1

Organisation for Social Science Research

in Eastern and Southern Africa

RWANDA CHAPTER

Monograph Series
Number 2

Governance
And Post-Conflict Reconstruction
in Rwanda

July 20013

Organisation for Social Science Research

in Eastern and Southern Africa

RWANDA CHAPTER

Monograph Series
Number 2

Governance
And Post-Conflict Reconstruction
in Rwanda

July 20013

Table of Contents
Foreword.i
Bernard N. Rutikanga
The 1994 Failure of Peace-Keeping in Rwanda....1
Bernard N. Rutikanga
Perceptions on the Role of Economic Policy and Governance in
the in the Reconstruction of Rwanda 200-2012...16
Prof. Herman Musahara.
Capacity Building as the Key for Rwandan Reconstruction.30
Remy Twiringiyimana
Governance, Gender Equality and Women Empowerment in Post
Genocide Rwanda.48
Aimee Muziranenge
Rwandas Post-genocide Democratic Process: Political Parties,
Decentralization, and Elections.64
Omar Khalfan Bizuru
Rwanda Gacaca Courts and the Reconciliation Process:
Testimonies And Analysis86
Prof. Deo Byanafashe
The Role of the National Commission for the Fight Against
Genocide in Combatin Genocide Ideology and Denial...100
Odeth Kantengwa

Foreword
One of the core objectives of OSSREA is to promote
dialogue and interaction between researchers and policymakers in member countries. It is on this basis that
OSSREA Rwanda Chapter organized a one-day workshop at
the National University of Rwanda on 24th August 2012, on
Governance and Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Rwanda;
thanks to a generous grant from OSSREA head office in
Addis Ababa. The workshop brought together researchers
and policy-makers from different government sectors. This
second monograph of OSSREA Rwanda Chapter is the
product of that workshop.
If Rwandan neighbours and the international community had
done the right thing vis--vis the long and costly Rwandan
conflict, then it would not have metamorphosed into
genocide. Rwandan neighbours, the Organisation of African
Unity, the United Nations and big powers folded their arms
as Rwandan bloody conflict changed from bad to worse.
Bernard Rutikanga (from National University of Rwanda)
looks at the betrayal of Rwandan people by the United
Nations peace-keeping mission in Rwanda. Whereas the
Commanding Officer of the United Nations Assistance
Mission to Rwanda, General Romeo Dallaire warned the
United Nations leaders several times that genocide was in the
making, he was ignored and was reminded now and then to
stick strictly to his missions Chapter Six Mandate. This
betrayal of Rwandan people culminated into the genocide
against the Tutsi, and destruction of infrastructure and
Rwandan social cohesion. The destruction was so extensive
that Rwanda was written off by many pessimists. The
articles in this monograph attempt to assess how the post-

ii
genocide governance has contributed to the reconstruction
and healing of the society.
The prominent 18th century British prominent economist
Adam Smith asserted that, no society can surely be
flourishing and happy of which the far-greater part of the
members are poor and miserable, and President Woodrow
Wilson of the United States supported this line of reasoning
when he said that, no one can worship God or love his
neighbor on an empty stomach. Prof. Herman Musahara
deals with the perceptions of economic policies and
implementation of socio-economic initiatives in the realm of
making people happy and ensuring that they have full
stomachs so as to enhance reconciliation and unity on a firm
basis.
The education sector has been at the centre of Rwandan
reconstruction and healing. The genocide led to a
tremendous loss of human resources; thousands of educated
Tutsi died, thousands of educated Hutu fled into exile and
others found themselves in jail due to their alleged crimes
committed between April and July 1994. Guided by the 1998
National Education Policy and the 2000 Vision 2020,
Rwandan government and the private sector have steamed
forward promoting the educational sector quantitatively and
qualitatively. Impressive achievements have been registered,
but, there are challenges which need to be addressed. These
aspects are covered by Remy Twiringiyimana (from the
Ministry of Education).
Rwandan people and government now believe that women
hold more than half of the sky, therefore their empowerment
is not a favour or a privilege, and rather it is their right. It is
on this basis that mainstreaming gender issues in policies,
programmes has resulted into women being given at least 30
per cent of decision making slots from national level to the

iii
grassroots. Women have been empowered economically,
provided with improved access to health and education, and
new strategies for fighting the scourge of gender violence
have been put in place. These issues and more are
highlighted by Aime Muziranenge (from Gender
Monitoring Office).
Genocide is not an event, rather it is a process. The
preparation and implementation of the genocide against the
Tutsi involved thousands of people. Some were willing to
participate, others were given inducements and still others
were forced to participate. When genocide was stopped more
than a million people had perished and its perpetrators were
scattered around the country. The classical courts had no
adequate staff and infrastructure to deal with more than a
hundred thousand genocide alleged genocide perpetrators
who were overcrowding prisons and cells. So, a home-grown
solution was adopted, Gacacaa traditional jurisdiction
which was adapted to the post-genocide situation to ensure
justice was introduced. Prof. Deo Byanafashe (from the
Centre for Conflict Management) a prominent Gacaca judge
in Butare town deals with the Gacaca system as he knows it
from the inside.
Genocide was stopped at the beginning of July 1994, but the
genocide ideology has not been eradicated yet. Odeth
Kantengwa (from CNLG, the National Commission for the
Fight Against Genocide) highlights how this Commission is
grappling with the effects of genocide, how it is combating
genocide ideology and denial of genocide through education,
memory and commemoration, and how it preserves Gacaca
archives and makes them accessible to the public.
There can be no good governance if the population has no
role to play in the decision-making process, and when their
leaders are imposed on them from above. Genuine

iv
democracy implies the power of the population to choose the
party and people whose policies/ideology they would like to
be implemented. In addition, the population exercises
democracy when the structures and institutions of the
government are near them so that the people can exert
influence/ control on them easily. Omar Bizuru (from
National University of Rwanda) in the last article tackles
these issues by showing how multipartism and
decentralization have been instituted and consolidated in
Rwanda. In addition, he shows how political parties in
Rwanda, though having different political agendas work
closely together in the Consultative Forum of Political
Organizations for the good of the country.
Bernard Noel Rutikanga
Liaison Officer, OSSREA Rwanda Chapter

List of Acronyms
AU:

African Union

CDR: Coalition pour la Dfense de la Rpublique, Coalition for the

Defence of the Republic

CEDAW: Convention on Elimination of all forms of

Discrimination against Women
CG: Central Government
COMESA: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CSO: Civil Society Organizations
DC: District Council
DHS: Demographic and Health Survey
EDPRS: Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy
EICV: Integrated Living Conditions Survey
ES: Executive Secretariat
FAWE: Forum for African Women Educationalist
FBO: Faith Based Organizations
FFRP: Forum des Femmes Rwandaises Parlementaires
FPR/RPF-Inkotanyi: Front Patriotique Rwandais Rwandese
patriotic Front;
GBV: Gender Based Violence
GDP: Growth Domestic Product
GMO: Gender Monitoring Office
GRB: Gender Responsive Budgeting
HIMO: High Intensity Labour Program
HIV/AIDS: Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome
ICT: Information Communication Technology
IRDP: Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace
LG: Local Government
MDGs: Millennium Development Goals
MDR: Mouvement Dmocratique Rpublicain, Democratic
Republic Movement
MIGEPROF: Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion
MINALOC: Ministry of Local Government and Social Affairs
MINECOFIN: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
MINEDUC: Ministry of Education

vi
MINICOFIN: Ministry of Finance and Planning
MININTER: Ministry of Interior
MRND: Mouvement Rvolutionnaire National pour le
Dveloppement, National Revolutionary Movement for
Development
MTEF: Medium Term Expenditure Framework
NCFPO: National Consultative Forum of Political Organizations,
NEC: National Election Commission
NEPAD: New Partnership for African Development
NER: Net Enrollment Rate
NGO: Non-Governmental Organizations
NISR: National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda
NWC: National Women Council
O.G: Official Gazette
PARMEHUTU: Parti de lEmancipation des HUTU, Hutu
Emancipation Party

PDC: Parti Dmocratique Centriste Centrist Democratic Party

PDI: Parti Dmocratique Idal Ideal Democratic Party
PL: Parti Libral Liberal party;
PPC: Parti du Progrs et de la Concorde Concord and Progress
party
PS: Private Sector
PSD: Parti Social Dmocrate Social Democratic Party;
PS-Imberakuri: Parti Social, Social Party-Imberakuri
PSP: Party for Solidarity and Progress
PSR: Parti Socialiste Rwandais Rwandese Socialist Party
RDB: Rwanda Development Board
RGB: Rwanda Governance Board
RRA: Rwanda Revenue Authority
SC: Sector Council
UDPR: Union Dmocratique du Peuple Rwandais Rwandese
Peoples Democratic Union
UNDP: United Nations for Development Programme
UNICEF: United Nations Childrens Fund
UNIFEM: United Nations Fund for Women
VUP: Vision Umurenge Program

The 1994 Fairule of Peace-Keeping in

Rwanda
Bernard Noel Rutikanga
We, the international community, should have been more active
in the early stages of atrocities in Rwanda in 1994, and called
them what they were-genocide. Madeleine Albright, December
1997(Cohen 2007, 9)
There are few successful stories about peacekeeping missions in
Africa. On the morrow of the independence of the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Belgium and the United States due to
neocolonial and Cold War objectives, fomented a political crisis.
When Belgium intervened militarily, and some provinces of the
country declared secession, a United Nations Peacekeeping
mission was sent to the country. According to Nzongola-Ntalaja
(2003), the mission was manipulated by Belgium, France and the
United States; the radical Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba was
removed from power and assassinated, and a puppet regime was
installed; and that is said to be the countrys starting point of its
quick march to a failed state.
In the early 1990s, a peacekeeping mission in Somalia ended in
disaster; eighteen Americans were killed and about seventy were
injured, and Pakistanis and Malaysians suffered ninety casualties
(Dallaire, 2003). Today peacekeepers are bogged down in Sudan,
Southern Sudan, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Most of these peacekeeping missions have not much to write home
about, rather, statistics of those who die on duty keep increasing.
One of Africas monumental failures of peacekeeping was in
Rwanda in 1994, when more than one million people were killed
under the nose of the United Nations Assistance Mission for
Rwanda (UNAMIR). From the outset, this peacekeeping mission
was beset by organizational, administrative and logistical
problems; however, its fatal problem was that the formulation of

2
its mandate left much to be desired. UNAMIR was given
inappropriate mandate, considering the nature of conflict Rwanda
was suffering from. The UN should have undertaken an in-depth
assessment of the conflict, and this would have led it to realize that
the 1990 war belligerents- the Rwandan government and the rebels
of Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) had incompatible aspirations
arising from a long ethnic conflict.
The RPF wanted unconditional repatriation of refugees;
eradication of ethnic and regional discrimination; and the
establishment of rule of law. The Hutu dominated government
(especially those from the north and north-western Rwanda) under
President Juvenal Habyarimana wanted to keep the status quo. The
warring parties were not flexible; they were not prepared to reach
a compromise. Peace negotiations in Arusha, Tanzania, and the
subsequent Arusha Peace Agreement was not signed by President
Habyarimana in good faith; immediately after its signature the
government started to violate it and it was never implemented.
If the UN and other actors who assisted in the peace negotiation
process had been very careful, they would have known that the
Agreement was nothing more than a public relations exercise that
was aimed at hoodwinking the international community and
donors. Without realizing that the Agreement was based on a
hypocritical calculation, the UN rushed to create a chapter- six
peacekeeping mission, i.e. UNAMIR which was supposed to
facilitate the implementation of the Agreement. Rushing to create
a chapter-six mandate for the mission was a recipe for catastrophe
due to the deep rooted ethnic animosity between the minority Tutsi
and the majority Hutu which was a legacy of Belgian colonialism.
Due to the divide and rule policy of Belgian colonialism in
Rwanda, Tutsi were initially favored by the Belgian colonial
administration. In the early 1950s, due to the decolonization
political stance of Tutsi elite, the Belgian switched their favoritism
to the Hutu, and in 1959 fomented ethnic violence which resulted
into thousands of Tutsi being killed, their properties destroyed or
looted. Hundreds of them were imprisoned, and thousands fled
into neighboring countries such as, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi,

3
and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Independence was granted
to Rwanda in 1962, and two Hutu post-independence regimes
oppressed the Tutsi and massacres which were committed in the
1960s and 1970s resulted into waves of refugees fleeing into exile.
(Goyvaerts, 2000; Prunier, 2006).
As the Tutsi refugees were denied the right of repatriation, they
organized themselves under the RPF, and with the assistance of
Ugandan government, they invaded Rwanda in October 1990. The
international community brought the belligerents to negotiate
peace and after protracted sessions, the Arusha Peace Agreement
was signed in August 1993 (Mamdani, 2001).
The major provisions of the Peace Agreement were: cessation of
the war; power sharing between the ruling party, the rebel party
and the newly formed opposition parties in a Broad-Based
Transitional Government; creating a new national armed forces by
merging government armed forces and the rebel army- the
Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA); establishing rule of law; and
unconditional repatriation of refugees from the Diaspora; and
resettling of internally displaced people (Prunier, 2006).
The implementation of the Peace Agreement needed assistance
from the UN, so, Security Council Resolution 872 of 5 October
1993 created UNAMIR, and its chapter six mandate clauses
included to assist in ensuring the security of the capital city of
Kigali; monitor the ceasefire agreement, including establishment
of an expanded demilitarized zone and demobilization procedures;
monitor the security situation during the final period of the
transitional government's mandate leading up to elections; assist
with mine-clearance; and assist in the coordination of
humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief
operations (UNAMIR website).
UN Chapter Six Mandate was inappropriate for UNAMIR; first,
the Arusha Peace Agreement did not create a win-win situation on
the side of the government supporters. While RPF supporters
celebrated for achieving almost all their aspirations, the supporters
of the ruling party- National Republican Movement for

4
Development and Democracy ( MRND) and its extremist satellite
party Coalition for the Defense of the Republic ( CDR) opposed
the peace negotiations and the resultant Agreement. Millions of
Hutu civil servants, supporters of the ruling party throughout the
country, and the population of the northern region where the
president hailed from, felt threatened because they would lose
privileges they had been enjoying since President Juvenal
Habyarimana toppled the previous southern Hutu -dominated
regime two decades earlier.
Civil servants at all levels felt threatened because the Tutsi
refugees from the Diaspora would be given some of their posts
due to the clause of power sharing. The government soldiers and
police were threatened too, because, the merging of rebel and
government troops implied demobilization and hence
unemployment of thousands of them. In the Agreement, it was
stipulated that military and police officer corps in the new national
armed forces would be equally shared between the government
and the RPA. As for the rank and file, the government was
allocated 60% and the RPF 40% (Prunier, 2006).
When the Tutsi refugees fled into exile in different waves from
1959, national, local leaders as well as peasants benefitted from
properties left behind, such as land and buildings. The repatriation
of refugees implied that Hutu people who had taken over Tutsi
properties would return them. The implementation of the Accords
was a thorn in the flesh of millions of Hutu. However, other
millions of Rwandan people supported them, especially the
refugees in the Diaspora; the Tutsi inside Rwanda who had been
marginalized for decades; Hutu who opposed the dictatorship of
Habyarimana regime; and southern Hutu who were marginalized
by the regime that had toppled a southern Hutu presidentGregoire Kayibanda in 1973.
Second, the president himself who signed the Agreement was
against it. He signed it because his army was losing the war;
pressure was exerted on him by donors, the Organization of
African Unity (OAU), neighboring countries and the UN. On
returning to Rwanda from Arusha, Tanzania, where the signing

5
ceremony took place, President Juvenal Habyarimana told his
partys militia that ( the author of this article heard him over
Radio Rwanda) the Agreement was not worth the paper it was
written on. He signed the Agreement in order to buy time;
meanwhile, he was preparing another strategy to defeat his
enemies- the Tutsi, the RPF and the moderate Hutu.
Third, the president devised a multi-dimensional strategy
(Dallaire, 2003) that was aimed at frustrating the implementation
of the Agreement. The hardliners of his ruling party, and its
satellite parties collaborated in recruiting and training of the
militia and disseminating hate propaganda against the Tutsi and
the Hutu moderates. Arms and machetes were imported and
distributed across the country. Also, the regime used the media
especially the hate Radio- the Radio Television Libre des Mille
Collines (RTLM) and a number of journals and newspapers to
promote ethnic extremism, to mobilize the Hutu to oppose the
Agreement, and to commit genocide (Cohen, 2007; Thompson,
2007).
A reign of terror by the militia and security forces, especially in
the capital- Kigali, claimed many lives of Tutsi and moderate Hutu
; lists of government enemies were drawn; and opposition parties
were divided through intimidation and bribery ( Dallaire, 2003;
Prunier, 2006). By creating squabbles in the opposition parties and
by trying to revise the clauses of the Agreement which the RPF
refused, President Habyarimana prevented the installation of the
transitional government until he died and the genocide started
(Cohen, 2007).
The Commander of UNAMIR in Rwanda, Major-General Romeo
Dallaire kept informing his superiors at the UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Kofi Annan (Under-SecretaryGeneral for Peacekeeping Operations) and General Maurice Baril
(Military Advisor to the UN Secretary- General and head of the
Military Division of DPKO) about the need of changing the
mandate of the mission to chapter seven due to unforeseen
dangerous political and military developments on the ground ; but

6
they kept rebuking him to stick to the provisions of chapter six
( Dallaire, 2003).
When president Habyarimana died as his plane was shot down as
it was landing in the capital, the genocide started immediately. In
one hundred days, from 6th April to the beginning of July 1994,
more than one million Tutsi and moderate Hutu were killed, and
thousands of Hutus were to die as they were forced into exile by
the defeated regime( Des Forges, 1999).This , according to Cohen
( 2007:180) was the greatest human failure in the twentieth
century. The former President of Zambia spoke for many when he
said: I do not know how we could have sunken to that situation
with the rest of the world watching and doing nothing about it. I
think it is unforgivable. I do not know how we can ever explain
that Cohen, 2007: 1).
The failure of humanity in Rwanda can be attributed to the then
Rwandan government which executed the genocide, the UN, the
five permanent members of the Security Council and Belgium. As
shown above, the UN did not design a mission appropriate to an
acute ethnic conflict. Initially the US, Russia and France had
suggested that only a force of 500 was needed (Dallaire,
2003).When Dallaire realized the futility of UNAMIRs chapter
six mandate, he wanted not only the increasing of his troops from
2500 to 5500, but also the changing of UNAMIRs chapter six
mandate to at least chapter six and half to use force up to and
including the use of deadly force to prevent crimes against
humanity (2003, 72).
The Special Representative of the Secretary- General in Rwanda,
Jacques- Roger Booh-Booh was incompetent. In the words of
Dallaire, he was rarely in his office before ten, took a full twohour lunch and left the office before five and had insisted that he
shouldnt be disturbed during weekends (Dallaire, 2003:118).And
as far as the conflict of Rwanda was concerned, Dallaire adds that
Booh-Booh did not bring anything new to the table in the way of
expertise on Rwanda, knowledge of the conflict, familiarity with
the Arusha Accords, or skill at identifying and dealing with the
political intrigues of the nation(Dallaire, 2003: 118). Booh-

7
Boohs working relationship with Dallaire was bad, he never
offered to debrief for me after major political working sessions, he
generally kept his own counsel or shared his thoughts with his
close political advisers, who were all francophone Africans
(Dallaire, 2003: 119). To make matters worse, Booh-Booh made
the RPF distrust him because he fraternized with the President and
acted as his advocate. It reached a stage whereby Dallaire stopped
giving him vital information because he was afraid of leakage to
the government.
With Booh-Booh being less useful as far as the dangerous
situation in Rwanda was concerned, Dallaire had to do what the
civilian head of the UNAMIR should have done; arranging and
facilitating negotiations between groups involved in Rwandan
conflict, facilitating humanitarian activities and pleading to the
international community to save Rwanda from the genocide.
Dallaire indulged in negotiations about cease-fire, neutrality of
Kigali airport, distribution of humanitarian aid, protection of
refugees and transfer of refugees to safe areas .The negotiations
were not easy; on the government side, there were three groups
that Dallaire had to deal with: the interim government that the
RPF did not recognize, and could not negotiate with: the militia
that was behind much of the killings and that the RPF could not
negotiate with; and the government army which the RPF did not
oppose to negotiate with. He was so prepared to meet his
objectives that he swallowed his revulsion and met, and shook
hands with the devil that is, the leader of the militia. He went to
the popular, but hate radio and tried to convince the population
that UNAIMR was a neutral force trying to broker peace. In the
long run, his negotiation initiatives proved useful as they saved
thousands of people (Dallaire, 2003).
The efforts of UNAMIR to save Rwandan lives were betrayed by
the UN. When genocide was picking tempo in April, Security
Council Resolution 912 reduced UNAMIR from 2500 troops to
250 (Peries & Servenay, 2007; Dallaire, 2003; Melvern, 2000).
When genocide had nearly run its course, the UN Security Council
adopted Resolution 918 of May 1994 that increased the UNAMIR

8
troops to 5500 ( Barnett, 2002) but these did not reach Rwanda
until the genocide had been stopped by the RPF.
In June 1994, the government army was on the run, so, France in
trying to save it from annihilation, forced the UN Security Council
to adopt Resolution 929 that established Zone Turquoise (a
chapter seven Humanitarian Protected Area) in South-western
Rwanda. The French intervention was supposed to be aimed at
saving lives, but many writers have argued that it was intended to
save the defeated army and government officials and to assure
them a safe passage to Congo (Melvern, 2000; Barnett, 2002;
Dallaire, 2003; Gouteux, 1999).
UNAMIR was overwhelmed by logistical problems and
humanitarian disaster. Before the genocide started in April 1994,
there were 150.000 refugees from Burundi and there were 900.000
internally displaced people. And during the course of the war and
genocide, more than one million people were displaced and were
on the move. Moreover, during the genocide thousands of Tutsi
and orphans were in tens of refugee camps, and they expected
protection and humanitarian aid and the only NGOs that were
active were the local Red Cross, the International Committee of
the Red Cross, and Mdecins Sans Frontires whose activities
were hampered by hordes of killers (Dallaire, 2003; Peries &
Servenay, 2007).
France was deeply involved in the genocide as it assisted the
genocidal regime before, during and after the genocide (Prunier,
2006; Gouteux, 1998; Des Forges, 1999). France did not want its
ally to lose power not because of economic interest in Rwanda, but
because of geopolitical considerations. Though France did not
colonize Rwanda, from the 1970s, it established a close
relationship with it, and as a Francophone country, France
considered it as its backyard. To let English speaking rebels defeat
its ally was unacceptable to France, as this would make it would
lose face, and set up a precedent in other Francophone countries
whose presidents were not less dictatorial than Rwandan president
and who looked at France as an invincible protector.

9
So, it provided Rwandan government with diplomatic, financial
and military support before, during and after the genocide (Ba,
1997; Verschave, 1999). At the height of the genocide, a secret
service official told Gerard Prunier (2006: 278) We are busy
delivering ammunition to the FAR (government army) through
Goma (Congo). But of course I will deny it if you quote me to the
press. When the French president was challenged on his receiving
two Rwandan high-ranking genocide perpetrators during the
genocide, he gave a cynical response, In a country like that,
genocide is a normal thing (Verschave, 1999: 32).
The United States government did not care about what was
happening in Rwanda. In April 1994, Senator Bob Dole told the
CBC audience, I dont think we have any national interest
therethe Americans are out, and as far as Im concerned, in
Rwanda, that ought to be the end of it (Cohen, 2007: 79).
George Orwells Animal Farm clich of some animals being
more equal than others proves right in the context of the
Rwandan genocide; the lives of Rwandan people did not deserve
protection as the Genocide Convention stipulates. The American
government even tried to avoid using the word genocide. On 10th
June 1994, Christine Shelley, a spokesperson of the State
Department told journalists: Although there have been acts of
genocide in Rwanda, all the murders cannot be put into that
category (Prunier, 2006: 274). When a journalist wanted her to
clarify the number of genocide acts that make genocide, she did
not respond.
The US negative attitude towards the peacekeeping mission in
Rwanda has been associated with its horrendous experience in
Somalia where its army lost 19 servicemen in one day, and one of
the corpses was dragged in the street and was shown on
international televisions (Des Forges, 1999; Prunier, 2006). After
the UNAMIR Belgian contingent lost 10 of its servicemen, the US
government exerted pressure on the Security Council to withdraw
the UNAMIR from Rwanda (Cohen, 2007) and this is one
instance in which the US not only took the position of inaction,
but actually made things worse(Cohen, 2007: 178).The American

10
attitude towards the genocide against the Tutsi was infectious;
according to Cohen ( 2007: 3) Had the US taken the lead in, and
advocated a strong international response to the genocide, there
would have been an increase in the pressure placed on
international organizations and other nations to take similar
actions. Instead, as the trend-setter for which international issues
receive global attention, the US government helped pave the way
for non intervention in Rwanda.
The indifference towards the 100 days in Rwanda by major
powers (apart from France) was due to the fact that the country
had no strategic importance, be it in natural resources or
geopolitics. Peace-keeping in Rwanda was bound to fail because
nobody cared about a small, poor country without any strategic
resources. The late Alison Des Forges, the American historian and
human rights activist is said to have confided to someone privately
that the international community did not care as thousands of
Rwandans were dying every day because, Rwanda was too poor,
too black, too small, and too remote.
The indifference towards genocide was underlined by an
American intelligence official in a conversation with an American
journalist Philip Gourevitch (1998: 170-171); he compared it with
a cheese sandwich.
Genocide is a cheese sandwich.What does anyone care about a
cheese sandwich? Genocide, genocide, genocide, cheese
sandwich, cheese sandwich Who gives a shit? Crimes against
humanity. Wheres humanity? Whos humanity? You? Me? Did
you see a crime committed against you? Hey, just a million
Rwandans. Did you hear about the Genocide Convention? That
Convention makes a nice wrapping for a cheese sandwich.
The backbone of UNAMIR was the strong Belgian contingent that
Major-General Romeo Dallaire relied on. The Rwandan
government from the outset opposed the presence of Belgian
troops in Rwanda because unlike France, the Belgian government
publically opposed the dictatorial regime of Habyarimana, so, the
government had it that Belgium was pro-RPF and therefore its

11
enemy. When the genocide started, the government wanted the
hurried departure of the UNAMIR and so, it assassinated 10
soldiers of the Belgian contingent. The Belgian government fell
into the trap of the genocidal government; it withdrew its
contingent immediately, leaving behind thousands of Tutsi and
moderate Hutu who had sought protection at their barracks. These
were massacred within minutes of their departure. Their departure
also precipitated the UN to scale down the manpower of UNAMIR
from 2500 to 250 (Dallaire, 2003).
The failure of the international community to resolve the Rwandan
conflict has adversely affected not only Rwanda but also the Great
Lakes region as we will illustrate later. In the case of Rwanda,
more than one million Tutsi people and some Hutu moderates
perished between April and July 1994. The genocide aggravated
the polarization between Hutu and Tutsi; reconciliation in the
country has not been an easy task. The civil war that stretched into
the genocide period destroyed infrastructure whose rehabilitation
wasted a lot of resources that could have been used in
development programs. Also, the genocidal regime incurred heavy
debts in the importation of machetes and grenades for genocide
purposes and military materials in its war against the RPA.
Payments of the debts especially wasted a good portion of the
hard-earned foreign currency.
The genocidal regime did not commit genocide against the Tutsi
only; it also committed another type of genocide against the
Hutu. Its propaganda and force led to about 2.5 million Hutu to
flee into exile especially to the Democratic Republic of Congo,
Uganda, Tanzania and Burundi. Thousands died in the camps due
to epidemics, fatigue and malnutrition (Dorlodot, 1996;
Mpayimana, 2004; Jones, 2001).
Refugee camps were run by genocide perpetrators- political
leaders, the militia and the army. They used force to prevent
refugees to return home. A good portion of humanitarian aid was
diverted to military preparations for war against the RPF regime,
and organizations which had been close to the defeated regime
such as Secours Catholic and Caritas Internationalis were

12
accomplices to this development (Gouteux, 1998: 88). Violating
international law, the Mobutu regime of the Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC) did not disarm the army and militia and France
provided clandestinely arms to its protg (ibid.).
In 1995 and early 1996, Rwanda experienced a number of bloody
attacks from the DRC (Prunier, 2006; 2009). Rwandas pleas to
the DRC government and the international community to disarm
the defeated army and militia, and separate them from civilian
refugees were ignored. As a result, Rwanda and Uganda created
the Alliance des Forces Dmocratiques pour la Liberation (ADFL)
- an umbrella organization of Congolese rebels. In September
1996, Rwanda attacked the Democratic Republic of Congo under
the cover of ADFL, the refugee camps were dismantled, about one
million refugees were forced to trek back to Rwanda; thousands
others fled westwards some of whom got killed; others died of
fatigue and hunger (Prunier, 2009).
By the 1990s, the DRC was already a failed state; the spread of the
Rwandan conflict into Congo, ultimately pushed it down the
precipice. It took only nine months for Rwanda and Congolese
rebels to conquer the country. Laurent-Desire Kabila who was
installed as the head of state was soon at loggerheads with
Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. In August 1998, a three-year
Africas Continental War broke out (Prunier, 2009). It involved
on the one hand, Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi, and on the other,
DRC, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Chad, Sudan and Rwandan
and Ugandan rebels.
The two wars have wreaked havoc not only in the DRC, but also
in the Great Lakes region. It is estimated that about four million
Congolese people have died due to causes related to the wars; with
DRCs weak state institutions, local armed groups have
proliferated and they are laws unto themselves. Among the
multitude armed groups operating in the DRC, the biggest, wellarmed and organized is the Democratic Front for the Liberation of
Rwanda (FDLR), the remnants of the Rwandan army and militia
that have been there since 1994. They have created a state within
a state; they mine and sell minerals, they buy arms and have

13
established an administration. The DRC government army is too
weak to dislodge them in their areas; rather the FDLR rebels
sometimes attack government areas, terrorize the population, loot
and rape women (Prunier, 2009).
These armed groups in Congo have led to the proliferation of
small arms in the region, such that insecurity is rampant in many
areas. Rwanda is wasting a lot of resources in order to arm itself
against the danger posed by the FDLR.
Based on the peacekeeping experience in Rwanda, in designing
peacekeeping missions, there a number of issues that must be
considered, lest the conflict degenerates into a catastrophe like
what Rwanda experienced in 1994, and what the Great Lakes
region has experienced since the fiasco of the Rwandan
peacekeeping mission.
First, in designing a peacekeeping mission, the nature of the
conflict should be known thoroughly well, and the cards up the
sleeves of the parties in conflicts should be identified lest they
damage the conflict resolution measures put in place.
Second, the peacekeeping primary mission should be the
protection of innocent populations. The success or failure of a
mission should be based on whether the populations got maximum
protection from violence being committed in their areas.
Third, the world being considered as one village inhabited by
equal people, when it comes to peacekeeping, being black, brown
or white or being poor or rich should not be the basis for
providing or denying the adequate assistance expected from the
international community. The international community should
accept that what is good for Central European conflict resolution is
good for African societies as well.
Fourth, there should be a strong cooperation and smooth
coordination between the military, the civilian and the
humanitarian agencies involved in the conflict resolution. The
scenario where the military and the civilians in the peacekeeping

14
mission are pursuing different agendas and are suspicious of each
other undermines the effectiveness of the mission.
Fifth, the peacekeepers should be furnished with adequate
equipment, human and financial resources so as to facilitate their
activities. The implications of failure of the mission should goad
the actors on the ground to avoid partiality and also avoid being
manipulated by the belligerents or their allies. They should also
avoid the habit of observing the- nine- to five- with- a- twohour- lunch- break working- schedule.
References
1. Ba, Mehdi. 1997. Rwanda, 1994: Un Gnocide Franais,
Paris, LEsprit Frappeur
2. Barnett, Michael. 2002. Eyewitness to Genocide: the United
Nations and Rwanda, Ithaca and London, Cornell University
Press
3. Cohen, Jared. 2007. One Hundred Days of Silence, Lanham,
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
4. Dallaire, Romeo. 2003. Shake Hands with the Devil: The
Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, Cambridge, MA, Da Capo
Press
5. Des Forges, Alison. 1999. Leave None to Tell the Story:
Genocide in Rwanda, New York, Human Rights Watch
6. Dorlodot, Philippe de. 1996. Les Refugies Rwandais a Bukavu
au Zaire: De Nouveaux Palestiniens?, Paris, Groupe Jrmie,
LHarmattan
7. Gourevitch, Philip. 1998. We Wish to Inform you that
Tomorrow we Will be Killed with our Families: Stories from
Rwanda, New York, Picador
8. Gouteux, Jean-Paul.1998. Un Gnocide Secret dtat: La
France et le Rwanda 1990-19997, Paris, Editions Sociales
9. Mamdani, Mahmood. 2001. When Victims become Killers:
Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda,
Princeton, Princeton University Press
10. Melvern, R. Linda. 2000. A People Betrayed: The Role of the
West in Rwandas Genocide, London, Zed Books Ltd

15
11. Mpayimana, Philippe. 2004. Refugies Rwandais, Entre
Marteau et Enclume: Recit du Calvaire au Zaire ( 1996-1997),
Paris, LHarmattan
12. Nzongola-Ntalaja, Georges. 2003. The Congo from Leopold
to Kabila: A Peoples History, London and New York, Zed
Books
13. Peries, Gabriel & Servenay, David. 2007. Enqute sur les
Origines du Genocide Rwandais (1959-1994), Paris , la
Dcouverte
14. Prunier, Gerard. 2006. The Rwanda Crisis: History of
Genocide, Kampala , Fountain Publishers
15. Prunier, Gerard.2009. Africas World War: Congo, The
Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental
Catastrophe, Oxford, Oxford University Press
16. Thompson, Allan (ed).2007. The Media and the Rwanda
Genocide, London and Ann Arbor, Pluto Press
17. UNAMIR
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamirM.ht
m accessed on 23rd December, 2011
18. Verschave, Franois-Xavier.1999. La Franafrique: Le Plus
Long Scandale de la Republique, Paris, Stock

16

Perceptions on The Role of Economic

Policy and Governance in the
Reconstruction of Rwanda 2002-20121
Herman Musahara2
Abstract
The interest in policy performance has been motivated by
performance of the Rwandan economy in the period between 2002
and 2012. Whereas it is common knowledge that there are
multiple and technical toolkits for policy analysis, none so far
looks at how people generally perceive the importance of
economic policy on visible positive or negative outcomes. A good
rating of perceptions can give insights on the relationship between
policy and performance. The paper outlines the policy packages in
Rwanda in the last ten years in light of recent economic
performance and then analyses a set of perceptions assembled
through a simple score sheet using standard evaluation criteria. In
2002, the first Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper was drawn.
Poverty was estimated then at 60 per cent? below national poverty
line and GDP per capita of about USD 200 per day/annum?. Ten
years later in 2012, the poverty rate under the national poverty
line is estimated at 45 per cent of the population, or a drop of 15
points. While the GPD per capita shot up to USD 550, the
average GDP growth per year has been on average 8 per cent.
These economic outcomes were preceded by multiple policy
interventions, legislation and creation of important institutions.
1

Paper presented in the OSSREA Rwanda Chapter workshop on

Governance in Rwanda on 24th August 2012.
2
Author is currently an Associate Professor of Development Studies
at the National University of Rwanda. He is currently Vice- President
of the Organization for Social Science Research for Eastern and
Southern Africa and was formerly Liaison Officer for Rwanda
Chapter. He is seconded to the Directorate of Planning and
Development of the National University of Rwanda as a Director.

17
The paper addresses the following questions; what has been the
influence of policy in the reconstruction and recovery of Rwanda?
The latter is usually regarded as implicit. The paper uses
qualitative indicators of performance of policy to assess their role
in the recovery of Rwanda. Select criteria used to assess policy in
Rwanda have been the policy relevance, efficiency, effectiveness
and test of impact. A method of scores made by an elite group of 5
respondents is used and on average the role of policy is perceived
to be very high. On a scale of 5 there are 8 policy items out of a
total 18 that score an average of 3.8. But having 10 policy items
with below average score suggests policies could have performed
better and could exert more impact on the economy. The most
notable implication is that in policy formulation and
implementation, care should be taken on the potential effect on the
economy with regard to the suggested or broader criteria that
involve a participatory process. In the latter process analyzing
perceptions of different stakeholders could be one cost effective
and simple way of evaluation, ex- ante or ex- post policy
implementation. All in all, economic policy implementation is seen
to have a notable role in the reconstruction and economic
recovery of the Rwandan economy. The question that this paper
provokes is whether this value judgment confirms the general
wisdom that the current economic successes of Rwanda are due to
good policies coupled with good implementation. The answer
looks like affirmative, but more empirical and detailed policy
analysis is still needed.
Key words: Policy analysis, reconstruction, recovery, perceptions,
Rwanda 2002 - 2012
1. Introduction
Policy is important for various reasons. Firstly, it influences
changes by indicating the dos and donts. It makes it possible
to interpret the laws and plans into workable principles in a blue
print. It leads the final operationalisation of visions by offering
strategies (or the how). Several successful economies have
attained higher levels of development from their previous policies.

18
Policy analysis and review is an important tool in monitoring and
improving the effect of policy. In this paper, the policy
interventions in the period of reconstruction and recovery of
Rwanda are outlined. Then a simple method of evaluation of
perceptions is used. The evaluation process has been done in a
framework of inquiry outlined in the rest of this section.
1.1. The problem
The problem is firstly lack of correct identification of the policy
problem in a given situation and the need to identify the gaps. The
generic problem frame is outlined in Table 1.
Table 1.The policy intervention problem
The problem
Intervention
1 Lack of policy
Draft one that is appropriate
2 Identification of why
1. Collect evidence
existing policy is not
2. Identify barriers
working as expected
3. Recommend remedial
or...policy governance
action
problem
3 Policy or policy change
Policy brief and dissemination
adoption
4 Lack of knowledge on the A form of policy analysis is
relationship between
designed
policy in place and results
In the current paper, the working assumptions are that policies
were formulated and that they have worked considerably well.
Therefore our problem falls within category 4 or designing a
methodology of establishing the link between policy, practice and
results. The problem is generally the lack of quantitative and
qualitative knowledge on the magnitude of policy influence on
economic performance. Specifically, no one has tried to assess
how people perceive the expected impact. In Table 2, it is further
shown that if good policies are in place and good decision making
and implementation is exercised, then the overall outcome is
positive. Is this general assumption implicit in the economic

19
success of Rwanda consistent with what people perceive about
most policy statements undertaken in the last 10 years?
Table 2. The policy and governance problem
Policy

Governance
Bad implementation

Good policy
articulation
Bad policy articulation

3
4

Bad policy
Good policy

Overall
outcome

Good
implementation
Bad implementation
Good
implementation

Green: The best outcome you can get. Orange: Somewhat good
Red: Not good at all
1.2. Objectives
As outlined above the objectives of the paper were three fold;
a) Take an inventory and analysis of policies in the post
conflict discourse;
b) Assess the policies by scoring perceptions using standard
criteria;
c) Draw out lessons and conclusions for post conflict
economies.
1.3. Working hypothesis
A blend of policies, both economic and political, with an
appropriate strategic framework and innovative approaches have
contributed to the successful reconstruction and recovery of
Rwanda in the last 20 years.
2. Policy evolution in the reconstruction transition of Rwanda
2.1. Overview
The period 2002 through 2012 can be regarded as that of a
transition from the effects of genocide to recovery and
reconstruction. In political terms, it is a transition from violent

20
conflict to peace, and in economic terms a transition from relief to
development (UNDP).The effect of Rwanda conflict and genocide
in 1994 was deep and devastating. There is plenty of evidence in
figures and narratives on the extent of the damage to the economy.
Costs were economic, political and social involving destruction of
human life, infrastructure and the social fabric.
At least 1 million people were killed in what were clearly
wrongful deaths. The GDP fell by more than 50 %. A further 3
million were displaced or forced into exile mainly to Tanzania,
Burundi and DRC. But many more fled and professionally
qualified Rwandans fled to Europe and North America. Poverty
had afflicted more than 77 per cent of the population in the
country by 1997 estimates. Incomplete families with either some
members in prison or having died characterized the basic unit of
production and livelihood. Women and child headed households
became a common feature of Rwandan economy. Shelter and
capital stock were drastically reduced both in the household and
small business sectors. Networks of social links, for instance
between rural and urban areas, were damaged, impeding internal
commerce. The immediate reaction was relief and rehabilitation
and a little bit later, in 1996 and 1997, resettling returning old and
new case load Rwandans. Old case load refugees are those
Rwandans who had fled the country in the 1960s and successive
years before the genocide. The policy challenge was thus two
fold. Policies that would reverse and replace those that may have
been the proximate causes of the tragedy, and those policies that
would put again Rwanda on track and on a footing of other
developing countries. Thanks to aid and post genocide
government, Rwanda, though with a lot of economic indicators
much below the pre- genocide period, had by 2002 reached the
catch up stage. In place of relief and rehabilitation, from 2002
clear policies for reconstruction and development started
emerging.
It was in 2002 that the first poverty reduction strategy was
formulated. This signaled almost immediately the beginning of
multiple policy actions, legislations and building institutions. It

21
may not be possible to give a chronology of events and list of
policy items that were put in place in each of the years after 2002,
either within a framework of poverty reduction, or reconstruction
and long term development. One important fact which is common
knowledge is that there was a relentless push for rapid change and
a constant undertaking of reform in the same vein. The speed with
which Rwanda put in place policies may be one unaccounted for
reason behind the economic reconstruction and recovery. A
general categorization can provide a general picture of the policy
pathways in the last 10 years.
Firstly policies in the period can be grouped into phases. From
2002 to 2005, the first generation poverty reduction policies
(PRSP) emerged, and from 2007-2012, a phase referred to as
second generation poverty reduction saw the light of day and has
been dubbed (EDPRS). Apart from the formal strategies that are
referred to more elaborately, later the phases can be seen to have
been greatly influenced by visioning and long term planning
(Vision 2020 and Long Term Investment Plan). A more elaborate
account of these is given in the sections below.
Another category of policies are those that are ostensibly
economic, besides being under broad poverty reducing strategies.
There were policies on trade, monetary and fiscal policy,
education, health and other social sectors and related legislations
and institutions. The Rwanda policy framework was also
influenced by internal benchmarked goals (MDGs) and
international deliberations on aid, debt and sustainability. A very
unique category of policy making in Rwanda that has
characterized the policy making discourse is the introduction of
home grown approaches to modern polices by invoking traditional
cultural techniques of problem solving.
2.2. Major policy interventions
a) PRSP
The Poverty Reduction Strategy did not come accidentally.
Rwanda joined other poor countries in drawing the paper in 2002.
But before that, Rwanda had instituted a liberalization policy, and

22
from 1996 to 1999, it had drawn the Policy Framework Paper
which was the first policy to address the condition of the poor. In
2000, a National Poverty Reduction Programme was set up as a
first step towards formulation of a Poverty Reduction Strategy in
2002.
PRSP was drawn to rest on six pillars. These were economic
growth, macroeconomic stability, prioritization of public actions,
forging a sound partnership between the government and other
stakeholders, as well as human resource development. Priority
sectors were identified as agriculture for transformation of the
rural areas, human resource development, economic infrastructure,
good governance, private sector, and a number of cross cutting
sectors particularly technology, gender, environment, HIV/AIDS,
capacity building, villagisation (imidugudu), and inequality.
Most of the earliest policies were formulated under the strategy.
As a policy instrument of Rwanda, it was hailed as one of the best
in Africa but as a member of the PRSP family of policies, it was
heavily criticized. One of the criticisms was that although it was
focused on poverty major policy, component items were not
adequately pro poor (Musahara, 2005).
b) EDPRS
Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS)
is virtually the second generation PRSP. It was better prepared
with a wider range of consultations and working group inputs
based on sectors in most of 2006 (www.devpartners.gov.rw).
When the final draft was adopted in 2007 it became an effective
policy document on a number of grounds. Firstly, it was less
sophisticated with the simple setting of answering where Rwanda
is, where it wants to be and how it can get there. The time horizon
was 5 instead of three years of the PRSP. Secondly, it recognized
international benchmarks set in the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs). The latter improvement meant not only explicitly
subscribing to poverty reduction globally, but also to render policy
amenable to measurable benchmarks as set in the MDGs. The
resolve was important because Rwanda, as a post conflict

23
economy, was subjecting its policy to international tests common
to all countries no matter what their previous experience was.
Thirdly, the long term goals embedded in Vision 2020 started to
be considered in policy making. Indeed a lower level programme
that seems to have poverty reduction and Vision 2020 in the same
policy perspective was the VUP Umurenge 2020. Finally, EDPRS
was nested in the need to focus also on solid economic pillars as a
prerequisite for sustainable poverty reduction.
Noting by dates and the list on the score sheet, several policy
reforms and institutions were set up in the period between 2007
and 2012. Above all, significant economic gains and poverty
reduction were obtained. In 2002 the poverty rate was 62 per cent
below the poverty line and went down to 59.2 percent in 2005. By
the end of the EDPRS policies cycle, poverty had gone down to 45
per cent, an almost 14 points drop. But what was more spectacular
during the period was the general economic performance. On
average, GDP had grown by 8 per cent per annum and GDP per
capita had gone up from USD 200 per capita to USD 550 in the
same period. The summary of economic performance is presented
in Table 3.
Table 3. Economic indicators during EDPRS 1 period
Year
GDP Per capita USD
2001
212
2002
206
2003
220
2004
242
2005
289
2006
333
2007
391
2008
479
2009
519
2010
540
Rwandan economy has undergone dramatic growth in the last 5
years with GDP per cent growth being on average more than 8. In

24
terms of reduction of poverty, the rate under the national poverty
line dropped by 12 points from 57 to 45 per cent.
Access to social services also improved considerably. On the part
of health, infant mortality dropped from 86 per 1000 live births in
2005 to 50 per 1000 live births in 2011. The use of contraceptives
went from 25 percent in 2008 to 45 percent in just three years.
Access to education went up significantly. Primary school
completion rates for 2011 reached 79 percent for boys and 82
percent for girls. The achievements are higher than the overall
targets of 59 percent and 58 percent respectively. Participation in
secondary education doubled between 2005 and 2011.Connections
to electricity rose from 91,000 to 215,000 households between
2006 and 2011.
Rwanda is now renowned for its policy of creating an enabling
environment for business. For 2012, Rwanda is ranked by the
World Bank as number 52 in the world in doing business or
number 4 in Africa after Mauritius, Egypt and South Africa.
Indeed the business and service sectors are rapidly replacing
agriculture contributing up to 60 per cent of GDP. In 1995 the
entire budget came from foreign aid. In 2011 the budget
component covered by foreign aid is 40 per cent. Tourism is also
growing fast to become number 2 after agriculture.
3. Scoring Methodology
We use a simple qualitative assessment of national and external
policies using most common and standard ex- ante criteria
(DAC/OECD/ODA) of
a) Policy relevance tests
b) Effectiveness
c) Efficiency
d) Impact
e) Sustainability

25
Table 4: Scoring system
Score
1
2
3
4
5

Rating
Not at all
Yes But weak
Average
Good
Very Good

Table 5: The general description of the tests

Test
Relevance
Effective
Efficient
Impact
Sustainability
Unity and
Reconciliation

General Description
Directly related to reducing poverty and
livelihoods
Visible change in output and outcome
Clear good use of finance and resources
Led to change compared to before or without
Will last long and be useful to future generations
Directly related to Rwanda unity and reconciliation

4. Results of scores on policy

R=Relevance ET=Effective EC= Efficiency I=Impact
S=Sustainability UR=Unity and Reconciliation

26
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
33
34
35
36
37
38

Sector
PRSP
E
EDPRS
E
VUP
S
MDGs
E
Aid Policy
E
Monetary Policy
E
Trade Policy
E
Fiscal Policy
E
Privatisation
E
VAT and Taxation
B
Formation of RRA
I
Investment code
E
Export promotion
E
Auditors General and auditing
B
Formation of RURA
I
National Electoral Commission
I
National Tender Board
I
Constitution 2003
P
Joining EAC
P
Joining Commonwealth
P
Doing Business Reforms
B
Formation of Rwanda Development Board I
9YBE
S
Mutuelles
E
Procurement polcies
E
Ombudsman
I
Land law and policy
L
Unity and Reconcilaiation Commission
I
Intellectual Property Law
L
Microfinance
B
Stock Exchange
B
Gacaca
P
Imihigo
P
Ubudehe
P
Umuganda
P
Itorero
P
Gender
S
Decentrailsatoiom
P
Demobilisation
P

R
4.3
5.0
5.0
4.3
3.0
3.3
3.7
3.7
3.0
4.0
4.0
3.3
3.7
4.0
3.7
3.0
3.3
4.0
4.7
4.3
3.7
4.0
4.0
4.7
4.0
3.3
4.0
4.7
3.7
3.3
3.0
3.7
3.3
4.3
3.3
3.3
4.0
4.0
3.3
149.0
4

ET
3.7
3.7
4.0
4.3
3.0
2.7
4.0
3.3
3.0
3.7
4.7
3.3
3.0
2.3
2.0
3.3
3.7
3.0
3.0
4.7
3.3
2.3
4.7
3.0
3.3
3.7
3.3
2.3
3.0
3.0
3.3
4.0
3.3
3.3
3.3
3.7
3.7
3.3
3.3
131.7
3

EF
2.3
3.7
3.0
3.7
2.7
2.7
3.0
3.0
2.7
3.0
4.0
2.7
2.7
2.7
2.3
3.3
3.7
3.0
2.7
3.3
2.7
2.3
4.3
2.7
3.0
3.7
3.3
2.7
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.7
3.0
3.3
3.3
3.0
3.7
3.3
3.3
120.3
3

I
2.3
3.3
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
2.7
3.0
2.7
2.7
3.3
3.3
3.3
3.0
2.3
2.7
3.0
3.7
3.3
3.0
4.3
3.0
3.0
4.3
3.3
3.3
3.7
3.3
2.3
3.3
2.7
3.3
3.7
3.3
3.3
3.0
4.0
4.0
3.0
124.0
3

S
2.7
3.0
3.3
2.7
2.3
2.7
3.3
2.7
2.7
3.3
3.0
3.0
2.7
2.3
2.7
3.3
3.0
3.3
3.7
4.0
3.3
3.0
4.0
3.7
3.3
3.3
3.3
2.7
3.0
3.0
3.3
2.7
3.7
2.7
3.3
3.3
4.0
3.3
3.3
122.0
3

UR
2.5
2.5
3
2
1
1
1.5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3.5
1.5
3
2.5
1.5
1.5
2
1.5
2.5
2
3
3
4
1
2.5
2
4
3
4
3.5
4.5
2.5
3.5
4
87.5
2

AV
2.97
3.53
3.56
3.33
2.50
2.56
3.03
2.78
2.50
2.94
3.33
2.78
2.72
2.56
2.33
3.19
3.03
3.33
3.31
3.47
3.14
2.78
3.58
3.47
3.17
3.39
3.44
3.28
2.67
3.03
2.89
3.56
3.33
3.50
3.36
3.47
3.64
3.58
3.39
122.42
3.2

5. Analysis and Interpretation

Each measure is dominantly average and before rounding it,
average but generally on the lower side that the majority of the test
score 3.Within the measures, the impact factor is higher, followed
by effectiveness of policy relevance and sustainability. The
majority of the policy items were highly relevant and the average
of this test was 4 out of 5. The unity and reconciliation test scores
lowest with an average of 2. Horizontally, individual policies
score slightly higher than average at 3.2. We can state with fair
confidence that, from peoples perception, the policy actions

27
influenced the current economic and social progress. However, it
is important to note that a lower score of the unity and
reconciliation test does not mean that unity and reconciliation has
deteriorated in the country. Most likely the policy items identified
have nothing to do with unity and reconciliation, especially those
that are purely economic and business. But instead, those like
Gacaca that are directly and uniquely related to unity and
reconciliation score highly. However, the data suggest that
mainstreaming unity and reconciliation in policies would
deliberately and positively influence performance even on the non
economic side.
There were policy items that scored relatively high. Seven policies
that scored more than 3.5 are EDPRS, VUP, 9YBE, Ubudehe,
Gender, Gacaca and Decentralization. Not unexpected for Rwanda
the gender policy item scores the highest with 3.6. Of course it
does not involve a lot of effort to note that four of the six, are
clearly and directly related to poverty reduction. These are EDPRS
(3.58) itself, VUP (3.56), 9YBE (3.58) and Ubudehe (3.50).
A number of policies and/or implementing agencies score between
3.0 and 3.5.These are perhaps the majority. They include
randomly PRSP, Trade, National Electoral Commission, National
Tender Board, National Constitution of 2003,Joining East African
Community, Joining the Commonwealth, Doing Business,
Procurement, Ombudsman, Land Law and Policy, Unity and
Reconciliation, Microfinance, Imihigo, Umuganda and
Demobilization.
Although not a majority, a number of policies and/or agencies
score less than average. These are Stock Exchanges, Intellectual
Property, introduction of RDB, Introduction of RURA,
introduction of Auditor General Office, Export promotion,
investment code, VAT and taxation policies, privatization, Fiscal
policies, Monetary policies and Aid Policies.
Also noticeable are the different policies? that scored highest and
lowest in specific terms. It is clear for instance that EDPRS and
VUP at individual and average levels scored 5 out of 5 on

28
relevance. No other policy items on average score have been
rated as being very good. It is most likely that the majority of the
people perceive that the major link between policy and poverty
reduction and growth is clearer in the EDPRS and its auxiliary
policy of VUP. On the other hand, there are several policy items
that score an absolute 1, especially in relation to their relevance to
unity and reconciliation, as observed earlier.
Another dimension of the score sheet on policy is looking at the
types of policies. The majority of them are purely economic (E)
and generally score very highly on relevance. The formation of
institutions as part of the Rwandan reform is of course very
important in control, but despite more than average score they do
not attract any unique scores. Social items register the highest
score, particularly VUP and Gender, while in the political items
Gacaca has one of the highest scores. Business items have just
more than average scores. Overall categorization of policy items
does not seem to form any major categorization and indeed the
whole analysis is anchored on economic policy making.
The crucial question is however the significance of all the features.
Firstly, these scores are essentially very subjective and secondly
there does not seem to be sharp variations that need to be
explained. The answer to the question is within the very nature of
policy items themselves. Policy effect is not easy to quantify
objectively. Therefore, the normal way would be to subject it to
qualitative assessment including perceptions on relevance,
effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability and an item we
added ourselves of consistency with unity and reconciliation. At a
general level we get a slightly more than average score which is
not negating the overall assumption that the current performance
in Rwanda must be deriving from immense policy reforms that
took place in the immediate past. It is however important to note
that despite the qualitative approach generally assigning figures
derived from scores provides a quantitative indication that can
leverage further interpretation. These are used to suggest some
lessons below.

29
6. Conclusion and Lessons
Policy has been instrumental in the rapid economic growth of
South East Asian countries. However, as suggested in the overall
presentation of the policy and governance matrix, good policy
would be useless or sub optimal if it was not accompanied by good
implementation. Thus, definitely the management of policy
reforms in Rwanda had a role in the final delivery of economic
performance. There are a number of conclusions that can be made
and which can offer lessons to policy making.
i. Policy relevance seems to be scored highly by the elite experts.
But it should be commendable that clear indicators be set to
enable monitoring being undertaken with less subjectivity.
ii. Effectiveness was not as high as relevance, but had on average
a score of 3. Effort and measures to enhance outputs and
outcomes can be taken by supporting policy with sound
planning.
iii. Efficiency scored also average. It means there is still more
room to improve the use of funds and resources for maximum
output.
iv. It would be useful to emphasize mainstreaming unity and
reconciliation to make policies consistent with the political and
social needs of Rwandans in the context of a post conflict
context.
Bibliography
1. Government of Rwanda(2002). Poverty Reduction Strategy
Paper. Kigali
2. Government of Rwanda(2002). Vision 2020. Kigali
3. Government of Rwanda(2007). Economic Development and
Poverty Reduction Strategy. Kigali
4. Government of Rwanda(2011). EICV 3. Kigali
5. Musahara (2005).An Assessment of Poverty and Government
Expenditure with reference to Rwanda. PhD Thesis. University of
the Western Cape

30

Capacity Building as the Key for Rwandan

Reconstruction
Twiringiyimana Remy
Abstract
The Genocide against Tutsis that took place in Rwanda in 1994
claimed more than one million lives of Rwandans. This Genocide
resulted in a total destruction of the country whereby education as
well as other sectors of national life were tremendously affected.
After the 1994 Genocide, the National Unity Government of Rwanda
underwent an emergency situation with the main objective to restart
and reformulate the education sector that was devastated. It was in
this framework that in 1998 the Government of Rwanda adopted the
National Education Policy with the main aim to reconstruct the
education system after the Genocide. In 2000, the Government of
Rwanda adopted a guidance document called vision 2020 to
overcoming socio-economic problems of the country. The education
sector had to fit in the above mentioned Vision 2020s guidelines. By
2020, Rwanda believes it will be a politically stable, peaceful,
dynamic, diversified, integrated and competitive middle-income
economy, that means a knowledge-base and technology-led society.
This vision is based on the attainment of the clearly stated aspirations
including education. Thus various mechanisms have been put in
place in the education sector so that by 2020 all Rwandans will be
able to read and write, and will be equipped with diverse professional
and technical skills including ICT. However, despite the remarkable
effort made by the Government of Rwanda to promote the education
sector for successful reconstruction and development, there are still
challenges in achieving quality education for all. This is mainly due
to the insufficient Science and ICT facilities in schools and an
insufficient number of qualified teachers at all levels of education.
Key words: Education Sector Policy, Education for all, EDPRD,
ESSP, Science and Technology, Access and quality.

Introduction

31
The education sector was one of the main key sectors to be
developed by the National Unity Government of Rwanda in order
to achieve the successful reconstruction of Rwanda after 1994.
Being a fundamental human right, education was considered to be
an inevitability essential tool to achieve socio-economic
development of Rwanda. The main goal of the education system
was to provide all Rwandan people with necessary skills and
values to be good citizens, and to improve the quality of human
life through formal and informal education for all and at all levels.
As stated in Vision 2020, Rwanda believes it will be a knowledgebased and technology-led society by 2020, and the education
sector is expected to play a key role to achieve this. It is in this
regard that relevant policies and strategies have been put in place
to ensure the successful reconstruction and socio-economic
development of Rwanda. In this work, policies, strategies
governing the education sector in Rwanda from primary to higher
education, as well as statistics and reports illustrating the success
in the education sector whereby capacity building has played a key
role in the reconstruction of Rwanda, are documented.
Aim and objectives of this paper.
The aim of this work is to show the vital role played by
governance in Rwandan successful reconstruction through
capacity building. This study has the following two objectives:
1. Documenting the contribution of the education sector for
successful reconstruction of Rwanda.
2. Summarizing the relevant statistics illustrating the
achievement of the Government of Rwanda in the education
sector, contributing to reconstruction and sustainable socioeconomic development of Rwanda through capacity building
in all sectors of development.
Scope of the study
This study focuses only on documenting and presenting key
indicators that show the vital role played by the Government of

32
Rwanda in the area of education for successful reconstruction of
Rwandan society.
Literature review
Education Sector Policy
After the 1994 Genocide, the first education sector policy was
adopted in 1998. The main aim of the policy was to urgently
reshape and revive the education sector, which, like any other
sectors, was affected by the Genocide. The revised education
sector policy was adopted in 2003 and this was guided by Vision
2020 and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The main
goal of the revised education policy was to fight ignorance and
illiteracy and to produce resourceful human capital for socioeconomic development of Rwanda. As stated in the Rwanda
Education Policy document (2003: 8), the revised education sector
policy was built upon six pillars. The established policy was
considered as a guide to address challenges experienced in key
education areas such as Vocational Training, Technical and
Professional/Vocational Education, Higher Education, Scientific
and Technological Research, Special Needs Education,
HIV/AIDS, Trilingualism, Literacy, Girls and Womens
Education, Science, Technology and ICT, Literacy, and Education
Institutional Issues (Rwanda Education Policy document, 2003: 916). Therefore, in order to overcome challenges and problems in
the above mentioned areas, the education policy defined the
following general and specific objectives respectively quoted from
Rwanda Education Policy document (2003: 17-18):
General policy Objectives
To educate a free citizen who is liberated from all kinds of
discrimination, including gender based discrimination,
exclusion and favoritism;
To contribute to the promotion of a culture of peace and to
emphasize Rwandese and universal values of justice, peace,

33

tolerance, respect for human rights, gender equality, solidarity

and democracy;
To dispense a holistic moral, intellectual, social, physical and
professional education through the promotion of individual
competencies and aptitudes in the service of national
reconstruction and the sustainable development of the country;
To promote science and technology with special attention to
ICT;
To develop in the Rwandese citizen an autonomy of thought,
patriotic spirit, a sense of civic pride, a love of work well done
and global awareness;
To transform the Rwandese population into human capital for
development through acquisition of development skills;
To eliminate all the causes and obstacles which can lead to
disparity in education, be it by gender, disability, geographical
or social group.

Specific policy objectives

To ensure that education is available and accessible to all
Rwandese people;
To improve the quality and relevance of education;
To promote the teaching of science and technology with a
special focus on ICT;
To promote trilingualism in the country;
To promote an integral, comprehensive education orientated
towards the respect of human rights and adapted to the present
situation of the country;
To inculcate in children and sensitize them to the importance
of environment, hygiene and health and protection against
HIV/AIDS.
Girls Education Policy
In order to implement the fifth pillar and the sixth objective of the
Rwanda education sector policy, it was decided to establish a

34
girls education policy. This policy was adopted in 2008 with the
vision of having a Rwanda society free from any type of gender
disparities in all sectors of development. The established policy
also aimed at having an education system where all children (boys
and girls) have equal access to quality education. The girls
education policy was established in such a way that it is in line
with the national gender policy (Girls Education Policy, 2008: 913).
Special Needs Education Policy
Researches done have proven that the implementation of the
Universal Primary Education (UPE) has been a result of the
commitment of the Government of Rwanda to meet the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Indicators on access to
primary education show that the enrolment increased from
1,154,000 in 1996/97 to 1.534,000 in 2001/2. On the other hand,
2006 reports show that the drop-out rate in primary schools
increased, resulting in a completion rate of only 65%, and most of
the students who dropped-out were learners with special
educational needs (Education Sector Strategic Plan 2006-2010:
71-73). Therefore, following the recommendations from various
education sector stakeholders, the special needs education policy
was established and adopted focusing on the following objectives:
Ensuring the conditions that permit learners with special needs
education to enroll in, remain in and complete school;
Promoting quality education for learners with special needs in
education;
Mobilizing a coalition in support of education for learners
with special educational needs;
Establishing mechanisms for planning and coordinating of
efforts to improve educational outcomes for learners with
special educational needs;
Establishing a system of regular monitoring, evaluation and
reporting on the implementation of the national policy on
special needs education;

35
Improving quality of delivery by ensuring appropriate
infrastructure as well as curriculum content and methodology
and provision of appropriate learning materials.
Management of the Education Sector in Rwanda
The Ministry of Education (MINEDUC) was established with the
mission to transform the Rwandan citizen into skilled human
capital for socio-economic development of the country by
ensuring equitable access to quality education focusing on
combating illiteracy, promotion of science and technology, critical
thinking and positive values. To ensure overall central
administration of the education sector at policy level, MINEDUC
top management is made of the Minister, Minister of State in
Charge of Primary and Secondary Education and the Permanent
Secretary. MINEDUC has two directorates- general namely, the
Directorate General of Education Planning and the Directorate
General of Science Technology and Research (DSTR). The role
of each of the above directorates is explained as follows:
Directorate General of Education Planning:
The Directorate General of Education Planning has the main role
of supervising all the activities of the Basic and the Post-Basic
Education as well as Special Programmes in education within the
ministry. These programmes include the Early Childhood
Education, Adult Literacy, Primary and Secondary Education, now
called 12 Years basic Education (12YBE), Technical and
Vocational Education Training (TVET) and Higher Education.
Special Education programmes cut across the whole sector
throughout all levels of education and this has a significant impact
on the achievement of national and international development
goals. The latter include the special needs education, girls and
women education, school sports and culture, and school health
programmes.
Directorate General of Science Technology and Research (DSTR)

36
The Directorate of Science, Technology and Research (DSTR)
was created under MINEDUC with objectives guided by the
Rwanda National Science, Technology and Innovation Policy
(2005) which hinges on four (4) priority areas, namely: (i)
Knowledge Acquisition and Deepening , to reinforce science and
technology teaching and resources at all levels of education; (ii)
Knowledge Creation, to develop Research Capability in all
priority sectors of the economy; (iii) Knowledge Transfer, to
reinforce Science and Technology Capability in all priority sectors
of the economy and (iv) Innovation Culture, to encourage
Innovation at all levels to help stimulate economic growth. The
Directorate has four major functions among which is the mandate
to co-ordinate, register and report on all research activities taking
place in Rwanda (Rules and Regulations for Research Activities in
Rwanda, 2010). Among many others, DSTR works closely with
three Government funded Research and Development Institutions
(R&DIs) including, Institut de Recherche Scientifique et
Technologique (IRST), Institut des Sciences Agronomiques du
Rwanda (ISAR) and the Institute of Policy Analysis and
Research-Rwanda (IPAR). In addition to the above R&DIs, DSTR
collaborates with other affiliated institutions including the
National Commission for Fighting against Genocide (CNLG),
National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC), Rwanda
Development Board etc (List of Institutions proposed for research
affiliation purposes in Rwanda, 2011).
Decentralization and Education Sector Implementation Strategies
With the spirit of adopting the responsive and quick service
delivery approach, MINEDUC has decentralized the activities to
specific agencies including the Rwanda Education Board (REB),
Workforce Development Authority (WDA), IRST, Higher
Education Council (HEC), Institutions of Higher Learning (HLIs)
as well as the Rwanda National Commission for UNESCO
(RNCU). The role of each institution is briefly explained as
follows:
Rwanda Education Board (REB)

37
Rwanda Education Board was established with the core mission to
fast-track education sector development and enable the sector
growth in Rwanda. This includes working with all public and
private schools with the aim of bringing the standard of the
education sector in Rwanda to the regional and international
standards. In order to achieve its mission, REB has six
departments namely: Curricula and Pedagogical Materials,
Education Quality and Standard, Examination & Accreditation,
High Education Students loan, ICT in Education and Open
distance and e-Learning, and Teacher Education Management and
Professionalization.
Workforce Development Authority (WDA)
Workforce Development Authority (WDA) was established
mainly to promote the Technical and Vocational Training
Education (TVET) in Rwanda. WDA has the main mission to
provide a strategic response to the skills development challenges
facing the country across all sectors of the economy. Considering
the fact that Rwanda has embarked on developing sector
development strategies under EDPRS, the challenge of technical
and professional capacity, one of the major constraints observed in
the implementation of the programs under PRSP 1, is among the
most important priorities to be addressed by WDA.
Institut de Recherche Scientifique et Technologique (IRST)
The Institute of Scientific and Technological Research was created
with the mission to contribute to the sustainable development of
Rwanda trough conducting relevant research, experimental
realizations, innovative trainings, scientific and technological
information mainly in the fields of applied sciences, life sciences
and human sciences, solving the problems facing the Rwandan
society and the rest of the world. IRST has the key goal to become
a world class Institution in research and generating suitable
technologies in energy, environment, and health, society and
economy fields. As a Research and Development Institution
(R&DI), IRST works in collaboration with other R&DIs and HLIs

38
operating in Rwanda. Research findings from IRST are published
in various recognized journals, and disseminated to relevant
communities.
Higher Education Council (HEC)
The Higher Education Council was created with the primary
mission to maintain the of quality assurance of higher education to
ensure that Higher Learning Institutions (HLIs) in Rwanda offer
relevant programmes meeting the labor market needs. HEC also
has the mandate to work with HLIs and advise on how they can
produce graduates capable of playing their role in the socioeconomic development Rwandans. Promoting equal opportunity
and gender sensitivity in all higher education programmes is one
of the key responsibilities of HEC.
Rwanda National Commission for UNESCO (RNCU)
The Rwanda National Commission for UNESCO has the main
mission to provide expert analysis and policy advice on United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) matters to the Rwandan Government. It contributes to
the development and implementation of programs in support of
UNESCO priorities, and promotes and publicizes UNESCOs
objectives and programmes. As a first point of contact for
UNECSO in Rwanda, RNCU has the mandate to advance
Rwandas priorities and interests as a UNESCO member state.
Collaboration with other Ministries and Government Institutions
In order to achieve overall goals of the Government, the
decentralization of the education sector allow MINEDUC not only
to work with the above mentioned agencies but also with other
Ministries including mainly the Ministry Local Government
(MINALOC). Studies have proved that, in addition to District and
Sector Education Officers, whose role is to manage the education
sector, district and sector administrations have responsibilities for
various services including education. For example, the District
Directors for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture Affairs spend

39
80% of their time on education, even though they are not under the
direct authority of MINEDUC (Rwanda Education Country Status
Report, 2008: 43).
Unity, Patriotism and fight against any discrimination
Since the late 1990s, the Ministry of Education has been
organizing Ingando activities for secondary school graduates, in
collaboration with other ministries namely, MINADEF, MYICT,
MINISPOC, and the NURC. The main purpose of these activities
has been to teach young citizens the culture, patriotism, fight
against any kind of discrimination, unity and values of true
Rwandans. Since 2008, the Ingando activities have been assigned
to Itorero Commission. Since 2011, the Ministry of Education in
collaboration with Itorero Commission, MINAFET, MINADEF,
MYICT, MINISPOC, MINADEF and NURC started Itorero
activities for Rwandan students studying abroad.
The 2012 Itorero activities brought together 258 students from 18
different countries. This was the first time that about 35 nonstudent Rwandans living abroad were admitted to participate in
such activities. In addition to learning about Rwandan culture and
values, Rwandan students living abroad use Itorero as their
opportunity to learn about the realities of their home country, and
this becomes the appropriate time whereby they share constructive
ideas on how they can contribute to the sustainable socioeconomic growth of Rwanda.
Discussion of appended education statistics
After exposing the background of the education sector as a key
player for capacity building in the reconstruction of Rwanda,
education statistics are appended and discussed below.

Access to pre-primary education

As it is illustrated in the following figures in Table 1, the
enrolment of girls in pre-primary education is greater than that of

40
boys. In order to mitigate this trend, parents and communities
around pre-primary schools are encouraged to send all children to
school.

Table 1. Status of Access to Pre-Primary Education

Access
2008
2009
2010
150,000
96,934
Number of students 145,405
71,058
72,833
47,034
Boys
74,351
77,167
49,900
Girls
84.9%
48.6%
48.5%
% of Boys
51.1%
51.4%
51.5%
% of Girls
1,705
1,369
Number of Schools 2,132
Source: MINEDUC Statistics 2012
Access to primary education
As illustrated by the following figures in table 2, it is observed that
girls have a higher enrolment than boys. Similarly to the case of
pre-primary enrolment,, in order to mitigate this trend, parents and
communities around pre-primary schools are encouraged to send
all children to school.
Table 2. Status of Access to Primary Education
Access
2008
2009
2,190,270
2,264,672
Number of
students
50.9%
50.8%
% Girls
92.9%
Net Enrolment 94.2%
Rate (NER)
93.3%
91.6%
NER Boys
95.3%
94.1%
NER Girls
2,432
2,469
Number of
Schools
Source: MINEDUC Statistics 2012

2010
2,299,326
50.7%
95.4%
94.2%
96.5%
2,510

41
Quality at primary education level
Quality of education at primary level can be viewed generally as a
set of factors within the education system that are believed to lead
to better students outcomes including dimensions of student
learning. Table 3 illustrates some of the key indicators of quality at
primary education in Rwanda. However, quality education may
comprise the sufficient and effective supply of direct resources to
schools including infrastructure, teachers, learning and teaching
materials, pedagogical support, supportive school climate,
effective school administration etc.
Table 3. Status of Quality at Primary Level of Education
Quality Indicators
2008
2009
2010
52.5%
74.5%
75.6%
Completion Rate, Overall
87.9%
95.0%
N.A
Transition Rate, Overall
86.3%
94.3%
N.A
Transition Rate, Girls
69.5%
73.8%
N.A
Promotion Rate, Overall
70.3%
74.3%
N.A
Promotion Rate, Girls
15.3%
14.0%
N.A
Repetition Rate, Overall
14.9%
13.5%
N.A
Repetition Rate, Girls
15.2%
12.2%
N.A
Dropout Rate, Overall
14.7%
12.2%
N.A
Dropout Rate, Girls
30,173
35,664
36,352
Qualified Teachers
91.0%
96.0%
98.5%
% of Qualified Teachers
63:1
63:1
Qualified Teacher Student 73:1
Ratio
Source: MINEDUC Statistics 2012
Access to Secondary Education
In Rwanda, secondary education means school age between 13
and 18. Table 4 shows that at this stage, girls enrolment is still
higher than boys at lower secondary. However, the enrolment of
boys is greater at upper secondary.
Table 4. Status of Access to Secondary Education
Access
2008
2009

2010

42
288,036
346,518
Number of students
47.8%
49.0%
% of Girls
52.2%
51.0%
% of Boys
13.2
Net Enrolment Rate 13.9%
(NER)
13.8%
12.8%
NER Boys
13.9%
13.7%
NER Girls
689
686
Number of Schools
Source: MINEDUC statistics 2012

425,587
50.7%
49.3%
22.6%
21.6%
23.7%
1,399

Quality at Secondary Education Level

Similarly to the case of primary, quality of education at secondary
level can be viewed generally as a set of factors within the
education system that are believed to lead to better students
outcomes including dimensions of student learning. Table 5
highlights a number of key indicators of quality at secondary
education in Rwanda.
Table 5. Status of Quality at Secondary Level of Education
Quality Indicators
2008
2009
2010
86.0%
90.0%
N.A
Transition Rate, Overall
86.9%
91.6%
N.A
Transition Rate, Girls
84.5%
94.0%
N.A
Promotion Rate, Overall
80.3%
94.5%
N.A
Promotion Rate, Girls
6.0%
4.4%
N.A
Repetition Rate, Overall
6.3%
4.8%
N.A
Repetition Rate, Girls
9.6%
1.6%
N.A
Dropout Rate, Overall
13.3%
0.7%
N.A
Dropout Rate, Girls
10,187
14,426
14,477
Qualified Teachers
57,4%
60.4%
60.0%
% of Qualified Teachers
49:1
40:1
49:1
Qualified Teacher Student
Ratio
Source: MINEDUC Statistics 2012
Education Sector Performance vs EDPRS Indicators

43
As illustrated in the following table 6, all Economic Development
and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS 2008-2012) indicators
were met except one. This shows the commitment of the
Government of Rwanda in investing in education for sustainable
development. EDPRS and the Education Sector Strategic Plan
(ESSP) articulate the importance of continuing to expand access to
education while improving quality in an equitable way in Rwanda.
MINEDUC refers to target indicators of EDPRS and ESSP while
developing its strategic plans.
Table 6. Education Sector Performance vs EDPRS Indicators
CPAF /EDPRS Indicators as
Reported in September 2011

Target
2010/11

Actual
2010/11

1. Primary School Completion rate

59%

75.6%

2. Primary School Completion rate

for girls

58%

82%

3. Primary school pupil to qualified

teacher ratio.

64:1

63:1

4. Transition from basic education

(TC) to upper secondary
education

88%

94%

5. Proportion of employers who are

satisfied with the performance of
TVET graduates

68% (2011-2012)

NA

6. Percentage of students in science

streams taking S6 national
exams who pass with a
minimum for public university
entrance to study a science
discipline (M/F) (EDPRS)

30%/20%

31%/21%

Source: Joint Review of Education Sector (JRES) Report 2011

Enrolment by Gender in HLIs

44
Table 6 and Fig.2 below illustrate that male students are almost
twice the female students in public HLIs. However in the private
HLIs, the enrolment of female students is much more than that of
males. This difference reflects the fact that pure sciences, applied
sciences and engineering field programmes are mostly offered in
public HLIs whereas, most private HLIs offer social science and
art.
Table 6. Access to Higher Education
Year
2008
2009
2010
Public Institutions of Higher Learning
20,967
26,305
31,565
Students
14,241
17,695
21,188
Male
67.90%
67.30%
67.10%
% of Male
6,725
8,609
10,376
Female
32.70%
32.90%
% of Female 32.10%
2008
2009
2010
Year
Private Institutions of Higher Learning
26,441
28,910
31,171
Students
12,978
13,479
14,054
Male
49.10%
46.60%
45.10%
% of Male
13,462
15,430
17,116
Female
53.40%
54.90%
% of Female 50.90%
Source: MINEDUC Statistics 2012
Figure 2. Students Enrolment by Gender in HLIs

45

Source: Higher Education Council Statistics, 2010

Enrolment by field in HLIs
As illustrated in the following figure 3, the enrolment in science
and technology fields is much bigger than any other field. This
implies the emphasis of the Government of Rwanda on
encouraging students to enroll in science related fields. The results
shown in figure 2 demonstrated the success of the Government of
Rwanda towards embarking on capacity building in Science
Technology and Innovation as the Government of Rwanda
believes in the power of Science, Technology and Innovation for
building her social-economic growth and poverty eradication.
Figure 3. Students Enrolment by field in HLIs

46

Source: Higher Education Council Statistics, 2010

Conclusion and Recommendations
To put all in a nutshell, it is observed that the Government of
Rwanda has been tremendously proactive in the process of
reconstructing the country through the education sector. This has
been marked by establishing policies in critical areas of education
and setting-up strategic mechanisms to implement the adopted
policies. The access to education for all through 9YBE and
currently 12YBE has been a success of the Government of
Rwanda to meet the MDG Goal. Continuous collaboration of the
Ministry of Education with other Ministries and other Government
institutions in activities such as Itorero, contributes to the
reconstruction of Rwanda through unity, patriotic spirit and
fighting any kind of discrimination. However, despite major
achievements in democracy, equality and equal access for all, a lot
is still to be done in the education sector. The main challenge of
quality education for all will be met by improving the
infrastructure of schools in rural areas and the implementation of
qualified teachers recruitment retention strategies. At the higher
education, the challenge of staff retention and lack of
infrastructure are also hindering the quality of education.

47
References
1. Rwanda Education Country Status Report. 2008. Toward
Quality Enhancement and Achievement of Universal Nine
Year Basic Education. An Education System in Transition; a
Nation in Transition. Washington, DC. The Word Bank
2. Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning? , Rwanda. 2000.
Vision 2020
3. Ministry of Education, Science and Technology and Scientific
Research, Rwanda. 2003. Education Sector Policy.
4. Ministry of Education, Rwanda. 2008. Girls Education
Policy.
5. Ministry of Education, Rwanda. 2006. Education Sector
Strategic Plan (ESSP) 2006-2010.
6. Ministry of Science Technology and Scientific Research,
Rwanda. 2005. Republic of Rwandas Policy on Science,
Technology and Innovation.
7. Ministry of Education, Rwanda. 2010. Rules and Regulation
for Research Activities in Rwanda.
8. http://www.mineduc.gov.rw/spip.php?article66 accessed: 1508-2012
9. Ministry of Education, Rwanda. 2011. List of Institutions
proposed for research affiliation purposes in Rwanda.
10. http://www.mineduc.gov.rw/spip.php?article66 accessed: 0508-2012
11. Ministry of Education, Rwanda. 2012. Education Statistics
12. Ministry of Education, Rwanda. 2010. Higher Education
Council Statistics
13. IRST research Progammes (2012).
www.irst.ac.rw/spip.php?rubrique93 accessed: 31-07-2012
14. www.reb.rw
15. www.wda.gov.rwwww.hec.gov.rw
16. http://www.unesco-rwanda.org/

48

Governance, Gender Equality and Women

Empowerment in Post Genocide Rwanda
Aimee MUZIRANENGE
Introduction
For a long time in history, Rwandan society, like any other
patriarchal society, was characterised by unequal social power
relations between men and women, boys and girls. These relations
were translated into males dominance and womens
subordination. Existing inequalities between men and women were
exacerbated by the 1994 genocide that prompted women into the
traditionally male reserved roles for which they were not prepared.
On the one hand, this situation can be seen as an irony of history,
as women accessed the public sphere through their involvement in
activities which before were reserved to men, but one should not
overlook the fact that assuming roles and responsibilities for
which these women were not prepared, was a big handicap for
respect of human rights and a serious threat to sustainable
development, on the other hand.
During the colonial era, mens supremacy over women was
reinforced. For example, the abrupt shift from a subsistence
economy to monetary economy based on paid employment and a
formal education system, weakened womens position relative to
that of men. In particular, it weakened their access to, and control
over, resources and the degree of their level of participation in the
development process.
The post-independence period was characterised by male
domination in power. Very few women participated in decisionmaking. Progressive changes took place after the multiparty
system was legalised in 1991, which opened a window of
opportunity for womens involvement in decision-making.
The 1994 genocide and the 4th World Conference on Women held
in Beijing (China) in 1995 were the key factors that underpinned

49
important changes in the Rwandan society. The following are two
of the major changes that took place in the country:
o Firstly, physical and social reconstruction of the country,
which had been left in ruins by the genocide, involved
women assuming roles traditionally reserved for men, as
few of them had survived the genocide.
o Secondly, the Beijing recommendations gave a push to
Rwandan women towards increased participation in
decision-making.
1. Methodology
The methodological approach used to attain the objectives of this
article was mainly desk review. A desk review on gender and
governance in post genocide Rwanda was carried out. This
enabled us to understand not only what has been done so far in
Rwanda, but also identify where there are weaknesses and
challenges. Desk review enabled us also to review policies and
strategies developed at both national and international levels to
promote gender equality. Documents were reviewed including the
Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda of 2003 as amended to
date, organic laws: of land law of 2001, 1999 Law on matrimonial
regimes, liberalities and succession.
Policies and strategies including, vision 2020, EDPRS, and
different reports from the Gender Monitoring Office, the Ministry
of Finance and Economic Planning, as well as Ministries of
Education and Health were also reviewed. The findings from the
desk research were organized to produce this short article on the
role of governance in promoting gender equality and women
empowerment in post genocide Rwanda

50
2. Approaches & Measures Adopted to Promote Gender
Equality in Rwanda
3.1 Approaches
Main approaches used to promote gender equality3 are shown
below:
a) Gender mainstreaming approach which aims at integrating
gender issues into the policies, programmes, activities and
budgets in all sectors and at all levels;
b) Affirmative action approach that aims at correcting the
huge gender imbalances existing in the various
development sectors;
c) Institutional capacity development of different gender
machineries and stakeholders in the implementation of the
national gender policy;
d) Involvement of men in addressing gender issues.
3.2 Measures
In addition, measures have been adopted to promote gender
equality and women empowerment through long term and short
term plans, Vision 2020 and Economic Development and Poverty
Reduction Strategy (EDPRS).
a) Capacity building for promotion of gender mainstreaming;
b) Development of gender sensitive indicators;
c) Established monitoring mechanisms;
d) Partnership with different stakeholders.
3. Good Governance and Gender Equality: Key Achievements
The strong political will and good governance characterizing
Rwandan Government and its commitment to promote gender
equality has allowed development of national key instruments
including but not limited to the National Constitution, Vision
2020, EDPRS, policies, gender sensitive laws, strategies and
plans, and establishment of mechanisms , all of which have
3

National gender policy 2010

51
contributed to great achievements as registered across the country.
Among these achievements, a significant number of them are best
practices that can not only serve as models for other areas of the
country but also play a vital role for future planning to thus
address the wide existing gender gap between the instruments and
mechanisms in place and their translation into practice.
4.1 Gender and Regional Commitment
Rwanda adopted the East African Community treaty that
recognizes gender as the role of the woman and man in the
society, being one of its fundamental principles like good
governance, social justice, state of right, principle of
accountability, chance equality, protection and promotion of
human and peoples rights. In its Chapter 22, Articles 121 and
122, the Treaty recognizes the role played by women in
socioeconomic development and in businesses. The Treaty further
foresees that the integration of the gender dimension in all
domains and sectors of member states is important for the
sustainable development of the community.
Rwanda is as well one of State members of COMESA. As
stipulated in the COMESA gender policy put in place in 2002,
sustainable socioeconomic development of the region requires
equal and total participation of men, women and youth. In its
strategic orientation process to reduce disparities between men and
women, COMESA developed a gender policy and strategy for its
implementation taking gender into account in different
development strategies
Gender is also linked to NEPAD objectives that put in place
conditions for sustainable development guaranteeing peace and
security, democracy and good governance, political, economic and
enterprises governance.
To implement this political commitment, NEPAD set as an
objective the reduction of womens poverty. Among actions to be
conducted, there is a working team on gender ensuring that
decentralization and good governance policy fosters an increase in

52
the representation of women and youth in the management of
political, economic and administrative issues in the country.
It is important to reiterate that the reinforcement of the principle of
gender parity adopted by the African Union, contained in the
formal declaration on gender equality in Africa adopted by AU
organs, and amendment of the Pan African Parliament Statutes to
enable real womens and mens participation, shows the high level
of consideration of the gender dimension. As a result In Rwanda,
different strategies have been put in place to facilitate the
implementation of this declaration.
4.2 Gender and National Commitment
4.2.1 Legal framework
The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda of 04 June 2003, as
amended to date, in its Article 9, 4, Rwanda commits to building
a state governed by the rule of law, a pluralistic democratic
government, and equality of all Rwandans and between women
and men reflected by ensuring that women are granted at least
thirty per cent of posts in decision making organs.
In addition to the Constitution, the Rwandan legislation is
composed of laws including provisions related to womens rights
and the rights of the child. New laws have been established and
the existing laws revised in order to enforce the principle of
gender equality and equity.
o Law N 22/99 of 12/11/1999 to supplement Book one of
the Civil Code and to institute Part Five regarding
matrimonial regimes, liberalities and successions (O.G. n
22 of 15/11/1999);
o Law N 27/2001 of 28/04/2001 Relating to Rights and
Protection of the Child against Violence (O.G. n 23 of
01/12/2001);
o Law N 47/2001 of 18/12/2001 instituting punishment for
offences of discrimination and sectarianism (O.G. n 4 of
15/02/2002);
o Organic Law n 16/2003 of 27/06/2003 governing political
organizations and politicians (O.G. n special of
27/06/2003);

53
o Organic Law n 17/2003 of 07/07/2003 related to
presidential and legislative elections (O.G. n special of
07/07/2003);
o Land Law (n 08/2005 of 14/07/2005);
o Law n 59/2008 of 10th September 2008 provides legal
sanctions against Gender-based violence perpetrators.
4.2.2 Policy framework
i. Gender and Vision 2020
Rwanda set objectives to integrate and adapt laws on womens
rights so as to reach equality and equity between men and women
in all policies and development strategies. It is worth emphasizing
the cross- cutting nature of gender in regard to the six pillars of
Vision 2020.
ii. Gender and EDPRS
The New Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy
covering the period of 2088-2011 involved all actors in
development. It gives particular attention to cross- cutting issues,
including gender, and requires that all policies and national
programs integrate the gender dimension to promote equal and
real participation of men and women in all aspects of national life.
iii. National Gender Policy
Rwanda designed a national gender policy consisting of guide
lines in the field of gender. The overall objective of the Gender
National Policy is to ensure that women and men have the same
access to resources, property and services and their management,
in all development domains, and their specific needs are taken into
account in all development processes.
iv. National Decentralisation Policy
Since 2000, Rwanda has been committed to the decentralisation of
public services. The objective of the decentralisation process is to
make those services effective and efficient, answering in a prompt
way and at lower cost the peoples requests. The cross-cutting
nature of decentralization does not only concern the establishing
of administrative authorities, but also the principle that gender

54
should be considered in the daily management of decentralized
entities.
4.2.3 Institutional framework
The strong political will to promote gender equality has
been characterized by creating a favorable policy environment and
putting in place a number of mechanisms to further promotion of
gender equality and womens empowerment. The mechanisms
cover the public, private and civil society organizations.
A. Public institutions
1) The Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion
It coordinates the formulation and implementation of national
policies, strategies and programs regarding the promotion of the
family, gender and childrens rights and initiates programs
encouraging and empowering women to participate in the socioeconomic and political development of Rwanda.
2) National Womens Council (NWC)
The National Womens Council is a social forum where girls and
women put their views in order to solve their own problems and to
participate in having a say in the development in the country.
3) Gender Monitoring Office (GMO)
The Gender Monitoring Office is an organ provided for in the new
Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda in its article 185, with the
role of monitoring implementation and progress towards gender
equality.
4) The National Gender Cluster
The gender cluster is a forum in which the Government of
Rwanda, development partners and civil society meet and discuss
planning, coordination and prioritization of Gender Equality
interventions. Its objective focuses on facilitating the collaboration
and coordination of all interventions in the area of gender by
sharing experiences, generating new ideas, identifying gaps,
lobbying and advocating for achieving gender equity and equality
in sectors across the country.

55
5) Gender Focal Points
The main aim of putting in place the gender focal points was to
mainstream gender in all development sectors and to promote
gender equality and equity at all levels. These focal points are
Government employees holding positions likely to influence
decision making, policy planning and management. At present, all
public departments are required to appoint directors of planning as
the new Gender Focal Points as per directives from the Prime
Minister.
B. Civil Society Organisations
A number of NGOs are actively involved in promoting sustainable
development in Rwanda, but the general trend is that they are
grouped into umbrella organizations promoting women rights,
gender equality and womens empowerment. Those include but
not limited to:
a) Pro-femmes/Twese Hamwe
It is an umbrella for civil society womens association promoting
women through advocacy, mobilization, and capacity building. Its
vision is to have Rwandan women safe from all forms of genderbased discrimination. Aiming to be a platform, an exchange and
consultation framework that promotes womens fulfillment and
their active and effective participation in national development,
PRO-FEMMES/TWESE HAMWE sets itself the following goals
that are translated into actions by the member associations.
b) Rwandan Women Parliamentarians Forum
This forum was established in 1996 under the initiative of Women
Parliamentarians with the mission to promote gender equality.
FFRP is serving as a framework for capacity building for its
members, builds partnership with other gender machineries for the
promotion of gender equality in different sectors. Also, this forum
serves as a tool allowing its members to positively participate and
influence in reviewing laws and programs to make them more
gender sensitive.

56
4.2.4 Programs, projects and initiatives
In the area of Gender Equality and Womens Empowerment,
Rwanda has tremendous achievements which constitute best
practices in this regard, some of which are the following:
I. Poverty Reduction
In order to reduce the disproportionate number of women living in
poverty, in particular rural women, Rwanda implemented national
poverty eradication programs with a focus on a gender perspective
and the empowerment of women. These include the following
programs that target the poorest households especially women:
o Vision 2020 Umurenge Program (VUP);
o HIMO (High Intensity Labor);
o UBUDEHE (Shared Labor Initiative);
o One Cow per Poor Household;
Since 2008, a Gender Responsive Budgeting Program (GRB) is
ongoing within the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning.
Rwanda has registered significant achievements. The poverty
reduction is demonstrated through the achievements of the
following targets:
o The proportion of the population living below the poverty
line has been reduced from 58.9 % in 2001 to 44.9% in
2011 (EICV1, EICV3);
o The per capita income increased from $250 in 2001 to
$540.5 in 2010;
o Non agricultural jobs increased from 200 000 in 2000 /01
to 650 000 in 2010/11.
o The annual real GDP growth average rate is 8.2% (20082011) (EDPRS: Lessons learned 2008 20011,
MINECOFIN);
o According to the DHS 2010, 87% of the households live in
rural areas and 33% of Rwanda households are headed by
women, which means that the various pro-poor families
programs benefit women at the proportion of 33%.

57
II. Access to Education
Rwanda has made enormous strides forward in improving access
of boys and girls to education at all levels, and in promoting
gender equality within the education system. Measures have been
adopted to advance gender equality at all levels of education.
The enrolment of girls in pre-primary is greater than of boys. In
2008, there were more girls 74 351 (51.1%) than boys 71 058
(48.9%) enrolled in early childhood education (MINEDUC,
Education Statistics, 2011). Enrolment in primary education
increased considerably between 2000/01 and 2005/06. This is
illustrated in the gender parity reached at primary education level
since 2007 with 50.8% (1 092 404) girls and 49.2% (1 058 026)
boys compared to 50.9% (1 190 941) girls and 49.1% (1 150 205)
boys in 2011.
At secondary school level, girls show higher enrolment than boys
at lower secondary. In 2007, the number of girls was 126 819
(47.6%) and the number of boys was 139 699 (52.4%) compared
to 2011 with 250 687 girls (51.5%) and to 235 750 boys (48%).
This is critical for enabling the country to achieve its objectives of
becoming a knowledge-based and technology-driven society. The
performance of candidates in A- level national examinations in
2011 shows that the percentage of females and males who passed
is respectively 43.7% and 56.3%.
A Workforce Development Authority survey done in 2010
highlighted that boys in Technical Secondary Schools (TSSs) were
62% and 57% in Vocational Training Centers (VTCs). The
number of women increased in public and private higher learning
institutions rising from 15 465 in 2006 (41.6%) to 31 799 (43.2%)
in 2011. Since 2007, gender parity has become a reality in private
universities with a number of women 10 954 (49.7%) in
comparison with men 11 087 (50.3%). In 2011, the number of
women was 18 920 (52.9%) in comparison with 16 852 men
(47.1%). However, the number of females selected to public
Universities was 6 071 (32%) in 2007 in comparison with men 12
901(68.0%). In 2011, the number of women was 12 879 (34.0%)
in comparison with men 25 023 (66.0%).

58
III. Access to Health
The Constitution of June, 2003 (Art. 41) stresses that All citizens
have the rights and duties relating to health. This provision has
been translated into actions through implementation of the
National Health Policy.
The achievements that are described deal with the improvement of
maternal and child health, Family Planning, Community Health,
and Reproductive Health status which are among the high
priorities of the Ministry of Health in line with the Millennium
Development Goals to reduce infant and maternal mortality. The
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS 2010) highlights an
improvement of women and children health status as shown
below:
o Maternal Mortality rate has fallen from 1071/100,000
(2000) to 476/100,000 live births;
o The number of married women using modern contraception
increased from 10% in 2005 to 45% in 2010;
o Mutuelle coverage increased from 44% in 2005 to 85% in
February 2012, overall health insurance coverage : 91%
(MOH annual report 2010/11)
o Infant mortality has fallen: from 107/1,000 (2000) to
50/1,000 live births
o Under 5 Mortality has fallen: from 196/1,000 to 76/1,000
live births in 2010;
o In five years (2005-2010), under five using anti-malaria
nets increased from 16% to 70%.
o Malaria fell from 27% to 1.4%.
IV. Fighting Gender Based Violence
Violence against women/girls is an obstacle to the achievement of
objectives of equality, development and peace. In addressing
violence against women, Rwanda adopted the National Policy
against Gender Based Violence. This policy has the overall
objective to progressively eliminate gender-based violence
through the development of a preventive, protective, supportive
and transformative environment (National policy against gender-

59
based violence, MIGEPROF, July 2011). Combating gender-based
violence requires a multi-sector approach, and therefore implicates
a number of laws, including:
o Law no 59/2008 of 10th September 2008, on the Prevention
and Punishment of Gender-based Violence;
o Law no 22/1999 of 12th November 1999, to supplement
Book one of the Civil Code and to institute Part Five
regarding Matrimonial Regimes, Liberalities and
Successions;
o Organic Law no 08/2005 of 14th July 2005, Determining the
Use and Management of Land in Rwanda;
o Law no 13/2009 of 27th May 2009, Regulating Labor in
Rwanda;
o Law no 27/2001 of 28th April 2001, Relating to Rights and
Protection of Children against Violence;
o The Penal Code of Rwanda
Furthermore, different mechanisms have been established to
respond to GBV, many important achievements have also been
made.
The existing One-Stop Centers provides critical support to
victims of GBV and can be used as a model for integrated
care and support. This much needed support also offers a
chance for victims to access legal aid as part of an
integrated package.
Gender Desks exist in the Rwanda National Police and in
the Rwanda Defense Force, with staff that has received
special training on GBV.
Each district has an Access to Justice Office (AJO) or
Maison d'Accs la Justice (MAJ).
Several toll-free telephone hotlines are available for
emergency calls.
V. Womens economic power
After the 1994 genocide, women were the majority of Rwandan
population and were seriously poverty stricken. The majority of
women were widows and thus became the heads and breadwinners

60
of their families, which they were not accustomed to. Thus in
terms of promoting womens economic rights and control over
economic resources, gender sensitive laws have been enacted in
the effort to promote equal land rights for both women and men:
o Law no 22/99 of 12/11/1999 on Matrimonial Regimes,
Liberalities and Successions or the Inheritance Law is the
most important , in particular Article 50 providing that all
children recognized by civil law, male and female, would
inherit property without any discrimination;
o The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda of 2003
recognizes equal rights of women and men , in particular
articles 26, 27 and 28 which provide for equal property
rights;
o The Organic Land Law was adopted in 2005 and aims to
achieve three basic goals: formally recognize land rights in
the form of long-term secure lease rights; resolve
uncertainty over landholdings caused by the post-conflict
situation; and encourage consolidated use, increased
productivity and improved stewardship of land. The Law
stipulates equal rights of women and men to land
ownership;
o The labor law enacted in 2009 provides equal rights of
women and men to remunerated work both in the formal
and non-formal labor market.
In a country where commercial banks serve only 6 percent of the
population, the Micro-Finance Institutions (MFIs) fill the gap in
the delivery of greater access for middle class business women to
credits and help in granting small loans to rural women for their
self-promotion.
o The Banques Populaires du Rwanda has a specific
branch that caters for womens advancement, due to the
commitment of the National Bank of Rwanda.
o COOPEDU,
the
micro-finance
company
of
DUTERIMBERE has granted credits to thousands of
women who are excelling in their business.

61
o A Women Guarantee Fund was established for women as
an affirmative action to enable them access to credit and
trade opportunities;
o The Ministry of Agriculture has entered into a separate
agreement with the National Bank of Rwanda to facilitate
women farmers.
VI. Decision Making
The at least 30% representation of women as provided in the
Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda (2003) is implemented in
most decision making organs. This has been achieved due to
measures adopted in the form of policies and mechanisms put in
place to promote womens leadership. Thus, the decentralization
policy promotes the representation of women at the various
administrative levels: members of the National Womens Council
become automatic members of the consultative committees at the
level of the Cell, Sector, District and Kigali City. Political parties
are required to include at least 30% of women in their list of
candidates for the parliamentary elections.
Various programs and projects including awareness raising and
capacity building programs have contributed to the realization of
active participation of women at different levels of decision
making as shown by the following figures: at central level Women
Senators represent 35%, women parliamentarians represent
56.25%, women Ministers 30% and women State Ministers
represent 66.6%4. Women Permanent Secretaries represent 50%,
Women Supreme Court Judges represent 50 %, Women High
Court of the Republic judges represent 30.8%.
Participation of women in various decision making organs has
increased as a result of implementation of the constitutional
provision of at least 30 % of representation by women.
According to the (gender Statistics Vol. 1, 2011 NISR), Rwanda is

GMO, 2010

62
the first country in the world to have a majority of women in
Parliament.
5. Key Challenges
There is no doubt that advancements have been made for women,
the most significant of which has been increasing access for
women and girls into the public space, especially local and
national politics, education, the business sector and so on.
Similarly there has been much initiative at policy level to take into
account the interests of women. However, there are key challenges
that need to be addressed for full implementation.
o Mindset and knowledge of gender and gender
mainstreaming;
o Poverty;
o Culture of silence leading to GBV;
o Limited Sex disaggregated data;
o Limited capacities, skills, agricultural assets and technologies
to transform the agriculture of subsistence into a market
oriented agriculture for food security and income generation;
o Lack of time saving technology for domestic and productive
activities for use by rural women in eradicating hunger and
poverty leading to sustainable development.
6. Conclusion
Good governance in Rwanda has registered great achievements. A
series of initiatives have been taken to address gender inequalities
in decision making both at central and decentralized levels. With
great strides made towards gender equality and women
empowerment and a high level commitment of Rwandan
leadership, a lot has to be done to sustain this momentum and thus
Rwanda continues to adapt and update laws and policies on gender
equality and women empowerment. Women empowerment is a
component of gender mainstreaming which affects governance,
but also the participation of women contributes to good
governance.

63
References
1. GMO, gender indicators and baseline Kigali (july 2011)
3. GMO, Evaluation of the Implementation of the Beijing
Declaration and Programme of Action, Country report, Kigali,
2009
4. GMO, NISR, Gender Statistics Vol. 1, 2011, MIGEPROF,
National Gender Policy, Kigali, 2010.
5. MIGEPROF, National Action Plan UN Security Council,
Resolution 1325, 2009-2012
6. MINECOFIN, Vision 2020, Kigali, November 2002.
7. MINECOFIN, Rwanda Development Indicators, Kigali, 2006.
8. MINECOFIN, Economic Development and Poverty Reduction
Strategy, Kigali, 2007.
9. MINECOFIN, Independent Evaluation of Rwandas Poverty
Reduction Strategy, 2005.
10. MINEDUC, Education Statistics, 2011
11. MINALOC, National Decentralisation Policy, May 2000.
12. NEPAD Secretariat: Rwanda Country Self-assessment Report
for the African Peer Review Mechanism, March 2005.
13. NISR, Preliminary Poverty Update Report: Integrated Living
Conditions Survey 2005/06, Kigali, 2006.
14. NISR, Demographic and Health Survey, Kigali, 2005,
15. NISR, Demographic and Health Survey, Kigali, 2010,
16. RWANDA, Constitution du 04 juin 2003, Kigali, 2003.
17. UNITED NATIONS, Beijing Declaration and Platform for
Action with the Beijing + 5 Political Declaration and outcome
Document, New York, 2001.

64

Rwandas Post-Genocide Democratic

Process: Political Parties, Decentralization,
and Elections
Omar Khalfan
It is only through effective decentralization policies that all nationals will have
ownership of whatever policies that are in place. That way we are involving them
in decision making.
Districts are supposed to deal with development and should be supported by the
Provinces, while sectors are supposed to carry out effective service delivery with
the support of districts.
Paul Kagame

1. Political Parties
From 1957 to 1994, Rwanda has known Multi Party Systems
through political parties, all of them claiming to defend freedom,
liberty and economic development of Rwandans.
Indeed, these political parties got access to political power through
divisionism that means (preaching ethnicity and religious
belonging, regional labelling, among others).
The political parties during the period mentioned above, were also
characterised by lack of good political programmes (manifesto(s)
and activities aimed at promoting security and national cohesion
and economic development for All Nationals.
Political Parties that were characterised by divisionism, included
MDR PERMEHUTU5, MRND6, and other divisionism-oriented
parties which were created after 1990 such as CDR7, and other
5

MDR: Democratic Republic Movement, (Mouvement Dmocratique

Rpublicain) PARMEHUTU: Hutu Emancipation Party (Parti de
lEmancipation des HUTU)
6
MRND: National Revolutionary Movement for Development
(Mouvement Rvolutionnaire National pour le Dveloppement)
7
CDR: Coalition for the Defence of the Republic ( Coalition pour la
Dfense de la Rpublique)

65
parties united under what was called HUTU POWER planned
the genocide against Tutsis in 1994.
In July 1994, RPF-Inkotanyi stopped the genocide and won the
struggle of liberating Rwandans. RPF together with other political
organizations MDR, PSD8, PL9, PDC10, PDI11, PSR12, and UDPR13
formed a Transitional National Government with the aim of
promoting unity and reconciliation among Rwandans. These
political organizations took the decision that MRND and CDR, as
sources of genocide and its consequences, should not be part of the
Transitional Government. Later on, MDR which did not
disassociate itself from the genocidal ideology of PERMEHUTU,
could respect the objective of unity and reconciliation among
Rwandans like other parties, and this led to its dissolution loosing
access to participating in transitional institutions.
1.1 Definition of a political party:
Thomas P. Bernstein14 and al. used the famous definition of
Edmund Burke15 of a political party as a body of men united for
promoting by their joint endeavours the national interests upon
some particular principle on which they are all agreed. Burkes
definition virtually ignores the vital roles of the party organization,
with its clear differentiation between the officers and the
professional workers and activists on the hand, and on the other,
those who passively support the party- the general run of voters
who identify with the partys program and goals.

PSD: Social Democratic Party (Parti Social Dmocrate)

PL: Liberal Party (Parti Libral)
10
PDC: Centrist Democratic Party (Parti Dmocratique Centriste)
11
PDI: Ideal Democratic Party (Parti Dmocratique Idal)
12
PSR: Rwandese Socialist Party( Parti Socialiste Rwandais)
13
UDPR: Rwandese Peoples Democratic Union (Union Dmocratique
du Peuple Rwandais)
14
Government and Politics: An Introduction to Political Science, P.561
15
Edmund Burke, reflections on the Revolution in France ( New York:
Dolphin, 1961). First Published 1980
9

66
Rwandan Organic Law No. 16/2003 of 27/06/2003 governing
political organizations and politicians as amended and
complemented today; defines a Political Organization in article
one: as a group of citizens who share the same ideas and
understanding as to the vision how to enhance the social welfare
and the development of the country, with the aim of coming to
power through democratic and peaceful means so that they may
achieve that vision. The Draft Organic Law on Political
Organizations and politicians, as the New Organic Law replacing
the above mentioned Organic Law, has already been passed by the
cabinet. Now it is in the Parliament for further discussions, and,
then it may be adopted. It has another way of defining a political
organization in article 2: an association of citizens sharing the
same thinking and views on the development of social welfare of
all the population and the development of the country, with the
objective to accede to power through democratic and peaceful
ways, to be able to put them in action
1.2 Consultative Forum of Political Organizations in Rwanda,
(CFPO)
Rwanda has her unique way in conducting political organizations;
CFPO officially is recognised in Rwandan Constitution of June 4th,
2003 article 56: through the Constitutions Article 56: Without
prejudice to the independence of each political organization and
their collaboration, Political Organizations officially recognised
in Rwanda shall organize themselves in a Consultative Forum.
CFPO works under Organic Law N0. 16/2003, and the Internal
Rules and Regulations of October 2003 as amended and
complemented by the internal Rules and Regulations of October
9th, 2008. It has also a Political Code of Conduct of Political
Organizations, and their Member politicians.
This Constitutional Article (56) was amended (Amendment No.
04 of 17th June, 2010) as follows: A National Consultative
Forum of Political Organizations (NCFPO) is hereby established
for purposes of national political dialogue, consensus building

67
and national cohesion. This amendment allows political parties
to optionally join NCFPO, and is not mandatory as it was before.
1.2.1 The main functions of the CFPO:
Facilitating exchange of ideas by political organizations on
major issues facing the country, consolidating national unity,
Advising on national policy,
Acting as mediators in conflicts arising between political
organizations,
Assisting in resolving internal conflicts within a political
organisation upon request of that political organisation.
The CFPOs decisions shall always be taken by consensus of
the constituent organizations.
It is also worth noting that in accordance with article 82 of
the constitution, the CFPO has the prerogative of designating
four (4) senators out of the 26 who make up the senate in
Rwanda.
1.2.2 The NCFPO is currently composed of ten political
Organizations:
1) RPF-Inkotanyi: Rwandese Patriotic Front,
2) PL: Liberal Party,
3) UDPR: Rwandese Peoples Democratic Union,
4) PDI: Ideal Democratic Party, PSD:
5) Social Democratic Party,
6) PPC: Concord and Progress party,
7) PDC: Centrist Democratic Party,
8) PSR: Rwandese Socialist Party,
9) PSP: Party for Solidarity and Progress,
10) Social Party-Imberakuri- PS-Imberakuri.
Within political organizations, especially during elections, there is
a type of alliance or coalition; RPF-Inkotanyi with five or six
political parties.
In the Presidential Elections of 2010, PL had its own candidate16
(Honourable HIGIRO Prosper), and PSD usually does not take any
16

Interview with Mr. Munyaneza Charles, Executive Secretary, NEC, on

20th June 2012

68
alliance in all elections, Presidential and Legislative. It (PSD) had
His Excellency Dr Ntawukuriryayo Jean Damascne (Current
President of the Senate) as its candidate at Presidential Elections.
Within the CFPO, PS-Imberakuri17 is the only political party that
stands on the side of the opposition. Other political parties argue
that it is not necessary to work as an opposition party in order to
correct ruling party programs, since in principle they complement
each other when they meet in the CFPO.
In the Constitution, article 9, there is a principle of power sharing
among political parties, or parties and a private candidate who
would have won elections. The winning party/candidate cannot
exceed fifty (50) percent either in Parliament or in the Cabinet.
PS-Imberakuri Chairperson18 said: t I believe to go through or
not to go through NCFPO is a sign of democratic process,
because before amendment of the said law, some parties entered
into CFPO unwillingly. She further added: we are an
opposition political party aiming at reaching power and we do
intend to correct RPF actions if deemed necessary, because RPF
is a ruling Party.
For the PDI Officials19, even after adoption of the current draftlaw enforcing the Constitutions amended article 56 that allows
political parties to join or not join the CFPO, PDI will remain
working through the CFPO. Its (PDI) long-term planning is to
have another political type of alliance with RPF, which is not the
type that takes place only during an election, but a permanent one,
and this is in line with article 32 of the Organic Law governing
political organizations N0. 16/2003 of 27th June 2003 that allows
the merging of political parties. For Honorable Mukankusi
Pierrine of UDPR, her personal point of view is not different from
17
18

Interview with CFPO Official

Interview with Ms. Mukabunani Christine, Chairperson of PS-Imberakuri, on

2nd July 2012
19
Interview with Honorable Hamidou Omar, Member of Parliament, Low
Chamber, Chairman of Political Commission; with the PDIs Permanent
Secretary Mr. Sued Nt., who is also a Commissioner for NEC, on 20th, June 2012

69
that of PDI, with regard to continuing to work within the CFPO.
My point of view20 is that: to work through CFPO is a good
thing, even after amending the law allowing parties not being
obliged to work through CFPO.
Political parties in Rwanda are operationally not active enough,
except the RPF-Inkotanyi which is the only political organization
that works actively from UMUDUGUDU (Village) the lowest
entity in Rwanda up to National level; others seem to be active
only during elections period21.
RPFparty members range between 80-82%22 nationwide; this
shows how RPF-Inkotanyi has a good political manifesto.
1.2.3 Some African Countries that have contacted the CFPO
The Republic of South Sudan, Zimbabwe, Burundi, and Somalia
have all contacted CFPO23 Officials for more information on
CFPO, and some of them are in the process of creating the same
institution as an African model to solve political issues.
2. Decentralization
All around the world, in matters of governance, decentralization is
the rage24. Even apart from the widely debated issues of
subsidiarity and devolution in the European Union and states'
rights in the United States, decentralization has been at the center

20

Interview with Honorable Pierrine Mukankusi, Senator and 1 st Vice

Chairperson, UDPR. On 2nd July 2012
21
Interview with Professor Ruzirabwoba Rwanyindo Pierre stating what came
out from the research done by IRDP on Political Organizations. Prof Rwanyindo
is an economist, Former Professor of Economy at NUR, and currently he is
Director of IRDP, a research centre. On 03rd July, 2012
22
Interview with Honarable Wellars Gasamagera, former Senator, and Current
Director General of RIAM. He is also in charge of RPF-Inkotanyi Political
Mobilizing. On 20th June 2012
23

Interview with Mr. Anicet Kayigema, the Executive Secretary, CFPO

Pranab Bardhan: The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 16, No.
4. (Autumn, 2002)
24

70
stage of policy experiments in the last two decades25 in a large
number of developing and transition economies in Latin America,
Africa and Asia. The World Bank, for example, has embraced it as
one of the major governance reforms on its agenda (for example,
World Bank, 2000; Burki, Perry and Dillinger, 1999).
Decentralization is not a new phenomenon. According to (Bidus
1995:36) many countries of Central America adopted the
decentralization policy a long-time ago with an aim of
empowering the people to participate in development of their
areas. Decentralization is a government policy where power of
decision-making and financial economy are transferred to local
government.
2.2 Rwandas Administrative Subdivisions:
(1) City of Kigali, and Four Provinces (Intara); thirty (30)
Districts (Uturere), Four Hundred Sixteen (416) Sectors, Two
Thousand One Hundred Eighty Four (2,184) Cells (Utugari),
Fourteen Thousand Eight Hundred Forty One (14,841) Imidugudu
(villages).
2.3 Definition of Decentralization:
Decentralization: According to Hey Wood, (2000:237)
Decentralization is usually understood to refer to the expansion
of local authority through the transfer of power and
responsibilities away from national bodies. Thus decentralization
highlights different territories, division of power, within the state
between central (national) and peripheral regional, local
institutions
Decentralization26: Transfer of responsibilities, authority,
functions, as well as power and appropriate resources, to district
and sub-district levels.

25

As The Journal of Economic Perspectives was released in 2002, that is

why it was said Two Decades currently we can say Three Decades
26
Rwandas Revised Policy, June 2012

71
2.4 Why Decentralization27?
To achieve good governance principles (through improved
participation, promotion of transparency and accountability,
and setting up responsive and sensitive decentralized
structures),
To enhance local economic development,
To bring quality and accessible services closer to the citizens.
2.5 Implementation of Decentralization Policy: 3 Phases
1ST PHASE: 2001-2005
Main achievement: establishment of democratic and community
development structures at the local government level. These were
implemented and accompanied by a number of legal, institutional
and policy reforms, plus democratic elections for local leaders.
May

On 26th
2000, the Government of Rwanda adopted the
Decentralization Policy and strategy for its implementation. The
main thrust of the policy is to ensure political, economic, social,
managerial, administrative and technical empowerment of local
populations to fight poverty by participating in planning and
management of their development process.
2ND PHASE: 2006-2010
Territorial restructuration, more capacities (human and financial)
at local levels, enhanced accountability particularly after the
introduction of the process of Imihigo, reinforcement of synergy,
coordination and harmonization of interventions in LGs.
3RD PHASE: 2011-2015, Future Perspectives
It focuses on political guidance of coherent and harmonized
decentralization and on laws aiming at improving the
implementation of service delivery in LGs.

27

Interview with Mr. AIME Haba Barihuta: he is a Governance Program

Analyst in MINALOC, on 21st June, 2012), he is also a former Bourgmestre,
and Former Mayor of the Ex- Ntenyo District

72
o Sectoral Decentralization: the decentralization policy is
reinforced by ministries.
o Service delivery by LG: mobilization of resources (human
and financial capacity) for equitable development at local
levels.
o LG capacity reinforcement: reinforced capacity of
harmonization and coordination for all intervening actors in
LG activities.
o Local economic development: LG plays an active role in
facilitating local economic development; citizens are actively
committed to activities generating revenues.
o Volunteerism, citizens participation, and democratization:
Citizens participate efficiently in LG activities. Volunteerism
has become popular, and it is incorporated into norms and
values of Rwandan society.
2.5 Challenges encountered during the 2nd phase
Legal and Institutional Framework
The District Level.
The composition and membership of the DC is inadequate
compared to its expected oversight and supervision function over
the district administration. The Mayor is overwhelmed by many
activities and always taken as the sole responsible and accountable
official for the district affairs.
The Sector Level
The sectors are responsible for service provision to the citizens
and statistical data collection, but they dont have much expertise
in those matters; the number of qualified staff is still very low. The
law does not say clearly who takes over the Executive Secretarys
functions when he/she is not available. The collaboration
framework between the ES and the Council is not well defined.
The ES appears to be more of a politician than a technician. The
sectors depend a bit on the dstricts: they are not autonomous. The
sectors work closely with the District EC instead of working
closely with the SC.

73
At Cells and Umudugudu levels, the role of the cell is to assist the
Cell ES and to provide political leadership at the cell. However,
these structures have not been active and their responsibilities
have not been well understood by the citizens. The role of
Imidugudu is to mobilize people in different matters regarding
their well-being. However, at Umudugudu level, the Head of the
Umudugudu bears every single responsibility, despite the
existence of a 5-member committee at that level.
Sectoral Decentralisation
While the decentralization framework gives the function of
implementation to the LG, persisting tendencies from line
ministries to implement their own programs, or do so through their
delegated agencies at central level are reported. This has created
many overlaps, parallel financing of activities, and has created
inefficiencies.
Many sectoral ministries have not yet provided implementation
guidelines to the LGs and are not providing technical assistance
for implementation of policies and programs in their respective
sectors.
Fiscal and Financial Decentralization
There is a problem of resources not always matching the devolved
roles and responsibilities at LG levels. Earmarked transfers
mechanisms and procedures continue to constrain the functioning
of districts. Financial management responsibilities continue to
create an overload for the district PFM staff, and there is no
delegation to lower levels.
Volunteerism and Effective Functioning of LGS
Many actors and many elected leaders at local level perform their
duties on a voluntary basis. The same individuals find themselves
in many committees, and volunteerism is the main cause of petty
corruption in service delivery.
Capacity building
Capacity building interventions in LG have been initiated by
various stakeholders: CG, NGOs, CSOs, PS but were mainly
limited to simple training of a few days. These fragmented and

74
uncoordinated trainings have raised the level of performance but
have left persisting gaps in a number of priority areas of LG
action, including planning, projects elaboration, etc.
Fiscal Decentralization
Financial responsibility is a core component of decentralization. If
LGs are to carry out decentralized functions effectively, they must
have an adequate and predictable flow of income. LG incomes
will normally comprise of locally raised revenues (tax and non tax
revenue); and Central Government grants (presently comprising of
earmarked and block grants)28. As the local revenue performance
is still low and incomes from local sources still too little, the focus
of fiscal decentralization is mostly around managing Central
Government grants. The status of fiscal decentralization can be
summarized as follows:
Financial resources channeled through the district have
increased from 47.9 billion Rwfs in 2006 to 179.2 billion in
2012/13. In 2012/13, about 33% of the previous years domestic
revenue is transferred directly to Districts (see table 1).
Table 1: Financial Transfers to Districts in Millions of Francs.
Financial
Year

CDF

Block
grants

Earmarked
funds

2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12

1,300
4,000
5,500
3,500
4,000
6,000
8,800
48,000
48,200
11,400
140,700

100
1,500
3,300
3,300
5,000
8,400
11,300
16,500
20,400
25,000
94,800

0
0
0
0
38,900
57,100
64,700
78,200
87,600
142,800
469,300

Total

1,400
5,500
8,800
6,800
47,900
71,500
84,800
142,700
156,200
179,200
704,800

Domestic
Resources

% of
Domestic
Revenue

101,700
117,900
133,700
169,600
190,300
242,000
297,800
385,100
471,200
538,400

1.4
4.7
6.6
4.0
25.2
29.5
28.5
37.1
33.1
33.3

Source: MINECOFIN 2012. Directorate of Budget

28

Block grants are generally non-conditional while earmarked funds are

conditional i.e. allocated to specific activities such as teachers salaries.

75
Local revenue generation is very low: Districts generate only
between 5-20% of their budgets. MINECOFIN is in the process of
commissioning a revenue potential study for districts to determine
the potential of districts after which baselines will be determined
and targets set for revenue improvement. This should form the
basis for supporting Local Governments to improve their internal
revenue generation and management. It is anticipated that with
effective tax administration, within the first year of implementing
the LG tax law, local government revenues will increase from the
present RwF 16 billion to as much as RwF 90 billion29.
The new legal framework for fiscal decentralization is coherent
and articulates clearly rights and obligations of CG and LG:
Revenue and expenditures are clearly assigned. A new law on LG
taxation is expected to address the major loopholes in the local
government revenue mobilisation. The main challenge, however,
remains in ensuring effective tax administration especially given
that Local Governments capacity in tax administration is very
low, and Local Governments generally tend to be inefficient in tax
administration. The Government will enlist the good experience of
the Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA) to help develop Local
Government capacity in local revenue mobilisation and
management.

29

Interview with the Director General for National Budget,

MINECOFIN

76
Figure 1. Ranking of decentralization in some African Countries.

Source: MINALOC, 2010

According to this graph, Rwanda is positioned sixth at Sub-Saharan African level which is a good sign because
this was in 2007, when she was still in the second phase of decentralization.
2. Elections
Even if controversy continues to rage about the nature of representation, there is one point of universal agreement:
the representation process is fundamentally linked to election and voting; therefore elections may not in
themselves be a sufficient condition for political representation, but there is a little doubt that they (elections) are
an indispensable condition.

77
According to this graph, Rwanda is positioned sixth at SubSaharan African level which is a good sign because this was in
2007, when she was still in the second phase of decentralization.
3. Elections
Even if controversy continues to rage about the nature of
representation, there is one point of universal agreement: the
representation process is fundamentally linked to election and
voting; therefore elections may not in themselves be a sufficient
condition for political representation, but there is a little doubt that
they (elections) are an indispensable condition.
3.1. Historical Background of Elections in Rwanda
Rwanda has had different systems1 of governance at different
periods of its history since the colonial era (1894-1962) up to the
2nd Republic (1973-1994).
These regimes did not manifest any political will to introduce the
system of governance in line with democratic principles.
During the 1st Republic (1962-1973) and the 2nd Republic (19731994) Rwandans were thrown into total confusion and were too
cheated to believe in the existence of democratic rule. Periodic
elections, whose outcome was known well in advance, were
organised on ethnic labelling and belonging, regional origin,
religious affiliation and the like.
In its endeavour to break with that past, the Government of
National Unity which was established in July 1994 has defined
orientation lines on which to lead the country through good
governance in line with the principles of the democratization of
institutions in order to have the population play their significant
role in their own daily governance. One of those democratic
principles and good practices is to organise transparent, free, and
fair and regular elections; it was, therefore, in conformity with this
1

National Electoral Commission Officials

78
principle that the Government of National Unity set up a National
Electoral Commission (NEC).
The NEC was created in 2000 and provided for in article 24-c of
the Arusha Peace Protocol signed in Arusha on August 04th, 1993,
between the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic
Front (RPF). It is established by Law No. 39/2000 of November
28th, 2000 as amended by Law No. 31/2005 of December 24th,
2005 which is consistent with the Constitution of the Republic of
Rwanda (Article 180).
3.2 What do elections mean2?
Definition of an election: An election is a competition based on
a formal expression of preferences by a population. These
opinions are then combined into a collective decision about
candidates who have won
The importance of elections cannot be doubted. At the very least,
they provide the public with its clearest formal opportunities to
influence the political process, and also help, directly or indirectly,
to determine who will hold government power. From this
perspective, elections are about results- in other words who wins
and who loses.
3.3 Electoral system(s)
An electoral system3 is a set of rules that governs the conduct of
elections. Not only do these rules vary across the world, but they
are also, in many countries the subject of fierce political debate
and argument. These rules vary in a number of ways:
- Voters may be asked to choose between candidates or between
parties.
- Voters may either select a single candidate, or vote
preferentially, ranking the candidates they wish to support in
order.

2
3

Andrew Heywood: Politics (2002), P.239

Ibid, P. 232

79
- The electorate may or may not be grouped into electoral units
or constituencies.
- Constituencies may return a single member or a number of
members.
- The level of support needed to elect a candidate varies from a
plurality (the largest single number of votes or a relative
majority) to proportional representation.
3.4 Functions of elections4
Because of the different kinds of elections, and the variety of
electoral systems, generalization about the roles or functions is
always difficult. Nevertheless, the advance of democratization in
the 1980s and 1990s, stimulated in part of the collapse of
Communism, has usually been associated with the adoption of
liberal-democratic election systems, characterised by universal
suffrage, the secret ballot and electoral competition.
The conventional view is that elections are a mechanism through
which politicians can be called to account and forced to introduce
policies that somehow reflect public opinion. This emphasizes the
Bottom-Up functions of elections: political recruitment,
representation, forming a government, influencing policy and so
on. On the other hand, a radical view of elections, developed by
theorists such as Ginsberg (1982), portrays them as a means
through which governments and political elites can exercise
control over their populations, making them more quiescent,
malleable, and, ultimately, governable.
3.5 WHAT IS A FREE AND FAIR ELECTION?
With the spread of democracy in the 1990s, election monitoring
became a growth industry.
In a report commissioned by the Commonwealth Parliamentary
Association, two Canadian election officers (Gould and Jackson,
1995: 36) set out some standards by which elections can be
4

Ibid. P.230

80
judged. They suggest that the key of a Free and Fair election
is whether the will of the majority of voters is expressed freely,
clearly and knowledgeably, and in secret.
Specifically a Free Election respects Human Rights and
Freedoms, including:
Freedom of speech; freedom of association; freedom to register as
an elector, a party or a candidate; freedom from coercion; freedom
of access to the polls; freedom to vote in secret; freedom to
complain.
A fair election takes place on a level playing field, including:
Non partisan administration of the election; constitutional
protection of electoral law; universal suffrage and accessible
polling places; balanced reporting by the media; equitable access
to resources for campaigns; open and transparent counting of the
vote; equitable and non-coercive treatment of parties, candidates,
and electors by the governments, the police, the military and the
judiciary.
3.6 NECS main achievements5
Since its installation in June 2000 to date, the NEC has made great
achievements.
The NEC has successfully organised and conducted the following
elections:
- Local elections at District, Town and Kigali City levels: 6 th13th March 2001;
- Elections of the members of Gacaca Jurisdictions: 4th -7th
October 2001
- Local elections at Cell and Sector levels: 25th-26th March
2002;
- Referendum on the Constitution: 26th may 2003;
- Presidential elections: 25th August 2003: Here6, Western
donors insisted to have legislative elections before the
5

Interview with Mr Munyaneza Charles, who is a former MINALOC

Official, and current NECs Executive Secretary, on 20 th June, 2012
6
Interview with Mr. Munyaneza Charles

81

presidential one. NEC refused to endorse their ideas, sticking

to the agenda as it was scheduled to start by presidential
elections and then legislative ones. Therefore, Westerner
Donors refused to honour the material and financial assistance
they had promised at the last minute. Consequently, the
element of volunteerism was introduced and endorsed by the
youth and women, making it possible to conduct the
presidential elections in a good atmosphere. Westerner donors
disbursed their money after the elections had been
successfully completed.
Legislative elections: 29th September- 3rd October 2003
Elections for Members of the Conciliators Executive
Committees: July , 2004
Elections for members of the Executive Committees of the
Women National Councils: July 2004
Local elections at the grass roots levels and specialised
institutions: January-March 2006
Elections for the executive Committees at the Village/
Umudugudu Level: August 2006
Legislative Elections ( Low Chamber, Deputies): September
2008
Presidential elections: August 2010
Legislative elections ( Upper Chamber, Senators): October
2011
Local Government Elections: March 2011.
Various reports on post-genocide elections such as those
produced by the European Union and various NGOs portray
an overall positive image of the various elections held so far,
although some procedural shortcomings have also been
pointed out.

4. General Conclusion
As we have seen these three components of politics: political
parties, decentralization, and elections are complementing each
other in the sense that the state cannot have good governance
without them. With regard to political parties, most registered
parties seem to be satisfied with the arrangement of working

82
together within the Consultative Forum of Political Organizations,
with the exception of PS-Imberakuri. The CFPO has attracted a
number of African countries who have indicated that the
arrangement may be worth emulating. The practice of coalition
making with the RPF at the time of national elections seems to be
phasing out, as many of the parties show confidence in standing on
their own.
Decentralization is firmly in place, but it still faces a number of
challenges including: mayors being overwhelmed by many
activities that ought to be performed by other decentralized
entities; fusion of technical roles with political ones; persisting
tendencies of line ministries to hold onto implementation of their
own programs; and miscellaneous problems in the fiscal and
financial decentralization mechanisms.
As for elections, since 2000 the NEC has successfully organized
several types of elections. Various reports portray an overall
positive image of the various elections held so far, although some
procedural shortcomings have also been pointed out and need to
be properly addressed.
5. References
I. Books
1. Bailey, K.D., (1978). Methods of social research (3rd edition),
New York, USA.
2. Bidus, M., (1995), A Review of decentralization and Municipal
Development Initiatives in Central America, International City
Council Management Association, USAID.
3. Bugingo E. Et al. (1992). Etude sur la commune Rwandaise.
Butare, Rwanda
4. BURNS, D et al; (1994), the political of decentralization. A basis
for Democratic Governance in Rwanda, Revitalizing Local
Democracy, Macmillan.
5. Churchill J.V, Gilbert A (1992), Basis marketing research, 2nd
edition, The Dryden press, USA.
6. Cox and Annis, (1982), Local participation in decision making,
Macmillan distribution Ltd, Hampshire, England.

83
7. Dye, T.R.,( 1974), Understanding Public Policy, Englewood
cliffs: USA Prentice Press, New Jersey
8. Eddy Asrivatham and K.K. Misra, (2008), Political Theory,
India.
9. Fesler, J., (1968), Support to decentralisation and civil society in
Mozambique: Implementation policy change, ABT Association
Inc., USAID.
10. Gilbert, N.W., (1999), Researching social life, London, Sage
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84

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March 2011.

85
9. National Electoral Commission, Raporo yitora ryAbagize
Inteko Ishinga Amategeko ryo kuva ku wa 29 Nzeri kugeza 03
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86

Rwanda Gacaca courts and the

reconciliation process: testimonies and
analysis.
Deo Byanafashe
Introduction
The atmosphere prevailing in Rwanda in the wake of the Tutsi
genocide of April July 1994 was a huge challenge to fragmented
Rwanda and to the helpless world: in three months and in absolute
horror, the genocide claimed 1,074,071 people of whom 93.7%
were Tutsi (MINALOC, 2001), while in 2000, prisons hosted
120,000 prisoners (REYNTJENS F. et MARYSSE S., 2000:7593) suspected as genocide perpetrators.
Given the dilapidated situation of the judiciary system, trying all
of these genocide suspects required 100 years at the very least. It
was an impasse and everybody wondered how the impasse had
come to be established in the country of A Thousand Hills!
Since independence on 1st July 1962, leaders of the First Republic
(1962-1973) first, and then those of the second Republic (19731994), had established ethnic-based exclusion as a system of
government (the Hutu against the Tutsi) which, in all impunity,
periodically was made concrete in anti-Tutsi pogroms.
These pogroms, radicalizing in 1994, resulted in the Tutsi
genocide which involved 1.9 million perpetrators out of a
population of 3.4 million adults in Rwanda in 1994. Actually,
over one persons out of two, 55.88%, were involved in genociderelated activity, and about one adult person out of two in 1994,
49%, was found guilty( MUGESERA A.,2012:8-9). It was a
mass crime and it is a considerable dispute.
This crime is at the heart of this serious dispute over genocide:
how are the secrets of this dispute to be penetrated? How should
the perpetrators of this genocide be prosecuted and tried, and how
should the victims rights be recognized so as to eradicate

87
impunity, while mending the social fabric and reinstating social
dialogue (http://www.inkikogacaca.gov.rw/Fr/ Generalities.htm)?
The right answer given by the leaders of the Third Republic to
these three questions was to establish Gacaca Courts7 which are
the object of this analysis. Gacaca Courts are a mechanism of
transitional justice in post-genocide Rwanda. This form of justice
was given more impetus in order to try, as of 2002, those who
were suspected of the genocide crime within the framework of
community and participatory justice, where the whole local
population (executioners and victims) replaces law professionals
in the operation of truth, justice and reconciliation, aiming at
the settlement of genocide related disputes.
However, Gacaca Courts should not be confused with the famous
South African Truth and Reconciliation Mission because, unlike
the former, the latter involves no judicial dimension. It is
absolutely ridiculous to stand by genocide, the ultimate crime,
without cracking down on it, as much as possible!
It is true that the principles of truth, justice and reconciliation
are an endogenous attempt likely to be successful where the
classic model of justice had proved inefficient when faced with a
mass crime perpetrated nationwide; but the fact of telling the truth
had always come up against the risk of punishment.
This situation was made necessary by the very nature of Gacaca
Courts. Their ultimate goal being reconciliation among Rwandans,
they could not be successful if the whole truth on the events was
not told and if the recognized perpetrators of Tutsi genocide of
April-July 1994 were not punished.
As of 2001, the principle of adopting the mode of Gacaca Courts
was accepted and the next step was to create and organize them, to
monitor their efficiency and their shortcomings, and at the end of
the day, to assess their results.
7

The literal meaning of Gacaca in Kinyarwanda is lawn . On this

lawn, traditional courts sat under a big tree in the open, and decided
certain community offences, such as murder.

88
1. Creation and Organization
Created by Organic Law no 40/2000 of 01/26/2001 and put under
the monitoring, auditing and coordination of the National Service
of Gacaca Courts (S.N.J.G.), a Service of the Supreme Court,
Gacaca Courts, to be able to prevent, fight and suppress anti-Tutsi
genocide and its rampant ideology forever, set the following
mission (http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/Fr/objectif.htm):
uncover truth on the genocide events;
accelerate genocide-related trials;
eradicate the culture of impunity;
reconcile Rwandans and build unity;
demonstrate the capability of Rwandans to find solutions for
their own problems through a mode of justice resorting to the
Rwandan custom.
To achieve each objective, the process of Gacaca Courts carried
out a number of concrete actions likely to fight genocide and
related challenges. Such actions include the systematic collection
of information, the progressive improvement of the legal
framework and the trials. Let us review how each component was
realized.
Uncovering the truth on the events during the genocide
- The author of this article was involved as inyangamugayo
(upright person ) judge in the activities of systematic
collection of information that started nationwide on
01/15/2005. In my Buye Gacaca Cell (later called ButareVille Cell, Ngoma Sector, Huye District), people regularly
gathered for data collection once a week, often on
Wednesday.
- During these data gathering sessions, the accused persons
who hold the information on the realities of genocide at
NUR and in the current BUTARE-VILLE Cell proved to
have various disturbing attitudes, allowing no hope.
non-confession of guilt;
accusations;
pacts of silence (also called guceceka associations)
meant to avoid counter-accusation;

89
attempts to bribe the recognized accusers, the upright
judges and other members on the juries called
Inyangamugayo;
killing of witnesses and elimination of evidence on
genocide;
with some, blatant persistence of genocide ideology
advocated by negationists-revisionists.
It is worth noting that strangely enough, all of these attitudes were
found in the Sectors where we were appointed as Inyangamugayo
judges: Matyazo, Kigoma, Kinazi and Muhororo in Huye District,
Southern Province; and in Kamembe Sector, Rusizi District,
Western Province. The spectre of manipulation by the negationists
such as the pacts of silence loomed everywhere, but in spite of
everything, the main part of the information on the anti-Tutsi
genocide was finally known.
Accelerating genocide-related trials
Today, there is no doubt that Gacaca system was successful where
the classic judicial system had given up: Gacaca Courts passed
1,952,388 sentences ( MUGESERA A. 2012, art. cit., pp 5-6)
in 10 years, while for sentencing 120,000 persons presumed guilty,
the most optimist observers estimation was 200 years minimum
for Rwandan classic courts. (http://www.humilationsstudies.
org/ documents/Cyprien Kanamugire Gacaca.pdf-25/05/2012).
Besides, the population massively participated (85%) in the
information gathering sessions which lasted only two years.
Eradication of the culture of impunity
For a reminder, the culture of impunity was established by the law
of 20th May 1963. This law grants amnesty to all crimes
perpetrated in 1959 and presents massacres against the Tutsi as an
essential event in the struggle for independence. (http:
//www.mouvements.info/Les Juridictions-Gacaca-au Rwanda.htm
Publi par Mouvements le 7/Avril/2009).
To hound this culture of impunity into a corner, four organic laws
on the organization, competence and functioning of Gacaca Courts
were successively created and modified in order to amend the

90
initial Organic Law no 40/2000 of 01/26/2001. The said laws are
the following:
- Organic Law no 16/2004 of 06/19/2004
- Organic Law no 28/2006 of 06/27/2006
- Organic Law no 10/2007 of 03/01/2007
- Organic Law no 13/2008 of 05/19/2008
The role of these laws is to make the structures and composition of
Gacaca Courts more adapted. They refined their competence, the
categories and subcategories of liability levels in crime to allow
the passing of the sentence, and they made the working of
jurisdictions simpler, more efficient, and limited in time (from 1st
October 1990 to 31st December 1994).
Actually, everything is put in place for justice to be made, and it
is in this sense that the process of Gacaca was seeking anything
likely to facilitate the issues meant to achieve reconstruction
through unity (BIDERI D., 2012, art. cit., pp. 145-146). :
confession, apologizing, receiving forgiveness, penalty and finally,
reconciliation..
Reconcile Rwandans and build their unity
Gacaca system, in its quest for truth on genocide facts during the
sessions of systematic collection of information, involved the
whole population (executioners and survivor victims) at Cell,
Sector and District levels for all kinds of confessions, accusations
and apologies which broke the atmosphere of suspicion and hatred
then prevailing. This opening of social dialogue inaugurated an
atmosphere of reconciliation which later was realized all along the
trials.
Those who were skeptical about Gacaca system had always made
people think that the truth could not come out while justice was
also made to punish perpetrators of various genocide offences. In
fact, justice in view of reconciliation was one of the major
challenges of the Gacaca system made modern, though essentially
endogenous.

91
In most Gacaca Courts nationwide, confessions prevailed and it
was a kind of collective healing towards reconciliation, a big
surprise for non-negationist skeptics!
Demonstrate the capability of Rwandans to resolve their
own problems
With the impasse facing the classic justice called modern in the
prosecution of mass crimes, Rwanda opted for Gacaca Courts, a
traditional Rwandan solution, typically endogenous, which
involved local communities together with executioners and
victims in order to settle their disputes, telling one another the
truth and getting reconciled without any external intervention on
their land and in their custom. Faced with popular genocide (J.P.
KIMONYO, 2008) which was disconcerting for classic judicial
proceedings, the broad mass of Rwandan people resorted to
Gacaca participatory justice which is also as popular. Members on
the jury and judges are people found upright, who are elected by
the administrative unit concerned (PRI, 2010, 11).
2. Gacaca Courts at Work (Success and shortcomings)
Gacaca Courts worked as Commissions for Truth, Justice and
Reconciliation to face the crime of genocide against the Tutsi and
its ideology, so as to accomplish their triple mission with dignity.
2.1. Truth on the genocide
Systematic collection of information started on 01/15/2005 after
training Inyangamugayo judges in 9013 Gacaca units at Cell level,
and 3090 Gacaca units at Sector level.
This data collection used an approach with levels, first aiming the
collection of information on a series of clear indicators, before
proceeding to trials (KAMUZINZI M., 2012, art. cit., p.27): at
the top is the level of planners just following the level of
organizers on the ground including those who made the lists of
people to be exterminated, those who supervised roadblocks and
those who distributed weapons (KAMUZINZI M., 2012, art.cit.,

92
p.27) ; and at the bottom, the level of those who carried out orders
to kill and loot!
Given resort to these indicators, active participation (85%) of the
local population was gained and efficient, since Gacaca Courts
were able to prosecute thousands of executioners, more than any
other judicial system had done so far.
During this process of acceding the truth on the genocide, Gacaca
Courts contributed three fundamental gains (KAMUZINZI M.,
2012, art. cit., pp. 30-31):
- the identification of planners, organizers and
executioners of genocide. With this, the negationists
thesis that there was no planning of genocide was null and
void!
- the identification of victims and places where their
bodies were thrown;
- the identification of places where the crime was
committed and of the form of death for each victim. This
aroused for survivors a constant desire to bury their family
members killed during the genocide with dignity and to
bring proceedings against the authors of these atrocities.
Finally, as a conclusion, let us join this survivor who had to this to
say: Gacaca Courts did not uncover the whole truth, but they
contributed for much. [PRI, 2010:25].
2.2. Free justice
Let us remember that the requirement for free and fair justice is
rooted into the very heart of the dispute over the Tutsi genocide of
April-July 1994. It is a necessary stage on the long way towards
reconciliation which in no way shall live under the same roof with
impunity which had become a recurrent phenomenon in Rwanda.
Therefore, the issue was to dispense justice within reasonable time
frames ( 10 years, which implied the acceleration of the trials),
with the express concern to eradicate impunity while building
unity and reconciliation among Rwandans.

93
It was possible, due to proceedings resorting to what is convenient
to call justice of proximity, involving the participation of the
whole population of the Gacaca Court in the Cell concerned,
during the process of uncovering the truth about genocide.
It is with Organic Law no16/2004 of 06/19/2004 that trials were
put into new categories to reduce their number to 3 (Cell, Sector
and Appeal) and that created a process of confession, plea for
guilt, excuse and repentance which, if accepted, would lead to the
commutation of half the penalty to community work (PRI,
2010:11).
Due to these two approaches, the trials and penalties given to the
authors of genocide were made easier and closer to the reality that
could lead to the first beginnings of reconciliation.
2.3. Reconciliation
Active and willing participation of the population in the trial
sessions of Gacaca Courts created a bringing together of victims
and authors of genocide. This bringing together then broke
generalized suspicion between the protagonists by encouraging the
establishment of truth instead of retreating into leagues of silence
(PRI, 2010:16).
Popular participation in Gacaca Courts paved the way towards
reconciliation which the National Commission for Unity and
Reconciliation (CNUR) defines in these terms:
Unity and reconciliation among Rwandans are defined as a
set of practices of a people having the conviction of sharing
the same nationality, the same culture and the same rights.
This people is characterized by mutual trust, tolerance,
respect, equality, complementariness, truth, and is ready to
mutual assistance, to heal up the sores that are a legacy of a
negative history, to definitely develop itself in full peace.
(CNUR, 2007:4-5)
This definition is perfectly appropriate to the definition of Gacaca
process, and even to IDEA. IDEA identifies four criteria or
organic objectives: uncover/narrate the truth (historical); heal the

94
victims wounds through, inter alia, confession and apology or
forgiveness, the administration of a mode of justice meant for
correction; and pay compensation. (PRI, 2010: 34)
Therefore, Gacaca Courts carried out the four criteria and
successfully initiated a reconciliation process that can be observed
on three levels: 1) non-violent cohabitation, devoid of fear; 2)
recovery of trust; 3) a kind of empathy, that is, the capacity of
getting into the skin of others and experience the same feelings or
emotions. (PRI, 2010:34)
Then, the beginning of the reconciliation process is well and truly
real, but full reconciliation is a very complex and long
phenomenon given the extent of the rift and the reluctance, and
even opposition of the authors of the rift: the truth on genocide
remains partial so far. This is a considerable handicap to the free
and fair character of some trials because when justice is not totally
done, the way towards reconciliation is ill-prepared; doubt and
suspicion prevail in the minds and the defendants guilty of the
crime of genocide go into exile, running away from the
proceedings of Gacaca Courts.
Such a situation has aroused caustic criticism against Gacaca
Courts from the International Community (UN Experts, the
Humanitarians, etc) who often have a faulty understanding of the
methods of negationists accused of genocide; this is at least what
was suggested in the balance sheet of Gacaca Courts just before
they closed!
3. Gacaca Results
Three important questions arise here: were facts about genocide
released; if yes, to what extent? Was related justice possible, and
to what extent? Finally, is reconciliation achieved?
3.1. Releasing facts on genocide
The systematic collection of information on the genocide events
was successful in identifying the authors of genocide on all levels:
identification of victims and places where bodies were thrown,

95
and in determining the kind of death for each victim
(KAMUZINZI M, 2012:27-30).
The local population actively participated in this systematic
collection, and this allowed Gacaca Courts to prosecute
thousands of executioners of genocide (KAMUZINZI M.,
2012:29.). The week of 11th to 18th June 2012 called Gacaca
week was dedicated to the last preparations for the closing and
not less than 2,000,000 files were made, all on the basis of the
facts released.
It is also due to the release of facts that the important places where
the crime was committed were identified and that since then, these
places host important memorial sites such as Murambi, Nyamata,
Bisesero, Nyarubuye, Mugina,etc. In these sites, the victims of
genocide were given the right burial and each year, Rwandans on
their way to reconciliation go there to commemorate the victims of
anti-Tutsi genocide.
Though it was unable to let us accede to all the secrets of genocide
and though it was not really closed, the systematic collection of
information has accumulated huge quantities of data on genocide.
These data allowed the phase of justice to start.
3.2. Justice to fight impunity
- Once facts about genocide were known and classified into
categories of individual responsibility (1, 2 and 3), the trials
could start and proceed in conformity with Organic Law no
40/2004 of 01/26/2004 (as modified and completed to date) on
Gacaca Courts. Trials were launched on 17th July 2006 at
national level.
- From 18th June to late January 2012, Gacaca Courts can boast
1,951,388 tried cases (65.1% in the 3rd category, 33.3% in the
2nd category and 1.6% in the 1st category). 1,678,672 persons
were declared guilty (that is, 72.70% in the 3rd category, 25.82%
in the 2nd category and 1.4% in the 1st category) and finally,
272,716 persons were declared innocent, of whom 18.3% in the

96
3rd category, 79.3% in the 2nd category, and 2.4% in the 1st
category (MUGESERA A., 2012:7).
- These results are after all impressing if we remember that
initially, before Gacaca was considered as a solution, the
judicial system was in an impasse and the judicial machine
almost broken down, to a point that 160 years were necessary to
try all the authors accused of genocide (BIZIMANA J.D.
,2012:45).
- This feat is due to the endogenous original formula of Gacaca
Courts based on a custom rule of participatory justice where
the population is at the same time judge, witness and the
judged (BIZIMANA J.D, 2012:44). This rule allowed the
achievement of fair trials while facing the double requirement of
fighting impunity and prosecuting the accused within a
reasonable time frame (BIZIMANA J.D., 2012: 44). This
justice, dispensed in all fairness (freedom and impartiality),
made the progression towards reconciliation easier and more
credible.
3.3. Reconciliation
- The Rwandan people, after the genocide horror, recovered and,
in the fashion of the Ecclesiastic Council, gathered in Gacaca
to decide a vital issue, as for a dogma: how to resume living
together and rebuild shattered unity. As is the case with any
peoples assembly, the solution was found after many long
exchanges and debates. Indeed, Gacaca gatherings had
something of a mixed bag: outpourings and reservations,
revelations and silences, truths and counter-truths, testimonies
and denials, confessions and counter-confessions, gaps and
weaknesses, wailings and tears, penalties and mercy, but at the
end of the day, due to Gacaca maieutics, national
understanding and harmony prevailed over Somalia-like
rupture and dislocation. It is the main thing. (MUGESERA
A., 2012:4).

97
- The keywords summarizing this long and rich quotation on the
complexity of the reconciliation process are: maieutics
understanding and harmony rupture and dislocation!
- In other words, The process of Gacaca made it possible for the
families of victims and of convicted persons to look one another
into the face, to talk viva voce of this evil blighting postgenocide Rwandan society, to mend the once positive social
fabric through the process of apology and mercy (Rutayisire P.,
2012, :20-21).
- In the end,
Gacaca greatest achievement is that it successfully stabilized
Rwandan society, socially and psychologically (MUGESERA
A., 2012;6). The uncovering of truth, especially on the basis of
guilty pleas, had contributed in psychologically relieving the
victims as it allowed them to know the places where the bodies
of their relatives had been thrown and to bury them with
dignity.Gacaca process had made it possible to reduce
suspicion among those who used to be neighbours before
genocide, since those who were really guilty on each hill had
been uncovered.the fact that Gacaca made it possible to
uncover the real culprits and to free the innocent persons.
(KAMUZINZI M., 2012:38).
- In a few words, it is clear that everything was done for Gacaca
Courts to be an opportunity par excellence to reconcile
Rwandans before any kind of effort towards national
reconstruction was made.
Conclusion
The impasse facing post-genocide Rwanda could not be overcome
without the contribution of Gacaca Courts regarding unity and
reconciliation among Rwandans.
To reconstruct Rwanda, it was first of all necessary to reshape
Rwandans in their identity and attachment to this distressed cradle
land in the wake of anti-Tutsi genocide.

98
This complex reshaping of hearts was successfully carried out by
Gacaca Courts in three aspects: truth, justice and reconciliation.
The aspect of truth which was to be a basis for the aspects of
justice and reconciliation was unexpectedly successful against the
leagues of silence: the basic elements on the planning and
implementation of an otherwise mass genocide was revealed, the
tools and methods used were known.
Once all these data were established, the aspect of justice could
start, basing on well- investigated cases. Thousands of judicial
sentences were made and a distinction between culprits, innocent
people was made possible and all this contributed in easing social
suspicion, mistrust and tension which used to prevail so far. The
fair character of trials and their verdicts made easier the first steps
towards the aspect of Reconciliation and virulently stormed the
culture of impunity.
Finally, once truth was uncovered and justice dispensed, the
aspect of Reconciliation could start and Rwandans are now able
to start their communal life again. But it is necessary to remain
vigilant because the closure of Gacaca Courts does in no way
imply the end of genocide- related plagues, namely, its ideology,
negationism and revisionism. These plagues are a permanent
threat to Unity and Reconciliation among Rwandans.
References
I. Works
A) Books, Reports and Dissertations
1. BYANAFASHE D. (2004), Rwanda, Ruptures du capital
social multisculaire et Gnocide, Yaound, Ed. Cl.
2. C.C.M. (2011), Evaluation finale du processus Gacaca,
Kigali, SNJG.
3. C.N.U.R. (2007), Politique nationale dUnit et
Rconciliation, Kigali, CNUR.
4. GATWA TH. (2005), The churches and Ethnic Ideology in the
Rwandan crisis 1900-1994, London, Regnum Books
International.

99
5. HATZFELD J. (2000), Dans le nu de la vie. Rcits des marais
rwandais, Paris, Seuil.
6. HATZFELD J. (2003), Une saison de machettes, Paris, Seuil.
7. HATZFELD J. (2007), La stratgie des antilopes, Paris.
Karthala.
8. KIMONYO J.P. (2008), Rwanda: un gnocide populaire,
Paris, Karthala.
9. MUGESERA A. (2004), Imibereho yAbatutsi kuri Republika
ya mbere niya kabikri (1959-1990), Kigali, Editions
Rwandaises.
10. MURWANASHAKA J .(2006), Processus de ngation du
gnocide des Tutsi du Rwanda (1994-2004), Butare, UNR.
11. NTARIBI KAMANZI C. (1995), Imizi yicyaha, Kigali,
Editions Rebero.
12. PARLEMENT/SENAT (2006), Rwanda. Idologies du
gnocide et stratgies de son Eradication, Kigali, Snat.
13. P.R.I. (2010), Rapport final de monitoring et de recherch sur
la Gacaca, Kigali, P.R.I.
14. RUTAZIBWA P.et RUTAYISIRE P. (2007) Gnocide
Nyarubuye, Kigali, Editions Rwandaises.
15. RUTEMBESA F. et MUTWARASIBO E. (2009), Amateka
ya jenoside yakorewe Abatutsi muri Mugina, kigali CNLG.
16. SEBASONI M.S. (2007), Le Rwanda. Reconstruire une
nation, Kigali, Editions Rwandaises.
17. S.N.J.G. (2012), Rapports annuels dactivits 2004, 2005,
2006, 2007,2008, Kigali, SNJG.
II) Journals
1. DIALOGUE no 178, Avril-Juin 2004.
2. DIALOGUE no 197, Janvier 2012.
IV.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Electronic Sources
http:// www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/
http:// www.diplomatie-judiciaire.com/nouvelles.htm
http:// www.penalreform.org/
http://www.mouvements.info/les-juridictions-gacaca-aurwanda. html

100

The Role of the National Commission for

the Fight Against Genocide in Combating
Genocide Ideology and Denial.
Odeth Kantengwa
Background
Between April and July 1994, Rwanda was the scene of one of the
most brutal Genocides in the history of humankind. It is estimated
that more than one million people were killed within that period
(MINALOC8, 2004). The 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in
Rwanda had many causes. The conflict-ridden ideology has played
a paramount role in the inception and execution of the Genocide. It
still inspires Genocide denial and new tensions and violence.
The German and Belgian colonial authorities (1895-1916 and
1916-1962, respectively) fostered divisions among Rwandans.
This division succeeded through indirect rule which was
introduced just for them to meet their interests. Gasanabo (2008)
states that in 1920 Jules Renquin, Belgian Minister of Colonies,
concretized the practice of ethnic-based rule, by officially
instituting a policy of requiring that all local colonial staff be
Tutsi.
In fact, the divide and rule principle would not work without the
introduction of the Identity Cards and group classification among
Rwandans. This group classification was an action of most
significance because it introduced a rigid racial concept of group
identity.
Importantly, the above classification led to the 1959 social
conflicts. As King Rudahigwa tried to calm the conflict, the Hutu
elite published the Hutu Manifesto9 in 1957. In June same year,
8

Ministre de Ladministration Locale, du Dveloppement Communautaire et des Affaires Sociales.

9
Manifeste des Bahutu

101
Grgoire Kayibanda and Joseph Gitera created the Hutu Social
Movement10, and two years later, in October 1959, PARMEHUTU
was founded.11 The Hutu Manifesto was a political document that
called for Hutu ethnic and political solidarity, as well as the
political disenfranchisement of the Tutsi people. It served as the
political seed for the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi.
Also the Hutu supremacy ideology was the political thought
around which power had been conquered and later organized, as
well as the economic, social and cultural life. Although other
political activists like Joseph Gitera of APROSOMA12 were also
vocal and violent in formulating the Hutu supremacy ideology,
Kayibandas PARMEHUTU emerged the winner. So, the
dominant ideology at that time can be labelled as the
PARMEHUTU ideology.The real nature of the Habyarimana
regime was ideologically the same as Kayibandas. Tutsi were
marginalized and continued to endure violence and oppression
(Mugesera, 2004).
In fact, the PARMEHUTU ideology is a type of the Genocide
ideology13 though the two terms emerged in different periods. For
those who keep wondering how the Genocide happened, it should
be understood that it was made possible by this ideology.
It is in relation to the above that genocide ideology as a concept
gained currency in Rwanda after the 1994 genocide against the
Tutsi and became widely the subject of public awareness since
2003. Recent reports, especially from the parliament, have drawn
public attention to the revival and alarmingly increasing genocide
ideology in various settings, including schools and families.
Attitudes of violence and several cases of murder of genocide
survivors and witnesses have also been registered under such
ideological grounds.
10

Movement Social Muhutu

PAEMEHUTU is a Party for the Emancipation of the Hutu People.
And ethnic political party as its name indicates.
12
Association pour la Promotion Sociale de la Masse
13
Ingengabitekerezo ya Jenocide in Kinyarwanda
11

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The link, therefore, between genocide ideology, genocide, and its
effects is important for effective post-genocide reconstruction.
Consequences of genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda include
social, psychological, economic and physical effects.
Accordingly, Rwandan government established the National
Commission for the Fight against Genocide (CNLG) as a means to
respond to the effects of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, with
a specific purpose of combating genocide ideology. Highlighting
the role played by CNLG in combating genocide ideology and
denial is what this paper endeavors to do.
Genocide Ideology
It is a common belief that genocide needs to have an established
ideology, and, indeed, history has proved that there was one
during the Holocaust, Armenia and another during the Red
Khmers regime. In the Rwandan case, the situation remains the
same.
It is worth showing that genocide ideology in Rwanda is deeply
rooted in PARMEHUTU ideology that was promoted by postcolonial regimes up to 1994. The hatred against the Tutsi was
developed, taught and channeled through schools and other
various means of communication like in newspapers, on the
national radio, RTLM and through different meetings. The most
notorious being the codified commandments. These include, in
their respective order of publication, the 10 commandments of
Gitera titled Amategeko ya buli muhutu wese ushaka kwibohora
ku ngoyi yubuja bwa bene gatutsi of September 27th, 1959; the
manifesto of MAGRIVI14 comprising more than 10
commandments titled Quelques lments pour la promotion du
peuple Hutu du Zaire distributed in the underground.
As the core part of the genocide ideology, the PARMEHUTU
supremacy ideology consists of taking the so called ethnic groups,
namely Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, as absolute identities and as
14

Mutuelle des Agriculteurs des Virunga

103
determining, if not exclusive factors, in the definition of social
relationships and the management of political power (Rutazibwa,
2008). This had the intention of considering the Hutu group as
holding an exclusive legitimacy to political power and citizenship.
And to defend that natural right, it resorted to hate propaganda,
political violence and genocide when need arose.
By spreading the PARMEHUTU ideology, Ngeze Hassan the
chief editor of Kangura newspaper emphasized the importance of
PARMEHUTU ideology in inciting the population to commit
genocide. He cited the 10th commandment of the Hutu The Social
Revolution of 1959, the Referendum of 1961, and the
PARMEHUTU ideology, must be taught to every Hutu at every
level. Every Hutu must spread this ideology widely. Any Hutu
who persecutes his brother Hutu for having read, spread, and
taught this ideology is a traitor (http://www.trial-ch.org/en/
ressources/ trial-watch/ trial-watch/ profils/ profile/ 107/
action/show/controller/Profile.html, last accessed July, 2012).
Also the discourse of extremist politicians was relayed by
renowned hate media like Kangura newspaper, RTLM (Radio
Television Libre des Mille Collines), and even Radio Rwanda
(Chretien, 1995). The Hutu power ideology became the
galvanizing tool to mobilize Hutu against the multi party politics
and the liberation war waged by the Rwandese Patriotic Front
(RPF) in 1990; and it ended up in incitement to commit genocide
against the Tutsi in 1994.
An important point worth emphasizing here is how incitement has
a very big role in promoting genocide ideology which provokes
perpetrators to commit genocide. Incitement to commit genocide
was essentially first prosecuted in the case of Julius Streicher at
the Nuremberg Tribunal. Streicher was a German newspaper
editor during the Nazi regime who often wrote (or published)
virulent anti-Semitic diatribes. Incitement to commit genocide did
not exist as a crime at this time so Streicher was tried for crimes
against humanity (http://www.sharedhumanity.org/ Library
Article.php?heading=Incitement%20to%20Commit%20Genocide,
last accessed July, 2012).

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Interestingly, the development of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the
International Criminal Court has allowed the crime of incitement
to commit genocide to be prosecuted for the first time. When Navi
Pillay was a Judge at ICTR, there were many prominent trials and
convictions for incitement at the ICTR, including cases where
leaders have been tried for inciting genocide in speeches, media
personalities and publishers for incitement in the media, and even
a pop singer for including genocidal messages in his songs.
The Hutu Ten Commandments15 was a document published in the
December 1990 edition of Kangura-an anti-Tutsi, Hutu-PowerKinyarwanda-language newspaper in Kigali, Rwanda. The Hutu
Ten Commandments are often used as a prime example of antiTutsi propaganda which was promoted by Hutu extremists
following the 1990 invasion by the Rwandese Patriotic Front and
prior to the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. Kangura
magazine was the print equivalent to R.T.L.Mthat is, it routinely
disseminated brutal hate speech about Tutsis and even tackled
Hutus who opposed the hawkish, racist Habyarimana regime.
Despite its proud advertisement as a bimonthly independent,
Kangura received significant funding from the Rwandan
Government, and even used Government-owned printing presses
for its first few issues. Also contributing were the M.R.N.D. 16and
C.D.R17, both prominent radical political parties.
The creation of Kangura was part of a much wider strategy on the
part of the State. By setting up such hate media, the authorities
hoped to broadcast as widely as possible the official ethnic
message. These media had a great influence on the Rwandan
population and played a major role in the genocide. (http: //www.
trialch.org/ en/ ressources/ trial-watch /trialwatch/ profils/ profile/

15

Also Ten Commandments of the Bahutu

National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development
17
Coalition for the Defense of the Republic
16

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107/action/show/controller/Profile.html, last accessed August,
2012)
It is important showing how group classification, though
introduced by Belgian colonial rule, was supported and promoted
by post-colonial regimes. Coupled with hate propaganda it played
a crucial role in the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. Prior to
independence, nine Hutu leaders declared their intention to retain
such classifications. These leaders stated that "we are opposed
vigorously, at least for the moment, to the suppression in the
official or private identity papers of the mentions 'muhutu',
'mututsi', 'mutwa'. Their suppression would create a risk of
preventing the statistical law from establishing the reality of facts
(Berry, 1999). By "statistical" the authors meant dominance by the
Hutu majority population group. In municipal elections organized
between June 26 and July 31, 1960, people voted overwhelmingly
for the Hutu-oriented PARMEHUTU. In the Referendum of
September 25, 1961, some eighty percent of the population voted
to disband the monarchy and to install a Republic. Kayibanda
became thus the first president of independent Rwanda on July
1962. Under his leadership the Rwandan Identity card18 continued
to display the ethnic group affiliation of the card bearer.
In connection with the above, despite the fact that different
individuals and governments advised President Habyarimana who
succeeded Kayibanda to remove group affiliation from ID Cards,
Habyarimana announced his intention to do so, which he never
acted upon. In 1991, independent consultants encouraged France
and other governments giving aid to Rwanda to require the
removal of group affiliation from ID Cards as a prerequisite for
assistance, but those governments failed to take that advice.
When the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi began, an ID card with
the designation "Tutsi" spelled a death sentence at any roadblock.
Along with the prior training of militias, stockpiling of weapons,
direction of the massacres by hate radio, the prior existence of
ethnic ID cards was one of the most important factors facilitating
18

carte d'identit

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the speed and magnitude of the 100 days of mass killing in
Rwanda (http://www.preventgenocide.org/edu/ pastgenocides/
rwanda/indangamuntu.htm last accessed July, 2012).
However, the concept of genocide ideology was for the first time
officially utilized in a 2003 Rwandan parliamentary report on
MDR19. (Repubulika yu Rwanda, Inteko ishinga amategeko,
Umutwe wabadepite, 2003). The report, which led to the ban of
that political party, contributed also to a wide dissemination of the
concept in the public opinion, though its creation and usage can be
traced some time before in a number of public speeches and
publications (Rutazibwa, 1999). The 2004 ad hoc parliamentary
report on the killings in Gikongoro and the genocide ideology in
the whole country defines genocide ideology as a set of
representations, thoughts and actions; a way of living and
behaving which brings confrontation between people, such that
when you lightly touch the trigger, genocide occurs immediately.
Basing on the preamble, articles 9 and 179 of the 2003
Constitution, the 2006 Senate report titled Rwanda: genocide
ideology and strategies for its eradication defines genocide
ideology as a set of ideas or representations whose major role is
to stir up hatred and create a pernicious atmosphere favoring the
implementation and legitimization of the persecution and
elimination of a category of the population (Republic of Rwanda:
Parliament and the Senate, 2006:16).
In this paper, genocide ideology is defined as an ideology which
led to 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda and still bears a
high potential, if not checked upon, to lead to genocide. It is a set
of organized thoughts and beliefs which use ethnic identity as a
base, primarily for competition for power, but also for stirring up
hate, conflict and violence as the main strategy to attain set
objectives. It is rooted in the Hutu supremacy ideology as the core
component, and the denial of the genocide against the Tutsi as the
main branch.

19

Mouvement Dmocratique Rpublicain

107
Effects of the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi
Post genocide societies demonstrate a wide spectrum of effects
resulting from genocide that mostly survivors experience: physical
effects which mainly are described as physical damage such as
Sexually Transmitted Infections like HIV/AIDS, whereby
perpetrators of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi used rape as a
weapon of war leaving tens of thousands of women infected with
HIV ; economic effects which are commonly related to poverty;
and psychological effects whereby rape, HIV and trauma resulting
from genocide are hard to deal with; tearing of the social fabric
and social stigma that results from rape. HIV still poses a big
challenge to survivors carrying the disease.
Rape, HIV, Psychological Trauma and Economic Violence:
Throughout the world, rape is routinely directed against females
during situations of armed conflict. Rape in conflict is used as a
weapon to terrorize and degrade a particular community and to
achieve a specific political end. In these situations, gender
intersects with other aspects of a womans identity, such as
ethnicity, religion, social class or political affiliation (Arcel, Smalc
and Kovacic, 1995).
Rape and other forms of violence were directed primarily against
the Tutsi women during the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi,
because of both their gender and their ethnicity. During the
genocide, rape, gang rape, sexual torture, sexual slavery, and
forced marriage were used systematically as weapons against
between 250,000 and 500,000 women and girls (African Rights
2004; Amnesty International, 2004).
A study conducted by AVEGA, showed 66.7% women with HIV
(Amnesty International, 2004). Thus rape and HIV as a weapon of
war combine into a deadly cocktail that only serves to radically
increase the number of casualties of genocide. The increased
prevalence of HIV/AIDS also contributes to Post Traumatic Stress
Disorders (PTSDs).
When the genocide ended, many of the survivors were left with
nothing, children killed, women raped, husbands and relatives had

108
been killed, their homes taken or burned, their communities
destroyed, and their health compromised. Access to medical care
and counseling were non-existent immediately after the genocide.
Survivors were left to pick up the pieces, care for surviving
children, and cope with psychological trauma.
Survivors still struggle with the horrors suffered and witnessed
during the genocide. Psycho-social problems have become one of
the most serious public health issues. People still seek psychosocial services for counseling for mental problems. A survey
conducted by Psychosocial Consultation Services from April to
September, 2003, showed that ninety women and thirty men
between eighteen and forty years of age showed the main
problems shared by the survivors of the 1994 genocide and the
main psychological disorders which they experienced. This shows
that genocide has dramatically affected the lives of those who
experienced the atrocities- and a strong psychosocial impact
persists even up to now (Gasanabo, 2008).
It is evident that most of the traumas come from the 1994 genocide
against the Tutsi because of the pain heard and seen during
genocide. Women were more affected than men. Some believe
that this is so due to the fact that men were killed immediately
while women and girls were first raped, tortured and this
experience left psychological scars that would traumatize
survivors for eternity.
According to Jewkes, Sen & Garcia-Moreno (2002), heightened
fear, anger, anxiety, depression, loss of trust, flashbacks, and PostTraumatic Stress Disorder compose some of the psychological
effects. For children, some have failed to perform well in schools
due to mental disorders inherited from genocide. As Herman
(2001) puts it, trauma arrests the course of normal development by
its repetitive intrusion into the survivors life.
Root (1996), states that the physical effects interact with
psychological symptoms to complicate recovery from trauma.
McFarlane (1995) argues that beyond the immediate effect of the

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violence, the prolonged stress reaction of victims may take a toll
on their health.
The failure to find the remains of family members and relatives
makes it difficult for some survivors to grieve them properly.
Some have been burned, drowned in rivers, left to rot in toilets or
buried anonymously in mass graves. This lack of respect for the
dead is an additional source of psychological distress. For some
survivors who were not with their family when they died find it
hard to accept their death.
On a social level, genocide disrupted social cohesion within
communities. It destroyed trust between former neighbors. It also
created a breakdown in the social make-up of communal values
and norms. Genocide also destroyed the unity and brotherhood
that Rwandans had built and believed for centuries. Denying the
identity and promoting the ethnic violence and mass killing have
completely eroded social solidarity.
Genocide has made it impossible for survivors to socialize within
communities to which they previously belonged. They are among
so many who participated in the killings, are related to the
perpetrators or are unwilling to denounce them and tell the
survivors how their relatives died.
The 1994 genocide against the Tutsi did not spare the economy of
the country. During the genocide, Rwanda lost qualified human
resources and experts that would plan and prioritize projects for
development. All these deaths caused serious problems in the
Rwandan economy.
HIV/AIDS that resulted from rape during genocide poses an
additional consequence of genocide and has been a constraint on
survivors ability to reclaim their lives after genocide. Even when
survivors are capable of working, those with HIV/AIDS are in
desperate need of medical attention for treatment of HIV-related
problems including opportunistic diseases. Those who are
widowed are often left out without family income. The theft of
property and destruction of houses threw most of them, especially

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those in rural communities, into sudden poverty and took away the
anchor of a family home.
Genocide effects are closely tied to the genocide ideology which
incited people to commit genocide and it still accounts for the
many consequences of genocide. Two parliamentary reports
exclusively centered on the genocide ideology were released in
2004 and 2007, respectively. The 2004 report highlighted the
existence of genocide ideology all over the country, and attempted
a classification of its main ways and places of manifestation. The
report mentioned what it calls indicators of genocide ideology
including killings, persecution, genocide negation, and prevalence
in religious organizations, Non Governmental Organizations
(NGOs), schools and in political parties20.
By considering the above, what role does CNLG play in
addressing these consequences?
CNLG addressing effects of the 1994 genocide against the
Tutsi in Rwanda
Despite the efforts to promote the unity among Rwandans and all
the progress towards reconstructing Rwanda, some Rwandans
within and outside the country, as well as foreign observers, wish
to carry on the work of denying the 1994 genocide against the
Tutsi. Comments, articles, books on the internet deny or justify
those atrocities as well as discuss the so called double genocide
as a way of minimizing the genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda.
The above complicates the reconstruction process in Rwanda.
Changing the mentality of the former perpetrators is a process that
needs patience. This is so because the seeds of hatred among
Rwandans were sown for many years. Without sincere efforts to
address the genocide ideology, social effects as well as

20

Repubulika yu Rwanda. Inteko ishinga amategeko. Umutwe

wAbadepite, 2004

111
psychological trauma, the development for Rwandans is unlikely
to be a success.
As it has been noted, it is very rare if not impossible to have
genocide perpetrated without the established ideology to incite the
population to get involved in the killings. Uprooting this ideology
from peoples mentality can take ages. Despite the complexity of
the issue, CNLG has found it vital to implement memory and
commemoration as a way to deal with the genocide ideology.
Combating genocide
commemorations

ideology

through

memory

and

Rwandans have a duty to remember. The motive behind this

remembrance has nothing to do with perpetrating feelings of
hatred and vengeance. The purpose is rather to educate Rwandans
and whoever might be interested in designing the better future of
Rwanda. It is worth remembering that genocide was engendered
by racist ideas and teachings. Given the influence of these
teachings, CNLG is strictly committed to promote memory and
commemorations and through this, Rwandans will have a role to
play in reconstructing their country free of violence.
In order to restore social relations destroyed during the genocide
and to deal with psychological consequences, every year in April,
Rwandans commemorate the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi with
a national week of mourning to mark the first killings of April 7.
Ceremonies are held at memorial sites across the country. The
Genocide is remembered in speeches, testimonies and prayers, and
in the solemn reburial of human remains.
In the same regard, Rwandans attend conferences and meetings to
hear lectures about the history of the genocide. During the
commemoration period, civic education programmes stressing the
value of living in peace, in unity and in reconciliation are
supported and expanded at all levels of society to foster social
cohesion.
The banners repeatedly proclaim the annual commemorative
slogan, such as the theme for 2008 Genocide commemoration:

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Let us remember the genocide while fighting against its
ideology. The expressions Remember and Never forget and
the defiant promise Never again can be heard and seen all over
the country, particularly during this week of mourning.
CNLG finds that it is important to preserve the remains of the
genocide victims. Some memorial sites like Murambi have unique
remains of intact bodies on display. A decision was taken not to
bury the remains so that at least these should be preserved as a
lasting memorial in order to show the rest of the world what
happened in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide. The memorial site
acts as an educational centre, describing the history and events of
the 1994 genocide, and as a memorial centre, remembering all
those individuals who were killed at the site, testifying to the rest
of the world the events that took place in Rwanda and enforcing
the statement never again.
Because remains at Murambi memorial site were covered in
lime21, information related to Age, sex, weight, cause of death, the
presence and absence of clothes can easily be obtained there. The
intention behind this spectacle of mortal remains and borne
chambers is to fortify the struggle against the negation and
revisionism. These remains, with their visual traces of violence,
testify silently but unmistakably that the 1994 genocide against the
Tutsi in Rwanda happened. They show the form and scale of the
atrocities.
For CNLG, the memorials should primarily serve as clear physical
evidence of the genocide for future generations, especially to
prevent a diminishment or denial of the genocide. This view
accords with the Rwandan governments perspective that there
should be no doubt about the atrocities of the genocide. The
practice is particularly addressed to revisionists in Rwanda and
beyond, and to genocide perpetrators who refuse to confess past
wrongs committed during the genocide or only very reluctantly
acknowledge their roles.

21

Lime is a chemical that affects decomposition of remains.

113
In order to restore social relationships destroyed during genocide,
CNLG supports and promotes social networks. This is believed to
be a factor affecting the survivors coping capacity, because
traumatic life events invariably cause damage to relationships. As
Bracken and Pretty (1998) put it, people in the survivors social
world have the power to influence the eventual outcome of the
trauma and stigma. These two authors argue that a supportive
response from others may mitigate the impact of the event, while a
hostile or negative response may compound the damage and
aggravate the traumatic syndrome.
Belonging to an association or a social network helps survivors to
restore social relationships. Through these networks, survivors are
helped to overcome their sense of isolation and despair. CNLG
encourages Rwandans to support one another in order to foster
social relationships.
The philosophy behind CNLGs interest in promoting supportive
networks where every Rwandan would participate is to combat
ethnic divisions that characterized the past regimes. This interest
also is based on national unity built on an implicit discourse of
Rwandanness22 as an identity field.
Basing itself on the realities on the ground, CNLG finds it relevant
that in Post-Genocide recovery, survivors require the
establishment of income generating projects to enable the
survivors to become economically self-sufficient. CNLG, through
its Advocacy department helps some survivors to have access to
economic opportunity which is very critical in Post Genocide
society because, first, survivors are the primary caretakers of their
own children and other relatives; and secondly, some women who
were raped during the genocide are in desperate need of medical
attention for treatment of HIV that resulted from the 1994
genocide.

22

The new concept intends to motivate Rwandans picking an interest in

being Rwandans as opposed to ethnic groups that were promoted and
supported by colonial regimes with the intention of achieving their goals.

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Combating Genocide ideology through Education
Although Rwanda has shown fast development in its educational
and literacy policies since independence, it has largely remained a
profoundly oral society, where talks are preferred to books. The
past is orally transmitted from one generation to another. This past
is first of all personal, then family-related, and then village, or
region-related. Many Rwandans have a story to tell about
their years in exile, their suffering in the displaced camps, the
atrocious killings of their loved ones, the survival experience, the
missing of a relative, the crossing of the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC), etc. Many try to find the political reason why they
found themselves in that situation and by doing so, they
inform/intoxicate their children, towards whom they have the
parental duty of transmitting the familys past. Whatever political
teachings are prevailing, the parents will make sure they have
some time of privacy to tell their truths to their posterity.
The above illustration highlights the challenge of not having
common facts to share with the young generation as one helps
them to design a better future.
By way of addressing the above and other related problems the
Rwandan government, through CNLG, decided to put in place a
Research and Documentation Center on Genocide (RDCG). Five
themes have been chosen to guide research:
Antinegationism desk: Responsible for fighting against all kinds
of trivialization and genocide denial. Through this unit, the Center
is creating an International Network fighting against the denials;
History and society: Analyzing the historical, social, cultural and
territorial dimensions of genocide;
Genocide studies and prevention: Conducting research on the
nature and causes of genocide and its prevention as well as the
links between genocide and other human rights violations;
Post Genocide effects and recovery program Studies: Research
on genocide effects and recovery process: counseling, resilience
and growth;

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Interdisciplinary and comparative research on Genocide:
Conducting systematic, empirical, theoretical and comparative
research on genocide.
RDCG also has Gacaca in its attributions. On Monday, July 18,
2012, the Gacaca Court system officially closed. Judging around
1.5 million cases within ten years has been a remarkable
achievement. The process attracted several delegations from
throughout the world that came to learn from the Rwandan
experience as a country emerging from genocide.
Gacaca records serve as a reference for future generations of
Rwandans to understand the true history of their country. CNLG
has inherited the Gacaca documents. It has become apparent that
these documents must be kept for long lasting security and use.
CNLG has, thus, created a plan for their preservation.
Importantly, the relationship between the Centers contributions
and educating young Rwandans is worth noting. While CNLG has
an objective of educating all Rwandans, it places special emphasis
on the youth. CNLG believes that it is of crucial importance to
educate the youth as a way to Post-Genocide reconstruction. In
educating Rwandans CNLG also believes that the society can
begin to rebuild the mutual ties and positive communal relations in
society.
Accordingly, teachers, parents, should employ positive discipline
practices. The schools can guide children to participate in psychosocial behavior outside the school and provide them with
opportunities to assume responsibility and be helpful to others
within schools and outside. By guiding children to concern
themselves with the world around them and contribute to the
social good, the schools and parents can help children to become
socially responsible citizens.
Through education, CNLG channels its role to combat genocide
ideology where the young generation is taught the respect of
others and to be able to ignore the culture of divisionism that
characterized the Rwandan past regimes that promoted

116
discrimination among Rwandans. CNLGs Research and
Documentation Center will shed light from the findings and this is
hoped to contribute to education and policy change.
Through RDCG, CNLG is confident that having the right
message, the right audience, and the right channel to deliver the
findings from the research conducted on each of the themes
mentioned above, it is certain that people, institutions will listen
and probably things would change. The Center has the potential to
shape public awareness, and influence policy relevant to fighting
genocide ideology. Also the findings are expected to act as an
evidence-based approach for the CNLG in its struggles to fight
against genocide ideology and denial.
CNLG believes that the findings may serve to counter attempts to
deny or minimize aspects of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in
Rwanda. By drawing on the realities on the ground, this Center
demonstrates the potential in Rwanda for a collective
understanding of the genocide that emerges through dialogue and
education.
Challenges and Future Perspectives
Dealing with effects of Genocide as a challenging issue: Despite
the general positive contribution by CNLG in fighting against
genocide ideology and denial, evidence shows that most of the
perpetrators of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi still prefer to
deny their criminal acts despite the substantial evidence against
them. There is a need for multi-sector contribution and collective
understanding of genocide which are expected to foster effective
reconstruction.
In relation to the above, strategies designed to deal with social and
psychological consequences of genocide, where memory and
commemorations have been in place, some people in and outside
Rwanda still raise issues on who should be remembered and
forgotten (those who argue that there was a double genocide).
They ask what forms of remembrance should be used in postgenocide Rwanda. Dealing with such questions needs to work on

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genocide ideology by changing the mentality of Rwandans
through educating them about the importance of concentrating on
what will bring lasting peace in Rwanda.
Many survivors, both children and their parents or guardians, see
education as the only hope for a brighter and more productive
future, the best chance to give meaning and order to their lives.
For young survivors, attending school invariably means
overcoming crippling economic problems, disability or ill-health
and facing up to haunting memories, prejudice, and loneliness.
Closely connected to the above, some children survivors of the
1994 genocide against the Tutsi still experience mental disorders
resulting from genocide. This, to some extent, impacts negatively
their way of performance in school, particularly those whose
school fees and scholastic materials are covered by Fonds
dAssistance des Rscaps du Genocide (FARG). Considering that
every child survivor of genocide is not covered by FARGs
assistance, other children who have not managed to make it to
school are struggling with the hardships of life. CNLG as a
national institution responsible for survivors of genocide is
challenged by responding accordingly to such needs, which
sometimes go beyond its spheres of influence.
Dealing with effects of genocide requires a collaboration of
different institutions both within and outside Rwanda. In this
regard, the reality shows that some countries that host perpetrators
of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi are not willing to
collaborate with Rwanda in tracking genocide fugitives.
CNLG still on track
Despite the challenges that CNLG faces in the struggle to combat
genocide ideology and denial, it is still committed and believes
that these challenges generate opportunities and new aspects on
how to improve what has been done. To this end, CNLG has got
different projects related to conservation of Gacaca Archives and
memory, given their importance in fighting against genocide
ideology and denial.

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Preserving Gacaca Archives
After collecting information related to Gacaca trials, CNLG
considers this as a documentary wealth which will be used as a
proof that genocide against the Tutsi happened and that there is a
need for never again. It is however important highlighting that
these archives are in need of protection because they are the
documentary evidence of the memory of the genocide.
Conservation of these documents means that they need to be
digitally scanned, filed, and properly stored for posterity.
Also records management is needed. This is primarily concerned
with the evidence of the courts activities. What matters about
such management is the value of the records rather than their
physical format.
The objective of preserving Gacaca Archives is to provide a high
level of data security, and to make them accessible to the public
and for long-term conservation. By digitizing the documents,
CNLG will reduce the time for the transfer of documents between
offices and the physical space required for their preservation, on
the one hand, and keep documents readable and easy to reproduce,
on the other.
Long-term preservation of the remains at Murambi memorial
site and other sites
Mobile Anthropological Laboratory: In different memorial sites,
there are genocide proof including remains, clothes, shoes,
cooking materials, photographs, and instruments used in killing
Tutsi that need to be preserved. It has been 19 years since the
genocide, and this evidence, which is an essential tool in
combating genocide denial, is at serious risk of deterioration. In
support of preservation efforts, CNLG bought a Forensic Mobile
Laboratory with its associated equipment, together with 20 acrylic
coffins, worth RwF 168,062,882. This modern and sophisticated
equipment can be used in the preservation of genocide proof,
protecting evidence for more than 150 years. The Mobile

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Laboratory and the 20 acrylic coffins have already been installed
at the Murambi Memorial Site.
The laboratory is capable of being moved between sites as
required. It is proposed that its use commence at Murambi
memorial site. The construction of a mobile Anthropological
Laboratory ensures a permanent facility owned by CNLG which
is available for continued use at many sites in Rwanda for
forensic, preservation and conservation purposes. Additionally the
facility will be used for training and educational purposes by the
Rwandans.
It is important noting that the laboratorys function will include the
following:
The analysis of skeletal remains exhumed in the field;
Preservation and conservation of human remains;
Analysis of any associated artefacts;
Carrying out preservation and conservation of artefacts;
Housing and acting as a data centre for the capture of postmortem information to aid identification; and
Training.
Coffins: In the same way, CNLG proposes that on the basis of
flexibility and cost, the selected remains are contained in custom
manufactured see through acrylic coffins and the atmosphere in
the coffin eliminated by vacuuming down to eliminate the
presence air which would allow the re activation of damaging
processes. These coffins will be used on twenty sets of remains
selected. These twenty were selected because they are well
preserved. They include a total of 11 adults, male and female, and
9 children. In order to avoid any confusion around these selected
remains, CNLG will document all the data relating to the remains.
Each set of remains will be given a unique catalogue number and
all information regarding its location, treatment, observations, etc.,
will be recorded and filed. It is important that each catalogue
number is physically associated with the body it refers to. The
bodies cannot be marked, so a label should be attached to each
body using durable materials.

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The doors for CNLG and the Center are open for any individual or
institution for any collaboration as we continue the struggle
against genocide, genocide ideology as well address genocide
consequences.
References
1. African Rights (2004). Rwanda: Broken Bodies, Torn Spirits
living with genocide, rape and HIV/AIDS. A publication of
African Rights
2. Berry; John A. and Carol Pott Berry (eds.) (1999). Genocide
in Rwanda: A Collective Memory (Washington, D.C.: Howard
University Press).
3. Bracken, P.J. & Pretty, C. (1998)). Rethinking the trauma of
war. London: Free Association Books.
4. Buckley Zistel (2006); see also Helen Hintjens, PostGenocide Identity Politics in Rwanda.
5. Chrtien, J.P. (sous la dir.), (1995). Rwanda. Les medias du
gnocide, Paris : Karthala.
6. Gasanabo, J.D (2008). Rwandan Genocide: Sociological,
Economic and Psychological Consequences. New Delhi.
New Century Publication
7. Herman, J.L (2001). Trauma and recovery. London: Pandora
8. Jan Assmann, Das kulturelle Gedchtnis: Schrift, Erinnerung
und politische Identitt in frhen Hochkulturen, Beck,
Mnchen, 1997, p.56-61; on ritual and feast in general
9. Jewkes, R.; Sen, P. & Garcia- Moreno, C. (2002). Sexual
Violence. In: Krug EG (eds) World report on Violence and
health. Geneva, World Health Organization: 149-181.
10. John R. Gillis, Introduction: Memory and identity: The
history of a relationship, in Commemorations: The Politics of
National Identity, Princeton, NJ, 2004.
11. McFarlane, AC. (1995). The severity of trauma. Plenum Press,
New York.
12. Ministre de Ladministration Locale, du Devloppent
Communautaire et des affaires Socials. Dnombrement des

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Victims du Genocide. Rapport Final. Version Revises.
Rwanda: Kigal, Avril 2004.
13. Mugesera, A. (2004). Imibereho yabatutsi kuri Repubulika
ya mbere niya kabiri (1959-1990). Kigali : les editions
rwandaises.
14. Root, M. (1996). Ethnocultural aspects of posttraumatic
stress disorder. American Psychological Association:
Washington DC.
15. Rutazibwa P. (Ed.). (1999). Les Crises des Grands Lacs et la
Question Tutsi. Rflexions sur lidologie du gnocide dans la sousrgion. Kigali: ditions du CRID.

16. Rutazibwa, P. (2008). Eglise et ethnisme au Rwanda: le

Temps du Repentir? In Dialogue, n 184-185, Janvier-Mai
2008. Article repris dans : Rutayisire, P., Schreiber, J.P.,
Byanafashe , D. (sous la direction de). (2009). Les Religions
au Rwanda : dfis, convergences et comptitions. Actes du
Colloque International du 18-19 septembre 2008. Butare.

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