
In a conversation with the famous theologian of M e d in a, Sa* id ibn
al-M usaiyab, * Abd a l-M a lik admitted that he drank wine after he became
caliph. ^ This same conversation has also been reported between the caliph
and the famous woman theologian Urn a l-D a rd a *, whose circle * Abd a l-M a lik
2
used to attend even after becoming caliph. It is also reported in the Kitab
- T3
al-AglianT that in talking to the Christian poet a l-A k h ta l, e Abd a l-M a ltk
described the taste and effect of wine to discourage him from drinking it -
does this suggest that t Abd a l-M a lik knew of its effects from bitter experience -
1. Ansab, X I, p p .215-6 (citing M ada’ inT); t Iqd, II, p . 351; N u w a iri,

T 7 7 p ".115.
2. f Asakir, X , fo l. 262b; Bidaya, IX , p . 6 6 ;S uyutT , p. 144.
3. A g h ., V I I I , pp. 290-1 (ed. Dar al-K uttub); X X I, p . 5.

60 .
1
as N . tf Akel says - or does it simply reflect what he had himself been told
by religious teachers in discouraging him from taking w ine?
There is evidence of another occasion when the caliph is said not only
to have spoken against wine to the Christian poet, but also tried to convince
2
him to give it up by tempting him with a large sum of money. On yet
another occasion, he threatened a l-A kh tal with the penalty of death, because
3
he asked one of the Palace servants for wine to drink.
From these contradictory reports and statements it is d iffic u lt to give
a final answer to the question whether * Abd a l-M a lik was a wine drinker or
- -4
not. It would appear from his own confession, reported by a i-M a d a 'in i
that i Abd a l-M a lik had tasted w ine, but there is no evidence to suggest
that he ever made a habit of drinking, or that he drank to excess: for
example, no sources mention drinking parties held by him or his drinking
5
companions. It is also apparent from these accounts that if he did drink,
he did so p rivately, w hile in public he went to great pains to discourage
wine and to maintain an orthodox position.
1. Studies in the Social History of the Umayyad Period as Revealed in the

Kitab al-AghhanT, p p .3 1 2 -3 , P h.D . Thesis, London, I9 6 0 .
2. A g h ., V I I I , p p .290-1 (ed. D5ral-K u tu b ), X X I, p .5 .
3. Agh., X I, p . 294.
4. Ansab, X I, pp. 2 1 5 -6 .
5. It is reported in the Kitab a l-T a j, (pp. 1 5 1-2 ), that * Abd a l-M a lik used
to drink once a month; but since there is no confirmation for this in
other sources, it seems d iffic u lt to accept it.
Similar contradictory reports circulated about his attitude to songs
and musicians. It is reported^ that on one occasion ‘ Abdaallah ibn J a ‘ far ibn
Abi Talib paid a visit to the caliph ‘ Abd a l-M a lik , who was at that time
suffering from sciatica. To relieve him from this pain, Ibn J a ‘ far advised
the caliph to invite somebody who was gifted in story-telling and Iitcyrofe/g,
to amuse him. The caliph refused this advice. The next day Ibn J a ‘ far came
again to see the call ph accompanied by his mawla Budaih the singer, saying
that he was a physician. However, Budaih did nothing but sing before the
caliph who was so pleased that he rewarded him lavishly. That ‘ Abd a l-M a lik
was known to disapprove of G h inaJ can be seen clearly in the fact that
‘ Abdallah ibn J a ‘ far had to pretend that Budaih was a physician and not a
2 - . T
singer. But this is contradicted by another story told by a l-M a d a ’ in i, who
tells how ‘ Abd a l-M a lik once said: "I have never seen this bellied lute
(Bufrbut) that everybody talks about". This remark provoked two responses in
those hearing it : - one group said, "Yes that is true, but he does know the
Janbur", and others said, ‘ "He is lying, he has not only seen the Barbut, but
3
he can even play it. " Both of these imply that ‘ Abd a l-M a lik was fond of
music and known by the people to be so.
1. Agh. , X IV , p. 10; Mustadraf, II, p. 295.
2. ‘ A ke l, op. c it . , p ,3 1 1 .
3. Ansab, X I , p . 261.
62.
Another story depicting ‘ Abd a l-M a lik as music-lover is from a
less reliable source: a story found in the Kitab al-Acjhanr tells how the fame
of ibn M isjah, a musician living in M ecca in the time of ‘ Abd a l- M a lik ,
spread so rapidly and he became so popular, that the strict Muslims com
plained to the governor that Ibn Misjah was seducing them by his profane
art. When this complaint reached the caliph ‘ Abd a l- M a lik , he ordered that
Ibn Misjah should be summoned to the cap ital. On his arrival there we read of
him singing many different songs before the caliph. ‘ Abd a l-M a lik not only
pardoned him but sent him back to M ecca with handsome presents, ^
2
Following this account of al-A ghgnf, Von Kromer, who seemed to
be greatly impressed by it, accepted it as true without frying to examine
3
its re lia b ility . As has been pointed out by N . ‘ A kel, Duhman al-Ashqar,
on whose authority this story was told, and who claimed to be the governor
of M ecca for ‘ Abd a l- M a lt k , was a "mawla singer of the late Umayyad and
early ‘ Abbasid period, and was mentioned as late as the ‘ Abbasid caliph
al-MahdT and al-Fad l ibn Yahya the Barmakide in the eighth century A .D . 11
Therefore, "he most probably was not born when ‘ Abd a l-M a lik 's reign came
4
to an end. "
1. Agh., Ill, p p .8 6 -7 .
2. The O rien t under the Caliphs, p .45 , C alcutta, 1920.
3. op. c it . , p. 254.
4. Ib id ., p p .3 0 8 -9 .
63 ,
In conclusion, as with the accounts of his wine drinking, it is
d iffic u lt to decide between such conflicting accounts, but if one accepts
the view that ‘ Abd a l-M a lik ibn Marwan was a music-lover (and a l -
MadSMnT, who argues this, is the most reliable authority), one still finds
it hard to accept Farmer's account that ‘ Abd a l-M a lik was a patron of
musicians: “ Both Ibn Misjah and Budaih, the best known musicians of the tim e,
were patronized by him. There is no reason to believe that ‘ Abd a l-M a lik
showed an inordinate interest in music, in a way to conflict with his religious
upbringing, or with his position as a sovereign of a Muslim State.
1. Farmer, A History of Arabian M usic, p . 6 1 , London, 1929,

CHAPTER II
THE ‘ALID O P P O S ITIO N
THE REVOLT OF AL-M UKHTAR IBN ABl * UBAID A L -T H A Q A F l
Gne of the most important events of the first century of Islam was the revolt
of a l-M u k h ta r ibn Abi ‘ Ubaid al-Thaqafi in Kufa 6 6 /6 8 5 . It contributed to a
large extent to the development of the Shi‘ a as a sect and also had its sig
nificance in both the political and the social history of the Umayyad period and
of Islam in general.
The early Arabic sources are remarkably rich in information about the
revolt and the developments which followed it. Tabari provides the fullest
account; the narratives of Baladhuri and Ibn A ‘ tham a l-K u fi are almost as fu lL
It is worth mentioning here that these three historians a ll u tilized the earlier
histories of Abu M ikhnaf, M ad a’ in i, Ibn a l-K a lb i, ‘ Awana ibn al-H akam and
W aqidi, Tabari relies almost entirely on the narrative of Abu M ikhn af, whose
importance lies in the fact that he uses the accounts of eye-witnesses such as
Hamid
• ibn Muslim a l-A z d i, al-S_ h a ‘ bi and ‘ Abd al-Rahman
* ibn Al i'l-K a n u d r
On the whole, Abu M ikh n af, though at times showing an Iraqi (Kufan) and ShiH
sympathy, is generally accurate in his information and more reliable than other
sources. In contrast, Ibn A ‘ tham shows clear p ro -‘ A lid sympathies and should
therefore be read carefully; he provides us with a means of balancing the other
sources. In some respects, such as the beginning of the revolt, he gives a more
detailed account than found elsewhere. Khalifa ibn Khayyat in his Tarikh
which is very brief on the revo lt, shows moderate Umayyad sympathies. A l-
D inaw ari, has his own distinctive approach: his accounts are at times con
fused and unconfirmed by early sources. He has a tendency to exaggerage:
the numbers he gives for those in the armies, the participants in the revolt,
and more especially the number of the m aw ali, are considerably higher
than any other source. G n the other hand, some of his information is
original. A l- Y a ‘ qubi's very brief account of al-M ukhtar's revolt reveals
moderate p ro -‘ A lid sympathies. Al-M ubarrad and Ibn ‘ Abd Rabbih are both
an ti-M ukh tar in their writings. With the former, this may be due to K harijite
inclinations and the latter's antipathy may spring from his close connection with
the Umayyad court in Spain. A l - ‘ Iqd of Ibn Abd Rabbih is more important for its
literary than historical qualities, and the information it contains on the social
conditions of the mawaii should not be taken at its face value. A l-M a s ‘ udi's
Muruj reveals a p ro -‘ A lid , and at times anti-Um ayyad fe elin g , but on the
other hand it provides us with some important dates which are lacking in the
other sources. He shows clearly the connection between a l-M u k h ta r and
Muhammad ibn a l-H a n a fiy y a . The later historians, such as Ibn a l-A th ir and
N u w a iri, add little new m aterial; they mostly re-e d it and summarize the
narratives in Baladhuri and Tabari. The Shi‘ ite biographers, such as Kashshi
and Tusi, provide valuable information about both the doctrine and the
personalities of the Shi‘ a. They provide a useful Shl‘ i background to the

revo lt, most useful since the history of al-M ukhtar has come down to us
mostly from non-Shi‘ i sources. Even the eye-witnesses mentioned in
Tabari, were men who, although formerly allies of a l-M u k h ta r, deserted

•
him and fought against him. The historical tradition to which we owe
our information grew up in K ufa, especially in the m ilieu of the Ashraf
and therefore is an ti-M u kh tar. ^
Modern scholars differ in their views on al-M u k h ta r and the nature
2
of his revolt* V an G elder considers him to be a man of remarkable
a b ilities, but so unscrupulous that he would pursue any means to achieve

3 m
his goal of seizing political power. Van V loten says that al-M u kh tar
gained the support of the mawali in Kufa as a result of sponsoring their
claim to equal share in the MFai’ " as the Arabs: this, however, led to a
4
decline in the number of his ‘ Arab supporters. Wellhausen regards a l -
M ukhtar as the first to work towards the removal of the social differences
of his tim e. He admits that al-M ukhtar exploited the name of Ibn a l -
Hanafiyya but considers him (al-M ukhtar) as sincere in his ideas and
not to be convicted of bad faith* Levi D ella V ida follows Wellhausen's
1. E. I ■^, (A l-M u kh tar).
2. Muhtar de Falsche Profeet, pp. 1 4 2 -3 , Leiden, 1888.
3. Reacherches Sur la Domination Arab, p ,1 5 , Amsterdam, 1894.

|P 1 1 ’ "■■■— i n . " ■■■■- * ■ ■ ' ......... M —
4. Die Religios-Folitischen OppositionSpartelen im alten Islam, p p .8 7 -9

and 9 4 -5 , Berlin, 1901.
5. E .l.\ (A l-M u kh tar).

67 .
argument when he says that al-M ukhtar's exploitation of Ibn al-H anafiyya's
name, and his double-deeding with the Ashraf were "tactical expedients"
necessary for thp triumph of his cause;and not the product of bad fa ith .
He adds that al-M u kh tar "sincerely believed in his mission and ecjualitarian
ideas about the m a w a li.. . " Professor M . Hodgson^ regards al-M u kh tar as
compromising the ShT‘ ite movement "with the toleration of such varied elements
*2
as ‘ Arab divination and equality for the m aw ali". S. Moscati considers
that al-M u kh tar was an "inspired prophet", and saw the significance of his
movement as lying in the more extremist religious cults arising at the tim e,
introducing a new political element, that of the m aw ali, into the Shi‘ ite
- r 3 - -
movement, A l-K harbutli considers al-M u kh tar as an enthusiastic Shi‘ ite ,
and his movement as a râl reflection of the social, p o litical and religious
conditions prevailing at the tim e. Finally, Dr. K .A . Fariq thinks that a l - . ’
4
Mukhtar was an opportunist and a false prophet. The following study is an
attempt to a better understanding and assessment of a l-M u k h ta r‘s personality
and his revolt.
A l-M ukhtar's father was Abu ‘ Ubaid Mas‘ udi ibn ‘ Amr ibn ‘ Umair
ibn ‘ Awf from the tribe of Thaqif. His mother was Dawma bint ‘ Amr ibn Wahb
1. How Did The Early Shi‘a Become Sectarian, p . 3 , J A O S , 7 5 , 1955.
2. Per Una Storia D ell'an tica S i‘ a , p p .2 5 6 -7 , RSO , X X X , 1 955.
3. A l-M u kh tar al-T h q q a fi, p . 5 , C airo, 1963.
4. The Story of an Arab Diplom at, p. 121, S ll, n o .3 , 1966.

68.
ibn Munobbih, another Thaqifite. ^ He was born in the first year of H ijra
in T a*if, 622 A , D, Little is known about his early life ; the first important
information is that when he was thirteen years old he accompanied his father,
2
an army leader, in the battle of the Bridge. His father lost his life in this
battle. A l-M ukhtar's uncle, Sa‘ d ib n M a s ‘ ud al-ThaqafT, was governor of
M ada’ in for the Caliph ‘ A li, and we find al-M ukhtar enjoying his uncle's
confidence, being entrusted with two important tasks. The first was to act as
-. . . - . . 3
deputy governor while his uncle left M ad a’ in in pursuit of a K harijite group.
The second occasion was when he was entrusted with a sum of money sent by
his uncle Sa‘ d from M a d a’ in to the Caliph ‘ AM in K ufa.^
In his youth, spent in M edi na after the death of his father, al-M ukhtar
_ 5
was known to be an ‘ A lid sympathizer and devoted to the Banu Hashim. Yet
there is a story which depicts him as a n ti-$ h i‘ i (‘ Uthmani), based on the advice
he gave to his uncle at the time when al-H asan, son and heir of ‘ A ll, was carried
wounded to M ada’ in. The advice was that al-Hasan be handed over to M u ‘ awiya
1. Z u bairi, p. 113; K halifa ibn K h ayyat, Tarikh, I, p. 92; M a ‘ a r if, p . 175;

Futufr, p . 250; Ansab, V , p . 214; NasaE>, fo l. 155b; J a b ., I, 2 1 7 5 f f .;
II, p .735; Jamharat, p .2 5 6 ff,; ‘ Asokir, X V I, fo l. 269b; Usd, IV , p . 336,
V , 248ff.
2. Ansab, V , p . 214; T a b ., 1, p .21 7 4 ff; Usd, IV , p .3 3 6 ; Lisan, V , p .6;

isaba, I I I , p. 1066. ”
3. D inaw ari, p. 218; T a b ., I, p .3366.
4. isaba, i l l , p. 1067. K .A . Fariq presumes thatal-M ukhtar was occupying

a financial post under his uncle in M ada’ in , The Story of an Arab Diplom at,
p ,5 4 ,j> N , no, 2 , 1966.
5. ‘ Asakir, X V I, fo l,26 9b (‘ Abdallah ibn Rabi‘ a al-M akh zu m i); Dhahabi, II,
p .3 8 0 ff. (citing Ibn Sa‘ d & WaqidT).
in order to win the la tte r’s favour. His uncle refused this advice and
- 1
cursed a l-M u k h ta r. This contradiction has been explained by historians
2
In various ways. Wellhausen avoids the issue: he simply quotes the story
without comment in a footnote, end follows it by another story depicting a l -
Mukhtar as a Shi4 i sympathizer refusing to sign the accusation against Hujr
ibn ‘ Adi a l-K in d i. Dr. Fariq^ takes the view that al-M u kh tar was an
opportunist and “sought to exploit the grave situation". A l-K harbutly
explains a l-M u k h ta r’s advice by saying he was infuriated by al-Hasan's
acceptance of a peaceful settlement wi th M u ‘ aw iya. Historical tradition seems
to be in favour of this last conclusion. It is reported by Abu M ikhnaf and

-5
a l-Z u h ri that when al-Hasan received the homage of the people of Kufa,
*
he stipulated that they should make peace with whom he chose to have
peace, and fight whom he chose to fight; this made them suspect that he was
preparing to negotiate with M u ‘ aw iya. These suspicions were confirmed when
for two months al-Hasan neither mentioned war against M u ‘ aw iya nor marched
1. Ansab, V , p . 214, fo l. 223b; T a b ., II, p p .2 & 520; Ib n a l-J a u z i, Tadhkirat

al-K h aw d s, p p .196-7 (citing al-S h a‘ b7).
2. Die Religios-Politischen Oppositiort&parteien im alten Islam, p .74.
3. The Story of an Arab Diplomat, p .56, S ll, I II , n o .2, 1966.
4 . op. c i t . , p. 52,
5. Ansab, fo l. 222b (citing Abu M ikhnaf & ‘ Awana); T a b ., II, p .5 (citing

al-ZuhrT); Bayasi, fo l. 31b (citing a l-Z u h ri).
against Syria. It is also reported by al-Baladhuri ^ that al-Hasan was
harshly criticised by his prominent Shi‘ i followers for concluding a settle
ment with M u ‘ aw iya. His Shi‘ i critics included al-M usayyab ibn N ajba
a l-F a z a ri, Sufyan ibn Layl al-H am dani, Hujr ibn ‘ Adi and Sulaiman
ibn Kathir a l-K h u z a ‘ i. Thus the advice given by A l-M u kh tar to his uncle
might have been influenced by the same motives, and the realization that
al-Hasan
* was not the man of the hour for the Shi‘ a. -
M oreover, if a l -
Mukhtar intended in giving this advice to his uncle, to go over to the side of
M u ‘ aw iya, he had his opportunity soon afterwards. The advice reached
M u ‘ awiya's ears and he would doubtless have welcomed al-M ukhtar as an
a lly ; but al-M ukhtar did not defect, which makes it d iffic u lt to accept
Fariq's conclusion.
A l-M ukh tar continued to show himself as a Shi‘ i, or at least a n ti-
Umayyad, until the end of his life . In 5 1 /6 7 1 , when Ziyad ibn Abih, the
governor of a l-K u fa for M u ‘ aw iya, accused Hujr ibn ‘ Adi a l-K in d i of having
attempted to revolt against the caliph, he asked the Ashraf of a l-K u fa to sign
the accusation as witnesses. W hile all were keen to do so to show their loyalty
to the governor, al-M u kh tar did not commit himself in this affair, managing to
1. Ansab, fo l. 225a; T a b ., I I, p. 9; lmta‘ , II, p .64; N ih a y a , I, p .73;

Siyar, p. 57. ^ ,
. IJ I ; ^\) J /v—^ 0 -V ^ |u )
, ■ C o - Ls J j ?—r \ J U * j? ^ Vs J
' t j j_j? bi ^ —o b L6 U lX ) cJ I
71 .
1
avoid signing it.
Muslim ibn ‘ A q il, sent by al-Husain ibn ‘ A li ibn Abi Jalib as his
personal representative to the 5 h i‘ a of Kufa in 6 0 /6 7 9 , chose the house
2
of al-M ukhtar as his residence. As a result, al-M ukhtar's house became
the centre of Muslim's and the Shi‘ as* activities, until the arrival of
‘ U baidallah ibn Ziyad as governor of Kufa for the Caliph Y azid ibn
M u ‘ aw iya. This choice of al-M ukhtar's house shows that Muslim must have
been sure of his attachment to the Shi‘ a cause, or at very least, certain that
he was anti-U m ayyad. Another reason for the choice was that al-M ukhtar
- T - T 3
was the son-in-law of a l- N u ‘ man ibn Bashir al-A nsari,
- - - •
who was still
the governor of Kufa, a fact which enabled the Shi* a followers to act
freely. Had al-M ukhtar really been a ‘ Uthmani, what better opportunity
would he have had of jeopardizing the Shi* a cause by betraying Muslim to the
governor?
When Muslim ibn * Aqil was forced to revolt prematurely in 6 0 /6 7 9 , al
Mukhtar was outside Kufa in his estate in Khutraniyya, Being informed of
Muslim's revolt, he hurried back to Kufa at the head of his mawali to support
1. Ansab, fo l. 403a (citing Abu Mukhnaf); T a b ., I I, p. 134 (citing Abu

M fkhrlaf): Agh. , X V I, p .8 (citing Abu M ikhn af).
2. Ansab, V , p . 214; D m aw ari, p . 244; T a b ., II, p . 237 (citing Abu

M ikhn af) & p .502; K u fi, I, fols. 196a; Irshpd, p . 205.
3. Ansab, fo l. 155a; D inaw ari, p . 247; T a b ., II, p . 264 (citing Abu

M ikhn af); Irshad, p. 207.
72 .
him.^ He arrived too late to assist Muslim, deserted by his followers,
and killed by the governor. He was, however, summoned to the governor's
presence, and reproached for his implication in the revolt. When a l -
Mukhtar denied any part in it, the governor struck him in the eye with
a stick, and sent him to prison. He remained there until after the battle of
Karbala’ 10th Muharram, 6 1 /1 0th O ctober, 680, when he was released
by the intervention of his brother-in-law ‘ Abdallah ibn ‘ Umar ibn a l -
2
Khattab; but he was ordered to leave the city within three days.
O n the third day after his release, he left Kufa for a l-H ija z ; on his
way there he met Ibn a l - ‘ Irq, a mawla of Thaqif, who asked him what had
happened to his eye. A l-M ukh tar told him that ‘ Ubaidallah ibn Ziyad
struck it and swore that he would cut "his fingers, hands and limbs into
pieces" as revenge. He confirmed this when Ibn a l - ‘ Irq doubted it, and then
asked him about Ibn a l-Z u b a ir. He was told that "Ibn a l-Z u b a ir has taken
refuge in the sanctity of al-Haram (the shrine of a I- K a ‘ b a ) . . . People say
that he receives homage secretly. He w ill come into the open as soon as
he has gathered sufficient followers". A l-M ukh tar replied: "Ibn a l-Z u b a ir
1. Ansab, V , pp. 2 1 4-1 5; Y a ‘ qubi, II, p .307; T a b ., II, pp. 220-1 (citing
Abo M ikhnaf); K am il, IV , p. 139.
2. Ansab, V , p p .2 1 5 -6 ; Y a ‘ qubi, II, p . 307; Tab, II, p p .522-3 (citing

Abu M ikhnaf); KufT, I, fols. 235b-236a.
73 .
is the man of the ‘ Arabs; if he follows my plans and listens to my advice,
I w ill be the man to take the responsibility of securing the people's support
for him. Otherwise, w e ll, I am equal to any other ‘ Arab. The time of
troubles is about to begin; one day you w ill hear that al-M u kh tar and his
followers are seeking revenge against those who slew al-Husain and by God,
I shall k ill as many as were slain in vengeance ofYahya ibn Zakariyya". ^
These veiled hints are the first indication of his ambitions for the
future. He must have realised that, after the fa ll of al-H usain, Ibn a l -
Zubair had become the centre of opposition to the Umayyad rule, since
there was no active ‘ A lid claim ant. This was presumably the reason why a l -
Mukhtar went to a l- H ija z , rather than elsewhere. It would seem that he
turned to Ibn a l-Z u b a ir not so much for love of his cause, but for a common
Umayyad antipathy, combined with his ambition to achieve an important post.
His claim that he could secure the support of the people for Ibn a l-Z u b a ir was
based on the increased anti-Um ayyad feeling in Kufa due to al-Husain's death:
al-M u kh tar knew that this could easily be exploited for Ibn a i-Z u b air's cause,
or for his own use. To gain such popular support in Iraq (especially in Kufa),
it would be necessary to depict the cause as one of vengeance for al-H usain:
such revenge would need the sanction of an ‘ A lid , especially ‘ A li ibn a l -
Husain, or Muhammad ibn a l-H a n a fiy y a .
Ansab, V , p p .2 1 5 -6 ; T a b ., II, p . 524 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); K u f i, I,

fol s. 263a-263 b . The name given here is a l-S u ‘ qub i"En Zuhair and not
Ibn a l - ‘ irq.
The sources give accounts of correspondence between al-M ukhtar
and both these ‘ A lid claimants. ‘ A li ibn al-H■usain was more favourable
for al-M ukhtar's purpose, since he was seeking to avenge his father's
death. ‘ A li at this time was a young man, about 24 years old, and was
keeping aloof from politics, perhaps because of witnessing the massacre of
his father and his family in the battle of Karbala* 10th Muharram, 6 1 /1 0th
October, 680. It was to Ibn al H aniftyya, however, that the eyes of the
Shi‘ a were turned after the death of al-H usain, for none of the ‘ Alids of the
Fatimid line was of a suitable age. ^ But he also was p o litic a lly inactive
and held strongly to the idea that a sovereign should be unanimously chosen.
2
He showed unwillingness to accept the Caliphate on any other terms. A l-
Mukhtar wrote to ‘ A li to show his loyalty to him, and asking if he could
rally the Kufans for him. He sent with the letter a large sum of money. ‘ A li
refused this offer and declared al-M ukhtar to be a liar who was trying to exploit
3
the cause of "AhI A l-B a it" for his own interests.
Having failed to gain the support of ‘ A li ibn al-H usain, al-M ukhtar
turned to his uncle Muhammad ibn al-H a n a fiy y a . Al Mukhtar sent him a letter
similar to that he had sent to ‘ A li ibn al-Husain and also sent a sum of money.
1. B. Lewis, The O rigin of lsmar il?sm, p . 26, Cambridge, 1940.
2. Sa‘ d, V , p p .6 6 -8 6 .
3. Ansab, V , p . 272 (citing Ahmad ibn Ibrahim); V.

^ \ , V , p. 172*
75 .
When news of this reached ( A ii ibn al-Husain he urged his uncle not to
accept al-M ukhtar's offer, and to declare him an impostor. The latter,
before taking any decision, consulted ‘ Abdallah ibn tf Abbas, who advised
him not to comply with ( A ll's advice, on the grounds that Ibn al-H an afiyya
did not know how he would fare with ibn a l-Z u b a ir who had just been
recognised as caliph in M ecca. ^
Since no chronology is given, nor place names, for these two letters,
it is impossible to be certain whether they took place before or after a l -
Mukhtar had arrived in Kufa. However, judging from the fact that he sent
with each letter a large sum of money, one might guess that they were sent
after he had gained a source of income, that is, after seizing Kufa. The fact
that al-M ukhtar gained success in Kufa by using the name of Ibn a l -
Hanafiyya can be explained in the light of a meeting which had taken
place between them before al-M ukhtar was left M ecca to go to Kufa. On
this occasion al-M ukhtar told Ibn a l-H a n ifiy y a that he was going to avenge
his relatives and acquire power for him. Ibn a l-H a n a fiy y a , however, gave
al-M u kh tar only a non-committal reply: he neither approved nor disapproved
of al-M ukh tar's intention to avenge al-H usain, and only warned him against
2
bloodshed. A l-M u kh far took this attitude as consent, and exploited Ibn
al-Hanafiyya*s name for his own interest in Kufa: but wishing to gain a more
1. Ansab, V , p . 218; M uruj, V , pp. 172-3.
2. Ansab, V , p. 218.
reliable 6 A lid recognition, he contacted * A li Ibn al-H usain, only to be
*
refused. He therefore wrote to Ibn al-H a n a fiy y a , but he never succeeded
in gaining e x p lic it recognition from him. In the event, the hestiation and
political inactivity of Ibn a l-H a n ifiy y a encouraged al-M u kh tar more and
more to exploit his name for his own interest.
In M ecca al-M u kh tar went to Ibn a l-Z u b a ir who inquired about
affairs in Kufa. A fter giving him full information about the situation there,
al-M ukhtar offered his homage to Ibn a l-Z u b a ir and said, "G ive me your
1
hand and receive my homage, and try to meet my desires. " Thus al-M ukhtar's
homage was not given unconditionally: he was attempting to exploit Ibn al~
Zubair's need for support in order to gain his own ends. But he over-estimated
his need; Ibn a l-Z u b a ir refused his aid , angry at his indiscretion in speaking
of such serious matters in public. N ot finding in M ecca what he wanted, a l -
2
Mukhtar left for a i-T a ?if, his native c ity , where he remained for a year.
The sources are all silent about his activities during this year in al-T a* if.
3
Van G elder presumes that during this time he was in contact with Ibn a l -
Hanafiyya in M edina. Dr. K. Fariq^ says that "he made periodical visits
to M ecca and M edina and met Ibn al-H an afiyya and ( A li ibn al-Husain to read
their minds and win their g o o d -w ill." But there is no evidence to support either
1. Ansab, V , p . 216; T a b ., II, p p .52 5 -6 (citing Abu M ikhn af); KufT, I,

fo l. 236b. ’ —
2* Ansab, V , p . 216; T a b ., II, p .2 2 6 ; KufT, I, fo l. 236b.

3. op. c it. , p. 29,
4. The Story of an Arab Diplom at, p . 62, $11, III, no. 2 , 1966.
of these views. F in ally , al-K harbutly says that he wanted to escape from
Ibn a-Zub air's observation. ^ It seems likely that al-M u kh tar was
watching the political situation from al-T a* if, and that during this retirement,
the p o litical and religious ideas later connected with his name began to take
shape. ^
A year later, al-M u kh tar appeared suddenly in M e c c a , By this tim e, Ibn
a l-Z u b a ir had been publically recognized as C aliph, but al-M ukhtar stayed
aloof at first. It was through the mediation of ‘ Abbas ibn Sahl that a meeting
was arranged between the two. A l-M u kh tar paid homage to Ibn a l-Z u b a ir
on the following conditions: that Ibn a l-Z u b a ir consult him in a il his
decisions, that he give him audience before everybody else, and award him a
high post as soon as he had been unanimously recognized as C aliph. Ibn
a l-Z u b a ir replied that he would receive al-M ukhtar's homage only in accordance r
to the Book of God (Q ur’ an) and the Sunna of the Prophet. A l-M u kh tar
refused to give homage on such terms, claiming that Ibn a l-Z u b a ir was not treating
4
him with the distinction he deserved. Ibn al—Zubair, on A bbas' advice,
accepted al-M ukhtar's terms. These serve to demonstrate very clearly his p o li
tical ambition and also confirm what he had already stated in his first meeting with
1. op. c it . , p. 92.
2. E. I. \ (al-M u khtar).
3. Ansab, V , pp. 2 1 6 -7 ; T a b ., II, p .5 2 6 ff. (citing Abu M ikh n af); K u fi, I,

fois. 237a-237b; Bad*) V I , p. 15. —
4. Ansab, V , p p .2 1 6 -7 ; T a b ., II, p .526 ; K^fT, I, fols. 237a-237b; B a d ', V I ,

p. 15. ’
Ibn a l-Z u b a ir - and even before that, in his conversation with Ibn a l - f Irq. ^
Why was Ibn a l-Z u b a ir now prepared to accept al-M ukhtar's terms after
before refusing them? The answer seems to be that Ibn a l-Z u b a ir, realizing
al-M ukhtar's ambitions, decided not to risk creating trouble for himself in a l -
H ija z or in Iraq by antagonizing him. It may also be that a l-M u k h ta r, by
this tim e, had become an important man, whose p o litical qualities were
indispensible. O r it could have been due to political diplomacy, as a way
of flattering ‘ Abdallah ibn ( Umar, a son-in-law of al-M u k h ta r's, whose

o
support Ibn a l-Z u b a ir greatly needed.
From this time until the death of Y azid I, 6 4 /6 8 3 , we find al-M ukhtar
closely attached to Ibn a l-Z u b a ir • When Y azid I sent a Syrian army against
Ibn a l-Z u b a ir 6 4 /6 8 3 , al-M u kh tar distinguished himself in fighting the
Syrians and defending the K a( ba. He remained in H iia z until the withdrawal
• 1
of the army at the death of the caliph Y azid in the same ye ar.^
Five months passed after the Syrians withdrew from M ecca and still
al-M ukhtar waited for Ibn a l-Z u b a ir to give him the promised post (probably
1. See p p ,7Z r£*
2. Ansab, V , p p ,1 9 5 -7 (citing Made? in i); Agh. , I, p. 12; Sharh, I, p .326;

X X , p. 149 (quoting Agh. ); Kharbutl? , op. c it . , p. 100.
3. ZubairT, p .2 6 9 ; Imama, II, p. 10 (citing AbJ M a'sh ar); T a b ., II, p p .5 2 8 -9 .

(citing Abu M ikhh af)J; KufT, I, fols. 238b-239a, 239b, 243b;M q d ,, IV ,
p. 393 (citing Abu M a'shar); M uru[, V , pp. 165-6; Bad’ , V I , p.TS; ‘ Asdkir,
, fol > 269b (citing <Abdallah ibn AbT Rab7*a al-M ak h zu m i). It is
reported (T a b ., H, p . 529) that during the seige of al-Ka< ba by al-Husain
• •
79 .
the governorship of K ufa), with no success. Therefore not prepared to
trust Ibn a l-Z u b a ir any more,he made up his mind to go to Kufa. ^ In
order to find out about the situation there, he kept asking everybody who came
from Kufa for news. He was informed that the people there had accepted the
authority of Ibn a l-Z u b a ir, although a considerable number of them were
waiting for a man who would rally them in support of their own cause, beyond
the simple anti-Um ayyad position of Ibn a l-Z u b a ir. If they could find such a
leader, he could, with their support, rule the whole Islamic world. At this
- . - - . 2
news, al-M u kh tar said, "I am Abu Ishaq. I am their man and no one e ls e .11
Therefore, he left M ecca for Kufa, very cautiously, in order not to arouse
the suspicions of Ibn a l-Z u b a ir who might prevent him from leaving and hamper
3 -
his project. Contradicting this, it is reported that al-M u kh tar left M ecca for
= ibn Num air, al-M ukhtar was fighting with a group of K h arijite who
came to Ibn a l-Z u b a ir to defend the Kaf ba. It is probably for this
reason that he was called a K harijite (Mubarrad, III, p . 264). Dozy
in his book Essai Sur L'lslamisme, p ,2 2 3 , Paris, 1879, refers to this,
and depicts al-M u kh tar as being a K h arijite. The fact that al-M ukhtar
fought with the Kharijites to defend a l-K a *b a does not make him a
K h arijite; this becomes very clear when we consider the other elements
who participated in the defence of the Kaf ba. In addition to the
Kharijites there were the people of Mecca and M e d in a, and also an
Abyssinian group headed by Ibn a l-Z u b a ir. If we consider al-M ukhtat"
a K harijite on these grounds, we must also regard all these groups, including
Ib rT al-Z u b air, as Kharijites too. The fact that the Kharijites deserted
Ib n -a l-Z u b a ir, after the withdrawal of the Syrian army from M ecca, reveals
the reason why they joined Ibn a l-Z u b a ir. Moreover when al-M ukhtar
seized Kufa we neither find him supporting the K harijite nor being supported
by them.
Ansab, V , p .217; Y a ‘ qubi, II, p .307; T a b ., II, p p .530-5 31.
2. Ansab, V , p . 217; T a b ., II, p p .530-532 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); KufT, I,

folsT"257a, 257b, 558a.
3. Ansab, V , p p .27 1 -2 (citing Wahab ibn Jarir); M u ru j, V , pp. 170-71.

Kufa with the permission of Ibn a l-Z u b a ir and not on his own accord. He
sent him there to rally the people of Kufa and prepare them for war
against the Syrians. This would seem to be u n likely, for if Ibn a l-Z u b a ir
was confident of al-M ukhtar and ready to offer him such an important post,
the latter would not have deserted him, but would continue to be on his
1
side. Dr. K. A . Fariq gives two contradictory accounts, stating that Ibn
a l-Z u b a ir did not trust al-M u k h ta r, this being the reason why he did not
give him a post; w hile at the same time he says that Ibn a l-Z u b a ir sent
al-M u kh tar to Kufa “to enlist the support of the Kufans for the new caliph
2 .
and rouse them to war against the Syrian army". As we have seen it was
now that al-M ukhtar contacted Ibn a l-H an a fiyy a for the first tim e.
- _ 3
A l-M u kh tar reached Kufa on Friday 15th Ramadan, 64 /6th M ay, 664.
He entered the city passing deliberately through the quarters of the S h i'a ,
showing himself to be a precursor (Bashir) of a new era of prosperity. He
saluted every one he met and promised them prosperity and success, inviting
4
them to see him at his house th a t same evening. Then he went to the mosque
and performed his prayer before going home. By announcing predictions of
success and prosperity in such a vague way, al-M u kh tar tried to rally to
1. The Story of an Arab Diplomat, p . 63, S II, II I , N o . 1, 1966.
2. See p. 7 5
3. T a b ., 11, p . 509.
4. Ansab,V, p .2 1 7 ;T a b ., II, p p .5 3 2 -3 3 (citing AbuM ikhn af); KufT, I,

fols. 257b-258a. ' —
himself as many of the Shi‘ a of Kufa as possible. Even those who were not
thinking of associating themselves with him, for one reason or another,
would have been curious to know what he had brought them, or for whom he
was working, especially in such a troubled period. ^
When the Shi‘ a assembled at al-M ukhtar's house that evening, they told
him that the majority of the Shi‘ a had joined Sulaiman ibn Surad al-K huza* i
who was about to march against ‘ Ubaidallah ibn Z iy a d , to stop his advance
on Iraq, and to avenge al-Husain. Then a l-M u k h ta r, already w ell-inform ed
about Sulaiman before arriving in Kufa, said that "he had been sent to them
by the M ahdi (the rightly-guided one), the son of the Wasi (legatee)
Muhammad ibn * A li, as his confidant (Amin), minister (W azir) and officer
(A m ir), with orders to fight a l-M u lh id u n , to avenge the Mahdi's fam ily and
1. It is reported in T a b ., II, p . 532, on the authority of Abu M ikhnaf,

that when al -M ukhtar passed by the quarter of Banu Badda’ , he
met ‘ Ubaida ibn ( Amr al-Baddt from the Kinda tribe. This man,
beside being a brave warrior and a zealous partisan of *A lT, was
known also as a good poet, who indulged in wine to an excess.
After saluting him al-M ukhtar conveyed to him the good news of
prosperity and success and promised him God's pardon because of
his love to i AIT and his fam ily. ‘ Ubaida, taking the most hopeful
view of al-M ukhtar's announcement, asked for an explanation. But
al-M u kh tar asked ‘ Ubaida to meet him with the other people of his
quarter in al-M ukhtar's house that same evening. It seems that
a l-M u k h ta r, realising the importance of the poet to his cause,
made fKTs concession to ‘ Ubaida.
82 .
to defend the weak (Du‘ a fa ?)" , He also told the S h ica that " . . . Sulaiman
is .. . too old, has had no experience in political matters or in wars.
By the weak he meant those who were socially w eak, i . e . the slaves, the
m aw ali and some * Arabs too, to whom his appeal was directed; perhaps
it is for this reason that we find many ( Arabs joining him in his first revolt.
The jursistsof later period classified the mawali into three categories:
mawla*Rahim, that is, a blood relation; mawlcT‘ A taqa, that is, a freed
man, who is often born free but enslaved in war, and through emancipation
becomes a mawla of his former master; fin ally mawla al~ ‘ Aqd, that is by
2
kinship. The second and third kind are of interest to us in this study.
A I-M ukh tar is credited with being the first to develop the idea of Mahdi
3 -
as a religious Messiah. The idea of Mahdi which al-M u kh tar here emphasized,
in talking of the w eak, was directed at the socially deprived groups, who
looked at Ibn a l-H a n a fiy y a as their "Saviour", the one to establish a reign
of justice. A l-M u kh tar was the first to understand, and to try to remedy, the
existing distinctions in social, economic and political rights between ‘ Arabs
1. Ansab, V , p p .207-218; Y a 'q u b i, II, p .308; T a b ., II, p p .351-52

(citing Abu M ikh n af): KufT, I, fo l. 258a.
2. G o ldzih er, Muslim Studies, p. 102 (ed. S .M . Stern), London, 1967;

M . W att, ShTe7sm Under the Early Umayyads, p. 163, JRAS, 1960;
A i-* A lT , al-TanzTmat g l-ljtim d * iyya wal Iqtisadiyya fil Basra fil Qarn
a l-A w w al a l- H ijr t , p. 63, Baghdad, 1953,
3. B. Lewis, The Arabs in History, p .72, London, 1964; Margoliouth,

On MahdT and Mahdisim, p .4 , PBA, X V , 1915; E. 1.1 , (al-MahdT).
83 .
and m aw ali. ^ As for the question of whether Ibn a l-H a n a fiy y a agreed
2
to be called a l-M a h d i, our sources, apart from the report of Ibn Sa*d,
are silent. This report says that Ibn al-H an a fiyy a had no objection to it,
but he preferred to be called by his name Muhammed or his "Kunya"
Abu'l Qasim. It seems, therefore, that al-M ukhtar applied this title for
Ibn al-H a n a fiy y a against the latter's w ill.
Al Mukhtar found in Sulaiman ibn Surad a great riv a l, for he was the
first to ca ll vengeance for al-H usain; and owing to Sulaiman's age and past,
it was d iffic u lt for al-M u kh tar to gather the Shi* a round himself. N everthe
less, he did not yield but carried on with his plans. He began to alienate
the Shi*a from Sulaiman by emphasizing his own mission from Ibn a l -
H anafiyya, and pointing out that Sulaiman was now old and without e x -
»
3
perience of w ar. “ If they followed Sulaiman, he would k ill them and him self."
These tactics were successful and as a result, only four thousand out of the
sixteen thousand men who paid homage to Sulaiman assembled in his camp
. - 4
prior to his march against Ibn Z iyad . Although both al-M ukhtar and
1. W ellhqusen,Die Religios-Politischen OppositionAparteien *m alten

Islam, p. 95.
2. S a*d, V , pp. 6 8 -9 .
3. Ansab, V , p . 218; T a b ., II, p p .509-510 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); Ibn a i -
JauzT, Tadhkirat a l-K h aw a s, p. 283. Sulaiman was an STd companion
of the Prophet, who after the death of the latter resided in Kufa and
became a champion of ‘ AIT, accompanying him in nearly a ll his wars.
He was also an influential figure in the Khuza*a tribe. See Sa*d, IV ,
p .30; K halifa ibn Khayyat, Jabaqat, pp. 107 & 137; M a *a d , fo l. 62b;
Jamharat, p. 226; Usd, 11, p. 359; l§aba, II , p. 253; TahdhTb, IV ,
p p .2 0 0-2 01; Baghdadi, Tarikh Baghdad, I, p .2 0 0 ff.
4. Ansab, V , p . 208; T a b ., II, p . 539 (citing Abu M ikhn af); K u fi, fols.
25§E^259a. —
84 .
Sulaiman were claiming to avenge al-H usain, yet they were working in
different directions. Because of a tribal relationship between Sulaiman's
followers and the AshrSf of Kufa, he refused to seize K^fa and k ill those
who participated in the massacre of al-H usain. He claimed that only
Ibn Ziyad and the Syrians were guilty of al-Husain's slaughter. A l-
M ukhtar, on the other hand, was preparing to seize K ufa, an important
factor in winning some of Sulaiman's supporters to his side.
A l-M ukhtar was, however, unwilling to take any violent action
against Sulaiman, for the majority of the Shîa were w ith him. It was
impossible for him to risk arousing the antipathy of the Shi‘ a , if his scheme
was to be successful. To this one might add that al-M u kh tar was almost
sure of the failure of Sulaiman's movement and therefore left him to face his
end. These tactics paid o ff, for SulaimSn’s failure led the Shi‘ a to re
consider al-M ukhtar's offer of leadership, and eventually they turned
towards him.
O n the 22nd of Ramadan 64/14th of M ay 684, only one week after
al-M ukhtar's arrival in Kufa, ‘ Abdallah ibn a l-Z u b a ir sent ‘ Abdallah ibn
YazTd a l-K hat arm as Governor to a l-K u fa . W ith himwas Ibrahim ibn
' - 2
Muhammad ibn Talha ibn * U baidallah, as collector of K haraj. This however
* • "
1. Ansab, V , p .2 0 9 (citing Abu M ikh n af); J a b ., I I , p.541 (citing Abu

M ik h n af).
2. Ansab, V , p .2 0 7 ; T a b ., I I, p .5 0 9 (citing Abu M ik h n af); KufT, I,
IS TT 258; K am il, IV , p. 134.
was an unfortunate choice on the part of Ibn a l-Z u b a ir, for Ibrahim's
father and grandfather had been killed in the battle of the C am el, which
made it extremely unlikely that there would be cordial relations between
him and the Kufans. M oreover, the relationship between the Governor
and the Kharaj collector was also strained, and in both cases the situation
could be exploited by a l-M u k h ta r. ^
A fter Sulaiman's departure, al-M ukhtar's activities aroused the
suspicions of the Ashraf of a l-K u fa , most of whom had participated in the
battle of K arb a la*, Muharram 61 /O ctober 680 against al-H usain. They
• *
reported him to the governor to warn him against the movement, saying that it
was more dangerous than that of Sulaiman; for a l-M u k h ta r wanted to revolt
2
against the governor in his own c ity . Consequently, al-M u k h ta r was
seized and imprisoned, where he remained until the return of the remnant
of Sulaiman ibn Surad's followers from the battle of 1 A in al-W ard a 6 3 /6 8 5 ;
Sulaiman had been killed in this battle.
During his imprisonment a committee of fiv e , a ll of them Yemenites,
3
were acting on his behalf and accepting homage for him. A l-M ukh tar
1. Ansab, V , p p .2 0 7 -8 ; T a b ., I I, p . 515 (citing Abu M ikh n af); Kam il,

IV , pp. 134-5; Kharbutli, op. c i t . , 140.
2. Ansab, V , p . 218; T a b ,, II, p . 535 (citing Abu M ik h n af).
3. They were: al-S a*ib ibn M a lik a l-A s M a ri, Y azid ibn Anas al-A sad i,
Ahmar ibn Shumait al-A hm asi, Rifa<*a ibn Shaddad a l-F ity a n i, and
cAbdallah TEn Shaddad al-Jumahc. It is very interesting to point out
that all these leaders belong to*the Yemenite Tribes alone. K halifa
ibn Khayyat, Jabaqat, pp. 152-3; Nasab, fo l. 58a; M a <ad, foT. 50b;
T a b ., II, p . 601; Jamharat, pp. 182 & 367.
86 .
himself was working actively from his confinement proclaiming in rhymed
prose propaganda emphasizing that his aim was to k ill every tyrant with the
help of his followers, whom he called Ansar (Helpers), in order to regain
the unity of the Muslims and to avenge the apostles; and for this end he
did not mind death or the loss of worldly glory. ^ He also wrote to the
routed followers of Sulaiman ibn Surad, praising them for their efforts and
wishing on them the mercy of God; he said that Sulaiman was not their
man but he (al-M ukhtar) was the one sent to be their leader and asked
them to be ready and hopeful. He summoned them to the "Book of G od",

2
the Sunna of the Prophet and the defence of the w eak. He was fu lly
aware of what the Shi*a of his time wanted and he played with their
sentiments accordingly, through these announcements.
A l-M u kh tar was released only after the request of his b ro th er-in -
law , * Abdallah ibn *Umar and on the guarantee of ten influential men;
he gave a strong religious vow not to engage in any subversive activities
against the governor and the collector of the Kharaj as long as they were
3
in power. However, al-M u kh tar was quite prepared to dishonour this vow
for the realizatio n of his cause - although in the event he did not need to
1. T a b ., I I , p . 536; Kami I, IV , p. 143.
2. Ansab, V , p . 219; T a b ., II , p . 569 (citing Abu M ik h n a f); K u fi, I,

fo l. 264a. * —
3. Ansab, V , p .219; T a b ., II, p . 600 (citing Abu M ikhn af).

87 .
do so - and laughed at the stupidity of the governor and his associate.
M eanw h ile, A b d a lla h ibn al—Zubair, considering the danger of
al-Mukhtar and his movement, appointed a new governor for a l-K u fa ,
* Abdallah ib n M u ti* , 27th Ramadan, 6 5 /6 th M a y , 685, and presumably
ordered him to be more cautious and prduent than his predecessors.^ The
coming of the new governor enabled al-M ukhtar to act more freely since
he has no commitments towards him.
In his first speech Ibn M u ti* told the Kufans that he would adopt
the policy of *Umar ibn a U K h a tta b and *Uthman ibn *A ffan and
2
warned them against disunity and creating troubles. Here again ibn a l-
Zubair was unfortunate in choosing this man for the governorship of a l -
Kufa, the centre of the Shi*a movement at that tim e. His speech shows
clearly his ignorance of both the political situation and the feelings of the
Shi*a towards * Umar and *Uthman and their financial policy. The Kufans
were looking back to the days of the Caliph * A li, where Kufa was the
capital of the Islamic Empire and the place of the central treasury, and their
Fai* was distributed among them. N o wonder, therefore, that the governor's
1. Ansab, V , p . 220; T a b ., II, p .602; K u fi, I, fo l. 264a.
2. Ansab, V , p . 220; T a b ., II, p . 603; K u fi, I, fo l. 264b.
3. T a b ., II, p .603 (citing Abu M ikhn af); W ellhausen, Die Religios-

Poiitischen Oppositioa&pqrteien im alten Islam, p . 76.
88 .
speech stirred up his audiences who opposed him openly and strongly, so
that he was forced to announce at the end of the speech that he would
adopt any policy to please them. ^
This opposition to the new governor showed clearly the latter's
weakness and the attitude of the ShM a towards Ibn a l-Z u b a ir, and also
how strong al-M u kh tar and his followers had become.
However, this strength of al-M ukhtar did not escape the shrewd
eyes of I'yas ibn Mudarib a !-* Ijli, who was at the head of the Shurta
(police); he warned the governor by informing him that those who opposed
him were the followers of al-M ukhtar. He also advised him to imprison
a l-M u k h ta r, for news had come to him that the latter was planning to seize
— 2 — r-‘j _
a l-K u fa . Consequently Ib n M u ti* sent Z a ida ibn Oudama g l-Th aqafi,
a kinsman of a l-M u k h ta r, and Husain ibn ( Abdallah al-Bursumi from the tribe
of Hamdan, to ask al-M u kh tar to come and meet the governor. Za ida ibn
Oudama, who was an intimate friend of al-M ukhtar and remained faithful
to him even after his death, hinted to a l-M u k h ta r, by reciting a certain
verse from the Q u r'a n , not to go. A l-M u kh tar pretended that he was sick
and asked the two men to inform the governor of this and apologise on his
behalf.^
1. Ansab, V , p . 221; T a b ., II, p . 604; K u fi, I, fo l. 264b,
2. T a b ., II, p . 604 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); K ufi, I, fo l. 264b.
3. T a b ., II, p . 604; K u fi, I, fo l. 264b.

89 .
A t this time al -M ukhtar began to prepare to seize a l-K u fa in
Muharram 6 6 /August 685 and sent for his followers to gather in the houses
around him. But as he was busy planning, a group of Shi* a among his
followers began to suspect his claim of being sent to them by Ibn al-H an a fiyy a
and decided to go to M ecca to question the latter about the authenticity of
al-M ukhtar's claim . Ibn a l-lja n a fiy y a answered that he wished for God to
take his revenge on his enemies, through whatever instrument He liked. ^
The delegation considered this vague and non-committal answer from ibn
al—Hanafiyya as permission from them to support a l-M u k h ta r, on the grounds

• 1
that if Ibn a l-H a n a fiy y a did not approve al-M ukhtar's activity he would
have ordered them not to join him.
A ll this inquiry was taking place without the knowledge of al-Mukhtar,
When he learnt of it, be became very worried, fearing that Ibn a l-H an a fiyy a
might have given them a reply which would be injurious to his plans. He
therefore wished to revolt before the coming of the delegation but was not
2
able to.
After a month the delegation came back and told al-M u kh tar that Ibn
1. Ansab, V , p .222; Ya*qubi , II, p .308; T a b ., II, p p .3 0 5 -6 (citing Abu

M ikhn af); K ufi, I, fols 265a-265b. The* delegation were : * Abd al-Rahman
ibrTShuraih a l-S h ib a m i, 5a*id ibn Munqidh a l-T h a w ri, S i*r ibn AbTSi*r
al-H anafT, al-Aswad ibn Jarad al-KindT and Qudama ibn M a lik a l -
JushamT. Here again a ll of them were Yemenites.
2. T a b ., II, p . 608 (citing Abu M ikhn af).

90 .
Ibn a l-H an a fiyy a ordered them to support him. A l-M u k h ta r, in re lie f,
summoned the Shi* a for a general meeting at which he announced the
approval of Ibn a l-H an a fiyy a of his mission. This was confirmed by the
head of the delegation and his companions, who delivered speeches on this
. 1
occasion.
It cannot be doubted that the favourable reply of Ibn al-H a n a fiy y a
brought by the delegation enhanced al-M ukhtar's prestige and increased his
followers. For it encouraged those who were in doubt of al-M ukhtar's claims
to be an agent of Ibn al-H a n a fiy y a to come to his camp, or at least to
sympathise with him. The celebrated traditionist al-S h a*b i and his father
Shurahbil were among those hesitators who responded to al-M u kh tar after
2
this event.
In order to face the governor Ibn M uti* and the Ashraf of Kufa,
al-M u kh tar had to win the support of Ibrahim ibn al-A shtar. The latter was
the son of M a lik ibn a l-H a rith al-A shtar, one of the noblemen of the tribe
• 1 1■■■
of al-tNakha* from M ad h h ij, and a great supporter of ( A li. Like his father,
Ibrahim was a man of great influence among his tribe's members. He was with
his father on Al i's side in the battle of Siffi n and remained faithful to ‘ AM
and his fam ily. It is not easy to account for the failure of Ibrahim to
1. Ansab, V , p p .2 1 1 -2 ; T a b ., II, p p .6 0 8-6 09 (citing Abu M ikhnaf);

K u fi, I, fo l. 265b. * —
2. J a b ., il, p . 609 (citing al-Sha* b l); KufT, I, fo l.2 6 5 b .

associate himself with Sulaiman ibn Surad's movement or with that of a l -
1
M u kh tat at the beginning. Wellhausen suggests that Ibrahim "did not
believe in Shi* ism as it was at that tim e. " It is probably because Ibrahim
did not trust either leader and considered himself at least their equal, if
not more competent than both. This view is confirmed by the answer he
gave to the followers of al-M ukhtar when they asked him to join the latter's
2
movement . A l-M ukh tar had sent to him notables of the Shi*a and in
fluential men among his followers, among whom was the famous al-S h a'bi
and his father. When they asked Ibrahim to join them he agreed only if
they would place the leadership in his hands. The delegation considered
this an impossible demand* since al-M ukhtar had been sent to them by a l -
M ahdi. But a l-M u k h ta r, hearing of Ibrahim's terms, wished to make a
compromise with him, and could only do so, given his followers' b e lief in
his mission, in an indirect w ay. A fter only three days, he and some of his
followers went to Ibrahim, bearing a letter purporting to be from Ibn a l -
Hanafiyya to Ibrahim. In the letter Ibn a l-H a n a fiy y a , calling himself
a l-M a h d i, asked Ibrahim to recognize al-M ukhtar and support him. In
return, besides God's reward, Ibrahim would have the command of the cavalry
1* Die Religios Poiitischen Qppositiorvfrparteienim alten Islam, p .7 7 .
2. Ansab, V , p . 222; DTnawari, p . 296; T a b ., II, p . 609 (citing A l -

Sha*bT); KufT, I, fo l. 266a.
3. Ansab, V , p . 222; Tab. ,1 1 , p . 609 (citing a l-S h a *b i); K u fi, I, fo l.

226a (citing al-Sha*b7).
92 .
and Invading armies, and all the lands lying between Kufa and Syria,
which would be conquered by him. If he did not comply with this letter, he
would meet a terrible fate. ^
-2
Ibn Sa'd and Dinawari , however, give a somewhat different version
of this event. They mention only one meeting, in which the letter was
presented by al-M u kh tar to Ibrahim. Dinawari inserts here that the lead
seal of the letter was new, as if if had been sealed the night before. They
also w rite that a ll those with al-M ukhtar bore witness to Ibrahim that they
saw Ibn a l-H a n a fiy y a writing the letter; and the latter accepted it without
any objection. M oreover, in the version of a l-D in a w a ri, the beginning of
the letter makes no mention of the title M ahdi. It seems that the detailed
3 _
accounts of Tabari and Ibn A* tham are taken from Baladhuri, the more
accurate version, since it is more likely that al-M u kh tar would not have
written any letter to Ibrahim had the latter not refused the first time.
There are many reasons to make us doubt the authenticity of this letter,
4
although Wellhausen has accepted if as genuine. Firstly, there is the
offer which Ibn a l-H a n a fiy y a made to Ibrahim, giving almost the same terms
1. Ansab, V , p p .2 2 2 -3 ; T a b ., II, p p .61 0 -1 1 ; K u fi, I, fols. 266a-266b.
2. S a*d, V , p p .7 2 -3 ; D inaw ari, p p .296-7 (citing al-S h a ‘ b7).
3. T a b ., II, p.6Q 9ff. ; K u fi, I, fo l. 266a.
4. Die Religios-Politischen OppositionAparteien im alten Islam, p .77.

93.
as Ibrahim had demanded for his support to a l-M u k h ta r. Another factor
is the brief span of time which lapsed between the first meeting with
Ibrahim and al-M ukhtar's presentation of the letter. M oreover, the
wording of the letter itself was suspicious even to Ibrahim, who asked a l -
Mukhtar for an explanation; he also made a l-$ h a *b i approve the
1
witnesses' claim that the letter was written by Ibn a l-H a n a fiy y a . The
witnesses and al-M ukhtar's explanation satisfied Ibrahim, and he placed
his services in the hands of a l-M u k h ta r, by attending meetings in the
latter's house.
2
A l-M ubarrad says that before giving his support to al-M ukhtar
Ibrahim wrote to Ibn al-H an a fiyy a for his approval, and the latter - as
usual - answered him in a vague w ay, which Ibrahim interpreted as
1. Ansab, V , £"223 (citing al-S h q *b i); T a b ., I I , p p .6 1 1 -1 2 (citing a l -

Sha*bt); K ufi, I, fols. 266a-267b, DTnawarT (p p .2 9 7-9 8) reports that
a l-S h a ‘ bi wanted to make sure whether the evidence given by witnesses
was right or not, and he therefore asked them one by one; they a ll con
firmed that they saw Ibn al-H an afiyya write the letter. Unsatisfied
with this, he went to Abu *Amra Kaisan. On asking him the same
question, he said that he did not see Ibn a l-H an a fiyy a writing the
letter, but they believed al-M ukhtar to be trustworthy. At this, the
story says, a i- S h a ^ i became sure that the letter was fabricated by a l -
M ukhtar, and therefore left Kufa for H ija z , and did not take part in
the wars of al-M u k h ta r. However, the fact that a l-S h a ( bT did not
leave Kufa, but remained there until the end of al-Jvfukhtar, makes us
doubt the story, which W . Rajkowski, (Early ShT< ism in Iraq, p. 174,
P h.D . Thesis, London, 1955), accepted as true; while K. Fariq
accepted the first part of the story only. See The Story of an Arab
Diplom at, p .7 7 , S ll, III, n o .2 , 1966.
2. M ubarrad, II I , p . 267.
94 .
permission to join a I -M ukhtar. it seems d ifficu lt to accept this account since
it is not confirmed in either the early or the late sources. M oreover, the
answer which Ibn a l-H an a fiyy a is said to have w ritten to Ibrahim is the same
as that he gave to the Kufan delegation when they inquired about al-M ukhtar's
claim , to represent him, which makes us think th a t al-M ubarrad had confused
the two events.
The date of the revolt had been decided by a l-M u k h ta r and his
followers, as being Thursday 14 th Rab7‘ a l-A w w a l, 66 /Tuesday 19th October
685. A l-M ukhtar's preparations for the revolt again did not escape the eyes
of lyas ibn M udarib, the police officer of the governor Ibn M u t i* , but it seems ;r,
he did not know the exact date. He advised the governor to send a reliable
2
man to every “Jabbana" in Kufa to secure the c ity ; he sent his own son
Rashjd ibn lyas to a l-K u n a s a , the Hamdan Jabbanat a l-S u b a i‘ , KhatMam
Jabbanat Bishr, Kinda their own Jabbana, A l-A z d Jabbanat al-S a* idiyyTn,
Murad their own Jabbana, Shamir ibn dhul Jawshan Jabbant Salim and
T 4
Shabath ibn Rabf i to al-Sabkha. If is only Madhhij and Asad who did not
join the forces of the governor; the former, perhaps, because of Ibn al-A shtar,
1* Ansab/ V , p .223; T a b ., II, p .613 (citing Abu M ikhn af); K u fi, I, fol. 267a;
K am il, IV , p. 178.*
2. Places in Kufa were used as cemeteries. Each tribe had its own Jabbana.
See N ihg yq, l> p p .23 6-2 37; ibn M anzur, Lisan a l - ‘ Arab, X I I I , p . 85;
A I-ZubaidT, Taj a l- f Arus, IX , p. 159; K . Al-JanabT, TakhfTt a l-K u fa , p. 93,
Baghdad, 1969.
3. A name of a place in Kufa. Ibn M anzur, op. c i t . , IV , p . 199; A l-Z u b a id i,

op. c i f . , IV / p . 235.
4. A name of a place in Kufa. Ibn M anzur, op. c it . , Ill, p . 24; A I-ZubaidT,

op* c i t . , II, p . 261.
while being in the same "Khums"^ w ith Madhhij led Asad to take the same
position. A ll these measures were taken on Monday, three days before the
exact date of the revolt.
On Tuesday evening 12th Rabi ‘ a l-A w w a l, 66/17th O ctober, 685, Ibrahim,
accompanied by about a hundred of his followers hiding their weapons went, as
usual, to al-M ukhtar's house. He made no attempt to avoid the governor's
forces, perhaps to show off his bravery. On his way there he met lyas ibn
M udarib with the Shurta, who tried to prevent him from passing and demanded
his surrender to the governor. Ibrahim answered this by k illin g the police officer,
lyas, and his police followers were dispersed. Ibrahim continued to march
towards al-M ukhtar's house. There he reported the death to al-M u kh tar and
showed him the head of lyas; al-M u kh tar was pleased to hear of it. But this
action caused him to declare the revolt one day earlier than planned. A l-
Mukhtar informed his followers that the revolt was already starting, by ordering
a fire to be lit in the reeds, and by the shouting of the slogan: "Ya Mansur
A m it" ,( ^ - _ ^j> ) and "Ya Li Tharat al-H usain"^ ( o —*— ^ ^ UJ L-).
The fact that a I -M ukhtar used as his w ar-cry "Ya Mansur Am it" is not
without significance. Al-M ansur is a messiah awaited by the Yemenites to restore
1. Tribal organization made by Z iy a d ibn Abih. See Masignon, Explication

Du Plan de Kufa (Iraq), p .345, M M , I II , 1935-40.
2. Ansab, V , p . 225; Jabr , II, p p .215-16 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); K ufi, II,
fols. 2 a - 2 b.
96 .
their power. ^ Since the Yemenites were the dominant element among the
supporters of a l-M u k h ta r, this w ar-cry was therefore an appeal to their
2
messianic aspirations.
The death of lyas ibn Mudarib aroused the R abija tribe and they
threatened to avenge him by killin g Ibrahim ibn al-A shtar. But it would
- 3
appear from the verses of Suraqa ibn Mirdas, that the Yem enite tribes were
strong enough to protect him.
A l-M u kh tar tried to cause as little blood-shed as possible. This
strategy can be seen clearly in his instructions to Ibrahim. He ordered
him to try his best to bypass the governor's forces, and to fight only when he
4
was attacked. On Wednesday morning 13th Rabi* a l-A w w a l, 66 / l 8 th
October, 685, al-M u kh tar with his followers were stationed near "Dair
Hind" in the Sabkhal His army contained about five hundred mawali under
their own A m ir.^
To counter him the governor sent Shabath ibn Rab* i al-Tam im i with
i)
three thousand men to al-Sabkha, and Rashid ibn lyas with four thousand
1. Shams, p. 103; A l-H a m d a n i, Ik l il, V I I I , p . 58.
2. B. Lewis, The Regnal Titles of the First ‘ AbbasidCaliphs, p. 17,

ZH P V , 1968.
3. Diwan, p p .8 2 -3 ; Ansab, V , 267 (citing M ada, in i).
4. T a b ., II, p .617 (citing Abu M ikhn af).
5. Ib id ., II, p p .6 2 2 & 627 (citing Abu M ikhn af); K u fi, II, fo l. 3b.
97 .
from the Shurta to Jabbanat M urad. Consequently a l-M u k h ta r sent Ibrahim
with nine hundred men to meet Rashid, N u ( aim ibn Hubaira with three hundred
cavalry men and six hundfed infantry against Shabath, and Y azid ibn Anas
with nine hundfed men as his vanguard. Shabath's troops began to retreat
in front of al-M ukhtar's forces. In order to incite them Shabath shouted
. , Why are you fleeing from your slaves?" Hearing this, the soldiers came
back and fought hard against the mawali who were in the army of al-M u k h ta r. ^
They put to death any of the mawali whom they captured w hile they allowed the
2 -
‘ Arab captives to fle e , and therefore al-M ukhtar's army found itself in a
d iffic u lt position. At this time the governor sent re-enforcements, two thousand
under Y azid ibn a l-H a rith ibn Ruwaim. A l-M ukhtar's cavalry was under Y azid
ibn Anas, w hile he himself was leading the infantry.
M eanw hile, Ibrahim had defeated Rashid ibn lyas and killed him, and
then came to the help of a l-M u k h ta r. This had the effect of ^ncourayiny
the followers of al-M ukhtar and discouraged those of Shabath. Then the
Governor sent Hassan

«
ibn Fa* id ibn Bakr aMAbsi with about two thousand
men to help his troops in preventing Ibrahim from reaching al-M u k h ta r. But
Hassan
•
was defeated and Ibrahim continued his march. As soon as Ibrahim
appeared, Shabath's troops began to retreat until they reached ibn M u ti‘ ,
who was in despair after receiving the news of the death of Rashid ibn lyas.
1. T a b ., II, p . 623 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); K u fi, II, fo l. 3b.
2. T a b ., II, p . 623; K u fi, II, fo l. 3b,

98.
Then the defeated forces gathered again in the Kunasa, but were again
defeated by Ibrahim. The governor and the Ashraf flew to the palace where
they were besieved for three days. On the evening of the third day, Ib n -
M u ti‘ left the palace and went to the house of Abu Musa ,a l-A s h ‘ a ri, where
he hid himself,^ w hile the Ashraf asked Ibrahim for "Aman". They were
granted if and submitted themselves to al-M u k h ta r.
A l-M u kh tar spent the night in the palace and next morning ascended
the minbar in the mosque where he delivered a speech, after which he received
the "b a i'a " from the Ashraf and the others. This “b a i‘ a" was based on the Book
of God (Q u r’ an) and the Sunna of the prophet; the revenge of “Ahl a l-B a it" ;
war against " a l-M u h illin " (those who regard the blood of the Prophet's fam ily
as lic it, i . e . the Umayyads and their supporters); the defence of the weak;
the war with those who sought war with him, and peace with those who sought
2
peace with him.
Kufa was a suitable place for a revolt at this tim e. Its population was
a mixture of different elements: ‘ Arabs, mainly from South A rabia, Persians,

3
Syria.cs, Nabateans, Christians and Jews. The ‘ Arabs also differed among
themselves. W hile the Tamim and Tay were Beduins, Rabi‘ a (Bakr and Asad)
were semi-Beduin and C hristian-influenced, w hile ‘ Abd a l-Q a is were Persian
1. Ansab, V , pp. 2 2 6 -2 8 ; T a b ., II, pp.625-31 (citing AbuM ikh n af); K u fi, 11,
fols. 3 a , 3b , 4 a , 4b , 5a, 5b and 6 a.
2. Ansab, V , p . 228; T a b ., I I , p . 633; K u fi, I I , fo l. 5b.
3. Futuh , p . 280; N ih q y a , IV , p . 208; V , p. 9 , Ibn M anzur, op. c i t . , V I I ,

p .411; A I-Z u b aid T , op. c i t . , V , p . 329; M a l a t i , II, p . 2034;
M untakhabat, p. 101; K . al-JanabT, op. c i t . , p .4 1 ff.
99.
influenced.^ To these differences in culture must be added the differences
in creeds. N o wonder, therefore, that the population of Kufa was turbulent,
- 2
dissatisfied and opposed to the Government and the Ashraf.
As for the nature of the support which al-M u kh tar received in Kufa,
at this stage of his revolt it was mainly from the W ab s . Members from nearly
a ll the CArab tribes of a l-K u fa participated in it. Members of a l-N a k h a ‘ ,
Hamdan, Banu Nahd, Shakir, Khath‘ am, Shibam, Asad, H an ifa, ‘ Abs,
3
W aliba of a l-A z d , M u zain a, Bakr and Ahmas, are said to have been his
supporters.
This major ‘ Arab support was due not only to their Shi‘ a sentiment but also
to their opposition to the Ashraf. It was only a small number of the mawali who
- . 4
joined al-M ukhtar at this tim e, only five hundred. This small number of
m aw ali supporters may have been due to the strong hold of their masters, the
Ashraf, upon them. This becomes clear when we consider that their support to
al-M u kh tar grew rapidly after the seizure of a l-K u fa and the “bai‘ a 11 of the
Ashraf. Moreover, they were doubtless encouraged by his success in gaining
5
power. It is not true, though, as Brocklemann has said, that this victory in
1. Masignon, op. c i t . , p . 342, M M , III, 1935-40.
2. B. Lewis, The Origins of ismaîlism, pp. 2 5 -2 6 .
3. Ansab, V , p . 227; T a b ., II, p .6 1 9 ff; K j f l , II, fols. 2a -5b .
4. T a b ., I I , p ,6 2 7 . Their number at this time in Kufa was forty thousand.

See DTnawari, p. 307.
5. Brockelmann, History of the Islamic Peoples, p . 7 9 , London, 1964.

100.
Kufa represents the victory of the Persians over the ‘ Arabs. Even in the
later stages of the revolt, al-M u kh tar did not defend the mawali because
they were Persians, but because they had many social grievances (Du‘ a fa ’ )
which al -M ukhtar could rectify to gain their support for his own ends.
Since he took hold of a l-K u fa he tried to reconcile all parties and show
justice and peace to everyone. To Ibn M u ti‘ , who was hiding himself, a l -
Mukhtar sent one hundred thousand dirhams and asked him to leave Kufa. ^
This however may have been due to the fact that he was a relative of ‘ Umar
ibn a l-K h a tta b , whose son ‘ Abdullah was married to Safya, the sister of a l-
M ukhtar. It is probabt y to gain the moral support of his b ro th er-in -la w ,
or at least his silence, that al-M u kh tar sent expensive gifts to Ibn ‘ Umar.
It may be added that Ibn M u t i‘ and al-M u kh tar had been friends during the
time that al-M u k h ta r was in a l- H ija z .
In the treasury of Kufa he found nine m illion dirhams. He gave those
who took part in the seizure of the palace five hundred each: they were three
thousand, eight hundred men. For six thousand who joined him later, he gave two
2
hundred each.
In his attempt to show toleration to all parties, he did not allow his
1. Ansab, V , p . 228; D inaw ari, p . 299; Y a ‘ qubi, I I , p . 308; T a b ., II, p .633

(citing Abu M ikhn af); K u fi, II, fo l. 6 a (he makes it ten thousand only).
2. Ansab, V , p .228; T a b ., I I , p . 634 (citing Abu M ikhn af).

101.
followers to k ill anyone, ^ He tried his best to make himself popular
to the Ashraf by offering them the most important posts. He appointed
‘ Abdallah ibn Kamil a l-S h a k iri, as a police officer (‘ A la'Shurtathi),
Muhammad ibn ‘ Umair ibn ‘ Utarid he appointed as governor of
Adhrbijan; ‘ Abd al-Rahman ibn Sa‘ id ibn Q ais, governor of M usil;
Ishaq ibn Mas‘ ud governor of al-M ad a* in and Jukhi, Qudama ibn
Abi ‘ Isa ibn Rabi‘ a a l-N a s r i- .a confederate of Thaqif — governor of
Bihqubadh q l - A ‘ lcT; Sa‘ id ibn Hudhaifa ibn al-Y a m a n , governor of

T _ _ 2
Halwan; Habib ibn Munqidh af-Th aw ri, governor of Bihqubadh a i-A s fa l,
? -- - 3
and Y a zid ibn N ajb a a l-F a z a ri, governor of Ray and D astihti. He
4
also gave the Ashraf pre-eminence in his court and even asked Muhammad
5
ibn al-A s h ‘ ath to work as a judge for him.
1. Al-M undhur ibn Hassan al-D ab b i after paying homage to a l -

M ukhtar, was killed with his son by one of al -M ukhtar *,s
enthusiastic followers on the grounds that he was one of the
Jabbarin (tyrants). When al-M ukhtar heard of this, he very
strongly opposed it. See Ansab, V , p. 228; T a b ., II, p .633
(citing Abu M ikhn af).
2. This, however, either did not take place or was of a short duration,
for we see him on the 22nd Dhul H a jja , 6 6 / 20th. Ju ly, 6 8 6 , on
the "Rub* of Hamdan in the army of IbrahTm ibn al-A shtar, who
went to fight Ibn Z iyad .
3. Ansab, V , p . 228; DTnawarT, p . 300; T a b ., II, p . 6 3 4 -3 5 . However,

the list of DinawarT differs from that of Tabari in these respects: he
gives the governorship of Arjan to Muhammad ibn ‘ Uthman a l -
TamimT, and makes ‘ Abdallah ibn a l-H a rith the governor of M ahin
and Hamadan, He mentions the name of lEn M a lik al-B akraw ! as
the governor of Halwan and Masbdan, and Zahr ibn Qais as the
governor of Jukhi.
4, T a b ., II, p p .633.
5* Ansab, V , p. 229.
102.
Nevertheless, a l-M u k h ta r also worked to defend the w eak, as
he had stated in his "baMa-11. According to Islam a ll Muslims are equal
regardless of their nationality or race.^ In practice, in this period the
‘ Arabs did not allow the non-* Arab Muslims the rights which Islam granted
them. The * Arabs monopolized the high posts in society, such as the
2
offices of judge, or of leadership in the army or in prayer. They con
sidered only the army and commerce as fit professions for themselves;
the m aw ali, on the other hand, were mainly engaged in manual labour,
in agriculture or industry. Although the mawali were used as infantry in
the army, they were not enrolled on the register (D iw an), and therefore
not usually paid. Even when they were paid, it was at a rate far below that
3 -?
of their ‘ Arab masters. The social inferiority of the mawali was regularized
by the custom that they should not be addressed by a uKunyaM, but by their
4
own name or “ Laqab11, with a few exceptions. N either were they allowed
to marry ‘ Arab women, and the children of an ‘ Arab man and a mawala woman
did not receive an equal inheritance to that of the p u re -‘ Arab children;
according to the principle of " K a fa 'a r,the ‘ Arabs were equal only to the ‘ Arab
1. Q u r'a n , X L IX , 13.
2. ‘ Iqd, I I I , p p .4 1 2 -1 3 .
3. Futub, p .457; Y a ‘ qub7, II, p. 213; KufT, II, fols. 159b-160a,

Agh. , V I , p .5 , N ih q ya, I, p .363; lmta‘ , I I I , p. 183.
4. ‘ Iqd, II I , p .413.
103.
and the mawali to the m awali. ^ The mawali must ask their patron's con
sent before choosing a w ife . The exemption from the* A t a ', and the inferior
social status of the mawali under the Umayyads, made many of them ready
to join any opposition movement against the regime and the ‘ Arab sovereignty,
in a claim for equality and justice. They, as w ell as some ‘ Arabs, especially
those unprivileged ones, not only participated in the Shi‘ i movements but
2 - t 3
also associated themselves with the Kharijites. Professor a l-D u ri , how
ever, thinks that these examples in our sources which show an inferior social
status for the mawali were the exceptions rather than the rule, and therefore
do not represent the reason for their resentment to ‘ Arab rule. The real cause
in his view was born of an a n t i- ‘ Arab, racial pride, in their Persian descend
(Shu‘ ubi). W hile not denying this factor, especially in the ‘ Abbasid and
later Umayyad periods, it is d iffic u lt to see it as the main reason in the
period under consideration. The fact that the ‘ Arabs did allow the odd
mawali in the diwans, and the rare examples of them holding the office of
army leader or judge were of a short duration only, and not without opposition
on the part of the ‘ Arabs. That only a few managed to achieve a high position
is clear on the consideration that the number of mawali in Kufa was
1. A l-H in d i, Kanz al ~* Ummal, V I I I , pp. 2 4 7-4 8; Sarakhsi, a l-M a b g u t,

V , p p .2 2 -9 ; also ‘ Iqd, III, p .417; Mubarrad, IV , p. 16; Agh. , X IV ,
p. 150 (citing a l-Z u b a ir ibn Bakkar); N ih ayo , I I I , p. 112.
Ansab, fo l. 216; Y a ‘ qubi, II, p. 262; G o ld zih er, op. c i t . , p. 130.
3. Al-Judhur al-T arik h iyy a lil Shu‘ ubiyya, p. 1 5 ff., Beirut, 1962.
104.
forty-thou sand. ^
These social disabilities had a religious offshoot, very relevant
in this context. The almost universal attraction of oppressed peoples to
2
messianic and m illenarian ideas operated here also: both * Arab and non-
‘ Arab (mawali) among the unpriveleged groups turned to their pre-Islam ic
beliefs and grafting them on to their new faith , gave rise to the b e lie f in
a Mahdi who would “fill the earth with justice and equity as it is now fille d
3 -
with tyranny and oppression11. A l-M u kh tar exploited this religious need with
1. The number of the mawali at the time when Kufa was b u ilt, was
four thousand. Prior to the battle of SiffTn their number increased
to eight thousand. During the time of al-M u k h ta r and especially
before the battle of Jabbant al-S u b ai4, they were forty thousand.
See Futob , p . 279; DTnawarl, p .307; T a b ., II, p p .3 7 1 -7 2 . There
is a chance narrative in Baladhur! (Ansab, fo l. 49 9a, citing M ad a’ ini)
and repeated by Ibn <Abd RaEEih (* Iqd, H I, p .3 1 4 ), which makes it
possible that for once that DTnawarT Is not exaggerating. The
narrative says that the number of the mawalT became so large that it
raised the attention of both the caliph M u f aw iya and his governor
Ziyad . The figure must have been of a big proportion of the popula
tion, when we consider that the number of the M uqatila in the city
was only eighty thousand, according to J a b ., (II, p .43 3, citing
i Umar ibn Shabba).
2. Lanternari, The Religions of the Oppressed, p .4 . (Translated by Lisa

Sergio), London, 1963; M . W eber, The Sociology of Religion, p. 108;
(translated by Ephraim Fischoff), London, 1966; Norman Cohn, The
Pursuit of the M illenn ium , p .2 0 f f ., London, 1962.
3. B. Lewis, An Apocalyptic Vision of Islamic History, p . 308, BSOAS,

X I I I , 1950.
105.
his claims to represent Ibn a l-H a n ifiy y a , as the M ahdi; this he backed up
by attempting to reform the social situation.
A l-M u kh tar made it legal for the mawali to share the fai* with
1
the ( Arabs, and to ride on horses; He even appointed a mawla of ‘ llra in a ,
* 2
Kaisan, Abu ‘ Amra, as the leader of his personal guard. This was possibly
because he trusted him more than the others and because he was the most
influential of his mawali supporters. A l-M u kh tar also declared that any slave
5
who came to him would be free. N o wonder, therefore, the number of the
mawali and slaves among his supporters became very large. A fter starting
4
as only five hundred at the beginning of the revolt, nearly all of the mawali
had joined him at the height of his power. Credit must be given to a l-
Mukhtar for his early understanding that the mawali were an important
5 - - 6 -
p o litical element in the society. A l-M ad a ^ n i reports that al-M n g h ira ibn
1. T a b ., II, p p .649 ff. (citing Abu M ikhnaf) & 724; K ufi, II, fo ls .!5 b ,
1 8 a.
2. Ansab, V , p . 229; T a b ., II, p .634 (citing Abu M ikhn af).
3. Ansab, V , p. 267 (citing Mada* in i).

4. See p. Y1
5. W ellhausen, Die Religios-Politischen Cppositioa&parteien im alten
Islam, p. 95.
6 . Ansab, V , p. 223.
Shu* ba was the first to attract the attention of al-M ukhtar to the Persians'
p ro -*A lid sympathies and to the fact that by addressing them by the name of
the family of the Prophet, he could make out of them a great political power.
Why did a l-M u k h ta r, after proclaiming his desire to revenge the
killin g of al-H usain, abandon this on achieving power, and instead work to
reconcile both the Ashraf and the mawali ? It seems that al-M ukhtar was more
concerned to achieve a stable state of affairs in the c ity , than he was to carry
out the revenge. For the Syrian army under < Ubaidallah ibn Ziyad was
advancing towards Musi I, and he was threatened by Ibn a l-Z u b a ir both
from Basra and H ija z . It would have been political myopia to involve himself
in a c iv il war by attacking the Ashraf, in addition to these outside threats.
There was a contradiction, however, in an attempt to reconcile
both the Ashraf and the m aw ali. By relying on the mawali and considering
them as equal to their masters, al-M ukhtar was undermining the whole social
structure on which Ashraf domination was based. The vested interests of a l-
Ashraf were opposed to the mawatPs interests and al-M u kh tar could only
reconcile the former by betraying the latter and dishonouring his promises.
When al-m aw ali noticed al-M ukhtar trying to reconcile the Ashraf, they
resented it, and communicated this to Abu * Amra Kaisan, their chief and the
head of the personal guard of al-M u k h ta r, saying, "(al-M u kh tar) is too
courteous to the * Arabs (Ashraf) and see how indifferent he is to u s .” When
this reached a l-M u k h ta r, he answered, "Tell them not to be upset, for you
belong to me and I to you . 11 Then he recited the following verse from the
Q u r'a n : MWe shall punish the crim inals1' ( a/ ^ This
answer satisfied the mawali for his hostile intentions to the Ashraf. A l-
Mukhtar realized that he could not for long ingratiate himself with both sides.
Shabath ibn Rabî communicated the grievances of the Ashraf to al-M u kh tar
prior to the battle of Jabbant al-S u b aK 6 6 / 6 8 6 : the most important of these
- - 2
was that al-M u k h ta r had made the mawali and slaves equal to the Ashraf.
When al-M u k h ta r replied with the question, that if he gave them back their
mawali and again distributed the fa i' among them alone, would they promise
to fight Ibn a l-Z u b a ir and the Syrians with him, they refused to do so. This
indication of the hostility of al-A shraf towards him confirmed him in his choice
of relying on mawali support, rather than on al-Ashraf. It seems it was the
p o litical circumstances which determined al-M ukhtar's choice to take the side
of the m a w a li, and not any genuine conviction on his part, as Levi D ella V id a
3
presumes.
There are two accounts of al-M ukhtar's activities in Basra: the
4 - - - 5
first is that of Baiadhuri, and the second that of M ada' ini in Tabari which
1. T a b ., II, p .634 (citing Abu M ikhnaf).
2. T a b ., II, p .650; K u fi, II, fo l. 15b.
3. E. I, \ (a l-M u kh tar).
4. Ansab, V , pp. 2 4 4 -4 5 .
5. T a b ., II, p p .680-83 (citing a l-M a d a 'in i).

108.
is rep eated b rie fly by Ibn a -A th ir and N u w a iri. ^ According to
T “ . . T 2
Bqladhuri, al-M uthanna ibn Mukhatfiba a l-* Abdi met al-M u kh tar
after the return of the Tawwabun from the battle of * Ain a l-W a rd a , in K u fa ,
where he paid homage to him. He told him that he had supporters in Basra,
and if al-M u kh tar agreed, he would go there to enroll them for him.
According to Tabari, al-M uthanna himself took part in the battle of * Ain
al-W ard a. When he returned from the battle to Kufa, he found al-M ukhtar
in prison, and he paid homage to him there. On al-M ukhtar's release, he
ordered al-M uthanna to go to Basra to rally the people for him. AI-M uthanna's
answer to the call of Sulaiman to participate in the battle, although he arrived
too la te ,is probably the reason for a l-M a d a 'in i saying that he actually fought
at * Ain a l-W a rd a. Whether it was al-M ukhtar's or al-M uthanna's idea that
the latter should go to Basra to rally the people, is not an important point, for
in either case it was certainly with al-M ukhtar's approval.
1. K am il, IV , p p .2 0 1 -2 ; N u w a iri, X IX , fols. 2 5 -6 .
2. A l-M uthanna ibn Mukharriba a l-* Abdi (from the tribe of *Abd
a l-Q a is J , was an old partisan of *A li who fought for him in the
battle of the Camel and supported him against M u* aw iya. He
also joined the movement of al-Taw wabun, but like the Shi*a of
M a d a 'in did not reach the baffle field in due tim e. See” Ansab,
fo l. 176a (citing Abu M ikhn af); fols. 179a, 207b; V , p .211
(citing Abu M ikhn af); Tab*., II, p . 568 (citing Abu M ikhn af).
Baladhuri then writes that al-M uthana went to Ba§ra, and took
a mosque as the centre of his activities there. Tabari writes that he made
his camp near M adin at a l-R izq , a place not mentioned by name in Baladhuri.
Both narratives then say that the governor, a l-jjju b a *, hearing of the sub
versive activities of al-M uthanna sent against him *Abbad ibn ai-H usain a l -
H abti, a police officer from the tribe of Tamim, with a troop of horsemen.
» •
Tabari also states that *Abbad was accompanied by Q a is ibn a l-H aith am ,
who stationed himself in the Sabkha. in Baladhuri's account, *Abbad was
defeated btj one of al-M uthanna's generals. In Tabari, al-M uthanna and most
of his followers left their camp and stationed themselves opposite *Abbad's
forces. The latter left Qais ibn al-H aitham there, w hile he and a small group
of followers went to M adinat a l-R iz q , and managed to place thirty of his men
on the roof of the city w a il. He ordered them to w ait until they heard the
shout", "Allahu A kbar", a sign that battle had begun. Then * Abbad returned
to al-Sabtfkha to join Qais ibn al-H aith am , and attacked al-M uthanna. M e a n
while those on the roof of M adinat a l-R iz lj, hearing the shouting, attacked the
remnant of a l-M u th an n a‘s forces there. This led to the defeat and flight of a l-
Muthanna's followers both in Sabkha and M adinat a l-R izq .
To return to Baladhuri's narrative, after ‘ Abbad's defeat, the
Governor sent another general against al-M uthanna, a l-A h n a f ibn Q ais, the
Tamimite chief, with men from Mudar, hostile to the tribe of *Abd a !-Q a is ,
a Yemenite tribe. This action caused tribal rivalries to flare up again, and
the situation became c ritic al when two tribes sided with a l-M u th an n a ;
the tribe of Bakr ibn Wc?M led by M a lik ibn M ism a*, and a l-A z d led by
Ziyad ibn i Amr al 4 Afrkl. This support was not because of their sympathy for
al-M uthanna's cause but because of tribal passion and the loyalty (Hamiyya)
fe lt by them towards the tribe of e Abd a l-Q a is .^ The ‘ Abd a l-Q a is and
Bakr were living near to each other in the north of Basra. But 4Abdallah
ibn M u ti * and eAmr ibn 4Abd al-Rahman ibn a l-H a rith ibn Hisham a l -
Makhzumt (the two ex-governors of Ibn a l-Z u b a ir in Kufa) intervened as
peace makers between the two opposing parties and a settlement was
reached, specifying that al-M uthanna should leave Basra and return to Kufa.
According to Tabari, this settlement was reached as a result of
the Governor sending a l-A h n a f ibn Qais and ‘ Amr ibn 4Abd al-Rahman a l -
Makhzumi to al-M u th an n a, after Ziyad ibn ‘ Amr a l - ‘ AfkT had threatened
the governor*s forces with attack by the Azd if he did not withdraw from
the quarter of 4 Abd a l-Q a is . The government's forces under ‘ Abbad were
advancing on this quarter where al-M uthanna and his followers had taken
refuge after their defeat by 4Abbad.
The account of Tabari would seem to be more lik e ly than that of
Baladhuri in the matter of whether or not eAbbad was defeated: al-M uthanna's
1* This perhaps was because of the "H ilf" (alliance) between a l - ‘ Azd
and Bakr. Naga* ?J, II, p. 729; Ansab, IV , p. 105; T a b ., II, p .446
(citing Abu ‘ Ubaida).
2. A I - ‘ Al7, Khftat a I-Basra, p .2 9 1 , Sumer, V I I I , ii, 1952.

111.
forces were numerically far weaker than the governor's, and the tribes,
apart from the small ‘ Abd a l-Q a is , were all a n ti-S h i‘ i; which makes
Baladhuri's account of ‘ Abbad's defeat seem suspicious. M oreover, a l -
Mada* ini is a reliable authority on matters concerning the region of Basra
1
and the Eastern Provinces, while the narrative of Baladhuri comes to us
without any chain of authority.
As for the nature of the support which al-M uthanna found in Basra,
it is stated in Baladhuri that when al-M uthanna made the mosque the centre
T 2 T
of his activities, the Shi‘ a gathered round him. Tabari, however, says
that those who came to him were only his own people from the tribe of ‘ Abd
3 _
a l-Q a is , N either of our sources mention any mawali support for al-M uthanna's
movement: this may be because the 4 Arabs had a strong hold on them in Basra.
Basra in its p o litical attitude was described as ‘ Uthmanite, that is, a n ti-‘ A lid .
This antiÂlid feeling was made very clear by a l-A h n a f ibn Q ais, the head
of the Tamim trib e , the most influential tribe in Basra. "We have tried Al
Abi T a lib , and found that they neither have any experience of government,
4
nor strategy in w ar. Also it is impossible to get money from th e m ." This,
1* E. I. ^ , (al-M ada* in i); J . ‘ AM , Mawarid Tarikh a l-T a b a ri,

p. 157; I..M I1 , 1, i, 1950. “ *
2. Ansab, V , p. 244.
3. T a b ., II, p . 681 (citing Mada* in i).
4. J a h iz, a l - ‘ Uthmaniyya. p . 96; Ansab, fol. 499b (citing M ada* in i);

about a l-A h n a f ibn Q ais and the Umayyads, see T a b ., II, p p .9 6 -7 .
112.
however, does not mean that the Basrans were pro-Umayyad or even sincerely
pro-Zub airid, as Dr. Fariq thinks. ^ It seems that they were ready to give
their support to whoever paid the most. Ziyad ibn ‘ Amr a l - ‘ A tk i, the
head of the Azd tribe, received a letter from al-M u kh tar promising him a
reward in this life and the next if he would support him; Ziyad replied, “We
2
do not fight on credit, but with whoever pays cash, " When ‘ Abd a l-M a lik
paid the Basrans more than Mus‘ ab ibn al -Z u b a ir, they betrayed the latter,
the tribes of a l-A z d , Bakr ibn Waîl and Banu Tamim going over to ‘ Abd a l-
M a lik .^
The tribes of Basra at this tim e, were: Ahl a l - ‘ A liy a , (among
whom was Bahila which was known for its a n ti-‘ A lid fe elin g ), Tamim,
4
Bakr ibn Wa* i l , a l-A z d and ‘ Abd a l-Q a is . O n ly the latter, a numerically
weak, p o litic a lly unimportant trib e, was p ro -‘ A lid .
A l-M u k h ta r endeavoured to seize Basra for many important
reasons. By seizing Basra with its dependences, ai-M u k h ta r would be master
of the whole of Iraq and the Eastern Provinces, thus depriving Ibn a l-Z u b a ir
of the rich resources of the area, and confining him to the poor country of
a l- H ija z , which could hardly support itself, Egypt had already been lost for
Ibn a l-Z u b a ir, being controlled by the Umayyads. The conquest of Basra would
op- c i t . , p .50, SU , IV , no. 1 , 1967.
Ansab, V , p .245; T a b ., 11, p .683 (citing M a d a ’ in i).
3. T a b ., II, p . 218.
4. A I - ‘ A li, a l-T ain zim at a l-ljtim a ‘ iyya wal Iqtisadiyya fil Basra fil
Q arn a l-A w w al af-HijrT; / Idem, Khitat al-Bcisra, p. 288, Sumer,
V I I I , 1771952; *
113.
give al-M u k h ta r new followers to increase his .military forces which might
have enabled him to face both Ibn a l-Z u b a ir and ‘ Abd a l- M a lik . It was a
favourable time for an attempt by al-M ukhtar to seize Basra for the city was
continually threatened by the Kharijites so that the governor's position there
was constantly undermined. M oreover, Ibn al -Z ubair was unable to send
forces against al-M u kh tar because he was hard-pressed by ‘ Abd a l- M a lik ,
and was preparing to face him. Finally, the seizure of Basra was part of the
strategy of a l-M u k h ta r, for it would be expedient for him to create new d if
ficulties for Ibn a l-Z u b a ir, without the necessity of distracting his attention
from consolidating his power in Kufa.
However, he did not succeed: al-M uthanna was driven out of the
city along with his followers. But the event was not without significance. It
proved to al-M u k h ta r that the centre of his power was K ufa, where the majority
of the Shi‘ a were. It also enabled him to understand the attitude of the tribal
chiefs in Basra. It is therefore in this light that we must see the letters a l -
Mukhtar sent to a l-A h n a f ibn Q a is, M a lik ibn Misma‘ and Ziyad a l - ‘ A tk i,^
in which he offered them a reward in this world and the next for their support.
In order to pave the way for his complete sovereignty over a l-lra q ,
it was necessary to avoid open hostility with Ibn a l-Z u b a ir. A l-M u k h ta r,
therefore, entered into a secret diplomatic correspondence with him. First,
1. Ansab, V , p .2 4 5 ;T a b ., II, p .683 (citing M ad a’ in i).

114.
al-M u kh tar tried to justify his act of expelling ‘ Abdallah ibn M u ti‘ , by
accusing him of working in the interests of ‘ Abd a l-M a lik . ^ He also wrote
to Ibn alZubair reminding him of the terms on which he paid him homage,
saying that he had kept his promises, although Ibn a l-Z u b a ir did not. If
Ibn a l-Z u b a ir still wanted his support, al-M u kh tar was still ready to offer
2
it to him.
Ibn a l-Z u b a ir, however, wanted to test the sincerity of a l-M u k h ta r,
so he sent a new governor to a l-K u fa . He was ‘ Umar ibn ‘ Abd al-Rahman ibn
a l-H a rith ibn Hisham al-M ak h zu m i. When the news of this appointment reached
al-M u kh tar through one of his spies at M ecca, he sent Z a ’ ida ibn Qudama
with five hundred cavalry men under the command of Musafir ibn Sa‘ id a l -
N a ‘ it i, and seventy thousand dirhams, twice what the new governor had spent
on his journey. He told Qt&dama to order the new governor to take the money
and go back to Ibn a l-Z u b a ir. If he refused, he was to show him the cavalry
3
and te ll him there were another hundred such squadrons in the rear. At first
‘ Umar refused to take the money and tried to carry out Ibn al-Z u b air's orders,
but when he saw the cavalry, he consented, took the money and went to Basra
t 4
as Ibn M u ti‘ had done.
1. Sa‘ d , V , p. 1 10; Ansab, V , p .266 (citing M ada* in i).
2. T a b ., M, p. 687 (citing Abu M ikhn af); Kam il, IV , p. 203;

N u w a iri, X IX , fol. 26.
Ansab, V , p p .243-4 4; T a b ., II, p .687 (citing Abu M ikh n af).
4. Ansab, V , p p .2 4 3-4 4; T a b ., II, p p .287-88 (citing Abu M ikhnaf).

115.
Political circumstances once again forced al-M u kh tar to act in an
underhand w ay, in asking for the friendship of Ibn a l-Z u b a ir and at the same
tim e, trying to undermine the latter's authority. Since he feared that his
double-dealing with Ibn a l-Z u b a ir would provoke him to send an army from
Basra against him, al-M u k h ta r tried once again to win Ibn a l-Z u b air's con
fidence, especially since he was also threatened with the advance of the
Syrian army* ‘ Abd a l-M a lik ibn Marwan had sent an army to a l- H ija z to
liquidate Ibn a l-Z u b a ir. A l-M u kh tar tried to exploit this opportunity by
writing to Ibn a l-Z u b a ir offering him his help against ‘ Abd a l-M a lik . Ibn
a l-Z u b a ir's reply to this was, " If you are loyal to me, then I do not mind your
bringing an army to my country. But you should first bring me the homage of
the Kufans. When I receive this, then I shall believe in your loyalty and w ill
refrain from attacking your territory. Send me your army quickly and order it
to proceed to Wadi a l-Q u ra and to fight the army of Ibn M arw an.
A l-M u k h ta r then sent three thousand men, among whom only seven
hundred were Southern ‘ Arabs, the rest being m aw ali, under the command of
an ‘ Arab leader, Shurahbil ibn Wars, from the tribe of Hamdan, also a
2 . T
Southern tribe. He ordered him to proceed to a l-M e d in a , station himself
there, and then to write to a l-M u k h ta r. A l-M ukhtar intended that when Ibn
WarS* army had occupied M ed in a, he would then send a governor for the city
1. Ansab, V , p. 246; T a b ., II, p p .6 8 8 -8 9 (citing Abu M ik h n af).
2. T a b ., I I , p .689 (citing Abu M ikhnaf).

116.
and order Ibn Wars to proceed towards M ecca to lay seige to the c ity . But
Ibn a l-Z u b a ir saw through this double-dealing. He sent * Abbas ibn Sahl
ibn Sa‘ d with two thousand men and ordered him to recruit more men on his
way from the‘Arab tribes dw elling there. He ordered him to annihilate
al-M ukhtar's army if they did not comply with his orders. The two armies
met at al-Raqim near M edina. Ibn Sahl asked the commander of al-M ukhtar's
army to proceed to W adi a l-Q u ra to fight the Syrian army. Ibn Wars answered
naively that he had been ordered to go first to M edina and then report to his
master for further instructions. It seems that Ibn Wars was either completely
ignorant of al-M ukhtar's p lo t,o r else that he was not clever enough to act
out the deception when faced with Ibn Sahl. In both cases, a l-M u k h ta r can
be blamed for his choice of general. Ibn Wars* answer was enough for eAbbas
ibn Sahl to understand the strategy of al-M u k h ta r, and he therefore led a
surprise attack on the army of Ibn Wars. Most of the army, and ibn Wars
himself, were k ille d . Most of those who fled died of thirst or hunger on their
- 1 . ~
way back to Kufa. Following this defeat, al-M u kh tar wrote to Ibn a l -
H anafiyya, saying that he had sent an army to defend him against his enemies
and to conquer the countries for him. But the army of a l- 'M u lh id 1 ibn a l -
Zubair had deceived them and taken them by surprise. He asked the permission
of ibn a l-tja n a fiy y a to send another army to M edina to fight Ibn a l-Z u b a ir if he,
1. Ansab, V , p p .2 4 6 -4 7 ; T a b ., II, p p .689-91 (citing Abu M ik h n af).

117.
Ibn a l-H a n a fiy y a , would make it clear to the people of M edina that al-M ukhtar
was working with his consent. As usual, Ibn al-H an afiyya's reply to al-M ukhtar
was cold and non-com m ittal: he said that he did not approve of bloodshed, and
advised him to obey God instead of causing war. If he (Ibn a l-H a n a fiy y a ) did
want to fig ht, he would find the people ready to rally round him without a l-
Mukhtar's help.^ This answer certainly disappointed a l-M u k h ta r, who was
hoping to get recognition from Ibn a l-H an a fiyy a to legalize his authority.
However, he did not let himself become discouraged by this answer and told
the Shj‘ a that al-M a h d i had asked him to follow a policy which would bring
2
them prosperity and righteousness, and wipe out all treachery and im piety.
Nevertheless, circumstances eventually forced Ibn al-H an a fiyy a
to ask help from a l-M u k h ta r. When Ibn a l-Z u b a ir proclaimed himself Caliph
in 6 4 /6 8 3 , Ibn a l-H a n a fiy y a and ( Abdallah ibn * Abbas, with their followers,
refused to pay him homage on the grounds that he had not yet been unanimously
recognized as C alip h. For the same reason they did not pay homage to Ibn a l-
Zubair's riv a l, { Abd a l-M a lik ibn M arw an. When a ll attempts to make Ibn
a l-H an a fiyy a change his mind fa ile d , Ibn a l-Z u b a ir decided to obtain the
"b aH a" from him by force. In the year 6 6 /6 8 5 , Ibn a l-Z u b a ir detained Ibn
a l-H an a fiyy a and his fam ily, with seventeen men from his supporters among the
1. Ansab, V , p p .2 4 6 -4 7 ; T a b ., II, p .6 8 9 ff. (citing Abu M ikhn af);

K am il, IV , p p .2 0 4 -5 .
2. T a b ., II, p. 693.
the notables of a l-K u fa , inside al-Haram and threatened them with death
*
if they did not pay homage w ithin a specified time. ^
Why did Ibn a l-Z u b a ir decide at this time to threaten Ibn a l -
Hanafiyya with death, if he would not pay him homage? It would seem that
he was afraid that the paople in H ija z and Iraq would pay homage to
Ibn a l-H a n a fiy y a , especially after success achieved by al-M u kh tar in Kufa
using his name.
Ibn a l-H a n a fiy y a sent a letter to al-M ukhtar informing him of the
situation and asking his urgent help. A l-M u kh tar was w aiting for just such
an opportunity and used the request for help as a demonstration of his recog
nition by Ibn a l-H a n a fiy y a . A l-M u k h ta r summoned the Shi‘ a of Kufa and
showed them Ibn al-H an afiyya's letter. He immediately sent four thousand
men to rescue him, and to give him a large sum of money. But he was careful
this tim e, and did not let Ibn a l-Z u b a ir know of this expedition, to avoid a
repetition of the disaster of Ibn Wars, and also to prevent Ibn a l-Z u b a ir from
killing Ibn a l-H a n a fiy y a and his followers before they could be rescued. He
wished also to avoid any unnecessary m ilitary engagement with Ibn a l-Z u b a ir
in order to save his strength to meet the Syrians.
1. Sa‘ d , V , p p .7 3 -4 ; K halifa ibn K hayyat, Tarikh/ 1/ 258

(he gives the year 6 5 /3 8 4 and makes the place of detention
ShHb Banu Hashim); Akhbar, fols. 43 b -4 4a; Ansab, fols. 2 6 1 a -
261b; Ya^qObT, II, p p .3 1 1 -1 2 ; J a b ., II, p .6 9 3 ff. (citing Abu
M ikh n af); K ufi, II, fols. IQ a-lO b; * Iqd, IV , p . 514; M u ru j, V , p. 179
(citing 4 Umar ibn Shabba); Aah . . V lT I, p *32; ‘ Asakir, X V , fol. 369b.
(citing K halifa).
119.
Wellhausen, ^ arguing exclusively on the evidence that the
forces sent by al-M u kh tar to rescue Ibn a l-H an a fiyy a held wooden clubs
in their hands on their entry into al-H aram , concludes that they were
m aw ali, though led by Arabs. But we are told that the holding of wooden
clubs instead of swords was according to Ibn al-H anafiyya's instructions,
2
since he would not tolerate the use of weapons in the Holy Shrine. This
is supported by the fact that Ibn al-H a n a fiy y a had always spoken against the
use of violence, and also that it was only on their entry into al-H aram that
3 4
they held these wooden clubs. They also carried hidden swords. This
however, does not mean that they were a ll Arabs; it only means that one
cannot argue that they were mawali simply because they carried clubs. More
w ill be said about these clubs in the context of the Khashabiyya.
The first hundred and fifty men who reached M ecca succeeded in
saving Ibn a l-H a n a fiy y a . But Ibn al-Zu bair did not yield until the rest of a l-
*
Mukhtar's men reached M ecca. Ibn al-H an a fiyy a forbade his followers and
those who came to his a id , to fight Ibn a l-Z u b a ir and distributed the money
he had received from al-M u kh tar amongst them. Ibn al-H anafiyya then left
1. Die Religios-Politischen Oppositiorvj^parteien im alten Islam, p . 81.
2. Akhbar, fol. 47a; T a b ., II, p .694 (citing Abu M ik h n af): K u fi, II,
fol. l i b ; K am il, IV , p . 207. —
3. Sa<d, V , p . 78; Ansab, V , p p .246-4 7; T a b ., II, p . 692 (citing

Abu M ikhnaf); K u ff, II, fo l. 12a; K am il, IV , p .205.
4. Akhbar, fols. 47a;47b; T a b ., II, p .6 9 4 (citing Abu M ikhnaf);

Ansab, fol. 262a; K uff, II, fo l. l i b .
120*
M ecca and went to a l-T a * if. It seems that he did not go to Kufa
*
because he distrusted al-M ukhtar and his ambitions to gain power. It may
be that he was afraid to come to Kufa, since a l-M u k h ta r, fearing that Ibn
al-H an a fiyy a would arrive and put an end to the activities of his more
extreme followers, had spread a rumour around the city that a true Mahdi
could not be harmed if struck with a sword. ^ Besides, it may have been that
Ibn a l-H a n a fiy y a did not want to incur the hostility of both Ibn a l-Z u b a ir and
4 Abd a l- M a lik , especially since the future of al-M u kh tar was still uncertain.
Furthermore, he no doubt suspected the Kufans 1 support after the terrible
experiences his father and his brothers had had with them.
A fter the battle of ‘ Ain al-W arda 6 5 /6 B 4 , in which Sulaiman ibn
Surad and his Tawwabun were massacred, 4Ubaidallah ibn Ziyad continued to
march against Iraq. He engaged with Zufar ibn a l-H a rith a l- K ila b i, who was
holding a l-J a zira ,firs t against Marwan ibn al-H akam and then against Marwan's
son, 4 Abd a l-M a lik . A fter a seige of about a year, Ibn Ziyad failed to conquer
a l-J a z ira , and marched on towards al-M u sil on his way to Kufa. 4 Abd a l-
Rahman ibn Sa 4 id ibn Qais al-H am dan i, the governor of a l-M u s il, reported
this to a l-M u k h ta r, informing him that, because of his lack of men, he had
!• Sa 4 d , V , p .74 (citing 4 A tiyya a l - 4 A w fi); Z u b a iri, p p .4 3 -4 (but

he gives the name of 4Ubaidallah ibn 4 A li instead of Ibn a l -
H anafiyya); 4 Uyun, p . 242 (citing al-Asm a 47); Ansab, V , p p .269-7 0
(citing al-Asm a 4t ) ; Bagh., p p .3 3 -4 ; af-RazT, H tigadat Firag1! -
ShJ4 a , p. 62; Dhahabt7~!ll, p p .2 9 6 -9 7 .
121.
left Musil to go to Takrit, and was awaiting al-M ukhtar's orders. On
receiving this news, al-M u kh tar sent three thousand cavalrymen, a ll of them
€Arabs, under the command of Y azid ibn Anas al-A sadi.^ They met the
Syrian army on 19th of D h u 'l-H a jja , 66/17th of July 6 8 6 , at dawn about five
"farsakhs" from M u sil. The result of the battle was victory for Y azid ibn
Anas, despite the fact that he was ill at the time and that his army was half
the size of that of the Syrians. However, Y azid died that evening, after
ordering all the Syrians captured in the battle to be k ille d . His death
greatly demoralized his followers, who thought it wise to withdraw because
their small number would not be able to stand against the eighty thousand
1. Ansab, V , p . 230; D inaw ari, p. 300 (he gives the army of Y azid
as 2 0 ,0 0 0 ). But.they withdrew after Yazid's death because of their
small number, and the fact that Ibn Ziyad sent against them double
of their number, makes us discount Dinawari's view . M oreover,
apart from the exaggeration in number, his narrative is brief and
unconvincing, for he writes that ‘ Abd a l-M a lik fought Y azid and
killed him and his followers, while none of the other sources gives
the slightest hint of this. See T a b ., II , pp. 6 4 2 -4 (citing ‘ Awana
and Abu M ikhn af); K ufi, II, fols. 13b-14a, (here the number is given
as 4 ,0 0 0 because ‘ Abd al-Rahman ibn Sa‘ Td Ibn Qais al-Ham dani
with 1 ,0 0 0 men joined the army of Y a z id .) It is important to point
out here that the army of Y azid consisted only of ‘ Arabs without
any m awali. (Kufi, II, fol. 14a. ^ yCcJvi^ )
The account of T a b ., (II, p .647), confirms this, although
Wellhausen, referring to it, but misunderstanding the te x t, writes
that the army was mostly m awali. See Die Religios-Politischen
Qpposition/£parteien im alten Islam, p. 81.
122.
Syrian troops marching against them, ^
This withdrawal of the Kufan army had a serious reaction in Kufa.
Rumours spread that ‘ Ubaidallah ibn Ziyad had defeated al-M ukhtar's army,
killed his leader, Y a zid ibn Anas, and with his huge army was advancing on
Kufa. Hearing this, al-M u kh tar ordered his general, Ibrahim ibn al-A shfar,
to march against Ibn Ziyad with an army of seven thousand men, and ordered
- 2
him to join up with the army of Y a z id . The situation of al-M u k h ta r, with
the Syrians advancing against him and a large number of his troops away to
fight them, encouraged the Ashraf to defy him and prepare to overthrow his
rule. They condemned al-M u k h ta r for appointing himself ruler without their
consent, for raising the status of their mawali by mounting them on horses,
giving them salaries and letting them share in their revenues (fa i*).
Shabath ibn Rabf i al-T am im i, a senior tribal chief, was their spokesman,
and carried these complaints to al-M u k h ta r. The latter promised to remove
every grievance brought to his attention. Shabath complained about the slaves
who had deserted their masters and joined him, and the m aw ali, saying, "You
have taken away from us our mawali whom God conferred upon us as booty with
this country, whom we freed hoping for God's reward. But you went far beyond
1* T a b ., I I , p .648 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Kuff, 1-1, fol. 15a; K am il, IV ,

p. 190. —
Anscib, V , p . 231; T a b ., II, p .6 4 9 (citing A bu?M ikh n af); K u fi, II,

fols. 14b-15a.
3. D inaw ari, p .306; T a b ., II, p .6 4 9 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); K u fi, II,

fols. 15a-15b; K am iI, IV , p. 190.
123.
this, and made them share in our revenues". A l-M u kh tar answered, " If I
give you back your mawali and distribute the revenue between you alone,
w ill you then fight with me against the Umayyads and Ibn a l-Z u b a ir? W ill
e 1
you make a solemn agreement to this effect in God's name?" The Ashraf
T T 2
refused to do this. A l-D in a w a ri, however, has a different account of this
occasion. He says some of the Ashraf met al-M u kh tar and reproached him for
his policy towards the m aw ali. A l-M u kh tar answered them, "When I showed
you honour, you became supercilious; and when I made you governors, you
embezzled the revenue. I found these Persians (‘ Ajam ) more obedient, loyal
and honest th an y o u ." Even allowing for Dinawari's Persian prejudices, this
account shows al-M ukhtar's opinion of both the mawali and the Ashraf, w hile
Tabari's account indicates the total lack of trust in al-M u k h ta r felt by the
Ashraf.
Was a l-M u k h ta r sincerely prepared to make those concessions to the
Ashraf, in order to get their confidence, and dispense with his faithful m awali?
It seems that in making this offer, al-M u k h ta r was banking on their hostility to
him leading them to refuse. He was using the concessions as an expedient
to appease the Ashraf temporarily, w hile so many of his troops were away. We
shall see him using the same tactics when the revolt of the Ashraf came into the
open.
1. T a b ., II, p . 650 (citing Abu M ikhn af); K u fi, II, fol* 15b; V a n V lo te n ,
op. c it . , p. 16.
2. D inaw ari, p . 306.

124.
W hile the Ashraf were speculating on the possibilities of revolting,
one of them, ‘ Abd al-Rahman Ibn M ikhn af, advised against it at that tim e,
for he said, * A l-M u kh tar is bound to be overthrown either by the Syrians
or the Basrans. Besides, you are disunited, and his side unites the mawali
with many of the ‘ Arabs. Your mawali and slaves hate you more than him,
and therefore, if you attack a l-M u k h ta r, you w ill have to face the bravery of
<Arabs and the hatred of the Persians. His advice was rejected and ■
eventually he joined them in revolt against al-M u k h ta r. His advice,
however, does show the presence of many ‘ Arabs on al-M ukhtar's side.
Following the departure of Ibrahim ibn al-Ashtar to fight the Syrian
army under ‘ Ubaidallah ibn Z iyad , the Ashraf rose in arms and occupied the
- - -2
important places in the c ity . ‘ Abd al-Rahman ibn Sa‘ id ibn Qais al-Ham dani
*
with the tribe of Hamdan occupied Jabbanat a l-S u b a i‘ ; Zuhr ibn Qais a l-
Ju‘ fi and Ishaq ibn Muhammad ibn al-A sh ‘ ath seized Jabbanat Kinda; Ka*b
ibn AbT Ka*b joined with Bashir ibn Jarir ibn ‘ Abdallah and the Bajila to occupy
Jabbanat Bishr; * Abd al-Rahman ibn M ikhnaf occupied Jabbanat M ikhnaf;
Shamir ibn dhul Jawshan occupied Jabbanat banu Sailul and Shabath ibn Rab‘ i
occupied al-K unasa, joined by Mudar. H ajjar ibn A bjar a l - ‘ Ijli and
1. T a b ., II, p . 651 (citing Abu M ikhn af); K u fi, II, fols. 15b-16a; Kam il,
IV , p. 191; NuwairT, X IX , fo l. 18.
2. Previous governor of al-M ukhtar in M usil. This explains how strong were
the tribal feelings among the ‘ Arabs of the time.
125.
Y azid ibn af~HaritH ibn Ruwaim with the Rabi( a tribe occupied al-Sabkha,
T . - 1
and 4 Amr ibn a l-H a jja j al-Z u b a id i occupied Jabbanat Murad. To face
al-M ukhtar's horsemen, the tribes of Kinda, a l-A z d , B apla, a l-N a k h a ‘ ,
Khath*qm, Qais and Taim al-Rabbab gathered in Jabbanat M urad; while
T T . - 2
RabH a and Tamim gathered in Jabbanat al-Hashshashin. This gathering
of the tribes in two places was a favourable opportunity for a l-M u k h ta r, for
it enabled him to concentrate his rather small forces against only two fronts.
A l-M u kh tar succeeded in recalling Ibn al-Ashtar with his forces to Kufa,
but w hile he awaited his arrival, he spared no effort to reconcile the Ashraf.
He sent to them, promising to comply with their wishes. When they demanded
his abdication, on the grounds that his claim to represent Ibn al-H an a fiyy a
was false, al-M u kh tar suggested that they should send a deputation to Ibn
3
a l-H a n a fiy y a to ask him about this point. By this, he tried to achieve two
important things; first, to cause a difference of opinion between them and
secondly, it was an attempt to make time until Ibn al-A shtar arrived. (Never
theless, a I-Ashraf did not accept the proposal, and decided to take their
chance to get rid of him. On the other hand, al-M u kh tar adopted the strategy
1. Ansab, V , p p .2 3 1 -2 ; T a b ., II, p p .6 5 1 -2 (citing Ibn a l-K a lb i); K ufi, II,

fol. 16a.
2. D inaw ari, p . 307; T a b ., II, p .652 (citing Ibn a l-K a lb i).
3. T a b ., II, p . 653 (citing Abu M ikhn af); KufT, II, fols. 16a-16b; Kam il,
Iv, pp. 192-3; NuwairT, X IX , "fol. 18.
126.
of increasing the hatred between the mgwgli, (40,000 at this tim e) and their
masters, by te llin g them that they were fighting for their own cause, identical
with his. He told the mawali that the Ashraf would never have risen in arms
against him, had he not adopted their cause and worked to improve their con
ditions. ^
O nly three days after his departure, Ibrahim returned to Kufa. The next
2 -
day, Sunday the 24th D h u 'l-H a jja 66/22nd J u ly , 6 8 6 , the Ashraf gathered
their forces in three places: Mudar was in al-K unasa, ahl al-Y em en in
Jabbanat al-Subai* and RabHa in the Sabkhq. A l-M u k h ta r, aware of tribal
rivalries, asked Ibrahim to fight Mudar in al-Kunasa, while he himself went
to fight Ahl a l-Y e m e n , for he thought Ibrahim might well, balk at fighting
3
his own people, the Yemenites.
A l-M u kh tar stationed himself near Jabbanat al-Subai* and sent Ahmar
ibn Shumait a l- B a jli al-Ahmasi and ‘ Abdallah ibn Kamil al-Shakir? to
Jabbanat al-Subai* from different directions. He also informed them that

4
Shibam would attack al-Jabbana from behind. Ibrahim was able to defeat
1. D inaw ari, p p .3 0 6 -7 .
2. W ellhausen, Die Religios-Politischen Qpposition/Sparteien im glten Islam,

p. 83.
3. Ansab, V , p . 232; T a b ., II, p . 655 (citing Abu M ikh n af); K u fi, I I , fo l. 16b.
4. From the Yemenite tribes there were only Hamdan fighting a l-M u k h ta r,
for M adhhij lbrahtm*s tribe did not take part on either side, w h ile Shibam
was w itfT a l-M u k h ta r. See W ellhausen, Pie Religios-Politischen Opposition^
%>arteien im alten Islam, p . 83.
127.
Mudar
• w hile Rabf*a left the b a ttle -fie ld *, either because of the defeat of
Mudar and al-Yem en or because of their bai*a to a l-M u k h ta r. ^ Then
Ibrahim came to the rescue of a l-M u k h ta r, whose forces were in a d iffic u lt
position.
The rivalry and jealousy between the Ashraf soon came into p lay, as Ibn
M ikh naf had expected, and contributed to the victory of a l-M u k h ta r. It is
. . -2
reported by Abu M ik h n af in Tabari that when Ahl al-Yem en gathered in
Jabbanat a l-S u b a i< , they disagreed about who would lead the prayer, for no
tribe liked to pray behind a man from another tribe. In the battle of Jabbanat
a l-S u b a i*, ‘ Abdallah ibn Qurad a l-K h a th ja m i, though he remained faithful to
3
a l-M u k h ta r, yet he refused to spill the blood of his fellow tribesmen. Moreover,
when A b u 'l-Q u lu s and his followers from the tribe o f Shibam entered Jabbanat
a l-S u b a i( shouting, "Ya Li Tharat al-H usain" as their slogan, Y a zid ibn ‘ Umair
ibn Dhu Murran al-Ham dani answered this by shouting, “Y a Li Tharat * Uthman11.
This had the effect of rallying the Shi‘ a among the Ashraf to al-M ukhtar's side.
For exam ple, R ifa*a ibn Shaddad a l-F ity a n i, who had once been a follower
of a l-M u k h ta r, but who was with the Ashraf in this revo lt, on hearing the
‘ Uthmanite slogan, became extremely angry and said, “ I w ill not fight on the
1. Ansab, V , p . 232; D inaw ari, p . 307.
2. T a b ., II, p .654.
3. Ib id ., I I , p . 6 5 7 .
128.
same side as those who seek the vengeance of ( U thm an." But in the end,
his tribal feelings were stronger than his Shi4 i feelings and he carried on
fighting against a l-M u k h ta r. ^ On the other hand, we find i Abd a l-M u ’ m in,
the son of Shabath ibn R a b 'i, fighting courageously with al-M u kh tar against
2
his father.
At last had come the time to annihilate the killers of al-H usain. In
doing so, a l-M u k h ta r achieved two goals. The first and most important was that
he fu lfille d his promise to avenge al-H usain, according to which homage had
been paid to him. The second was that he inflicted punishment upon those
Ashraf who revolted against him after a ll his attempts to reconcile them had
3
proved abortive. Furthermore, he was encouraged by the remark said to have
been made by Ibn a l-H an a fiyy a criticizin g al-M u k h ta r: "It is surprising that
al-M u kh tar claims to be the avenger of our family and yet the killers of a l-
4
Husain are his associates and companions." A l-M u kh tar killed all those he
could find who had taken part in the murder of al-H usain, and tore down the
*
5
houses of those who managed to flee to Basra. A t first, many innocents were
attacked either due to personal antagonisms, or because of the hatred fe lt by
1. T a b ., II, p .659.
2. Ib id ., II, p .6 5 4 .
3. Ib id ., p . 667 (citing Abu M ikh n af).
4. Imama, I I , p. 19; Ansab, V , p . 237; D inaw ari, p . 300; T a b ., II, p .604

(citing Abu M ik h n af); K u ff, II, f o l. 8 b.
5. T a b ., II, p . 660; KufT, II, fo l. 17a; 45

kX - j , V , pp. 1 7 3 -4 .
• 1
129.
the mawali to the Ashraf; but al-M ukhtar took over the supervision of
1
prisoners and killed only those who were truly guilty of al-Husain's death.
Whatever his reasons, al-M u kh tar did perform his duty by annihilating
the killers of al-H usain, among whom were Shamir ibn Dhu'l-Jawshan, * Umar
t - 2
ibn Sa*d ibn A bi Waqqas , and many others. This campaign of revenge had
two important consequences. On one hand, ten thousand Ashraf and non-
Shi * 1 *Arab leaders managed to escape to Basra, where M u s*ab ibn a l -
Zubair was the governor for his brother * Abdallah; these Ashraf played an
important part in inciting Mus*ab against al-M ukhtar and was an effective
factor in accelerating his death. On the other hand, it increased his
popularity among the Shi*a and also pleased Ibn a l-H a n a fiy y a , whose recognition
3
al-M ukhtar was seeking.
4
A story is reported in many sources but differently phrased, about a poet
1. T a b ., II, p . 660.
2. It is reported that when al-M u kh tar killed * Umar ibn S a*d, he hired female
mourners and ordered them to w ail at the door of his house, to prepare the
public opinion for the next step. Imama, II, p. 19; * Iqd, IV , p p .4 0 4 -5 . If
this account is true, it shows how al-M ukhtar used such matters as a means
of propaganda. When he razed to the ground the houses of Muhammad ibn al
Ash * ath al-KindT and of Asma* ibn Kharija al-FazarT, he used the building
materials of the two houses for rebuilding the houses of Muslim ibn * AqTI
and Hujr ibn *AdT al-K indT. See T a b ., II, p . 680; K u fi, II, fols. 12b-13a.
Certainly this act was highly appreciated by the Shi*a of his time.
3. Kufi", II, fo l. 8 b.
4. Suraga ibn M irdas, DTwan, p . 7 4 f f .; Mabasin, p. 128; *U yun, p . 2 4 4-5 ;

Ansab, V , p . 234; DTnawarT, p . 309; Tab. ,1 1 , p . 663 (citing Abu M ikhnaf);
KalT, II, fols. 17a-17b; * Iqd, II, pp. 170-71; Agh. , V I I I , p p .31 -2 ; * Asakir,
V I, p .69; Kam il, IV , pp. 196-7.
130.
named Suraqa ibn Mirdas al-B a riq i, who was seized as a prisoner after the
battle of Jabbanat a l-S u b a i*. The story says that when Suraqa was brought
to a l-M u k h ta r, he denied that he was captured by the followers of a l-M u k h ta r,
but by the angels whom he claimed to have seen fighting on w hite horses at the
side of a l-M u k h ta r. The latter ordered him to announce this publicly from the
pulpit. Then al-M u k h ta r summoned Suraqa and told him that he knew very
w ell that he had seen nothing and he ordered him to leave Kufa. Suraqa left
for Basra where he composed satirical verses against a l-M u k h ta r. If this story,
which looks like a piece of imaginary literature, is true, it should be considered
as one of al-M ukhtar*s expedients to strengthen his cause among his followers,
especially the mawali who were more readily prepared to believe in anything
told them by a l-M u k h ta r.
On the 24th Dhul H ajja, 66/22nd Ju ly, 6 8 6 ,^ two days after he returned
from the battle of Jabbanat, a I-S u b a i*, al-M u kh tar despatched Ibrahim ibn
al-Ashtar with an army against *U baidallah ibn Z iy a d , who was now advancing
- 2 - - -
with his army from Musil towards Kufa. A l-M u kh tar instructed Ibrahim, saying,
"Fear God in a ll your acts public and private, be quick in your march and attack
1. According to T a b ., (II, p . 66 7), the battle of Jabbanat al-Subai* was bn

the 24th Dhul H a jja , 6 6 . On the other hand, he says (p .7 0 1 ), that a l-
Mukhtar sent IbrdRtm only two days after the b a ttle , that is 26 Dhul Hajja
6 6 . A g a in (on p .70 0 ), he says that Ibrahim left Kufa on the 22nd Dhul
H a jja . This, however, is corrected by the narrative in BaladhurT (Ansab,
V , p . 24 8), where he states clearly that Ibrahim left Kufa o n lh e 24th Dhul
H ajja 6 6 .
2. The number of his army has been differently given. According to Baladhuri
(Ansab, V , p . 248), it was of nine thousand men; according to DTnawart (p .30 1),
131.
1
your enemy on reaching him without delay". A l-M u kh tar also accompanied
the army until it reached the Euphrates and promised them victory. The army
--2
of Ibrahim was predominantly composed from the m awali, although there
t - 3
were also * Arabs from the tribes of M adhhij, Kinda, Asad, Tamim and Hamdan,
apart from Tamim they are all Southern * Arabs. The two armies met on the
river Khazir about five "farsakhs" from Musi I. The date of the battle is
- 4
given by Ibn G u taib a and confirmed by al-Dhahabi and Ibn K athir, as the
10th Muharram, 67 /6th August, 6 8 6 . The army of al-M ukhtar eventually
won a victory over the Syrians, and ‘ Ubaidallah ibn Z iyad , the one most
responsible for al-Husain's murder, al-Husain ibn Numair al-S akkuni,

• • •
Shurahbil ibn Dhul K ila* and many other Syrian notables, were killed while
those who fled were drowned.
Several factors contributed to the victory of Ibrahim, though his army was
small compared with that of Ibn Ziyad. Apart from Ibrahim's bravery and m ilitary
= it was of thirty thousand men. Finally, KufT (II, fol. 9a), makes it
seventeen thousand, ten thousand of whom were horsemen and the rest
were infantry. Since the figures given by DlnawarT are always exaggerated,
and as it is stated in T a b ., (II, p .705), that Ibrahim's army was small,
BaladhurT's figure seems more convincing.
1. T a b ., II, p .702 (citing Abu M ikhn af); KufT, II, fol. 19a.
2. DlnawarT, p .3 0 2 ; Mubarrad, II, p p .6 1 -2 ; T a b ., II, p . 709 (citing Abu

M ikhhaf); If the account of KufT (II, fo l. 19a) is true, the ten thousand
cavalry said to have been with Ibrahim, were not necessarily all ‘ Arabs,
for al-M u kh tar allowed the mawali to mount on horses.
3. Ansab, V , p . 248; Ta b ., II, p.701 (citing Abu M ikh n af); KufT, II, fol. 24a.
4. M a *a rif, p. 152; Dhahabi, II, p .375; Bidaya, V I I I , p. 283.

genius, there was the religious fanaticism of the Shi* a fa c e -to -fa c e with
Ibn Z iy a d , the k ille r of al-H usain; this fanaticism was enf lamed by a speech
delivered by Ibrahim before the beginning of the b attle.^ Another reason
for the victory was the treason of the Qaisites in the army of Ibn Z iyad . It
2 . „ _ - -
is reported that *Um air ibn al-IJubab al-S u lam i, who was with the Qaisites
on the left wingof Ibn Ziyad's army, visited Ibn al-A shtar and informed him that
because of the battle of M arj R ah it, they had no love for the Marwanids.
Therefore, «Umair promised Ibn al-A shtar to flee when the war began. But
the sources do not agree when this treason took place. According to Baladhuri,
? T . T 3
Tabari, Ibn a l-A th ir and Nuwairi , *Um air only fled when he saw the Syrian
army about to be routed, w hile at first he fought courageously. Tabari,
inserts here that when *Umair saw the retreat of the Syrians, he sent a
message to Ibrahim, "Shall I come to your help now?" Ibrahim answered,
"N o t before the zeal of the Shi*a against the Syrians has calmed down".
On the other hand, another account in Baladhuri, D inaw ari, Mubarrad and
- t 4 . .
M as’ udi report that when the war began *Umair shouted "Ya Li Tharat M arj
1. Ansab, V , p . 249; T a b ., I I , p p .710, 713 (citing Abu M ik h n af); K ufi, II,

TSfTTSa. * ~
2. Ansab, V , pp. 248, 268 (citing M ad a’ in i); D inaw ari, p .310; Mubarrad,
III, p .2 6 8 ;T a b ., I I , p .708 (citing Abu M ikhn af); K u fi, II, fo l. 23b;
M u ru j, V , p . 223 (he states that *Um air was on the right wing and not on
the le ft); K am il, IV , p . 215; N u w a iri, X IX , fo l. 33.
3. Ansab, V , p p .2 4 9 -5 0 ; T a b ., II, p .713 (citing Abu M ik h n a f); K am il, IV ,

p . 217; NuwairT, X IX , fo l. 34.
4. Ansab, V , p p .3 1 3 -4 (citing *Aw ana); D inaw ari, p . 2 0 2 -3 ; Mubarrad, III,

p .269; 55
V._ I ; , V , p . 223.
133.
Rahi{ “ and left the battle field with the Qaisites, and thus gave the battle
to the Iraqis. However, Ibn A* tharn^ has yet another account of this event.
He reports that when the two armies camped near each other Ibrahim sent to
* Umair ibn al-H ubab to come to his side, offering him security “aman" and
promising him a reward. Therefore, ‘ Umair deserted Ibn Ziyad with one
thousand men from his Q aisite kinsmen and their m aw ali, joining Ibn a l -
Ashtar, who warmly welcomed him and distributed money among his followers.
Though this account of Ibn A*tham is not confirmed by any other source, and
it is not in itself convincing,yet it agrees with other accounts, confirming
that *Um air betrayed Ibn Ziyad and helped to bring about the victory of the
Iraqis. Moreover, the narrative of Abu M ikhnaf in Baladhuri, Tabari and its
repetition by Ibn a l-A th ir and N u w a iri, represents the Iraqi tradition which
tried to show the victory of Ibrahim as being achieved without any outside
intervention, especially from the Syrian side. This view could be seen very
clearly in the narrative of M ada* ini in Baladhuri, and also the account of
D inaw ari, Mubarrad a n d M a s *u d i.^ Furthermore, Baladhuri, Dinawari and
- 3
Ibn a l-A th ir preserve an important piece of information, which confirms
our argument that such treason did take place; it says that after the battle of
1. K u fi, II, fo l. 23b.
2. Ansab, V , p . 268 (citing Mada* in i); D inaw ari, p p .2 0 2 -3 ; M ubarrad, III,

p .269; M u ru j, V , p. 223.
3. Ansab, V , p. 251 (citing al-H aytham ibn * A di); D in a w ari, p .304; Kam il, IV ,
£72T3. “
134.
K hazir, Ibrahim ibn al-A shtar confirmed Zufar ibn a l-H a rith as the
governor of Qarqisya* and *Um air ibn al-H ubab was appointed as
governor of Kafr Tuta and Tur* Abdin. Why should Ibrahim make these
appointments except as a reward for the help that *Um air and the Qaisites had
rendered him in the battle of K hazir? Thus from a ll these arguments it seems
1
impossible to accept Wellhausen's view that there was no treason and, even
if there w a s ,it came after the battle had been decided for the Iraqis.
Wellhausen is depending here almost exclusively on Tabari and Abu
M ikhnaf's n a rr a tiv e ,i.e . the Iraqi tradition.
_ 2 - T
It is reported by al-M ubarrad that when Ibrahim ibn al-A shtar marched
from Kufa to meet the Syrians, al-M u k h ta r walked with him for two "farsakhs".
He gave some of his courtiers white doves ordering them to set them free if
Ibrahim won a victory, and to send them back to him if the battle went the
other w ay. A t the same time he told the Shi*a that God w ill send them
3
angels in the form of white doves to help them against the Syrians. Dozy
accepted this story and regarded it as a way in which al-M u k h ta r would get
4
information about the result of the battle. Rajkowski also accepted the story
1. Die Religios-Politischen OppositiorL£parteien im alten Islam, p . 84.
2 . Mubarrad, II I , p . 267 ff.
3. D ° * y , op» c it . , p .2 2 ff.
4. Early Shi* ism in Iraq, p. 178, P h .D . Thesis, London, 1955.

135.
but gave it the different explanation of being one of al-M ukhtar's methods
of impressing his followers. The story seems to be, as Wellhausen^ has
- 2
pointed out, a superstition derived from the story of Suraqa ibn Mirdas.
The fact that no confirmation of it has been reported in our sources and that
it only occurs, without a chain of authority, in al-M u b arra d , who is known
to have had K h a rijite inclinations, is enough to make us suspect it.
When a l-M u k h ta r accompanied Ibrahim ibn al-Ashtar on his departure
to fight the Syrians, at D air* Abd al-Rahman, they met some enthusiastic
Shi* is with an empty chair placed on the back of a grey mule in a very
solemn procession, escorted by the sadin (guardian), Hawshab at-Bursumi.
3
They were circling it and asking God for victory. This scene, however,
caused a reaction from the moderate Shi* a, such as Ibrahim ibn al-Ashtar,
who disapproved of it. As we shall see later, it was one of the reasons which
led him to abandon a l-M u k h ta r. On the other hand, it added to the zeal
of the extremists and gave them courage to meet their Syrian adversaries.
Two narratives te ll us of the origin of this Kursi (chair) and its cu lt.
1. Die Religios-Politischen Opposition-on.&pqrteien im alten Islam, p . 84.
2. See p.
3. Ansab, V , p p .2 4 7 -8 ; T a b ., II, p p .7 0 0 -2 ; Kamil, IV/ p .2 1 2 j iMuwairi, X IX ,

ld L 3 2 ; B idaya, V I I I / p . 278.
The one is Abu M ikhnaf's in Baladhuri and Tabari ^ which depicts a l-
Mukhtar as responsible for the presence of the kursi. The second is that
t 2
of Tufail
* ibn J a ‘da ibn Hubaira in Tabari
* which shows al-M u kh
— tar only•
giving his approval to the idea. Both are repeated by Ibna l-A th ir and
,-3 - _ - . 4
N uw airi . Abu M ikhnaf says that a l-M u k h ta r asked Al Ja*da ibn Hubaira
to give him the chair of * A ll ibn AbT Talib. They denied that they had such
a chair, but when he insisted on it, they brought him one and claimed that it
was the chair of * A li. However, Tufail's narrative differs in that he says one
day he was in need of money and saw a chair with a neighbouring oil dealer.
He took it after it had been cleaned. He went to al-M u k h ta r and informed
him that it was the chair on which his father Ja*da ibn Hubaira used to sit
and that once it had belonged to * A li. A l-M u kh tar ordered the chair to be
brought and gave Tufail twelve thousand dirhams for it.
The most significant point here is, who were the guardians of the chair?
and who were those encircling it in prayer? The answer may help us to trace
- T 5
the origin of this cult. It is reported by Abu M ikhnaf inTabarithat thefirst
1* Ansab, V , p p .2 4 1 -2 ; T a b ., II, p .706.
2. T a b ., I I , p p .7 0 2 -3 .
3. Karnil, IV , p . 214; N u w a iri, X IX , fo l. 46.
4. Um Ja*d a was Um Han** the sister of * A ll ibn Abi Talib.

5. T a b ., II, p .607.
sadin of the chair was Musa the son of Abu M usa a l-A s h *a ri, and then
Hawshab al-Bursumu Both belonged to Yemenite tribes. Those who were
surrounding and worshipping the chair were also Yemenites, members of the
tribes of Shibam, N ah d, K harif and Shakir. ^ The fact that in pre-lslam ic
times certain South Arabian clans acted as guardians of sanctuaries, and that
guardianship passed from generation to generation, and conferred high status
2 .
(Sh araf) , explains why a ll the sad ins of the Kursi were South Arabians.
Moreover, among a ll South Arabian tribes the custom of carrying their tribal
emblems with them when going to war was very common. For they believed
that these emblems would give them victory and thus increase the valour of
the warriors. Therefore, on the day of Dhu Q ar we find Banu Bakr ibn Wa* il
expressing their joy by w alking round the Gubba of H anzala ibn Tha* laba before
they held their meeting. Thus the chair here acted exactly like a tribal
emblem in giving victory and increasing the valour of the warriors. It is also
significant that the word uminbar" was borrowed by old Arabic from the
Ethiopic by way of South A rabia, and that the first * Arabs to whom tradition
4
attributes the use of the "minbar" were Yemenites. It is not surprising,
1. Ib id ., I I , p p .7 0 5 -6 .
2. R .W . Smith, Lectures on the Relig io n of the Semites, p. 1 4 7 ff., London,

1894; R. B* Serjeant, Haram and tja w ta, the Sacred Enclavage in A rabia,
pp. 4 1 -2 , M T H , 1962. *
3. Agh. t X X , p* 136.
4. J. Sauvaget, La Mosgu6 e Omeyyade de M e d in e , p. 141, Paris 1947;
E. Tyan, Institution du D roit Public Musulman, I, p .4 8 8 f f ., Beirut, 1954;
Sourdel, Questions de CeremoniaMAbbasTde, p. 130, REI, X X , 1961.
138.
therefore, that the victory of Ibrahim ibn al-Ashtar made them worship
it even more. It is cle ar, therefore, that the chair was not al-M ukhtar's
idea and in this case, we may prefer the narrative of Tufail to that of Abu
M ikh naf.
Nevertheless, the presence of the chair was used by al-M u kh tar
as a means of getting more support from the extremist S hj*a and encourag
ing the warriors. C ertainly to them it was a holy chair, since they believed
it to be * A lPs, and would give them victory.
A new menace faced al-M u kh tar shortly after his victory over the
Syrians* This danger came from Basra, where M u s*ab ibn a l-Z u b a ir was
governor for his brother * Abdallah. ^ After seizing Kufa and defeating the
Syrians, a l-M u k h ta r had become as formidable a foe of Ibn a l-Z u b a ir as * Abd
a l-M a lik ibn M arw an. His territories embraced a l-K u fa and its Sawad and
also the whole J a zira . * Abd a l-M a lik kept Syria and Egypt, while Ibn a l -
Zubair was confined to the poor country of a l- H ija z and Basra, and was
threatened by both the presence of al-M ukhtar in Kufa and the Kharijites in
2
Persia. The Kufan refugees in Basra, ten thousand in number, led by
Shabath ibn Rab* i and Muhammad ibn al-A sh*ath a l-K in d i played an
important role in inciting Mus*ab against al-M ukhtar and urging him to end
his activities in Kufa. But Mus * ab would not yield to their request unless
1. Ansab, V , p . 231; T a b ., I I , p p .665, 6 8 8 .
2. D inaw ari, p .310.
3. Ansab, V , p p .251, 270 (citing Mada* in i); D inaw ari, p p .31 0 -1 1 ; T a b ., I I ,

p .718 (citing Abu M ikhn af); K a m il, IV , p . 220; N u w a iri, X IX , fo l. 36.
139.
a l-M u h a lla b ibn Abi Sufra, with the troops of Basra, stopped fighting the
Kharijites in a l-A h w a z , Far& and Kirman, and joined his forces. This
was because of a l-M u h a l lab's m ilitary competence, and because his troops
were composed of the best fighters of Basra. However, a l-M u h a lla b was
unwilling to leave his post as the governor of Fars, or to stop the war against
the Kharijites, and only after M u s*ab despatched Muhammad ibn a l-
Ash*oth to him, with the claim that he had come as the messenger of the
women and children of the Ashraf , would a l-M u h a lla b agree to join the
2
army of M u s *a b . He appointed his son Y azid as his deputy in Fars. The
presence of a l-M u h a lla b in this campaign re-enforced the army of M us*ab
with men, money and equipment, m ilitary experience and leadership.
Mus*ab also was joined by ‘ Ubaidallah ibn *A li ibn Abi Talib for personal
3 -
reasons. Before leaving Basra, M u s f ab had secretly sent ( Abd al-Rahman
- . - 4
ibn M ikhn af to Kufa in order to provoke the people against a l-M u k h ta r.
Hearing of Musâb's preparations for war, al-M ukhtar delivered a speech
in which he promised his followers victory. He followed this by raising an
1* Ansab, V , p . 252; D in a w a ri, p . 310; T a b ., I I , p . 719 (citing Abu

M ikfin af); K u fi, II, fo l. 13a.
2. It is said that a l-M u h a l lab concluded a temporary truce with the

K harijite leader QatrT ibn a l-F u ja ’ a. See D inaw ari, p . 310.
3. S a*d, V , p p .8 7 -8 ; Z u b a iri, p p .4 3 -4 ; D inaw ari, p . 311 (the name

given here is *Umar ibn * A li).
4. Ansab, V , p . 253; T a b ., I I , p .719 (citing Abu M ik h n af); K am il, IV , p . 220.

140.
1
army under the command of Ahmar ibn Shumait . A l-M ukh tar's army
- 2 - -
met the Basrans in al-M ad h ar * A !-m a w a li in al-M u k h ta r *s army
- - - 3
were under the command of Abu *Amra Kaisan, a mawla of 'U raina.
Before the battle had started *Abdallah ibn Wahab al-Jusham i, who was on
the left wing of Ibn Shumait's army, (and who, it seems, could not bear to
see the mawali mounted on horses and wanted to get rid of them as a reprisal
for what they had done against their masters) ddvised his commander-in-chief
to ask the mawali to fight on foot on the excuse of their alleged readiness
4 t
to fle e; th e latter followed this advice. A l-M ukhtar's army suffered a
crushing defeat in the battle and Ahmar ibn Shumait was k ille d . Those
who fled were pursued by M us*ab's cavalry, especially by the Kufan
refugees who killed everyone they caught,to revenge themselves. O nly a
1. The number of Ibn Shumait's army is given by Baladhuri (Ansab, V , p . 272)

as forty thousand; *while DlnawarT (p .311) makes it sixty thousand; but
Kufi" (II, fo l. 28a) says it was only of three thousand.
2. It is reported by Waqidi in T a b ., (II, p .748 ) that al-M u k h ta r told ibn

Shumait to meet M us*ab in a l-M a d h ffr, because he hadTeard that a
ThaqflFite w ill gain victory in a l-M a d h a r. But that Thaqifite was a l-
H a jja j and not a l-M u k h ta r. This anticipatory character of this account
shows that it is of a later fabrication.
3. Ansab, V , p . 253; T a b ., II, p .721 (citing Abu M ik h n af).
4. T a b ., II, p .721 (citing Abu M ik h n af); K am il, IV , p .2 2 1 .
5. Although if is not mentioned in our sources, yet it seems that Abu * Amra
Kaisan was also killed in this b a ttle , for we do not hear about him after
this defeat in a l-M a d h a r.
141.
few reached Kufa and communicated the news of the defeat to a l-M u k h ta r.
The date of this battle has not been given in our sources: one might assume
it to be about the middle of 6 7 /6 8 6 . ^
The defeat of al-M ukhtar's army in al-M ad h ar had very serious con
sequences, both on his own part and on that of his followers. When the
news of the defeat reached him, he said, "By God the slaves have been
k ille d on an unprecedented scale” . He also said on the same occasion,
"Death is inevitable and there should be no better death for me than to die
2
fighting like Ibn Shumait This shows how disastrous it was for the morale
of al-M u kh tar himself. It also shook to the very foundation the trust of
his most sincere followers, i . e . , the Persian mawali to whom he had promised
3
victory. They expressed this distrust by saying, "This time he told lies".
M ean w h ile, M u s*ab continued to march on Kufa. In order to speed
up his march, M us*ab ordered the infantry, the weak and the provisions to
be carried by boats, w hile the cavalry advanced by land. In order to hamper
their march, a l-M u k h ta r drained the Euphrates and caused its water to go into
the neighbouring canals. As a result the Basrans1boats came to a h alt. But
al-M u k h ta r was unable to man the dam for long, so that the Basrans soon removed
1. W ellhausen, Die Religios-Politischen Oppositiorv&parteien im alten Islam,

p. 85.
2. T a b ., I I , p .7 2 4 (citing Abu M i khna f); K am il, IV , p .2 2 2 .
3. Ansab, V , p . 254; T a b ., II, p .7 2 4 (citing Abu M ik h n a f).

142.
it , and could again continue their journey in their boats. ^
After fortifying the mosque and the palace, a l-M u k h ta r left Kufa
- - 2
and made his camp at Harura> in order to prevent Mus*ab and his army
from entering the c ity . He had left * Abdallah ibn Shaddad al-Jushami as
his deputy there. Mus*ab's army was arranged into five divisions. On the
right wing was a l-M u h a lla b , on the left was * Umar ibn ‘ Ubaidallah ibn
M a*m ar al-Tam im i; in command of the cavalry was * Abbad ibn al-H usain,
and of the infantry, M uqatil ibn Misma* al-B akri; and the Kufan refugees
- 3
were under Muhammad ibn al-Ash* ath a l-K tn d i. To counteract Mus * ab, a l -
• ■■■ — #
Mukhtar sent to every tribal "Fifth" of the Basrans, one of his followers
from the same tribe. To Bakr ibn Wa* N, he sent Sa* id ib n M u n q id h , to f Abd
a l-Q a is he sent * Abd al-Rahman ibn Shuraih aI»Shibami; to Ahl a l-* A liy a he
sent * Abdaliah ibn J a ‘ da ibn Hubaira al-Q uraishi al-M akh zu m i; to a l-A z d
he sent Musafir ibn Sa* id ibn Nimran a l - N a * i t i ; to Banu Tamim he sent Sulaim
ibn Y a zid a l-K in d i and to Muhammad ibn a l-A s M a th , he sent al-Sa* ib ibn
-4
M a lik al-A sh f ari . The two armies soon joined b a ttle , in which Muhammad
ibn al-A sh*ath and ‘ Ubaidallah ibn * AM were k ille d . At this point, Muhallab's
division joined the b a ttle , attacked ai-M ukhtar's army and inflicted defeat on
1. Ansab, V , p . 228; T a b ., II, p .7 2 4 ; K u fi, II, fo l. 29a.

•
2. T a b ., II, p . 748 (citing a l-W a q id i).
3* Ansab, V , p .259; T a b ., II, p . 725 (citing AbuM ik h n af).
4. Ansab, V , p . 259; T a b ., II, p . 726.

143.
it. But al-M u kh tar continued to fight all the night, and only under
pressure from his followers did he agree to return to the palace. ^
Since the battle of K hazir, 10th of Muharram 67 /6 th of August, 6 8 6 ,
Ibrahim ibn al-Ashtar had remained in M usil governing Jazira and its
dependences. Why did he remain there when al-M u kh tar was in such
straits in Kufa, and there was so little need for his presence in M usil?
Why did not al-M u kh tar ask him to come and join him in the war against
2
M u s ‘ abi? W ellhausen, presumes that there were reasons to prevent a l-
Mukhtar asking the help of Ibn al-A shtar, or that the latter was not sincere
in his adherence to a l-M u k h ta r. In fact, the relationship between al-M ukhtar
and Ibrahim had become cool when, on Ibrahim's departure to flight
‘ Ubaidallah ibn Z iy a d , al-M ukhtar's followers met him with the chair.
Ibrahim had expressed his disapproval of this by saying,"O G od, do not
3
punish us because of the deeds of the silly among u s ." But he did not give
up his task, perhaps because he was a sincere adherent of the ShH i cause. He
might also have been motivated by a personal am bition, in that he had been
1. Ansab, V , p . 259; T a b ., II, p .7 2 6 ff. (citing Abu M ik h n a f). Here again,

no date for the battle has been given and all we know is that it took place
6 7 /6 8 6 ; but if we consider the narrative of W aqidi in T a b ., (II, p .74 8),
which says that al-M ukhtar was killed in Ramadan, 6 7 , four months after
the battle of Harura* ,"the date of the battle should be 15th Jumada a l-A w w a l,
6 7 /ls t December, 6 8 6 ; W ellhausen, Die Religios-Politischen O pposition-
ip a rte ie n im alten Islam, p. 56.
2. Ib id ., p. 8 6 .
3. Ansab, V , p . 248; T a b ., I I , p .702 (citing Abu M ikh n af).

144.
promised by Ibn al-H a n a fiy y a supposedly, (in the false letter), the governor
ship of conquered lands. His ambition was satisfied now that he was
governor of Musil and Jazira; why, therefore, should he be concerned with
al-M ukhtar's affairs? That the two were on not very good terms is hinted
at by Tabari; a ll the heads of the tribal quarters deserted Ibrahim as soon as
he became governor of M u sil, since they believed him to be failing in his
adherence to the cause of al-M u k h ta r. These tribal heads were sent with
Ahmar
*
ibn Shumait
— ■ .
to the battle of al-M adi h ar. ^ When Muhammad
.
ibn a l-
Ash* ath went as a messenger to a l-M u h a lla h , to ask him to join Mus*ab against
2
a l-M u k h ta r, we are told by Ibn A*tham that he told him, " A l- Mukhtar now
stands alone, for Ibn al-Ashtar has deserted him and seized a l-J a z ira . " The
same source says that when al-M ukhtar heard about Mus*ab's preparations for
w ar, he believed that Mus*ab had been encouraged to a ttac k, because he
- 3
knew that Ibn al-Ashtar would no longer come to the assistance of al-M u k h ta r.
A l-M u k h ta r, trying to raise the valour ofhis followers,madeit clear in his
speeches that Ibn al-A shtar was no longeronhis side,and asked them to
4 -
join the army of Ibn Shum ait. However, al-M u kh tar was in great need of
Ibrahim's help and m ilitary experience, especially after the defeat of his army
1. T a b ., II, p . 720 (citing Abu M ikhn af).
2. K ufi, II, fo l. 27b; Bagh. , p p .3 5 -6 .
3. K u fi, II, fo l. 28a.
4. Ibid.
in a l-M a d h a r. He wrote several times to him to ask his help, but Ibrahim
refused. ^ When the battle of Hamra* began, al-M u k h ta r could only
express his deep sorrow and regret at his abandonment by Ibrahim. One
could mention here that after al-M ukhtar's death, Ibrahim made a firm
alliance with M us*ab. Mus*ab would never have placed his complete con
fidence in Ibrahim, had he not been sure of his indifference to al-M ukhtarb
cause. It is probable that if Ibrahim had not deserted a l-M u k h ta r, the out
come of the battles of Madhar and ârura* might w ell have been different.
Gn the next day, (Thursday), Mus*ab and his army continued their
march on Kufa, which they entered from al-Sabakha and laid seige to
a l-M u k h ta r. To prevent provisions reaching the latter and his followers,
he sent ‘ Abdallah ib n a l-H u rr a !-J u *fi to Jabbant al-S a* id iy in , and
*Abbad ibn al-H• usain

•
to Jabbant Kinda; he also ordered a l-M u h a lla b to
- - .
- 2
patrol the road to and from Kufa. These measures prevented al-M ukhtar
from getting even drinking water from the Euphrates, so that he was forced
to mix honey with the water from the palace wells.
In the palace, with a l-M u k h ta r, were a large number of mawali and
t 3
few * Arabs. During the seige which lasted, according to W aqidi , four
.. 4
months, or forty days according to D inaw ari, the * Arabs deserted al-M ukhtar
1. Ib id ., II, fo l. 29a.
2. Ansab, V , p p .2 6 0 -1 ; T a b ., I I , p p .7 3 3 -4 (citing Abu M ik h n af).
3. T a b ., I I , p .749.
4. D inaw ari, p . 313.

and took refuge with their tribes, while the mawali remained with him
until he was k ille d . During the seige, however, al-M ukhtar's prestige had
1
fallen and people in Kufa dared to throw stones and rubbish on his followers.
The only way they could get supplies was for their wives to bring them, but
soon this visiting of wives was stopped. Realizing that the seige would weaken
th e ir resistance, al-M ukhtar urged his followers to go out with him and fight
until they die or w in , but they refused and decided to surrender unconditionally
to M u s *a b . Therefore, al-M ukhtar and only nineteen followers went out to
battle. A l-M u kh tar met his death after having distinguished himself in fighting
courageously. It is reported that he said during this last battle before his
death, to al-S a*'ib ibn M a lik al-A s h f ari: "I am an Arab. I saw * Abdallah
ibn a l-Z u b a ir seize a l- H ija z , Marwan ibn al-H akam seize S yria, N ajda ibn
* Amir a l-H a n a fi (the Kharajite) seize al-Yam am a; so I, inferior to none,
seized this region. The only difference is that I revenged the Prophet's family
2
(Ahl a l-B a it) w hile the Arabs forgot i t , " A l-M u kh tar died on the 14th of
- 3
Ramadan 6 7 /3 rd of A p ril, 68 7, when he was 67 years old.
1. T a b ., I I , p . 734 (citing Abu M ikh n af); K am il, IV , p . 224.
2. Ansab, V , p . 261; D inaw ari, p . 313; T a b ., II, p . 737 (citing Abu

M ikhn af); K u fi, II, fo l. 30b; K am il, lv , p . 225; Dhahabi, II, p . 378.
3. T a b ., II, p .750. It is mentioned in Baladhuri (Ansab, V , p . 264) that

al-M ukhtar's death was in 6 9 /6 8 8 in the month of Ramadan. According
to Fariq (op. c i t . , p. 119, S11, III, no. 2 , 1966) this date is more likely
since al-M u kh tar had fought several wars in distant regions where the
means of communication were slow.
147.
A ll those who were with al-M u kh tar in the palace, said to have been
six thousand in number, were killed on the order of Mus‘ ab, under pressure
from the Kufan refugees to take revenge for their relatives and kinsmen. ^
This massive slaughter provoked the indignation of pious men like ‘ Abdallah
ibn ‘ Umar, and many of the people of Kufa, which could be noticed in the
death of Mus‘ ab in the battle of Maskin with ‘ Abd a l-M a lik ibn Marwan
7 2 /6 9 1 . Mus‘ ab, however, showed no mercy towards al-M ukhtar's followers,
and k ille d the two sons of Hujr ibn ‘ Adi and also the son of Hudhaifa ibn a l -
- 3
Yaman. He cut off the hand of al-M ukhtar and pinned it to the side of the
mosque, an act which certainly enraged not only al-M ukhtar's family but all
those followers who remained faithful to him even after his death.
Following the death of a l-M u k h ta r, Mus‘ ab summoned his two widows,
Um Thabit bint Samura ibn Jundub a l-F a za ri and ‘ Amra bint a l- N u ‘ man
ibn Bashir al-A n sari, and ordered them to declare that al-M u k h ta r was a
liar and an imposter. The former yielded reluctantly, w hile the latter refused
and asserted that he was a good Muslim . Mus‘ ab imprisoned her and wrote to
1* Ansab, V , p p .2 6 2 -3 ; D inaw ari, p . 315; T a b ., I I , p p .7 4 0 -1 ; KufT, II,

fo l. 31a; ‘ Asakir, X V I, fo l.27 0b (citing ‘ Abdallah ibn Abi Rabi‘ a
a l-M ak h zu m i); K am il, IV , p . 225. It is reported also th a tM u s ‘ ab in
tended to k ill the m aw aif and set the ‘ Arabs free. The latter were only
seven hundred according to I bn ‘ Asakir (X V I, fo l. 270b) and two thousand
according to Dinawari (p .315). See also Ansab, V , p. 263; T a b ., I I , p .749
(citing W aqidf).
2. Ansab, V , p . 265 (citing Abu M ikhn af and ‘ Awana), p . 271 (citing ‘ Awana)
T a b ,, II, p .745 (citing Abu M ik h n af).
3. Ansab, V , p p .270-1 (citing Ibn a l-K a lb i).

148.
his brother ‘ Abdallah ibn a l-Z u b a ir in M ecca, saying that she claimed
that al-M u kh tar was a prophet ‘ Abdallah ibn a l-Z u b a ir passed sentence
of death on her, but she still refused to recant t ^. The poet ‘ Umar ibn
7 ? - - 2
Abi Rabi‘ a al-M akhzum i has expressed how her death shocked the people
at that tim e.
A fter al-M ukhtar's death, ‘ Abdallah ibn a l-Z u b a ir sent his brother
‘ Urwa to Ibn a l-H a n a fiy y a demanding his homage and threatening him with
death should fee refuse. ‘ Urwa gave his brother's message, and then said
to Ibn a l-H a n a fiy y a that, "God had killed the imposter a l-M u k h ta r on whom
you were depending". Ibn al-H a n a fiy y a replied . . By God I did not send .
a l-M u k h ta r as my agent nor was he my supporter; he was more intimate with
3
your brother than with m e ." This account shows that a l-M u k h ta r had
exploited the name of Ibn al-H an a fiyy a for his own ends, and that the latter
did not approve of his activities.
The interpretation of al-M ukhtar's character given in both the early and
late sources, as w ell as by modern historians, is of a "false prophet” ,
making himself into the agent of a l-M a h d i, with connotations of a reflection
of the relationship between God and the Prophet, forecasting events to show
1. Ansab, V , p p .2 6 3 -4 ; D inaw ari, p . 315; T a b ., I I , p p .7 4 3 -4 (citing Abu

M ikhn af); K am il, IV , p . 227. C ertainly this act provoked the people
of Kfffa even more against Mus‘ ab, since he had committed a deed which
the Prophet had forbidden against the wives of the infidels. ‘ Iqd, V I , p. 118.
2. Ansab, V , p p .2 6 3 -4 ; D inaw ari, p . 315; T a b ., II, p .744 (citing Abu M ikhn af);
K am il, IV , p . 227. * ”
3. Sa‘ d, V , p p .7 7 -8 ; ‘ Asdkir, X V , fo l. 273a; DhahabT, 111, p . 299.

149.
himself as in touch with the unknown, using rhymed prose to im itate the
Q u r’an, and arousing and directing religious emotions for his own political
ends. His motivations were no higher than po litical am bition, and he
unscrupulously used all means to these ends. M y own opinion is that he
was a genuine Shi‘ i and became impatient with Ibn al-H an afiyya's in activity
■ *
in pursuing the revenge of al-H usain, especially since he could see the
p o litical possibilities that the revenge could offer to an ambitious man. He
achieved power by calling Ibn a l-H an a fiyy a a l-M a h d i, and this sparked
off a wave of religious fanaticism which he had to contain by continuing the
religious pretence: for example, his use of rhymed prose, and his forecasts.
He used this religious fanaticism both for the ends of his p o litical ambition,
and for the end of the revenge of al-H usain. He seemed to have a genuine
concern for the social dissabilities of the mawalT, although a part of this
would spring from the fact that they were the easiest to arouse in support of
his cause, both because of their religious extremism and their social grievances.
Apart from an ephemeral p o litical success, the revolt of al-M u kh tar
contributed considerably to the history of the ShHa movement; for it was
connected with the origin of the Kaisaniyya and the Khashabiyya sects.
A l-K aisan iyya derives its name from a man called Kaisan, about whom
our authorities are not agreed. It is said that Kaisan the mawla of <Ali ibn Abi
150.
1 -
Talib was the founder of the sect, from whom a l-M u k h tc r took his ideas;
it is claimed that Kaiscn wcs with al-M u kh tar in the taking of the revenge
of al-H usain. Since this Kcisan, however, was killed in the battle of Siffin
# •
2
3 7 /6 5 7 , about thirty years before al-M ukhtar's revolt and the origin of
the Kaisaniyya, it is impossible to accept this view . It is probable that
by attributing the Kaisaniyya to the mawla of t A li, or depicting him as a
3
disciple of Ibn a l-H a n a fiy y a , the intention was to give the sect a strong
religious pedigree, since Kaisan would take his knowledge either directly
from his master, ( A li, or indirectly from his son.
Another view holds that the Kaisan after whom the sect was named, was
al-M u kh tar himself, who was nicknamed Kaisan, either by ( A li or by

4
Muhammad ibn a l-H a n a fiy y a . The sources, however, show only that a l-
Mukhtar was c a lle d uKayyis" by ‘ A li and not Kaisan at a ll. The claim that
the title was conferred on a l-M u k h ta r by Ibn a l-H a n a fiy y a is extremely un
lik e ly , since Ibn a l-H a n a fiy y a never trusted him, nor recognized him as working
for the 11Ah I a l-B p it" . Therefore, it would seem that a l-M u k h ta r and Kaisan
1. N aw b akh ti, p . 21; M a q a lc f, p . 18; Ibn Hayyun, Sharh a l-A k h b a r, fo l.4 8 b ;

M a fatrh , p . 21; Begin,, p 7 / 7 j Adyan, p . 35; M if a l, p . 280; HiJr, p. 182;
M ir * a t, V I , fo l.3 9 a ; Muqaddima, p .351. “
2. T a b ., I, p .3293 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); K am il, I II, p . 247.
3- P -280; M r ^ a t , V I , fo l. 39a.
4* M a *a rif, p . 267; N aw bakhti, p . 20; A M aq , p . 218; M a q a la t, p. 18;

M u ru j, V , _Pj*180 (citing <Dmar ibn Shabba); Bagh., p . 27; Nubdha min
K itab al-TarTkjn, fo l. 245b; M ir * a t, V I , fo l. 3 9 a .
151.
were two different people. ^
One final explanation for the name Kaisaniyya is given by Ibn Hazm
_ 2
and Nashwan a l-H im y a ri, who state that the Kaisaniyya were the followers
of al-M u kh tar and Kaisan Abu * Amra, a mawla of *Uraina from the tribe of
B ajila. This last explanation helps us to clarify the point that, if al-M ukhtar
was ever called Kaisan, it was due to the activities of Kaisan Abu * Amra, who
as the head of al-M ukhtar's personal guard, threatened the non-Shi* i and
was very influential among his fellow m awali. It could be that when in later
years Kaisan*s a c tiv ity against the non-Shi* i were remembered, after the man
himself had been forgotten, the word “ Kaisaniyya" was used to describe all
the activities of that brief spell of al-M ukhtar's power. This shows how
Kaisan and al-M u k h ta r became linked names, so that M ukhtariyya and
Kaisaniyya became synonymous.
This study is not concerned with the theological aspect of al-K aisaniyya
sect; it is suffice to mention here that the p o litical party which overthrew
the Umayyids and established the * Abbasids in power (the Hash imiyya) was
a group of the Kaisaniyya, which split into three groups after the death of Ibn
3
a l-H a n a fiy y a .
1. Sa*d, V , p .77; DTnawarT, pp. 2 9 6 -7 .
2. Fi§al, IV , p. 94; y u r, p. 182; Freidlaender, The Heterodoxies of the

Shi* ites in the Presentation of Ibn lâzm, p . 3 4 , J A O S , X X IX , 1908.
3. V a n V lo te n , op. c it . , p .42; £. 1. (*Abbasfid), (Hashimiyya), (G hulat).

152.
The name al-K hashabiyya, " club men", was used for the first time
to designate those sent by al-M ukhtar from among the people of Kufa to
rescue Ibn a l-H a n a fiy y a , after being imprisoned by Ibn a l-Z u b a ir. They
were called so because they held wooden clubs in their hands as weapons. ^
2
It is said that this was on the instructions of Ibn a l-H a n a fiy y a to avoid
the use of swords in the baram. It is also reported by al-Baladhuri and Ibn
_ 3
a l-A th ir , on doubtful evidence, that they were called Khashabiyya because
they took the wooden clubs which were piled up by Ibn a l-Z u b a ir beside the
prison in preparation for burning Ibn al-H a n a fiy y a and his followers. The fact
4
that Ibn a l-H a n a fiy y a was always against violence and the use of force and
that it was only on their entry into ai-H aram that they held swords, makes us
favour the first interpretation.
Another account has it that it was Ibrahim's army that was called
.t 5
Khashabiyya. According to Ibn Q u taib a, Ibn Rusta and M aqdisi, most of
Ibrahim's army that fought Ibn Ziyad carried wooden arms (khashab), and for
1. Akhbar, fols. 45b, 4 6 a , 47a; Ansab, V , p . 231; T a b ., I I , p . 694 (citing

Abu M ik h n af); Kam il, IV , p . 207.
2. Akhbar, fo l. 47a; Ansab, V , p . 231; fo l. 262a; T a b ., II, p p .6 9 4 -5 (citing

Abu M ik h n af); K uft, II, fo l. l i b ; K am il, IV , p .^ 0 7 .
3. Ansab, Y , p . 231; fo l. 262a; Kam il, IV , p . 207.
4. Sa‘ d, V , p .78; Ansab, V , p p .2 4 6 -7 ; T a b ., I I , p p .689-91 (citing Abu

M ik h n af); K uft, II, fo l. 12a; K am il, IV , p p .2 0 4 -5 .
5. M a * a r if, p. 267; A ‘ lag, p. 218; Bad*, V , p. 133.

153*
this reason were called Khashabiyya* After al-M ukhtar's death, a l -
M uhallab ibn Abi Sufra, a general of Mus*ab ibn a l-Z u b a ir, laid seige to
Nasibin, where Ibrahim al-A shtar was governor. Abu O a rib , Y a zid ibn
Abi Sakhr and the Khashabiyya were defending the c ity . M uhallab addressed
the people saying, "Do not be frightened of these men. They are only slaves
with nothing in their hands but sticks."^ This shows both that Khashabiyya
was being used as a name for Ibrahim's army, and that this was associated
with the fact that they were m awalt.
These Khashabiyya are not the same as those who rescued Ibn a l-H a n a fiy y a
- 2
from Ibn a l-Z u b a ir. This is made clear by information given in Baladhuri,
who relates that the four thousand men who came to Ibn al-H an afiyya's
rescue, and among whom he distributed the money sent by a l-M u k h ta r, did
not go back to K ufa, but remained with him in the Shi^b of ( A li. Even those
few among them who, with the permission of Ibn a l-H a n a fiy y a , weht to see
their families and remained in Kufa until the battle of Jabbanat a l-S u b a i‘ ,
fought in that battle against a l-M u k h ta r. It is therefore d iffic u lt to imagine
them in the army of Ibn al-A shtar fighting the Syrians for the sake of a l-
M ukhtar; nor would the latter have trusted them any more. This informa-
? 3
tion of Baladhuri has been confirmed by Ibn Sa( d's narrative which says that
1. A gh ., V , p. 155 (citing al-Haytham ibn *A d i).
2. Akhbar, fo l. 47a; Ansab, fo l. 262a.
3. Sa( d, V , p .76.
in the year 6 6 -6 7 /6 8 5 -6 8 6 , Ibn a l-H an a fiyy a and four thousand of the
Khashabiyya who were residing in the Shi4b of M in a performed the pilgrim
age. Thus there were two groups of men known as Khashabiyya: the first,
the rescuers of Ibn a l-H a n a fiy y a , and the second, Ibrahim's army. In the
first case, the name was simply used as a descriptive name; it seems that it
was the second group that developed into a religious sect.
W hat was the relationship between a l-M u k h ta r, the Kaisaniyya and the
Khashabiyya? A l-M a $ 4udi ^ tells us that when a l-M u k h ta r was fighting
M u s*ab ibn a l-Z u b a ir, "he had with him many of the Shi 4 a , called
Khashabiyya, belonging to the K aisaniyya." On the authority of a l-Z u b a ir
- t 2
ibn Bakkar, al-lsbahani says that, " it was Khi^dif al-Asadi who converted
1 3
Kttfhayyir$vhowas known to be a Kaisani ) to the K hashabiyya." A l-M a s 4udi
in al-Tanbih says that when al-M u k h ta r was killed and his followers, about
six thousand, surrendered unconditionally to M u s 4 ab, they were all put to

4
death; these followers were known as Khashabiyya. We are told by a l-
Tabari and a l-ls b a h a n i,^ that Y a zid ibn 4 Uthman al-Khashabi received his
1. M u ru j, V , p. 226.
2. Agh. V I I I , p . 33.
3. Freidlaender, op. c i t . , p. 94, JA O S , X X IX , 1908; E. I. ^, (al-Khashabiyya).
4. Tanbih, p p .3 1 2 -1 3 .
5. T a b ., II, p. 1798; Agh. , V I , p. 139.

name from the fact that he was descended from one of the Khashabiyya of
a l-M u k h ta r. These accounts show that a I-Khashabiyya was used as a name
for al -M ukhtar's followers, and that either al-Khashabiyya was another name
for a I-Kaisaniyya^ or else that one of the sects took over the other, perhaps
in a later period, so that the two names were used interchangeably.
As to the reason why Ibrahim's followers carried wooden clubs in their
2
hands and not weapons, modern historians disagree. Wellhausen presumes
that being m aw ali, they were poor and thus could not afford to buy weapons.
The fact that it is not true that all the mawali were poor, nor that a ll the
Khashabiyya were mawali , makes this presumption inadequate. As has
3
been pointed out by Friedlaender, the name must have had religious im p lica-
4
tions. It is reported by Ibn Hazm that the Rawafid hold that it was forbidden
• •
to use weapons before the speaking Imam (a l-N a tiq ) came forth. After that,
it would be obligatory to draw swords tflong with him. It may be that the
Khashabiyya were motivated by similar doctrinal reasons, since both were
extremist Shi 4 i sects. This doctrine of using sticks instead of weapons has
5 6
been ascribed to both Jewish and Christian origins.
1. E. I. \ (al-Khashabiyya).
2. Die Religios-Politischen Oppositioru&parteien im alten Islam, p .80.
3. op. c i t . , p. 94, JA O S , X X IX , 1908.
4. Fi$al, IV , p. 171.
5. Freidlaender, op. c i t . , p . 94, JA O S , X X IX , 1908.
6. Rajkowski, op. c i t . , pp. 1 6 8 -9 .

156.
Al-Khqsh qbiyyg as a name was also given to a group of a Zaidi Shi 4 a,
known as Shurkhabiyya after a certain Shurkhab a l-J a b a ri. ^ This
2
obscure Shurkhab might, as Arendank has suggested, have been the
- 3
one who played a part in Tabaristan in the time of al-Hasan ibn Zaid*
It is also reported that a group of al-Jahm iyya was called Khashabiyya;
they held that God does not speak and that the Q u r’an is created.
4
F inally, it is reported that al-Khashabiyya were called so because
they kept the wood on which Zaid ibn 4 A li was crucified. This, however,
cannot be true, because the crucifixion of Zaid happened much later, after
the death of Ibn 4 Umar, on whose authority this story has been reported.
1* M a fa tih , p. 21; Adyan, pp. 3 4 -5 .
(ql"Khashabiyya).
3. Ibn Isfandiyar, (English translation by E. G . Browne), Index.
4. N ih a y a , II, p . 33.
157.
CHAPTER III
‘ ABD
-
A L -M A- L IK IBN M A R W A n A N D THE * ASABIYYA
»— — --
Tribal feuding existed long before 4 Abd a l-M a lik 's reign began, a l
though it reached a new intensity during his caliphate. Nevertheless, by
the end of his reign, outbreaks of raiding and other manifestations of
t A§abiyya were very much in the decline, as a result of the policies pursued
by 4Abd a l-M a lik towards the tribes.
Feuding broke out in both Syria and al - Ja zira first between the Q ais
and the Kalb, and later between the Q ais and the Taghlib. Khurasan was
also the scene of feuding, starting between Rabi4a and Mudar ( i . e . Bakr, Tamim
and Qais)* Later, the Mudarites divided, and feuding began between the
Tamim and the Qais* F in a lly , the Tamim began to feud among themselves.
Historians hold different views on the origins of the antagonism between
the Q ais and the Kalb ( i. e . the Northern and Southern *Arabs). W hile Dozy^
thinks that the struggle between the G ais and the Kalb "has existed from time
2
immemorial" , G oldziher considers that it derived from the rivalry between
3
the Quraish and the Ansar. Wellhausen stresses the view that the hostility
between the G ais and the Kalb "did not exist before the capture of Syria
by the Muslims and the immigration thither of the Q ais". It seems erroneous
1. Histoire des Musulmans d'Espagne, I, p . lO & f f ., Leiden, 1861.
2. Muslim Studies, I, p. 91, Ed. S. Mb Stern, London, 1967.
3. The Arab Kingdom and its F a ll,p . 180.

158.
to connect these feuds with the pre-lslam ic ones, for the latter were
between “neighbouring tribes often related to one another1'. ^
The development of the tribal feuds in the Umayyad period seems to
be due to economic and social fact or sand goes back to the time of the
Conquest and the settlement of Arab tribes in the conquered lands. Even
before the conquest of Syria, there were many<Arab tribes living there, most
of them Yemenites. They were Ghassan, Tanukh, Judham, ‘ A m ila, K alb,
S alih , and Bahra’ . In the north of Syria there were Taghlib, Tanukh, lyad
2
and a l-N im r ibn Q asit # Some of these tribes, such as Ghassan, were
associated with the Byzantines and even fought against th e ‘Arabs with the
3
Byzantines. This might have temporarily weakened the Yem enite influence
in Syria, yet their prior presence and their numerical strength meant that
they soon regained much of their earlier predominance over the other tribes.
Their years of contact with the Byzantine Empire had raised their economic
standards of liv in g , and culturally and economically they were superior to
the new se ttlin g ‘Arabs. On the other hand, the conquering Yemenite Arabs
fe lt that the prior occupation of parts of Syria gave them a special interest in the
area: when the Caliph ‘ Umar I tried to send re-inforcements to the Muslim
1. B. Lewis, The Arabs in History, p .7 4 , London, 1964.
2. M c farif, p . 212; Ishtiqaq, pp. 225, 3 1 3 -1 4 , 327; Futub, p . 59; T a b .,

I, p . 2347; HamdanT, Sifat JazTrat a l - ‘ Arab, p . 1297 A g h ■, X V , p. 91;
Bakri, I, p p .50 , 8 6 ; Jamharat, p . 423; ‘ Ibar, II, p p .3 6 -7 .
3. Futuh, p. 135; T a b ., I, p. 2081 (citing Saif ibn ‘ Umar); E. I. (Ghassan).

159.
armies who were carrying out the conquest of Iraq, the Yemenites p re-
1
ferred to go to Syria as "the land of their forefathers". Thus most of the
new ‘Arab settlers arriving with the conquests were also Yemenites, thus
making it lik e ly that the Southern‘A rabs would continue to be dominant in
Syria even after the conquest. A look at the settlement of tribes in Syria
clearly shows this dominance: in Palestine were Lakham, ‘ A m ila, Judham
and Kalb; in Jordan were Ghassan, M ad h h ij, Q uda‘ a, Hamdan, Kalb and
‘ Ik; Hu ran and Julan contained a mixture of Lakham, Juhaina and
Dhubian; w hile Damascus was also inhabited by G u da‘ a, Ghassan and
Himyar with a small number of O aisite and Q uraishite. Hims was predominantly
Yemenite in character, where were Kinda, Tay, Him yar, K alb, Hamdan and
a minority of ‘ lyad and G ais. Hamat was inhabited by Yementies too,
especially the Tanukh_and Bahra*. In the northern region we find Salih,
Zubaid, Hamdan, Kinda, and Tay, all Yem enite, with a minority of Gais
and lyad. The G ais were in a majority in Qinusrin and its outskirts, as w ell as in the
JaziraV'as were the Rabi‘ a. The K alb , on the other hand, were the sole
occupants of the desert of the Samawa. The Taghlib were on the Khabur
in the Ja zira region.^
1. T a b ., I, p p .2 1 87-8; 2 2 17-8 (citing Saif ibn ‘ Umar).
2. Nasr ibn M uzahim , W aq‘ at S iffin , p . 232; Futuh, pp. 107-92; Dinawari,
p. 183; Bui dan/ p p . 325, 3 2V; T a b ., U pp. V555^5, 1 6 0 4 -5 , 1611, 17 40-1,
2 3 4 7 -8 , 11, 468; HamdanT, §ifat Jazirat a l - ‘ A rab, pp. 129-34; M u ‘ jam , 11,
p .4 4 , IV , p. 391; Bughya, fols. 4 6 7 -5 0 1 .
160.
The campaigns of the conquest led to a new development in the
structure of Arabian society: the change from the Bedouin way of life to
c ity -d w e llin g , as different tribes settled in the cities of the conquered
lands. Contrary to one’s expectation, that this settlement in the cities
would weaken tribal cohesion, and act as a check on the rivalries and
jealousies of the different tribes now forced to live together, it did, in fa ct,
increase tribal loyalty. Indeed, the Caliph had m ilitary reasons for main
taining tribal loyalties, as they were used to maintain discipline in the
lower ranks of the army. The settlement in towns was organised on a tribal
basis, each tribe having its own quarter.^
In Syria, the m ilitary settlements and districts of the tribes were
called Jund. The tribes were quartered in these Jund, and could be
m obilized for seasonal campaigns or for more protracted expeditions. There
were at first four Junds in Syria, of IHims, Damascus, Jordan and Palestine.
Later, the Jund of Ginasrin is said to have been detached from this
? 2
organization by the caliph Y a z id . "The whole army was a mixture of
men of various tribes, but in the lower ranks, the soldiers remained grouped
3
in communities of tribal origin".
1. Futub , pp. 2 7 6-8 9; D inaw ari, p. 147 f f . ; T a b ., I, pj>.

Massignon, Explacation duPlan deKufa (Irak), p p .345, M M , 111,
1935-40; a l-J a n a b T , TakhjTt a l-K u fa , p p .7 6 -8 0 , Baghdad, 1967.
2* E. I. (Djund).
3. E. I. (Djaysh).
161.
From the battle of J iffin , one can detect the elements of the Syrian
army in the early Umayyad period. In that battle the army of M u ‘ awiya
was composed m ainly of Yemenites with a minority of G aisite but no
Rabi‘ ites. The Yemenites were Him yar, G uda‘ a (Kalb and Tanukh), Lakham,
Judham, Hamdam, Khath‘ am, Ghassan, M ad h h ij, ‘ Ik, Ash‘ ar, Kinda and
A zd. The Gais minority were mainly H aw azin, G h atafan, Sulaim and lyad. ^
On the whole, command of the army was in the hands of the Quraish. The
religious and political superiority which the Quraish had enjoyed over the
other tribes in pre-lslam ic times continued in Islamic times due to their
special status as the tribe of the Prophet: they held, in fa c t, almost all the
important offices, as commanders of armies and rulers of the ‘A rabs. This
helped them to maintain a position above the rivalry of the tribes. The
Umayyad and the Quraish, w hile not unnaturally choosing to rely on the
stronger K alb , nevertheless avoided antagonizing the Q ais, with whom they
were related by blood-ties.
To return to the tribal organizations of the cities, this served to preserve
the tribes as distinctive units and to prevent much in ter-trib a l mixing. Cn
the other hand, the new closeness of the tribes made friction between them
unavoidable, thus causing unrest and feuding.
1. Nasr ibn M uzahim , op. c i t . , p p .2 3 3-9 9; T a b ., I, p p .3282-3310.

162.
To examine this specifically in the Syrian context, jealousies were
aroused between the dominant Yemeni element, especially the Kalb,
with their resentment of the non-Yemenite groups with whom they had to
share resources, and the Q a is , who envied the Yem eni influence and pros
perity.
This jealousy showed itself clearly in the relations between the two parties
and the sovereign, i . e . first the governor of Syria and then the Umayyad
caliph. Both parties competed with each other to get the favour of the ruler
by offering their servi ces to him in return for rewards or appointment to state
offices, a rich source of both wealth and influence. The sovereign chose to
rely most on the Kalbites, as they were the stronger, a fact which both
increased the strength of the Kalbites through government patronage, and
caused the Q ais to swing into bitter opposition to the government. The Qais
found themselves deprived of office and influence, and thus unable to themselves
act as a patronage group, which in its turn increased their hostility to the
Kalbites. It is in the light of this vicious circle that the relations between
the Umayyad caliphs and the tribes should be seen.
The policy of M u ‘ awiya in Syria follows this pattern, for he favoured
the Kalb in order to both secure his own position at home, and to prepare
himself to face the Caliph ‘ A li Ibn Abi Talib in war. Both he and his son
163.
1
Y a zid concluded marriage alliances with the Kalbites, which made the
Yemenites in general, and the Kalb in particular, the most influential of
the tribes in Syria during their reign, and during the short reign of
2 - 3
M u *aw iya II. It is also reported in the Kitabat Aghani that at first
M u *a w iya allotted the * Ata* to the Yemenite tribes alone
thus strengthening the Yemenites to the extent that they threatened the Gais
with expulsion from Syria. No other sources confirm this account, but even
if it is an exaggeration, it may w ell have been based on the state of tribal
tension at the tim e.
C onflict in the interests of the two tribes, led the Kalbites (Yemenites)
and the Qaisites (Mudarites) to support opposing p o litical groups. In the
period of political trouble that followed the death of the caliph Y a z id I,
the support the Yemenites gave to the Umayyads was due to the favourable
4
economic and p o litical position which they had enjoyed under them. On
1. Ansab, IV , i i , p . 6 j ; T a b ., I I , p . 204; K h u la fa *, II, fo l. 70b; E. I.

(Kais ( A ila n ); E. I. , (K alb). These marriage alliances between the
Kalb tribe and the Umayyad fam ily date from the time of the caliph
cUthman ibn ‘ A ffan, who married N a ’ ila bint al-Farafisa a K alb ite.
Ansab, V , p. 99 (citing M a d a ?inT and Abu M ik h n a f), 10*6; T a b ., I,
p . 3056.
2. Abu Tammam, Naga* ?j Jarir wal A kh tal, p. I f f . ; Idem, Hamasa, I,

p. 31 9; K halifa ibrTKhayydt , Tflrtkh, I, p. 21 9; Muhabbar, p. 373;
Ansab, 177 11/ pp. 60, 65; *V, pp. 1 2 7 -8 , 132 (citing 6Abbas ibn Hisham
al-K albT ); Ya'qubT, II, p p .283, 301; T a b ., I I , p p .205, 4 7 4 -5 , 837;
JahshiyarT, pp. 24 , 26 , 3 1 /A s a k ir, IV , pp. 145, 460; V , p p . 8 6 , 337;
jja b a , I I I , p . 337; Dhahabi, II, p .69; II I , p. 16.
3. A gh. , XV111, p p .6 9 -7 0 . Concerning the favour shown by M u ‘ aw iya to

the Yem enites, see also Nasr ibn M uzahim , op. c it. , p p .4 9 2 -3 .
4. See the notes 1 and 2 on this page.

164.
the other hand, the Qaisites gave their full support to Ibn a lZ u b a ir, less
for their love of his cause, then for their hatred to the Kalbites, and the
Umayyads who supported them. Mas*udi ^ reports that the Yemenites,
headed by the K albite Hassan ibn M a lik Ibn Bahdal, stipulated, before
giving their full support to Marwan ibn al-H akam , that they should be given
the same concessions as they enjoyed during the caliphates of Mu* awiya I,
Y a zid I and Mu* awiya II. These were that two thousand of them should
receive two thousand dirhams each annual payment for th eir support, and if
the recipiant died, his son or cousin should receive the payment. The
Kalbites should be given the front place in the court, and should be con
sulted in every important matter. To ali these terms Marwan gave his consent.
It is also reported by Abu J a *fr in Tabari, that before al-Husain ibn Numair
gave his support to M arw an, he stipulated that he should give al -S aiga’
2
to Kinda as a fie f. Not unnaturally, therefore, the Q aisite gave their full
support in the battle of M arj Rahit (64/683) to Ibn a l-Z u b a ir while the
- 3
Yemenites took the side of M arw an. This b a ttle , however, ended with a
4
crushing defeat for the Qaisites. This defeat at the hands of the Yemenites
1. M u ru j, V , p. 200.
2. T a b ., I I , p .487.
3. Abu Tammam, Naga* id Jarir wal AkhJtal,pp. 16-17; Idem, Hamasa, I,

p p .3 1 7 -1 9 ; K halifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, I, p . 255; Ansab, V , pp. 127-28,
132 (citing *A w ana), 138, 146 (citing WaqidT), 148; Y a *q u b i, II, p p .3 0 3 -4 ;
T a b ., I I , p .478; MarzubanT, M u * jam a l-S h * ara* . p . 241; M u ru j, V , p . 202;
k h u la fa *, II, fols. 95a;95b, 96b; Shams, p .42 .
4. It is reported that nine thousand Qaisites were k ille d . This might be an

exaggeration, but it does reflect that heavy losses were suffered.
Abu Tammam, N aq a?id Jarir wal A kh tal, p. 17; MarzubanT, op. c i t . , p. 227.
165.
was never forgotten by the Q ais, and made the conflict between the two
even deeper. This was one reason for the feuds between them in the
reign of *Abd a k -M a lik ibn M arw an,^ for the Qaisites found in the political
disturbances at the time of his accession an opportunity to revenge themselves.
Tribal conflicts over waterwells and pastureland did not cease with
Islam and continued even during the Umayyad period. A good example
of such conflict can be found in the region of a l-J a z ira . The immigration
of Qais at the time of the conquest brought them close to the Taghlib who
were dwelling in Musil and the Euphrates basin. As a result, they began
to compete with each other for the most important economic resources,
water wells and pastureland, which was a cause of the feud between them
- 3
during the caliphate of ‘ Abd a l-M a lik ibn M arw an. Economic and social
conflicts led to other differences; w hile the Qais were pro-Zubairids, we find
the Taghlib supporting the Umayyads. It seems that this was the reason for
the Taghlib joining the Yemenites in the battle of M a rj Rahit against the
1. Abu Tammam, Naqa* id Jarir wal Akh.tal, p p .24, 25, 26; Idem,
Hamasa, I, p p .71 , 3 1 7 -1 8 ; KhalTfa ibn K h a y y a t, TarTkh, I, p p .256-5 7;
Hayawan, III, p p .4 2 2 -2 3 ; Ansab, V , pp. 141-2 (citing Abu M ikhn af);
Tab. , IT, p p .4 8 2 -8 3 ; AmidT7~PP-74, 129; M u ru j, V , p . 203; A g T ., X V II,
p .112 (citing Mada* in i); M u ‘ jam, II, pp. 7 4 3 -4 4 .
2. E. I. ^, (Kais f A ilan ; E. I. ^, (Taghlib).
3. See below, p.
166.
Qaisites,^ They probably hoped that the defeat of the Qaisites in
this battle would enable them to expel the Qaisites from the region,
leaving them free to enjoy its economic advantages. However, despite
their d efeat, the Qaisites continued to live as neighbours of the
Taghlib, thus ensuring the continuation of the tribal c o n flict.
A third scene of tribal conflict was Khurasan, where it flared up
after the death of the caliph Y azid I. We shall have occasion to discuss
this later in d e ta il: it is sufficient to mention here that the Rabi( a were
jealous of the extent to which the Mudar were exploiting the resources
of Khurasan. ^ ( \ as
During the reign of f Abd a l-M a lik ibn Marwan (6 5 -8 6 ), no such
tribal feuds as were taking place in a l-J a z ira or Khurasan, have been
reported to us in Iraq. It seems that the people of both Kufa and Basra
3 „
were pre-occupied with fighting the Kharijites (Azariqa and Shabib).
M oreover, one must not forget the efforts made by a l-H a jja j to suppress
the * Asabiyya among the tribes. The people of Iraq were also busy in the
conquest of the Eastern provinces. However, tribal rivalry and jealousy
did assert itself in an earlier period. The attempt of al-M uthanna ibn
1. Abu Tammam, Hamasa, I, p . 71; Ansab, V , p . 328 (citing ‘ Awana);

D a if, A l-Tatqw ur wal-TajdTd fiM^Shi^r al-UmawT, p. 17, C airo,
1965; E. I. f , (TaghTibT
2. Futub, p .414; Ansab, fo l. 593a; T a b ., II, p .4 8 b ff.
3. AI-Muss , A I-* Asabiyya a l-Q a b a liy y a wa Atharuha fi'l-S h i* r q l-

UmawT, p .315, Beirut, 1964,
167.
Mukharriba
. a I - ‘ Abdi to seize al-Basra
• for a l-M u k h ta r^ .* and the revolt
t 2
of Ibn al-Jarud (where the Q aisite sided with a l- H a jja j), are good
examples of conflicts between the tribes. This w ill be discussed in detail
in a later chapter.
The Qaisites were awaiting their opportunity to avenge
themselves for their defeat in the battle of M arj Rahit: this came in the
%
battle of K hazir, 10th Muharram 67 /6th August 6 8 6 , when f Umair ibn
al-H ubab al-S u Iam i, who was with the Qaisites on the left wing of the Syrian
army, deserted the battlefield as soon as the battle was joined, thus
bringing about the victory of the Iraqis. Following this treason, *Umair
took refuge with the head of the Qaisites, Zufar ibn a l-H a rith a l-K ila b i.
The latter had been keeping a strong hold on Garqisya, against the
- . 4
Umayyads, since the battle of M arj R ah it. From this time onwards
began the armed conflict between Qais and K alb , taking the form of raids.
These wars or raids were called Ayyam (days),each of which usually carried
the name of the place in which the raid occurred.
Our information about these '‘days'1 comes mainly from al-Baladhuri
and al-lsbahani in his A ahani. Ibn a l-A th ir mainly repeats the narrative
1. See Chapter I I , p. IQ T j^
ibn K hayyat, TarTkh, p . 269; Ansab, X I , p .2 8 2 ff. (citing
M ad a’ ini and Ibn a l-K a lb f); T a b ., II , p p .87 3 -7 4 (citing Abu M ikhnaf);
Kami I, IV , p .3 0 8 f f .; * Ibar, IN , p. 94ff.
3. See Chapter II, pp. * 5 2 . - 4 .
4. Abu Tammam, N a g a’ T j Jarir wal A k h ta l, p. 26; K h alifa ibn K h a yya t,

Tarikh, I, p . 256; Ansab, V , p p .30 1 7-3 1 3 - 4 ; J a b ., II , p p .4 8 0 , 483
(citing Abu M ikhn af); A g ^ ,., X V II, p. 112 (citing Mada* in i); M u ( jam ,
II, p .744; Kam fl, IV , p .254.
of al-B aladhuri. He repeats the narrative of a l-M a d a * ini in Tabari
when dealing with the feuds in Khurasan, and thus in both cases he
adds but little to our knowledge. A l-T a b a ri, however, provides an
important detailed account of the tribal conflicts in Khurasan and the
Eastern provinces, which together with that of Ibn A *them , provides us
with a fu ll picture of the events in that area. Our second source of
information is the poetical works of a l-A k h ta l, G atam i, Farazdaq and Ja rir,
as w ell as many other poetical and literary works, ^ which confirm the
historical tradition that has reached us from the classical sources. F in ally,
there is another indispensible source of information on these “days11, in
the books of geneology (Nasab) of Ibn Habib, ibn a l-K a lb i, Ibn Duraid,
al-H am d an i, Ibn Hazm and al-S a m *an i. Apart from such scattered informati
as they contain, they are useful in that they show the tribal relationships of
the individuals involved in these "days1*. However, despite the abundance
of the m aterial we possess about these "days", it is of a somewhat confused
nature and rarely follows a chronological sequence. Y e t, by comparing
the different narratives and by following the faint clues they contain, one
is able to build up a chronology for these events.
We have four narratives which describe the beginning of the feud
1. Abu *U b aid a, Naga* id Jarir wal Farazdaq; Abu Tammam, Nag a* id

JarTr w a l-A k h ta l; AI-QurashT, JamhararAsh* ar a l-*A ra b ; Ibn Sal lam,
Tabagat al-Shu* a ra *; J a h iz , AT-Hayawdn; RasMl; A l-B ayan wal
TabyTn; Am idt, A l-M u * ta lif w a l-M u k h ta lif.. . ; M arzubflnf, M u*jam a
Shu* arci*; Tawfrtdt, A l-lm ta * wal - M u 3 anasqT " A I-* AskarT, Kitab a l -
Sfna* atain.
*
169.
T 1
between the Q ais and Kalb; two are in Baladhuri and two in the
- - 2 ~
K itab a l-A g h a n i. The first account of Baladhuri narrates that when
the battle of M arj Rahit was over, Zufar ibn a l-H a rith a l-K ila b i fled
to Q arq isya *. He was then joined by ‘ Uniair ibn al-H ubab al-S ulam i.
They both began to make raids on the Kalbites and other Yemenites to
revenge the death of those Qaisites killed in M arj R a h it. Some of the
Taghlib were with them in these raids, which led the Kalbites to retaliate
by raiding those Tagh lib who were with Zufar. The second narrative of
Baladhuri has come to us on the authority of Dawud ibn * Abd al-H am id .
He says that after the battle of K hazir, *Um air ibn al-H ubab al-Sulam i,
scorning tc join a l-M u k h ta r, went to Garqisya* to join Zufar ibn a l -
Harith al - K ila b i, where the two began to raid the Kalbites and other
Yemenites. Owing to the many problems which *Abd a l-M a lik faced at
the tim e, he was unable to deal with Zufar immediately. M eanw hile, *Umair
ibn al-H u b a b , not wishing to stay longer with Zufar in G a ^ lE y a * , asked *Abd
a l-M a lik for Aman . Despite the malice which *Abd a l-M a lik bore against
‘ Umair for his treason in the battle of Khazir, he did not refuse to grant
this request, and *Um air joined ‘ Abd a l-M a lik . However, false rumours
soon caused ‘ Abd a l-M a lik to imprison* * Umair, who however eventually
managed to escape and went to a l-J a z ira . * Umair took his residence on
1. Ansab, V , p p .3 1 3 -1 4 .
2. A g h ., X V II, p. 11 I f f . ; X X , p .!2 0 f f.
170.
the banks of the Bulaikh river,where he was joined by his branch of the
Q aisites. He then began to make raids on the Kalb and other Yemenites in
the region, and also made enemies of his Taghlibite neighbours by
tyrannizing them. This was before ‘ Abd a l-M a lik marched to fight first
Z u far,9 and then Mus« * ab ibn a l-Z u b a ir, Both of these narratives show
that the feud between Q ais and Kalb was started by the Q aisites. They
also agree that Zufar ibn a l-H a rith and ‘ Umair ibn al-H ubab together
• ■■ ■ «
began to raid the Kalb and other Yemenites from Qarqisya’ . However,
the first narrative, which comes to us without any chain of authority,
makes no mention of the role of ‘ Umair in the battle of K h azir, and
portrays him as joining Zufar after the battle of M arj R ah it. Thus it
does not follow as closely the sequence of events as the second account,
although it does explain how some of the Taghlib took part in the
Q aisite raids on the Kalbites. The second narrative is repeated by Ibn
al -AthTr. ^
- T 2
According to the first narrative of the Kitab a l-A g h a n i, however,
the feud began when Zufar ibn a l-H a rith a l-K ila b i made a sudden attack
on the settlements of the Kalbites in Musaiyakh , killin g twenty of their
men. When news of this reached Humaid ibn Huraith ibn Bahdal a l-K a lb i,
1. K am il, IV , p . 254.
2. A g h ,, X X , pp. 1 2 0-1 .
171.
he retaliated by killin g sixty men from Banu N um air, who were living
in Tadmur. This slaughter of Banu Numair led Zufar to search out the
Kalbites, and k ill more than five hundred of them in the “day" known
as the “day of a l - l k l i l 11. Zufar returned safely to Qarqisya^ where
Humaid could not reach him. The second narrative of the Kitab a l -
A ghani, ôn the authority of M ada 9 i n i , says th a t, following the defeat
of the Oaisites in the battle of M arj R ah it, Zufar fled to Q arqisya’ ,
where he was joined by *Um air ibn al-H ubab after the death of Ibn
Ziyad in the battle of K hazir. Then ‘ Umair began his raids on K alb,
Q u d a*a and other Yemenites. These raids caused the K alb, led by
t '
Humaid ibn Huraith ibn Bahdal, to re ta lia te , k illin g a large number of
the tribe of Banu Num air in Tadmur.
Thus we see that the Kitab al-A ghani's first narrative portrays Zufar,
and not *U m air, as the one who began the feud. This, however, is not
confirmed in any other accounts. On the other hand, the narrative of
Mada* ini in the Kitab al-Aghan? confirms that of Dawud ibn *Abd a l-
Hamid in Baladhuri, in that both say it was *Um air who started the feud
2
against the K alb. They also agree that *Um air only joined Zufar in
Q arqisya’ after the battle of K hazir. Therefore, it is possible to give
1. Agh. , X V I I, p. I l l ff. (citing Mada* in i).
2. Forming his opinion from Kitab a I-Agh an i's narratives, Wellhausen

decides that it was Zufar ibn al-H arith who started the feuds, and
not ‘ Umair ibn al-H ubab. The Arab Kingdom and its F a ll, p . 202.
a rough date for the beginning of this feud, from these two accounts.
The feud, it seems, did not start before the year 6 7 /6 8 6 , for this was
the year of the battle of K hazir, the time when ‘ Umair joined Zufar.
M oreover, considering that narrative of Baladhuri which states that ‘ Umair's
raids on the Kalbites were before ‘ Abd a l-M a lik had fought either Zufar
or Mus* ab, it is also possible to oonclude that these raids between Kalb
*
and Qais were confined to a period between 6 7 /6 8 6 and 7 0 /6 9 9 , for
‘ Abd a l-M a lik fought Zufar and Mus‘ ab in the years 7 0 -7 2 (699-701).
Perhaps this is why Ibn al-A thir^ gives the year 7 0 /6 9 9 as the date of the
feud. A fter the slaughter of the Banu Numair in Tadmur by Humaid ibn
2
Huraith ibn Bahdal, Zufar ibn a l-H a rith killed five hundred Kalbites.
However, Humaid attempted to retaliate by following * Umair when he
went to raid the Banu Janab of the Kalb tribe, but being unable to
reach him, he instead attacked a group of Q aisite followers of ‘ Umair, and
put them a li to death, except for one who managed to flee and carry the
3 r -
news of this massacre to * Umair.* Umair returned to Q arq isya*. The
feuds between Qais and Kalb continued and thenames of several "days'1
1. K am il, IV , p . 254.
2. A g h ., X X , p. 121.
3. Ansab, V , p .3 0 9 (citing Ibn a f-K a lb i); Aah . . X V II, p. 112ff.

(citing Mada* in i).
173.
- 1
are reported to us, such as that of a l-G h u w a ir, ai-Faras and Duhman.
Owing to these constant raids, the Kalbites left the area affected by the
2
Qasite raids, and emigrated to al-G h a u r in Palestine. Thus we see
that Qais realized their end of achieving unchallenged supremacy in the
area.
Following the accession of Marwan ibn al-H akam to the Caliphate
6 4 /6 8 4 , he sent an army under ‘ Ubaidallah ibn Ziyad to conquer Kufa.
On his w ay, Ibn Ziyad tried to liquidate Zufar ibn a l-H a rith , who, with
the Q aisites, had a strong hold on Qarqisya’ . After an abortive seige
of a year, Ibn Ziyad had to give up this project, and marched on to Kufa,
where he was defeated and killed in the battle of K hazir, 6 7 /6 8 .
Being engaged in consolidating his power in Syria, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik ibn Marwan
left Zufar and the Qais in Qarqisya’ unmolested for a w h ile . However, as
soon as he felt secure enough at home, he returned his attention towards
Iraq. There was little fioint in attacking M u s‘ ab ibn a l-Z u b a ir, the
governor of Iraq for his brother ‘ A bdallah, w hile Zufar still held
Qarqisya’ in support of Ibn a l-Z u b a ir. Therefore, before advancing
against M u s ‘ ab, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik wrote to Aban Ibn Abi ‘ Uqba Ibn Abi
M u ‘ a i t , his governor of Him s, ordering him to fight Zufar in in Q a rq is y a \^
1. A g h . , X X , pp. 121-23.
2. Absab, V , p . 308; A gh ., X X , p. 123.
3. See Chapter II, p. „
4. Ansab, V , p .307 (citing ql-Haythqm ); Kam il, IV , p .275; ‘ Ibar, III, p .81.
174.
Zufar's forces were defeated in this campaign and one of his sons k ille d ,
yet he still remained in control of Q arqisya*.
Having put down the revolt of ‘ Amr ibn Sa‘ id al-Ashdaq in Damascus,
‘ Abd a l-M a lik once again marched against Iraq to fight Musâb ibn a l -
Zubair, Before doing so, he made another attempt to end the insurrection
of Zufar and the Qaisites in C a ^ E y a ’ . This task occupied the whole
summer of 71 -7 2 /6 9 1 . ^ ‘ Abd a l-M a lik first laid seige to the city of
Q a rq isya’ and began to bombard its fortifications by catapults for forty days.
Following the advice of the Kalbites, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik ordered that only the
Yemenites in his army should take part in the battle which followed the seige.
This decision, however, worked in the favour of Zufar and his followers
2
who were able to cause ‘ Abd a l-M a lik 's Yemenites to retreat. ‘ Abd a l -
M a lik 's army at this time was composed predominantly of Yemenites,
especially K alb, Q uda‘ a and to a lesser extent, Kinda. There were
minorities of Qaisites and Quraishites - the latter including the caliph and
3
some‘ Umayyad princes.
Having failed to attain his goal by force, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik tried by
peaceful means, endeavouring to reconcile Zufar. He wrote to him asking
for his obedience, pointing out that the majority of Muslims recognized him
1. Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom and its F a ll, p. 191.

2. Ansab, V , p p .301 -4 ; KufT, I I, fo l. 50a; K am il, IV , p p .2 7 5 -6 ;
‘ Ibar, III, p p .8 1 -2 .
3. Ansab, V , p p .3 0 1 -5 , 3 0 7 /(citing al-H aythgm ); Kufi , II, fo l.5 0 a ;
Kam il, IV , p . 276; ‘Jbgr, I I I , p . 8 1 -2 , ”
as caliph , and inviting him to do the same. ‘ Abd a l-M a lik promised
him a reward for his acceptance of this offer, and threatened him, should
he refuse it.^ The messengers of ‘ Abd a l-M a lik were the theologian
- - 2
Raja' ibn H aiw a al-K in d i and a l-H a jja j ibn Yusuf al-T h a q a fi. However,
Zufar refused this offer; but his son al-H u d h ail was not unwilling to
accept it. This convinced ‘ Abd a l-M a lik of the possibility of reaching
a peaceful settlement and led him to order his brother Muhammad ibn
#
Marwan to grant Zufar and his son a l-H u d h a il, Aman (safe conduct)for
3
themselves and their followers and promise them favour. A l-H u d h ail
again responded to this offer and managed to persuade his father to accept
it. Zufar agreed on the condition that he would have the choice either of
remaining loyal to Ibn al-Zu bafh, or of joining ‘ Abd a l- M a lik .^ W hile
these negotiations were going on, the Kalbites in ‘ Abd a l-M a lik 's army
opposed this agreement between the caliph and their O aisite adversaries,
and they advised the caliph to refuse Zufar's terms and instead to continue
the battle. They pointed out that most of the fortifications of the city of
1. Ansab, V , p . 305.
2. The choice of a l-H a jja j ibnYusuf and Raja' ibnHaywa as messengers

to Zufar ibn a l-H a rith seems to have been a diplomatic one. W hile
the first was Q aisite like Zufar's followers, Raja* was from the
Kinda trib e, to whom Zufar was related, as known to ‘ Abd a l-M a lik .
Ansab, V , p . 303; K am il, IV , p . 278. One should also note the
important religious status of Raja’ .
3. Ansab, V , p . 305.
4. Ansab, V , p . 305; Kam il, IV , p . 277; ‘Ibar, I I I , p . 82.

176.
T ” 1
Qarqisya* were already destroyed. At first, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik gave way to
this demand of his Kalbite supporters, but eventually he was forced to
make peace on Zufar's terms, seeing that the war was not to be so easily
won. This voluntary submission of the Qaisites may have been due to the
fact that the future of Ibn a l-Z u b a ir was not yet secure, or may have been
in response to the generosity of ‘ Abd a l-M a lik 's terms.
The agreement between the caliph and Zufar was made on the fo llow
ing terms: the Caliph granted Amah to Zufar, his son a l-H u d h a il, and all
of their followers. Zufar would bear no responsibility for his insurrection,
either for the people k ille d , or for the money spent in the fighting. Zufar
agreed not to make war against ‘ Abd a l-M a lik , but because of his previous
homage to Ibn a l-Z u b a ir, he would not fight with ‘ Abd a l-M a lik against
him. F in ally, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik was to give Zufar a sum of money to
2
distribute among his followers. This agreement was sealed by a marriage
contract between al-R abab, the daughter of Zufar ibn a l-H a rith , and Maslama,
the son of ‘ Abd a l-M a lik . To show his loyalty to the caliph, Zufar ordered
his son al-H u d h ail to join ‘ Abd a l-M a lik 's army against M u s‘ ab ibn a l-Z u b a ir,
1. Ansab, V , p p .3 0 3 -4 (citing Mada* inT); p . 305; K am il, IV , p .277;

‘ Ibar, III, p . 82.
2. Ansab, V , p. 305; X I, pp. 2 4 -5 (citing ‘ Awana); K u fi, I I , fo l. 50b;

Kami I , IV , p. 277; ‘ Ibar, I I I , p. 82.
3. J a h iz, Rasa* il, (ed. Sandubi), p. 182 (citing M a d a ?in i); Ansab, V ,
Kam il, IV , p .278; ‘ Ibar, I I I , p . 82.
177.
because, unlike his father, he had no commitment towards Ibn a l-Z u b a ir . ^
M e an w h ile, the feud between the Taghlib and the Q ais started in
the J a zira , which led to a temporary lull in the raids between the Q ais
and the Kalb there. However, the G a is /K a lb feud broke out in a different
area. The raids of Humaid ibn Huraith ibn Bahdal, the sayyid of the
Banu K alb , on the Qaisites in the Jazira had stirred up the leaders among
2
the Qaisites in Iraq, especially of the Banu Fazara. Their complaints were
carried to ‘ Abd a l-M a lik ibn Marwan by ‘ Abdallah ibn M as‘ ada a l-F a z a ri,
who refused to dine with the caliph as a protest against the massacre of the
Banu Sulaim and the Banu ‘ Amir in the raids of Humaid ibn Huraith ibn
3
Bahdgl. When Humaid heard of ‘ Abdallah's complaints, he decided to
• •
raid the Banu Fazara, to whom Ibn Mas‘ ada belonged. This decision
of Humaid was welcomed by the ‘ Umayyad princes whose mothers were
Kalbites. These princes were infuriated by the pride their half-brothers

4
with Q aisite mothers took in the Q aisite raids on the Kalbites. Humaid,
*
therefore, did not find it d iffic u lt to get a letter of assignment (‘ Ahd) in
the name of ‘ Abd a l-M a lik commissioning him to collect the Sadaqa from
5
the Banu Fazara. The latter had not yet been involved in the feuds,
1. Ansab, V , p .350 (citing ‘ Awana); Kam il, IV , p . 278; ‘ Ibar, I I I , p . 82.
2. Fazara ibn Dhubian ibn Baghid ibn Ghaith ibn Ghatafan ibn Sa‘ d ibn
Qais ‘ A ilan ibn Mudar ibn N fza r ibn M a ‘adibn ‘ Adnan. See Nasab,fols.
173a-174a; Jomharat, p .2 4 5 ;E . 1.2, (Fazara).
3. Ansab, V , p . 309 (citing Ibn al—K a lb i); A a h ., X V I I, p . 311 (citing Vlada’ in
4. Abu Tammam, Hamasa, I, p. 260.
5. Ib id. , I, p . 260; Ansab, V , pp. 309-310 (citing Ibn a l-K a lb i); A a h ., X V II,
p. 114 (citing M ada’ in i); ‘ Asakir, V I , p . 118; M u ‘ jam , I, p .739;
178.
possibly because their settlements, (W adi'l Rumma in N ajd and southern
Syria), were far from the J a zira . A fter getting a false ‘ Ahd to collect the
Sadaqa from the Banu Fazara, Humaid ibn H uraith, accompanied by two
• 1
■- ■ —
hundred^ cavalry men from his own people, the K alb, marched on Banu”
Fazara. He took them by surprise and killed a large number of them in a
- 2
place called a l - ‘ A h.
This raid incited the Banu Fazara to re ta lia te . Their chiefs,
including Asma* ibn Kh arija a l-F a za ri and Khalid ibn Dathar ibn Q u ra iz,
met ‘ Abd a l-M a lik ibn Marwan at a l-N u k h a ila after he had defeated
Mus‘ ab ibn a l-Z u b a ir. They raised a strong protest to him about Humaid's
action, and demanded Q aw ad(that ‘ Abd a l-M a lik should slay Humaid for their
3
revenge). ‘ Abd a l- M a lik , however, found it enough to give the Banu
Fazara money to recompense for the blood of Humaid .had shed. He expressed
f*
his opinion by saying, “You were in Fitna (dissension), the equivalent of
= according to Abu Tammam (op. c i t . , I, p . 260), it was Khalid ibn Y azid

ibn M u ‘ awiya who prepared th eÂ h d for Ftamaid. There is also
reference to this in Baladhuri's Ansab, IV , i i , p . 6 8 . Other sources confirm
that Humaid had a false ‘ Ahd, which he acquired as a result of the rivalry
between the Umayyad princes, according to their fam ily relation with
either the Qais or the K alb , which leads us to believe that it was Khalid
ibn Y a z id , whose mother and grand-mother were Kalbites, who was the
most lik e ly to have prepared the false ‘ Ahd for Humaid.
1* Agh. , X V II, p. 119 (citing M ada* in i).
2. Abu Tammam, jjamasa, I , p. 261; Ansab , V , p. 309 (citing Ibn a l-K a lb i);
Agh. , X V I I, p. 113 (citing M a d a ’ in?); BakrT, I, p . 279; ‘ Asakir, V I , p. 118;
M u ‘ jam , I, p .739.
3. Qawad and Qisas are synonymous, both meaning reta liatio n . According to
Muslim law , Qawad and Qisas are applied in cases of k illin g , called =
179.
Jahiliyya (pre-Islamic times), and there was no Qawad in J a iliy y a " . At
first, they refused to accept only money, but came to agree, with the
2
intention of using it to buy m ilitary equipment for reta liatio n . Clt is
possible that f Abd a l-M a lik refused to take severe action against Humaid
and the Kalbites, because he feared to provoke against himself this strong
and influential tribe and other Yemenites in Syria, especially since
4Abdallah ibn a l-Z u b a ir was still holding strongly in the H ijq z *. He may
*
w ell also have hoped that the money payment would provide a peaceful
end to the strife between the two parties at a time when both were equally
gu ilty of the feud*

3 -
It is reported that at the time of Humaid's raid, 4 Abd a l - 4 A ziz
4
ibn M arw an, whose mother was a K alb ite, was boasting to his brother
5 .
Bishr ibn M arw an, a son of a Q aisite mother, in the court of 4Abd a l-M a lik .
- Qisas fi'l-N a f s (blood vengeance), and of wounding, called Qisas

flma dun a l-N a fs . E, I. (Kisas).
1. Ansab, V , p . 310 (citing Ibn a l-K a lb i).
2* Abu Tammam, Hamasa, I, p . 262; Ansab, V , p . 310 (citing Ibn a l-K a lb i);
Agh. / XV11, p. 114” (citing Mada* int); 4 Asak?V, V I , p. 118.
3. Abu Tammam, Hamasa, I, p . 262; B a k ri, I, p. 279; 4 Asakir, V I , p . 118.
4. Abu Tammam, hjamasa, I, p . 262; Ibn Qais al-R uqayyat, Diwan, p. 153;
Khalffa ibn K h ayyat, Tabaqat, p .60;H a yaw an , V I I , p. 154; Ansab, V , pp.
143, 164; Nasab,fo l. 1 2 b; M a 4 ad, fo l. 74b; 4 Asakir, X , fo i. 194b.
5. Abu Tammam, Hamasa, i , p . 262; Ansab, V , p. 164; Nasab, fo l. 12b;

Bakri, I, p . 279; Jamharat, p . 264; 4 Asakir, I I I , fo l. 177a.
180.
This provoked Bishr, to give money to the Banu Fazara to help their
retaliation. This story shows clearly how the ‘ A.sabiyya asserted itself
even among the princes of the ruling dynasty. It was by exploiting this
that Humaid ibn Huraith obtained the false ‘ Ahd commissioning him to
* * - ——
collect the Jiadaqa of the Banu Fazara. ^ There seems no reason to reject
2 "
this story, asWellhausen does, simply because ‘ Abd a l- * A z iz and Bishr,
the caliph's brothers, were the governors of Egypt and Kufa respectively.
This event may w ell have occurred during a visit to the court, as we know
such visits did take p la c e .^
4
Feeling that they were treated unjustly, and encouraged by Bishr
ibn M arw an, the Banu Fazara used the money they received to buy m ilitary
equipment. They then retaliated against the Kalbites (the Banu ‘ Ulaim and
Banu ‘ Abd Wudd) in a place called Banat G a in , k illin g a large number of them.
When he heard of this, ( Abd a l-M a lik became very angry and ordered
ibn Yusuf a l-T h a q a fi, his governor of a l-H ija Z /^ to punish
1. See p .l7 8 o f this

W ellhausen, The Arab Kingdom and its FaH p . 207.
3. K halifa ibn K h a y y a t, TarikJi, I, p . 268; K in d i, p . 5 1 , where he states

that in the year 7 0 , £Abd a l - ‘ A z iz ibn Marwan visited his brother
‘ Abd a l-M a lik ; Dhahabi, 111, p. 117.
4. Ansab, V , p. 310.
5. AbC? Tammam, Hamasa, I, p . 263; Ansab, V , p . 311 (citing a l-K a lb i);

Agh . , X V I I, p . 115 (citing M a d a *in i); BakrT, I, p p .2 7 9 -8 0 ; IV , p . 160;
‘ Asakir, IV , p. 118; M u cjam , I, p .739; III, p . 596.
6 . According to Mada* in i (Agh., X V , II, p. 115), this day of Banat G ain

happened during the governorship of a l-H a jja j in Iraq. This, however, =
181.
the Banu Fazara severely. However, H alhaia ibn Q ais and Sa‘ 7d ibn
* *
‘ Uyayna, the two Fazarites chiefly responsible for this feud, averted
the disaster from their tribe by giving themselves up voluntarily to a l -
H a jja p . He sent them to the caliph. ^ In the court at Damascus, the
presence of the two offenders caused a difference of opinion among the
Umayyad princes. W hile those of K albite women demanded their execution,
the sons of Q aisite mothers demanded that they should pay a money recom-
2
pense. Eventually, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik gave the two offenders to the Kalbites,
who killed them in vengeance for their people.
This did not in any way mean that ‘ Abd a l-M a lik took sides against
the Q aisites. It shows only that he tried to be above the parties, and to
punish the Banu Fazara for violating his measures to end the feud.
The dates of the days of a ! - 4Ah and Banat Q a in are not given pre
cisely in our sources. However, it is possible to conjecturefhem from the events
- - 3 _
of the period. According to M a d a *in i, Humaid's raid on the Banu ‘ Amir and
Banu Sulaim (the day of a l - ‘ Ah) took place before Mus‘ ab ibn a l-Z u b a ir had
t 4
been k ille d by ‘ Abd a l- M a lik . This has been confirmed by Ibn a l-K a lb i.
- could not be possible, since Bishr ibn Marwan was present at the court
when Sa‘ id and H a lh a ia gave themselves up .A I-IJajjaj did not
receive the governorship of Iraq until the year # 5 , when he replaced
Bishr after the latter's death.
1. Abu Tammam, op. c i t . , I, p. 263; A nsab,V , p . 311 (citing Ibn a l-

KalbTJ; A ah. , X V II, p. 115 (citing Mada* in i); BakrT, I, p p .2 7 9-6 0;
‘ Asakir, V I , p. 116.
2. Ansab, V , p . 311 (citing Ibn a l-K a lb i); A a h ., X V I I , p. 116(citing

M ada* in i); Bakri, I, p . 280; ‘ Asakir, V I , p. 118.
3* Ag|h., X V II, p . 114 (citing Mada* in i).

4. Ansab, V , p . 310.
182.
Moreover the two sources state clearly that it was after the death of M us‘ ab
that the Banu Fazara complained to ‘ Abd a l-M a lik about Humaid's raid of the
day of a i - ‘ Ah. This makes it clear that the day of a l - ‘ Ah could not have
occurred after the year 7 2 /6 9 1 , the year of M us'ab's death. As for the day
of Banat G a in , our sources^ say that a l-H a jja j ibn Yusuf was the governor
of a l-H ija z when ‘ Abd a l-M a fik ordered him to punish the Banu Fazara.
Judging from the fact that a l-H a jja j was appointed the governor of a l-H ija z
in the year 7 3 /6 9 2 and was only transferred to the governorship of Iraq in
the year 7 5 /6 9 4 , the day of Banat G a in must have taken place some time
between 7 3 /6 9 2 and 7 5 /6 9 4 . Therefore, it would seem that Dozy was wrong
in putting the day of Banat G ain in M u ‘ awiya's tim e.
As one would expect, the Kalbites who suffered at Banat G ain were not
satisfied by the k illin g of the two chiefs of the Banu Fazara. They began to
prepare for a fu ller reta liatio n . When news of this reached the ears of ‘ Abd
a l- M a lik , he threatened them, saying that "he would k ill as many of them as
3
they kille d from the G aisites". Thus, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik once again showed
himself above the parties. This threat seems to have been effective in that we
do not hear of any other "days" during ‘ Abd a l-M a lik 's reign, and the day of
1. Ansab, V , p .311 (citing Ibn a l-K a lb i); Bakri, I, pp. 2 7 9 -8 0 ; ‘ A s a k ir,V I,

p. 118.
2. D ozy, Spanish Islam, p . 69 , London, 1913.
3. Ansab, V , p . 311 (citing Ibn a l-K a lb i); Agh. f X V I I, p. 115 (citing Mada*
183.
Banat G ain was the last of the famous “days" between Q ais and Kalb.
Despite the fact that they were both N iz a rite , the relations between
TaghMb and Qais were far from cordial. The feuds between them were
almost constant. The exception was when a small group of the Taghlib
joined ‘ Umair ibn al-H ubab in his raids on the K albites.^ But one may
assume that on this occasion they were forced to act so, for fear of ‘ Umair
and his Q aisites, in command of the Jazira at that tim e.
The campaigns of the conquest which brought the Qaisites into the
Jazira region made them close neighbours of the Banu Taghlib who were already
living there. But the Q aisites' maltreatment of their neighbours caused
2
strained relations between the two. The situation deteriorated when ‘ Umair
- - 3
ibn al-H• ubab with the Banu Sulaim settled on the Khabur river.
The tense situation exploded when a man from Banu al-H arish (from
• ■
the Banu ‘ Amir) slaughtered a goat belonging to a Taghlibite woman called
Urn D aw b al. As a result, her son Dawbal made a raid on the Banu al-H arish.
The Qaisites* answer to this raid was to kill three men from the Taghlib and to
4
take a number of their camels. In an attempt to put an end to these encroach
ments some of the Banu Taghlib went to Zufar ibn a l-H a tith a l-K ila b i, the
1. Ansab, V , pp. 308, 313; A g h ., X V II, p. 112 (citing M a d a ’ inT); Kamil, IV , p.

p725?.
2. Ansab, V , p. 314.
3. Ansab, V , p . 314; A g h ., X X , p. 126.
4. A l-A k h ta l, DTwan , pp. 3 5 -7 ; Abu Tammam, Naga* id Jarir wal A kb tal, p .6 6 ;

Ansab, V , p p .3 1 4 ff.; Agh . , X X , p p .l2 6 ff.
184.
sayyid of the Qais at the tim e, asking him to return to them their camels,
to pay compensation for the three men killed by the Q aisites, and to ask
4 Umair ibn al-H ubab to leave the region of the Khabur, for as long as
he stayed there, the feud would continue. ^ W hile Zufar agreed to the first
two demands, he refused the third one. He tried in vain to convince them
to give up the idea of expelling 4 Umair from the Khabur region. M eanw h ile,
the Taghlib attacked some Q aisite villages near Q arq isya*, but were
defeated, lyas ibn a l-K h a rra z, a Taghlibite sharif, sought a peaceful
solution by going to Zufar ibn a l-H a rith in Qarqisya* to negotiate; however,
he was k ille d by a fanatic Q a is ite . Zufar paid the ransom for this murder
and reconciled his people.
3
Wellhausen sees in Zufar's attempts to reconcile the Taghlibites
a move to prevent them going over to the Umayyad side. But the Banu
Taghlib were already described in our sources^ as pro-M arwanid (M arw aniyya),
and are even said to have fought with Marwan against the Qaisites in the battle
5
of M arj Rah i t . It is probable that Zufar was trying either to get Taghlib's
help against his bitter enemies, the Kalbites, or at least ensure their
neturality in the conflict with Kalb.
It would seem, however, that 4 Umair did not like this peaceful
1. A gh ., X X , p. 127.
2. Ib id ., X X , p. 127.
3. The Arab Kingdom and its F a ll, p . 204.
4. Ansab, V , p . 314, p . 328 (citing ‘ Awana).
5. Abu Tammam, Hamasa, I, p .71 .

185.
settlement, and that he hoped to expel the Taghlib from the J a zira , as
he had the Kalbites before.^ This was no doubt as a reaction to the
Taghlib demand for Zufar to force ‘ Umair to leave the Khabur region.
'Umair went to Mus‘ ab ibn a l-Z u b a ir and told him that he had already
forced Q uda‘ a to settle in Syria and there only remained the Christian Taghlib
r 2
in the J a zira . He asked Mus‘ ab to give him authority over them. Probably
he convinced Mus‘ ab that "being Christians, they were under suspicion of
sympathy with the Syrians". ‘ Umair managed to get permission to collect
dues from them, but Mus*ab only granted this commission subject to the
consent of Zufar ibn a l-H a rith . The latter, being convinced that ‘ Umair
wcuW not treat the Banu Taghlib fa irly , but would seize this opportunity to
give free reign to his hostility, sent others to the Banu Taghlib ordering them
to treat the latter kindly. When the Banu Taghlib refused to pay their dues to
these men, Zufar sent them again to inform the Banu Taghlib that they
were acting on the orders of Mus‘ ab ibn a l-Z u b a ir; they would have to pay
the dues or he would fight them. The Taghlibites answered this by killing some
4
of Zufar's men. This action infuriated Zufar, and he sent their bitter enemy
‘ Umair ibn al-H ubab with the Qaisites against them. The Taghlib under
1. See p. 1 7 5
2. A g h ., X X , p. 127.
3. W ellhausen, The Arab Kingdom and its F a ll, p . 204.
4. Agh. , X X , pp. 127-8.

186.
Shu*aib ibn M u lai|, met ‘ Umair at a place called MaksTn (also called
Maks and Khabur). In this battle the Banu Taghlib suffered a defeat and
their leader Shu*aib was killed with a large number of his followers.^ This
battle was the first large scale confrontation between Qais and Taghlib.
Zufar was considerably upset to see the two sons of N iz a r fighting
2
each other, w hile their common enemy, the Kalbites, were left unmolested.
On the other hand, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik found that this conflict played into his
hand, on two accounts: firstly, because it weakened both sides, thus, he
hoped, rendering them more amenable to his control in the future; secondly,
because it prevented the Qaisites from helping his enemy M u s ‘ ab ibn a l-Z u b a ir.
'iL
The Taghlib did not let their massacre in the day of Masin go without
revenge. They received re-inforcements from R abija in a l-J a z ira and Iraq,
- 3
especially from a l- N i’mr ibn Q asit and Banu Shaiban. They chose as their
- ? 4
leader the Taghlibite, Ziyad or Y azid ibn Huber. Hearing that they were
gathered for b a ttle , ‘ Umair ibn al-H ubab appealed to the Asad and Tamim for
5
help, but neither responded. H e, therefore, decided to meet them with
his own people, the Banu Sulaim in this b attle, which was called "Yawm a l -
1. Abu Tammam, Nago*icj Jarir wal A k h ta l, pp. 2 3 0 -1 ; Ansab, V , p p .3 1 6 -7

Agh. , X X , pp. 127-8; K am il, IV , p . 255.
2. Abu Tammam, Naqa* id JarTr wal A kh tal, p. 27; Ansab, V , p . 320; Agh* /
X X , p. 127. ‘
3* Ansab, V , p .318; Agh. , X I , p .6 1 ff. (citing Abu ‘ Ubaida).
4. Nasab,
i
fo l. 229b; he called him Hanzala
* »
ibn Qais ibn Huber.
5. Ansab, V , p . 318; A g h ., X I , p . 62 (citing Abu ‘ Ubaida).

187.
Tharthar a l-A w w a l" , the Qaisites suffered a severe defeat in which many
of them were k ille d , w hile thirty women from the Banu Sulaim had their
stomachs opened as a reprisal for the day of Maksin. ^
The defeat of the Qaisites in the day of al-Tharthar al-A w w al was
so grave that Zufar ibn a l-H a rith , before this time hesitant to involve himself
in the feud, came from Qarqisya* to help ‘ Umair in his retaliation against
the Taghlib. These two, with Banu ‘ Amir and Sulaim, met the Taghlib
under Ibn Huber again on the Tharthar, which gave its name to the battle,
"the day of a I—Tharthar a l-T h a n i". When battle was joined, the Banu ‘ Amir
fled but the Banu Sulaim remained firm and were able to in flic t a defeat
2
on the Taghlib.
However, neither the victory of the Qais nor the defeat of the Taghlib
in these two "days" put an end to this feud* We hear of "days" c a lled , al-F u d a in ,
_ 3
a l-S u k a ir, a I- M u ‘ arik, Lubba, al-S h ar‘ abiyya, Balad, and al-B ulaikh. On
a ll of these "days", the Qais were victorious, apart from the indecisive "day
of Lubba", and the “day of a l-S h a r‘ abiyya" , which was a victory for the
Taghlib.
To break this run of successful Q aisite raids against them, the Taghlib
1. A l-A k h ta l, P iw an, pp. 132-4; Abu Tammam, N a q a ’ id Jarir wal A kh tal,

p p .3 4 , 107; Ansab, V , p p .31 8 -1 9 ; Agh. , X I , p p .6 1 -2 (citing AbtT** Ubaida).
2. Ansab, V , p .320; K am il, IV , p . 256.
3. J a rir, P iw an, p. 54; Abu Tammam, N a qa‘ id Jarir wal A k h ta l, p p .8 0 a n d 1 1 3

Ansab, V , p p .3 2 1 -2 3 ; Kam il, IV , p p .2 5 6 -5 8 .
drew up forces from both the desert and the towns. As in the "day of
a I-Tharthar a l-T h a n i" , the Qaisites were under both ‘ Umair ibn al-H ubab
and Zufar ibn a l-H a rith . The Taghlib, headed by Ibn Huber,met them
in al-Hashshak and the bitter fighting lasted for three days. On the third
day, Zufar ibn al-Harith^ with the Banu ‘ Amir fled to Qarqisya>. To justify
his d efeat, he later claimed that he had heard news that ‘ Abd a l-M a lik had
marched against him in Q arq isya*. Whether this pretext was true or not,
‘ Umair met the Tagh I i b alone; his followers were defeated, and ‘ Umair
was k ille d in battle. ^ The Banu Taghlib joyfully sent his head to Damascus
2
as a sign of their loyaltyto‘ Abd a l- M a lik , but Zufar ibn al°Hari_tlh was moved to
3
sorrow' and expressed this in sad verses. As for the date of the battle,
according to K h alifa ibn Khayyat and Ibn a l-A th ir ,^ it was the year 7 0 /6 8 9 .
This date sounds authentic as ‘ Abd a l-M a lik ibn Marwan only in that year fe lt
himself free enough from cares at home to deal with Zufar ibn al-HariHi_ and
the Qaisites in G arqisya’ .
The death of ‘ Umair ibn al-H ubab did not go unrevenged. Hisbrother
1. A l-A k h ta l, D iw a n , pp. 33, 106, 151, 220; A l-Q a ta m i, P iw an, p . 8 9 f f .;

NaqcTTd, 1 ,3 7 3 , where it is called the "Pay of S injar"; Abu Tammam,
N aqa* id Jarir w a l-A k h ta l, pp*33, 34, 1 1 7 -1 8 , 160; Ansab, V , p . 323;
MarzubanT, M u ‘ jam al-S h u ‘ ra1, p . 245; K am il, IV, p .2 5 8 f f .; Bakri, p . 338
(here it is called the Day of al-Tharthar).
2. Ansab,V , p p .325, 327; K am il, IV , p p .2 5 9 -6 0 .
3. AnsSb, V , p. 325.
4. K halifa ibn K h a y y a t, Tarikh, I, p . 262 (citing a l-L a y th ); K am il, IV ,

p p .2 5 8 -6 0 .
189 .
Tamim ibn al-H ubab came to Zufar ibn a l-H a rith asking him to take
vengeance. Z u far, however, at first was unwilling to undertake this
task, but under the persuasion of his son a l-H u d h a il, be bound himself
to do it, Zufar then left his brother Aws ibn a l-H a rith as his deputy in
Q arq isya*, probably to watch the movements of ‘ Abd a l- M a lik against him.
Before Zufar himself advanced against Taghlib, he sent Y a z id ibn Hamran
against the Banu Fadukis, killin g their men and proscribing their properties.
Zufar also sent Muslim ibn Rabi‘ a a l - ‘ U q a ili, who surprised a gathering of
Taghlib, and killed a number of them. Muslim then marched against the
main body of the Taghlib, who were gathered in a place called al-*Aq7q
in M u sll. The Taghlib fled before him , attempting to cross the Tigris.
When they reached a l-K u h a il, they were followed by Zufar with the Q aisites.
The Taghlib suffered a severe defeat; even more of them were drowned in
the Tigris in flig h t, than were killed in the battle. Those who survived
went to Lubba, but were followed by a l-H u dhail ibn Z u fa r, who killed alt
]
those except the few who managed to cross the river.
In the year 7 3 /6 9 2 , when ‘ Abdallah ibn a l-Z u b a ir was killed and
‘ Abd a l-M a lik ibn Marwan was recognized as the sole c a lip h , there was a
temporary lu ll in the feud between Q ais and Taghlib. This was mainly
1. J a rir, D lw an, p p .2 4 4 , 3 6 2 -6 3 ; N a q ? i d , I, p . 507; Abu Zaid a l -

QurashT, Jamharat Ash‘ ar a l - ‘ A rab, p. 169; Abu Tammam, N aq a‘ \<j
Jarfr wal A k h ta l, p p .9 0 -9 1 , 2 2 6 -2 7 ; Ansab, V , p p .3 2 6 -2 7 ;A g h . , X I ,
p p .5 8 -9 (citing ‘ Umar ibn Shabba); K am il, IV , p p .2 6 0 -6 1 .
190.
due to the policy of ‘ Abd a l-M a lik in keeping in check a ll parties.
However, under this apparent peace, the hostility between them was
smouldering and needed only an opportunity to flare up again. Such
an occasion arose when the Taghlib poet, a I-A k h ta l, boasted of the
prowess of his clansmen to a l-Jah h a f Jbn Hukaim al-Sulami, in the court
1 -
of ‘ Abd a l-M a lik . Infuriated by this boast, al-J a h h a f ibn Hukaim con
trived to get a letter of assignment (‘ Ahd) for himself, by which he was
appointed to collect tax from Bakr and Taghlib in the region of a l-J a z ira .
Accompanied by a considerable Q aisite cavalry, a l-J a h h a f set out for a l -
J a zira . On his w ay, he told his followers that his intention was to spill
the blood of the Banu Taghlib, and that his ‘ Ahd was false. He then
said, "You have the choice between H ell if you follow me, and disgrace
2
if you do not . 11 They chose to follow him. He surprised the Taghlib at
a place called al-Bishr, or al-R ahub, or Mukhashin, and made a fearful
massacre among them. A son of a l-A kh tal is said to have been k ille d , and
a l-A k h ta i himself was seized as prisoner, but was set free because they
3
thought he was a slave. On being released, he returned to ‘ Abd a l-M a lik
1. Akhj-al, Piwan, p. 268; Nag a ' id , I, p p .4 0 1 -2 , 5 0 7 -8 ; Abu Tammam,

Naqa* id Jartr wal Akht a l, p. 2 2 8 ff.; Jumafcn, p . 41 I f f . ; Shu‘ ara9,
p p .3 0 3 -4 ; A n ja b , V , p . 228 f f . ; Mubarrad, II, p. 98 (citing a l-Z u b a ir
ibn Bakkar); Jlmidi, p .76 ; §in a‘ atain , p .87; K am il, IV , p . 261 f f . ;
Bughya, fols. 4 6 -7 .
2. Abu Tammam, N aq a’ id Jarir wal A kh tal, p . 229; Agh . , X I, p. 59
(citing ‘ Umar ibn Shabba); Bughya, fo l. 4 8 .
3. A l-A k h ta l, D iw a n , pp. 10-11; J a rir, Diw an, pp. 2 5 , 4 9 , 5 0 , 8 7 , 8 8 ,

199, 200, 366, 367, 381, 382; N aga‘ id , I, p p .40 1; 5 0 7 ff .; Abu_
Tammam, Naga* id JarTr wal A k h ta l, pp. 173, 186, 2 2 8 ff .; Jumahi,
p .41 2; Shu‘ arg; , p . 303; Ansab, V , p . 328; Agh. , X I , p . 59 (citing =
191.
with the news of this massacre, and asked for his help to punish a l-J a h h a f.
Fearing the caliph's punishment, al-Jah h af fled to the territory of the
Byzantines and remained there until the Qaisites managed to persuade
‘ Abd a l-M a lik to grant him Amam. ^
Realizing that if he let this occasion pass without any decisive
action, the feud between the two parties would never cease, ‘ Abd a l-
M a lik tried as much as possible to satisfy both sides. On the one hand,
‘ Abd a l-M a lik forced al-Jah h af to pay money as compensation to the
Taghlib for the blood shed in the "day of a l—Bishr**, On the other, ‘ Abd
a l-M a lik made his own son a l-W a lid , whose mother was a Q aisite (from
Banu ‘ Abs), pay a money recompense to both sides, for a ll the bloodshed
2
between them before the "day of al -Bishr". The choice of a l-W a lid for
this task was because the Taghlib were the ones who had suffered most
in the feud, and moreover, by this device, both sides would feel that
they were treated eq u ally, with neither of them having the upper hand as
a result of these feuds. However, a l-Jah h a f was unable to pay the money
set as compensation, for it was w ell beyond his financial means. In order
to honour his promise to the caliph and to save his life , he went to Iraq
where a l-H a jja j ibn Yusuf al-Th aqaff was governor. A l-J a h h a f appealed to
= ‘ Umar ibn Shgbba); A m idi, p .76; Ishtiqqq, II, p. 187; M u ‘ jam , I,

p . 362/ K am il, IV , p .2 6 1 f f .; Bughya, fo l. 4 6 ff.
1. Abu Tammam, Naga* i j Jarir wal A k h ta l, p . 229; Ansab, V , p . 330; A g h .,

X I, p .60 (citing ‘ Umar ibn Shabba); $in a‘ a ta in , p . 87; Kam il, IV , p . 263;
Bughya, fo l. 49 (citing Ibn aT-SakTt).
2. Abu Tammam, Naqa* id JarTr wal Akhj~al, p. 229; Ansab, V , p . 330;

Bughya, fo l. 49 (citing Ibn a l-S a k ft).
192.
him for help, as the most influential man among the Qais at the tim e.
After some hesitation, for he did not wish to be accused of spending
the money of the Muslims in the interests of his own people, a l-H a jja j
agreed to help, and gave al-Jah h af half of his own annual salary. ^ It
is clear that in aiding al-Jah h a f fin a n c ia lly , a l-H a jja j was following
the same policy as the caliph himself, in seeking a peaceful end to the
tribal feud between Qais and Taghlib.
In the end, a l-Jah h a f ibn Hukaim and his companions undertook

• • *
to make a pilgrimage to M ecca in repentence and there to ask God for
forgiveness. Thus the feud between Qais and Taghlib came to an end
during the reign of *Abd a l-M a lik ibn M arw an, as a result of the latter^
policy towards the tribes.
The ‘Arab tribes which settled in Khurasan after its conquest carried
with them their rivalries and jealousy. Rivalry for power was clear from
the very beginning among the leaders who participated in the conquest of
the country, a good example of which was the rivalry between Q a is Ibn a l -
T 2
Haitham al-Sulam i and his kinsman ‘ Abdallah Ibn Khazim al-S u lam i.
1. Abu Tammam, N aq a?id Jarir wal A khJal, p. 2 2 9 -3 0 ; Ansab, V , pp. 3 2 9-3 0

A g h ., X I , pp. 60- (citing ‘ Umar ibn Shabba); Kami I, IV , p. 263; Bughya /
ftlT . 4 9 -5 0 (citing ibn al-SakTt).
2. Ansab, fo l. 593a; Futuh, p p v 4 0 8 « 9 ; T a b . , I I , p p . 6 5 - 6 (citing M ada*inT)?

7 7 k ia fir, V I I I , p p . T T S ; E. 1.2, (|bn Khazim).
193.
The p o litical troubles in Syria and Iraq in the period following the death
of the caliph Y azid I had their repercussions in Khurasan and other Eastern
provinces. The disturbances started first in Sistan, when the death of Y azid
was followed by a revolt in Kabul. As a result, the governor Y azid i.bn
Ziyad was killed and his brother Abu * Ubaida was taken prisoner. Their
brother, Salm ibn Z iy a d , then the governor of Khurasan, sent Talha ibn
‘ Abdallah a l-K h u z a ‘ i as the new governor of Sistan. The latter managed
to release Abu ‘ Ubaida by paying a ransom of five thousand dirhams. ^
The new governor of Sistan, Talha, was soon to d ie , and he appointed
as his successor a Bakrite from Banu Yashkur. This appointment infuriated the
Mudarites, who drove the Bakrite from his office, thus causing hostility
_ 2
(5\sabiyya) to flare up between Rabi‘ a and Mudar. This state of affairs
- 3
encouraged the Zunbil to exploit the situation. A l-Q u b a ‘ , Ibn al-Zubair*s
governor of Basra, therefore sent ‘ Abd a l - ‘ A z iz ibn Âbdallah ibn 1 Amir as
governor to Sistan. He fought the Zunbil and killed him, but was forced by
the Tamimite ‘ Abdallah ibn Nashir to leave the country. W hen,however,
Ibn Nashir entered the city of Z ira n j, he himself was driven out and killed
by another Tamimite, W aki‘ Ibn Abi al-A sw ad, and thus ‘ Abd a l - ‘ A z iz was
4
able to return once more to the c ity .
Fu tuh ,pp .3 8 7 -8 ;Tab, ,11, p p .4 8 8 -9 (citing M a d a ’ inT); Kam il, IV , p . 84.

2. Futafr , p . 398; K a m il, IV , p . 84.
3. Zunbil is a regnal title and not a personal name, the exact form of which is
somewhat uncertain. Bosworth, Sistan Under the Arabs, from the Islamic
Conquests to the Rise of the Safforfds, p p .3 4 -6 , Rome, 1968.
4. Futuh, p .398.
194.
In Khurasan, the governor, Salm ibn Z iy a d , at first tried to keep
secret the news of the c a lip h ‘s death and those of his brothers in Sistan and
Basra. When he could no longer keep this secret, he asked the Arabs in
Khurasan to pay him homage, until the unity of the Muslims should be restored
by the election of a new caliph. They agreed, but soon betrayed their
1
homage, and Salm then found himself forced to leave Khurasan. Before
leaving, he appointed a l-M u h a lla b ibn Abi Sufra as his deputy governor. But
the Bakrites found it humiliating to submit to the insignificant A zd ite .
I P ^ T h e r e f o r e , Sulaiman ibn Marthad a l-B akri,
meeting Salm ibn Ziyad in Sarkhas, forced him to appoint him as governor
of Mervarud, Faryab, Ja liq a n and Jurjan. Salm was also forced to appoint
another Bakrite, Aws ibn Tha‘ laba, as governor of Herat, M eanw hile,
‘ Abdallah ibn Khazim al-S u iam i, who since an early date had also tried to
get the governorship of Khurasan, met Salm at Nishapur. Ibn Khazim asked
Salm whom he had appointed as his deputy. When the latter told him, Ibn Khazim,
surprised, answered, “Could you not find a M u darite, rather than divide Khurasan
between Bakr ibn Wa* il and Muzun ‘ Uman* (Azd ) ^ %

%
pje a | s0 managed t 0 get from Salm a patent
1. Ansab, fo l. 593b; Futufr , p .413; Tab. II, p p .4 8 8 -9 (citing M ada?inT).

■ -*-*■— — *
2. T a b ., I I , p .489 (citing M a d a’ in i). ProfessorS. a l - ‘ A li considers* these

appointments as being w illin g ly given by Salm ibn Ziyad to satisfy the
tribes in Khurasan. Istitan a l - ‘ Arab fi Khurasan, p p .4 8 -9 , M K A B , III,
1958. WKTle there is no evidence to support this vie w , it seems more
lik ely that Salm only made these appointments to save his life with
no intention of keeping the balance between the tribes.
195.
as governor of Khurasan, and a subsidy of one hundred thousand dirhams.
Then Ibn Khazim returned to M erv P This complicated situation made
imminent an outbreak of conflict between Rabi‘ a and M udar. These reports
of Salm*s appointments, however, may well be fabrications of a later date,
“Tribal traditions trying to legitim atize the subsequent actions of their
heroes*1. ^
Finding himself unable to face both Rabi‘ a and M udar, al-M u h alla b Ibn .
Abi Sufra departed from M e rv , leaving a Tamimite as his deputy, thus
adding to the confusion. The weakness shown by a l-M u h a lla b was due
- - 3
to the fact that the Azdites were few in number in Khurasan at this tim e.
A fM u h allab ^ deputy tried to prevent Ibn Khazim from entering M erv, but
4
was defeated and died of his wounds in the struggle.
However, the rivalry between Bakr and Tamim turned out to favour
Ibn Khazim. Although he was not Tamimite, as a Mudarite he gained the
support of Banu Tamim. The Rabi‘ ites, however, were not prepared to leave
1. Ansab, fo l. 593b; Futufi, p .414; Y a ‘ qubi, II, p . 323; T a b ., II,

p .489 (citing M a d a *in i); Ghurar, fo l. 4.
2. Sha‘ ban, op. c it . , p p .6 7 -8 .
3. Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom and its F all, p .417.
4. T a b ., II, p p .490-1 (citing M a d a *in i).

196.
s
the Mudarites to exploit Khurasan unopposed, ^
and soon afterwards, fighting started between Ibn Khazim,
supported by Mudar (Qais and Tamim) and Sulaiman ibn Marthad with the
Rabi‘ ites (Bakr and other Rabi‘ ite branches) in Mervarud. Sulaiman was
killed and his followers defeated. Then Ibn Khazim went to a l-T a lik a n and
inflicted another defeat on Bakr, killin g ‘ Amr ibn M arthad, a brother of
Sulaiman, who held the c ity . The defeated Barkites fled to H erat, where
they joined Aws ibn Tha‘ laba in the hopes that they could expel Ibn
- - 2
Khazim and the Mudar from Khurasan. The Banu Suhaib among them were
most enthusiastic to this idea, and thus Aws was forced to act against his
w ill.
As in Syria, these tribal rivalries had p o litical implications, in as much
as the Mudarites were opposing the direct authority of the Umayyads,
prefering the rather loose authority of Ibn a l-Z u b a ir; the RabiMtes, on the
other hand, opposed the Zubairids, largely because of their fear and jealousy
3
of the Mudarites.
This conflict between Rabi‘ a and Mudar did not arise without leading
some of the Mudarites to seek a peaceful solution; Ibn Khazim was forced to
1. Futuli, p . 414.
2. Futub, p . 414; J a b ., II, p p .480-91 (citing M a d a ’ in i).
3. Sha*ban, op. c i t . , p. 83.

197.
negotiatie with the RabHites. These negotiations fa ile d , since the
RabHites were not prepared to accept anything less than the expulsion
of Mudar from Khurasan. ^ Accordingly, Ibn Khazim left his son Musa
in M e rv , and marched against them in H erat. The RabHites fortified
themselves by digging a ditch. The fighting between them and Ibn Khazim
continued for about a year. In order to incite the RabH ites, Ibn Khazim
said to them, “You have shut yourselves up in your ditch: are you prepared
to accept that ditch as your share of Khurasan?" Enraged by this, they left
their strong position, and suffered very heavy losses in lives. Aws ibn
Thac laba, who was wounded in this battle, fled to Sistan to take refuge with
? o . 2
the Zunbil but died before arriving. These two successive crushing defeats
left the Bakrites powerless, and Ibn Khazim and the Mudar dominant in
Khurasan. This also had its echo in Ba$ra, for, according to a l-M a d a * in i,
when the news of it reached Basra, al-A h n a f ibn Qais and other Tamimite
chiefs went to M a lik ibn M is m a *, the chief of the RabH a there, to apologize.
This move, however, was spoilt by the verbal aggression of one of al-A hnaf's
colleagues at this meeting* M a lik burnt down the houses of the Tamimites in
1. T a b ., II, p p .4 9 4 -5 (citing M a d a *in i). Here the narrative of M a d a*in i

ends, but it is completed by that of Abu1!-Hasan al-Khurdsani.
2. Futuh, p p .4 1 4 -5 ; T a b ., M, p p .4 9 1 -6 . This fighting between RabHa

and Mudar occupied the period 6 4 -6 5 .
198.
Basra as a reprisal for the slaughter of the Bakr in Herat. ^
The peace in Khurasan was only of a short duration. H ostility
soon flared up among the Mudarites themselves, i . e . , Qais against Tamim.
Cur sources are unanimously silent about the reason for this hostility,
„ 2
apart from a chance narrative in Jabari , repeated by both ibn a l-A th ir
and N u w a iri. The narrative says that after Ibn Khazim had used the Tamim
to defeat the RabH ites and become the sole master of the whole of
Khurasan, he neglected them. This negligence could not be other than
a reluctance to give them o ffice, or at least, not giving them as much

- - 3
as they expected as their share of the revenue of Khurasan.
Ibn Khazim appointed his son Muhammad governor of H erat, and left
him for assistants, two Tamimites, Shammas ibn Dathar a ! - tfUtaridi and
Bukair ibn Washah, who was head of the Sh urta. It seems that beyond this,
Ibn Khazim was not prepared to give any concessions to the Banu Tamim,
who were not satisfied with these appointments. It was probably for this
reason that when Banu Tamim went to H erat, Ibn Khazim wrote to Shammas
ibn Dathar and Bukair Ibn Washah ordering them to prevent Banu Tamim from
entering the c ity . Shammas refused to obey this order, and joined his people,
1. Ansab, fo l. 496b (citing Mada* in i); Tabf , II, p p .4 5 1 -2 .

■ »
2. T a b ., I I , p . 593; K a m il, IV , p. 171; N u w a iri, X IX , fo l. 52.
3. A I - ( A li suggests that Ibn Khazim relied on the Ahl a l- * A liy a and

not on the Tamimites, and therefore the latter opposed him. Ai —4 A l i ,
Istitan a l A r a b fi Khurasan, p . 51, M K A B , III, Baghdad 1958.
199.
while Bukair complied with the order. This difference was due to the personal
hostility between Bukair and Shammas. Bukair promised Shammas thirty
thousand dirhams for himself, and a thousand for each of the Banu Tamim if
they withdrew. They refused, and entered the c ity , killin g Muhammad ibn
T 1
( Abdallah ibn Khazim in revenge for two Tamimites he had killed by lashing.
The Banu Tamim then went to M e rv , where they were joined by other Tamimites,
and chose al-H arish ibn ( Abdallah a l-Q u r a i‘ i as their leader in the struggle
•
against Ibn Khazim. The war between the latter and the Banu Tamim is said
2 „
to have lasted for two years. The Tamimites found themselves unable to
overcome Ibn Khazim. They therefore adopted the plan of dividing their
forces, with one group leaving M erv to entice Ibn Khazim to follow them,
3
and thus enabling those who remained in M erv to seize the c ity . Following
this policy, Bahir ibn Warqa* went to Nishapur, Shammas to Sistan, * Uthman
ibn a l-M u h ta fa r and Zuhair ibn Dhu’ aib a l - ‘ Adawi to Fartana, and al -
- 4
Harish Ibn H ila l a l-Q u ra i* i to Mervarud. But this division made it possible
for Ibn Khazim to defeat them, by attacking one group at a tim e. He began
1. Futuh, p .415; T a b ., II, pp.496 , 5 9 3 -4 (citing M ada; in i); G hurar,

fo l. 4 ; K am il, IV , p. 171; N uw airi X IX , fols. 5 2 -4 .
2. T a b ., II, p . 595 (citing M ada* in i); Kamil , IV , p. 172. This, however,

might* have included the war against Bakr also. W ellhausen, The Arab
Kingdom and its F a ll, p p .4 1 9 -2 0 .
3. Futuh , p .415.
4. T a b ., I I , p . 596, (citing Mada* in i); Kam il, IV , p. 172;N u w a iri,

X IX , fols. 5 3 -4 .
200.
t . - - 1
with al-H arish and forced him to leave Khurasan. He then turned to
Zuhair and his followers, who surrendered unconditionally. Ibn Khazim

2
killed them a ll in revenge of his son Muhammad. Finally, he set out to
fight Bahir ibn W arqa? and his followers in Nishapur.
Before leaving M erv to fight Bahir, Ibn Khazim made Bukair his
deputy there, and ordered his son Musa to cross the C xus and to seek refuge
3 ”
in a fortress, or with a king there. This was because Ibn Khazim feared
that the Tamimites might k ill Musa as they had killed his brother Muhammad,
before.
When Mus‘ ab ibn a l-Z u b a ir was k ille d , 7 2 /6 9 1 , Ibn Khazim was still
fighting Bahir Ibn W a rq a *, At this tim e, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik wrote to Ibn Khazim
asking his " b a i'a *1 and promising him in return the governorship of
Khurasan for a term of seven years. Ibn Khazim, who had secured the
country by his own sword, would not accept this offer. He considered it
as little more than an insult, and made the messenger eat the letter of ‘ Abd
4 5 „
a l-M a lik . Welihausen thinks that the reason for Ibn Khazim's refusal to
1. T a b ., II, p . 596; Kam il, IV , p . 172; NuwairT, X IX , fols. 5 2 -4 .
2. T a b ., I I , p p .6 9 6 -8 ; Kamil, IV , p . 210; N u w a iri, X IX , fols. 5 4 -7 .
3. Futuh, p . 415; T a b ., 11, pp. 1145-6; Kam il, IV , p .402.
4. K halifa ibn Khayya't, Tarlkh, I, p . 296; Futuh, p . 415; Ansab, fo l. 593b;

Y a ‘ qub7, I I , p p .3 2 3 -4 ; Bui dan, p. 81; Tab7, T l , p p .8 3 1 -2 (citing
Mada* inT), 8 3 4 -5 ; Ghurar, fo l. 4; Bad*, V I , p . 27; K am il, IV , p . 282
Bidaya, V I I I , p .325; ( Ibar, II I , p .83.
5. Welihausen, The Arab Kingdom and its F all, p .420.

201*
recognize ( Abd a l- M a lik , was that he wanted to rule independently. However,
it is clearly stated in the sources,^ that the refusal was bacause of his "BaHa *1
to Ibn al -Z u b a ir.
Failing to obtain Ibn Khazim's homage, *Abd a l-M a lik offered the
governorship of Khurasan to Bukair ibn Washah, Ibn Khazim's representative.
He accepted the offer and called the people to the "BaMa" of 6Abd a l-M a lik ,
with which they w illin g ly complied. This popular willingness to renounce
- 2
Ibn Khazim sprang from the cruelty and ill- w ill he had shown to Banu Tamim.
Ibn Khazim found himself unable to face both Bukair ibn Washah and Bahir
ibn Warqa* and therefore he decided to join his son Musa in al-Tirm idh.
However, he did not succeed in reaching him, for he was overtaken by
Bahir and k ille d , after putting up a stiff resistance, by W a k i‘ i ibn a l -

3
Dawraqiyya, in 7 2 /6 9 1 .
The death of Ibn Khazim, however, did not put an end to the feud
in Khurasan. A new feud now broke out between the Tamimites themselves.
Bukair ibn Washah stole the head of Ibn Khazim from the k ille r, and sent
■■■■ II •
it to ( Abd a l-M a lik ibn Marwan in Damascus. He not only told the caliph
that he had kille d Ibn Khazim himself, but he also put Bahir, the one really
1. Y a q ‘ ubi, II, p . 324; T a b ., II, pp. 1145-6; K a m il, IV , p .402.
2. Ansab, fo l. 593; Futuh, p .4 1 5 -6 ; Y a ‘ qubi, II, p .324; Buldan, p . 81;

T a b ., II, p p .8 3 2 -3 (citing M a d a ?inT); ‘ Asakir, IX , fo l. 81b; K am il,
IV , p . 282; N u w a iri, X IX , fo l. 70; Dhahabi, I I I , pp. 111-2;
Bidaya, V I I I , p . 325; ( Ibar, I I I , p .83; Tahdhib , V , p. 195.
202.
responsible for his death, in prison. ^ This action not only started the rivalry
between Bahir
* and Bukair which continued until the letter's death,9 but
also had another serious consequence. It severely strained the relations
between Banu M u q a4is ibn 4Amr and al-B utun, and the Banu 4A w f ibn K a4b
- 2
and the Abna’ . The first supported Bahir, while the latter supported Bukair.
The old feud which Khurasan had witnessed since the death of Yazid I, and this
new tension between the two Tamimite branches created a state of affairs at
the time so serious that the people of Khurasan were brought to reconsider
their position. They realized that such a state of instability would encourage
their enemies to attack them. This led them to believe that stability and
peace would return to Khurasan, only if they could find a neutral governor,
not belonging to any one of the rival groups in Khurasan. Accordingly, they
wrote to 4 Abd a l-M a lik asking him to send a Guraishite governor, who would
stand above the envy and rivalry of the tribes. 4 Abd a l-M a lik then sent them
Umayya ibn 4 Abdallah ibn Khalid ibn Asid, in the year 7 4 /6 9 3 , who was both
3
an Umayyad and a Q uraishite. 4 Abd a l-M a lik instructed him not to take
sides in the feud, but to engage the people of Khurasan in the jihad against
the Turks; and to take trouble to collect and develop the revenue of the country.
1. Farazdaq, Diwan , I, p. 90; J a b ., I I , pp. 8 3 2-8 34; K am il, IV , p. 282.
2. T a b ., II, p . 680; Jamharat, p p .2 0 7 -8 ; M i / a t , V I , fo l. 8 b.

» I mm 1 — ■ ■■>■ i n -
3. K halifa ibn Khayya.t, TarTkh, I, p . 297; M u g h talin , p. 176; Futuh,

p .416; Bui dan, p . 81; T a b ., II , p p .8 6 0 -i (citing M ada* in i); G hurar,
fo l. 5; M ir* at , V I , fo l. 8 b; DhahabT, III, p. 117; 4 Ibar, III, pp. 9 1 -2 .
203.
Bahir met Umayya on his arrival in Nishapur and tried tb incite him
against Bukair, without success. Umayya offered the leadership of the
Shurta to Bukair. The latter, being ex-governor of Khurasan, fe lt it
beneath him to accept this o ffice . His rival Bahir, however, was prepared
to accept the post, probably in the belief that it would help him to execute
his plan of vengeance against Bukair.^ However, Umayya did not remove
any of the officials appointed by Bukair. It would appear that he was
following instructions from 4Abd a l- M a lik , to avoid favouring either Bukair
or Bahir, but to try to reconcile them both. This was the reason for his
appointment in the first place. M oreover, with both Bukair and Bahir in
such a strong position, Umayya would have to attempt to win them both to
his side if he expected tohave any authority in the caliph's name.
Bukair, however, was infuriated by both the appointment of Umayya
as governor of Khurasan and by the hostile attitude of Bahir towards him, and
he seized his opportunity to act when Umayya set out on one of his campaigns.
Being left in M erv as Umayya's deputy, Bukair seized the city. Hearing of
2
this, Umayya hurried back and beseiged Bukair for four months. When he
found that he was unable to defeat him, for Bukair had secured the money
1. M u g h talin , p. 176; T a b ., I I , p p .8 6 0 -2 (citing M ada* in i); K ufi, II,

fols. 58a-58b ; G hurar, fo l. 6 ; M i r , a t, V I , fols. 8 b -9a ; Dhahabi,
I I I , p. 117; 4 Ibar, I I I , p p .9 1 -2 .
1. KufT, I, 58b.
and the men of M erv for himself, Umayya entered into peace negotiations
wi th h im. These were welcomed by Bukair, probably because he was not
sure of the continuing support of the people of M e rv . Bukair and Umayya
agreed that Umayya should pay Bukair's debts, give him a large sum of money
for himself, and that he should give Bukair a period of forty days to go
wherever he wished in Khurasan.^ Bukair chose to remain in M e rv . This
settlement was made in the year 7 7 /6 9 6 .
4 Abd a l- M a lik , however, became impatient with Umayya's failure to
carry out his instructions on appointment, and relieved him of office. The
responsibility for the area was given to the capable a l- H a jja j, who appointed
a l-M u h a lla b ibn Abi Sufra.

6
The rivalry between Bukair and Bahir continued, the latter continually
warning Umayya against Bukair, until he was eventually convinced that Bukair
was conspiring against him. Despite Bukair's denials, Umayya seized him
and had him killed by his bitter enemy, Bahir, in the year 7 7 /6 9 6 . Bahir
was convinced that the “ Banu Sa4d would never be united w hile they both
liv e d " . 2
1. M u a h ta lin .p . 176; Futuh, p .416; Y a 4 qubi, II, p . 324; T a b ., I I , pp. 1122-8

(citing Mada* in i); K u fi, I, fols. 58b-59a; Ghjurar, fols. 6 - 7 ; M ir* a t, V I ,
fo l. 26b; Bidaya, IX , p . 21; 4 Ibar, III, pp. 1 0 1-2 .
2. M u g h talin , p. 177; Ansab, fo l. 315a; Futufo, p .417; Y a 4qubi, II, p .324;

T a b ., II, pp. 1028-31 (citing M a d a *in t); KufT, I, fo l. 59a; Qh.urar, fo l. 7;
jqm harat, p . 207; 4 Asakir, IX , fo l. 82a; K am il, IV , p . 361 ;~7v\irTdt, V I ,
fo l. 26b; Bidaya, IX , p . 21; 4 Ibar, I I I , p. 102.
205.
Bukair's death, however, did not end the hostility in the Banu Sa 4 d,
to whom both Bahir and Bukair belonged. Four years after the death of Bukair,
in 8 1 /7 0 0 , Bahir was publically assassinated by one of the Banu 4 Aw f, ibn
§ a 4 â4a ibn Harb, who shouted, "Ya li tharat Bukair11 as he killed him;
*
this took place in the court of al-M u h alla b ibn Abi Sufra, who was at this
- - 1
time the governor of Khurasan. The assassin was put to death and his people
satisfied by the payment of blood money. Thus the feud among the Banu Sa 4 d
came to an end.
During the governorship of a l-M u h a lla b ibn Abi Sufra (7 9 /6 9 8 -
8 2 /7 0 1 ) and that of his son Y azid after him (82/701 -8 5 /7 0 4 ), we see the Azd
2
as one of the strong powers in Khurasan, taking their part in al! important
3
events. The alliance between a l-A z d and Bakr (Rabi4 a) in Basra was also
*
formed in Khurasan. The date of this alliance is not d itectly given by the
sources. Judging from the fact that a l-A z d were not strong in Khurasan before
the governorship of a l-M u h a lla b , it is unlikely that the Azd/B akr alliance was
formed before 7 9 /6 9 8 , It was perhaps formed by al-M u h allab 's efforts for there
is no mention in our sources of this alliance before his tim e. It is reported in the
- T 4
Kitqb al-A ahani that during the governorship of a l-M u h a lla b , some dispute
1* M ughtalin, p. 179; Ansab, fo l. 503b; T a b ., I I , pp. 1047-51 (citing

M ad 5?inf)”; Jamharat, p . 207; 4 Asakir, IX , fo l. 82a; Kam il, IV , p p .3 6 7 -9
Bidaya, IX , pp. 3 4 -5 ; 4 ibar, III, p. 103.
2. Welihausen, The Arab Kingdom and Its F a ll, p .427.
3, Ansab, IV , pp. 105-6 (citing M ad a?ini and Abu 4 Ubaida); N a q a M d ,

II, p . 729; T a b ., II , p»446 (citing Abu 4 Ubaida). ’
4* A g h ., X I I I , p . 58.
206.
arose between a l-A z d and 4 Abd a l-Q a is . This was expressed by the
satiric verses of the pcetsKa4b al-Ashqari and Ziyad a l - A 4 jam. A l-M u h a lla b
intervened and paid blood money to both sides and thus the dispute was
ended. It is also reported by the same source^ that al-Yem en and Rabi4a
were in H ilf during the time of a l-M u h a lla b and his son Y a z id . There is
also re ference to this H ilf in the verses of the poet Nahar ibn TawsHa al -
” t 2
Tamimi bewailing a l-M u h a lla b . In a later period, as the revolt of Q utaiba Ibn
Muslim al —Bahi 1i (95/714) and that of Y azid ibn a l-M u h a lla b (1 0 1 /7 1 9 ),^ this
u* 4
H ilf is also mentioned. However, al-Nusst seems to have misunderstood
5
the report of Abu 4 Ubaida, and decided that this Hi If existed in the time of
‘ Abdallah ibn Khazim. But W aki* ibn Hassan a l-G h u d a n i, to whom Abu
‘ Ubaida referred, is not the same W a k i 4 as killed Ibn Khazim. Ibn Khazim
was killed by W a k i 4 ibn 4 Umair a l» Q u ra i 4 i, called Ibn al-D aw raq iyya.
It was expected that 4 Abd a l-M a lik ibn Marwan would give himself
up to the Kalbites and the Yemenites in general, for it was through them that
1. jb i d . , X I I I , pp. 5 9 -6 0 .
2. T a b ., II, p. 1084 (citing Mada* in i).
3. Naqa*
_ _
id , I , p . 358; Agh . , X I I I , p. 55; A l - 4 Uyun w a l-H: a d a ’ iq,
4. Al-Nusjs , op. c i t . , I, p . 293.
5. N aqa’ id, I, p. 365.

207.
his father, and the Umayyads generally, had secured the caliphate. However
this was not the case. 4 Abd a l-M a lik had learnt in the turbulent period
before his accession how dangerous tribal feuds could be and he, therefore,
tried not to patronize one side against the other. This was a d iffic u lt task
since the politics of the time depended on understandings with the tribes.
M oreover, tribal passion and jealousy (4A sabiyya) were strong even among
the members of the ruling house, which made the task of the caliph more
d iffic u lt. However, 4 Abd a l-M a lik showed himself a clever statesman and
above parties. Being from the Guraish, the caliph was able to take up a
middle position. ^
Having failed to subdue the Qais by force, he reconciled them to him,
and when they gave up their opposition to him, he treated them equally with
the Kalbites. Zufar ibn al-H d rith and his sons al-H u d h ail and Q aw thar,
4 Abdailah ibn Mas4ada al-F aza ri and other Gaisites were among the most
influential men in the court of 4 Abd a l-M a lik . Even when al-H u d h ail ibn Zufar
deserted the caliph's army after the reconciliation to join Mas4ab ibn a l-Z u b a ir,
2
4Abd a l-M a lik showed him tolerance.
In order to get the confidence of the Gais and win them more firmly to
his side, 4 Abd a l-M a lik himself married a Q aisite woman, W allada of the Banu
1. W elihausen, The Arab Kingdom and its F a ll, p . 211.
Ansab, V , p .350 (citing 4 Awana); Jghshiyari, p . 30; Im ta *,H I,

pjD. 1 7 0-1 ; Jamharat, p. 245; 4 Asakir, V , p .376; V I , fo l. 212a;
K am il, IV , p . 278; 4 Ibar, III, p .82,
208.
1
4 Abs, who became the mother of his sons a l-W a lid and Sulaimdn. He
also sealed the treaty between Zufar ibn al-H arith and himself by the
marriage of his son Mas lama to al-Rabab, the daughter of Zufar ibn a l -
2 . 3
H a rith . The Kalbltes showed their displeasure at this; however, 4 Abd
a l-M a lik , in spite of associating himself with the Q ais, did not neglect
the K alb , but on the contrary treated both Qais and Kalb equally. To the
end of his reign, Yemenites, like Ibn Bahdal, Rawh, ibn Zinba4 , a l - 4Ayyash
• * — —
ibn Khaythama, Abu Hafs a l-S h a k iri, Ibn al-Zubriqan ibn A zlam , M a 4yuf
a l-H u ja r i, and Ibn Abi 4Aushn (the latter five from Hamdan) were among his
intimate courtiers.^
This policy of treating tribes equally also showed itself on other
occasions: after the day of al-Bishr, 4 Abd a l-M a lik through his son a l-W a lid
paid money recompense to both sides for the blood-shed before the day of
5 „
al-Bishr. 4 Abd a l-M a lik also put to death two Fazarite chiefs, for their
responsibility in the feud of Banat G a in . 4 Abd a l-M a lik imprisoned Arta*a
t 6
ibn Suhya a l-M u rri, for incitement in his poem against the Kalb. Gn the
1. Fgrazda^, D iw an, I, p .8 0 ; Ansab, X I , p. 172 (citing Abu 4 Ubaida);

Bughyq, fo l. 174.
2. Rasa* i I, (Ed, Sandubi), p. 182, (citing Mada* in i); Ansab, V , p. 307;

Kam il, IV , p . 277; 4 Ibar, I I I , p .82.
3. Abu Tammam, Naqa* id Jarir Wal A khtal rpp. 19-20; Idem,Hamasa, I,

pp. 6 5 6 -6 5 7 , 6 5 8 -9 ; AmidT, pp. 3 5 -6 .
4. Ansab, X I, pp. 173-4 (citing al-H aytham ), 253(citing Mada* in i);

Ham dam , IklTI, X , pp. 148-9.
5. See above, p.
6 . BakrT, IV , pp. 1159-60.
209.
other hand, he imprisoned a number of Yemenite nobles (W ujuh), because
of the murder of a Q aisite . ^ He also threatened 4 Abd Yasu4 ibn Harb,
the sayyid of Banu Taghlib, as an attempt to put an end to the feud between
2
Qais and Taghlib.
In choosing his officials, 4Abd a l-M a lik , following the normal
practise of the tim e, favoured his relatives. However, he was not the
prisoner of his fam ily. Probably he trusted them more than others, because
of the nature of the problems he faced at the time of his accession; and as
Quraishites, they were able to attain a level of aloofness from tribal frictions,
more d iffic u lt for other 4Arabs to obtain. Nevertheless, 4 Abd a l-M a lik kept
an eye on them and was ready to remove any who showed incompetence; he
would replace them by a more capable person, no matter whether he was an
Umayyad or not. When Khalid ibn 4 Abdallah ibn Khalid ibn Asid showed
incapability in facing the K harijite threat and in collecting the Kharaj,
he was soon removed from his post as a governor of Basra. 4 Abd a l-M a lik
also removed al»H arith Ibn K h a lid al-M akhzum i, the governor of M ecca,
4
because he did not perform his duty as a leader of the congregation. As
1. A g M , X IX , p. 109.
2. Nasab, fols. 227b-228a.
3. Ansab, X I, p p .266-7 (citing Abu M ikhnaf and 4Aw ana), fo l. 25b (citing
M a d a’ in i); 4 Iqd, IV , pp. 2 3 -4 ; T a b ., I I , p .825 (citing Aba M ikhn af).
4. A g h ., III, p p .102-3 (citing Mu$4ab a l-Z u b a iri, a l-Z u b a ir ibnBakkar

and 4 Umar ibn Shabba), 113 (citing M u s 4 ab a l-Z u b a ir!).
210.
we have seen, Umayya ibn 4Abdallah ibn Khalid ibn Asid was appointed
to the government of Khurasan in order to keep the balance between the
conflicting parties. When Umayya failed to end the feuds and engage the
people of Khurasan in the Jihad against the Turks, he was removed from his
_ |
post and the government was transferred to a l-M u h a lla b ibn Abi Sufra.
O n the other hand, the death of Bishr ibn Marwan (74/693) left vacant
the important post of governor of Iraq. Apart from having strong anti-Um ayyad
feelings (especially in K ufa), Iraq was constantly menaced by the Kharijites.
To this must be added the turbulant and insubordinate nature of the 4 Arab
tribes there. The governorship of Iraq was therefore the most responsible post
in the whole Islamic Empire. On the other hand, the severity with which
a l-H a jja j restored the peace in a l- H ija z , and the harsh treatment and
discrimination he showed to the people there, made 4 Abd a l-M a lik transfer him
o
to Iraq.
1. Ansab, X I, pp. 194=5; (citing Mada* in i) , 310=11 (citing a l-H a y th a m );

Futgfr , p . 399; T a b ., II, pp. 1028-29; KufT, II, fols. 59a-59b, 7 2 a -
72b, lOOa-lOOb; Ghurar, fols. 6 -7 ; 4 Iqd, IV , p p .2 3 -4 ; A g h ., X I I , p. 56;
M arzubani, op. c i t . , p p .2 2 7 -8 , 230, 265; K am il, IV , p p .299-300;
Dhahabi, III, pp. 125-6; M ile s , Two Unpublished Dirhams of 4Abdallah
fBn Umayya, p. 156, A N S M , X IV , 1968.
2. Mahasin, p p .6 3 -4 ; A l-Z u b a ir ibn Bakkar, Akhbar al-M uw afaq iyyat fil

Siyar, fo l. 46 (citing 4 Awana); Imama, II, p . 25; Y a 4 qubf, II, p p .3 2 6 -7 ;
T a b ., II, p p .8 6 3 -7 3 ; K ufi, II, fo l. 69a; 4 Iqd, II, p p .78181; Muruj, V ,
p p .290-302; Bad*, V l,p ,2 7 ; TanukhI, al-M ustajad min Fi 4 lot a l-A jw a d ,
p p .4 4 -6 ; J q I t s , fols. 8 b, 9a, 9b felting M u s 4ab a l-Z u h r t); Ghurar, fo l. 17
Kam il, IV , p p .3 0 3 -5 ; M ir * a t, V I , fols. 8 a , 14b, 15a; Bidaya, IX , p . 7;
4 Ibar, I I I , pp. 9 3 -4 . However, contrary to the written sources which give
the date of Bishr's death as 74, there is a coin bearing the name of Bishr s
211.
A l-H a jja j has been accused of showing4Asabiyya to both the Qaisites,
and more especially to his own people, the Thaqifites. It is true that he
removed many of the previous officials, appointed by Bishr, and replaced
them with Thaqifites. In Sistan, he appointed 4Ubaidallah ibn Abi Baka;^
in Basra, al-Hakam ibn Ayyub and 4Urwa ibn al-M u g h ira as his deputy in
2 3
Basra and Kufa; in the Yemen, he appointed his brother Muhammad, and
4
in Fars, another Thaqifite, Muhammad ibn al-Q asim . Nevertheless, there
are also examples of his appointment of Yemenites to high office: 4 Abd al “Rahman
ibn Muhammad ibn a!-Ash4ath a l-K in d i was his choice as governor of Sistan and
5 - T
as leader of the celebrated army, Jafeh al-Taw aw is; appointed head of the
6 —
Shurta was Abu l - 4Amarta (Kinda); and he appointed a l-R a b i 4 ibn Q ais (Kinda)
= struck in Basra in the year 75. This numismatic evidence would seem
to indicate that Bishr was immediately succeeded by a l- H a jja j, thus
elim inating K halid ibn 4Abdallah ibn Asid from the list oF"governors of
Basra and Kufa. See W alker, Some New Arab Sassanian Coins, p. 107,
N C , X I , 1952; M ile s , A Byzantine Bronze W eight in the Name of Bishr
ibn M arwan, p p .1 1 7 -8 , A rabica, IX , 1962.
1. K halifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, I, p . 386; Ansab, X I , p p .310-11 (citing

al-H aytham ); T a b ., I I , p p .1033-4 (citingÂbo M ikh n af); K u fi, I I , fo l.
1 0 0 a; Ghurar, fo l. 52; Kam il, IV , p . 362; M ir*at,"\7"l, fo l.2 9 a ;
W afayat, I I , p . 215.
2. K h a lifa,ib n Khayyat, TaFtkh, I, p . 385; Ansab, V , p . 179; T a b ., II,

p p .872, 979~fciting Abu M ikh n af), 4 Asakir, IV , p p .389-9*0; Bidaya, IX , p.
3. Futuh / p .73 (citing Mada* in i); K ufi, II , fo l. 83a.
4. T a b ., I I , p. 1200; Dhahabl, I II , p .2 3 3 .
5. Farazdaq, D iw an, I, p . 328; Imama, I I , p p .2 9 -3 0 ; Ansab, X I, p . 319;

Y a *q u b i, II, p. 331; T a b ., II , pp. 1044 (citing a l-S h a 4 bT), 1046; K ufi,
II, fo l. 101a; M u ru j, V , p . 301 f f - ; TanbTh , p. 314; Ghurar, f o l.5 3 f f .;
Bad*, V I, p . 53; K a m il, IV , p p .3 6 5 -6 ; M ir * a t, V I, fo l.3 1 b ; Bidaya,
IX , p p .31 -5 ; Shgdharat, I, p .87.
6. M a 4a 4 fo l. 27a; Jamharat, p .401.
212.
] _
as governor of Pars, Abd al-Rahman ibn Abt Sabra (N akha4) as governor
- 2
of Isbahan, a l-Z u b a ir ibn Khuzaima (Khath 4 am) as a later governor of
• 3 - - - 4
Isbahan, and 4 Imara ibn Tamim (Lakham) as governor of Sistan. Thus it
seems that rather than exercising a tribal system of patronage, a l-H a jja j
was advancing men on the basis of his trust in them and his b elief in their
efficiency: it was more a personal system of patronage.
5 .
Welihausen is one who believes a l-H o jja j to have favoured the
Q ais. He says that a l-H a jja j removed al-M ufaddal ibn a l-M u h a lla b from
Khurasan because he killed Musa ibn 4 Abdallah ibn Khazim. The latter was
a Q aisite who held out for twelve years after the death of his father, in
Tirmidh. However, historical tradition is not in favour of this conclusion.
A l-M u h a lla b ibn Abi Sufra was appointed the governor of Khurasan by a l -
— 6 —
H a jja j. Before his death, a l-M u h a lla b nominated his son Y a zid as his
- 7
successor. This nomination was approved by a l-H a jja j. If a l-H a jja j had
1. M a 4a d ,fo l. 27a.
2. M a 4a d ,fo l. 46b; Jamharat, p .385.
3. M a 4ad ,fo l. 53b.
û^ qn/ P« 61; Jamharat, p. 398.
The Arab Kingdom and its F all, p .429.
6 . Ansab, X I , p .311 (citing al-H aytham ); Futuh, p . 317; Y a 4 qubi, II, p .330
BuTddn, p p .6 0 ,8 1 ; T a b ., I I , pp7T033, 1039, 1047, 1063; K J fl, II,
fo l. 90b; Ghurar, fo l* 33; Kam il, IV , p . 362; M ir * a t, V I , fo l. 29a;
4 (bar, I I I , p . 103.
7. Futub , p .4 1 7 ; D inaw arr, p . 289; Y a 4 qubi, II, p . 330; Buldan,

p .8 2 ; T a b ., II, p p .1083 (citing Mad a* in t), 1085; Ghurar, f o l.74;
M ir * a t’, V I , fo l.4 0 b .
213.
had any sort of partisanship to his people, he would have chosen a
Q aisite governor for this important post; or at least he would not confirm
the nomination of al~Muhal lab ’s son Y azid as his successor. But al«lâjjaj
only removed Y azid from Khurasan after he had been governor there for three
years. This removal of Y azid from Khurasan was not caused by a l-H a jja j's
partisanship to the Qais against the A zd, to whom Y a zid belonged;
relations between the two had become strained when Y a z id , because of his
<Asabiyya to his people, sent only the Mudarite participants in* the revolt
*
of Ibn al-Ashâth as prisoners to a l-H a jja j, setting free all the Yemenites.^
Moreover,proud and disobedient to his master as he was, Y azid was unpopular
2 . 3
in Khurasan, even among his own people, the A zd. It is also reported that
1. Ansab, fols. 19a~l9b ; Y a 'q u b i, I I , p . 330; T a b ., II , pp. 1119-22 (citing

Abu ( Ubaida); Kcrfi, I I , fo l. 1 1 2b; M ir * a t, V I , fo l.5 1 b .
2. T a b ., I I , p p .1142-43 (citing M a d a *in i), 1143-44 (citing Ib n a l- Kalbi

and Abu M ikhn af); K ufi, II, fols. 127b, 128a; Ghurar, f o l.75; Agh . ,
X llt ,p .6 1 ; K^m il, IV , p.4Q2. " “
3 * Jalis, fols. 56a~56b; Ghurar, f o l.78. It is also possible that owing

to the insurrection of Sa( Td and Sulaiman, the sons of sAbbad, with
the Azd in * Uman, a l-H a jja j feared Y azid and he was very cautious
in removing him from KhurSsan. See ‘ Asakir, V I , pp. 167-68;
A zka w i, Kashf al-Ghum m a a l-J a m M i Akhbar al-U m m a, fol.326a«326b.
Part of the latter work has been translated into English by E .C . Ross,
C alcu tta, 1874. The same part has been edited by Hedwig K lein ,
Hamburg, 1938. The Kashf al-Ghumma was also copied, for the most
part lite ra lly , by another local Historian called S alil ibn Raziq in his
work “History of the imams and Seyyids of *Um an“ , translated and
edited by G . Badger, printed for the Hakluyt Society, M .D C C C L X X L );
English translation, p. 10; K elin , p. 12.
214.
a l-H a jja j removed Y azid because he was embezzeling the treasury of the
1
country. F in a lly , the hostile tradition, which tries to show a l-H a jja j
as superstitous, and connects this with th e dismissal of Y azid has so much of
the flavour of a legend that it is not worth serious consideration.
In order not to arouse Yazid's suspicions that he was to be dismissed,
? 2
a l-H a jja j married Yazid's sister. Another device a l-H a jja j employed in
this connection was when he asked Y azid to come to Wasit* to discuss an
important matter with him, and to leave his weaker brother al-M ufadd al as
3 T
his deputy governor. A fter some hesitation, Y azid submitted to the order
of a U H a jja j and left Khurasan to his brother. The latter reamined for a few
months until O utaiba ibn Muslim a l-B ah ili came to replace him as governor.
Thus we see that the temporary appointment of al-M u fad d al was but a device
used by a l-H a jja j against Y a z id . It was because a l-H a jja j considered Yazid's
position in Khurasan to be not in the interests of the state, that he dismissed
him, not because of the £A§abiyya. A l-H a jja j must also by this time have
realised that his appointment of a l-M u h a lla b and his A zdite supporters had had
the effect of driving the Mudar party into such sharp opposition, that it even
1. T a b ., II, pp. 1143-4 (citing Mada* in i); Ghurar. fols. 7 5 -6 ; A a h .. IX ,

p p .5 5 -6 ; Kam il, IV , p p .4 0 0 -1 ; M ir * a t, V I , fo!52a; i Ibar, II I , pp. 119-20*
2. Ya*qubT, 11,p . 330; K j f f j l , fols. 128a»128b.
3. Y a 'q u b i, II, p . 330; T a b ,, II, p. 1141; K ufi, II, fo l. 128b;

Ghurar, fols. 76-77; Kam il, IV , p .401; M ir * a t , V I , fo l.5 2 a ;
Bidaya, IX , p . 56; 6 Ibar, III, p. 120.
215.
led the Qais to align with the Tamim. H e, therefore, chose another
governor who could be relied on to carry out his policies and yet would
be acceptable to the Mudar - th a t is, G utaiba ibn Muslim. ^
A l-H a jja j is also said to have enouraged the £Asabiyya among
the tribes by inciting the poets against each other, as for example, in the
satirical battle between Jarir and al-Farazdaq. The fact that a l-N a q a ’ Ic!
3
were composed more for entertainment than for political hostility, does not
convince us in favour of al-N uss's thesis, especially since we know that

• •
- 4
Jarir and al-Farazdaq enjoyed an intimate friendship.
Fin ally, it was a l-H a jja j who imprisoned his brother-in-i-Jaw, M a lik
- - t 5
Ibn Asma7 ibn Kharija a l-F a z a ri, for embezzlement. M a lik asked his
father, the Sayyid of Fazara, to use his influence to release him, only to
be met with a refusal because his father dared not petition a l-H a jja j on such
a m atter. This shows $hat it was well known that a l-H a jja j would not respond
to appeals of kinship.
1. Sha£ban, op. c i t . , p. 99.
2 . A l-N u s s , op. c i t . , p . 262.
3. P a if, op. c i t . , pp. 179-80.
4. Ja rir, Pi w an, p p .72, 323, 439; Jumahi, p. 1 0 0 , ‘Iq d , III, p. 145;

Aghf X’lX , pp. 2 4 -9 .
5. A g h ., X V I, p .41 ; Jalis, fols. 8 8 a - 8 8 b.
6 . A g h ., X V I, p .41 .
216.
Al "H ajjaj's system of patronage may well have added to his
unpopularity; it would seem more likely that he upset the Qais for
failing to exercise his powers of patronage on a solely tribal basis, than
that he erred in favouring his own people beyond what was usual at the
time. In many ways it seems he was a man one step in advance of his tim e.
Another characteristic of the policy of * Abd a l-M a lik in choosing
his governors and officials, was that he mainly employed members of the
Northern tribes as governors, while his court officials mostly belonged to
the Southern tribes. Out of fifty six officials whom he employed as
governors during his regime, only five were from the Northern tribes;^
1. H adhif, p p .3 ,7 1 ; Sa‘ d, V , p p .4 1 , 112-13; Z u b airi, p p .82 , 190-1 ,

313, 3 2 8 -9 ; K halifa ibn Khayyat, Tabaqct, p .601; Idem, Tarikh, I,
p p .340, 341, 3 8 1 -3 9 4 ; AzraqT, II, p. 136; Muhabbar, p p .2 3 -5 , 378;
M u g h talin . pp. 176-7; Munammaq, p p .5 0 1 -2 ; Bay an. I, p. 165;
Mahasin, p p .6 3 -4 ; M a f a rif, pp. 155, 156; * Uyun, p. 207; Imama, II,
p. 25 (citing AbH M a ‘ shar), 4 8 -9 ; Futuh , p. 229 (citing WaqidT, 332,
3 3 9 -4 0 0 , 4 1 5 -7 ; Ansab, V , p p .7 9 T 7 5 0 , 160, 1 6 2 -3 , 166, 171 (citing
Mada* in i), 178, 186 (citing Mada* in i), 34 6 -7 (citing al-H aytham );
351 (citing Abu M ikh n af), 354, 373 (citing WaqidT), 374; X I, pp. 17-18
(citing al-Hqythqm)^"3 0 -2 (citing M a d aM n i), 6 8 -9 , 189 (citing
M ada’ in i), 266-7 (citing Abu M ikhnaf and ( Aw ana), 2 6 9-7 0 (citing
M ad aM n i ), 310-11 (citing al-Haytharn); Ya^gubi, II, p p .3 2 4 -5 ; 3 2 6 -7 ,
331, 335; Buldan, p p .6 0 -1 , 8 0 -1 ; Idem, Mushakalat a l-N a s ii
Zamanihim, p. 18; Bahshal, Tarikh W a s it, p .40 (citing i Awana); Nasab,
fols. 3 a -3 b , 13a, 13b,“ l5 b , 17a-17b, 29 a-2 9b , 173a, 185a; Q u j a t T T
pp. 124, 135, 130; T a b ., II, p . 81 6-7 (citing M a d a M n i), 818 (citing
M a d a M n i), 852, 8 5 3 -4 , 855, 859-63 (citing M a d a M n i), 873 , 928
(citing 6 Umar ibn Shabba), 940 (citing W aq id i), 1022 ff. (citing M adah'ni),
1031-32, 1033;*5 (citing Abu M ikhnaf and M a d a M n i), 1039, 1046-7, 1063,
1085, 1127 (citing WaqidT), 1171; K u fi, II, fols. 5Sa-59b, 68b -69a, 7 2 a -
72 b ;flqd, II, p p .7 8 -8 1 ; IV , 304; M u rJ j, V , pp. 266, 2 9 0 -2 ; K indi, I,
p p .4 8 -9 , 55, 58; B ad ', V I , p p .25-7; Agh. , 111, pp. 1 0 0 (citing Mus‘ ab
a l-Z u b a ir l), 1 0 2 -3 7 T 0 7 -8 , 1 10 ( c it in ^ a d a M n l ) , 113; X I I I , p. 56;* =
217.
w hile fifteen out of twenty court officials were from the Southern tribes, ^
This might have been another way of keeping the balance between the two
sides.
= TonukhT, op. c i t . , p p .4 4 -6 ; M arzubani, op. c it . , p p .2 2 7 -8 , 230,

260; Jails, folsT 8 b -9a ; Ghurar, fols. 5 - 7 , 17; Jamharat, pp. 138-9,
178, 234; Bakri, I, p. 55; Sam 'ani, fo l. 64a; ‘ Asahir, 11,p. 131; III,
fols. 177a-177b, I7 9 a -1 7 9 b ; 180a; III, pp. 128-30; IV , p p .5 2 ,8 2 ;
V I I , p p .4 0 - 1 ; Mu< jam, I, p . 326; II, p . 669; I I I , p p .928-3 0; Kamil,
IV , p p .270, 274, 294, 295, 296, 298, 300 , 303 , 308 , 3 3 8 ,”3 6 l 7
362, 364, 367, 374, 382, 411; Us£, I, pp. 117, 258; I I I , p. 135;
M ir* a t , V I , fols. 2a, 3b, 8 a , 8 b, 9 a -1 0 a , 1 4 a-1 5a, 17br 24a, 29a, 40b;
Ibn a l-A b b a r, a l-H u lla t a l-S iy a ra *, pp. 189, 4 6 5 -6 6 ; Zubda, I, p p .4 4 -5 ;
W afayat, I, p p .599, 630; N uw airT, X IX , fo l. 70; Mukhtasar, I, p . 208,
DhahabT, III, pp. 115, 117, 126, 213, 2 3 3 -4 , 241, 310;“ B id ^ a , V I I I ,
pp. 3 1 6 -7 , 326, 347; IX , p p . 2 , 3 , 7 , 9, 15, 2 1 , 22, 3 2 , 52, 61;
4 Ibar, III, p p .81, 9 1 -2 , 93, 1 0 3 -4 , 2 9 2 -5 ; Arab, p p .4 1 , 7 9 , 160,
177, 186, 285, 360, 3 7 2 -4 , 382, 393 , 396; Khitat., II, p .7 1 ;
Tahdhib , I, pp. 371-2; 111, p. 102; V ,p p . 5 -7 ; ^ d d h a r a t, I, p p .7 9 -8 0 ;
K arb ala, M u f jam Qaba* il a l - ‘ Arab, I, p p .2 7 , 4 2 , 60, 125, 148; II,
pp. 622; I IT, pp. 929, 989-90 , 9 9 6 ft . , 1 0 2 f f . , 1 0 7 0 ff., 1192, 1213;
A I - ‘ A ll, Muwazafu Btlad al-Sham fil *Asr a l-U m a w i, p .7 2 , al-A b b atb ,
X IX , 1966;C ask el, Gamharat an-Nasb das Genealogische Werk des
Hisham b. Muhammad a i- K a lb t , I, pp. 1 , 8 , 1 0 , 1 1 , 14, 2 1 , 23, 29,
35, 96, 118, 137, 144, 147 , 236, 352, Leiden, 1966.
1. $ a *d , V , p. 131; K halifa ibn Khayyat, TarTkh I/ p p .3 9 0 , 3 9 4 -6 ;

Idem, Tabaqat, p .792; MuhabBar, p . 373; Ansab, X I , pp. 155, 192-3;
Maia_cJ fo]s. 31b, 32b, 61 b ; “T a b ., I I , p .Z S T p T q d , IV , p. 169;
Jahshiyari, pp. 2 8 ,3 0 -3 ; Masbahir, p. 112; KhuIflnT, p. 109; La/aM f, p . 61;
Jamharat, pp. 224, 393, 395, 405; Khulafa? II, fols. 139a-139b, 140b;
Usd, IV , pp. 191 -2 ; M ir*a t, V I , fo l.3 3 a ; NuwairT, X IX , fo l.7 0 ;.A rab/
p p .42 , 58, 83, 192, 222, 224, 230, 231, 355, 406; l$aba, I, pp. 1072;
H I, 532; TahdhTb, V , p . 85; V I I I , p p .3 6 4 -7 ; Kabbala* op* c i t . , I, p p .3 0 -1 ,
4 9 , 174, 286, 305, 344, 3 6 5 -6 , 388; II , pp.527 7 706; III, p p .84 4, 1260;
A I-Â IT, M aw azafu,B ilfld al-Sham fil ( Asr a l-U m a w i,p p .5 3 -6 1 , al-Abbath
X IX , 1966; Caskel ,op. c ? t.,T , pp. 199,' 208, 24 3, 245, 248. '
218.
The success of ( Abd a l-M a lik 's policy towards the tribes can be
measured by the fact that the last few years of his reign were free from
armed in ter-trib al struggle. He was successful in harnessing tribal feeling
to the interests of the government, at the same time suppressing its violent
manifestations. His successors, however, were less careful in treading this
narrow road between the beneficial and disruptive effects of the tribal
system, and in later years, the rivalries and antipathies of ‘ Asabiyya again
erupted in violent feuds.

219.
CHAPTER IV
THE C IV IL WAR, 67 - 7 3 A .H .
Throughout the twenty-one years of his reign, * Abd a l-M a lik faced
a series of revolts and dissensions, perhaps the most serious of which was
the revolt of ‘ Abdallah ibn a l-Z u b a ir, who had proclaimed himself caliph
on the death of Y azid I in 6 4 /6 8 3 . At the height of his power, he controlled
a l-H ija z and Iraq, as well as receiving at least nominal recognition from
many other provinces of the Empire.^ C ertainly, not until Ibn al-Z u b air's
death in the year 7 3 /6 9 2 , was f Abd a l-M a lik acknowledged as Caliph
throughout the Empire.
4 Abd a l- M a lik , however, was unable to challenge Ibn al-Z u b air's
sway in Iraq and the East before he had secured his position in Syria itself,
the centre of his -authority. There, N a til ibn Qais al-Judhami was
2
occupying Palestine in support of ‘ Abdallah ibn a l-Z u b a ir. * Abd a l-M a lik
succeeded in liquidating N a til in the battle of Ajnadin. Both K halifa ibn
1. As in the case of ‘ Abdallah ibn Khazim al-Sulam i in Khurasan and

Zufar ibn a l-H a rith a l-K ila b i in S a rq is y a *. Ansab, V , p p .305, 350
(citing ‘ Aw an a), fo l. 593b; Futuh, p p .4 1 4 -5 ; Ya'qubT, II, p p .304,
324; Buldan, p. 81; Bad?, V I, p. 27; Khulafd*, 11, fo l. 1 12a; Kamil,
IV , p p .277, 278, 282; Ibar, III, p . 82; Tahdhib, V , p. 195; l§aba,
II, p p .7 3 5 -6 ; M ile s , Some New Light on the History of Kirman, p . 89,
W O I, 1959.
2. Khalifa ibn K hayyat, Tarikjh, I, p . 332 (citing al - Lay th); Ansab,

V , p. 158 (citing M a d a’TnT); Y a ‘ qubT, II, p . 321; M u ru j, V , p p .2 2 4 -5 .
220.
Khayyat and M as'udi ^ state that this battle took place in the same year
as the battle of Khazir, in which 'U b aidallah ibn Ziyad was k ille d . The
date of the battle of K h a zir is given by other sources as 10th Muharram,

2
67/6th August, 6 8 6 ; w hile K halifa dates it as 6 6 /6 8 5 , without specifying
the month. These two dates are not necessarily contradictory, for if the
battles of Ajnadin and Khazir took place at the end of the year 6 6 , in the
month of D h u l-h a jja , the difference between Khalifa's and M as'udi's dates
is as little as ten days, which is not significant.
Another threat to 'A b d a l-M a lik 's position in Syria at this time
came from the Byzantine Emperor, who, encouraged by the political con-
" . . . . 3
fusion of the tim e, sitrred up the Jarajima (Mardaites) against the 'Arabs.
■? 4 . . -
According to Baladhuri, a Byzantine cavalry came into the Amanus district
(Lukam) and penetrated as far as Lebanon. This force was joined by a large
number of Jarajim a, Anbat (Nabateans)and runaway slaves. The caliph
found himself compelled to make a treaty with them, guaranteeing them a
weekly payment of one thousand Dinars. Then, following the precedent of
1. K halifa ibn K h ayyat, Tarikh , i, p .3 3 2 ;M u r u j, V , p . 224.
2. M a 'a r if , p. 152; Dhahabi, II, p . 375; Bidaya, V I I I , p . 283.
3. Futuh , pp. 1 6 0-1 , 188; Ansab, V , p . 299; Y a 'q u b i, II, p .321;

T a b ., II, p .7 9 6 ;M u r u j, V , p. 224; M u 'ja m , II, pp. 3 5 -6 ; Kam il,
!V , p p .250-1; Bughya, fbls. 255 (quoting Baladhuri), 258; Duwal,
I, p .37; Bidaya, V I I I , p .313; Shadharat, I, p .77.
4. Futuh, pp. 160-1 .

221.
M u 'a w iy y a , he offered peace terms to the emperor.
The contents of the treaty between them are preserved only by
the Christian sources. According to this treaty, the caliph agreed to
pay 3 6 5 ,0 0 0 gold pieces, 365 slaves and 365 thoroughbred horses; he had
also to surrender half of the tribute from Cyprus, Armenia and Iberia. In
return, the emperor Justinian If agreed to withdraw the M ardaites, and he
recalled 12,000 of them to be settled in Byzantine territory. ^ It is interest
ing to note here that the Christian sources reproach the emperor for denuding
the frontiers in this way.
Following the account af Baladhuri, after signing the treaty, 'A bd
a l- M a lik sent one of his trusted men, Suhaim ibn a l-M u h a jir, to the
Byzantine officer commanding the Jarajim a. Suhaim succeeded in
winning his confidence by pretending to take his part against the caliph.
Then Suhaim used his troops, which he had hidden, to make a surprise
attack, killin g the officer and his Greek followers. As for the Jarajim a,
they were guaranteed Aman; some went away and settled in the villages
of Hims and Damascus, w hile the majority of them went back to the Amanus;
the Anbat returned to their villages and the slaves to their masters, while
1. Theophanes, Chronographia, 6176, M ig n e, 1857; Constantine

Perphyrogentus, De Administrando fmperio, pp. 9 3 -5 , ed. G y .
Moravcsik and translated by R .J. H. Jenkins, Budapest, 1949;
M ichael the Syrian, Chronique, II, pp. 4 6 9 -7 0 ; Ibn a l - ' Ibri
(Bar Hebraeus), Chronographia, I, p. 103; E. I. (Djarqdjima).
222.
others entered the caliph's service, ^
Here again, cs in most of the events of this period, no definite
date is given for the Mardaites' raids or the treaty. Baladhuri, Theophanes,
Constantine Perphygrogentus, M ichael the Syrian, Ibn a l-'A d im , Ibn a l -
? T2 .
' Ibri and Dhahabi date them after the death of Marwan ibn al-H akam and
the accession of 'A b d a l-M a lik to the caliphate, in the time of political
« - « » 3
turmoil. Both Y a'q u b i and M as'udi refer to the same date when they
place these events along with the rebellion of N a til ibn Q ais in 6 6 /6 8 5 .
Another account without any chain of authority in Tabari, repeated by
T t - 4
Ibn a l-A th ir , Ibn Kathir and ibn a U ' Imad, gives the year as 7 0 /6 8 9 .
Finally, another report found in Ibn a l-A th ir puts this Byzantine threat in
the year 6 9 /6 8 8 , to coincide with the revolt of 'Am r ibn S a 'id al-Ashdaq
5
in Damascus. O f all these different dates, it would seem that the period
6 5 -6 6 /6 8 4 -5 is the most lik e ly , in that troubled period before 'Abd a l-
M a lik secured his succession; the narratives which give other dates are
either less detailed and without a chain of authority (Xabari's) or without
confirmation in the early sources (Ibn a l-A th ir's ).
1. Futuh , pp. 1 6 0-1 .
Fi’frub/ pp. 1 6 0 -1 , 188; Chronographia, 6176; De Administrando Imperio,

p . 93; Chronique, II, 469; Bughya, fols", 25 5 -6 (quoting Baladhuri);
Chronographia, I, p. 103; Duwal, I, p . 37.
3. Y a 'q u b i, II, p. 3 2 1 ;M u ru j, V , p . 225.
4. T a b ., II, p .796; K a m il, IV , p . 251; Didaya, V I I , p . 313; Shadharat, I,

p .77.
5. K am il, IV , p p .250 - 1 .
223.
It was these troubles which 'A b d a l-M a lik faced at home that
prevented him from interfering in the war between M u s 'a b ibn a l-Z u b a ir
and al-M u kh tar ibn Abi 'U b a id al-Thaqafi in 6 7 /6 8 6 . M oreover, 'A b d a l-
M a lik may w ell have thought it wiser to let his enemies fight each other and
so weaken themselves. Welihausen^ has argued that the reason for 'A b d
a l- M a lik ’s neutrality in this conflict was due to the famine that struck Syria
in 6 8 /6 8 7 ; this, however, is incorrect, since the famine occurred a year
2
after the war between Mus 'a b and al-M u k h ta r. ' On the other hand,
M u s 'a b himself was too busy fighting other enemies, such as the S h i'a in
Kufa and the Khawarif in Basra, to take the offensive against 'A b d a l-
M a lik . Therefore, any conflict between the two was delayed.
As soon as he was free from troubles at hom ^,'A bd al-jVtalik launched
an attack on M u s 'a b , advancing until he reached But nan Habib in the district
• * •
of Q in a s rin , where he made his camp. M u s 'a b consequently left Kufa and
made his camp in Bajumaira near Takrit. These choices of camp headquarters
were not without significance. Apart from the fact that both were boundary
stations on the road from Syria to Iraq, there were other, more important
1. Welihausen, The Arab Kingdom and its F a ll, p. 187.
2. K halifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, I, p . 335 (citing a l-L a y th ); T a b ., II,

p .765; KamiTT"IV , p . 236; Bidaya, V I I I , p . 294, (quoting Tabari).
reasons for their ch oice:- But nan Habib and the neighbouring Q inasrin
were inhabited by the Banu 'Abs ibn Baghid, with whom 'A b d a l-M a lik
1
had a marriage a llian c e. On the other hand, M us'ab may w ell have
chosen Bajumaira on the Euphrates because of its proximity to the
Qarqisya* area, where Zufar ibn al-H a rith a l-K ila b i adhered to him
2
and opposed 'A b d a l-M a lik .
The first march of 'A b d a l-M a lik against M us'ab was in the summer
3
of 6 9 -7 0 /6 8 9 . However, 'A b d a l-M a lik had to leave Butnan and return
to Damascus, to deal with the revolt of one of his kinsmen, ' Amr ibn S a'id
ibn a l- 'A s , nicknamed al-Ashdaq. 'Am r's revolt was to establish his
claim to the caliphate, which had been acknowledged at the treaty of
1- Nasab, fo l. 35a; Jamharat, p p *239-40; Buahya, fo l. 471 (quoting

Muhammad ibn Ahmad a l-A z d i, al-N assaba).
* 9
2. See Chapter III, pp. / i 7
3. K halifa ibn Khayyat, T a rik h , I, p . 336 (citing a l-L ay th ); T a b ., I I ,

pp. 783 (citing WaqidT), 784 (citing ' Awana); Kam il, IV , p . 250;
N u w a iri, X IX , fols. 8 9 -9 0 ; Dhahabi, II, p p .3 8 3 -4 ;( Bidaya, V I I I ,
p .307. As for the account in J a b ., (II, p .76 5 ), repeated by Ibn a l-
AthTr, (Kam il, IV , p .236), which says that 'A b d a l-M a lik and his
army camped in Butndm Habib in 6 8 /6 8 7 , it seems, as Welihausen
justly observed, that "it contradicts the preceding account, that at
that year 'A bd a l-M a lik did not take the fie ld , because of the
fam ine". The Arab Kingdom and its F a ll, p. 188.
a l-J a b iy a ; Marwan had then broken his fa ith , by appointing his two
sons as his successors. Our information on ‘ Amr's revolt comes from the
narrative of W aqidi in Ibn Sa( d , repeated by Ibn ‘ Asakir and Dhahabi,^
the narrative of Abu M ikhnaf in Baladhuri, repeated by Tabari and Ibn a l -

- 2 .
A th ir, and that of ‘ Awana in Tabari, repeated by Ibn a l-A th jr, a l-N u w a iri,
*? - 3
Ibn Kathir and Ibn Khaldun. There are also other accounts which are mainly
compilations of these three main narratives. The narratives not only
disagree on the date of the revolt, but also emphasise different aspects of
it. W hile 6Awana is interested in the way that ‘ Amr was k ille d , Abu
M ikhn af endeavours to explain why ‘ Amr so easily succeeded in taking
Damascus. W aqidi passes over the agreement between * ‘ Abd a l-M a lik and
* Amr before the letter's submission, it is therefore only by putting a ll the
accounts together that one can form a satisfactory picture of this revolt.
According to Ibn Sa‘ d , M us*ab a l-Z u b a iri, Baladhuri, Tabari,
Ghurar al Siyar, Ibn ‘ Abd Rabbih, Ibn ‘ Asakir, Ibn a l-A th ir N uw airi and
Dhahabi, ‘ Amr ibn Sa‘ id was with ‘ Abd a l-M a lik when he marched from
Damascus against M u s‘ ab ibn a l-Z u b a ir in Iraq. On the way there, ‘ Amr
reminded ( Abd a l-M a lik of Marwan's promise that he should succeed him, and
1. Sa‘ d, V , pp. 168-9; 6Asakir, X III , fo l. 230b; Dhahabi, III, p p .5 8 -9 .
2. Ansab, IV , i i , pp. 138-40; T a b ., II, p .782; Kam il, IV , p . 250.

Ili u m ! nHi | « ■■■■< I iitaM
3. T a b ., II, p. 2 8 3 ff.; Kam il, IV , p .2 4 5 ff.; N u w a iri, X IX , fo l. 89ff;

Bidaya, V I I I , p .3 0 7 ffT T n b a r, II I , p .7 2 ff.
asked <Abd a l-M a lik to name him as successor on his own death, in honour
of his father's promise. ‘ Abd a l-M a lik paid no heed to ‘ Amr's claim . As
a result, ‘ Amr, accompanied by some of his followers, deserted ‘ Abd al
M a lik 's camp at night and went to Damascus.^ Another account, given
- - - — - - 2
by Y a ‘ qubi, Tabari, Ibn a l-A th ir, N u w airi, Ibn Kathir and Ibn Khaldun,
says that the desertion of ‘ Amr from ‘ Abd a l-M a lik 's army occurred when
the latter was going to fight Zufar ibn a l-H a rith a l-K ila b i in G arqisya*,
not in his campaign against Mus‘ ab. ‘ Abd a l-M a lik besieged ‘ Amr in
3
Damascus for sixteen days, during which time negotiations and correspondence
1. Sa‘ d, V , pp. 168-9 (citing W aqidi); Z u b airi, pp. 178-9; Ansab, IV , it,
pp. 138-40 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); T a b ., I I , p .784; G hurar, fols. 7 -8 ;
‘ Iqd, IV , p p .4 0 7 -9 (citing Abu M a ‘ shar); ‘ Asakir, X I I I , fo l. 230b
(quoting lb n S a‘ d); Kam il, IV , p . 250; N u w a iri, X IX , fo l. 95; Dhahabi,
III, p p .5 7 -9 (quoting Ibn Sa‘ d).
2. Y a ‘ qubi, 11, p p .3 2 1 -3 ; T a b ., II, p .783 (citing ‘ Awana); K am il, IV ,

p p .2 4 5 -6 ; N u w a iri, X IX , fols. 8 9 -9 2 ; Bidaya, V I I I , p p .3 0 7 -8 ; ‘ Ibar,
III , p p .7 2 -5 . As for the account which says that ‘ Abd a l-M a lik left
‘ Amr ibn Sa‘ id in Damascus as his deputy, when he went to fight
M u s‘ ab ibn a l-Z u b a ir, this seems unlikely since ‘ Abd a l-M a lik knew
very w ell how ambitious his rival was. Their rivalry went back to
their early years. Imcma, II , p . 20 (citing Abu M a ‘ shar); T a b ., II,
p .783 (citing W aqidt); M u ru j, V , pp. 2 3 3 -5 ; M arzubant, op. c i t . ,
p . 231; K am il, IV, p. 250; E. 1 . (‘ Amr ibn Sa‘ Td al—AshdagJI
3. Sa‘ d, V , pp. 168-9 (citing W aqidi) ‘ Asakir, X I I I , fo l.2 3 0 b (quoting

Ibn Sa‘ d); Dhahabi, ill, p p .5 7 -9 (quoting Ibn Sa‘ d ). According
to Abu M a ‘ sTiar (Imama, II, p .20), the siege lasted for more than
one month.
227.
took place between them, which brought about the submission of * Amr, and
( Abd a l-M a lik re-entered the c ity . Unfortunately, our sources do not
preserve for us a complete version of the terms of the agreement between
eAmr and f Abd a l-M a lik . However, the following terms can be gathered
from the fragments that do occur in the sources:- £Amr would succeed ‘ Abd
a l-M a lik to the caiiphate; ‘ Amr would be put in charge of the treasury
and the Diwans, and would appoint one official for each one appointed by
2
‘ Abd a l-M a lik ; and the caliph would consult i Amr in all decisions . Such
a division of responsibility at the head of power was hardly p o litic a lly feasible,
and ( Abd a l-M a lik decided to remove the threat of ‘ Amr once and for all -
according to tradition, ‘ Amr was invited to the palace and killed by f Abd
3
a l-M a lik 's own hands.
M ughtalin, p . 205; Bayart, I I I , p p .229-30; Ansab, IV , i i , pp. 138-40

(citing Abu M ikhnaf); Y a ^ u b T , II , p p .3 2 1 -3 ; Ghurar, fols. 7 -8 ;
M u ru j, V , p .234; f A sa kir, X II I, fo l.23 0b (quoting K halifa); Kam il,
IV , p . 246; N u w a iri, X IX , fo l. 89ff; Dhahabi, I I I , p p . 5 7 -9 ; Bidaya,
V I I I , p p .3 0 7 -8 ; 3 1 1-1 2; ‘ Ibar, 111,p p .7 3 -4 ; Shadharat, I, p . 77.
2. K halifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, I, p. 263; iViughtalin, p. 205; Imama, II,

pp. 13-20; Ansab, IV , i i , p. 138ff. (citing Abu M ikhn af); DTnawar'f,
p .294; Y a ‘ qubi, II, p .322; T a b ., I I, p p .793 (citing ‘ Awana), 875
(citing ‘ Awana); Ghurar, fols. 7 -8 ; ‘ Iqd, I, pp. 92 (citing M a d a’ im )
IV , p . 408 (citing Abu M a ‘ shar); M u ru j, V , pp. 2 3 4 -5 ; eAsakir, X I I I ,
f o l.230 (quoting K halifa); Kam il, IV , p p .2 4 5 -6 ; Dhahabi, III, p p .5 8 -9 ;
Bidaya, V I I I , p p .3 5 7 -8 , 3 l2 7 1 hadharat, I, p.77.—
3. ^9‘ cl/ V , p. 169 (citing W aqidi); Z u b airi, p. 179; K halifa ibn Khayyat,
Tarikh, I, p . 263; M u g h talin , p . 205, Kitab a l-T a j, p . 6 6 ; D inaw arf,pp.
29 4 -5 ; Y a ‘ qub7, II, p p .3 2 2 -3 ; T a b ., I I , p p .8 9 1 -2 (citing ‘ Awana);
Ghurar, fo l. 8 -9 ; Mqd, IV , p p .4 0 8 -9 (citing AbtJ M a ‘ shar); iViuruj, V ,
p p .2 3 7 -9 ; ( Asakir, X III,fo ls . 227a, 230b (quoting K h a lifa ), 230b
(quoting Ibn Sa‘ d); Kam il, IV , p p .2 4 8-9 ; Sharh , IX , p. 119; Nuvyxiiri,
X IX , fols 9 2 -4 ; Dhahabt, III , p p .5 7 -9 (quoting Ibn S a ‘d and K halifa);
The murder of ‘ Amr left a stigma on ‘ Abd a l- M a lik (s name, used
by the hostile tradition to condemn him, with no consideration of any of
his achievements. One can argue, however, that ‘ Abd a l-M a lik had some
justification for killin g ‘ Amr. In this troubled time of p o litical confusion,
there was no room for ambitious men of the ruling fam ily to put forward
claims that undermined the unity of the Umayyad fam ily and the security of
the Empire: ‘ Amr's murder was "pour encourager les autres". M oreover,
had ‘ Amr lived to succeed in his bid for power, he would surely have had to
k ill ‘ Abd a l-M a lik .
‘ Abd a l-M a lik cast ‘ Amr's head to the crowd, together with a large
sum of money: the people fe ll on the money, paying no attention to the
2
severed head. In this w ay, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik succeeded in diverting the
attention of the people from the killing of ‘ Amr. At the same tim e, he
ordered an announcement to be made. It is reported in the al-Im am a w ai
.. - 3
Siyasa that when the head and the money were thrown to the crowd, one of
1. K halifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh^, I, p .263; D inaw ari, p . 294; T a b ., II,

p .795 (citingtA w ana); G hurar, fo l. 9; Kam il, IV , p . 250; Nahaya,
II, p .46; NuwairT, X IX , f o l . 94; Dhahabi, II I, p . 59; Bidaya, V I I I ,
p .310; ‘ Ibar, II I , p .7 5 . —
2. Imama, I I , p p .21 - 2 (citing A b u M a ‘ shar); Ansab, IV , i i , p. 139 (citing

Abu M ikhn af); DinawarT, p . 295; Y a ‘ qubi, II, pi 323; T a b ., I I , p .791
(citing ‘ Awana); Ghurar, f o l . 9; ‘ Iqd, IV , p .409 (citing Abu M a ‘ shar);
M u ru j, V , p . 339; Ibn HamdCfn, Tadhkira, I, fo l. 6 6 b; K am il, IV , p p .2 4 8 -
9; N u w a iri, X IX , fo l. 93; Bidaya, V lll,p .3 0 9 ; ‘ Ib a r, III, p p .7 4 -5 .
mm
3. Imama, II, p p .2 1 -2 (citing Abu M a ‘ shar).

229.
‘ Abd a l- M a lik ‘s men made the public announcement, that "Your man was
killed by the caliph according to the Qadar of A lla h , which no one can
prevent , 11 and urged the people to keep quiet,promising them material
rewards, to which they agreed. Two important points emerge from this
announcement: the first is that the caliph, i .e . the S tate, held to the
doctrine of Q adar (predestination) and used it in the p o litical sphere as
a means of silencing opposition to the regime. This point has been made
1
clearly by Ibn Q u taib a, when he described how government officials pointed
to the doctrine, in justification for their acts of tyranny. The second
important point is that there were a considerable number of people, at least
in Damascus, who believed in this Qadar doctrine. Both of these points
are borne out by the evidence of a letter sent by ‘ Abd a l-M a lik to al-Hasan
ibn A b i11 Hasan al-Basri concerning this doctrine.^
Once again we face problems of chronology, for more than one date
r 3
is given for ‘ Amr's revolt. Tabari, Ibn a l-A th ir and other late sources give
the year 6 9 /6 8 8 . On the other hand, K halifa Ibn K h ayyat, Y a ‘ qubi, Mas‘ udi,
M a ‘ a rif, p . 195. According to al-D hahabi (Tarikh, III, p . 1 2 8 ) ‘ Abd

a l-M a lik hung M a ‘badal-Ju han i, because he refused to believe in the
doctrine of "Q adar” .
2. Risalat M ukatabat ‘ Abd a l-M a lik ibn Marwan W al Hasan ibn AbiM-Hasan
al-BasrT, fols. 1-13; Ritter, Studien Zur Geschichte der Islamischen
Frommigkeit, p p .6 6 -8 2 , D l, X X I, 1933; Obermann, Political Theory
in Early Islam, pp. 132-6 2, JO A S , 55, 1935; Schwarz, The letter of al -
Hasan al-BasrT, pp. 1 5 -3 0 , Oriens, X X , 1967; M urtada, pp. 19-20;
Jarir, D iw an, p p .380, 474.
3. T a b ., I I , p p .783 (citing WaqidT), 783 (citing ‘ Awana); ‘ Asakir, X II I,
fo l, 231a (citing IbnS allam ); K a m il, IV , p . 245; N u w a iri, X IX , f o l . 89;
Dhahabi, I I I , p .59 (quoting al-L ayth ); Bidaya, V I I I , p .307; TahdhTb, V I I I ,
p .38 (citing al-L a y th ).
230*
Ibn ‘ Asakir, Ibn aMAdim, D hahabi, Ibn Hajar and Ibn a l- * lmad/ ^
2
mention the year 7 0 /6 8 9 , Moreover, a third group of sources place the
desertion of * Amr from ‘ Abd a l-M a lik 's army in the year 69, and his
death in. 70 , This account seems to be the most convincing, for according
to the Muslim calendar, "the turn of the year then fe ll in the summer", and the
m ilitary activities, which ceased in w inter, would therefore be spread over
3 - T ?
two Muslim years. W aqidi in Tabari, and * Awana state that * Amr left
the camp of ‘ Abd a l-M a lik and returned to Damascus in 6 9 /6 8 8 ; w hile Mas‘ udi
4
specifically states that * Amr was killed in the year 7 0 , The argument in
favour of these events covering a period of two years is strengthened by the
consideration that ‘ Abd a l-M a lik had reached as far as Butnan Habib in the
• •
5
summer of 6 9 -7 0 /6 8 9 on his march against Mus ‘ ab, before he was forced to
return to Damascus to deal with ‘ Amr's revolt; these journeys would certainly
take a considerable time.
The revolt of ‘ Amr and his death occupied the whole summer and ‘ Abd
a l-M a lik spent the rest of the year 7 0 /6 8 9 in the capital re-establishing his
au tho rity.^ The next year, 7 0 -7 1 /6 9 0 , the campaign against M u s ‘ ab was
1. Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, I, p . 263; Y a ‘ qubi, II, p. 323; Murup, V ,

p .233; ‘ Asakir, X IIt , fo l.2 3 0 b (quoting K h alifa); Bughya, foK 256 (quoting
BaiadhurT); Dhahabi, III , p . 58 (quoting K h a irfa ); TafidhTb, III, p .38;
Shadharat, I, p . 77.
2. T a b ., II, p . 796 (citing WaqidT); Bidaya, V I I I , p . 310 (citing W aqidi);

TahdhTb, ill, p .38.
3. Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom and its F a ll, p, 187.
4. T a b ., II, p .7 8 3 ; M u ru j, V , p . 233.
5. See Z 2* ■
6 . Sa‘ d, V , p. 169 (citing W aqidi); K halifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, I, p . 262

(citing a l-L ay th ); M u ru j, V , p . 240.
231.
resumed and ‘ Abd a l-M a lik with his army once again marched as far as
Butnan Habib. M u s ‘ ab was waiting for him in Bajumaira where he had
made his camp. Winter came on before the two reached each other and no
battle took place, since they both turned back home.
However, taking advantage of M u §‘ ab's absence from Basra, ‘ Abd
a l-M a lik tried to instigate a tribal revolt there in his favour. Our information
about this event comes mainly from Abu ‘ Ubaida, Mada* ini and Abu M ikhnaf
found in Baladhuri and Tabari, There are only minor differences in these
accounts, and on the whole they re-inforce each other. There are another
two accounts, one of Wahab ibn Jarir in Baladhuri, and one of Sha‘ bi in
al-Futub of Ibn A ‘ tham; these are brief and without details, although they
broadly agree with the three accounts before mentioned. Both Ibn a l-A th ir
and N u w a iri, however, had restricted themselves to the account of MadaMni
alone.
According to Abu ‘ Ubaida, Abu M ikhn af, Wahab i*bn Jarir and al -
- 2 -
Sha‘ bi, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik began by writing to his supporters (sh i ‘ a) in Basra,
1. Naqa* id , II, p. 1091; Ansab, V , p .336 (citing ‘ Awana); T a b ., II,

p .797; K ufi, II, fo l.4 8 a (citing a l - 5 ha‘ bT); Agh . , X V II, p. 162
(citing M a d a’ inT); ‘Asakir, X V I, foT7266b (quoting K h alifa); M u ‘ jam,
I, p .454; Bidaya, V I I I , p .3 1 5 . ~
2. Naqa’ icj, II, pp. 1090-91; Ansab, IV , i i , pp. 155 (citing Abu M ikhn af),
157 (citing Wahab ibn Jarir); Kuff, II, fo l.4 8 a (citing a!-S ha‘ bt).
232.
promising them lavish rewards if they would support his cause against
M u s‘ ab. Finding an encouraging response to this offer, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik
sent Khalid ibn ‘ Abdallah ibn Khalid ibn Asid to seize Basra for him.
- 1
Mada* ini and M u s ‘ ab a l-Z u b a iri, however, do not mention this cor-
respondence, and they say that Khalid himself suggested to the caliph
that he should send him to Basra to seize the town for him, and that ‘ Abd
a l-M a lik agreed to this. Khalid went to Basra secretly with his mawafi
and retainers, and took refuge with one of the Ashraf of Bahila tribe,
probably because of its w ell-known Umayyad sympathy. However, this
man found himself unable to protect Khalid against the forces of the
governor and advised him to seek the help of M a lik ibn M i sma‘ , the head
2 -
of the Bakr tribe. M a lik was one of those mentioned in other sources, to
whom ‘ Abd a l-M a lik had w ritten, and he took Khalid into his Jiwar (protection).
Soon Ziyad i.bn ‘ Amr a l - ‘ A tk i, the chief of the A zd, came to their aid ,
T 3
mainly due to the H ?If between Rabi‘ a and a I-A z d . Members of the tribes
of Thaqif, Tamim, ‘ Abd a l-G a is and Sadus are also said to have joined
— 4
the side of K halid. On the other hand, we find the majority of the Zubairid
N aqa3 id , I I , p .749; Z u bairi, p. 189; Ansab, IV , ii, p. 159; J a b ., II,

p .798; Kam il, IV , p . 252; N u w a iri, X IX , f o l . 68.
2. Ansab, IV , i i , 0 0 .1 5 6 (citing Abu M ikh n af), 159 (citing Mada* in i);

T a b ., II, p .798 (citing Mada* in i); K am il, IV , p . 252; NuwairT, X IX ,
fo l. 68. It is also reported that Khalid directly went to M a lik ibn Miisma ‘
and no mention of that Bah i i i te Sharffhas been given. Nag a* i<j, II,
p. 1061; ZubairT, p. 189; Ansab,"IV , i i , p. 158.
3. N aqa’ id., II, p .729; Ansab, IV , ii,p p . 105-6 (citing M ada?ini and Abu
‘ Ubaida); T a b ., II, p .446 (citing Abu ‘ Ubaida).
4. Farazdaq, PTwan, II, p. 57; ZubairT, p. 189; Naga* id / H/ PP* 7 4 9 -5 0 ,
1091-2; Ansab, IV , i i , p p .156 (citing Abu M ik h n af), 157-8 (citing 2
233.
front was drawn from the Mudarites, headed by ‘ Umar ibn ‘ Ubaidallah
ibn M a ‘ mar al~Makhzum i, M u s‘ .ab's governor of Basra. However, it is
clear that th e‘Asabiyya played only a small role in this rising, since
members from the same tribe fought each other on different sides. Abu
‘ Ubaida and Wahab ibn Jarir^ state this clearly. The main reason for the
support received by the Umayyad front would appear to be the monetary
2
rewards that they offered their adherents.
The two parties met in a battle in a place called a l-J u fra in the
district of a l-M irb a d , which gave its name to the supporters of K halid,
3
"Jufriyya". The fighting between them, according to one accoutit, lasted
for forty days, according to another,^ only twenty-four days. Hearing of the
battle, M u s ‘ absent Zuhr ibn Qais a l-J u ‘ f i , with a thousand horsemen, to
5
help Ibn M a ‘ mar. ‘ Abd a l-M a lik , on the other hand sent ‘ Ubaidallah
ibn Ziyad i.bn Zabian, whose brother had been killed by M u s ‘ ab, with a
• *
Wahab ibn Ja rir), 160 (citing Mada* in i); J a b ., I I , p . 799 (citing

M ada* inT); BakriJ II, p . 387; Kam il, IV , p . 252; N u w a iri, X IX , fo ls .6 8 -9 .
1. Naga* icl/ 11, pp. 1091-2; Ansab,. IV , i i , p. 158.
2. Ansab, V , p p .332 (citing Wahab ibn Ja rir), 3 4 4 -5 ; X I, p. 14 (citing

MadcT inT); fols. 499b-500a (citing M a d ? inT); a l - ‘ AIT, A I-Tanzim at
a l-ljtim a ‘ iyya wal Iqtiâdiyya fil Basra fil Qarn al-A w w al a l- H ijr t , p. 108,
Baghdad, 191953. “ “
3. Naqa* id, H, p. 1092.
Naga* id , II, p . 750 (citing Mada* in i); Ansab, IV , i i , p. 116 (citing
Mads ?inT); T a b ., II, p. 800 (citing M ada‘ inT); K am il, IV ,p .2 52 ;
N u w a iri, X IX , f o l. 69.
l^qcl ^ d , II, p. 1092; who adds another thousand men sent by Mus’ ab to
the help of Ibn M a ‘ m ar;Ansab, IV , ii, p. 161 (citing Mada* inT); T a b ., II,
p. 800 (citing Mada* inT); Kuff, II, fo l.4 8 b (here it is presented that one
thousand men were sent by boat);K am il, IV , p . 252; N u w airi, X IX , fo ls .6 8 -9 .
234.
Syrian army to help K halid, but he arrived too iate.^ Thus the balance
of the battle turned to Mus‘ ab's favour. However, soon the two sides
entered into negotiations which resulted in the Aman for Khalid and those
who supported him; it was agreed that Khalid should leave Basra, which he
did and returned to Damascus, to join ‘ Abd a l-M a lik . Fearing Mus‘ ab?s
punishment, M a lik ibn M ism a‘ left Basra for al-Yam am a after losing one
2
of his eyes in the battle. Mus ‘ab tried in vain to reach Basra before Khalid
and his followers left it. Nevertheless, he inflicted a severe punishment
3
on those who remained in the c ity .
According to M a d a ’ ini and al-M ubarrad, the rising of al-Ju fra w as in
- . - 5
the year 7 0 /6 8 9 . This date is also given by Abu M ikhnaf in Baladhuri, when
he says that it was at the same time as ‘ Amr ibn Sa‘ id's revolt in Damascus,
- 6
i . e . 6 9 -7 0 /6 8 9 . Wahab ibn Jarir may well be agreeing with them in giving
the year 69, for he might, like Abu M ikhnaf, have meant the summer of
- -7
6 9 -7 0 /6 8 9 . However, aI-S am ‘ ani is certainly wrong when he gives the year
1. Ansab, IV , ii, pp. 156(citing Abu M ikh n af), 161 (citing Mada* ini);
Tqb , , 11, p. 800 (citing Mad a* inT); Kami I , IV , p. 252; N u w a iri, X IX , fo l. 69.
2. Farazdaq, Diwan, II, p. 57; N aq a’ id, II, pp.750(citing Mada* in i), 1092;
ZubairT, p. 189; Ansab, IV , ii, pp. 156-7 (citing Abu M ikh n af), 157
(citing Wahab ibn JarTr), 161 (citing Mada* inT); Mubarrad, I, p. 131;
T a b ., I I , pp. 800-1 (citing MadaMnT); Bakri, 11, p . 387; Samzan7,
fo l. 132a; Kami I, IV , p . 253; NuwairT, X IX , fo ls .6 9 -7 0 .
3. Ansab, IV , H , pp. 162-3; T a b ., II , p p .80 1 -3 (citing M a d a ^ n i); Kuft,

ll, fols. 48b, 49a, 49b; Kam il, IV , p .253; NuwairT, X IX , fo ls .6 9 -7 0 .
4. NaqSM d, II, p. 749 (citing Mada* in i); Mubarrad, I, p . l3 1 ; T a b . , II , p .798

(citing Mada* in i); Kam il, IV , p. 252; N u w a iri, X IX , f o l.68.
5. Ansab, IV , i i , p . 157(citing AbuM ikh n af).
6. Ib id ., IV , ii, p. 157.
7. Ansab, fo l. 132a.
235.
7 3 /6 9 2 , for Mu$‘ ab himself was killed in the year 7 2 /6 9 1 .
‘ Abd a l-M a lik spent most of the summer 7 1 -7 2 /6 9 1 in subduing the
insurrection of Zufar ibn al-H a rith a l-K ila b i and the Qaisites who were
■? - - . 1
holding out in Qarqisya* since the battle of M arj R ahit. When he had
pacified this area, he marched on N asibin (Nisibis), where about two
thousand of the Khashabiyya, a remnant of al-M ukhtar's followers, were
still unsubmissive. On being offered the Aman , they surrendered and
2
were enrolled in the army of the caliph.
Now came the time for the third and last decisive encounter
with M u s ‘ ab: ‘ Abd a l-M a lik set out with a large army from Damascus and
made his camp in Maskin. When Mus‘ ab heard of this advance against him,
H u ^3
he left Kufa to fight ‘ Abd a l-M a lik , stationing himself at Bajumaira.
The battle between them took place in Dair a l-J a th liq , (monastry of
Catholics), between Maskin and Bajumaira.
The time preceeding the battle was not wasted by ‘ Abd a l-M a lik ;
he wrote to the tribal chiefs among Mus‘ ab's followers, promising fhfety
1. See Chapter 111, p.
2. M u ru j, V , p .2 4 1 ; Agh., V , p. 155; V I I I , p . 33; X I , p .4 7 .
3. Sa‘ d , V , p. 169;(citing W aqidi); M a ^ a rif, p. 156; Ansab, V , p p .335

(citing ‘ Awana), 332 (citing Wahab ibn JarTr); DinawarT, p . 316; T a b .,
II, p p .8 0 4 -5 (citing WaqidT), 804 (citing Mada* inT); KufT, II, fo l.5 0 b ,
where troops from Egypt are said to have been with ‘ Abd a l-M a lik ; ‘ Iqd,
IV , p .410; 65 V , p . 242, here also there is mention of Egyptian
troops; TanbTh/ pi 313; Bad*, V I , p. 23; A g h ., X V II, pp. 161-2 (citing
Mada* irtf)7 ‘ Asakir, X V I, fo l. 217a; K am il, IV , pp. 2 6 3 -4 ; Dhahabt,
III,p . 108; Bidaya, V I I I , p . 3 1 4 ; ‘ lbar, III, p .76.
236.
them governorships and money rewards if they would betray Mus‘ ab. ^
Many of the discontented among them had already written to ‘ Abd a l-
- 2
M a lik offering him their support in return for the governorship of Isbahan.
Moreover, by killing six thousand men from among the followers of a l -
M ukhtar, Mus‘ ab had made enemies, not only of their relatives, but also
- . o 3
of most of the Kufans, who disapproved of this act of savagery. The
Basrans also, especially those who had taken part in the rising of a l-J u fra ,
never forgot the humiliating punishment Mus‘ ab had inflicted on those who had
■? 4
supported Khalid ibn ‘ Abdallah ibn Asid. Therefore, Mus‘ ab had alienated
■1 •
both peoples by his cruel behaviour. To these factors, one might add the
insubordinate nature of the tribesmen in Iraq, and their tradition of frequently
shifting their allegiance, which also worked against Mus‘ ab. Mus‘ ab seems
* .
to have been aware of his isolation and tried to get the loyalty of the Basrans
1. Imama, II, p . 23; Ansab, V , p p .337 (citing ‘ Awana), 340 (citing a l -

Haytham), 344 (citing Mada* inT); X I, p p . l , 6ff, (citing al-H aytham ),
1 1 -1 3 , 13-14 (citing M ada’ m i), 27; DTnawari, p p .3 1 7-1 8; Y a ‘ qub7,
II, p p .3 1 7 -1 8 ; T a b ., I I , p p .804 (citing M ada’ in i), 804 (citing
WaqidT); ‘ Iqd, IV , p .410; 25 V..~. V , p. 243; A gh. , X V II, p. 162 (citing
M ada’ in T )/K a m iI, IV , p . 265; Dhahabi, I I I , p. 108; Bidaya, V I I I ,
p . 3 1 4 ; ‘ lbar, 111, p .77 ; Shqdharat, I, p . 79.
2. Ansab, IV , i i , p p .157-8; V , p p .332,-333 (citing Wahab ibn Ja rir),

3 3 5 ,3 5 1 ; Agh . , X V II, p. 161 (citing M a d a’ inT)>.X, p. 9 4 ; ‘ Asakir,
X V I, f o l . 271 a; K a m il, IV , p .264; Mukhtagar, I, p. 207; ‘ Ibar, III, p .76.
3. Ansab, V , p p .2 6 2 -3 ; D inaw ari, p .315; T a b ., I I , p p .7 4 0 -1 , 7 4 9 -5 0

(citing M adaM ni); KufT, I I , fo l.3 1 a ; ‘ Asakir, X V I, fo l.2 7 a (citing
‘ Abdallah ibn abF Rabi‘ a al-M akhzum i); K a m il, IV , p . 225; E. 1. ,
(Mus‘»
ab ibn a l-Z u b a ir).
4. See p. 23*+
237.
by giving them the ‘ Ata* twice a year, but without avail. ^ In vain also
2
were the warnings of ai-A h n af ibn Q ais, the Tamimite ch ief, and Qats
*
ibn al-Haytham al-S u lam i, not to let the hungry Syrians get into their rich
Iraqi land. When Mus( ab asked the Basrans to fight with him against ‘ Abd
a l-M a lik and the Syrians, they showed great reluctance and insisted that the
K harijite threat in Basra should be dealt with first. Thus M u s ‘ ab was forced to
dispense with a part of his army, in sending a l-M u h a lla b with the best troops
- . 3
of Basra against the K h arijite. Mus‘ ab showed himself a short sighted
leader by not listening to the warning of Ibrahim ibn al-A shtar against the
traitor-chiefs, nor did he follow Ibrahim *s request not to send him any as
reinforcements. Ibrahim had given to Mus* ab,unopened, a letter he had
received from ‘ Abd a l-M a lik , and told him that ail the other leaders had
4
probably received similar letters, but had kept them to themselves. He was
1. Ansab, V , p p .271 (citing Wahab ibn Ja rir), 280; A zm ina, II, p . 134;
* Asakir, X V I, fo l. 271a.
2. Ansab, V , p p .332 (citing Wahab ibn J a rir), 3 4 4 -5 ; fols. 499b-500a

(citing Mada* in i); X I, pp. 14-15 (citing Mada* in i); T a b ., II, p .806
(citing ‘ Umar Ibn Shabba).
3. Ansab, V , p p .33 2;3 35-6 (citing * Awana); M u ru j, V , p . 241; ‘ Asakir

X Y lT f o l. 271a.
4. Hayawan , V , p . 594; Imama, II, p . 23; Ansab, V , p p .337 (citing

* Aw ana), 340-1 (citing al-H aytham ); X I, p p .6 (citing ‘ Awana), 11-12;
D in a w a rt,p p .31 7 -1 8 ; T a b ., II, p. 805 (citing WaqidT); ‘ iqd, IV , p .411
M u ru j, V , p . 243; A g h ., X V II, p. 162 (citing M a d a?inT); K am il, IV ,
p .265; Dhahabi, I I I , p. 108; Bidaya, V I I I , p .315; * Ib a r, III,
p. 77.
238.
the only chief to remain faithful to Mus‘ ab until his death at the
9 9
beginning of the battle. The names of the treacherous leaders are
preserved to us by a I-B aladhuri, Tabari/ a n d M a s cudi. It appears
from their names that they were all Kufans. On the other hand, we find
the Rabi‘ ites of Basra delighted that Mus‘ ab and his son ‘ Tsa were killed
2
and that they boasted that they were responsible for his death.
A fter the death of Ibrahim ibn al-Ashtar in the beginning of the
battle, ‘ Attab ibn W a rq a *, who was on the cavalry of the Kufans in
Mus‘ ab's army, gave w ay, while the other Kufan leaders, such as
Q atan ibn ‘ Abdallah al-H arijrhj, with M adhhij, H ajjar ibn Abjar and
Muhammad ibn ‘ Abd al-Rahman ibn Sa‘ id al-H am dant, refused to obey
3
M u s ^ b 1s orders, and left him almost alone in the battle fie ld .
Owing to the close friendship between Mus ‘ ab and ‘ Abd a l-M a lik
in their early life , the latter offered to spare Mus‘ ab's life and was prepared
to give him the governorship of Iraq, or any other country, in return for his
1. A ‘ sha Hamdan, Diwan, p . 313; Ansab, V , p p .3 3 8 -9 (citing ‘ Awana),

440-1 (citing al-H aytham ), 344 (citing M ada* in i); X I, pp. 1 -2 , 6 -9
(citing al-H ayfham ), 13-15 (citing Mada* in i), 2 1 -3 ; T a b ., I I , p p .804,
8 0 6 -7 (citing ‘ Umar ibn Shabba); M uruj, V , p . 245; Kam il, IV , p . 266.
2. A ‘ sha Hamdan, Diw an, p p .314-15; Bakkar, p . 314 (citing Mlus‘ a b a l -

Zubairi); Ansab, X I,p . 282.
3- Ansab, V , p p .331 (citing ‘ Awana), 340-1 (citing al-H aytham ); X I ,

p p .6 -7 (citing al-H aytham ); T a b ., I I , p p .8 0 6 -7 (citing ‘ Umar ibn
Shabba), ‘ Iqd, IV , p fT lO ; M u ru j, V , p . 245; A g h ., X V II, p. 163
Inciting MadSj* inT); Kam il, IV , p . 266; DhahabT7"i1I, p. 109 (quoting
Tabari); Bidaya, V I I I , p .315; ‘ Ibar r III, p .78.
239.
allegiance, ^ but in vain. ‘ Abd a l-M a lik then tried to save the life of
Mus‘ ab ’s son, but without success, and ‘ 7sa was killed before the eyes
of his father. Then Mus‘ ab, already bleeding from many arrow shots, was
killed by Za* ida ibn Qudama a l-T h a q a fi, who, when dealing the fatal
blow, shouted, MYa Ii Tharat a l-M u k h ta r". ‘ Ubaidallah ibn Ziyad ibn
2
Zabian cut the head from the body and went with it to ‘ Abd a l-M a lik .
Thus the death of al -M ukhar had not been allowed to go unrevenged; the
death of Mus‘ ab shows that al-M ukhtar's followers did not submit after
their leader's death but continued to work underground, to reappear when
they found a favourable opportunity.
The date of the battle of Dair a l-Jath liq between Mus‘ ab ibn a l -
Zubair and ‘ Abd a l-M a lik ibn Marwan was the month of Jumada I or I I ,
1. tjadhhif, p .47; Ansab, V , p p .339 (citing ‘ A w ana), 340; X I, p p .2 -3

(citing ‘ A w ana), 7 (citing al-H aytham ); T a b ., II , p p .8 0 8 -9 (citing
MadS* h i); A m a li, p. 122 (citing Mada* inT); Muruj, V , p .2 4 7 ;
Agh . , X V II, p. 163 (citing Mada* inT); K am il, IV , p . 267; Dhahabi,
llT, p. 109; Bidaya, V I I I , p .315 (citing M ada’ in i); ‘ Ibar, TIT, p .78.
2, Sa‘ d, V , p. 169 (citing W aqidi); Imama, II, p . 23; Ansab, V ,

pp. 334 (citingW ahab ibn J a rir), 340; X I, pp. 5 (citing*A w ana),
7 (citing al-H aytham ); DTnawarT, p. 3 1 9 ;Y a ‘ qubi, I I , p . 317;
T a b ., I I , p. 809*7citing M ad a‘ inT); ‘ Iqd, IV , p. 411; M u ru j, V ,
p p .2 4 8 -9 ; Agh. , V I I , p . 117 (citing Miada* inT); Jamharat, p .296;
‘ Asakir, X V i / fo l. 171 (citing al-S h a ‘ bi); M u ‘ jam , IV , p . 530;
Kam il, IV , p . 268; Sharh., H I, p . 296; Dhahabi, I I I , p. 110;
Bidgya,V II I , p . 316 (citing M ada?inT); ‘ TEar, III, p p .7 8 -9 ;
Shadharat, I, p .79,
240 •
1 - - - 2
7 2 /6 9 1 , Waqidi In Tabari, however, alone among the early authorities,
gives the year 7 1 /6 9 0 , The fact that this date is repeated by other late
3
sources is not evidence that it is correct, for it is lik ely that they have
used W aqidi's account as their source. Moreover, there is another account
- . T - 4
by Waqidi himself, in Ibn Sa‘ d ’s Tabaqat and repeated by Ibn ( Asakir,
which gives the year 7 2 /6 9 1 . Furthermore, the date 72/691 is confirmed
by the fact that the victory of ‘Abd a l-M a lik was followed by the sending
of a l-H a jja j against Ibn a l-Z u b a ir, which our authorities unanimously agree
was in the year 7 2 /6 9 1 .
1. Sa‘ d, V , p. 136 (citing W aqidi); K halifa ibn K h ayyat, Tarikh, I,

p p .26 4 ,2 6 5 ; Idem, Tabaqat, p . 603; M a *a rif, p. 1 5 6 , Ansab, V ,
pp. 286 (citing M ad a’ inT); 342; X I, p p .8 , 26 (citing Ib n al-K alb T
and Abu M ikhnaf); DinawarT, p .319; Y a ‘ qubi, II, p .317;
T a b ., II, p p .318 (citing Mada* inT), 1466 (citing 6 Umar ibn Shabba
and Mada* inT); M u ru j, V , p .243 f f . ; TanbTb, p . 313; Agh . , X V II,
p. 161ff, (citing Mada* inT); Athar, p. 318; ‘ Asakir, X V I, fol 177a
(quoting K h a lifa), 264a, 273 ^quoting Ibn Sa‘ d and W aqidi); Mu* jam,
IV , p . 5297"Dhahabi, III , pp. 108-10, 210; Bidaya, V I I I , p .316
citing Mada^Tnf); Shadharat, I, p .79.
2. T a b ., II, p .S 04ff. (citing W aqidi).
3. Mash ah i r , p . 67; Kamil, IV , p .2 6 3 f f .; Fakhri, p. 112; N u w a iri,

X IX , f o l.70; Mukhtaâr, I, p p .3 1 4 -6 ; ‘ Ibar, I I I , p .79.
4. Sa*d, V , p. 136 (citing W aqidi); ‘ Asakir, X V I, f o l . 273 (citing

WaqidT),
241.
Following the victory over Mus*ab ibn a I -Z u b a ir at Dair a l-
Jath liq , ‘ Abd a l-M a lik entered Kufa, where he received the homage of
the people, and appointed his officials. He also sent al-H a jja j ibn Yusuf
al-Thaqafi at the head of two thousand Syrians against ‘ Abdallah ibn a l-Z u b a ir
1
in M ecca. The choice of a l-H a jja j to lead this campaign was because of his
strong leadership, as evidenced in the efficiency with which he restored
discipline among the mutinous troops of the caliph, when he was in the
2
rearguard in the campaign against Mus ‘ ab. Even before that, he had shown
unlimited loyalty to ‘ Abd a l-M a lik in the negotiations with Zufar ibn al -
Haritji a l-K ila b i. A l-H a jja j refused to pray with Zu far, because he was a
3
rebel against the caliph.
However, a l-H a jja j's army was not the first Syrian army that ‘ Abd
a l-M a lik had sent against ‘ Abdallah ibn a l-Z u b a ir. Going back to the time
1. Sa‘ d, V , p. 169 (citing W aqidi); K halifa ibn Khayyat Tarikh, I,

p p .3 4 0 -1 ; M a ‘ a rif, p. 156; Imama, I I , p p .2 3 -4 (the numXer of the
army here is given as 1500); Ansj b , V , p p .346 (citing al-H aytham ),
352, 357 (citing WaqidT) and ‘ Awana); X I, pp. 17-18 (citing
al-H ayth am ), 3 9 -4 0 (citing WaqidT and ‘ Awana); DTnawarT, p .319;
Y a ‘ qubT, II, p . 318 (the number here is 2 0 ,0 0 0 ); T a b ., II, pp. 839-40
(citing WaqidT); K ufi, I I , fols. 52a-52b; ‘ Iqd., IV , p .414 (citing
Abu M a ‘ shar); Mturuj , V , p . 259; Bad; ; VT, pp. 2 4 -5 ; * Asakir, III,
fo l. 177a; K am il, IV , p .2 8 4 ;U s d , 111, pp. 1 6 3 -4 ; M ir ?a t, V I , fo ls .3 a -b
(citing Ibn-HabTb); Buahya, f o l.3 9 ; fIbri, p. 193; Mukhtasar, I, p . 207;
I, p . 207; DhahabT, Ml, p. 113 (citing WaqidT); Bidaya, V I I I , p .325;
‘ Ib a r, III, p . 85. W ith this army of a l-H a jja j, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik is said
to have sent M a lik ibn ShurahTl al-K h u lan t with three thousand men
from Egypt by a sea route. KindT, I, p . 51; K ufi, I I , fo l.5 3 a .
(A l-H a jja j ibn Yusuf).
3* Ansab, V , p . 305; Tadhkira, I, fo l.7 8 a .

of his succession, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik had sent an army of six thousand men
under ‘ Urwa ibn Unaif to a l- H ija z , with the orders not to enter M edina,
but to make his camp in a l - ‘ Arda ( This was perhaps to
protect Syria from any retaliatory attack from Ibn a l-Z u b a ir. When Ibn
a M Z u b a ir’s governor of M edin a, a l-H a rith ibn Hatib al-Ju m ah i, learnt of

• —M M « • *
the advance of this army, he fle d , leaving his office vacant. ‘ Abd a l-
Mtalik's army remained there undisturbed for a month and then went back
home, on the caliph's orders. ^
‘ Abd a l-M a lik sent another army to a l- H ija z , consisting of four
thousand men under ‘ Abd al—Wahid ibn al-Hakam ibn aUAs . A gain, Ibn
• . *
a l-Z u b air's governor of Fadak and Khaibar, Sulaiman ibn Khalid a l-Z u ra q i,
fled. He was pursued and killed by a detachment of horsemen under A b u 'l-
Qamqam, sent by ‘ Abd al-W ahid ibn al-H akam . However, Ibn al-Z u b air's
• *
new governor of M ed in a, Jabir ibn al-Aswad a l-Z u h ri, retaliated by sending
640 men under Abu Bakr ibn Abi Gais against AbuM-Oamqam. They found
the latter with his followers in Khaibar, where he was defeated, and thirty
2
of his men taken prisoner, later to be kille d .
M eanw h ile, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik dispatched Tariq ibn ‘ Amr with a Syrian
1. Ansab, V , p . 355 (citing W aqidi); X I, p . 34 (citing W aqidi); Kamil, IV

p . 283; ‘ Ibar, I I I , p .84.
2. Ansab, V , p . 356 (citing W aqidi); X I, p p .3 5 -6 (citing W aqidi); Kamil

IV , p p .2 8 3 -4 ; ‘ Ibar, III, p .84.
243.
army, ordering him to station himself between *A y la and W a d i'l-G u ra ,
with instructions to check the activities of ibn al-Z u b a ir's governors,
to protect the land lying between his camp and Syria, and fin a lly , to
]
cope with any situation that might develop. When he reached the arranged
place, Tariq sent some of his horsemen against Abu Bakr in revenge for
A bu'l-Q am qam , They killed Abu Bakr and his followers. Ibn a l-Z u b a ir,
however, had already written to a l-Q u b a * , his governor of Basra,
instructing him to send two thousand men to defend M edina against the
Syrians. These reinforcements did not arrive until after the death of Abu
Bakr and his followers. They were therefore ordered to go to fight Tariq's
«
army. The two armies met near M edina in a place called Shabakat al-Dam
( where the Basrans were annihilated. Hearing of this,
Ibn al-Zubair wrote to his governor of M edin a, ordering a recruitment of two
thousand men from the city and its environs to defend their city ; he promised
to send money for their pay. However, the money for this recruitment was
never sent, and it was therefore abolished and called "Fard a l-R ih " .^
Jariq and his army returned to W a d i'l-G u ra and remained there until they
received orders from ‘ Abd a i- M a lik ,to join the army of a l-H a jja j.
1. Ansab, V , p. 356 (citing W aqidi); X I , p. 36 (citing W aqidi); ‘ Asakir,

V II,. p .40 (citing K h alifa); Kam il, IV , p . 284; ‘ Ibar, I I I , p p .8 4 -5 .
2. Ansab, V , p p .35 6 -7 (citing W aqidi); X I, p p .3 6 -8 (citing W aqidi);

‘ Asakir, V I I , p p .40-1 (citing K halifa and Ibn Sa‘ d); K a m il, IV ,
p . 2 8 4 ; ‘ Ibar, III, p .85.
244.
A l-H a jja j, obeying ‘ Abd a l-M a lik 's orders, made his camp at a l -
T a 'i f , from where he made frequent skirmishes against the troops of Ibn
a l-Z u b a ir, in which a l-H a jja j was almost always victorious. However,
when the negotiations with Ibn a l-Z u b a ir fa ile d , and realizing that these
skirmishes would not lead to a decisive victory, a l-H a jja j wrote to ‘ Abd
a l- M a lik asking for re-inforcements and for permission to attack M ecca by
force. ^ ‘ Abd a l-M a lik granted both requests. The significance of ‘ Abd a l-
M alik's original reluctance to allow a l-H a jja j to enter M edina and M e cca , has
2
been discussed in detail in Chapter I. At the same tim e, it was argued that
..- 3
a l-H a jja j showed considerable scrupulousness in his attack on a l- K a ‘ ba.
The historical tradition which is hostile to the Umayyads in general and
a l-H a jja j in particular, have ignored the fact that it was only the new part
of a I- K a ‘ ba that was attacked, and emphasized only that a l-H a jja j and his
master, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik , violated the sanctity of the holy shrine. However,
when, during the storming of a !-K a ‘ ba, a sudden thunderstorm raged and
was interpreted by religious men among his followers as a sign of Divine
disapproval, a l-H a jja j succeeded in convincing all that it was but a natural
1. Ansab, V , p p .358 (citing ‘ Awana), 359 (citing W aqidi); X I , p p .4 0 -1 ,

(citing ‘ Awana), 42 (citing W aqidi); DlnawarT, p .319; T a b ., II, p . 830
(citing WaqidT); K u f i, II, fo l.5 3 a ; Kam il, IV , p p .2 8 4 -5 ; M ir*a t, V I,
fo l.3 b (citing Ibn H abib); DhahabT, 111, p. 113 (citing W agidf); B idaya,
V I I I , p .325; ‘ Ibar, III, p .85.
2. See ^ p - ^
3, Ib id ., pp. 5 2 ^ 7
245.
phenomenon, and even that it could be a portent of victory. During
?2
the siege, which started according to W aqidi on the first of Dhul Q u ‘ da,
7 2 /2 5 th March 79 2, and lasted for over six months, Ibn a l-Z u b a ir was hard
pressed by a l- H a jja j, who made a complete blockade of M e cca , preventing
- . 3
all food and supplies from reaching a l-H ija z from outside. As a result of this,
pri ces in M ecca became in flated , which was aggravated by the avarice of Ibn
4
a l-Z u b a ir. Since a l-H a jja j and his Syrian army were constantly supplied
1. Ansab, V , pp. 362 (citing ‘ Awana and M ada’ in i), 363 (citing
W aqidi); X I , p p .4 7 -8 (citing ‘ Awana), 48 (citing M a d a ’ inT), 4 8 -9
(citing WaqidT); Y a ‘ q u b f, 11, p .3 1 8 ;T a b ., I I , p p .8 4 4 -5 (citing
WaqidT); ‘ Asakir, I V , p . 50; K am il, IV , p .285; M iV a t, V I, fo l.5 a ;
DhahabT, 111, p . 114 (citing WaqidT); ‘ Ibar, I I I , p . 86.
2. Sa‘ d, V , p. 169; Ansab, V , p p .3 6 7 -8 ; 386; X I , p . 57; T a b ., II,

p p .844, 851; K am il, I V , p . 290; Ibn al-Jaw zT, Sifat a l-S a fw a , I, p .325;
Sharfo, X X , p. 122; Mukhtasqr , I, p. 207; Bidaya, V I I I , p . 329; Dhahab, p . 26.
3. Nasab, fo l. 190b; Jamharat, p .233; Bidaya, V I I I , p . 329 (citing WaqidT).
4. Abu Tammam, Hamasa, I, pp. 3 1 9-2 0; M a ‘ a rif, p . 99; Imama, II,

p p .2 0 ,2 3 ; Ansab, V , pp. 194-5 (citing M ada> inT), 281 (citing ‘ Awana),
360-1 (citing WaqidT), 36 1 -3 (citing WaqidT and Ibn al-K albT), 373;
X I, p p .4 4 -6 (citing WaqidT), 4 6 -7 (citing WaqidT and Ibn al-K albT),
49 (citing Ibn al-K albT ); DTnawarT, p .314; Y a ‘ qubT, II, p . 319;
M a ‘ad, fols. 46b, 76b; ‘ Iq d , II, pp. 96 -7 (citing a l-Z u b a ir ibn
BaklaiJr), 98; IV , pp. 1 7 6 ^ T M u rJ j, V , pp. 174-5; Bad’ , V I ,
pp. 25, 26; Agh^., I, p. 9 (citing"‘ Umar ibn Shabba); IV , p. 138
(citing a l-Z u b a ir ibn Bakkar); X , pp. 165-6; JalTs, fo l. 160a (citing
Mad a’ inT); Lata’ i f , p. 140; N ih a y a , I, p p .78 , 2 9 5 -6 ; III, p. 265;
Tadhkira, I, fols. 130a, 139b; Kamil, IV , p p .286, 414; M ir ’ at, V I ,
fo l.4 b ; Sharh, X X , p p .103, 145 (citing M a d a’ inT); Fakhrt, p . 110;
Mukhtasar, I, p .204; Bidaya, V I I I , p. 137; ‘ Ibar, III, p .68; Khizana,
III, p p .2 3 7 -8 ; IV , p p .4 5 -6 ; A l-F a d il fi'l-F u n O n , fo l. 103b-104a
(citing aI-S h a‘ b7).
246,
with all provisions by the caliph, they enjoyed far better conditions than
the troops of Ibn a l-Z u b a ir, so that many began to desert Ibn a l-Z u b a ir,
especially when a l-H a jja j issued a free pardon for all who joined him. It
is said that ten thousand of Ibn a l-Z u b a ir ‘s followers, including two of
- 1
his sons, defected to a l-H a jja j.
Ibn a l-Z u b a ir went into the b a ttle -fie ld with greatly depleted forces;
among his loyal supporters was his youngest son. On the 17th Jumada, J
7 3 /1 8th September 692, Ibn a l-Z u b a ir was slain after showing considerable
2 „ „
bravery. Other reports give the date as the month of Jumada II, while
al-Bustt alone gives the year 7 2 /6 9 1 .^
At the death of Ibn a l-Z u b a ir and the submission of a l- H ija z , the
unity of the Muslims was restored and ‘ Abd a l-M a lik was recognized as the
sole caliph. It is for this reason that the year 7 3 /6 9 2 was called ,(the year
1• Ansab, V , pp. 194, 364, 3 7 6 -7 ; X I, p p .45 , 51; T a b ., II, p ,8 4 5 ;

KafT, II, fo l.5 3 b ; M u ru j, V , p . 262; ‘ Asakir, V I I , p .415; Kam il,
IV , pp.286°7; Shar'bT X X , p p .144 (citing Mas‘ ud7), 118 (quoting
Tabari); Dhahabi, III, pp. 114-15 (citing WaqidT); Bidaya, V I I I , p p .330,
341. ~
2. Sa‘ d, V , p p .169-70 (citing WaqidT); K halifa ibn K h ayyat, Tarikh.-, I,

p .343; Idem, Tabaqat, p .31; M ughtalin, p . 25; M a ‘ a rif, p. 156; Imama,
II, p. 25; Ansab, V , p. 368 (citing W aqidi); O u d a t, I, p. 142; T a b ., II,
pp. 844 (citing WaqidT), 849 (citing W aqidi); JanbTh, pp. 3 1 3 -1 4 ;
‘ Asakir, V I I , p p .3 4 1 -2 ; In a fa , I, p. 130; Dhahab, p . 25; Is aba, I I ,
p .759; Tahdhib, V , p . 312; Suyuti, p. 142; Shadharat, I, p .80.
Ansab, X I , p. 25 (citing W aqidi); D inaw ari, p . 321; T a b ., II, p .851

(citing W aqidi); Mturuj, V , p .209; KindT, I, p . 51; K am il, IV , p p .289-90
Usd, IN , p. 16 4 ;3Harfr, X X , p. 104; Mukhtagar, I, p. 207; Dhahabi, Ml,
p .75; ‘ Ibar, 111, p . 89; Suyuti, p. 142s
4. Mashahir, p . 30. However, Ibn A ‘ tham gives it as lOth^Jumada 1, 73,

while another account in Mas‘ udi" gives the 14th Jumada 1, 73 . K ufi,
II, fo l. 55a; M u ru j, V , p .266.
What was the nature of the support which Ibn a l-Z u b a ir had received
for his movement? To some, he was a champion who would restore the political
. " 2
supremacy of a l- H ija z , lost since the murder of ‘ Uthman. To others, ibn
a l-Z u b a ir was the focus of opposition to the Umayyads after the murder of al -
3
Husain ibn *AH ibn Abi T a lib , which left no active ‘ A lid claim ant. Ibn
• •
a l-Z u b a ir was aware of the possibilities in this source of support, as shown in
- 4
his encouragement to al-H u sain to leave a i-H ija z for Kufa; he did not lay
claim to the caliphate before the death of al-H usain. This tragic death, he
«
tried to exploit for his own ends, by exposing the harsh treatment that the
5
Umayyads had dealt to the family of the Prophet. S im ilarly, Ibn al-Zubair
laid great stress on the religious aspect of his caliphate. He tried to imitate
‘ Umar I, in carrying the Durra as the emblem of his caliph ate, and claimed
1. * Iqd, V , p. 35; Agh. , X I , p. 143 (citing Ibn a l-* A rabi).
2. H e ll, Arabic C iv iliz a tio n , p . 52, London, 1926; Wellhausen, The

Arab Kingdom and its F a ll, pp. 199-200.
3. See Chapter II, p. J j
4. Mabasin, pp. 152-3 (citing a l-S h a <bi); K halifa ibn Khayyat, TarTkh.
I, p p .2 2 3 -4 ; Akhbar, fols. 47b-48a (citing al-ShaÊt); T a b ., II,
pp. 23 2-3 (citing Abu M ikhn af); KufT, I, fols. 192a-193b, 20 7 a -
207b, 234a; Sharfr, X X , *p7134; Bidaya, V I I I , pp. 189 (citing AbO
M ik h n af), 190.
5. Akhbar, fo l. 47b; Ansab, IV , ii, pp. 1 6 -17 , fo l.2 6 2 a ; K u fi, II, fo l.

11a.
248.
that he had been appointed by ‘ Uthman as his successor in the defence of
- 1
the Dar, although there were many other Quraishites and companions of
the Prophet better qualified for this task. He also made capital out of the
Holy city by using it as the headquarters of his movement; he called
2
himself "A l-*A id h 11 (the one who takes refuge in the K a*ba). He was
helped in portraying himself in a religious way by the fact of his re la tio n -
3
ship with the Prophet on both his father's and his mother’s side, and by the
b elief of the people of H ija z that the sons of the old companions of the
4
Prophet were the most elig ib le for the caliphate.
There were also economic reasons for the support received by Ibn
a l-Z u b a ir. The fiscal reforms introduced by M u *a w iya I made the provinces
1. A l-J a h iz , al-U thm aniyya, p . 223; Ansab, V , 7 4 , 189-90 (citing

Madd* inT); * Iqd, IV , p .418; ‘ Asakir, V I I , p. 402; M ir* a t, V I , fo l. 4b;
Sharh, II, p. 166; Bidaya, V I I / 167.
2. K halifa ibn K h ayyat, TarTkh , I, p .224; T a b ., I I , p . 222; M u ru j, V,

p . 165; K a m il, IV , p . 13.
3. ZubairT, p p .2 3 7 -9 ; K halifa ibn K hayyat, Tabaqat, I, p . 31; J a b iz ,

al-IJthm aniyya, p. 224; Nasab, fols. 24 a-2 4 b ; Mash ah i r , p. 30; Lata* I f ,
p. 12; Akhbar Isbahan , I, p p .4 6 -7 ; * Asakir, V I I , p p .3 9 6 -7 ; Usd,
III, pp. 161-2; M ir >at , V I , fo ls.4 a-4 b ; D hahafi , III, p. 167f f . ; jsaba,
II, p . 7 5 f f .; TahdhTbT V , p. 213; Suyuti, pp. 141 -2 ; E. I. , (‘ Abdallah ibn
a l-Z u b a ir).
4. Duri,Muggddiimq fi Tarikh Sadr al-Islam , p. 64, Beirut, 1961.

249.
contribute to the expenses of the State. They also laid down the
principle that pensions were in return for m ilitary service, particularly
for the government. This had deprived a considerable number in H ija z
of their pay as heirs of the first recipients of pensions, ^ leading many
of them to look bitterly on the Umayyads. M oreover, the Umayyads,
through their ownership of large estates in MedTna, controlled the
market in wheat there, which brought upon them the hostility of the
people caused by their economic grievances at the high price of essential
. 2
food stuffs in M ed in a, as compared to Syria and the rest of the Empire.
A ll these discontents in Medina found a means of expression in the
opposition movement of Ibn a l-Z u b a ir.
ibn a l-Z u b a ir himself had been ambitious for the caliphate from
quite an early date. He was pushed forward towards this aim by the sudden
death of Y azid and the very short reign of his son M u ‘ awiya II. But in
other ways Ibn a l-Z u b a ir showed himself less able as a politician than his
riv a l, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik . A cause such as his needed active propaganda
work and a generous distribution of money to rally the people round him and
to propagate his claims through the tongues of the poets; however, he was a
man very reluctant to part with his money, even when it would pay back
^ Ful'ub / P*45S; Larmnens, Le C alifat de Y a z id le r, p p .804-13;

Beirut, 1921; E. I. , (a l-H arra ).
2. Imama, I, p. 169 (citing ‘ Abdallah ibn J a ‘ far); Y a ‘ qubi, II, p p .2 6 7 -

8. These estates are said to have yielded at the time of M u ‘ awiya I,
1 50,000 Wusq of dates and 5 0 ,0 0 0 Wusq of wheat annually. A ! - ‘ A li,
Muslim Estates in H ija z in the First Century of H ijra , p. 251, JESHC,
II, 1969.
250,
large dividends in terms of support, while *Abd a l-M a lik opened his hands
to embrace everyone who came to him, showing generosity and forgiveness.
Another reason for the failure of Ibn a l-Z u b a ir was that be
shut himself up in M ecca. Countering the religious support that this brought
him, were the shortcomings of the area as a headquarters; econom ically, it
was a poor district, relying on other provinces for its support, and the
population of a l-H ija z were not p o litic a lly ac tive , prefering a life
of pleasure (or in other cases piety) to that of fighting causes. Ibn al-Z u b a ir
neglected to make full use cf the support he received in other, more favourable
areas. For exam ple, he left M us*ab In Iraq to his own resources, which
were quickly exhausted by the fighting against the Kharijites and the
•? 1 2
S hi*a. Welfhausen considers that Ibn a l-Z u b a ir lost a golden opportunity
when he refused the offer of a I-H«usain

•
ibn iMumair that he would secure
the b a i*a for Ibn a l-Z u b a ir in Syria, if he would go there. However, what
reason had Ibn a l-Z u b a ir to trust this offer of a past enemy who had often
fought against him? Even had he trusted Ibn Num air, his chances of a good
reception in Syria were not high, as it was the centre of the Umayyads and
their supporters. He committed a graver political fault when he failed to
ally the opposition in Iraq to himself, so that the energy of his supporters was
1. See p. J S ^ f '
2. The Arab Kingdom and its F all, p . 200.

exhausted by fighting the Kharijites and the Shi* a there, never leaving
him free to face the Umayyads. The support of the Shi* a was lost by his
strong a n ti-* A lid feelings, which dated from his early life ; this also
|
aroused opposition to him in his own ranks, among his close supporters.
The failure of Ibn al-Z u b air's movement owes a great deal to its leader's
meanness, and his lack of political ab ility to make the best use of his
chances.
1- K halifa ibn K h ayyat, Tarikh, I, p . 204 (citing Abu *Ubaida);

A kh b d r, fols. 47a - 49b (citing Abu M ikhnaf and al«Sha*b7),
51b-52a (citing Abcj M ikhn af); Jah iz, M in Fusul al-JdiTig, fo l. 4 b -5a ;
Imdma, II, p p .47 , 5 5 -6 , 61, 64, 67, 68; Ansab, IV , n , p ,2 8 (citing
al-H aytham ); V , p .372 (citing al-ZuhrT); X I, p p .6 5 -6 (citing a l-Z u h ri)
fols. 173a-174b, 178a (citing Abu M ik h n af), 180a; K uff, I, fols. 30a, 31
31b, 32b, 36b; JalTs, fols. 36a-36b; * Iqd, IV , pp*31 3 -1 4 ; 25 V,
pp. 184 (citing *Umar ibn Shabba), 184-5 (citing * Umar ibn Shabba),
187-88; A gh ., X I I I , p . 168; X V I, p . 131 (citing M add’ inT); Khulafa*,
II, fols. 201a~2Qlb; Ijily a , 1, p . 91; *Asakir, V I I , p p .201 -2 ; Sharb /
I, p p .2 2 -3 , 2 3 3 -4 ; II, pp. 169-70 (citing a l-Z u b a ir ibn BakkarJTvTl,
p p .38, 2 3 0 -1 ; X IX , p p .9 1 -2 (quoting I.sbahanT); X X , p p .12 8-3 0, 134,
138 (quoting Mas*udT).
252,
CHAPTER V
OTHER O P P O S IT IO N M O V E M E N TS
The Revolt of ‘ Abdallah ibn ai-Jarud
In the year 7 3 /6 9 4 , a l-H a jja j ibn Yusuf al-Thaqafi was trans-
1
ferred from the governorship of al—H ija z to a l-lra q , The famous
inauguration speech in which he proclaimed his policies,showed the
2
Iraqis from the very start that the time of leniency was over. A l-
H ajjaj 's first and most urgent task in Iraq was the restoration of discipline
among the troops of Basra and K ufa, who, on the death of Bishr ibn M ar wan,
the previous governor, had deserted the camp of a l-M u h a ila b ibn Abi Sufra
in Ramhurmuz and were wandering in the towns. A I-M u h a lla b was garrisoned
at Ramhuruz to fight the Kharijites who were threatening Basra, A I-H ajjcij
made an announcement that a ll deserters should return to camp within three
3
days, or else they would be killed and their property laid open to plunder;
1. See Chapter III, p. Z-1 & ‘
2. Jumahi, p ,1 4 6 ;B a y a n , II, pp. 164-5; A l-Z u b a ir ibn Bakkar, Akhbar

ai-M u w afag iyyat fi'l-S iy a r , f o l. 4 7 f f .; Imama, II, pp. 2 5 -6 (citing
At>u M a ‘ shar); Ansab, X I, p p .2 6 6 - 7 (citing Abu M ikhn af and cAwana),
269-70 (citing MadcP in i); 2 7 0 -3 , 274 (citing M a d ^ inf); Y a ‘ qubT, II,
p p .3 2 6 -7 ; Mubarrad, I, p p .3 8 0 -1 ; II I, p . 366; T a b ., II, p p .8 6 3 -6 ,
8 6 9 -7 0 , 8 7 0 -2 (citing ‘ Umar ibn Shabba); * Iqd, IV , p. 12 4 ;\25A_ ,
V , p p .292-302; J a ils , fo l*1 8a (citing ai-STJa^Bl); ‘ Asakir, IV , p p .52 -3
Tadhkira, I, fo l.6 9 a ; K am il, IV , p p .3 0 3 -8 ; Sharb, IV , pp. 181-4; X I,
p .4 5 , NuwairT, V I I , p . 244; Bidaya, IX , p p .7 - 8 ; * Ibar, III , pp. 9 3 -4 .
3. Bayan, II, p. 165; A l-Z u b a ir ibn Bakkar, Akhbar al-M uw afaq iyyat
fi'l-S iy a r , fo l.5 0 ; AnscTb, X I, p p .270 (citing M ada7in f), 274 (citing =
253.
and he kept his word. The soldiers streamed back to their camp and a l-
H ajja j h imself supervised the distribution of their pay and accompanied
them as far as Rustuqobad. ^ It was at this time, Sha‘ ban 75 A . H . , that a l-
H ajjaj was faced with a very dangerous revolt led by ‘ Abdallah ibn al~
Jarud, the Sayyid of ‘ Abd a l-G a is .
Thanks to Baladhuri we know much about this revolt. Unfortunately,
the account of Abu M ikhnaf in Tabari is'flo more than a brief notice, which
adds nothing to the account of Baladhuri. Late sources, such as Ibn a l -
A th ir, Ibn a l-J a w zi and Ibn Khaldun, as usual do but repeat the early
sources, in this case the narrative of Baladhuri.
The revolt led by Ibn al-Jarud started as a dispute over pay. During
the governorship of M u s ‘ ab ibn a l-Z u b a ir in Basra, the Basrans not only
received their pay (‘ At a5) twice a year, but also were awarded an increase
2
in pay of one hundred dirhams each. In one of his speeches to the Basrans,
- Abu M ikhnaf), p p .2 7 5 -6 ; Mubarrad, I, p p .3 6 3 -6 , 382; T a b ., II,

p p .8 6 5 -6 , 868-71 (citing ‘ Umar ibn Shabba); K u fi, II, fols. 6 7 a -
68a; G hurar, fols. 12-15; M u ru j, V ,p . 297; Tadhkira, I, fo l.6 9 a ;
Kam il, IV , p p .2 9 7 -8 ; Sharh, IV , pp. 180-2; Bidaya, IX , p p .3 ,8 ;
‘ ibar, I I I , p p .9 0 -4 , 320ff.
1. Ansab, X I, p . 277; Mubarrad, I, p . 383; III , p p .3 6 6 -7 ; T a b ,, II, p . 866

^citing 'Umar Ibn Shabba); Muruj, V , p p .29 8-3 02; KamiI, IV , p p .3 0 5 -6 ;
Sharh, IV , p . l 8 2 ; ‘ lbar, III , p . 94.
2. Ansab, V , p p .271 (citing Wahab ibn J a rir), 280; X I , p .280; J a b ,, II,

p . 874 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); Azmina , I I , p . 134 (citing 1bn a M A r a b t);
‘ Asakir, V I I , fo l.2 7 1 a ; M u ‘ jam , II, p . 834; Kam il, I V , p . 309; M ir * o t,
V I , fo l. 15b; Dhahabi, li 1 / p.TT9 (citing T a barf); ‘ Ibar, III, p*95.
254.
a !-H a jja j declared that this increase of pay was ille g al and that he would
permit it no longer. He gave as reason the fact that it had been granted
1
them by M u s‘ ab, who was an enemy of the caliph. Probably the real
reason was the need to economise in order to meet the cost of the war against
the Kharijites, although he also found it an occasion, to demonstrate his loyalty
to the caliph against all enemies.
In protest against this declaration, ‘ Abdallah ibn al-Jarud said that
the increase had been approved by the caliph ‘ Abd a l-M a lik himself during
the governorship of his brother Blshr in Iraq. But a l-H a jja j, seeing this reply
as a challenge to his authority, threatened Ibn al-Jarud with death if he
dared to speak again in such a matter. The latter made it clear that he was
expressing not only his own personal view , but that of all the people
concerned. Realizing the truth of this, a l-H a jja j ta ctfu lly restrained
from mentioning the matter of pay for a w h ile, in order to give himself
time to establish himself firm ly in the town. However, he did not intend to
give up the matter altogether, and only a few months later, he mentioned the
reduction again, to be met with the same reply from Ibn a l-J a ru d , supported
2
by the Ashraf of the c ity .
1. Ansab, X I , p. 280; T a b ., 11, p. 874 (citing Abu M ikhn af); M u ‘ jam, II,
p .834; Kam il, IV , p . 3 0 9 - M ir * a t, V I, fo l, 15b; DhahabT, III, p. 119
(quoting Tabari); ‘ Ibar, I I I , p. 95.
2. Ansab, X I , pp. 2 8 0 -1 ; T a b ., II, p. 874 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); M u ‘ jam ,

II , p .834; Kam il, IV , p p ,3 0 9-3 10; M ir* at, V I , fo l. 15b; DhahabT, III,
119 (quoting Tabari); * Ibar, III, p . 95,
• 1 ' “
255.
Thus, learning that a l-H a jja j had no intention of dropping his
plan to reduce their pay, all the tribal chiefs and the most influential
men (Wujuh) of Basra made Ibn al-Jarud their leader. They paid homage
to him, pledging to support him in driving a l-H a jja j out of the country;
they would then w rite to * Abd a l-M a lik asking him to appoint a new
governor. If he refused, they would denounce him, although they did
not expect him to refuse their request, since the Kharijites still formed a
' 1
constant threat to the authority of the Umayyads in Iraq. Most
enthusiastic among the Wujuh of Basra were the two Tamimites, al-H udh ail
_ _ — — — 2
ibn ‘ Imran al-Burjumi and f Abdallah ibn Hakim ai-M u jash i* i .
From this b a i‘ a and plan of action, many of the characteristics of
the revolt began to emerge: the in itia l grievance over the threat to their
pay acted as a focus for the Iraqi resentment of all the repressive measures
initiated by a l-H a jja j since his appointment. This protest against the over
activeness of a l-H a jja j bore elements of Iraqi dislike of Syrian domination.
One can also see traces of current social tensions in this revolt, for
exam ple, the ‘ A.sabiyya: the Rabi‘ a and their allies a l-A z d did not like
to submit to the Mudarites represented by a l-H a jja j, w hile the Tamimites
1. Ansab, X I , p . 281; K a m il, IV , p. 309; M ir* a t, V I , fo l. 15b; ‘ Ibar,

TiTTp”. 95. '
2. Arab, p .378; Kahhala, M u ‘ jam G a b a *il a M A r a b , I, p . 71; III,

p. 1038; Caskel, op, c i t . , II, p. 111.
256.
showed reluctance in submitting to the Q aisite sway.^
Hearing of the plans of Ibn al-Jarud and his followers, a l-H a jja j
* *—
took precautionary measures. He separated the Akhmas of Basra from the
A rbaf of Kufa by putting a heavy guard on the roads between them. He
,- 2
also put a guard around the treasury (Bayt a l-M a l).
After secret preparaiions, the rebels came into the open (Rabi* 11,76).
A ll the tribes, our authority says, rallied under the flag of Ibn al-Jarud ,
while a l-H a jja j was supported only by his intimate friends (Khassatihi) and
his fam ily. By cutting the bridge between the two camps, Ibn al-Jarud was
able to seize a l-H a jja j's store of weapons which were stored on the other
side of the river. However, a l-H a jja j did not surrender, and sent A 9 yun,
one of his m aw ali, to Ibn al-Jarud ordering him to come before him, or else
he would k ill him with his fam ily and all his supporters. But both the
3
messenger and his master were hum iliated, A ‘ yun being turned away.
Then Ibn al-Jarud and his followers marched against a l-H a jjc j,
* am
m
entered his MFustat u and plundered his property. Successful in this,
they decided to put off dealing with a l-H a jja j until the next morning
1. A I" Z ih e ri, NaqaMcj Jarir w al-Farazdaq, p. 178.
2. Ansab, X I, p . 281; K am il, IV , p .3 1 0 .
3. Ansab, X I, pp. 2 8 2 -3 ; Futuh , p . 281 (citing Mada* inT); K am il,

IV , p. 310; M ir* at, V I , fo l. 15b; ‘ Ibar, III, pp. 9 5 -6 .
257.
for their intention was not to k ill him, but to expel him from the country.
For this reason, the Yemenites carried off his first w ife , a daughter of
a l- N u ‘ man ibn Bashir al-A nsari, while the Mudarites took with them Um
■ » •
Salama, his second w ife .
Being left alone, a l-H a jja j became so desperate that he began
to think of fleeing the country to save his life . But to his side began to
drift the more hesitant of the rebels, those who had probably been forced
to join in the rebellion in the first place. A l-G hadban ibn a l-Q u b a ‘ thari
warned Ibn al-Jarud not to leave a l-H a jja j until morning, pointing out
•
how many had already gone over to his side, and how more might be
1
'expected to do so; this warning was ignored. Thus the rebels lost an
opportunity, which was to cost them their lives.
The jealousy of the clans made it possible for a l-H a jja j to play them
off one against the other. It is said that while ‘ Abdallah ibn al-Jaru d , a l-
HudiVaiI ibn ‘ Imran al-Burjumi and ‘ Abdallah ibn Hakim a l-M u ja s h i‘ i were
discussing their affairs in a council, ‘ Abbad ibn al-Husain a l-H a b ti came

• • . ■
to join them, but they refused to admit him. As a result of this slight, ‘ Abbad
and one hundred men went over to the side of a l-H a jja j. This so raised the
latter's morale that he is said to have declared: j,Now I do not care If nobody
else comes to my side. H ‘ Abbad *s action precipitated other divisions in the
1. Ansab, X I , p p .2 8 3 -4 ; K a m il, IV , p p .3 1 0 -1 1; M i r j a t , V I , fo 1.15b;

‘ Ibar, H i, pp. 9 6 -7 .
side of the rebels: it was followed by the desertion of G u taib a ibn Muslim
al-B ah ili and about thirty men from the tribe of A ‘ sur, to join a l-H a jja j
• •
This was a reflection of ‘ Asabiyya, for being a Q aislte like a l-H a jja j,
9 • mm
G utaiba could not tolerate the latter being left alone with both his life
and property exposed to danger. The same motive seems to have led both
Sabra ibn ‘ AM a l-K ila b i and 5 a ‘ id ibn Aslam ibn Z a r‘ a a l-K ila b i lo g o
over to the side of a l-H a jja j. In addition, some of the Azd and Bakr changed
to his side. Thus did a l-H a jja j succeed in playing the tribes against each
1
other for his own interest.
Feeling himself again strong enough to fig ht, a l-H a jja j joined the
rebels in battle. During the fighting, Ibn al-Jarud fe ll dead from a chance
arrow. His followers were so discouraged that they could not carry on the
battle and soon gave w ay, a fact which gave the victory to a l-H a jja j. The
latter issued a general pardon (Aman), but which excluded the two chief
instigators, al-H udh ail ibn ‘ Imran al-Burjumi and ‘ Abdallah ibn Hakim
a l-M u ja s h i‘ i : both were k ille d . Their bodies,with that of Ibn al-Jarud ,
were crucified, w hile their heads were sent to the camp of a l-M u h a lla b In
Ramhurmuz to discourage the Kharijites, who had banked on this revolt to
1. Ansab, X I , pp. 2 8 7 -8 ; K a m il, IV , p p .311 -1 2 ; M ir* at, V I , fols.

15b-16b; ‘ Ibar, III, p. 97.
provide them with an opportunity to invade Basra*
Settling the affairs in Rustuqabad, a i-H a jja j returned to Basra

• w - 9
and wrote to the cafiph informing him of the revolt and the steps he had
taken to suppress it, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik approved of his actions, and praised
his loyalty to him* Thus a l-H a jja j put down the first Iraqi revolt against
• —
himself and the Umayyad rule, and temporarily restored peace and discipline
in the country.
The Revolts of the Zanj
Having put down the revolt of ‘ Abdallah ibn al-Jaru d , a l-H a jja j
• ***
found himself confronted with another menace: the insurrection of the Zanj in
3
Ba§ra. They took advantage of the unrest and disorder of the time to ravage
and devastate the Euphrates area.
Unfortunately, apart from the brief account in Baladhuri, no other
early source says a word of this revolt. Among the late sources, only Ibn
a l-A th ir and Ibn Khaldun mention it, only to repeat the narrative of Baladhuri,
thus adding nothing to our knowledge. What complicates the issue further is
1. Khali fa ibn K h a yya t, Tarikh . I, p. 347; Mulpabbar, p .462; M a ‘ a rif,

pp. 147-6; Ansab, X I , pp. 2 8 8 -9 ; M a ‘qd fo l. 18b; Nasab, fo l.2 3 5 b ;
T a b ., I I , p p .8 7 3 -4 (citing Abu M ikhn af); Jolts, fo l.4 4 b ; Jamharat,
p. 279; ‘ Asakir, I I I , fo l. 180a; Mu ‘ jam , II, p. 834; Kamil, (V , p. 312;
M ir * a t, V I , fo l. 16a; DhahabT, III, p. 119 (quoting TabarT); Bidaya,
T X 7 ? 1 0 ; ‘ ibar, I I I , £797.
2. Ansab, X I, pp. 2 9 3 -4 .
3. The Zanj were gangs of forced-labourers, mainly drawn from imported

negro slaves from the East coast of A frica (hence their name), but - =
260.
that Baladhuri does not state clearly the reason for this revo lt, nor how
it was organised. He mentions Ahl a !-K a la ’ and others whom he calls
"Bidan‘ "(white people), as joining the revolt but gives no reason why
*
they should do so. Thus, regretfully, one can only present a very incomplete
account of the revolt.
Thei r first insurrection was during the governorship of Mus‘ ab
ibn a l-Z u b a ir in Basra. They mutinied and plundered the crops, but
Mus ‘ ab was too busy to take effective action against them. A fter Mus ‘ ab's
death, ‘ Abd a l-M a lik appointed Khalid ibn ‘ Abdallah ibn Asfd as governor
of Basra. The people complained to the new governor, urging him to put
an end to the devastating activities of the slaves. Khalid raised an army
against them, but before he could reach them, the Zanj dispersed. However,
some of them were seized and sent to the governor, who killed them and
crucified their bodies. ^ It has been stated that this event was less a rebellion
than a mutiny of gangs consisting of a small number of slaves living the life
2
of robbers.
Despite the severe punishment inflicted on them by K halid, the
slaves revolted again during the governorship of a l-H a jja j, utilizin g the
confusion that resulted from Ibn al-Jarud's rebellion. However, this time
= including also peasants of the surrounding country. They were

employed, under very poor working conditions, on the land In an ^
attempt to make the nitrous lands of Shatt a l - ‘ Arab cultivable. E. I.
(Zandj). According to Ja h iz, their tribes were Q unbula, Lanjawiyya,
Naml and K ilab . Bayan, Til, p .36; P ellat, Le M ilie u Basrien et la
Formation de G a h iz , p p .4 l- 2 , Paris, 1953.
1. Ansab, X I, p p .3 0 3 -4 (citing Rawh ibn ‘ Abd a l-M u *m in );K a m il, IV , ^
p .314; ‘ Ibar, 111, p . 98.
2. N old eke, Sketches from Eastern History, p. 152, English translation by
J .S . Black, London, 1892.
261.
their movement reached a new phase. It was no longer a mutiny of robbers,
but an organised revolt. In addition to the Zanj (black slaves), other
elements rallied themselves under the banner of the leader of the revolt.
«- 1
According to Baladhuri, Ahl a l-K a la ’ and other white poeple joined them.
2 -
By Ahl a l- K a la ’ he meant the Z u tt, whom Mada* ini describes as those
•*
3 - -
who were in the Tufuf area following the K ala’ , Some Persian mawali
possibly joined the revolt. The leader of the revo lt, a man called Riyah,
- 4
was given the title of Shir Z a n ji, a Persian name which means "the lion of
the Z a n j" . Unfortunately we know nothing of the social or political aims of
the Z a n j, beyond the safe assumption that they sought to improve their con
ditions, and doubless sought freedom; our ignorance of the details of the
revolt is the more frustrating since we do know that for a short period its
success was not inconsiderable.
Riyah Shir Zanji made his authority fe lt all over the Euphrates
region and Ubulld> a fact which led K irraz ibn M a lik al-S u lam i, the governor
of a l-H a jja j in the region, to fle e . Riyah went so far as to call himself the
1. Ansab, X i, p .305.
2. People of Indian origin, mainly from the Sind area, who were wandering
around the Persian G u lf. Futub, p p .373 (citing M a d a ’ in i), 375 (citing
‘ Awana), 377; A l- A li , al-Tangim at q i-ljtim a * iyya wal Iqti\sadiyya fil Ba§ra
fjI Oarn- al -Awwal a l-H ijr F,p. 7T; ibn MangOr, LisSn a l - ‘ Arab, V I I , p. 308;
A l-Z u b a id f, Taj a l - ‘ Arus, V , p. 146.
3. Futuh, p. 373.
4, Ansab, X I, p p .304, 305.

262.
"Commander of the Faithful" (AmTr a l-M u ?rnmin), ^ an indication of
his power, or perhaps of his ambitions.
Having suppressed the revolt of Ibn a l-Jaru d , a l- H a jja j sent an
army against Shir Zanji and his supporters, under the command of Hafs
ibn Ziyad ibn ‘ Amr a i - ‘Atki , whose father Ziyad was the police officer of
. 2
a l-H a jja j. But this army was routed, and its leader Hafs k ille d . Thus
• — • •
was Shir Zanji able to defy the government's forces.
The news of this defeat incensed a l-H a jja j and he threatened the
Basrans with a very severe punishment if they would not put an end to the
insurrection of their slaves and sweepers (Kassahin). Therefore, men from
every khums of Basra were recruited to re-inforce the regular M u q atila.
Both were under the command of the defeated governor of U bulla, Kirraz
ibn M a lik al-S u lam i. After a severe struggle, the Zanj were forced to
retreat to the desert of Dawraq. There a decisive battle took place in
which the Zanj and their leader were massacred after putting up a brave
- 3
fig ht, as indicated by the verses preserved in Baladhuri. This revolt of the
Zanj which a l-H a jja j succeeded in repressing, seems to have left no mark
on the Islamic society of the tim e. However, it is almost certain that it laid
the seed for the later revolt of the slaves in Basra in 2 5 5 /8 6 8 , which lasted
1. Ansab, XIJ? p . 305 (citing Rawh ibn ‘ Abd a !-M u ’ min)»
2. Ansab, X I, p p .3 0 4 -5 (citing Rawh ibn ‘ Abd a l- M u Jmin); Kam il, IV ,

p. 315; ‘ Ibar, I I I , p. 98.
3. Ansab, X I , p p .30 5 -7 (citing Rawh ibn ‘ abd q l-M u ?roin); K am il, IV ,

p . 3 1 5 ; ‘ Ibar, I I I , p . 98.
263*
for fourteen years and gave a severe shock to the whole fabric of the
‘ Abbasid empire.
The insurrection of the Azd in ‘ Uman
A l-H a jja j had to suppress another insurrection in ‘ Uman on the
G u lf coast of A rabia, led by the two Adzite brothers, Sa‘ id and Sulaiman
the sons of ‘ Abbad ibn al-Julanda ibn al-M ustaqir. The ‘ Umanis felt
their independent position in the Muslim empire to be threatened by the
energetic policies of a l- H a jja j, directed towards making the caliph's
authority effective throughout the Empire. The c iv il war between ‘ Abd a l-
M a lik and ‘ Abdallah ibn a l-Z u b a ir, together with the remoteness of ‘ Uman
from the central government, encouraged them to seize this opportunity of
re-asserting the independence they had maintained since the time of the
1 "
Prophet. O nly by successive m ilitary campaigns was a l-H a jja j able to
restore order there.
The imperial historical tradition does not usually concern itself
with minor events in the outlying provinces, and this revolt is dealt
with only summarily by the Arabic sources. O f the early sources, only
1. M ile s , The Countries and Tribes of the Persian G u lf, p . 34,

London, 1966.
264.
Khalifa ibn Khayyat,^ mentions it, briefly. The account of Ibn
2
‘ Asakir, of the later sources, is not only brief and confused, but is
also unreliable, since he tells it more as a fable than as history. However,
we are fu lly informed of the event by the eighteenth-century chronicler,
‘ Umani Sirhan ibn Sa‘ id a l-A z k a w i, in his annals entitled Kashf al-Ghum m a,
probably based on oral tradition.
N o date has been given for the earliest , unsuccessful, campaigns
that a l-H a jja j sent against Sa‘ id and Sulaiman . However, one can conclude
- 4
from the account of Ibn ‘ Asakir that it was before the revolt of ‘ Abd al-Rahman
»
ibn al-A sh‘ ath. ‘ Uman was not only an outlying province but also a
mountainous region d iffic u lt of access; its western borders were the desert
(the empty quarter) which could be used as an escape route in times of
emergency. This inaccessibility doubtless accounts for the failure of a l-
H ajja j ‘s in itia l campaigns. Not before the rebellion of Ibn a l -
1. Tarikh, I, p. 319.
2. ‘ Asakir, IV , pp. 167-B.
3. M S . in the B ,M . N o. O r.B 076. A part of this work has been

translated into English by E. C. Ross, C alcutta, 1874. The same
part has been edited by Hedwig K eiin, Hamburg, 1938. The
Kashf al-Ghumma was also copied, for the most part lite ra lly , by
another local historian called SalTI ibn Roziq in his work "History of
the ImGtns and Seyyids of ‘ Uman1*, translated and edited by G . Badger,
printed for the Hakluyt Society, M O C C L X X I.
4. ‘ Asakir, V I , p. 168.
Ash‘gth had been crushed did a l-H a jja j have a free hand to deal with * Uman
Then he despatched a large army under the command of al-Q asim ibn Sha‘ wa
a l-M u z a n t, by sea to ‘ Uman; but the A zdite cavalry, led by Sa‘ id and Sulaiman,
routed this army and killed its leader al-Q asirn. ^
When this alarming news reached a l- H a jja j, he was incensed and
eager for revenge. He kept the A zdite chiefs in Basra under close observation
to prevent them aiding the rebels, and raised an army of 4 0 ,0 0 0 from the
N izarites alone. The command of this army was given to M u ja ‘ a ibn
Sha‘ wa a l-M u z a n i, a brother of a l-Q a s im , killed in the last campaign. H alf
of this army took the land route, w hile the other half was sent by sea.
Sulaiman and his A zdite cavalry were able to defeat the land division, who
reached ‘ Uman ea rlier. M ean w h ile, M u ja ‘ a and the sea army marched on
Sa ‘ id after being informed that he had been left with a small body w hile his
brother, with the rest of their supporters, was fighting the army that had come
by land. Realizing that with such a small number of men he could not w ith
stand the large army of M u ja ‘ a , Sa‘ id retreated by night and took refuge in
2
the mountains; but he was pursued and besieged.
1. A zk a w i, fo l.3 2 6 b ; English translation, p. 10; K le in ,op* c it. , pp. 11-12;

Saiil ibn Raziq, op. c it . , pp. 1 -2 ; M iles, op. c it . , p . 50.
2. A zk a w i, fo l. 327a; English translation, pp. 1 0 -11 ; K lein , op. c it . ,

pp. 1 2 -1 4 ; SalTI ibn Raziq, op. c i t . , p p .2 -4 ; M ile s , op. c i t . , p . 52.
266%
When he heard of this, SuicnmGn came back to meet M u ja ‘ a in
battle, to release his brother. Csfore this, he had set fire to fifty of
M u ja ‘ a's ships, w hile the rest of the fleet managed to escape to sea.
Finding himself unable to cope with Sulaiman, M u ja ‘ a managed to escape
with his followers to a piece called J a lfar, from where he wrote to a l-H a jja j
asking for re~inforcements. The latter sent him five thousand Syrians under
‘ Abd al-Rahman ibn Sulaiman. Perhaps owing to a decrease in their local

■
support, Sa‘ id and Sulaiman perceived that they could resist no longer,
especially when they heard of these new re-inforcements. They fled with their
families and property to the land of the Zanj (East African Coast),^ where
they remained to their deaths.
Following their flig h t, M u ja ‘ a and ‘ Abd al-Rahman entered ‘ Uman
where they punished the inhabitants for their support of the rebels. Then a l -
H ajja j appointed al-K hayar ibn Sabra al-M ujashH i, governor of ‘ Uman, who
remained there until the death of a l-H a jja j, to face no more trouble from the
A zd.
The Revolt of ‘ A bd al-R ahman ibn Muhammad ibn al-Ash‘ ath
Far more dangerous than any of the other revolts was the revolt of ‘ Abd
al-Rahman ibn Muhammad ibn al-A sh ‘ ath , which shook the very foundations of
the Umayyad rule.
]. A zkaw i, fois. 327a-327b; English translation, p . 11; K le in , op. c it. ,

p - 1-4; S aliI ibn Raziq, op. c it* , p p .4 -5 ; E. I , ( A z d ) ; M ile s , op. c i t . ,
p. 53*
267.
In the year 7 8 /6 9 7 , after the recovery of Iraq from the K harijite

« - ]
threat, Khurasan and Sistan were added to the governorship of a l-H a jja j.
He appointed to govern Khurasan, a l-M u h a lla b ibn Abi Sufra, w hile to
Sistan he sent ‘ Ubaidallah ibn Abi Bakra al-T h aq a fi, At that tim e, the
first task of a governor of an outlying province was the "G h a zu 11, to subject
the bordering lands. The undertaking of the "G h azu11 both provided extra
revenue for the central government, and was an opportunity to train and
discipline the troops. For these reasons, ‘ Ubaidallah ibn Abi Bakra
undertook a campaign in 7 9 /6 9 8 against the King of Kabul and Zabul, the
„ 2 -
Zunbil who had been refusing to pay tribute to a l- H a jja j. W ith the troops
*
of Basra under his command, and Shuraih ibn Hani* a l-H a rith i at the head of
the Kufan troops, Ibn Abi Bakra advanced against the Z u n b il. The latter
enticed him far into the country, drawing him into the d iffic u lt passes of
Kabulstan and then cut him off in the rear. It was only by paying the Zunbil
5 0 0,0 00 or 7 0 0 ,0 0 0 dirhams, by leaving some of his followers, including
three of his sons, as hostages, and by promising not to invade his territory as
1. K halifa ibn K h a yya t, Tarikh , I, p . 297; Ansab, X I , p . 311 (citing

afcHaytham); Bui dan, p. 81; T a b ., II , p. 1033_ (citing Abu M ikhn af);
‘ Asakir, III, p. 129; Kam il, IV , p .362; M ir * a t, V I , fo .2 9 a ; Bidoya,
IX , p .2 1 ;M b a r , III, p .1 0 3 .
2
2. Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom and its F a ll, p p .231 -2 ; E. I. , (Ibn
al-A sh ‘ ath); Bosworth/S is td n under the Arabs from the Islamic Conquests
to the Rise of the § a f f a ^ s , pp. 3 4 -6 , Rome, 1968^ Mas‘ crcST, incorrectly,
however, makes him one of the Indian Kings. M u ru j, V , p .302.
long as he was governor, that Ibn Abi Bakra was able to retreat, ShGraifr
did not approve of this settlement, finding it humiliating to offer such
terms to the enemy. He wanned Ibn Abi Bakra that any sum he paid to the
Zunbil would be deducted by a l-H a jja j from the ‘ A ta* of the troops. A
group of the army under Shuraih then took the field against the Zunbil only
1
to suffer heavy losses in lives and Shuraih himself was k ille d . ‘ U baidallah,
however, had made peace with the Zunbil after explaining the resistance of
Shuraih as disobedience to his orders. The news of the heavy losses and
humiliating defeat infuriated a l- H a jja j, who wrote to the caliph asking
2
his permission to take vengeance on the Zunbil for the Muslims,
Receiving the permission of the caliph for his plan, a l-H a jja j
•
raised an army from Basra and Kufa,so numerous and magnificently equipped
- - 3
that it was called the “ Peacock army1*, (Jaysh al-Taw aw is). The command
of this army was given by a l-H a jja j to ‘ Abd al-Rahman ibn Muhammad ibn
. ~ » •
1. K halifa ibn Khayyat, Tdrikh./ 1/ p. 275; Futuh, p. 399; Ansab, p p .31 1-7
(citing M adaHnT); T a b ., I I , pp. 1036-38 (citing Abu MiCKnaf); Kami l ,
IV , p p .3 6 3 -4 ; M i r * a t , V I , fols, 31a-31b (citing MadcftnTJ; DhahabT,
III, p. 126 (quoting KhalTfa); concerning these heavy losses see also the
Diwan of A ‘ sha. H am dan,pp.3 1 7 -8 .
2. Ansab, X I , p . 318 (citing Abu M ikhnaf and ‘ Awana); T a b ., I I, pp. 1038

(citing Abu M ikh n af), 1042-3 (citing Abu M ik h n af); Kam il, IV , pp.364,
365. “ ~
3. Ansab, X I, p p .3 1 9-2 0 (citing Abu M ikhnaf and ‘ A w an a); T a b ., II,

p. 1046; TanbTh , p. 314; Kam il, IV , p . 367; M ir* at, V I, fo f.3 1 b .
269.
aI-A sh‘ ath a l-K in d i, a descendent of the pre-lslamic Kings of Kinda.
Conflicting reports ere to be found in the sources as to where ‘ Abd
al-Rahman sbn al-A sh ‘ ath was at the time of his appointment. According
* — _ •
T T T - 1
to Baladhuri, Tabari, Ibn a l-A th ir, Ibn Kathir and Ibn Khaldun, he was sent
_ 2
to Kirman to suppress a mutiny of Himyan ibn ‘ Adi al-Sadusi. Another
account in Tabari and Ghurar al-S iyar^ suggests that he was in Kufa and
accompanied the “Peacock army" from there. A third account says that he
- . 4 . 5
was fighting the K harijites. Finally, there is the account of Ibn A ‘ tham
which says that Ibn al-A sh ‘ ath was at the head of the “Peacock army11 when
it left Kufa, and on the march to Sistan, he put down the mutiny of Himyan
*
ib n ‘Adi al-Sadusi in Kirman: this last account seems the most convincing way
of reconciling the other accounts.^
1. Ansab, X I, pp. 320-1 (citing Abu ‘ Ubaida); T a b ., II, p. 1046; Kami I ,

IV , p p .3 6 6 -7 ; Bidaya, IX , p .32; ‘ Ibar, III , p. 105.
2. Himyan ibn ‘ Adi al-Sadusi was originally sent there to help the governor
of Sistan and of Sind, if necessary.
3. T a b ., II, p. 1044; Ghurar, fo l. 53.
4. Ansab, X I, p p .320 (citing Abu M ikhnaf and ‘ A w ana), 318.
5. K u fi, II, fo l. 101a.
6. M me L, V ecc ia V ag lieri prefers thefirst account simply ^because

it is a detailed one. This is perhaps because she had no access
to ibn A ‘ tham'o work (ai-Futub)» E. I . (I bn al-A sh ‘ ath).
270.
Cur mam source is Tabari, who follows almost exclusively the
narrative of Abu M ik h n a f, taken from his two books, Kitab Pair ql-Jam ajim
and KhaH <Abd al-Rahman Ibn al-A sh‘ ath and Kitab Hadith ya Himyara wa
M a q ta l’ ibn a l-A s M a th .^ Abu M ikhn af was a Kufite who died in 157 A . H. ,
and thus was very nearly a contemporary of the revolt. The next of our
sources is Baladhuri, who mainly reports the narrative of M ada* in i, which is
as detailed as that of Abu M ikhnaf, but which suffers from some gaps. However,
Ibn A*tham follows a quite different account which lacks both chronology and
consistency, but which agrees almost entirely with the narrative of Ghurar
a l-S iyar in its main outline. D inaw ari, however, as shown by M me L. V eccia
2
V a g fie ri, portrays the revolt as being the result of a religious dispute started
by propaganda from Ibn al-A sh *ath , declaring a l-H a jja j to be impious;
this so stirred the religious men that they started the revolt, Apart from Ibn
K athir, the late sources add no new information; they re-e d it the narratives
of the early sources. As for Ibn K athir, he is the only one among our authorities
to report the narrative of W aqidi which gives fresh information here and
there. Despite the fact that W aqidi's account confuses the battles of Dair
3
al-Jam ajim and Maskin with each other, yet is worthy of consideration,
1. Ibn a l-N a d im , Fihrist, p ,9 3 .
2. op. cit.
2
h / (Dayr al-D jam adjim ).
271.
There are two varying chronologies of the revolt. One gives the
year 81 as the beginning of the revolt, the year 82 for the battles of
Ba§ra, Kufa end Mas kin , and the year 83 for the battles of Sistan and
HI U
Khurasan. The other puts the dates a year later, i . e . 8 2 , 8 3 , 84,
respectively. Both chronologies are uncertain of the year of Ibn al-Ash* ath's
death, except that it was either in 84 or 85. Wellhausen^ studied this
2
question thoroughly and decided, I think justly, in favour of the first one.
3
In order not to repeat the same argument, as M me V eccia V a g lie ri has done,
I shall follow the same chronology as followed by Wellhausen.
In the year 8 0 /6 9 9 , * Abd al-Rahman ibn al-Ash*o,th and his army
arrived in Sistan, where he made a speech inviting the muqatila there to join
4
his army, which they did. An army from Tabaristan under his brothers a l -
Qasim and al-Sabbah is also said to have joined him. Hearing of this powerful
army sent against him, the Zunbil wrote to Ibn a I-A shf ath apologising for the
fate of the army of Ibn Abi Bakra, and offering him a plan for a peaceful
1. The Arab Kingdom and its F a ll, p p .2 4 1 -2 .
2. The coins struck in Fars in the year 81 A . H. support the chronology

which regards the beginning of the revolt as 81 A , H, W alker, A
Catalogue of the Arab-Sassanian Coins, pp. I X i i - I X i V , 117;
BoswomT^ op. c i t . , p . 61. However, another piece of numismatic
evidence favours the second chronology. M ile s , Some New Light on
the History of Kirman, pp. 9 6 -8 , W O I, 1959.
3. E .l.^ , (Ibn al~Ash*ath).
4* Ansab, X I , p p .321 (citing Abu M ik h n af), 3 2 2 -3 (citing M a d a *in i);

T a b ., II, pp. 10 44-5 (citing Abu M7I<hnaf); K am il, IV , p. 366; M ir*a t,
V l, fo l.3 1 b ; * Ibar, III, p. 105.
settlement. Ibn al-A^h* ath paid no heed to this and marched against the
- 1
Zunbil. Hoping thct he could trap him in the same way as he had Ibn
Abi Bakra, the Zunbil began to entice Ibn al-A sfrath far into the country
by withdrawing in front of him. But Ibn 01-Ash‘ ath was aware of this
strategy and was too cautious to be so trapped. He established garrisons
in every city or fortress he occupied, and assured his lines of communications
by linking these places by an organised postal service. A fter mastering a
considerable part of the country and securing valuable spoils, ibn al-A sh f ath
returned to Bust, postponing the m ilitary operations until the next spring
(8 1/70 0). He thought it wiser to let the soldiers get accustomed to the
2 . . . . . .
mountainous area and its severe w inter. He wrote to a l-H a jja j informing
him of his success and of the strategy he was employing. But a l-H a jja j,
quick and impatient as he was, wrote to him a series of humiliating and
arrogant letters ordering him to advance without delay far into the enemy's
territory and to fight him to the death; if he refused, he would give the
command to Ibn al-A sh‘ cth's brother, and reduce him to the rank of a simple
1. Ansab, X I , pp. 3 2 1 -2 (citing Abu M ikhn af), 3 2 2 -3 (citing Mada* in i);

T a b ., N, p . 1045 (citing Abu MikhnaTJ; KufT, II, fo l. 101 b; K am il,
iV , p .366; M ir * a t, V i , fo L 31 b ; Bidaya, IX , p .32; * Ib a r, I II , p. 105.
2. Ansab, X I? p . 223 (citing M a d a *in i); Y a ( qubi, I I , p . 331; T a b .,M l,

pp. 1045-6 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); K a m il, IV , pp. 3 7 3 -1 ; M ir 7at, V I ,
273.
1
soldier to serve beneath him.
Deeply offended by a l-H a jja j's aggressive letters, which depicted
him as an inefficient coward, Ibn a!-A sh( ath decided to avenge himself.
He ordered a meeting of the chiefs among his followers, during which he
told them of the orders of a i-H a jja j and revealed his intention to defy him.
He pointed out that his own strategy had been approved by a ll the
experienced men among them, and said that he was more concerned for their
welfare than a I -H a jja j. Finally, he told them, 111 am only one of you: if
you want to march, I shall march; if you refuse, I shall refuse. “ They a ll
2
shouted, "We w ill not obey the enemy of G od, a l- H a jja j. n Another
7 . 3
version is given by Baladhuri, Ibn A f tham and the author of Ghurar a l-S iy a r,
who say that Ibn al-A sh‘ ath, before holding the meeting, fabricated a letter
in which he represented a l-H a jja j as ordering him to depose some chiefs of their
posts and k ill ;*others, in an attempt to aggravate their hatred and discontent.
In fa c t, little aggravation was needed: the harsh policies of a l-H a jja j at
home, and the prolonged wars in distant lands were enough to lead the
1* Ansab, X I , p p .3 2 3 -4 (citing M a d a *in i); Y a tfqubi, I I , p . 331; T a b .,

II, pp. 1052-3 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); Tanbih, p . 314; Bad*, V I ,
p. 35; K am il, IV , p .317; M irH ilt, V I, fols. 32a, 37 a-3 7b ; Dhahabi,
III, p. 128; Bidaya, IX , p .3 5 ; * Ib a r, III, p. 106; Ferier, V ie d 'a l-
H ajjaj ibn Yusuf, p. 162, Paris, 1904.
2. Ansab, X I, p p .3 2 4 -5 (citing M a d a *in i); T a b ., II, p p .1053-4 (citing

Aba M ikh n af); Kuff, II, fols. 101 b-102a; G h u ra r, fo l. 53; Kami I , IV ,
p .371; /STir*at, V I , fo l.3 7 b ; DhahabT, I I I , p. 128; Bidaya, IX , p . 35;
* Ibar, 111, p. 106.
3. Ansab, X I , p . 325 (citing M ada’ in i); KufT, I I , fo l. 101b; Ghurar, f o l . 53.

274.
Iraqis to give such a reply to Ibn al-A sh4ath. He need do no more than
remind them of their grievances to get their support. Abu a l-T u fa il
4Amir Ibn W athila al-K in an i was the first to announce the deposition,
(K hal4) of a l-H a jja j; and 4Abd a l-M u ’ min ibn Shbath ibn Rab4 i a l -
Tamtmi invited the troops to march on Iraq to expel the hated governor.
They swore an oath of allegiance to Ibn al-Ash4ath. ^ It is highly sig
nificant that both Abu a l-T u fa il and 4Abd a l-M u ?min were not only Kufans,
2
but also former sincere adherents of a l-M u k h ta r. Thus the first men to declare
publicly the revolt were from Kufa with Shi4ite inclinations.
In order to be free to carry out this scheme, Ibn al-A sh 4ath
made peace with the Zunbil on the following terms: if Ibn al-A sh 4ath
was victorious, he would grant the Zunbil an exemption from paying the
tribute as long as he was in power; if he were defeated, the Zunbil would
3 T
give him refuge. It was advantageous for the Zunbil to accept this offer,
for even in the case of Ibn al-A sh 4ath's defeat, this war with a l-H a jja j
would not only leave the Zunbil unmolested for a w h ile , but would also
weaken a l-H a jja j and the government of a l-lra q . Before marching on Iraq,
Ibn al-Ash4athr also appointed governors for the important towns of Sistan,
AnsSb, X I, p p .3 2 5 -6 (citing M ada4 inT); T a b ,, II,p p . 1054-5 (citing Abu

M ikh n af); K a m il, IV , p p .371 - 2 ; M ir 'a t , V I , fo l.3 7 b ;P h a h a b T ,ill,
pp. 128-9; Bidaya, I X , pp. 3 5 -6 (citing Abu M ik h n af); 4 Ibar, 111, p . 106.
Professor Bosworth attributes the speech given by 4Abd a l-M u 7min ibn
Shabath ibn Rab^T al-TamTml to Ibn al-A sh 4atT}. Perhaps the sim ilarity of
the two names has caused this confusion. See Sistan under the Arabs
From the Islamic Conquest to the Rise of the JaffarTds, p . 59.
2. Ansab, fol.261.a; T a b ., II, p p .654, 694 (citing Abu M ikhn af).

3, Ansab, X I, p .3 2 7 ; Futuh, p .400; Y a 4qubi, II, p . 332; T a b ., I I , p. 1055 ~
275.
such as Bust and Z a ra n j. (8 1 /7 0 0 ).
On the march to Iraq, the poet A 4sha Hamdan was with Ibn ai~
Ash4ath, reciting verses celebrating the occasion. ^ These verses are
important in that they reveal a religious conviction behind the revolt, for
a l-H a jja j is depicted as of bad fa ith . Moreover, the verses show clearly
that both the M a 4adites and the Yemenites (Hamdan, M adhhij and Oabtan)
a llie d themselves against a l-H a jja j and his tribe, Thaqif. This is supported
**• — 2 „ — me
by evidence in al-Farazdaq's Diwan and Baladhuri. M V eccia V agliert
in w riting, “ Ibn al-A sh 4ath had put himself at the head of the l<ahtanis and
3
Hamdanis against the M a 4adis and the Thaqafis1' has misunderstood these
verses of a l- A 4sha. In fa c t, the revolt of Ibn al-A sh 4ath was one of the
rare occasions where we find the Northern and Southern 4Arabs standing
together against a common foe. It was the first time that the Mudarites found
it not unacceptable to follow a Yemenite leader, and in which their 4Asabiyya
to their country, Iraq, was stronger than their tribal loyalties.
When Ibn al-A sh4ath and his rebel army reached Fars, they realised
that the deposition of a l-H a jja j could not be separated from a revolt against
*Abd a l- M a lik . Consequently, the rebels renounced the latter and paid
(citing Abu M ikhn af); Kam il, IV , p . 372; M ir * a t , V I , fol .37b;

Bidaya , IX , p. 36; 4 Ib a r / III, p. 107.
1. A 4 sha Hamdan, D iw an , p . 342; T a b ., II, p. 1056; Agh . , V , p. 159

(citing Miubarrad); M ir* at , V I,fo l.3 7 b ; M ukhtasar, I, p . 208.
2. Farazdaq, DTwan, I, pp. 2 3 9 -4 1 ; Ansab, X I , p. 334.
3. E. I. (Ibn al-A s h 4ath). However, Baladhuri reports, on doubtful evidence,

that a l-H a jja j kfTTed some Yemenite Syrians who joined Ibn a I -Ash4ath
under the impetus o f4Asabiyya. Ansab, fo l.2 7 b .
homage to Ibn al-Ash4ath , thus leading the revolt into a new phase. They
paid homage to ibn al-A sh 4ath in accordance with the “ Book of G od, the
Sunna of the Prophet, the deposition of the Imams, of error (A* immat ai
D<$ialc&), and the Jihad against a l-M u h illin " . ^ This Bai4a w ill be
discussed later.
Ibn al-A s h 4ath is said to have written to a l-M u h a lla b ibn AbT Sufra
inviting him to join the revolt, but he refused and warned Ibn al-A sh4ath
2
not to spill the blood of the Muslims. It is also said that a l-M u h a lla b wrote
to a l-H a jja j advising him not to fight the Iraqis before they reached their
home, for as soon as they could be with their wives and children again, they
would lose interest in revolt. A l-H a jja j, however, did not follow this
a d vice.^
When the news of the homage paid to Ibn al-A sh 4ath reached a l-
H a jjS j, he went to Basra and sent an urgent letter to the caliph asking for
4
Syrian forces; the caliph, equally alarmed by the news, sent him one
1. Ansab, X I , p . 334; T a b ., II, pp. 1057-8 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); Tanbih ,

p .314; M u ru j, V , p p .3 0 2 -3 ; Kami I, IV , p .373; M ir ’ a t, V I , fol .37b;
Bid ay a , IX , p. 36; 4 Ibar, III, p. 107.
2. Ansab, X I, p .329 (citing Wahab ibn Ja rir), 3 3 5 -6 ; T a b ., II, pp. 1058-9;

Kafr, II, fo l. 102a; M irât, V I , fo l.3 8 a ; Bidaya, IX, p . 36.
3. Ansab, X I , p .3 3 6 ; J a b ., I I , p. 1059; KSmil, IV , p .373; M ir ’ a t, V I,
fo l. 38a; Bidaya, I X , p . 36; 4 Ibar, II I , p. 107.
4. On this occasion 4Abd a l-M a lik is said to have sought the advice of
Khalid ibn Y azid ibn M u 4aw iya, who told him that he should not worry
since the threat had come from Sistan and not from Khurasan. Ansab, X I,
p. 337; T a b ., II, p. 1059; K am il, IV , p. 373; M ir ’ atT V i , fo l.3 8 a ;
Bidaya, IX , p. 36, Professor Bosworth refers to tfiis~account and regards -
277.
detachment' after the other continually.
it would appear that Ibn al-A sh4ath spent a considerable time in
Fars, for he minted his own dirhams. ^ The first encounter between his army and
a l-H a jja j took place on the 10th Dhul H a jja , 81/25th January, 7 0 1 ,^ near
Tustar. A l-H a jja j's forces were defeated, and consequently a l-H a jja j
withdrew to Basra; but finding no support there, he left and established
himself in a l-Z a w iy a . During this tim e, they were hard-pressed by the lack
of provisions, which led a l-H a jja j to confiscate the food supplies of the
3
merchants. M eanw h ile, Ibn al-A sh 4 ath entered Basra unchecked, and was
= it as evidence of a "relative decline, at this tim e, in terms of m ilitary

resources and man power, of Sistan as compared with Khurasan."
Sistan Under the Arabs From the Islamic C onquest to the Rise of the
JaffarTds, p. 61. However, Ibn A 4tham reports this event and says that
4Abd al -M a lik sought Khalid's advice, because the latter was well
informed of the "days of the people" and the "books of dissention"
( V.C: Ibn A 4tham also says that
4Abd a l-M a lik asked Khalid whether it was the time when "the Black
Banners ) would appear as a sign of the cessation of
"Cur M u lk " . Khalid told him not to worry unless the danger came from the
"Bottom of M e rv ". K ufl, II, fo l. 104b. Very similar to this is the account
of the author of Ghurar a l-S iy a r, f o l.55. The anticipatory character of
this account leads us to question its authenticity.
1. W alker, op. c it . , pp. IX ii i- lX iV ; Bosworth, op. c it . , p . 61.
2. Sa4d, V I I , i i , p. 177 (citing al-H aytham ); K halifa ibn K h ayyat, TarTkh ,

I, p p .36 2-3 (citing M ada’ inT); Ansab, X I, p .341 (citing al-Ffaytham );
Y a 4qub!, II, p . 332; T a b ., I I , pp. 1060-1 (citing Abu M ikhn af); K uff, II,
fols. 105a; 105b; Ghurar^, fo Is .5 5 -6 ; TanbTh, p p .3 1 4 -5 ; Bad’ , V I , p .36;
K am il, IV , p . 374; M ir ’ a t , V I , fo l.3 8 a ; DhahabT, III, p p .2 2 6 -7 ; Bidaya,
IX , pp. 3 6 -7 ; 4 Ibar, Mi, p. 107. _
Ansab, X I, pp. 3 4 0 -1 ; K ufl, II, fo l. 106a.

278.
_ ]
met with a very enthusiastic reception, especially by the G u rra’
and elderly men. He dug a trench and set up fortifications. After about
a month of skirmishes, a battle was joined on 28th Muharram, 8 2 /e a rly
March 70 1, in which many G u rra’ were kille d . Thanks to the perseverence
of a l-H a jja j and the skill of his Syrian leader, Sufyan, Ibn aUAbrad a l-
■r 2
K alb i, he eventually was victorious.
Following this defect in a l-Z a w iy a , Ibn al-A sh 4ath left Basra and
went to Kufa. With him were his Kufan soldiers, as w ell as some cavalry
from Basra. In Basra, he left 4Abd al-Rahman Ibn 4Abbas al-Hashim i a l -

♦ * •
Gurashi, who continued the struggle only for a short w h ile , because the
majority of the Basrans accepted the Aman of a l-H a jja j and opened the
1. Literally, the readers of the Q u r’ an. Their first appearance is

said to have been at the time of Abu Musa al-A sh f ari. They received
high payments, regardless of their tribe or their participation in the
early conquests. They also gained the financial support of some wealthy
men. Thus they held a high status, both religiously and m aterially.
Their number increased steadily and many Ashraf as w ell as mawulT
joined them. They played a distinctive role in the battle of Siffin;
and ten thousand mawali from among them are said to have joined the
Kharijites. H jjy a , V , p .61; A l - 4AIT, A l-T anzim at a l-ljtim a 4 iyya wal
iqfi^sadiyya fil Basra fil Qarn q l-A w w a fa T -H ijrt, p p .4 4 -6 .
2. K halifa ibn K h a yya t, T a rik h ., I pp. 364 (citing M a d a ’ Ini and Abu1!
Yaqdan), 36 8-7 0 (citing Abu 4 Ubaida); M a 4ar if, p. 156; Ansab, X I,
p p .3 4 1 -8 ; T a b ., II, pp. 1063-66 (citing Abu M ikhn af); Kuft, II, fols.
106a-106b; Ghurar, fo ls .5 6 -8 ; Tanbih, p p .3 1 4 -5 ; M u 4jam , II, p . 911;
Kam il, IV , p p .3 7 4 -5 ; M ir ’ a t, V I, fols. 38 a -4 0 a ; S a f a d r /a l-W a ft b i1! -
W afayat, X V I, fo Is.228b -229a; Bidaya, IX , pp03 7 -9 ; Waqidi* here
confuses this battle with that of Dair al-Jam ajim ; 4 Ibar, I I I , p. 107.
279.
way for him through the c ity . As a result, *Abd al-Rahman with a
1
small group of followers left Basra and joined their leader in Kufa.
Ibn al-Ash* ath probably chose Kufa for his next centre because it
was his home c ity , where he could count on the support of his tribe and
friends.
However, on his arrival there, he found himself obliged to drive
out M atar ibn N a jiy a al-Tam im i, who had taken hold of the Qasr (the
government centre) there, after turning out the Syrian garrison left by a l-
H ajjaj* M atar was an officer of a l-H a jja f in a l-M a d a ’ in , who took
advantage of the troubled situation to seize Kufa. W ith the help of Hamdan,
2
kinsmen of Ibn al-A sh *ath , the latter was able to force M atar to submit.
The Kufans received Ibn al-Ash* ath very warm ly, and his army was
re-inforced by many elements who were discontented with the Umayyads.
M ean w h ile, a l-H a jja j left Basra to his cousin Ayyub ibn A bi'l-H akam ibn
. — . .
*A q il a l-T h a q a fi, and made his way through the desert to Kufa. Being
harrassed on route by *Abd al-Rahman ibn * Abbas al-Hashim i with a
1. H ad hif. p. 23; Khalifa ibn K h ayyat, Tarikh, I, p .365; Ansab, X I ,

p p .2 4 8 -9 , 355 l e i ting al-Haytham*); Y a *q u b f, II, p .332; Nasab,
fo l. l l a ; T a b . , II, p. 1066 (citing Abu M ik h n af); KufT, I I , fo l. 106b;
G hurar, fo ls .5 7 -8 ; TanbTh, p. 315; BakrT, I I , p. 373; K a m il, IV ,
p. 375; M ir* a t , V I , fo l.4 0 a ; A l-S a fa d t, op. c it. , X V I, fo l. 299a; Bidaya,
IX , p . 4 0 ; * lb a r , III, p. 108.
2. K halifa ibn Khayyat, Tarrkh , I, p .365 (citing M ada* in i); Ansab, X I ,

p p .3 5 3 -5 , 355 (citing al-H aytham ), 3 5 6 -7 (citing Abu M ikhnaf);
Nasab, fo l. 17a; T a b ,, II, pp. 1069-71 (citing Abu MikhnaTJ; K u ff, II,
fo l. 106b; Jamharat, p. 215; Kam il, IV , p . 376; M ir * a t , V I , fo l.4 0 a ;
Bidaya, IX , p .40 (citing W aqidt); * Ibar, III, p. 108.
28C,
detachment of cavalry, a l-H a jja j was forced to pitch his camp in
Dair Q arra; nevertheless, this position facilitated easy communication
with Syria, from where he received constant re-inforcements. Ibn a l -
Ash *ath left Kufa with his enormous army ^ and made his camp in Dair
al-Jam ajim (Rabi* I, 8 2 /A p ril, 70 1). Both sides dug trenches and for
2
months engaged in indecisive encounters. The more prolonged the war
between a l-H a jja j and Ibn al-Ash* ath, the more the caliph , * Abd a l-M a lik ,
became alarmed. However, on the advice of some Guraishite and Syrian
dignitaries, he decided to negotiate with the rebels in an attempt to find a
peaceful settlement. He therefore sent another Syrian army under the
command of his brother Muhammad and his son * A bdallah, charging them to
propose terms to the Iraqis if they would submit. If they refused, the
army and its two leaders were to join a l- H a jja j, and be under his command.
These were the terms to be offered to the Iraqis: a l-H a jja j was to be removed
from Iraq, their pay (*Atc7) was to be raised to be euqal to that of the Syrians,
and Ibn al-A sh*ath was offered the governorship of any town in Iraq he wished
for life . A l-H a jja j tried to dissuade the caliph from offering such terms but
1• His army is said to have numbered 20 0 ,0 0 0 m en,h alf of them on the

regular pay roll , w hile the other half were m aw afi. T a b ., II, p. 1072
(citing Abu M ikhn af); K a m il, IV , p . 377; M ir * a t , V I , fo l.4 0 a ,
2. Abu Yusuf, Kitab al-Kh.araJ p. 57; K halifa ibn Khayya t, TarTkh , 1,

p . 356; Ansab, fo l. 15b; YcfqubT, l l / T l / p .3 3 2 ;"T a b ., II, pp. 1071-3
(citing Abu M ik h n a f); K ufi, II, fo l. 107a; Ghurar, f o l. 58; Tanblh,
p ,3 1 5 ; BakrT, II, p . 573; Mu* jam , II, p . 685; K am il, IV , p . 377; M ir* a t,
V I , fo l.4 0 a ; B idaya, IX , p740 (citing WagicffJT* lbar, III,p . 108.
3. Ansab, fo l. 16a; T a b ., II, p . 1083 (citing Abu M ikhn af); K ufi, ll,fo ls .
107a-107b; Ghurar, f o l . 5 8 , here, as in K u fi, no mention of a pay rise
is given; K a m il, IV , p .377; M ir* a t, V I , f o l . 40a; Bidaya, IX , p . 41
(citing WQqtdT); * Ibar, 111, p. 108.
281.
in vain.
In spite of Ibn a I-Ash* ath's attempts to persuade the rebels to accept
these terms, the Iraqis, hot-headed by temperament, refused and
(t w
once more denounced the b a i*a of *Abd a l-M a lik . They were banking on
the fact that a l-H a jja j and his Syrian troops were suffering from a lack of
provisions, but their calculations were mistaken. The Syrians, despite their
diffic u ltie s, stood firm and as a result, the Iraqis lost their chance to rid
themselves of a l-H a jja j and to gain a pay increase.
Consequently, the fighting was resumed and it lasted for one
hundred days. The most enthusiastic of Ibn alÂsh* ath "s followers were
the Gurra* in the fighting against a l-H a jja j; they placed themselves as a
separate squadron under Jabala ibn Zahr ibn Gais a l- J u * f i, and showed
a remarkable bravery. But their enthusiasm was lost after the death of their
leader and they soon dispersed. On Jumada II, 8 2 /J u ly 7 0 1 , the decisive
b attle of D air al-Jam ajim was joined. A t first, the Iraqis gained the
upper hand but when al-A brad ibn Q arra al-Tam im i,on the right wing of
Ibn al-Ash*ath*s army, was unable to withstand the attack of the Syrian
Sufyan, ibn al-A brad a l-K a lb i, and therefore gave w ay, the Iraqis inter
preted this as treason, and were so discouraged that they fled . In vain Ibn a l -
Ash* oth tried to rally them again* Their flig h t was fa cilitate d by the Aman
issued by a l-H a jja j. Ibn al-Ash* ath himself was forced to flee with some of
his supporters. He first entered Kufa, where he took leave of his fam ily, and
282.
then went in the direction of Basra. M ean w h ile, a l-H a jja j entered
Kufa, where he executed a large number of the captured rebels.^
However, the defeat of Ibn al-A sh ‘ ath was not yet completed.
Some of his followers with Muhammad ibn Sa‘ d ibn Abi Waqqas took
« •
possession of al-M ad a* in. But they soon left their position on hearing
that a l-H a jja j was advancing against them, and joined their leader in
• i—^
2
Maskin. At the same tim e, ‘ Ubaidallah ibn ‘ Abd al-Rahman ibn Samura
*
. 3
al-O urashi succeeded in seizing Basra for Ibn al-A sh ‘ ath. But the
latter could not stay long enough in the city and returned to Maskin on the
D u ja il. A l-H a jja j spent a month in K u fa , after which he went in pursuit
of Ibn a l-A s h ‘ ath and his followers. They met in Maskin where a long
and severe struggle took place. Finally, in Sha‘ ban 82/September 701,
Ibn a l-A s h ‘ ath was defeated decisively and his followers fled across the
1. Sa‘ d, V I I , ii, p. 177 (citing al-H aytham ); K halifa ibn K h a yya t,

TarTkh, Itf, p. 368; Ansab, fols. 17a-18b (citing Abu a I—Mukhariq
al-Rasibij; T a b ., II, pp. 1086-95 (citing Abu M ikh n af); K ufl, II,
fols. 107b-T08b; Ghurar, fo ls .5 9 -60 ; Tanbih, p .3 1 5 ;M u ru j, V ,
p .304; Bad^ , V I , p .36; BakrT, II, p p .5 7 3 ,5 7 4 ; 593;Mu* jam , I I ,
p p .652, 685; Kam il, IV , p p .3 7 8 -9 , 3 8 3 -6 ; M ir * a t, V I , fo ls .4 0 a -
40b, 42b~43b (citing al-H aytham ), 43b; Dhahabf, I I I , p p .2 2 7 -8 ,
229; Bidaya, IX , p p .4 1 -2 (citing WaqicfiTT'47-8; ‘ Ibar, I I I , pp. 109-10
Shadharat, I, I, p . 92. It is said that the Qaisites fought very
courateously in the battle against Ibn al-A sh‘ ath, J a r ir , DTwan,
p. 264; Naga* id , I, p .410.
2. Ansab, fo l. 18a; J a b ., I I , p. 1098-9 (citing Abu M ikhn af); K ufi, II,

fo l. 109b; Ghurar, f o l. 60; Kam il, IV , p . 3 8 6 ; ‘ Ibar, III, p . 110.
3. Nasab, fo l. 18b; T a b ., II, pp. 1098-9 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); Jamharat,

p .67; Kamil, IV , p . 386; ‘ Ibar, II I , p. 110.
283.
D ujail riv e r, where many of them were drowned. ^
Ibn al-Ash* ath and those who survived the battle of Maskin
retreated towards SistcTn. But a detachment of Syrians under * Umara
ibn Tamim al-Lakham i, accompanied by a l- H a jja j‘s son, was sent to
pursue them. They reached Ibn al-Ash* ath at Sus, where the rebels were
defeated and fled to Sabu”r. Here Ibn a I-Ash* ath was joined by the Kurds
and with their help was able to defeat the Syrians when they met in battle.
However, Ibn al-Ash*ath continued his march until he reached Kirman,
and then went on to Sistan, But his governor of Z a ra n j, a Tamimite called
‘ Abdallah ibn * Amir a l-B a *a r, refused to let him enter the c ity ; w hile his
governor of Bust, * lyad ibn Himyan al-Sadusi, took him prisoner, hoping
thus to get the favour of a l- H a jja j. However, the Zunbil forced the
governor of Bust to free Ibn al-Ash* ath and took the latter with him to
1. K halifa ibn K h ayyat, Tarikh, I, p .368; Ansab, fo l. 18a; Y a*q u b i,

II, pp. 3 3 2 -3 ; T a b ., I I , pp. 1099-1101 (citing Abu M ikhn af); K ufi,
II, fols. 109b-110a; Ghurar, f o l . 61; both the author oFThis work
and Kufi give the name al-M aftij? instead of Maskin; Tanbih , p. 315;
Kam il, IV , p p .3 8 6 -7 ; M ir * a t, V I , f o l.43 (citing Ibn al-K albT ); * Ib ar,
I I I , pp. 110-1 1. The account found in T a b ., II, pp. 11 23-5, which
makes the defeat of Ibn al-Ash*ath a result of the guidance given
a shepherd to the troops of a l-H a jja j, seems unconvincing; for it is
neither reported with a chain of authority nor has if any support in
other early sources. It is probably, therefore, an anti-Syrian tra
dition trying to find justification for the defeat of the Iraqis.
2. Ansab, fo l. 18a; M a *a d , fols. 111 a - 1 11 b; Ghurar, fo ls .6 2 -3 ; Kam il,

IV , p .387; M ir* a t, V I , fo!43b (citing Ibn al-K alb T ), * Ib a r, III,
p. 111.
284.
“ 1
Kabul, and showed him great honour. This treatment Ibn al-A sh*ath
received from the ZunbM was due to the agreement between the two some
time e a rlie r.^
M eanw hile, how ever, *Ubaidallah ibn *Abd al-Rahman ibn Samura
al-Qurash I and *Abd al-Rahman ibn * Abbas al-H ashim i, with followers
numbering 6 0 ,0 0 0 Iraqi fugitives, gathered in Sistan. They invited Ibn
al-A sh*ath to resume the struggle and he accepted. First they marched
against Z aranj, where they took the city and punished the unfaithful governor,
*Abdallah ibn *Amir a l-B a *a r. At this tim e, * Umara ibn Tamim and the
Syrian army were approaching, and being afraid of the Syrians, Ibn a l -
Ash* ath*s followers forced their leader to enter Khurasan, where Y azid
ibn a l-M u h a lla b was governor. They chose Khurasan thinking that as it was a
large country, they would either not be attacked at a ll, or else would be
able to find some place of refuge there where they could maintain themselves
until the deaths of a l-H a jja j and * Abd a l-M a lik . They also hoped to get the
support of the people of Khurasan. In vain did Ibn a I-Ash* ath try to convince
them that entering Khurasan would only lead them into the necessity of
fighting both Y a zid ibn a l-M u h a lla b and the Syrians, However, at this
1. Ansab, fols. 18a-18b; T a b ., II, p p .1101-2 (citing Abu M ikhnaf);

Kffft, II, fols. 11 lb -1 1 2 a ; Ghurar. f o l .63; K am il, IV , p . 388; M ir * a t,
V I , fo l.4 3 b (citing Ibn al-K albT); Bidaya, IX , p .48 (citing WaqidTj;
* Ibar, 111,pp* 111—112.
2. See p. £/
285.
point, f Ubaida!lah ibn *Abd al-Rahman ibn Samura, with two
thousand men, deserted and began to urge the others to do likewise.
N o reason has been given for this move, but presumably Ibn Sapiura
realised that Ibn al-A sh*ath had lost control over his followers and so
was no longer fit to lead. This had the result of deciding Ibn al-Ash* ath
to rely on the Iraqis no more, because of their disunity and fickleness, and
be made his way back to the Zunbil with a remnant of supporters. The rest
paid homage to *Abd al-Rahman ibn a l-* Abbas al-Hashim i and entered Herat,
killin g al-Ruqad a l-A z d i, an official of Y azid ibn a l-M u h a lla b . Therefore,
Y azid was forced to retaliate and sent an army under his brother al -
M ufaddal, which inflicted a crushing defeat on them. M a n y , including the
leader, fe ll prisoners.^ Ibn a l-M u h a lla b , because of his *Asabiyya to the
2
Yemenites, released these, and sent the rest of the prisoners to a l- H a jja j,
who executed a large number of them.
M eanw h ile, some five hundred of Ibn al-A sh*ath's followers, under
Mawdud ibn Bishr a l-N a d a ri, were still holding out in Z aran j, although they
1. K halifa ibn K h a y y a t, Tarikh, I, p p .3 6 7 -8 ; Ansab, fols. 18b -l 9b;

T a b ., II, pp. 1 1 04-10(citing Abu M ik h n a f), however, the narrative
of M ada* inT (T a b ., II, p. 11 lO ff.) is somewhat different from that
of Abu M ik h n a f.; Kufl", II, 112a; Ghurar,fo ls . 6 3 -6 ; K a m il, IV ,
p p .3 8 8 -9 0 ; M ir* a t, V I, fo l.4 4 a (citing Ibn a l-K a lb i); Bidaya, IX ,
p p .4 8 -9 (citing WaqidT); * Ibar, II I , p. 112; Tarikh - i Sistan, p p .116-7.
2. Ansab, fols, 1 9 a -1 9 b ; Y a *q u b i, II, p. 330; T a b ., II, pp. 1120-2

(citing Abu *U baida); Kufi', I I , fo l. 112b; M ir 'a t , V I , fo l.5 1 b .
286.
eventually submitted when * Umara ibn Tamim granted them Amam
(approved by a l-H a jja j), so becoming master of the whole of Sistan. ^

* * •* *
Now only *Abd al-Rahman ibn a I-Ash* ath himself remained a
possible danger to a l-H a jja j. A l-H a jja j, therefore, wrote repeatedly
to the Zu nb il, in turn threatening him and offering him inducements, to
persuade him to hand over Ibn al-A sh*ath. At last a l-H a jja j succeeded, by
-r 2
exempting the Zunbil from the payment of tribute for seven or ten years.
This agreement was reached in the year 8 5 /7 0 0 . Our sources give different
versions of the death of Ibn a I-Ash* ath. He is said to have been killed by
” 3 A
the Zunbil himself, or to have died in his bed,of consumption, and his
severed head sent to a l- H a jja j. Finally, there is the generally accepted
account which says that he was put in chains and delivered to * Umara ibn
Tamim, who was to take him to a l-H a jja j. However, on the way to Iraq, he
1. Ansab, fo l.1 9 b (citing Mada* in i); T a b ., II, p p .1132-3 (citing Abu

M ikh n af); K a m il, IV , p. 399; M ir* a t, VS, fo l. 52b; * Ibar, III, p. 116.
2. Ansab, fo ls.20a-20b (citing al-Haytham and M ada* in i); Y a *q u b i, II,

p p.3334; J a b ., II, pp. 1133-3 (citing Abu M ik h n af); KufT, I I , fols. 112b-
113a; Ghurar, fo ls .6 6 -7 0 ; Tanbih, p p .3 1 5 -6 ; Bad*, V I , p p .3 6 -7 ; Kamil
IV , p p .39 9-4 00; M ir * a t, V I , fo l.5 3 a ; Mukhtasar, I , p . 208; Bidaya,
IX , p. 53; * Ibar, III, p. 116.
3. Ansab, fo l.2 0 a ; J a b ., II, pp. 1133-4 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); K a m il,

IV , p. 399; B idaya, IX , p . 53; * Ibar, II I , p. 116; ShqcfFTarat, i, p. 94.
4. Ansab, fol.2G a; T a b ., II , p. 1134 (citing Abu M ikhn af); KufT, I I , fo l.

113a; K a m il, IV,* p p .399-400; B idaya, IX , p . 53; * Ibar, III, p . 116.
287.
threw himself from a rooftop at Rukhkhaj;^ and then his head was severed
and sent to a l-H a jja j.
The revolt of Ibn al-A sh*ath has received much attention from
2 3 4
modern scholars. Von Kremer , followed by A . M u ller and by Van V loten,
links the revolt of Ibn al-Ash* ath with that of al-M u k h ta r, and regards it as
another attempt by the mawali of Basra and Kufa to obtain economic, social
and p o litical rights, as much due to them as to the *Arab aristocracy, by the
5 -
teachings of Islam. Wellhausen. recognises that the fa ll of al—Mukhtar did
not put an end to the revolt of the m awali; and that the new measures^ imposed
on the mawali by a l-H a jja j had made things even more d iffic u lt for them.
* *
1. Ansab, fo l. 20a (citing al-H aytham ), 20a-20b (citing M adal in i); Y a*q u b i,
II, p .334; Ghurar, fols. 6 9 -7 0 ; Tanbih, p p .3 1 5 -1 6 ; Bad*, V I?, p p .3 6 -7 ;

Kam il, IV , p .400; Tadhkira, I, fo l. 163b; M ir * a t, V I , fo l.5 3 a ;
Mukhtasar, I, p . 208; Duw al, I, p . 24; Bidaya, IX , p . 53; * Ibar, III, p. 116.
2. Culturgeschichtilche Streifzuge, p .2 3 ff. (quoted by M me I. V eccia

VagNeri in E. I. (Ibn al-Ash* ath); Idem, Culturgeschichte des O rien t, I
(English translation), p p .2 0 1 -3 , C alcutta, 1920.
3. Der Islam im Morgen-und Abenland, I, p p .3 9 0 -2 (quoted by M me L .

V ecc ia V a g lie ri, in E. I. (Ibn al-Ash* ath).
4. La Domination Arab, Le Chi*tisme et les Croyances Messianiges sous la

KTtalifoFdes Qmayades, pp. 17, 26. ~ ~
5. The Arab Kingdom and its F a ll, p. 245ff; also Lammens, E. I. ^, (a l-

Hadjdjadj ibn Yusuf).
6. See p. '
28b.
However, he rejects the view that the revolt of Ibn al-A sh*ath was a
mere continuation of that of al-M u k h ta r. The participation of a large number
of mawali in the later revolt was, in his opinion due to the custom of the
tim e, that they should fight side-by-side with their patrons. They might,
he adds, have had their own interests in the revolt, but considers that
these were only secondary. Wellhausen also denies that the revolt of Ibn
al-A sh*ath had any religious motives; and concludes that it was "rather
a renewed and desperately powerful attempt of the Iraqis to shake off the
Syrian yoke. “ Professor Bosworth agrees with Wellhausen when he says
that the revolt of the "Peacock army" was “basically a reaction of the old
* Arab aristocracy against the authoritarian rule of the plebian a l- H a jja j,

•
and of the Iraqi * Arabs against Syrian domination. F in ally , M me L.
2
V eccia V a g iie ri, w hile considering Wellhausen's argument, refuses to accept
the view that the revolt had no religious motivation. She emphasizes the
religious aspect of the revolt in the light of the “vehement participation of
the Karra* in it. “
Crucial to the proper understanding of this revolt is to take account
of the grievances and causes of all the different elements who took part in it:
in the case of the leader, the main cause was the personal insult inflicted by
a l- H a jja j, but his supporters had each their own reason for joining him. One
could define the basic tensions lying beneath the revolt as four: the Iraqi hatred
1. op. c it . , p . 60.
2. E. 1.^, (Ibn al-Ash* ath); also E. I. (al-Hadjadj ibn Yusuf).

289.
of a l-H a jja j *s attempts to make Syrian rule effective, the inequalities in
pay and privelege between Syrians and Iraqis, the Shi*a opposition to the
Umayyads, and the social inequalities between *Arab and m aw ali. The
mawali were supported in their struggle for equal rights by the O u rra *, many
of whom were m awali. But to deal first with the leader of the revolt; the
Arabic sources stress strongly the alleged mutual personal hatred between Ibn a l -
- 1 2
Ash*ath and a l-H a jja j. But M me V ag lieri is right to point out that the relation
ship between the two had always been friendly, the reason for a l-H a jja j giving
to Ibn al-Ash* ath the command of the “peacock army". M oreover, Ibn a l-
Ash*ath had been a faithful subordinate to a l- H a jja j, obeying him until the
year 8 1 /7 0 0 , when the latter insulted him. Nevertheless, from this tim e,
personal factors were important in providing the immediate cause of the revolt.
Once a suitable leader presented himself, the people of Basra and K ufa were
quick to support him in his defiance of a l-H a jja j; but for reasons of their
own, not because of the original personal insult. One main reason for their
1. Imama, II, pp. 2 9 -3 0 ; Ansab, X I , p p .31 9 -2 0 ; (citing Abu M ikhnaf and

* Aw ana), 319 (citing al-Sha* b f); D inaw ari, p .322; T a b ., II, p p .1043-4
(citing Abu M ikhn af); KufF, II , fols. 98b, 99 a-9 9b , 101a; Ghurar, fo!53;
Kam il, IV , p .366; M ir * a t, V I , fo l.3 1 b ; Dhahabi, II I , p. 128; Bidaya,
IX , p p .31 -2 ; * Ibar, II , p. 105.
2. I.E .2, (Ibn al-A sh *ath ).

290.
readiness to support Ibn al-Ash*ath was because a l-H a jja j had sent them
to fight for a long period (Tajmir) in inhospitable lands far away from their
homes and families; w hile on the other hand, Syrian troops were not
employed in remote regions, neither did they serve any but short periods.
Whether they did their m ilitary service in the cities of Syria or in Iraq, the
Syrians received higher pensions than the Iraqis, despite the latter's harsher
conditions. That this inequality of pay and treatment was an Iraqi grievance
1
can be seen by the terms offered to the rebels by the caliph.
Another clear motive behind the in itia l support given to Ibn a l -
Ash* ath can be seen in the Shi* a inclinations of the two most active
supporters: Abu a l-T u fa il *Amir ibn W athila a l-K in an i and *Abd a l- M u ’ min
• ' rAi -
- - 2
ibn Shabath ibn Rab* i al-Tam im i. Both were past followers of a l-M u k h ta r,
and also both Kufans from the Northern tribes. This supports what the
poet A*sha Hamdan has said, that the Asabiyya was not a motive attracting
adherents to the revolt of Ibn al-Ash* ath. It would appear that one of the key
in itia l sources of the m ilitancy of the revolt derived from the Shi*a of Kufa,
awaiting any opportunity to challenge Umayyad rule.
Underlying the baMapaid to Ibn a I-Ash* ath in Sistan was the Iraqi
hatred of a l-H a jja j and his harsh policies aimed to make the caliph's rule in
1. See p. 0 ■
2. Seep. U J note (£ )
291 *
Iraq effe c tiv e . This b d i*a: "to give him support and fight with him until
1
God expels a l- H a jja j, the enemy of G od, from Iraq", is almost identical
" - . 2
to that paid to Ibn al-Jarud a few years earlier. In the two revolts, the
first target was a l- H a jja j, the main intention, to expel him, rather than
any direct renunciation of * Abd a l-M a lik . However, by the time of the
bai*a in Fars a new development has taken place; homage was paid to Ibn a l -
Ash* ath "on the Book of God and the Sunna of the Prophet, to depose the
Imams of Error (A* immat a l- D & la la ) and to fight against a l-M u h ilfm " ,
3 -
i . e . the Umayyads. From a revolt against a l-H a jja j and his oppressive
policies, the rebels had moved to a revolt against the caliph and the Umayyad
v
rule in general. This development was inherent in the earlier b a i*a , since a l -
H ajjaj had no pretensions to be more than *Abd a l-M a lik 's o ffic e r, and the
caliph had always supported his governor's policies.
On Ibn al-A sh*ath 's arrival in Basra and K ufa, he was joined by a
new element, very large numbers of Q urra’ . The reasons for their adherence
to the revolt are many: as other Iraqis, they disliked a l- H a jja j’ s attempts
to strengthen Syrian domination, and their m aterial interests, they fe lt,
were not sufficiently cared for by a l-H a jja j. But other distinctive grievances
1. Ansab, X I, q . 326 (citing M a d a ’ in i); J a b ., II, p. 1055 jc itin g Abu

M ik h n af); K am il, IV , p . 372; M ir * a t, V I , fo l.3 7 b ; Bidaya, IX , p .36.
2. See p. 2 5 5 '
3. Ansab, X I , p . 334; T a b ., II, p p .1057-8 (citing Abu M ikh n af);
Tanbth , p . 314; M u ru j, V , p p .3 0 2 -3 ; Kam il, IV , p.373T M i r ?at, V I ,
fo l. 37b; Bidaya, IX , p . 36; * Ibar, III , p. 107.
292.
they had as G u rra?, religious men: they considered a l-H a jja j to be a
ruthless and impious man, with religion low on his list of priorities. They
were also strong sympathisers of the m a w a li, who had received particularly
harsh treatment from a l-H a jja j. In an effort to restore the finances of Iraq,
depleted as a result of the conversion of a great number of the native population
to Islam, a l-H a jja j had ordered new converts to pay the J iz y a , and had,
moreover,ordered them to return to their villages.^ The Gurra* supported the
mawali as champions of equal rights for all Muslims, in accordance with the
teachings of the Prophet. The Gurra* were very effective in rallying the
population to join the revolt through their propaganda: they proclaimed the
need to fight a l-H a jja j and his followers by calling them "M u h iU m ",
. —* *
innovators, who disregarded truth and practised oppression. They also depicted
them as neglectful of the prayers, and accused them of persecuting the weak.
The slogan of the Gurra* is said to have been, "Ya li Tharat a i-S a la t" . They
1. Ansab, X I, p p .336-7 (citing *Umar ibn Shabba); Mubarrad, I I , pp.

96-7 (he puts this order of a l-H a jja j after and not before the revolt
of Ibn al-Ash* ath); T a b ., II, pp. 1122-3; * Iqd, II I , p .416 (citing a l-
Ja h iz); K am il, I V , p . 374; * ib ar,III,p . 107; Von Kramer, Culturgeschichte
des O rient (English translation), pp. 2 0 1 -2 ; Van V loten , op. c it . ,
p . 26; Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom and its F a ll, p . 280; A I-* A IT ,
A l-Tanyim at a j-ljtim g * iyya wal Iqtisadiyya Fil Basra Fil G am o l-
Awwal a l-H ijrT pp. 8 4 -5 , 282; Shartf, A l-J ira * B ain 'i-* Arab wal
M a w a lf, pp. 2 5 -6 .
293.
urged the people to fight the Syrians, whose impiety endangered both the
religion and the m aterial prosperity of the Iraqis (Dinukum wa Dunyakum).^
They not only preached these doctrines, but were prepared to die for them
on the b a ttle field .
Another somewhat surprising, element among the supporters of Ibn a l -
2
Ash4ath were the M u rji’ a , who had received special favour from the Umayyads,
since their doctrine favoured passive support of the ruler, whatever his
evils. The Z u tt, Asawira and the Sayabij a also joined the revolt with their
T . - 3
masters, Banu Tamim, to be severely punished as a result by a l-H a jja j.
1. Sa4d, V I I , i i , p . 137; K halifa ibn K hayyat, Tarikh_, I, p p .3 7 1 -2 ;

Ansab, fols. 16a, 16b, 17a, 609a~(citing M ada7 in t); 612a; T a b ., II,
pp. 1086-8 (citing Abu M ik h n a f; Koft, II, fols, 107b, 108a, 108b, 109a;
A g h ., V , p. 1 5 3 ;H ily a , IV , p . 379; ‘ Asakij; IV , fo l. 124b; Dhahab", III,
p .229; Bidaya, IX* p .40 (citing WaqidT).
2. Hur, p . 204. It is also said that some Ibadi Kharijites of Basra fought a l-
with Ibn al-Ash 4ath . E. I, , (A l-lb a d iy y a ).
3. Futuh , p p .3 7 3 -4 ; A l - 4A li, A l-T anzim at a l-ljtim a 4 iyya wal Iqtisadiyya

fil Basra fil Q arn al-A w w al a l - H i j r t , p .204. Refering to the punishment
inflicted b y 'a l-H a jja j on the rebels who fe ll into his hands, M me L.
V a g lie ri says that a l- H a jja j "spared all the Kurayshis, all the Syrians,
and a ll those belonging to the clans of the 'two tribes' (named in S iffin " .
To support her argument she refers to a passage in T’abari (II, 1097), which
tells the story that, when a l-H a jja j asked a man from the tribe of
Khath 4 am to admit that he was an unbeliever since he had not
supported a l-H a jja j against Ibn al-A sh4 ath, the man refused to do so, and
therefore was sentenced to death. He found sympathy among the Quraishites,
the Syrians, and the parties of both Ibn al-Ash4 ath's and a l-H a jja j *s , .
followers, who mourned the death of such a pious man. ( ^
, j h us ft can be seen that this passage
in n o w ay supports M me L. V e c c ia V aglieri's thesis, and th at, therefore,
she must have misunderstood the passage.
294.
The strength of the Yemenite influences in the revolt is reflected
by Ibn al-Ash* ath's use of the title of Q a h ta n i, the one awaited by the
]
Yemenites to restore them to power. He was also called by the poetess,
- 2
Bint Sahm,' al-M ansur
• * Abd al-Rahman;
* * it is also said that he called
„ T 3
himself N as ir a l-M u ’ minin.
Therefore, since the revolt was coloured by the particular greivances
and ideas of every contributing group, it is a mistake to attempt to describe
the nature of the revolt as though it were homogeneous. Perhaps the only
general characteristic among all Ibn al-Ash *ath 's followers was a hatred for
a l-H a jja j and his policy of subjecting Iraq's interests to those of Syria.
One could, indeed, make a general comment on all the revolts dealt with
in this chapter (with the exception of the Z a n j), that all were provoked by the
1. Tanbfh , p. 314; Bad*, V I , p. 35; Van V lo ten , op. c i t . , p. 61; Lammens,

Etudes sur le Siecle des Qmayyades, p .400; W ellhausen, The Arab
Kingdom and its F a ll, p. 245; Farazdaq, quoted by Wellhausen, _
op. c it . , p . 234, n . l ; Lewis, The Regnal Titles of the First *Abbasid
Caliphs, p. 17, ZHPy, 1968; Curie I, Monnaies, Arabo-Sasanides,
p. 6 7 , r ; p N , V TT fT1966.
2. Ansab, X I, p p .3 3 3 -4 ; Van V lo te n , op. c i t . , p . 61; Lewis, The

Regnal Titles of the First *Abbasid Caliphs, p. 17, ZHPV, 1968.
3. Tanbih, p .314; BadJ, II, p. 184; V I , p . 35 (he is called here Nasir

Amir a l-M u V n in in T /V a n V lo te n , op. c i t . , p . 6 1 , n .4 .
harshness or tactlessness of a I-H a n o i , so that one might wonder why * Abd
a l-M a lik did not save himself a fair amount of trouble by removing a l-H a jja j
and appointing in his place a more reasonable man. This, however, would
be to miss the point that only a man such as a l-H a jja j could have made
the caliph's rule in Iraq effective. The benefit of a l-H a jja j's ruthlessness
in crushing Iraqi opposition was fe lt in the years 8 5 -9 5 /7 0 4 -7 1 3 in which
Iraq was peaceful and free from troubles.

CHAPTER V I
THE KHARIJITE RISINGS
The worst period of K harijite risings during the Umayyad caliphate
occurred in the reign of * Abd a l-M a lik ibn M arw an, who was threatened by
them from several fronts. In Yam aha were the N ajd at or a l-N a jd iy y a , ^
whose field of ac tivity embraced, in addition to Yamama, Hadramut, parts
of Yem en, Bahrain, Ta* if and *Uman. Basra was directly and constantly
2 -
threatened by the dangerous A zariq a, who controlled a l-A h w a z , Pars,
- - 3
Isfahan and Kirman. In Muusil and the Jazira region were the Sufriyya.
-... . 4
Finally, there was another K harijite group in Basra, namely al-lb a d iy y a ,
■™— . *
who played a distinctive role in the history of the period, although they did
not take arms against the caliph.
1. Followers of N ajd a ibn * Amir a l-H a n a fi, E. I. , (Kharidjites); W e ll

hausen, Die Religios Politischen Oppositions^parteien im alten Islam,
p. 29; W att, Islam and the Integration of Society, p. 100, London, 1966.
2. A K harijite sect which took its name from its leader N a fi* ibn al -
A zraq. He held the doctrine that all his adversaries should be put
to death with their wives and children. E. I. (A zariqa); W att, Islam
and the Integration of Society, pp. 99-100; Idem, Islamic Political Thought,
p p .5 5 -6 , Islamic Surveys, 6 , Edinburgh, 1968.
3. Followers of Salty ibn Mussarih, who was succeeded by Shabib ibn

Y a zid ibn N u*aim al-S h aib ant. E, I. , (ShabTb ibn YazTd ibn N u*aim
al-S h aib an i); W a tt, K harijite Thought in the Umayyad Period, p . 222,
D I," X X X B I, 1961. —
4. An important branch of the K harijites, which derived its name from that
of its founder * Abdallah ibn"TBdy a l-M u rrt al-Tam im i, E« I. , (A l-
lbadiyya).
297.
The K harijites, because they held to the doctrines of equality
and the elective caliphate, considered the Umayyads to be usurpers. The
p o litical confusion in the period 6 4 -7 3 /6 8 3 -6 9 2 , together with the harsh
policies of a l-H a jja j in Iraq, were certainly among the reasons
encouraging the Kharijites to defy the central government.
It is not the intention of this study to deal with the origin of the
K harijites, nor their doctrines or theological differences: its only concern
is the po litical aspect of the K harijite risings during * Abd a l-M a lik 's reign, and
how these risings were suppressed.
In the year 6 5 /6 8 4 , the Kharijites of Yamama, who were from Bakr
and,more especially, from Banu H anifa, chose Abu Talut, Salim , as their
leader. This choice was, however, conditional, for they stipulated that
should they find a better person, both Abu Talut and the Kharijites would
pay homage to the new man, ^ Abu Talut with his followers then seized a l-
Hadarim, which had originally belonged to Banu H an ifa, but had been
* • .
confiscated by M u *a w tya , who had sent there four thousand slaves, probably
to cultivate the land for him. When Abu Talut seized the region, he
distributed the slaves among his followers. M eanw h ile, one of the Kharijites,
N ajd a ibn * Amir a l-H a n a fi, intercepted a caravan coming from Basra to Ibn
a i-Z u b a ir in M ecca, and brought the spoils to Abu Talut in al-H ad arim ,
where they were distributed. N ajd a also advised the Kharijites to continue
1. Ansab, X I, p. 126; K a m il, IV , p. 165; N u w a iri, X IX , f o l.46; * Ibar,

TiT7pT3i3.
298.
to use the slaves to cultivate the land for them. Those actions brought
him such distinction that Abu Talut was deposed and N ajd a elected as
leader in his place and from now on the movement was called after him.
N ajd a was by this time (66/685) only thirty years old. ^ He had already
2
exercised considerable influence in Yamama , and it is probable that it was
only his youth which had before delayed his election as K harijite caliph.
On assuming the leadership, N ajda went to al-B ahrain where he raided
the Banu K a‘ b ibn Rabi‘ a, and in the battle of D h u 'l-M a ja z , inflicted a
severe defeat on them. In the year 6 7 /6 8 6 N ajd a marched once again on a l -
Bahrain to subdue the tribes of * Abd a l-O a is who were at this time hostile to
the Kharijites. W ith the help of a l-A z d , N ajda was able to k ill a large
number of ‘ Abd a l-Q a is and also captured a large number as prisoners in a l -
Q a tif, where he stayed for a w h ile .^
The growing strength of N ajda in ‘ Arabia threatened directly the
authority of Ibn a l-Z u b a ir. Consequently, Hamza ibn ‘ Abdallah ibn a l-
1. Ansab, X I , pp. 127-8; M u ‘ jam , II, p .4 5 0 f f .; Kamil, IV , p. 166; N u w a iri,

)OX7~fol.45.
2. T a b ., I I , p p .4 0 1 -2 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); M a g a la t, I, pp. 8 9 -9 0 ; Bagh.,
p. 66; Brunnow, Pie Charidschiten unter den ersten Umaiden, Leiden, 1884,
(English translation), p. 14.
3. Ansab, X I, pp. 127-8; K am il, IV , p. 166; N u w a iri, X IX , fo l.47; ‘ Ib a r,

Tn7pT3i3.
4. AnsQb, X I , pp. 13 0-1 ; M g q a la t, I, p. 90; K am il, IV , p. 166; N uw airi
X IX , f o l.47; ‘ Ibar, III, p .3 1 4 .
299*
Zubair, who was the governor of Basra for his father, tried to check
Najda's influence there. He sent ‘ Abdallah ibn ‘ Umair a l-L a ith i with an
army of fourteen thousand against him, but this army was surprised and
put to flight (6 7/68 6). ^ Following this victory, N ajd a sent ‘ A tiyya ibn a l -
Aswad a l-H a n a fi to ‘ Uman where ‘ Abbad ibn ‘ Abdallah ibn al-Julanda

#
T - 2
and his two sons, Sa‘ id and Sulaiman, were in control. ‘ A tiyya succeeded
in capturing ‘ Uman and stayed there for a few months, and then left the
country in the hands of A b u 'l-Q a sim , his deputy. However, A bu'I-G asim
was k ille d and SaMd and Sulaiman, supported by the ‘ Umanis, once again
3
seized the country. M eanw h ile, ‘ A tiyya ibn al-Aswad fe ll out with N a jd a ,
- 4
perhaps because of personal jealousy, and went back to ‘ Uman. Unable
to seize the country, he went to Kirman, where he achieved enough success

5
to enable him to issue his own coins (al-Darahim a l - ‘ A tw iy ya). However,
1* Ansab, X I, p. 133; Y a ‘ qubT, II, p .325; T a b ., II, p .752; K am il, IV ,

p p .166-7; N u w a iri, X IX , fo ls.4 7 -8 ; ‘ Ibar, ll! ,p .3 1 4 . Gn the
chronology of this event, see Wellhausen, Die Religios Politischen
Oppositions>parteien im alten Islam, p . 30 , n .2 .
2. See Chapter V , p. ^ 3^,
3. An$ab, X I , p. 134; Kam il, IV , p. 167; N u w a iri, X IX , f o l.48; M bar,

111, p . 314.
4. According to Baladhuri the reasons for the disagreement between the
two were Najda's inequality in distributing the ‘ Ata* and his corres
pondence with ‘ Abd a l-M a lik . Ansab, X I, p. 142.
5. Ansab, X I , p. 142; K am il, IV , p. 167; N u w a iri, X IX , f o l.48; M ile s ,

Some New Light on the History of Kirman, p. 90, W C I, 1959.
300.
this success was not long lasting, for he was followed by al-M u h allab 's
cavalry. He fled to Sistan and then to Sind, where he was killed in
Q in d a b il. ^
By this time (6 8 /6 8 7 ), N ajd a had subdued the northern parts of al*“
Bahrain and levied the Sadaqa from the Banu Tamim in Kadima. He also entered
San*a* where he received the homage of the people and collected the Sadaqa
m
from them. To Hadramut, N ajda sent Abu Fudaik to levy the Sadaqa on
• • _
its people. ^
As a result of these successful campaigns, the influence of N ajda in
3
Arabia became even greater than that of Ibn a l-Z u b a ir, At this tim e, * Abd
a l- M a lik , with many problems to face at home, was unable to send an army
against N a jd a , Instead he wrote to him, confirming him as a governor of
Yamama and freeing him from a ll responsibility for the blood he had shed and
. 4
the money he had seized, on the condition that he would pay him homage.
N a jd a , however, bluntly refused. * Abd a l-M a lik had tw o objects in mind
1. Ansab, X I, p. 135; Bagh., p . 67; K a m il, IV , p. 167; N u w a iri, X IX ,

fo l.4 8 ; * Ibar, 111, p .3 T 4 , However, Professor Montgomery W att,
following the account of Ash*ari, makes this /agreement as between
*A tiy y a ibn al-Aswad and^5bu Fudaik. M a q a la t, I, p. 92; K harijite
Thought in the Umayyad Period, p .219, D l , X X X V I, 1961.
2. Ansab, X I, pp. 136-7 (citing M a d a *in i); Kam il, IV , pp. 167-8; N u w a iri,
X IX , f o l.4 8 ; * Ibar, III, p . 314.
3. W ellhausen, The Arab Kingdom and its F a ll, p . 200.
4. Ansab, X I, p . 314; M a q a la t, I, p. 92; M i l a l , p. 215; K a m il, IV , p. 169;

* Ibar, III , p . 315.
301.
in this correspondence with N a jd a . Firstly, he hoped to win
N ajd a over to his side or else to keep him quiet for a w h ile ; should
this f a il, he might succeed in causing disagreement between N ajd a
and his followers. As we shall see, * Abd a l-M a lik achieved this last
object, causing N a jd a to be deposed and eventually k ille d . ^
However, in the pilgrimage of this year (6 8 /6 8 7 ), N ajd a and about
680 of his followers went to M ecca where they performed their religious
2
pilgrimage independent of both Ibn a l-Z u b a ir and * Abd a l- M a lik . This
shows the weakness of Ibn al-Z u b a ir,s in c e he did not dare refuse them
permission; it also shows that N ajd a was equal in power to both the
caliph and his rival Ibn a l-Z u b a ir . Finishing his pilgrim age, N ajda
intended to proceed * to M edin a, but he abandoned this plan because of
— 3 -
religious scruples, and went to Ta> if instead. On approaching Ta* i f,
4Amir ibn *Urw a ibn Mas*ud al-ThaqafT met N ajd a and paid him homage
on behalf of himself and the people of Ta* if , thus making it unnecessary
for N a jd a to enter the c ity . He then went to Tabala, from where he proceeded
to al-B ahrain . Before leaving al-B ahrain, however, he appointed officials.

* . ___
1. See p.
2. K halifa ibn Khayyat^ Tarikh, I, p .333; Ansab, X I , p. 137; J a b ., II,

p p .7 8 2 -3 (citing W agidt); K a m iI, IV , pp. 158, 2 4 4 -5 ; NuwairT, X IX ,
fols. 4 8 , 67; Bidaya, V I I I , p p . 2 9 4 -5 ; * Ibar , II I , p . 314.
3. It is said that all the Medinese, oh hearing that N ajd a was coming
towards them/ prepared themselves to fight him; even the most pious
and p o litic a lly in active, ‘ Abdallah ibn ‘ Umar ibn al-K h a tt ab. Ansab,
X I, p. 137; Kam il, IV , p. 188; NuwairT, X IX , fo l. 4 8 .
302.
A l-H aruq a l-H a n a fi was made governor of Ta’ if, Tabala and al-Surat; and
• • *
Sa*d a l-T a la y i* was sent to collect the Sadaqa from Banu H ila l In N ajran .
* *
From al-B ahrain , N ajda sent orders stopping the M ira (food provisions) for
M ecca and M edina. This was another way of defying the authority of
Ibn a l-Z u b a ir in his own c a p ita l. It was only by repeated requests from
pious men such as ‘ Abdallah ibn ‘ Abbas, appealing to Najda's religious
feelings, that the M ira was restored.^
Underlying Najda's apparent success were currents already working
to undermine him: no sooner had he reached the peak of his power, than
he was rapidly to decline. For discontent soon arose among his followers,
which first led to his deposition and eventually to his murder in 7 2 /6 9 1 .
This discontent arose from the perennial problem of Kharijism; the conflict
between the believers in a strict adherence to the literal interpretation of
the Q u r’ an and the Sunna of the Prophet, and those who believed in the
_ 2
"evolutionary adaptation based on reason and the spirit of Islam". N ajda
was overthrown by the first group. The sources give as the reasons for their
discontent, Najda's correspondence with ‘ Abd a l-M a lik ibn Marwan and his
giving to him a grand daughter of * Uthman ibn ‘ A ffan , seized in one of the
3
raids; Najda's refusal to k ill those who followed him only because of
1. Ansab, IV , pp. 139-40; K a m il, IV , pp. 16 8-9 ; NuwairT, X IX , fo l.4 9 ;

‘ Ibar, I I I , p .3 1 5 .
2. Salem, Political Theory and Institutions of the K haw arij, p . 22 (the
John Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science,
Series L X X IV , N o .2 , 1956).
M ughtaltn , p. 179; Ansab, X I , pp. 137-8; 143; Y a ‘ qubi, II, p. 325;
M a g a lo t, I , p . 92; M IlgT) p .2 1 5 ;K a m il, lV ,p p . 1 6 8 - 9 / Ibar, 111, p .315.
303.
Taqiyya (prudent fear); his unjust distribution of the Fai’ among the troops;^
his unwillingness to punish one of his distinguished followers because he had
2
drunk w ine; and fin a lly , his payment to both M a lik ibn Misma* and
‘ Ubaidailah ibn Ziyad ibn Z a b ia n of ten thousand dirhams each when they
3
fled from M u s‘ ab ibn al—Zubair to take refuge with him in Yamama.
A fter the deposition of N ajd a,h is followers chose one of the mawali
called Thabit al-Tam m ar, as his successor. They were soon to realize
that they would rather follow an ‘ Arab than a mawla, proving that their tribal
feelings were stronger than their K harijite doctrine. However, they charged
Thabit to choose a new caliph for them, and he chose Abu Fudaik, ‘ Abdallah
4
ibn Thawr from the Banu Qais ibn Tha‘ laba.
M ean w h ile, N a jd a , fearing Abu Fudaik, hid himself in one of the
villages of H ajar. When this hiding place was discovered, he took refuge
with his cousins, Banu Tamim. N ajd a thought by this time to flee and join
1. Ansab, X I , p. 142; M a q a la t, I, p. 91; K am il. IV , p. 169; N u w a iri,

X IX , fo l.4 9 ; ‘ Ibar, ilT 7 ~ p .3 1 5 .
2. Ansab, X I, p. 143; M a q a la t, I, p. 91; K am il, IV , p. 169;* Ibar, I I I , p . 315.
3. M u g h ta lin , p. 179; Ansab , X I , p. 143; Y a ‘ qub?, I I , p . 325; M a q a la t,

I, pp. 9 1 -2 . — -
4. M ughtalin , p. 179; Ansab, X I , p. 143; Y a ‘ qub7, II, p p .3 2 5 -6 ; M a q a la t,

I, p. 92; K a m il, IV , p. 169; NuwairT, X IX , fo l.4 9 ; ‘ Ibar, III, p . 315.
However,according to Baghdad? and Ibn A b i'l-H acffd , it was N a jd a ,
after his deposition, who^Rose Abu Fudaik and not Thabit al-Tammar.
Bagh. , p .69; Sharh, IV , p. 134.
304.
1 . 2
‘ Abd a l-M a lik in Damascus, but he was surprised and killed (7 2 /6 9 1 ).
His death did not go unrevenged. One of his followers, called Muslim ibn
Jabir a l-H a n a fi, plunged a knife into Abu Fudaid. However, the latter was
3
only wounded, w hile the assailant was assassinated. Because of this Abu
Fudaik left Yamama, where Banu Hanifa were dominant, and went to a l-
*
Bahrain, where he made his head-quarters.

4
Despite his pre-occupai tons, Mus‘ ab ibn a l-Z u b a ir, the governor of
t
Basra for his brother, tried to put an end to the activities of the Kharijites
of Yamama. It seems that he was encouraged by the last dissenscon among
them which had resulted in the murder of N ajda and the leadership of Abu
Fudaik. He therefore sent a Basran army under Muhammad ibn ‘ Abd al-Rahman
ibn a l-Is k a f (7 2 /6 9 1 ) against them; this campaign, however, was a complete
5 6 —
fa ilu re. According to Baladhuri, another army under Ziyad ibn al-Q u ras h i,
1. This reflects the early correspondence between the two. See p. 3 0 o ,
2. K halifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, I, p . 338 (the year given here is 70);
Ansab, X I, pp. 14 4-5 ; T a b ., II, p .829; M a q a la t, I, p. 92; Bagh., p .69;
M i l a l , p . 215; Kam il, IV , pp. 169-70; Shari} IV f p. 134; NuwairT, X IX ,
fols. 4 9 -5 0 ;jjb ^ T T T l, p. 315.
3. Ansab, X I, p . 147; Idem, fo l.4 0 a (citing M a d a’ in i); K am il, IV , p*170;

N u w a iri, X IX , fo l.5 0 .
4. He was by this time threatened by both the A zariqa and ‘ Abd a l-M a lik .
5. K halifa ibn K h ayyat, Tarikli, I, p .339 (the year 71 is given here); Ansab,
foT.40a (citing M a d a’ in t).
305.
with troops from Basra and Bahrain, marched against Abu Fudaik. But
* .
Ziyad was killed with a large number of his army. Thus ended in failure
a ll the attempts of the Zubairids to crush the Kharijites of Yamama. Mus‘ ab
had no more time to deal with Abu Fudaik and his followers, for he was
k ille d in that y e a r, 7 2 /6 9 1 , in a battle with ‘ Abd a l-M a lik .^
The new governor of Basra, Khalid ibn 6Abdallah ibn Asid, dispatched
an army under his brother Umayya against Abu Fudaik, 7 3 /6 9 2 , But Umayya
2
and his twelve thousand men were ambushed and put to flig h t. It was such
a humiliating defeat that Umayya had to hide himself from the people, while
his brother Khalid wrote to the caliph in an attempt to justify the defeat by
blaming the Basrans for not holding firm in the b a ttle -fie ld . Khalid also
informed the caliph of the seriousness of the situation, for Basra was threatened
by both Abu Fudaik and the A zariqa. It is worth noting here that at this time
another brother of K halid, *Abd a l - ( A z iz , was defeated by the A zariqa.
Despite their theological differences, both the A zariqa and the N ajdat
seem to have been co-ordinating, to force the government's troops to fight
on two fronts. ^
1. See Chapter IV , p. 2 3 3 ,
2. Farazdaq, Diwan, p . 221; *U yun,p.2Q S; Ansab, fo ls.3 9a-39b (citing

Wahab ibn Jartrj) 40a-40b (citing Mada* ini'); Y a ‘ qubi, 11, p. 325; T a b .,
I I , p p .8 2 9 ,8 6 1 ; i Igd, I, p. 168; Mu* jam , IV ,p .4 9 3 ;K am il, IV , p . 281;
M i V a t , V I , fo l.3 a ; Dhahabi, III, p. I l l ; Bidaya, V I I I , p.348(quoting
Jqbaft); f Ibar, II I , p . 322; Khizana, IV , p .40 (quoting NuwairT).
3. Wellhausen, Die Religios Politischen Oppositions^parteien im alien

Islam, p . 38; QaiamawT, Adab al-K haw arij fit *A$r al-U m aw t, p .36;
C airo , 1945.
Owing to this alarming situation, the caliph decided to send another
campaign against Abu Fudaik, to which command he chose ‘ Umar ibn ‘ Abdallah
ibn M a ‘ mar. The latter only accepted this appointment on the assurance from
the caliph that neither his brother Bishr ibn M arw an, the governor of Kufa,
nor Khalid ibn ‘ Abdallah, the governor of Basra, would interfere in the
campaign. For he was sure that such interference would take place since
his appointment came directly from the caliph. M oreover, in K halid’ s
case, he would be delighted to see this campaign end with failure to save his
brother's reputation. ^
‘ Umar left Damascus with Syrian troops for K ufa, where he recruited
about eight thousand men. He placed them under Muhammad ibn Musa ibn
*
Jalha and ordered them to proceed to Basra. ‘ Umar spent few days in
Kufa and then joined his army. In Basra he recruited another ten thousand
men under his cousin Musa ibn ‘ Ubaidallah ibn M a ‘ mar. W ith this numerous
2
army, ‘ Umar marched on Abu Fudaik in al-B ahrain.
As with almost a ll other K h a rijite leaders, Abu Fudaik was joined by
3
a number of Bedouins (A ‘ rab), who did not profess Kharijism. It is this
1. Ansab, fols. 4Gb-41a (citing M a d a’ in i).
2. U adhif, p .78; Ansab, fo l.3 9 b (citing al-Haytham and Wahab ibn Ja rir),
41 a-4 1b (citing M a d a ’ im ); T a b ., II, p .852; K a m il, I V , p . 294; M ir ’ a t,
V I , fo l.3 b ; PhahabT, IN , pp. 115-16; ‘ Ibar, 111, p. 322; Kh i zana, I V , p . 40
(quoting NuwairT).
3. Ansab, fo l.4 1 b .
participation of the Bedouins, together with religious fanaticism, which
gave the K harijite movement its distinguishing characteristics of deep
tribal and religious fervour.
‘ Umar ibn ‘ Ubaidallah ibn M a ‘ mar with his army, said to have
numbered twenty one thousand men, met Abu Fudaik and his followers in a l -
Mushshaqqar in al-B ahrain. In the battle, which lasted for five days, the
advantage was first with Abu Fudaik's army. However, thanks to the courage
and skill of ‘ Umar, the situation was reversed, and Abu Fudaik was k ille d ,
1 - _
his head being sent to the caliph. His followers were pursued and the mawali
among them were k ille d , w hile the ‘ Arabs were set free. Thus the Najdat
were crushed in A rabia, never to rise again.
When ‘ Abd a l-M a lik recovered control of Iraq after the death of M u s‘ ab
ibn a l-Z u b a ir in the battle of M askin, 7 2 /6 9 1 , he found it necessary to take
immediate measures against the A zariqa. By this time the A zariqa held
Khuzistan, Fars and Kirman, forming a direct menace to Basra and the
surrounding territories. Although a l-M u h a lla b , whom Mus‘ ab had sent against
them, achieved no decisive victory over them, he did succeed in driving
them away from Basra. Under ‘ Abd a l-M a lik , a l-M u h a lla b was confirmed in
1. tja d h if.p .7 8 ; Ansab, fols.39a (citing al-H aytham and Wahab ibn J a rir),
41b -43a (citing Mada* in i); Y a ‘ qubi, II, p .326; T a b ., II, p p .8 5 2 -3 ;
Bagh., p . 70; M il a l, p . 216; K am il, IV ,p p .2 9 4 -5 ; M ir ’ a t, V I , fo l.3 b ;
DhahabT, III, pp. 115-16; ‘ Ibar, II I , p . 322; Khizona, IV Tpp.40-1
(quoting NuwairT).
his post, to fight the A zariqa. But, nevertheless, the situation did not
improve. For ‘ Abd a l-M a lik 's new governor of Basra, Khalid ibn
‘ Abdallah ibn Asid, out of personal jealousy, decided to fight the Azariqa
himself, disregarding the caliph's orders. He also paid no heed to the advice
of his intimates nor of the people of Basra discouraging him. With his army,
K halid, accompanied by a l-M u h a lla b , met the A zariqa in a l-A h w a z .
M eanw h ile, following the caiiph's order, Bishr ibn M arw an, the governor
of Kufa, re-inforced the army fighting the A zariqa by Kufan troops under
( Abd al-Rahman ibn Muhammad ibn ai-A sh*ath. Thanks to the caution and
advice of a l-M u h a lla b , K h a lid managed to drive the A zariq a , after forty
- 1
days of fighting, back to Kirman.
After this scant success, Khalid returned to Basra leaving his brother
‘ Abd a l - ‘ A z iz in charge of the war with the A zariqa, w hile al-M u h alla b was
- 2 . ^ T
appointed governor of a l-A h w a z. A fter five months in Kirman, Q a tri and
his followers came back to Fars. As a result, ‘ Abd a l - ‘ A z iz with thirty
thousand Basrans met them in a battle in Darabjird. Owing to his lack of
experience and m ilitary foresight, ‘ Abd a l - ‘ A z iz was overwhelmingly defeated
1. Ansab, fo ls.31a-32b (citin g M ada’ in i); Mubarrad, III , p p .34 7 -5 3 ; T a b .,

II, p p .8 2 4 -7 (citing Abu M ikhn af); K u fi, I I , fols. 60b-61b; Ghurar,
fols. 10-11; K a m il, IV ,p p .2 8 5 -1 ; M ir ’ a t ,V I ,f o l. 3 a ; Sharh, IV ,p p . 171 —
3 ; ‘Jbgr, lll,"pT32l. ”
2. According to Abu M ikh naf, after his success, Khalid dispatched Dawud
ibn Qahdhbam with some cavalry men to follow the A zariqa. Being
informed of this, the caliph ordered Bishr ibn Marwan to send a Kufan
army to re-inforce Dawud's cavalry. Bishr therefore sent ‘ Attab ibn
W arqa’ al-R iyahi with four thousand Kulans. Both Dawud and ‘ Attab
followed the retreating Azariqa but without success. T a b ., II,p p .827-28
K am il, I V , p . 281; M ir ’ a t ,V I ,f o l. 3 a .
1 .
and his army scattered. This failure to cope with the K h arijite threat
cost Khalid his governorship: he was soon removed from his post and Basra
2
was added to the government of Bishr ibn Marwan in Kufa.
We have two narratives dealing with these events. One is a l-
M a d a ’ ini's in Baladhuri repeated by al-M ub arrad, and with which both Ibn
A ‘ tham and Ibn A b i'l-H a d id are in complete agreement. The second
narrative is that of Abu M ikhn af in Tabari, a detailed narrative, repeated
by Ibn a l-J a w z i and Ibn Khaldun. The narrative of the author of Ghurar
a l-S iy a r is very similar to that of Ibn A ‘ tham . However, the former is
less d etailed . There is one main difference between the two narratives of
M a d a ’ ini and Abu M ikh n af. Contrary to a l-M a d a ’ in i, Abu M ikhnaf dates
the campaign of Khalid after that of ‘ Abd a l- A z iz . However, judging from
the fact that a l-M a d a ’ ini is a more reliable authority on the affairs of Basra
and the eastern provinces than Abu M ikhn af, whose main interest was Kufa '
and its affairs, one is inclined to prefer the narrative of a l-M a d a ’ ini on this
point. Moreovdr, M ada’ ini's account has a confirmation in the narrative of
- 3
Wahab ibn Ja rir, who agrees with him on this.
1. Ibn Q ais al-R uqayyat, Diwan, p. 190; Ansab, fo ls.32b-33b (citing Abu
M ikh n af); Mubarrad, I I I,p p .3 5 3 -5 ; T a b ., I I , p p . 8 2 2 -6 (citing Abu
M ikhnaf ); KufT, ll,fo ls .6 2 a -6 3 b ; G h u ra r, fo l. II; M u ‘ jam , 11,p.66;
K am il, IV ,0 0 .2 7 9 -8 0 ; M ir ’ a t , V I , f o l . 21; Sharb, IV ,p p l7 3 -6 ;
‘ Ibar, I I I , p . 320.
2. See Chapter III , p. 2=0^
3. Ansab, IV , ii, pp. 1 5 8 -9 .

310.
The caliph, despite the removal of K halid, re-appointed a l-
M uhallab as responsible for fighting the A zariqa, and gave him a free
hand in recruiting troops from Basra. Also on the caliph's orders, Bishr
ibn M arw an, the governor of Iraq, sent a Kufan army under ‘ Abd a l-
Rahman ibn M ikhn af to join a l-M u h a lla b . ^ However, being appointed
directly by the caliph, a l-M u h a lla b was independent of Bishr. Realising this,
Bishr sought to depose him and turned to Ibn M ik h n af, ordering him to disobey
a l-M u h a lla b . But, being an Azdite like a l-M u h a lla b himself, and wiser than
the young inexperienced Bishr, Ibn M ikhnaf considered the interest of his
2
own people and country rather than the personal interest of the governor.
H e, therefore, did not listen to Bishr*s orders, although he pretended to
accept them. A l-M u h a lla b , with the troops of Basra and Kufa, was able to
push the A zariqa back, and captured Ram-Hurmuz where he stayed for ten
days.
Mieanwhile, Bishr ibn Marwan died in Basra. The news of his death gave
the turbulent troops of Basra and Kufa an excuse for leaving their camp:
3
they made their way to their homes, loitering in the cities. Being left
1. Ansab, fo l. 34a; Mubarrad, III, p p .3 6 2 -3 ; T a b ., II, p .855 (citing Abu

M ik h n af); KufT, II, fo ls .6 5 a -6 7 a ; Ghurar, fo l. 12; K am il, IV ,p .2 9 7 ;
M iP ljt , V I,fo l.8 b ;S h a rb , IV ? p . 178; Dhahabi, H I,p p . 116-7 (quoting
TabarTj; Bidaya, I X , p . 3; ‘ Ibar, I I I , p . 322.
2. Im am q, I I , p . 7 6 -7 ; A nsab,fols.34a;34b; M ubarrad, III, p p . 3 6 2 -3 ; T a b .,

11, p. 826 (citing Abu M ikh n af); K a m il, IV , p. 297; M ir ’ a t , V I , fo i.b b ;
Sharh, IV ,p . 180; Bidaya, I X , p . 3; ‘ Ib a r , III,p p .9 0 -1 , 323.
3. Ansab, fo l. 34b; Mubarrad, III, pp. 3 6 4 -6 ; J a b ., 11, pp. 8 5 7 -9 (citing Abu

M ik h n af); KufT, 11, fo l. 67b; Ghurar, fols. 1 2 -13 ; K a m il, IV ,p p .2 9 7 -8 ;
M ir * 5 t , V I,fo l.8 b ; Sharh, IV ,p p . 180-1 ;Bidaya, IX ,p .3 ; ‘ Ibar, 111,pp- 9 1 ,3 2 3 -4 .
311.
with only small number of his A zdite people, a l-M u h a lla b was forced
to the defensive. Thanks to the disagreement which arose among the
1
A zariqa, a l-M u h a lla b was left unattacked. The situation,how ever,
remained crucial, and needed an energetic and prudent man to restore
order among the indisciplined troops of Iraq, and to back a l-M u h a lla b
effectively in his campaign against the A zariqa. As we have seen ea rlier,
‘ Abd a l-M a lik found such a man in a l-H a jja j, to whom he assigned the
2
governorship of Iraq i / 5 / 6 9 4 ).
The presence of a l- H a jja j, as governor in Iraq, was indeed a turning
point in the struggle against the Kharijites in general and the A zariqa in
particular. He not only forced the insubordinate people of Iraq to go back to
their camp in Ram-Hurmuz, but also continued to back a l-M u h a lla b until the
3
A zariqa were completely crushed. In order to strengthen a l-M u h a lla b to
face the enemy e ffe c tiv e ly , al-H a jja j assigned to him the Kharaj of all the
lands which he would conquer between Fars and Basra, until the war was
over.
With this energetic backing, a l-M u h a lla b was now able to take the
offensive, pushing back the Azariqa to Sabur. Then he made his camp in
Arjan and seized Sardan, a mountainous region which otherwise the A zariqa
1. K u fi, 11, fo l. 68a; Ghurar, fols. 14-15.
2. See Chapter III, pp . 21 o
3. See Chapter V , p.Z^jJL

might have used to fortify themselves. From Arjan a l-M u h a lla b moved to
Kazrun where he secured his camp from night attacks by digging a ditch
round it. By this time the Kufan army under Ibn M ikhn af had also arrived,
but had a separate camp to a l-M u h alla b 's . Ibn M ik h n af, who had no
experience of the method of warfare of the A zariqa, ignored the advice
of a l-M u h a lla b and refused to dig a trench around his camp. The A zariqa
made a surprise night attack on ai-M uh allab's camp, which completely
failed because of the ditch. They then turned to Ibn M ikhnaf's feamp w hich,
unprotected as it was by a ditch, allowed them to in flic t a severe defeat
an the Kufans in which many lives were lost, including that of their leader
Ibn M ikhn af (7 5 /6 9 5 ). ^
In the next year, 7 6 /6 9 6 , a l-H a jja j sent ‘ A ttab ibn W arqa’ al-RiyahT,
. — *
the governor of Isbahan, to replace Ibn M ikhnaf as the leader of the Kufan
army. However, ‘ A ttab did not stay long as commander, being recalled to
Iraq after only eight months (7 7 /6 9 7 ). He was transferred because he was
needed in the war against another K harijite group, Shabib and his followers;
1. Suraqa ibn Mirdas, DTwan , p p .4 3 -4 ; Ansab, fo ls.3 4b -35a ; M u b a rra d ,III,

p p .3 7 0 -3 ; T a b ., II, p p .875 (citing Abu M ik h n a f), 8 7 9 -8 0 ; Kamil , IV ,
p p .3 1 5 -1 6 ; M ir ’ at, V I , fo l. 16b; Sharh , iVTpp* 185-7; D h a h a b r,lll,
pp. 119-20; Bidaya, IX , p. 10; ‘ Ibar, ill,p p . 99, 3 2 3 -4 . However, the
Kufans' account, which implies that a l-M u h a lla b was responsible for
this defeat, should not be taken seriously. It is obviously an a n ti-
M uhallab tradition; and also Kufan attempt to justify their defeat.
T a b ., 11, p. 876.
•
313.
also the relationship between him and a i-M u h alla b had begun to deteriorate,
threatening a tribal conflict between the Tamim supporting * A ttab, and the
Azd and Bakr supporting a l-M u h a lla b . It was in the light of this rift that
a| -M u h allab became keen on strengthening the Hi If between a l-A z d and
Bakr, of which he had not at first been in favour.^ After * Attab's departure,
a l-M u h a lla b appointed his own son Habib to be head of the Kufan army. They
■
together continued to fight the Azariqa in Sabur, and expelled them from
Fars completely. The A zariqa then went to Kirman, where they fortified
t 2
themselves in Jiru ft.
Impatient as always, a l-H a jja j continued to send reproachful messages
and deputations to a l-M u h a lla b . He accused him of deliberately prolonging
the war in order to appropriate for himself the Kharaj of the lands under his
3
control. A l-H a jja j urged him to waste no time in exterminating the enemy.
*
Because of his distrust of a l-M u h a lla b , a l-H a jja j took away from him the control
1. Ansab, fol .35b; Mubarrad, l l l,p p .3 7 9 -8 1 ; T a b ., 11,pp.87 2 -8 (citing

Abd1M ikhn af); Kamil, iV ,p .3 1 6 ; M ir*a t ,V I,fo M 7 a (citing Ibn a l-K a lb i)
Sharh. l^ ,p p . 19 4-6 ; B idaya, IX ,p . 10; * Ibar, 111,pp. 9 9 ,3 2 4 .
2. Ansab, fo l.3 6 a ; Mubarrad, l l l , p . 382; T a b ., II,p . 1003 (citing Abu M ikh n af);
Kam il, IV ,p p .3 1 7 ,3 5 3 ; M ir * a t, V I,f o l.2 6 a ; Sharh , IV ,p . 196;* Ibar, III,p . 99.
3* * Uyun.p .4 9 ; Ansabr fo ls.34b -35a; 35b (citing Mada* in i); M ubarrad, 111,
p p .3 6 8 ,3 7 0 ,3 7 3 -4 , 3 7 7 -8 ,3 7 9 ,3 8 5 -6 ; T a b ., II,p . 1003 (citing AbJ
M ikh n af); KufT, II, fo ls ,7 2 a ;7 2 b ,7 3 a -7 5 b ,7 7 a -8 0 a ; Ghurar, fo ls .1 9 -21 ,
2 2 -2 4 ; <lqd, I,p . 145; Aghy, X I I I , p .6 0 ;.K a m il, IV ,p p .3 6 3 -9 ; M .V a t,
V I , fols. 26a-26b; Sharh , IV , pp. 1 8 7 ,1 8 9 -9 2 ,1 9 3 -4 , 195, 199-200,
219-20 (quoting UbahCtnT); NuwairT, V I I , p . 2 4 6 -8 .
of Fars, as soon as the district was recovered once and for a ll from the
A zariq a. It was only on the caliph's orders, that he left the revenue of
special "Kuwar11 for a l-M u h a lla b to maintain his army. ^ On the other hand,
a l-M u h a lla b showed tolerance towards the impatient governor, and tried
to explain to him that his strategy was not to risk a battle which would
expose his army to danger, preferring to wait until an opportunity arose
to deal the fatal blow to the enemy. Nevertheless, he did not leave them
completely unmolested, but carried on continuous skirmishes and minor
battles.
M ean w h ile, disputes "over matters of state and interpretation of law"
2
arose among the A zariqa. These disputes were fomented by a l-M u h a lla b ,
who found in them a good opportunity to weaken his enemy. Eventually, these
disputes resulted in the desertion of eight thousand m aw ali, under one
of them, ‘ Abd Rabbih al-S ag h ir, from Q atri ibn a l-F u ja ’ a , with whom were
1. Ansab, fo l. 36b; Mubarrad, I I I , p. 389; T a b ., 11,pp. 1003-4 (citing Abu

M ikhnaf); K a m il, I V , p . 354; M ir* at, V I , fo l. 26a; Sharb, IV , p . 201;
< Ibar, I I I , p . 342.
2. Ansab, fo ls.36a, 36b (citing Ibn a l-K a lb i), 37a; Y a ‘ qubi, I I , p . 329;
JvQbarrad, III, p p .3 8 2 -3 ;T a b ., II,p p . 1006-7; KulT, ll,fo ls .8 3 b -8 8 a ;
G hurar, fols. 2 7 -3 0 ; Maqa I St, i,p p ,8 7 -9 ; Bad', V I , p . 32; Bagh., pp. 6 5 -6 ;
Kam il, IV ,p p ,3 5 4 - 5 ; M ir , S t , V I , f o l . 2 6 b ; ^ h , IV ,p p . 1 9 7 -9 ,2 0 2 -3 ,
2 0 4 -5 ; e Ibar, I I I , p . 343; I. ‘ Abbas, Shi‘ r a l-E k a w a rij, p . 35, Beirut,
1963. However, this large number of mawsh in the ranks of the
Azariqa might have been due to the fa c tjh a t their movement flourished
in the Persian provinces of a l-A h w a z , Fars, fsbahan and Kirman. For,
with its doctrine of equality, the K harijite movement was the most
attractive movement to them. Thomson, Kharijitism and K h a rijite s ,p .3 7 b ,
MPV,/ Princeton, 1933.
315.
the majority of the ‘ Arabs. Also ‘ A m ru 'i-Q an a with a small number of
‘ Arabs joined ‘ Abd Rabbih al-S agh ir.^ Consequently, a l- H a jja j, since
the war was costly both in men and equipment and in loss of revenue from
Kharaj-controlled provinces, urged a l-M u h a lla b to seize this opportunity
and attack them. However, a l-M u h a lla b did otherwise, for he thought
that this attack on them might serve to reunite them. Nevertheless, ‘ Abd
Rabbih al-Saghir and his mawali followers drove Q a tri and his ‘ Arab
supporters out of the city of Jiruft and they made their camp outside the
c ity . But they soon realised that .it was wiser not to put themselves
between two stools, i.e . ‘ Abd Rabbih and a l-M u h a lla b , and they therefore
- 2
left Jiruft and made for Tabaristan.
The departure of Q atri to Tabaristan made it easier for a l-M u h a lla b

• .
to deal with the remainder of the A zariqa under ‘ Abd Rabbih al-Saghir.
The latter was soon killed in a battle and his followers dispersed, w hile some
of them were granted Aman by a l-M u h a lla b . The latter returned to Basra
where he and his sons and his prominent soldiers were received very warmly
1. W ellhausen, Die Religios Politischen Cppositiondfrparteien im alten

Islam, p .4 0 .
2. Ansab /o ls . 137b-13Sa; Y a ‘ qubi, 11, p. 329; Mubarrad, I I I , p. 394; T a b .,

II,p . 1007 (citing Abu M ikh n af); KufT, 11,fol. 85b; Ghurar, fo l. 28;
Bagh . ,p .6 6 ; M u ‘ ja m ,ll,p .6 2 ; Kamil, I V , p . 355; M ir * a t , V I,fo l,2 6 b ;
Sharb , IV , p. 206; W af ay a t, I, p. 601; Bidaya, IX , p. 30 (citing Abu
M a ‘ shar and WaqidT); ‘ Ibar, II I, p .343.
316.
by both a l-H a jja j and the people (7& /692). Thus the war between a l -
M uhallab and the A zariqa, which lasted for three years of al-H ajjaj*s
governorship, ended in success.
W hile a l-M u h a lla b was still fighting ‘ Abd Rabbih al-S agh ir and
his followers, he wrote to a l-H a jja j about the situation and asked him to send
•
an army against Q a tri ibn a l-F u ja *a and ‘ Ubaida ibn H ila l in Tabaristan.
* •
A l-H a jja j accordingly sent Sufyan ibn al-A brad a l-K a lb i with a Syrian
army against them. To Sufyan's aid came a Kufan army under ‘ Abd al-Rahman
ibn al-A sh ‘ ath from Tabaristan, as w ell as Ja‘ far ibn ‘ Abd al-Rahman ibn
M ikhnaf with an army from Rayy. By these combined efforts, Q a tri was
—
mmm f
- 2
killed and his head sent to a l-H a jja j*
Nevertheless, the A zariqa were not completely exterminated. For ‘ Ubaida
ibn H ila l and his followers fortified themselves in a castle in Oumis. But
Sufyan ibn a l-A b ra d , who was now in charge of the war against the A zariqa,
tackled him as soon as he finished with Q a tri. He beseiged them for three
months. During this they suffered badly from lack of provisions. Sufyan also
issued Aman for those who would lay down their arms and come over to his side.
1. K halifa ibn Khayyo^, Tarlkh, I, p .356; Ansab, fo ls.37a,37b (citin g a l-

Haytham); DTnawarT, pp. 2 8 6 -9 ; Y a ‘ qubT, II, p . 329; M ubarrad, I I I, p p .394,
396^?09; T a b ., II,p p . 1007 (citing Abu M ik h n a f), 1033 (citing Abu
M ik h n af); K a fi, II, fo ls,8 4a-88b ; 89a, 90a-90b; Ghurar, fo ls .2 8 -3 0 ,
3 1 -3 ; * Iqd, 11,pp. 8 1 -2 (citing Mada* irn); M u ru j, V ,p p . 3 5 0 -1 ; Bad*
V I , p . 32; Bagh., p . 66; Kam il, IV ,p p .3 5 5 -7 ; M i r * a t , V I , f o l . 26^1
Sharh . IV ,p p . 2 0 6 -1 6 , 22Q-3; ‘ Ibar, I II,p p .3 4 3 -4 .
2. KhalTfa ibn K h a yya t, TarTkh, I, p. 356; Bayan, 111,p. 134; M a * a r if,p . 181;
Ansab, fo l-3 8 a -3 8 b ; DTnawarT, p .2b 9 ; Y a ‘ qubT, I I ,p p .32 9 -3 0 ; *, s.*
317.
W hile some accepted this offer, others, including ‘ Ubaida himself, decided
1
to fight and were very easily defeated (7 8/69 2), Thus this dangerous
K harijfte sect was exterminated. Sufyan, however, remained in Tabaristan
until he was recalled to Iraq prior to the battle of Dair al-Jam ajim between
- - 2
‘ Abd al-Rahman ibn al-A sh‘ ath and a l-H a jja j.
During the time of the war against the A zariqa, another serious
K harijite rebellion occurred in the Jazira region, forming a potential threat
to Kufa and its surroundings. This rebellion was led by the Sufrite Salih
ibn Musarrih al-Tam im i. However, the movement took its name from that of
ShabTb ibn Y a zld ai-S h aib an i, one of the most distinguished followers of
Salih and was able to defy the government's forces for over a year.
We have two accounts of this event. The first and most detailed one is
that of Abu M ikhnaf in Baladhuri and Tabari. The second is that of ‘ Awana
ibn al-H akam , reported by Baladhuri, Ibn A ‘ tham and the author of Ghurar
a l-S iy a r. W hile it is interesting to have both the Iraqi and the Syrian accounts,
- T a b ., 11, pp. 1018-20 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); K ufi, II, fols. 90b-91a;
Ghurar, fo ls.4 6 -7 ; Bad*, V I , p. 33; Bagh. , p . 66; Kam il, IV , p. 3 5 7 -8 ;
M ir * S t, V I,fo l.2 6 b ; W afayat, l,p .6 0 1 ; Bidaya, I X , p . 30 (citing
Abu M a ‘ shar and WaqidT); ‘ ibar, III ,p . 344; Shadharat, I,p p .86 -7
(quoting lEn Q u taib a).
1. Ansab, fo ls.38b -39a; T a b ., II,p p . 1020-1 (citing AbTJ M ikhn af); K ufi, I I ,
fols. 91 a -9 2 a ; Ghurar. fo ls.4 7 -8 ; Bagh., p . 66; M u ‘ ja m 7 T ll,p .6 2 ; Kamil ,
pp. 3 5 8 -9 ; M ir 7a t , V I , fo l. 26b; ‘ Ibar, 111, pp. 3 4 4 -5 ; G a b rie li, La Poesia
H arigita nel Secolo degli Cm ayyadi, p . 358, RSO , 1943; I . ‘ Abbas,
op. c i t . , p p .5 2 -3 .
2. See Chapter V , p. 2 1 $
318.
unfortunately ‘ Awana's account is not only brief, but also inconsistent
and lacks chronology. Moreover, it presents a somewhat incomplete
picture, since it omits the beginning of the movemebt by Salih ibn
Musarrih. However, the details provided by Abu M ikhnaf*s account
fit in with and supplement the other historians, such as K halifa ibn Khayyat
and Ibn Q u taib a. Furthermore, Abu M ikhnaf reports his account on the
authority of eye-witnesses on bdh sides; men like a l-M u h a lla m i, Farwa
ibn Laqit, ‘ Abd al-Rahman ibn Jundub and the Syrian Abu Zaid al-Saksaki.
. •
For a ll these reasons, we should place more reliance on the narrative of
Abu M ikh n af.
The movement began when Salih ibn Musarrih, the K h arijite leader
in Dara, and about 120 followers rebelled against Muhammad ibn M arw an,
_ ]
the governor of /Vkcusil and Jazira in Safar, 6 7 /M a y ,6 9 5 . They seized
some of the Dawab(animals)belonging to the governor, in Dara. This was
an essential first step, since none of them was mounted. For thirteen days
they remained in the area arousing the fear of the people of Dara, Nasibin
and Sinjar. At first the governor underestimated the importance of this
K harijite band and tried to send ‘ Adi ibn ‘ Adi ibn ‘ Umaira with only five
1. However, Salih ibn Musarrih was not the first K harijite to revolt
in the Jazira region. His revolt was preceeded""Ey that of Fadala
ibn Sayyar al-TaimT al-S h aib an i, who with his eighteen followers
was massacred by the ‘ Anza tribesmen. The caliph rewarded the
latter by letting them settle in the Bamqya* and assigning ‘ A ta *
to them. T a b ., II, p . 893 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); K am il, I V , p . 321;
‘ Ibar, I I I , p . 326.
319.
hundred men against them. It was only when ‘ Adi called the attention of
the governor to the fact that they contained the bravest cavalry of the
Rabi‘ ites, that he agreed to increase this expedition to one thousand
men. However, ‘ A d i, who was a pious man and therefore hesitant to fight
them, was surprised and put to flight by Salih and his followers in a place
. *
called Suq Dhughan. ^
Following this defeat, Muhammad ibn Marwan reconsidered the situa-
tion and sent two armies against the Sufriyya, each of which contained 1500
men under Khalid ibn Jaz* al-SuIam i and al-H arith ibn J a ‘ una a l-M u rri.
When hostilities were resumed, the Kharijites found themselves unable to
cope with this overwhelming force, and retreated by night to al-D askara.
This brought them into conflict with a l- H a jja j, for al-D askara was considered
as a Kufan territory. Consequently, a l-H a jja j dispatched three thousand men
under a l-H a rith ibn ‘ Umaira al-Ham dani against them. A l-H a rith and his army
followed them until they met in a battle in al-M u d ab b aj, in the Mausil region,
where the Kharijites were beaten and their leader Salih was killed on 13th
2
Jumada 1, 76 /3rd September, 695. The seventy men of Salih's followers who
survived the battle of al-M u d ab b aj, retreated into a stronghold there. But Shabib
1. K halifa ibn K hayyat, TarTkh, I , p . 351; Ansab, fo l.4 4 a (citing Abu Mltkhnaf);
T a b ., 11, pp. 8 8 6 -9 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); K am il, IV ,p p .3 1 8 -9 ; M ir* a t, V I ,
fo ls .21 a -2 1 b ; Sharh, IV ,p p .2 2 5 -9 ; DhahabT, III,p . 121; Bidaya, IX ,p p .1 0 -
12 (quoting Tabart); ‘ Ibar, i l l , p p . 324^5.
2. KhalTfa ibn K h ayyat, Tgrikh, I , p . 351 (here Jumada II is m entioned); Ans£b,

fols.44a-44fcT{citing Aba M ikhn af); T a b ., II,p p . 8 8 9-9 2 (citing Abu M ikhnaf)
B agh., p .89; M ila l, p. 224; M u ‘ jam , IV , p . 448; K am il, IV ,p p .3 1 9-2 0; s
ibn Y azid al-S h aib an i, who now assumed the leadership, succeeded in
saving them; for in a night attack he inflicted a defeat on his enemy, and
1
the Sufriyya escaped far from Kufa* This was the beginning of a series of
m ilitary victories over the troops of a l-H a jja j, which met but rarely with
•
reverses until Shabib* s death.
In M ausil, Shabib was joined by Salama ibn Sayyar, and together
they raided the tribes of * Anza and Banu Shaiban, Shabib's own tribe.
M eanw h ile, a l-H a jja j ordered Sufyan ibn A b i'l - ‘ A liy a a i-K h a th ‘ ami,
originally sent to Tabaristan, to return to fight Shabib. A l-H a jja j also
ordered Sawra ibn Abjar to take over the army of a l-H arith ibn ‘ Umaira, and
join Sufyan in his campaign against Shabib. However, Sufyan and his army
met Shabib in Khanaqin before Sawra was able to arrive, where Sufyan was
defeated. Then, following the orders of a l-H a jja j, Sawra ibn Abjar with his army
55 M ir * a t, V I , fo ls.21b-22b ; Sharh, IV ,p p .230-1 (citing Farwa ibn LaqTt);

Dhahabi, 111,p. 122 (here also Jumada II is given); Bidaya, IX ,p p . 12-13
(quoting Tabari); ‘ Ibar, I I I , p . 325. According to BafadhurT, ShahrastanT
and Y aqut, it was Bishr ibn Marwan who sent the army of a l-H arith ibn
‘ Umaira against S a l * b n Musarrih and his followers. However, judging
from the fact that S alih was killed in the year 7 6 , and that the death of
Bishr ibn Marwan was in theyyear 75, it is certain that it was a l-H a jja j
and not Bishr who sent that army. Ansab, fo l.4 4 a ; M i l a l , p . 224; M u ‘ jam,
I V , p . 448.
1. It is said that Salih ibn Musarrih, before his death, ordered his followers
to pay homage to Shabib. K halifa ibn K h ayyat, TarTkh, I , p . 351;
M a ‘ a r if, p. 180; Bagh., p . 89; M il a l, p . 224; Dhajabt, 1II,p * 112.
However, another account says that Shabib himself, after Salih's death,
asked the latter's followers to pay him homage and they agreed to do so.
Ansab, fo l. 45b (citing Abu M ikhn af); T a b ., 11, p. 891 (citing Abu M ikhnaf)
Kgm il, I V , p . 320; Sharb, IV , p . 231; ‘ Ibar, I I I ,p p .3 2 5 -6 .
pursued Shabib. They met in battle in al-N a h ra w a n , where Sawra was
defeated and followed until he reached al-M ad a* in* Thanks to local
resistance, Shabib was turned away from a l-M a d a *in , and the troops of Sawra
1
went back to Kufa.
A fter these successive defeats, a l-H a jja j raised an army of four
thousand men under ‘ Uthman ibn Sa‘ id a l-K in d i, nicknamed a l-J a z l. Con
trary to his predecessors, the latter showed great caution towards Shabib, being
always on the alert and digging trenches to avoid night attacks. For two
months no decisive battle issued between the two. The impatient a l-H a jja j
could wait no longer,and he replaced a l-J a z l by Sa‘ id ibn a l-M u ja lid a l~
Hamdani. A l-H a jja j ordered the latter to reverse his predecessor's strategy
and to fight Shabib as soon as he saw him. Following these orders,
Sa‘ id led his army in pursuit of Shabib and his followers, until they met in
Baraz al-R uz. A fierce struggle took place which ended in a disaster for a l-
H a jja j*s army; Sa‘ id was k ille d and his army fled. However, a l-J a z l tried to
2
rally them, but he was severely wounded and soon died in a l-M a d a * in .
1* K halifa ibn Khayyat , Tarikh, I, p .351; Ansab, fo ls.45b -46a (citing

Ibn al -K a lb T jT ja b ., 11, pp. 893-901 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); K a m il, IV ,
p p .321 -4 ; M ir* a t, V I , f o l . 22a; Sharb, IV ,p p .2 3 2 -6 ; Dhahabt, I I I ,p . 122;
‘ Ibar, I I I , pp. 3 2 6 -7 ; E. I. ^ (ShabTb ibn Y a zid ibn N u ‘ aim al-ShaibanT).
2. K halifa ibn Khayyat-, T a rik h , I, p .351; Ansab, fo l.4 6 a (citing ibn

a I -K al b i); M a 'ad, fols. 28b, 69a; T a b ., 11, pp. 202-11 (citing Abu M ikhnaf)
91 1-1 5; K am il, IV ,p p .3 2 4 -7 ; M ir ’ a t, V I, fo ls.2 2a-22b ; Sharb , IV ,
pp.2 2 7 -4 4 ;~Dh ahabT, III,p . 122; ‘ Ib a r , III ,p p . 3 2 7 -8 .
322.
As a result of this victory, Shabib marched towards Kufa routing an
army which a l-H a jja j sent against him commanded by Suwaid ibn ‘ Abd a l -
Rahman a l-S a ‘ d i. However, Shabib did not enter Kufa but instead went to
Adharbayjan. It seems that Shabib decided to give his followers a rest and
also planned to surprise his enemy. Throughout all his wars with the govern
ment he showed himself a master of guerrilla warfare. His small forces helped him
to move sw iftly, enabling him to surprise his enemies. M oreover, because he
was on good terms with the Christian population in the area of his m ilitaryopera-
tions, they helped him to find shelter for his small forces, and also provided him
with full information about his enemy's movement. ^ However, a l-H a jja j was
relieved to know that Shabib was far from Kufa, and he went to Basra. W hile he
was there, he heard that Shabib was on his way to Kufa, which news sent him back
to Kufa. He reached there the afternoon of Shabib's arrival in the evening of
the same day. That night, Shabib and his two hundred followers entered Kufa
and defied a l-H a jja j by thundering with an iron bar on the gate of the Qasr
(palace) of a l- H a jja j, leaving a deep trace on it. They also went to the mosque
of Kufa, killin g all those who they found praying there. But in the morning
2 _
they dispersed. A l-H a jja j then sent Zahr ibn Qais a l-J u ‘ fi with eighteen hundred
1. E. I. ^ , (Shabib ibn Y a zid ibn N u ‘ aim al-S h aib an i).
2. It is said that Shabi b entered Kufa with his w ife G h a z a la , who per
formed her prayers in the mosque of Kufa in fulfilm ent of a vow she
had made some time e a rlie r. K halifa ibn K h ayyat, Tarikh, I , p . 352;
M a ‘ a rif, p. 181; Ansab, fols.46E (citing Ibn a l-K a lb t),4 8 a (citing a l -
Haytham); KufT, ll7fol«93a; Ghurar, f o l . 29; M u ru j, V ,p p 3 2 0 -1 , 441;
323.
cavalry men to pursue Shabib and fight him. At the same tim e, a l-H a jja j
sent Bishr ibn G h alib al-Asadi with two thousand men; Za* id a ibn
Gudama al-Thaqafi with two thousand men; A bu 'l-D h aris, a mawla
of Tamim, with one thousand men; A ‘ yun, a mawla of Bishr ibn Marwan
with one thousand men; and Muhammad

•
ibn Musa ibn Talha
• •
w ith two
thousand men. ‘ Abd a l-M a lik appointed the latter to the governorship of
Sistan and made him dependent on a l- H a jja j. A l-H a jja j had persuaded him
that he should not go to Sistan before fighting Shabib, to get the merit of
defeating or killin g him. A l-H a jja j also made Za* ida ibn Qudama the
com m ander-in-chief of these five armies, which were gathered at Rudbar,
about twenty four parasangs from Kufa. M eanw h ile, Shabib had met Zahr
ibn Q ais, seriously wounded him and routed his army. Then Shabib marched
against the huge army under Za* ida ibn Qudama, killin g the latter and defeating
his army. ^ Despite the urging of his followers, he did not attack Kufa although
it lay open to him by this tim e, and thus did not take advantage of his victory.
Instead he went to Khanjar, where he constituted a direct threat to al-M ad a* in,
the door to Kufa.
“ Agh. , X V I,p . 155; Bagh., p p .90-1 (here his mother's name ismentioned
instead); M ir* at, V I , fo l.2 3 a ; W afayat, I, p . 314; Bidaya, I X , p . l 4 ;
Shadharat, I, pp. 8 3 -4 ; I . ( Abbas, op. c i t , , pp. 6 3 -4 . However, the
narrative of Abu M ikhnaf in Tabari, repeated by Ibn a l - A ‘ thq; Ibn
A bi'l-H adTd and Ibn Khaldun, is completely silent on G hazala's vow
and prayers. T a b ., II,p p . 917-1 9; Kam il. IV , p p .3 2 8 -9 ; Sharh., IV ,
p p .2 4 5 -7 ; ‘ Ibar. I l l,p p .3 2 9 -3 0 .
1. K halifa ibn K h ayyat, Tartkh, I, p . 352; M a ‘ a rif, pp. 180-1; ‘ Uyun,

p. 152 (citing”Abu11-Yaqdan); Ansab, fols.46b (citing Ibn a l-K a lb t),
50a (citing Abu ‘ Ubaida); Y a ‘ qubl, 11, p. 328; T a b ., II, pp. 915-29 (citing
324.
Again a l-H a jja j raised an army under ‘ Abd al-Rahman ibn Muhammad
* •
ibn al-A sh ‘ ath and ordered him to fight Shabib. Cn the advice of a l-J a z l,
Ibn al-A sh ‘ ath was always on his guard and entrenched himself at night.
Shabib, failin g to surprise this army, tried to draw Ibn al-A sh ‘ ath into
rough and d ifficu lt passes and roads to tire him out, so that he could then
launch his attack. But Ibn al-A sh‘ ath refused to be drawn, although his
caution infuriated a l-H a jja j, who replaced Ibn al-A sh‘ ath by ‘ Uthman
ibn Gatan a l-H a rith i . The new leader was as hasty as his predecessor had been
cautious and very soon engaged in a battle with Shabib on the banks of the river
D u ja il, D hu'l-H ajja, 7 6 /M a rc h , 696. But here again a l- H a jja j‘s army was
defeated and its leader ‘ Uthman ibn Q atan k ille d , w hile Ibn al-A sh ‘ ath
1
managed to return to Kufa with the routed army.
A fter these b rilliant m ilitary victories, Shabib went to the mountains
of Bahrugan where he spent the three months of the summer of 7 7 /6 9 6 . Here
..-2
he was joined by many who were dissatisfied with a l-H a jja j. However, these
three months of unofficial truce gave a l-H a jja j time to m obilize all those Kufans
• —
able to fight and in receipt of the ‘ A ta * , and also some Basran troops. The
- Abu M ikhn af); Jamharat, p. 183; Bagh. ,p p . 9 0 -1 ; K a m il, IV ,p p .32 7 -3 3 ;

M ir * a t, V I, fo ls .2 3 a -2 3 b , Sharh , IV ,p p 2 4 4 -5 4 (citing Farwa ibn LaqTt);
W afayat, I , p . 314; Dhahabt, Il l/p . 122;Bidaya, IX ,p . 14; ‘ I b a r , I I I , p p . 32 8 -3 2 ;
Shadharat. I, pp. 8 3 -4 .
1. K halifa ibn K h ayyat, Tarikh, I , p . 352; A nsab,fols*46b-47a (citing Ibn a l -

KalbT);Tab., 1l,p p . 9 3 0 -9 (citing Abu M ikhn af); KufT, 11, fo l. 92b; Ghurar,
fo ls .4 8 -9 ; Bagh,. pip. 90; K a m il, IV ,p p .3 3 3 -6 ; M ir * a t, V I , fo ls.23b -24a;
Sharb, IV ,p p . 25 6 -6 0 ; DhahabT, ll,p . 122; Bidaya, IX ,p . 14; ‘ Ibar, III, pp. 3 3 2 -4 .
2. T a b ., 11, p. 914; (citing Abu M ikhnaf); Kami 1, IV ,p . 338; M ir* a t, V I , fo l. 24b;
Sharb, IV ,p p .2 6 0 -1 .
325.
]
number of this army is said to have reached fifty thousand men. M eanw hile,
Shabib marched on a l-M a d a * in , where Mut arrif ibn al-M u g h ira was governor.
The latter was a fanatical Muslim, sympathetic to the K h arijite cause although
he was not one of them. When ShabTb approached a l-M a d a * in , he kept him for
2
four days in discussions, but without any result. Realising that a l-H a jja j
would punish him, M u tarrif evacuated a l-M a d a *in and went to the mountains.
Thus Shabib seized the c ity , a fact which gave him a better strategy for his
attack on Kufa. M ean w h ile, a l-H a jja j recalled ‘ Attab ibn Warqa* a l-R iy a h i,
who was fighting the Azdriqa with a l-M u h a lla b , and gave him the command of
- 3
the overwhelming army he had raised against Shabib. ‘ A ttab made his camp in
Suq Hakama not far from Baghdad. Shabib, however, with only six hundred
- 4
followers, was able to defeat ( A tta b ’s army, and killed ( A ttab. A l-H a jja j,
however, had already appealed to the caliph for help after the Kufans had failed
1. Bidaya, I X , p . 17.
2. See p. 3 5 5 .
3. See p. 5
4. Khalifa ibn K h a yya t, Tarikh, l,p .3 4 5 ; A nsab, fo l.4 7 a (citing Ibn a l -

K alb i); T a b ., II,p p .942-54 (citing Abu M ikhn af); KufT, ll,fo l.9 2 b ;
Kam il, IV , p p .3 3 8 -4 3 ; M ir*a t, V I, fols.24E^25b; Sharfr, IV ,p p .2 6 1 -8 ;
DhahabT, 111, pp. 122-4 (citing Abu M ikhnaf and Farwa ibn LaqTt);
Bidaya, IX ,p . 17; * lb a r,lli,p p .3 3 4 -6 ;3 h a d h a ra t. I,p p . 8 3 -4 .
326.
to meet the K harijite threat. The caliph sent him six thousand Syrians, four
thousand under Sufyan ibn al-A brad a l-K a lb i and two thousand under
_ _ _ ]
Habib
•
ibn ‘ Abd al-Rahman
*
al-H• a k a m i.
The death of ‘ Attab and the defeat of his army encouraged Shabib
to march on Kufa. On his way there he defeated an army of one thousand
men under al-HarijT^ ibn M u ‘ aw iya ai-T h aq afi. Then Shabib made his camp
in one of the Kufan suburbs, where he built a mosque, showing that he was
there for a considerable tim e. Before the next decisive b a ttle , ShabTb was
able to k ill the mawali and slaves which a l-H a jja j had equipped to defend him.
However , a l-H a jja j and his Syrian army made their camp in al-S abkha,
and soon a battle was joined. None of the Kufans who had been in the
army of ’‘ A tta b were allowed to participate in this b a ttle , except for Khalid
the son of ‘ A ttab, and Sawra ibn ‘ Abd al-Rahman ibn M ik h n a f, with a very
- 2 —
small number of Kufans. However, contrary to a ll previous battles, Shabib
was strongly resisted by the Syrians,and began to retreat slowly. M eanw hile,
with the permission of a l- H a jja j, Khalid ibn ‘ Attab and some Kufans attacked
1. Ansab, fo l.4 7 a (citing Ibn a l-K a lb i); T a b ., I I , p . 943 (citing Abu M ikhftaf);
KufT, II, fo 1.93a; Ghprar, fo l.4 9 ; Muruj, V , p p . 3 2 2 -3 ; K am il, I V , p . 339;
M ir* a t, V I , fol ♦24b; Sharh. IV , p. 263; W af ay at, l,p .3 1 4 ; DhahabT, III, p. 123;
B idaya, IX ,p . 14; ‘ ibar, Ill,p .3 3 4 .
2. The narrative of ‘ Umar ibn Shabba in Tabari, however, tries to ignore

completely the Syrian role in this battle. J a b ., I I , p p . 9 6 2-9 ; Wellhausen,
Die Religios Politischen Qppositiony&parteien im alten .Islam, p .46 .
327.
Shabib's camp from the rear, killing his wife G hazala and his brother
Masad, and setting fire to the camp. When Sh abib heard of this, he and
his followers took to flight followed by a l-H a jja j*s army (7 7 /6 9 7 ). ^

•
A l-H a jja j sent Habib ibn ( Abd al-Rahman al-H akm i with three thou-
• “ * • *
sand Syrians in pursuit of Shabib. They met in al-A nbar but no decisive
battle took place, and Shabib with his followers retreated to a l-A h w az
2
and then to Kirman where they stayed for some time for re lie f and recovery,
A l-H a jja j dispatched against him in Kirman, Sufyan ibn al-A brad al-KalbT
witha.Syrian army. A l-H a jja j also ordered his deputy governor in Basra, a l -
Hakam ibn Ayyub al-T h a q a fi, to send a Basran army to assist Sufyan.
Therefore, Ziyad ibn ( Amr a l-^ A tk i and four thousand Basrans were sent
to join Sufyan, but they arrived only after the latter had already engaged
Shabib in battle. On the other hand, Shabib lost some of his followers who
accepted the AmQ.n of a l-H a jja j. In order to meet Sufyan, Shabib crossed
]. K halifa ibn K h ayyat, Tari-kh., I, p .354; *Uyun, p. 152 (citing A b t/I

Yaqdan); Ansab, fo ls.47a-47b (citing Ibn a l-K a lb i); T a b ., II,p p . 955-61
(citing Abu M ikhn af); K ufi, ll,fo ls . 93b-94a; G hurar, fo ls .5 0 -1 ; Muruj ,
V , p p .2 2 1 -2 ; K a m il, IV ,p p .3 4 3 -5 ; M ir*a t, V I , fols. 25b-26a; Shark,~
IV ,p p .2 6 8 -7 2 ; W a fa y a t, l,p ,3 1 4 ; DhahabT, III, p. 12 3 -4 (citing Abu M ik h n af)
Bidaya, IX , pp. 17—19; * Ibar, IU,ppT5i36-8; Shadharat, I,p p . 8 3 -4 .
2. K halifa ibn K h ayyat, T a rik h ., I , p . 354; Ansab, fo l.4 7 b (citing Ibn al

KalbT); Y a ( qub7, I I , p . 328 (here as w ell as in Kuff and G hurar, the
name ‘ Alqama ibn f Abd al-Rahman is given); T a b ., II,p p . 969-72 (citing
Abu M ikh n af); K uff, II,fo l.9 4 a ; Ghurar, f o l . 51; B agh., p . 91; K a m il,
IV , p p .3 4 5 -6 ; M ir 5a t, V I,f o l.2 6 a ; Sharfrf IV ,p p . 2 7 2 -5 ; DhahabT, IN],
p. 1 2 4 ;M b a r, I I I , p p . 3 3 7 -8 .
328.
the river Dujoii and came to a l-A h w a z , where hostilities began. Once
again Shabib could not meet the strong resistance of the Syrians and began
to retreat, crossing back over the river D u ja il. He let a ll his followers
cross first, and while he in the rear was on the bridge, he fe ll in and was
drowned. ^ This was probably at the end of 7 7 /6 9 7 .
D ifferent versions exist of the death of Shabib. According to one

2
account, w hile he was crossing his horse *s foot went off the bridge, because
there was a mare in front of him, thus tossing Shabib in the river. Another
3 _
account says that when Shabib was on the bridge, Sufyan ordered the bridge
to be cut down, thus causing Shabib's death. F in ally , there is a third account
1. K halifa ibn K hayyat, Tarikh, I , p . 355; M a *a rif, p. 180; ‘ Uyun, p. 152

citing A bu 'I-Y aq dan); Ansab, fols.47b (citing Ibn al-K albT ), 48a (citing
al-H aytham ); Ya'qubT, II, p .328; T a b ., II,p p . 97 2 -6 (citing Abu M ikhnaf);
KufT, fT7fol.94g; Ghurar, fo l.5 1 ; M u ru j, V , p . 322; Bagh. , p. 91;
M i l a l , p .2 2 4 ;K a m il, IV , pp. 346-5 0; M ir* a t , V I, fo l. 26a; Sharh , iV ^
p p .2 7 6 -7 8 ; W a fa y d t, I, p .314; Mukhtagar, I , p . 208; Dhahabt, III,p p . 124-5
Bidaya, IX ,p p . 19-20 (citing Ibn al-K albT); ( Ibar, IiT^pp*338— 40;
Shad bar at, I, p. 84; Theophanos, Chronographia, the year 6185.
2* Ansab, fo !.47 b (c itin g Ibn a l-K a lb i); T a b ., I I , p . 974 (citing Abu M ik h n a f);
M uruj , V , p. 322; Kami I , IV , p. 349; Sharh , IV , p. 277(citing Farwa ibn
LqqTt); W a fa y a t, I,p .3 1 4 ; Dhahabt, III,p . 125 (citing Abu M ikhnaf );
B idaya, IX ,p p .19-20 (citing Ibn a l-K a lb i); * ibar, I I I , p p . 3 3 9 -4 0 .
3. Ansab, fo ls.4 7b ,4 9a (citing al-H aytham ); Y a 'q u b i, II,p .3 2 8 ; K ufi,

II, fo l.4 9 a ; G h u ra r, f o l . 51; Bagh., p. 91.
which reports that some of Shabib's own followers had already crossed before
Shabib and that they cut the ropes of the bridge which led to its collapse
t 1
and the death of Shabib. What makes it d ifficu lt to decide in favour of
any of these narratives is that, w hile Abu M ikhnaf implies that the last
2 r - 3
account is the right one, Ibn a i-A th ir and Ibn A b i'l-H a d id prefer the .
first account. However, several reasons make us think that the third account
is the most convincing. Apart from the fact that the first account reads more
4 o
as a story than history, the second seems unlikely; for if Sufyan could cut the bridge,
would not it have been wiser to do so when Shabib had first crossed the River
D u ja if, saving himself the d iffic u lt task of fighting him? Cn the other hand,
Shabib had killed some of his own people (Banu Shaiban)as w ell as other tribes,
in his raids on those who did not follow him. This seemed enough to turn some of
his followers against him, especially those who did not profess Kharijism as such,
but had joined him out of fear, or to get material benefits as a result of his
1. Ansab, fo ls.4 7b , 149a; T a b ., 11, pp. 97 5-6 (citing Abu M ikhn af); K am il,
I V , p . 349; Sharh, I V , p . 277; Bidaya, IX , p .2 0 (c itin g Ibn aI-K albT )I
2. T a b ., II,p . 976.
3# K am il, IV / p . 349; Sharh/ IV, p . 277.
4. W ellhausen, Die Religios Politischen Oppositiorv£pqrteien im alten

Islam, p .47.
5. Ansab, fols.47a (citing Ibn a l-K a lb i), 49a (citing a l-H a y th a m );J a b ., II,
pp.895(citing Abu M ikhn af ), 915-16 (citing Abu MikhnafJJ 941 (citing
Abu M ik h n af), 975 (citing Abu M ik h n af), 976-7 (citing Abu M ikh n af);
K am il, I V , p . 322; Sharh, IV ,p . 277; B id a y a ,IX ,p .20 (citing Ibn al-K albT);
* Ibar, I I I , p . 326.
330.
b rillia n t m ilitary successes, or else to escape a l-H a jja j *s severe policies. ^
It should be added that disputes arose among his followers and also others felt
jealousy towards him. It is reported that in the battle of al-S abkha,
Masqaia ibn Muhalha! a l-D ab b i with some of his followers deserted Shabib,
- . ♦ 2
because the latter refused to show adherence to Salih ibn Musarrih. Some
. • •
of Shabib's followers also were dissatisfied with him because at one time he
3
showed mercy to his own people or old friends. F in a lly , according to a l -
- 4
Haytham ibn ‘ A d i, some of his followers accused him of being unjust and
in giving a mare to one of his followers. It is very lik e ly , therefore, that
Shabib had met his death at the hands of those malcontents among his followers.
The fate of .Najda ibn ‘ Amir al-H a n a fi and that of Q a tri ibn a l-F u ja 7a confirms
this view .**
However, Shabib's death proved the turning point in the Sufriyya
movement: his followers chose al-Bu.tain as their leader and continued to defy the
1. T a b ., ll,p . 941 (citing Abu M ikhn af); K a m il, IV ,p . 338; M ir 7a t , V I ,

fo l. 24b; Sharb/ IV , pp. 2 6 0 -1 , 2 7 4 -5 ;" Ib a r , 111, p. 334.
2. T» a b ., II,p . 967 (citing <Umar ibn Shabba).

i
3. Ansab, fo ls.48 (citing al-H aytham ), 50a (citing Abu ‘ Ubaida); T a b .,

TTTpjpT927-S , 928 (citing ‘ Umar ibn Shabba), 9 6 7 -9 (citing ‘ Umar ibn
Shabba ), 975 (citing Abu M ikhn af); K am il, IV ,p p .3 2 8 ,3 3 3 ,3 4 9 ;
M ir 7a t , V i , fo l.2 3 b ; Sharh, IV ,p p .2 5 2 -4 .
331.
government by seizing the Suq a l-A h w a z , but without great enthusiasm.
Sufyan ibn al-A brad a l-K a lb i with his army followed al-B utain and his
followers and the two met in a battle; before long the Sufriyya asked Sufyan
for Aman
i n i .
in return for thier submission, and al-B utain
*
had to flee to save
his life . He was soon seized, however, and put to death by an order of
a l-H a jja j. ^
How had the movement'been able to sustain its success for so long?
At the height of its power under Shabib, it had never numbered more than
a thousand supporters, and normally far fewer. This small army had been
able to defy larger forces of the government, partly because of their
skill in guerilla warfare, partly because of the help they received from the
Christians in the area. But blame must also rest with a l- H a jja j: in his
impetuosity, he thought only to send larger and larger armies against them.
His thinking remained conventional: he never grasped the principle of
adapting his strategy to meet guerrilla tactics. It was not until the arrival
of Syrian troops that the Sufriyya began to experience reverses.
Another revolt against a l-H a jja j and the Umayyad rule came from
a l-M a d a 7in , led by M u ta rrif ibn al-M u g h ira ibn Shu1 ba al-T h a q a fi, the
governor of a l-H a jja j there: whether or not it was a K harijite revolt historians
1. K halifa ibn Khayyat , Tarikh, I , p . 355; Ansab, fo l*4 9 b (citing M ada7 in i).
332.
disagree, but certainly it was associated with the Kharijites.
Cur information about this revolt comes from the narrative of Ibn a l -
Kalbi in Baladhuri and that of Abu M ikhnaf in Tabari. Apart from the details
»■11 *
provided by Abu M ik h n af, which he reports on the authority of a l-N a d r
ibn S alih, a friend and a courtier of M u ta rrif, these two accounts are
f undamentally the same; whick leads to the conclusion that either Ibn a l -
Kalbi used Abu M ik h n a fs account, or else they both u tilized a common
source.
M u tarrif and his two brothers Hamza and *U rw a were considered among
• •
the Ashraf of the time and enjoyed a reputation for good conduct. For these
reasons, and possibly also because of kinship with a 1—HciQaj, they received
the la tte r’s favour;, he appointed M u tarrif as governor of a l-M a d a ’ in ,

♦
Hamza the governor of Hamadan, and ‘ Urwa his deputy in Kufa during
his residence in Basra.^

*
Thus M utarrif was in authority over a l-M a d a , in in the year 7 7 /6 9 6 ,
while a l-H a jja j was busy fighting the K harijite Shabib. When Shabib
marched from Satidma towards K ufa, M u tarrif wrote to a l-H a jja j informing
V
him of his advance and asking for re-inforcements to defend a l-M a d a ’ in.
A l-H a jja j sent him four hundred men under Sabra ibn ( Abd al-Rahman ibn
1. Ansab, fo l.29 b (c itin g Ibn al-K albi); T a b ., II,p p . 979-80 (citing Abu
M ik h n af); Kamil, I V , p . 355; M ir ’ a t, V I,f o l.2 8 a ; * Ibar, I I I , p . 340.
M ikhnaf and ‘ Abdallah ibn Kunnaz. By this time Shabib had reached
]
Buhursir where he made his camp.
M u ta rrif, realising how close Shabib was, cut down the bridge which
• i
connected a l-M a d a ’ in to Buhursir. He also wrote to Shabib asking him
to send some trustworthy men among his followers "to examine their under-
standing of the Q u r’ an and to inquire about your preaching11 (
\j>J j j I Our sources do not say whether this surprising
request sprang from M utarrif's sympathy to the K h a rijite cause, or
whether he intended to show them the error of their ways. Shabib agreed
and his deputation told M utarrif that their cause was "the Book of God and
the Sunna of the Prophet; they opposed the appropriation of the Fay1, the
disregard of the Hudud and the practice of oppression" ( i )
M u tarrif agreed with a ll these aims and appeared to have thought of joining
them. But he insisted that the caliphate should be an elective office
restricted to the Quraishites. He believed that the Quraishite claim to the
caliphate would rally the ‘ Arabs freely under their banner.^ Thus both his
1. T a b ., I I , p p . 946-7 (citing Abu M ikhnaf); Kamil , IV ,p p .3 5 0 -1 .
2. Ansab, fo l.2 9 b (citing .ibn a l-K a lb i); T a b ., II, p p .981-3 (citing Abu
M fkK haf); K a m il, IV , p . 352; M ir ’ a t, IV ,fo l. 28a; ‘ Ibar, I I I , p . 340.
3. T a b .; 11; p. 984 (citing Abu1Mukhnaf).
4. Ansab, fo l. 29a (citing Ibn al-K albT); T b b ., 11,pp. 98 3 -4 (citing Abu
M ikh n af); Kam il, IV , p . 351; M ir ’ at, \?1, fo l. 28a; ‘ Ibar, I I I , p p . 3 4 0 -1 .
334.
insistence on a Quraishite caliph and his emphasis on an ‘ Arab following
separated him from the Kharijites; the latter maintained that the most
distinguished man should be elected caliph, regardless of his fam ily or his
tribal connections. Nor did they care whether their support was from ‘ A rab,
mawla or slave. However, the interest M u tarrif had shown in Kharijism
encouraged Shabib to try again to win him over to his side. He sent some of
his followers to M u tarrif to convince him that Ouraish had no better claim to
the caliphate than any other ‘ Arab; but without a v a il. Thus the negotiations
between them, which had lasted for four days, ended without either side having
come to terms.
In the event, a l-IJ a jja j unintentionally profited from the situation.
For these four days of negotiations prevented Shabib from surprising on their
way to Kufa the Syrian troops which ‘ Abd a l-M a lik had sent to the aid of a l-
Moreover, it gave time for ‘ Attab ibn Warqa* al-RiyahT to reach Kufa
from Kirman. ‘ A ttab was to command the army raised by a l-H a jja j against
Shabib. ^
M u tarrif now found himself caught between Shabib and a l-H a jja j;
fearing attack from the former and punishment from the latter, he left al-Zviada’ in
]. A n sab ,fo l.35b (citing Mada* in i); T a b ,, II,p . 947 (citing Abu M ikhn af);
Sharh , IV f p . 262; Kam il, IV ,p p .3*40-1.
2. See p.
335.
and went to al-D askara. There, he gathered a council of the prominent
men among his followers and for the first time told them of his intention
to rebel. He declared the deposition of both a l-H a jja j and ‘ Abd a l-M a lik .
He gave his followers the choice of either following him or returning to
their c ity . W hile some went back, the majority remained with him and
swore homage to him according to "The Book of God and the Sunna of
the Prophet; and the doctrine (hat the choice of a Quraishite caliph should
be decided by a Shura". Among those who deserted him were Sabra ibn ‘ Abd
al-Rahman ibn M ikhnpf and ‘ Abdallah ibn Kunnaz with their four hundred
r 2
men, where they took part with the Syrian army in the fighting against Shabib.
From al-D askara, M u tarrif went to Halwan, where Suwaid ibn ‘ Abd
. •
al-Rahman a !-S a ‘ dT was governor for a l-H a jja j, To put himself in favour with
• • —
a l-H a j.ja j, Suwaid went out with a small army against M u ta rrif. But Suwaid
* — f
was reluctant to fight M u tarrif, perhaps out of sympathy with him, and asked
him secretly to leave Hulwan, which the latter did. He went to Hamdan
where his brother Hamza was governor. Cn his w ay, M utarrif was interrupted
* •
3
by the Kurds, but defeated them in al-Thanya.
1. Ansab, fo l. 30a (citing Ibn a l-K a lb i), T a b ., 11,pp. 9 8 8 -9 (citing Abu

M ik h n af); Kam il, IV ,p p .351 -2 ; M i^ a t, V I, fo l,2 8 a ; * Ibar, I I I , p . 341.
2. See p.
3. Ansab, fo l.3 0 a (citing Ibn a l-K a lb i), T a b ., II,p p . 989-91 (citing Abu
M ikh n af); K am il, IV , p. 352; M ir* at, V l , fo l. 28a; ‘ Ibar, i 11, p. 341.
When M u tarrif approached Hamadan, he sent for his brother, asking
his help. The latter, although he would not join him, sent him money and
weapons. In order not to harm his brother, M u tarrif did not enter
Hamadan, instead making his way to Isbahan where he pitched his camp. By
•
now his followers had increased, for people from al-R ayy and other districts
opposing a l-H a jja j's severe policies, joined him. Consequently, al-Bara* ibn
Qabisa, the governor of Isbahan, wrote for a l-H a jja j asking for re-inforcements,
• • • —
The latter ordered ‘ Adi ibn W attad, the governor of al-R ayy, to join al-B ara’ ,
and sent other re enforcements to him. Their army, which now numbered six
thousand, was placed under the command of ‘ Adi ibn W attad. A l-H a jja j had
previously removed Hamza from Hamadan, lest he should join his brother. He
chose as the new governor of Hamadan, Qais ibn Sa‘ d a l~ ‘ ij l i , because the
latter's tribe was the most powerful in Hamadan. Soon the two armies joined
in battle, and after a severe struggle, M u tarrif was killed and his followers
dispersed. ^
Our authorities differ as to the nature of the revolt of M u tarrif. Abu

9
M ikhnaf passes almost completely silent on his motives, without committing
2 t 3
himself to any explanation. According to al-Haytham ibn ‘ A d i, M u tarrif
1. A nsab,fols.30a-30b (citing ibn a l-K a lb i); T a b ., 11, pp. 992-1000 (citing

Abu M ikh n af); Jamharat, p . 255; K am il, 1 ^ ,p p .3 5 2 -3 ; M ir * a t, V I, fo ls .28
28b; ‘ Ibar, I I I , p p . 3 4 1 -2 .
2. There is, however, some indication which implies that it was not a
K h arijite revolt. T a b ., I I , p p . 9 8 7 ,9 9 2 .
3.37.
was "opposing al-M un kcr* (moral atrocities) and did not go as far as the
K harijites". Baladhuri,^ however, in assessing M utarrif's views, states that
"some said that M u tarrif held the K harijite doctrine, but this is false. His
views were the same as the Q u rra’ who revolted with Ibn al Ash‘ ath".
2
S im ilarly, modern historians differ in their opinions on M u ta rrif. W eil
? 3
considers him as a follower of Shabib, while Van V loten thinks that his
revolt could be categorised with those of the Ashraf against the Umayyads.
Wellhausen, however, is not ex p lic it about M utarrif and his views and says
that "he had great K harijite inclinations, but he refused either to be a
follower of Shabib or to fight against him"^. However, neither the
contacts which M utarrif had with Shabib, nor his rigid attacks on the injustice
of the caliph and his governors, necessarily make him a K h a rijite . For while
the K harijite sects assert strongly that every believer who is morally and
religiously irreproachable qualifies for election to the caliphate, "even if
he were a black slave", M u tarrif restricted the claim to the Quraishites alone.
M oreover, neither the Kharijites nor M utarrif's own followers referred to him
as a K harijite,nor did he or his followers adopt the common K harijite slogan
2. W e il, History of the Islamic Peoples, p. 122, Englishtranslation by

S. Kh. Bukhsh^ C alcutta, 19 ]4 .
3. op. c it . , pp. 2 6 -7 .
4. Die Religios Politischen Qppositioq,£parteien im alten Islam, p .45.

338.
"La Hukma Ilia L i'L lah ". Furthermore, he left behind him no followers
preaching a special doctrine. For all these reasons, it seems difficult to
depict him as a K h a rijite . He was rather a fanatic Muslim who wanted to
reject the oppressors of the pious. One therefore can agree with a l -
Baladhuri that his motivations were no doubt similar to the Qurra* * ^ His
contact with Shabib may have been an attempt to win him over to his
side, since they were both agreed on opposing the existing regime and the
brilliant m ilitary success of Shabib may w ell have encouraged M u tarrif to seek
to gain his support. But failing to do so, he also failed to emulate his success
and his revolt was ineffectual and shortlived.
Apart from these major risings, there were also during the reign of
<Abd a l-M a lik other sporadic and shortlived K harijite risings in a l-J a z ira ,
Yamama, Bahrain and Basra. The suppression of Shabib's rebellion did not put
an end to the risings in b a l-J a z ira region. Soon after Shabib's death, Abu
Ziyad al-M u rad i rebelled in Jukh a. A l-H a jja j sent eight hundred men against
him under al-Jarrah ibn ‘ Abdallah a l-H a k m i, the governor of Babil and a l -
Fallu jatain . It was only after fierce fighting that Abu Ziyad and his followers
1. See Chapter V , p p .Z ^ I^ Z
339.
were massacred. In Jukha, another K harijite rising occurred, that of
Hudba a l-T a ’ i with a small group of followers. But Saif ibn Hani* was
stationed there with his Maslahaf for the purpose of quelling K harijite
2
insurrections, and he succeeded in seizing Hudba and k illin g him. Another
K harijite rising came from Dara under Sakin al-S h aib ani; but he was
seized by the cavalry of Muhammad ibn Marwan and handed over to a l-H a jja j,
3 “ 7
who consequently executed him. Another K harijite rising in the Jazira
region was that of M atar ibn * Imran in MatisM, who was also seized by the
' .4
cavalry of Muhammad ibn Marwan and handed over to a l-H a jja j. (All
* •
Kharijites seized in the Jazira or in Syria were handed over to a l-H a jja j for
execution to prevent them from using these places as JIDar H ig ra"). F in ally,
there was the rising of a l-K h a tta r a l-N a m ri in Radhan. The latter was
originally a Christian but converted to Islam and then adopted Kharijism. He
5
met his death at the hands of Saif ibn H a n i*.
One small K harijite revolt broke out in al-Yam am a in Suq H ajar, that
of Abu Harira from the Banu H anifa. He was soon killed by the people there.
• »
1. Ansab, fo l.5 0 b (citing al-H aytham ); Y a ( qubi, I I , p . 328.
2. A nsab,fol.45a;(citing Mada* in i).
3. Ib id ., fols.52b (citing Mada* in i), 53a (citing Ibn a l-K a lb i).
4. A n s ab ,fo l.5 2a (citing al-H aytham ). However, according to Mada* in i, M atar's

rebellion was before that of Salih . *
ibn Musarrih.
•
Ansab,
— 1, .
fo l.5 2 a .
6. Ib id ., fo l. 52a (citing al-H aytham ).

Owing to its distance from the central government, al-Bahrain was
m
also a centre of K harijite revolts. In the year 7 8 /6 9 7 , w hile a l-H a jja j
was still fighting the A zraq ite, Q atri ibn a l-F u ja ’ a , a K harijite rebellion
broke out in al-B ahrain. The leader of this rising and his followers came from
the tribe of f Abd a l-Q a is . The governor, Muhammad ibn S a*sa‘ a a l-K ila b i,
• * *
appealed to a l-H a jja j for help, but the latter was at this time short of men
for the troops of Basra and Kufa were busy fighting the A zariqa with a l-
M uhallab, A l-H a jja j, therefore, asked the caliph to order Ibrahim ibn ( A rabi,
the governor of a i-Y a m a m a , to assist the governor of al-B ahrain. Ibrahim

t
marched on the rebels, defeated them and returned back to al-Yam am a.^
In the following year 7 9 /6 9 8 al-Rayyan a l-N a k ri revolted against
Muhammad ibn Sa‘ sa‘ a a l-K ila b i. A l-R ayyan was soon joined by another
K harijite rebel, Maymun, who came from ( Uman. Muhammad ibn S a ^ a ^ a
summoned the people of al-Bahrain to fight al-Rayyan and his followers,
but the <Abd a l-G a is , because of their K harijite sympathy, refused to take
part in quelling the rebels. However, Muhammad sent an army under the
A zdite ‘ Abdallah ibn *Abd a l-M a lik a l - ‘ Awdhi against al-R ayyan, but it
was defeated and the latter k ille d . Shamed by this defeat, and afraid of the
1. Ib id ., fols, 5 0 b -5 1 a (citing M a d a 'in i).

hostility shown by the ‘ Abd a l-O a is towards him, Muhammad left a l -
*
Bahrain to save his life . However, by this time a disagreement seems to have
*
occurred between al-Rayyan and Maymun, for the latter left al-Bahrain only
forty days after Muhammad's departure, and returned to ‘ Uman. Muhammad,

* •
however, did not take advantage of this to return to the country and exploit
the disagreement among his enemies. On the other hand, when he heard the
news of these alarming events, a l-H a jja j dispatched Y azid ibn Abi Kabsha
al-Saksaki with twelve thousand Syrians to help Muhammad, but they arrived
after the latter had already left the country. Y azid and his army met a l -
Rayyan with 1500 men in b a ttle , and the latter was k ille d with a large number
of his followers (8 0 /6 9 9 ).^ Y azid had the bodies of al-Rayyan and his followers
crucified, w hile their heads were sent to a l-H a jja j. The latter imprisoned the
previous governor of al-Bahrain for his cowardice and inefficiency in handling
the situation; he died in prison.
Soon after al-Rayyan's revolt, Dawud ibn M ihriz from ‘ Abd a l-O a is
also rebelled. He and his followers first buried the bodies of al-Rayyan and
his followers, assisted by the people of al-Bahrain. Dawud, however, made
a l- Q a t t f his headquarters, and succeeded in putting to flight the first army
sent against him under the police officer of a l- G a tif. He also defeated
1. K halifa ibn K h a y y a t, Tarikh,, I, p p .3 5 8 ,3 6 0 ; Ansab, fo l*5 1a

(cTting Madc?mT)i
342.
the A zdite * Abd al-Rahman ibn a I-N u *m a n a l-* A w d h i, which defeat,
however, had the effect of rallying the Azd with the people of a l-G a ti f
against Dawud and *Abd a l-Q a is . This alliance defeated Dawud and he and
his K harijite supporters were k ille d . These continuous risings of Kharijites
from *Abd a l-O a is in al-Bahrain led a l-H a jja j to seize some of their chiefs,
» * **•
2
whom he punished severely by death, amputation and imprisonment.
In Basra, a K harijite from *Abd a l-Q a is called Abu M a*bad al-Shanni
rebelled. Abu M a*b ad came originally from a I-Bahrain and chose M aw qu *,

*
a place in the outskirts of Basra, as his headquarters. He was, however,

«
3
soon killed by the troops of al-Hakam ibn Ayyub the governor of Basra.
» •
Even the last year of * Abd a l-M a lik 's reign did not pass without a K harijite
rising (8 6 /7 0 5 ), for in this year Dawud ibn a l-N u *m a n , another of * Abd a l-Q a is
originally from al-B ahrain , rebelled in Basra at Mawqu* of Abu M a *b a d . Dawud

• •
arrived in Basra with forty men, and was joined there by other Kharijites: he
• 11 "
probably chose M awqu( as the centre of his rising, knowing that he could find
K harijite support there. A l-H a jja j's deputy governor in Basra, al-H akam ibn
Ayyub, sent aginst him * Abd a l-M a lik ibn a l-M u h a lla b ibn AbiSufra. After
1. A nsab,fol. 51a (citing Mada* in i).
2. Ibid. , fo ls.5 1a-51b (citing Mada* in i).
3. A nsab,fo l. 50b (citing Mada* in i); Y a *qubi,II,p p . 3 2 8 -9 ; Mu* jam , II,

p .688 (here, he is called Abu Sa*id).
343.
putting up strong resistance, Dawud and his followers, among whom was his
own sister, were kille d ; this was the last K harijite rising in the reign of
* Abd a l-M a lik . ^
In sharp contrast to a ll these battles and rebellions of Kharijites
groups, was the behaviour of the I bad i K harijite sect, which enjoyed a
friendly relationship with the caiiph from the time of their first leader,
Ibn Ibad, until the death of *Abd a l-M a lik . Ibn Ibad 's successor, Jabir
ibn Z aid , was not only friendly with the caliph, but even with his governor in
Iraq, a l-H a jja j, normally so bitter an enemy to the K harijites. Jabir is said
• —• ■
to have received a salary from a l- H a jja j. It is not enough to explain this

« “ “
friendship between the caliph and the IbadT leaders solely in terms of their
3
Q u *u d (quietism), for the Sufriyya were also among the Q a*ad a, yet they
fought *Abd a l-M a lik repeatedly. But one can find another explanation in the
correspondence which took place between the caliph and ‘ Abdallah ibn Ibad.
The Ibadi chronicles preserve to us two letters of advice Nasa* ih from’
4
‘ Abdallah ibn Ibad to * Abd a l-M a lik . The date of these letters is not known,
1. K halifa ibn K hayyat, Tarikh, I, p . 348 (he gives the year 75 instead); Ansab,
fo ls.52a-52b (citing MadcFTni).
2. Rubinacci, II, C a liffo *Abd a l-M a lik b. Marwan e gli Ib aditi, p. 105.
A IU O N , 1954; E J . 2, (A l-lb a d iy y a ).
3. E. 1.2 , (A l-lb a d iy y a ).
4. Siyar, p .7 7 ; Barradi, pp> 1 5 6-7 ; Siyar a l-*U m a n iy y a , p p .4 4 5 -5 5 .

344.
yet one can conclude that the first letter was written after the year 6 7 /6 8 6 , for it
contains a reference to the defeat of al-M ukhtar by Mus ( ab ibn a l-Z u b a ir. ^
However, it is obvious that * Abd a l-M a lik had taken the in itia tiv e in starting
the correspondence, since the first letter is a reply of Ibn Ibad to an earlier letter
- - 2
from the caliph, through a certain Sinan ibn * As im. From this, bearing in
mind the caliph's letter to N ajd a ibn 1Am ir, one can trace one of ‘‘Abd al
M a lik's methods of dealing with the Kharijites: bribery! Just as N ajda was
offered the governorship of al-Yam am a, the leader of the Ibadi Kharijites was
offered a pension; whereas the former refused the bribe, the latter appears to have
accepted, as we find a l-H a jja j paying Jabir a salary.
( Abd a l-M a lik 's approach was subtle: even if the bribe fa ile d , the
correspondence might well serve to divide the leader from his followers by
arousing their suspicions (as in Najda's case); or, in the case of the Ibadi leader,
it served to deepen the difference of opinion between the sect and other K harijite
groups, thus preventing them from uniting to form a common front against the
caliph. <Abd a l-M a iik 's successor, however, appears to have abandoned this
policy, and the Ibadi sect was to take up the sword against him.
1. Rubinacci, op. c it• , p. 104, A IU O N , 1954;E . I. (AH Ibadiyya).
2- Siyar, p .77; Barradi, pp. 156-7; Siyar a l-* Umaniyya, p p .4 4 5 -5 5 .

‘ Abd a l-M a lik 's success in suppressing all opposition movements by the
end of his reign, gave a new political unity to the Empire, which together with
his administrative reforms, laid a solid foundation for the more spectacular
achievements of his son, a l-W a lid , in the expansion of the Islamic Empire.
346,
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Dixon, 'Abd Al-Ameer (1969) - The Umayyad Caliphate, 65-86/684-705: (A Political Study)

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Dixon, 'Abd Al-Ameer (1969) - The Umayyad Caliphate, 65-86/684-705: (A Political Study)

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UNIVERSITY OF L O N D O N

f Abd A l-Am eer 1 Abd Dixon

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philoso]

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

In the unlikely e v e n t that the a u thor did not send a c o m p le te m anuscript

Published by ProQuest LLC(2017). C opyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.

All rights reserved.

This thesis is a political study of the Umayyad Caliphate during

the reign of f Abd a I -M a lik ibn M arwan, 6 5 -8 6 /6 8 4 -7 0 5 . The first

a l- M a lik , and relates this to his later policy on becoming caliph.

Chapter II is devoted to the ‘ A lid opposition of the period, i . e .

The ‘ Asabiyya(tribal feuds), a dominant phenomenon of the Umayyad

period, is examined in the third chapter. An attempt is made to throw

The fourth chapter is concerned with the c iv il war between Abd

the Zubairid opposition movement in general.

of activity in this period, in its political aspect, as a source of opposition

as w ell as the better-known major K h a rijite revolts. This chapter also

movement of Shabib ibn Y azid and the Kharijites in general.

In the first place I should like to express my deepest gratitude to

my supervisor, Professor Bernard Lewis, to whose invaluable learned

guidance, help and encouragement throughout all the years of my study, I

owe a great deal*

I am also greatly indebted to Miss Susan W allis for her help in

making some Arabic books available to me*

Thanks are also due to the staff of the libraries of S. O , A . S ., the

Society for their ready help.

I should also like to thank the libraries of Ayasofya, Ahmet III,

Istanbul; a l-Z a h ir iy a , Damascus; the Bodleian, Oxford; the Chester

Kulturbesitz, Tubingen, for providing me with photographs of different

F in ally , I thank my family and a ll my friends, for their unfailing

support and encouragement.

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