1.

Pics sa cp

2.

SPOUSES MARIA BUTIONG and VILLAFRlA, DR. RUEL B. SPOUSES MARIA

FACTS: On November 16, 1989, Pedro L. Rifioza died intestate, leaving several heirs,
including his children with his first wife the respondents leaving several properties to
them. Thereafter, a complaint for judicial partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery
of Possession was filed by the respondents alleging that they discovered that their co-
heirs sold the properties to the petitioners, who were now deceased and duly
represented by their son, without their consent.
The respondents also learned of a notice of an extra-judicial settlement of estate of their
late father was published in a tabloid called Balita. Because of this, they caused the
annotation of their adverse claims over the subject properties before the Register of
Deeds and filed the said complaint.
The petitioners denied the allegations of the complaint on the ground of lack of personal
knowledge and good faith in acquiring the subject properties. Petitioner Francisco
further contended that what they purchased was only the resort. He also presented an
Extra-Judicial Settlement with Renunciation, Repudiations and Waiver of Rights and
Sale which provides that respondents’ co-heirs sold the family home to the spouses
Rolando and Ma. Cecilia Bondoc for Pl million as well as a Deed of Sale whereby
Benita sold the resort to petitioners.

The trial court nullified the transfer of the subject Properties to petitioners and spouses
Bondoc due to irregularities in the Documents of conveyance offered by petitioners as
well as the circumstances Surrounding the execution of the same. CA affirmed hence,
the petition where they alleged that since the Respondents’ complaint alleged causes of
action for settlement of estate under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, therefore it is
actually one for settlement of estate and not of judicial partition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is for partition or for settlement of estate?

HELD: The court held that the complaint filed by the respondents was for judicial
partition. It is true that some of respondents’ causes of action pertaining to the
properties left behind by the decedent Pedro, his known heirs, and the nature and
extent of their interests thereon may fall under an action for settlement of estate.
However, a complete reading of the complaint would readily show that, based on the
nature of the suit, the allegations therein, and the relief’s prayed for, the action, is clearly
one for judicial partition with annulment of title and recovery of possession.

In this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was not disputed, that Pedro
died without a will, leaving his estate without any ending obligations. Thus, contrary to
petitioner’s contention, respondents were under no legal obligation to submit the subject
properties of the estate of a special proceeding for settlement of intestate estate, and
are, in fact, encouraged to have the same partitioned, judicially or

3. G.R. No. 174975 January 20, 2009

LUISA KHO MONTAÑER, ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, JR., LILLIBETH MONTAÑER-BARRIOS, AND

FACTS:

On August 17, 1956, petitioner Luisa Kho Montañer, a Roman Catholic, married
AlejandroMontañer, Sr. at theImmaculate Conception Parish in Cubao, Quezon City.Petitioners
Alejandro Montañer, Jr., Lillibeth Montañer-Barrios, andRhodora Eleanor Montañer-Dalupan are
their children.On May 26, 1995, Alejandro Montañer, Sr. died.

On August 19, 2005, private respondents Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen Liling
S. Montañer, both Muslims, filed a "Complaint" for the judicial partition of properties before the
Shari’a District Court alleging that 1) the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr. is a Muslim; (2) petitioners
are the first family of the decedent; (3) Liling Disangcopan is thewidow of the decedent; and (4)
Almahleen Liling S. Montañer is the daughter of the decedent. They prayed, among others, the
following: (1) the partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the appointment of an
administrator for theestate of the decedent.

Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss mainly on the grounds that Shari’a District
Court has no jurisdiction over the estate of the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr., because he was a
Roman Catholic At first, the Shari’a District Court dismissed the private respondents’ complaint.
The district court held that Alejandro Montañer, Sr. was not a Muslim, and its jurisdiction
extends only to the settlement and distribution of the estate of deceased Muslims.

However, on MR,the Shari’a District Court reconsidered its order of dismissal. The district court
allowed private respondents to adduce further evidence. It also ordered the continuation of
trial, trial on the merits,adducement of further evidence, and pre-trial conference.Hence,
petitioner sought recourse before the SC despite the fact that respondent Sharia District has not
rendered a decision yet if it has jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE:
1) Did the respondent Sharia District Court lack jurisdiction over petitioners who are Roman
Catholics and Non-Muslims.(Civ-Pro issue)2) Did the respondent Sharia District Court fail to
acquire jurisdiction over the estates and properties of the late AlejandroMontañer, Sr. (The
contention of the defendants is the prohibition)
RULING:1)

NO.
Jurisdiction depends upon the averments in the complaint; not in the answer or motion to
dismiss. We cannot agree with the contention of the petitioners that the district court does not
have jurisdiction over the case because of an allegation in their answer with a motion to dismiss
that Montañer, Sr. is not a Muslim. Jurisdiction of a court over the nature of the action and its
subject matter does not depend upon the defenses set forth in an answer or a motion to
dismiss.
Note that the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding is controlled by the
averments and character of the relief sought in the complaint or petition. In this case, although
private respondents designated the pleading filed before the Shari’a District Court as a
"Complaint" for judicial partition of properties, it is a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the decedent. It contains sufficient
jurisdictional facts required for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim, such as the
fact of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death as well as the allegation that he is a Muslim.

5. SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS – RULE 90

Facts of the Case:

Juan Uriarte y Goite died in Spain and he left reasonable properties in the Philippines. Vicente
Uriarte, who is claiming to be the son and sole heir of the deceased, filed a petition for the
intestate settlement of the estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental. However, said petition was opposed by the nephews of Juan stating that there is a
valid will left by the deceased in Spain, a copy of which is being requested. Then, the nephews
filed a settlement of the estate in the court of Manila, on the basis of the alleged will of the
deceased. Vicente filed an opposition to the settlement of estate in the court of Manila stating
that the court of Negros Occidental has already acquired original jurisdiction over the case. The
opposition of Vicente was dismissed together with the intestate settlement In the CFI of Negros.
Hence, Vicente filed a petition for certiorari questioning the dismissal of the intestate settlement
in the CFI of Negros.

Issue:

Whether or not the intestate settlement should be dismissed.

Ruling of the Case:

The Supreme Court held that the dismissal of the intestate proceeding is proper.Under the Rules
on the settlement of estate of the deceased person, testate proceedings enjoy priority over
intestate proceedings. Therefore, in case intestate settlement was filed prior to the finding of
the will of the deceased, then the intestate proceedings shall be dismissed to give priority to the
testate proceeding.

Jao VS CA

Facts:

On April 17, 1991, Perico instituted a petition for issuance of letters of administration before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99, over the estate of his parents. He alleged that his
brother, Rodolfo, was gradually dissipating the assets of the estate Rodolfo moved for the
dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper venue.[2] He argued that the deceased
spouses did not reside in Quezon City either during their lifetime or at the time of their deaths.
The decedent's actual residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga, where his late mother used to
run and operate a bakery In his opposition,[3] Perico countered that their deceased parents
actually resided in Rodolfo's house in Quezon City at the time of their deaths.

Rodolfo filed a rejoinder, stating that he gave the information regarding the decedents'
residence on the death certificates in good faith and through honest mistake.

The court required the parties to submit their respective nominees for the position.[6] Both
failed to comply, whereupon the trial court ordered that the petition be archived.

The court required the parties to submit their respective nominees for the position.[6] Both
failed to comply, whereupon the trial court ordered that the petition be archived.[7]

Subsequently, Perico moved that the intestate proceedings be revived.[8] After the parties
submitted the names of their respective nominees, the trial court designated Justice Carlos L.
Sundiam as special administrator of the estate of Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea Jao.

On April 6, 1994, the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Rodolfo was denied

Rodolfo filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,... he Court of Appeals
rendered... the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.

Rodolfo's motion for reconsideration was denied

Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Petitioner Rodolfo invokes our ruling in the case of Eusebio v. Eusebio, et al.,[1

Petitioner strains to differentiate between the venue provisions found in Rule 4, Section 2,[18]
on ordinary civil actions, and Rule 73, Section 1, which applies specifically to settlement
proceedings. He argues that while venue in the former... understandably refers to actual
physical residence for the purpose of serving summons, it is the permanent residence of the
decedent which is significant in Rule 73, Section 1.

Issues:

The main issue before us is: where should the settlement proceedings be had --- in Pampanga,
where the decedents had their permanent residence, or in Quezon City, where they actually
stayed before their demise?

Ruling:

Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Where estate of deceased persons be settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines
at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in
which he resides at the time of his death. Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines
shall be settled or letters of administration granted in the proper court located in the province
where the decedent resides at the time of his death.
The facts in Eusebio were different from those in the case at bar.It cannot be said that Eusebio
changed his residence because, strictly speaking, his physical presence in Quezon City was just
temporary.

In the case at bar, there is substantial proof that the decedents have transferred to petitioner's
Quezon City residence

Furthermore, the decedents' respective death certificates state that they were both residents of
Quezon City at the time of their demise. Significantly, it was petitioner himself who filled up his
late mother's death certificate.

To our mind, this unqualifiedly shows... that at that time, at least, petitioner recognized his
deceased mother's residence to be Quezon City. Moreover, petitioner failed to contest the
entry in Ignacio's death certificate, accomplished a year earlier by respondent.

We agree with the appellate court's observation that since the death certificates were
accomplished even before... petitioner and respondent quarreled over their inheritance, they
may be relied upon to reflect the true situation at the time of their parents' death.

the documents presented by petitioner pertained not to residence at the time of... death, as
required by the Rules of Court, but to permanent residence or domicile

Petitioner's argument fails to persuade.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED

Principles:

Where estate of deceased persons be settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines
at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the

Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death,... In Raymond
v. Court of Appeals[19] and Bejer v. Court of Appeals,[20] we ruled that venue for ordinary civil
actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined,
"residence", in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person's actual
residence or place of abode, provided... he resides therein with continuity and consistency.

SANDEJAS VS LINA
Facts:

The facts of the case, as narrated by the Court of Appeals (CA). On February 17, 1981, Eliodoro
Sandejas, Sr. filed a petition, in the lower court praying that letters of administration be issued in
his favor for the settlement of the estate of his wife, Remedios Sandejas, who died on April 17,
1955.

On July 1, 1981, Letters of Administration were issued by the lower court appointing Eliodoro
Sandejas, Sr. as administrator of the estate of the late Remedios Sandejas. Likewise on the same
date, Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. took his oath as administrator.
On November 19, 1981, the 4th floor of Manila City Hall was burned and among the records
burned were the records of Branch XI of the Court of First Instance of Manila. As a result, he
filed a Motion for Reconstitution of the records of the case on February 9, 1983. On February 16,
1983, the lower court in its Order granted the said motion.

On April 19, 1983, an Omnibus Pleading for motion to intervene and petition-in-intervention
was filed by Movant Alex A. Lina alleging among others that on June 7, 1982, movant and
administrator Eliodoro P. Sandejas, in his capacity as seller, bound and obligated himself, his
heirs, administrators, and assigns, to sell forever and absolutely and in their entirety the
following parcels of land which formed part of the estate of the late Remedios R. Sandejas.

It showed that there was receipt of money with promise to sell and to buy with the sum of
P100,000.00

Issues:

a) Whether or not Eliodoro P. Sandejas Sr. is legally obligated to convey title to the property
referred to in the subject document which was found to be in the nature of a contract to sell
where court approval was not complied with?

b) Whether or not he was guilty of bad faith despite the conclusion of the CA that he [bore] the
burden of proving that a motion for authority to sell had been filed in court?

c) Whether or not undivided shares of Eliodoro in the subject property is (3/5) and the
administrator of the latter should execute deeds of conveyance within thirty days from receipt
of the balance of the purchase price from the respondent?

d)Whether or not the respondent's petition-in-intervention was converted to a money claim and
whether the [trial court] acting as a probate court could approve the sale and compel the
petitioners to execute [a] deed of conveyance even for the share alone of Eliodoro P. Sandejas
Sr.?

Held:

The Petition is partially meritorious.

Obligation With a Suspensive Condition

Petitioners argue that the CA erred in ordering the conveyance of the disputed 3/5 of the
parcels of land, despite the nonfulfillment of the suspensive condition -- court approval of the
sale -- as contained in the "Receipt of Earnest Money with Promise to Sell and to Buy" (also
referred to as the "Receipt"). Instead, they assert that because this condition had not been
satisfied, their obligation to deliver the disputed parcels of land was converted into a money
claim.

The agreement between Eliodoro Sr. and respondent is subject to a suspensive condition -- the
procurement of a court approval, not full payment. There was no reservation of ownership in
the agreement. In accordance with paragraph 1 of the Receipt, petitioners were supposed to
deed the disputed lots over to respondent. This they could do upon the court's approval, even
before full payment. Hence, their contract was a conditional sale, rather than a contract to sell
as determined by the CA.
When a contract is subject to a suspensive condition, its birth or effectivity can take place only if
and when the condition happens or is fulfilled. Thus, the intestate court's grant of the Motion
for Approval of the sale filed by respondent resulted in petitioners' obligation to execute the
Deed of Sale of the disputed lots in his favor. The condition having been satisfied, the contract
was perfected. Henceforth, the parties were bound to fulfill what they had expressly agreed
upon.

Court approval is required in any disposition of the decedent's estate per Rule 89 of the Rules of
Court. Reference to judicial approval, however, cannot adversely affect the substantive rights of
heirs to dispose of their own pro indiviso shares in the co-heirship or co-ownership. In other
words, they can sell their rights, interests or participation in the property under administration.
A stipulation requiring court approval does not affect the validity and the effectivity of the sale
as regards the selling heirs. It merely implies that the property may be taken out of custodia
legis, but only with the court's permission. It would seem that the suspensive condition in the
present conditional sale was imposed only for this reason.

MANALO VS CA
GR No. 129242, January 16, 2001

FACTS:

Troadic Manalo who died on February 1992, was survived by his Pilar and his 11 children. The
deceased left several real properties in Manila and a business in Tarlac. In November 1992,
herein respondents, 8 of the surviving children, filed a petition with RTC Manila for the judicial
settlement of the estate of their late father and for appointment of their brother Romeo Manalo
as administrator thereof. Hearing was set on February 11, 1993 and the herein petitioners were
granted 10 days within which to file their opposition to the petition.

ISSUE: WON the case at bar is covered under Article 151 where earnest efforts toward
compromise should first be made prior the filing of the petition.

HELD:

It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the
averments and the character of the relief were sought in the complaint or petition, shall be
controlling. The careful scrutiny of the petition for the issuance of letters of administration,
settlement and distribution of the estate belies herein petitioners’ claim that the same is in the
nature of an ordinary civil action. The provision of Article 151 is applicable only to ordinary civil
actions. It is clear from the term “suit” that it refers to an action by one person or persons
against another or other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the
law affords him for the redress of an injury or enforcement of a right. It is also the intention of
the Code Commission as revealed in the Report of the Code Commission to make the provision
be applicable only to civil actions. The petition for issuance of letters of administration,
settlement, and distribution of estate is a special proceeding and as such a remedy whereby the
petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. Hence, it must be
emphasized that herein petitioners are not being sued in such case for any cause of action as in
fact no defendant was pronounced therein.

De Leon v. CA
G.R. No. 138884. June 6, 2002.

Quisumbing, J.

FACTS:

On the complaint for sum of money filed by petitioner against respondent spouses Estelita and
Avelino Batungbacal, the trial court issued a partial judgment against Estelita on May 14, 1996
and a final judgment against Avelino on June 2, 1997. Thereafter, the spouses filed an appeal
from both decisions, which was opposed by petitioner who thereby did not file an appellee’s
brief. The Court of Appeals denied the motion to dismiss and admitted the Amended Appellant’s
Brief.

ISSUE:

WON the appellate court erred or committed grave abuse of discretion when it considered the
appeal as submitted for decision without petitioner’s brief.

RULING:

No. When a party is represented by counsel of record, service of orders and notices must be
made upon said attorney and notice to client and to any other lawyer, not the counsel of record,
is not notice in law. In this case, the counsel of record for the private respondent is presumed to
be their counsel on appeal and the only one authorized to receive court processes. Notice of
judgment upon such counsel, therefore, was notice to the clients for all legal intents and
purposes.