Case Number: 79

Doctrine: N/A
Applicable Law/s: Article 827 of Code of Commerce

G.R. No. L-22630 January 31, 1925

GORGONIO DE SARASOLA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
YU BIAO SONTUA, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
The complaint alleges "that at 6:43PM on March 3, 1922, one vessel Mercedes going
out of the bay and the other Y. Sontua coming in; each on its own course, which if both
had followed there would have been a full clearance and no collision. That the officers on
the one vessel at a distance of two or three miles could clearly see the course and
maneuvers of the other vessel. The Y. Sontua changed its course which was the primary
cause of the collision. Even so, if the Mercedes had remained true to its course, there
would have been a full clearance. If the collision had taken place after dark, there would
be much force in plaintiff's contention that the Mercedes acted on an emergency, and that
it ought not to be responsible for an error of judgment. But it appears from the physical
facts that by the aid of natural light, at the time of and prior to the collision, either vessel
could be clearly and distinctly seen for a considerable distance. Hence, we have a right
to assume that without the aid of artificial light, the officers of the Y. Sontua saw the
Mercedes and the course of the vessel. That the officers of the Mercedes saw the Y.
Sontua and its course and the maneuver which it made. The Mercedes either knew or
should have known that, if it remained true to its course, there would not have been any
collision. It follows from what has been said that the negligence of the Y. Sontua was the
primary cause of the accident, and that the Mercedes was guilty of contributory
negligence in failing to maintain its course, and that the case comes under the provisions
of article 827.

ISSUE:
Whether the negligence of Mercedes is contributory to the collision or not.

RULE:
The judgment in favor of the plaintiff is reversed, and the complaint dismissed, neither
party to recover costs in this or the lower court. So ordered.
Case Number: 80
Doctrine: N/A
Applicable Law/s: Articles 826, 827, 828, and 830 of the Code of Commerce and
Section 197 of the Philippine Marine Regulations.

G.R. No. L-13422 November 8, 1918

THE MARINE TRADING COMPANY (INC.), plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

On August 10, 1915, plaintiff owned launch Active and defendant owned launch Bohol.
Both launches were in use upon the Pasig River in the city of Manila. About 8 o'clock in
the morning of this date, in the Pasig River, below and near the bridge of Spain, the launch
Bohol was towing up the river two rudderless scows or lighters, one behind the other. The
scow nearest the launch was about 5 meters behind, was empty, and was high in the
water. The second lighter was tied to the rear of the first one, with a distance of about 2
meters intervening, was loaded, and was lower in the water. The Active was coming down
the river from Pandacan toward Manila Bay. The patron of the Active blew one blast of
his whistle, which indicated that the Active had a clear way and should pass to starboard.
When under the bridge of Spain, the Active passed the bohol and the first scow towed by
it. But when the Active was about to pass the second scow, the latter swerved to the left,
and its forward left end corner struck the Active on the port side between the cabin and
the bow with such force and impact that the launch sank immediately. The Active was in
good condition and state of operation before the collision occurred. The launch was so
seriously damaged by the collision and the sinking that it took the sum of P9,677 to repair
it.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accident occurred through the negligence of the Bohol only, or whether
both launches can be blamed for the collision.

RULING:

The trial court was clearly of the opinion that there was negligence on the part of the
patron of the Bohol in operating his launch and the scow in such a way as to endanger
the Active and its occupants. The court was further of the opinion that there was no
negligence on the part of the patron of the Active. With this view of the trial court, we are
in accord.

With the elimination of so much of the judgment as provides for interest and costs,
judgment is affirmed, without special finding as to costs in this instance. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Araullo, Street and Fisher, JJ., concur.

Case Number: 81
Doctrine: Small vessels devoted in navigation on rivers not covered by Book III of
Code of Commerce thus not covered by Article 835 of the said law.
Applicable Law/s: Articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code

G.R. No. L-29166 October 22, 1928

AUGUSTO LOPEZ, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
JUAN DURUELO, ET AL., defendants.
ALBINO JISON, appellee.

FACTS:

On February 10, 1927, the plaintiff, who is a resident of the municipality of Silay,
Occidental Negros, was desirous of embarking upon the interisland steamer San Jacinto
in order to go to Iloilo. This boat was at the time in the anchoring-ground of the port of
Silay, some half a mile distant from the port. The plaintiff therefore embarked at the
landing in the motor boat Jison, which was then engaged in conveying passengers and
luggage back and forth from the landing to boats at anchor, and which was owned and
operated by the defendant Albino Jison, with Juan Duruelo as patron. The engineer
(maquinista) aboard on this trip was one Rodolin Duruelo, a boy of only 16 years of age.
He is alleged to have been a mere novice without experience in the running of motor
boats; and the day of the occurrence now in contemplation is said to have been the third
day of his apprenticeship in this capacity. It is alleged that the Jison, upon this trip, was
grossly overladen, having aboard fourteen passengers, while its capacity was only for
eight or nine. As the motor boat approached the San Jacinto in a perfectly quiet sea, it
came too near to the stern of the ship, and as the propeller of the ship had not yet ceased
to turn, the blades of the propeller struck the motor boat and sank it at once. It is alleged
in the complaint that the approach of the Jison to this dangerous proximity with the
propeller of the San Jacinto was due to the fault, negligence and lack of skill of the
defendant Juan Duruelo, as patron of the Jison. As the Jison sank, the plaintiff was thrown
into the water against the propeller, and the revolving blades inflicted various injuries upon
him, consisting of a bruise in the breast, two serious fractures of the bones of the left leg,
and a compound fracture of the left femur. As a consequence of these injuries the plaintiff
was kept in bed in a hospital in the City of Manila from the 28th of February until October
19 of the year 1927, or approximately eight months. In the conclusion of his complaint the
plaintiff sets out the various items of damage which he suffered, amounting in all to
something more than P120,000. These damages he seeks to recover of the defendants
in this action.

ISSUE: Whether or not small boats are required to make protest pursuant to Article 835
of the Third Book of Code of Commerce.
RULING:

It is therefore clear that a passenger on a boat like the Jison, in the case before us, is not
required to make protest as a condition precedent to his right of action for the injury
suffered by him in the collision described in the complaint. In other words, article 835 of
the Code of Commerce does not apply. But even if said provision had been considered
applicable to the case in hand, a fair interpretation of the allegations of the complaint
indicates, we think, that the injuries suffered by the plaintiff in this case were of such a
nature as to excuse protest; for, under article 836, it is provided that want to protest cannot
prejudice a person not in a condition to make known his wishes. An individual who has
suffered a compound fracture of the femur and received other physical injuries sufficient
to keep him in a hospital for many months, cannot be supposed to have in a condition to
make protest within twenty-four hours of such occurrence. It follows that the demurrer in
this case was not well taken and should have been overruled.

In their brief in this court the attorneys for the defendant have criticized the complaint for
a general lack of certainty and precision in more than one respect. However, we have
read the document attentively and, in our opinion, it states a good cause of action upon
a civil liability arising from tort under articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code, and our
attention has not been drawn to any provision of law which would constitute an obstacle
to the maintenance of the action.

The judgment appealed from is reversed, the demurrer overruled, and the defendant is
required to answer the complaint within five days after notification of the return of this
decision to the court of origin. So ordered, with costs against the appellee.

Johnson, Malcolm, Villamor and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

Ostrand, J., concurs in the result.
Case Number: 82
Doctrine:
Applicable Law/s:

G.R. No. 1875 September 9, 1905

RUDOLPH WAHL, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DONALDSON SIM & CO., defendant-appellant.

This action was brought by the plaintiff on the 4th of March, 1902, upon a contract made
between the parties in December, 1900, and the question is, Who was the real defendant
in the case? Was it the partnership of Donaldson Sim & Co., or was it James C.
Donaldson Sim, an individual? In the complaint in the case the defendant is designated
as Donaldson Sim & Co., and it is alleged in the complaint that the defendant is a juridical
person and a collective partnership duly organized in accordance with the provisions of
the Code of Commerce, and duly inscribed in the mercantile registry of the city of Manila.

FACTS:

When the summons was served upon the defendant it failed to answer, and a judgment
by default was entered against it. Upon the motion of the defendant this judgment was
vacated, and the defendant allowed to answer. Instead of answering, the defendant
presented a demurrer to the complaint, which was sustained by the court below. The
plaintiff appealed from the resulting judgment to this court which reversed it. (Wahl, Jr.,
et al., partners, etc., vs. Donaldson Sim & Co., 1 Off. Gaz., 441.) The case was remanded
to the court below, and was received in the clerk's office thereof on the 1st of June, 1903.
The defendant again failed to answer, and on the 30th of July the plaintiff moved for
judgment by default. The defendant appeared and asked permission to answer. A hearing
was had upon both of these motions on the 6th day of August, and the application of
defendant for leave to answer was denied, and the application of the plaintiff for judgment
by default was granted and the 8th day of August was assigned for the taking of evidence.
On that day the defendant again appeared and presented another motion, asking that the
default be set aside, and it be allowed to answer, and present a counterclaim. It
accompanied this motion with a copy of its proposed answer and a large amount of
documentary evidence in support of its proposed counterclaim. The hearing of the motion
was continued from time to time until the 25th day of August, 1903, when the court made
an order denying the application of the defendant for leave to answer and present a
counterclaim, and assigned the 5th day of September for the taking of evidence in support
of the plaintiffs' claim. On that day Mr. J.W. Haussermann appeared as attorney for Rita
Donaldson Sim, as the administratrix of James C. Donaldson Sim, and stated that the
latter had died on the 28th day of August, 1903. Further hearing of the case was
postponed until the 2nd day of October, 1903, when the administratrix again appeared
and presented a motion asking that the case be dismissed on the ground that the only
defendant in it was James C. Donaldson Sim as an individual, and that his death had
terminated the proceeding, and it was the duty of the plaintiff to present his claim before
the commissioners appointed in his estate in accordance with the provisions of section
686 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

It was stated in the motion that James C. Donaldson Sim and Henry Edwards
Higginbotham, on the 1st of October, 1897, entered into a collective partnership for the
period of one year, which was afterwards extended to the 1st day of October, 1903; that
in October, 1900, Higginbotham retired from the company, and transferred all of his
interests therein to James C. Donaldson Sim, and that after that day Donaldson Sim was
the sole owner of all of the property of the company, and since that time he had been
carrying on business under the fictitious name of Donaldson Sim & Co. This motion or
statement was not sworn to by anyone, and no proof whatever was offered to show that
the statements made therein were true, and they can not, therefore, be taken as facts in
the case. This motion was denied by the court on the 9th of October, 1903, and the 15th
day of October was assigned for the receiving of evidence and proof of damages, and on
the last-named day the court below entered judgment against the defendant for the sum
of 19,554. 13 pesos. From this judgment Rita Donaldson Sim has appealed.

The facts stated in the motion of Rita Donaldson Sim not having been proved, there is no
evidence in the case to show that the defendant was not such a partnership as is stated
in the complaint. On the contrary, the whole record shows that Donaldson Sim himself,
and his lawyers, always considered that the defendant was a partnership.

It will have been noticed that the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant was
made in December, 1900, after the alleged dissolution of the partnership. Notwithstanding
this, the attorneys for the defendant who made the first motion in August, 1903, for leave
to answer, refer to the defendant as the defendant partnership. Donaldson Sim, in his
affidavit which accompanied one of the motions, stated that he was the principal member
of the partnership of Donaldson Sim & Co. The proposed answer which Donaldson Sim
caused to be presented in connection with the second application made in August for
leave to answer, contains the following clause:

Que la demandada es actualmente, y lo ha sido en todas las fechas aqui mas

adelante mencionadas una sociedad colectiva, debidamente organizada y en
existencia bajo y en virtud de las leyes de las Islas Filipinas, y debidamente
registrada para dedicarse el comercio en el Registro Mercantil de la ciudad de
Manila, Islas Filipinas.

RULING:

We hold that the record shows that the defendant in this case was a collective partnership,
organized under the provisions of the Code of Commerce, and was therefore a juridical
person, under article 116 of the Code of Commerce and under article 35 of the Civil Code.
According to the latter article it had a personality distinct from that of each one of the
partners. To such persons section 119 of the Code of Civil Procedure has no application;
the death of Donaldson Sim dissolved the partnership but the liquidation of its affairs is
by law (art. 229 of the Code of Commerce) intrusted, not to the executors of the deceased
partner, but to the surviving partners or to liquidators appointed by them. This may be
inferred also from the provisions of sections 664 and 665 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Appellant claims also that the court below erred in refusing to set aside the default and
allowing the answer to be made. There is nothing in the case to show that the court
committed such error. The defendant had already been once in default, and had been
allowed to answer, notwithstanding its default.

It is claimed by the appellee that Rita Donaldson Sim, as administratrix, had no standing
in the court below to take an appeal. We have not considered this question, but without
deciding it have assumed that she had such right.

For the reasons above stated the judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs
of this instance against the appellant. After the expiration of twenty days judgment will be
entered in conformity herewith, and the cause will be returned to the lower court for
execution.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, and Carson, JJ., concur.

Case Number: 83
Doctrine: Abandonment by shipowner or ship agent necessary under Article 837 of
Code of Commerce
Applicable Law/s: Maritime Law, Book III, Code of Commerce. Articles 587, 590 and
837.

G.R. No. L-58897 December 3, 1987

LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HIJOS DE F. ESCANO, INC., and DOMESTIC INSURANCE
COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:

On May 30, 1968 at past 6:00 in the morning a maritime collision occurred within the
vicinity of the entrance to the North Harbor, Manila between the tanker LSCO "Cavite"
owned by Luzon Stevedoring Corporation and MV "Fernando Escano" a passenger ship
owned by Hijos de F. Escano, Inc. as a result of which said passenger ship sunk. An
action in admiralty was filed by Hijos de F. Escano, Inc. and Domestic Insurance
Company of the Philippines against the Luzon Stevedoring Company (LSC) in the Court
of First Instance of Cebu. In the course of the trial, the trial court appointed two
commissioners representing the plaintiffs and defendant to determine the value of the
LSCO "CAVITE." Said commissioners found the value thereof to be P180,000.00.

ISSUES: Whether abandonment is required under Article 837 of the Code of Commerce.

RULING:

We reiterate our previous decisions that the real and hypothecary nature of the liability of
the shipowner or agent is embodied in the provisions of the Maritime Law, Book III, Code
of Commerce. Articles 587, 590 and 837 of the same code are precisely intended to limit
the liability of the shipowner or agent to the value of the vessel, its appurtenances and
freightage earned in the voyage, provided that owner or agent abandons the vessel.
Although it is not specifically provided for in Article 837 of the same code that in case of
collision there should be such abandonment to enjoy such limited liability, said article on
collision of vessels is a mere amplification of the provisions of Articles 587 and 590 of
same code where abandonment of the vessel is a pre-condition. Even without said article,
the parties may avail of the provisions of Articles 587 and 590 of same code in case of
collision. This is the reason why Article 837 of the same code is considered a superfluity.

Hence the rule is that in case of collision there should be abandonment of the vessel by
the shipowner or agent in order to enjoy the limited liability provided for under said Article
837.
The exception to this rule is when the vessel is totally lost in which case there is no vessel
to abandon so abandonment is not required. Because of such total loss the liability of the
shipowner or agent for damages is extinguished. Nevertheless, the shipowner or agent
is personally liable for claims under the Workmen's Compensation Act and for repairs of
the vessel before its loss.

In case of illegal or tortious acts of the captain the liability of the shipowner and agent is
subsidiary. In such instance the shipowner or agent may avail of the provisions of Article
837 of the Code by abandoning the vessel.

However, if the injury or damage is caused by the shipowner's fault as where he engages
the services of an inexperienced and unlicensed captain or engineer, he cannot avail of
the provisions of Article 837 of the Code by abandoning the vessel. He is personally liable
for the damages arising thereby.

In the case now before the Court there is no question that the action arose from a collision
and the fault is laid at the doorstep of LSCO "Cavite" of petitioner. Undeniably petitioner
has not abandoned the vessel. Hence petitioner cannot invoke the benefit of the
provisions of Article 837 of the Code of Commerce to limit its liability to the value of the
vessel, all the appurtenances and freightage earned during the voyage.

In the light of the foregoing conclusion, the issue as to when abandonment should be
made need not be resolved.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz and Paras, JJ., concur.

Case Number: 84
Doctrine:
Applicable Law/s:

G.R. No. L-10051 March 9, 1916

ERLANGER & GALINGER, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
THE SWEDISH EAST ASIATIC CO., (LTD.) ET AL., defendants. THE "OELWERKE
TEUTONIA" and NEW ZEALAND INSURANCE CO. (LTD.), appellants.

FACTS:

First. The steamship Nippon loaded principally with copra and with some other general
merchandise sailed from Manila on May 7, 1913, bound for Singapore. Second. The
steamship Nippon went aground on Scarborough Reef about 4.30 in the afternoon of May
8, 1913. Third. Scarborough Reef is about 120 to 130 miles from the nearest point on the
Island of Luzon. Fourth. On May 9, 1913, the chief officer, Weston, and nine members of
the crew left the Nippon and succeeded in reaching the coast of Luzon at Santa Cruz,
Zambales, on the morning of May 12, 1913. Fifth. On May 12, 1913, the chief officer sent
a distress telegram to Helm, the Director of the Bureau of Navigation, at Manila.

Sixth. On the same day (May 12) at 1.30 p. m., the Government of the Philippine Islands
ordered the coast guard cutter Mindoro with life-saving appliances to the scene of the
wreck of the Nippon . Seventh. On the same day (May 12) at 3 p. m. the steamship
Manchuria sailed from Manila for Hongkong and was requested to pass by Scarborough
Reef. Eighth. The Manchuria arrived at Scarborough Reef some time before the arrival of
the Mindoro on May 13, 1913, and took on board the captain and the remainder of the
crew. Ninth. The Manchuria was still near Scarborough Reef when the Mindoro arrived.
The captain of the Manchuria informed the captain of the Mindoro that the captain and
crew of the Nippon were on board the Manchuria and were proceeding to Hongkong.
Tenth. The captain of the Mindoro offered to render assistance to the captain and crew
of the Nippon , which assistance was declined The Mindoro proceeded to the Nippon and
removed the balance of the baggage of the officers and crew, which was found upon the
deck. Eleventh. The Mindoro proceeded to Santa Cruz, Zambales, where the chief officer,
Weston, and the nine members of the crew were taken on board and brought to Manila,
arriving there on May 14, 1913. Twelfth.

ISSUE: Whether or not a particular ship and her cargo is a fit object of salvage depends
upon her condition at the time the salvage services are performed

RULING:

In view of all of the foregoing, it is hereby ordered and decreed that the judgment of the
lower court be modified, and that a judgment be entered against the defendant-appellants
and in favor of the plaintiff-appellant, as follows: First, it is hereby ordered and decreed
that a judgment be entered against the defendant, the Oelwerke Teutonia, and in favor of
the plaintiff in the sum of P41,721.55. Second, it is further ordered and decreed that a
judgment be entered against the defendant, the New Zealand Insurance Company (Ltd.),
and in favor of the plaintiff, in the sum of P1,127. Third, it is further ordered and decreed
that the amount of the judgment hereinbefore rendered in favor of the plaintiff be paid out
of the money which is now under the control of the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila. And without any finding as to costs, it is so ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson, and Trent, JJ.

Case Number: 85
Doctrine: Reward should constitute a sufficient compensation for the effort of salvors.
QUANTUM MERUIT
Applicable Law/s: Salvage Law Act No 2616

G.R. No. L-3488 August 10, 1907

C.S. ROBINSON ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
THE SHIP "ALTA" ET AL., defendants-appellants.

FACTS:

On the 26th day of September, 1905, the sailing vessel Alta was wrecked and stranded
upon the coast of Cavite Province. The certain of the ship removed the cargo and after
working ten or twelve days in attempts to float the ship made a contract, in writing, with
the plaintiffs

The plaintiffs went to work immediately upon the vessel, raised it, and towed it to Cavite
on the 10th day of December, 1905. It was at once decided to put her into the dry dock
or slip there for the purpose of examining her hull and ascertaining the extent of the
damages. This could not be done until the 18th day of January, owing to other demands
upon the dock company. On that day she was put upon the slip, was examined, and again
taken off. The exact day on which she came off from the slip does not appear, but it
probably was the 19th day of January. On the 20th day of January plaintiffs removed all
of their machinery, tackle, and utensils from the ship and did no more work upon her.

The plaintiffs, on the 30th day of December, 1905, were paid by the defendants the sum
of 3,000 pesos on account of the contract. They brought this action against the ship and
her master on the 27th day of February, 1906, claiming to recover the reasonable worth
and value of the services performed by them, which they fixed at 15,000 pesos. Judgment
was rendered in the court below in their favor for 9,760 pesos and costs. From this
judgment the defendants have appealed.

ISSUE: Whether the contract is binding between the parties or not despite the nature of
the contract as contingent upon success.

RULING:

The court, after a review of all the authorities upon the subject, held that the contract was
binding, reversing the judgment of the court below.

It is true that in that case the persons seeking to repudiate the contract were the owners
of the ship, while in this case they are the salvors. It is, however, a direct and controlling
authority to the point that contracts will be enforced under certain circumstances although
they are conditional upon success.

It is claimed by the plaintiffs that Captain Thonagel deliberately made statements to

Captain Robinson at the time of the contract, which statements Captain Thonagel knew
to be false.

The only evidence on the part of the plaintiffs to sustain this claim which we have found
is in the testimony of Robinson. He said that —

The captain gave me to understand that there was a crack in her from 30 to 40
feet long; then I made the contract with him, and I told him if that is the case we
will have her out of there quickly, but when I went to work at her I found it was 200
feet long from stem to stern and a very large hole in the stern fully 12 feet long and
2 feet wide.

He said also that "she turned out to be forty times as much damaged as they reported to
me."

Thonagel testified that he made no representations to Robinson as to extent of her

injuries; that he did not know that the crack spoken of by Robinson was more than 30 or
40 feet long, and did not find it out until the vessel was in the ship.

It appears that Captain Robinson visited the wrecked vessel twice before he made his
contract. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show that the contract was entered into
by reason of fraudulent representations on the part of the defendant. We do not think that
this has been established.

That part of the contract which required the plaintiffs to bring the ship to Cavite they
performed, but that part of it which required them to put her in condition to be sailed to
HongKong they never performed. Notwithstanding the declaration of the plaintiff
Robinson to the contrary, it is very apparent that the ship was at no time prior to the 20th
day of January in a condition to be even towed to Hongkong or Singapore. It is claimed,
however, by the plaintiffs, and it was so found by the court, that the defendants prevented
the plaintiffs from fulfilling that part of their contract and that they are, therefore, entitled
to recover in this action.

That the plaintiffs removed all of their machinery and utensils from the ship on or about
the 20th day of January and never did anything more thereon thereafter is undisputed.
The question is whether they did this voluntarily or were ordered to do it by Captain
Thonagel.

The plaintiff Robinson at first testified that about this time the captain wrote him a letter,
telling him to remove his pumps and boilers and all other machinery from the vessel.
When on cross-examination he was shown the letter to which he referred, and from which
it appeared that the only request therein was a request that Robinson return a certain
pump belonging to the quartermaster, he then testified that Captain Thonagel told him
verbally to remove his machinery. Thonagel denies that he ever gave any such orders
and testifies that he was constantly insisting that Robinson proceed with his contract.
Practically all of the evidence in the case upon this subject is the evidence of these two
witnesses, and it is in direct conflict. After a careful examination of it, we are satisfied that
the plaintiffs have not established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that any such
orders were given by Thonagel and that, on the contrary, the evidence preponderates
against their contention. The finding of the court below, therefore, to the effect that the
defendant prevented the plaintiffs from fulfilling their contract, can not be sustained.

There is considerable testimony in the case relating to a difficulty between the first officer
of the ship and the plaintiff Robinson. Evidence that while the ship was ashore on the
Cavite coast, the first officer, when drunk, discharged a revolver at the plaintiff Robinson
was stricken out, but it seems to be assumed by the parties that such was the fact. When
Captain Thonagel heard of this, and while the ship was still upon the Cavite coast, he
took the first officer off and placed him in the Sailor's Home. Later, and while the ship was
lying in Cavite harbor waiting to go into the dock, Thonagel employed him temporarily for
ten days to do some work upon the sails of the ship, and on the 26th day of February,
after the plaintiffs abandoned the ship, he was employed permanently again as first
officer. During this ten days Robinson was on the ship several times and was not
interfered with in any way by the first officer. This temporary employment did not, under
the circumstances, justify the plaintiffs in abandoning their contract.

The delay from the 10th day of December to the 18th day of January furnished no
jurisdiction for the abandonment of the contract. That this was consented to by the
plaintiffs very clearly appears from the evidence of Robinson himself.

3. The view which we have taken of the evidence leads necessarily to a reversal of the
judgment of the court below. Judging by the contract which was afterwards made between
the owners of the ship and a dock company of HongKong, it would have cost the plaintiffs
22,000 pesos to do what they had agreed in the contract to do for 15,000 pesos. The
case may be hard one for the plaintiffs but we can not affirm this judgment without holding
that when parties have voluntarily entered into a contract they can disregard it if it turns
out to be unprofitable to them, and can recover as if no contract had been made.

The judgment of the court below is reversed and judgment is ordered in favor of the
defendants and against the plaintiffs, absolving the defendants from the complaint, with
the costs of the first instance. No costs will be allowed to either party in this court. So
ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, and Tracey, JJ., concur.