F. Gonzales Vs People
F. Gonzales Vs People
F. Gonzales Vs People
DECISION
QUISUMBING , J : p
For review on certiorari is the Decision 1 dated March 11, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 22157, affirming the guilty verdict against petitioner for arson by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 97.
Petitioner Joel P. Gonzales, Jr. 2 was charged in an Information 3 dated July 24, 1997,
which read as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of June, 1997, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and deliberately set
fire to an inhabited place, to wit: a two-storey residential building which [was]
partitioned into dwellings rented out to tenants, owned and occupied likewise by
CARLOS C. CANLAS, located at No. 120 corner Halcon and Simon Streets, Brgy.
San Isidro Labrador, La Loma, Quezon City, thereby setting said residential
building into flames and razing it including other properties; and that the
properties that were burned with their corresponding owners and value were as
follows:
1. The residential building and other property
owned by Carlos C. Canlas valued at P3,000,000.00
with the total of FIVE MILLION, FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND
(P5,465,000.00), all belonging to the aforesaid persons, to the damage and
prejudice of said owners in the aforesaid amount of P5,465,000.00, Philippine
Currency.
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CONTRARY TO LAW.
Gonzales appealed, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. In its
Decision dated March 11, 2003, the Court of Appeals held that the denial of Gonzales
cannot prevail over the positive identification of a witness. The Court of Appeals also held
that the prosecution established circumstantial evidence sufficient to support the
conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals noted that
although there were discrepancies in the testimony of Canlas and his affidavits, the
discrepancies did not necessarily discredit him because affidavits taken ex parte are
generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in open court. Moreover, the
Court of Appeals held that the alleged discrepancies pertain to minor matters which
negated any suspicion that the testimony was perjured and rehearsed.
Gonzales moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, petitioner now raises the
following issues for this Court's consideration:
I
II
Stated simply, in our view, the main issue is whether the discrepancies in the affidavit and
the court testimonies of a witness are sufficient to exculpate Gonzales of the crime of
arson.
Petitioner argues that the trial court and the appellate court erred in giving credence to the
testimony of prosecution witness Canlas. He claims that the sworn statements of Canlas
before the investigating officer of the fire department on June 27, 1997 and before the city
prosecutor of Quezon City on July 17, 1997, were inconsistent. Further, petitioner adds
that Canlas had testified that he saw petitioner start the fire, but Canlas's testimony on this
point was made only for the first time in court. Petitioner points out that in the two prior
sworn statements of Canlas, he made no mention of seeing petitioner start the fire. This
discrepancy is a material point that ought to cast doubt on the credibility of Canlas. He
cites People v. Salik Magonawal, 7 where the material discrepancies between the court
testimony and prior statements of a witness at a preliminary investigation made the
testimony incredible.
Petitioner seeks to discredit the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses for being
self-serving and ill-motivated. He avers that both the trial court and the appellate court
failed to consider the Physical Science Report which stated that no flammable substance
was found in the specimen ashes.
Finally, petitioner claims that although he had in the past threatened to burn the house, he
never really meant it.
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In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that the findings of the
trial court and the Court of Appeals should stand because their findings are well supported
by the records.
The OSG contends that the discrepancies in the testimonies of the witnesses and their
sworn statements were not substantial to warrant a review of the findings of fact of the
trial court. The OSG asserts that the testimony of Canlas in court clarified, corroborated
and complemented his affidavit. Likewise, the testimony of the other prosecution
witnesses corroborated Canlas's testimony.
The OSG rebuts petitioner's dependence on the case of People v. Acosta, 8 where the court
held that evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible
to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at another time, but, it may be
received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, habit, custom or
usage.
After thoroughly considering the submissions including testimonies and exhibits
presented by the parties, we hold that the instant petition lacks merit.
The arson committed in the instant case involving an inhabited house or dwelling is
covered by Section 3 (2) of Presidential Decree No. 1613. 9 In the prosecution for arson,
proof of the crime charged is complete where the evidence establishes: (1) the corpus
delicti, that is, a fire because of criminal agency; and (2) the identity of the defendant as the
one responsible for the crime. In arson, the corpus delicti rule is satisfied by proof of the
bare fact of the fire and of it having been intentionally caused. Even the uncorroborated
testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible, is enough to prove the corpus delicti and to
warrant conviction. 1 0 When these are present, the only issue is the credibility of the
witness. Whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a
witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight considering that affidavits taken
ex parte are inferior to testimony in court, the former being almost invariably incomplete
and oftentimes inaccurate, 1 1 sometimes from partial suggestions and sometimes from
want of suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to
recall the connected circumstances necessary for his accurate recollection of the subject.
12
In this case, the eyewitness positively identified Gonzales as the culprit who caused the
fire. Both the trial and appellate courts found the testimony of eyewitness Canlas credible.
As a general rule, when the findings of both courts are in agreement, this Court will not
reverse their findings of fact.
Furthermore, in our view, the findings of the Physical Science Report is a negative evidence
and taken together with the bare denial of petitioner, supported only with testimonies of
relatives, constitute inferior evidence as against the circumstantial evidence coupled with
the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the offense by a credible
witness.
On the damages, we have consistently held that proof is required to determine the
reasonable amount of damages that may be awarded to the victims of conflagration. As a
rule, therefore, actual or compensatory damages must be proved and not merely alleged.
1 3 The records do not show concrete proof of the amount of actual damages suffered by
each complaining witness. Thus, we cannot grant actual damages. However, we may
award nominal and temperate damages.
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The assessment of nominal damages is left to the discretion of the trial court according to
the circumstances of the case. Generally, nominal damages by their nature are small sums
fixed by the court without regard to the extent of the harm done to the injured party.
However, it is generally held that a nominal damage is a substantial claim, if based upon
the violation of a legal right; in such a case, the law presumes damage although actual or
compensatory damages are not proven. In truth, nominal damages are damages in name
only and not in fact, and are allowed, not as an equivalent of wrong inflicted, but simply in
recognition of the existence of a technical injury. 1 4
Now, temperate damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary
loss has been suffered but its amount cannot from the nature of the case be proved with
certainty. 1 5 Under the circumstances, we find it reasonable to award Canlas with
P500,000 temperate damages, and to the other complaining witnesses, Simpao and
Villaflor, the amount of P100,000 as temperate damages each. In addition, exemplary or
corrective damages should be awarded as a way to emphasize that any future conduct of
this nature is condemned so as to correct the anti-social behavior that is deleterious in its
consequences. 1 6 Thus, Canlas and the other complaining witnesses, Simpao and Villaflor,
should be awarded P50,000 each as exemplary damages.
Concerning the penalty to be imposed, Section 3 (2) of P.D. No. 1613 prescribes the
penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua. But there being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum prison term should be within the range of
six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor and the maximum,
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal. Hence, the penalty imposed by the trial court on
the accused ought to be modified correspondingly.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated March 11, 2003 of the Court of Appeals sustaining the
conviction by the RTC finding the accused-petitioner guilty of the crime of arson of an
inhabited dwelling is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. He is hereby sentenced to the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of nine (9) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum, with full credit for
the entire period of preventive imprisonment provided he is qualified therefor according to
Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
As to his civil liability, he is ordered to pay temperate damages in the amount of P500,000
to Carlos C. Canlas, the owner of the burnt premises, and P100,000 each to Francis F.
Simpao and Andres V. Villaflor, together with exemplary damages of P50,000 to each of
them. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Tinga and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 10-16. Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino with Associate
Justices Eubulo G. Verzola and Sergio L. Pestaño concurring.
5. Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or mill central; and
6. Any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse.
10. People v. Oliva, G.R. No. 122110, September 26, 2000, 341 SCRA 78, 87.
11. People v. Mamarion, G.R. No. 137554, October 1, 2003, 412 SCRA 438, 465.
12. People v. Siguin, G.R. No. 126517, November 24, 1998, 299 SCRA 124, 137, citing
People v. Marollano, G.R. No. 105004, July 24, 1997, 276 SCRA 84, 102; See People v.
Andres, G.R. No. 122735, September 25, 1998, 296 SCRA 318, 333-334.
13. People v. Soriano, G.R. No. 142565, July 29, 2003, 407 SCRA 367, 379-380.
14. T. Aquino, TORTS AND DAMAGES 876 (1st ed., 2001).
15. People v. Tagana, G.R. No. 133027, March 4, 2004, 424 SCRA 620, 647.
16. Supra note 13, at 380.