The Change OFWs Want in A Duterte Presidency
The Change OFWs Want in A Duterte Presidency
The Change OFWs Want in A Duterte Presidency
Telefax: (02)911-4910
Website: http://migranteinternational.org
Background
Migrante International congratulates President-elect Rodrigo Duterte on his overwhelming victory in the May 2016
polls. The Filipino people have spoken, and they chose change.
Dutertes sweeping victory is testament to how Filipinos, wherever we are in the world, thirst for a new leadership that
is not corrupt and cacique. The Filipino people want a new government that will depart from all the failures and empty
promises of the so-called tuwid na daan. The Filipino people want accountability for all the crimes committed by the
Aquino government against the Filipino people.
For these elections, despite and against all odds, a record-breaking 407,000 overseas Filipino voters exercised their right
to vote and fulfilled their duty to the nation. This big increase is proof of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) stake in the
outcome of the May 2016 elections. It disproved all claims that there had been a growing apathy among our OFWs.
OFWs have once again proven how significant the OFW vote is.
Migrante International is one with the Filipino nation in hoping that a Duterty presidency will immediately address
fundamental problems that beset the country widespread unemployment, lowest wages, contractualization,
landlessness, lack of basic social services, corruption, violations of human rights and national sovereignty the root
causes of forced migration.
Migrante International is one with all OFWs in hoping that Dutertes presidency will scrap the labor export policy that
exploits OFWs cheap labor and remittances but offers them nothing in return, especially in times of need. OFWs will
hold Duterte to his promise to make OFWs his top-most priority in the next administrations labor agenda. They want
new leaders who will be nurturing to OFWs and their families. OFWs want a new government that will uphold and
protect their rights and welfare.
President-elect Duterte specifically outlined the following major programs and policy-changes with regard the
improvement of the rights and welfare of OFWs:
- The creation of a Department of OFWs;
- Accountability of erring and abusive officials, illegal recruiters and traffickers;
- The creation of OFW banks; and,
- A tracking system by PH posts to immediately identify and assist OFWs in distress.
Context
President Benigno Aquino IIIs six years in office can only be characterized by the further intensification of a four-decade
long labor export policy that has been detrimental to the lives, rights and welfare of Filipino migrants and their families.
Before he came into office, Aquino boasted of a campaign platform filled with promises, a so-called action plan on
OFWs (overseas Filipino workers). He committed to create jobs at home and guarantee the welfare and protection of
OFWs, particularly through the enactment of better laws and policies, improvement of services of benefits, persecution
and punishment of illegal recruiters and traffickers and the implementation of a sustainable reintegration program.
Aquino further emphasized his supposed goal of domestic job generation so that there will be no need to look for
employment abroad, in effect relenting that massive unemployment and lack of local opportunities for livelihood are
key push factors for the phenomenon of forced migration of OFWs. He also ordered the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA), Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and the OWWA and other relevant agencies to be
more responsive to the needs and welfare of OFWs.
Six years after, the Aquino administration has recorded the biggest number of OFW deployment since the labor export
policy was implemented in the 1970s. Despite Aquinos posturing and promises, the Philippines continues to suffer from
a chronic economic crisis that has aggravated forced migration and cast Filipino migrants and their families to direst
straits.
The problem lies in the Aquino governments perpetuation of a semi-feudal semi-colonial economy through its refusal to
implement genuine land reform and national industrialization to generate decent domestic employment. Contrary to
this administrations pronouncements, the countrys economic situation has not improved under Aquinos policies. The
Philippine Development Plan (2011-2016) continues to rely heavily on foreign investment, export-import dependence,
debt and the so-called free market. Aquinos essential economic thrust is clear-cut: strict adherence to neoliberal
globalization by implementing programs such as the Private-Public-Partnership (PPP), and more recently, through a
proposal for a charter change to further pave the way for an unparalleled surrender of sovereignty and imperialist
plunder of national patrimony.
A more intensified and aggressive labor export policy has been far fully entrenched in the Aquino administration to
further produce and commodify cheap Filipino labor for the global market.
dollars that course through banks and remittance centers. To do this, it became more aggressive in lobbying for job
markets abroad in the past six years.
However, the so-called remittance boom does not necessarily translate to economic growth, nor does it automatically
translate to higher investments or economic relief for families of OFWs factors that are supposed to have contributed
greatly to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth iii. The latest 2015 BSP Consumer Expectations Survey on OFW
Expenditures also shows that OFW households allotted a major chunk of their remittances not for investments and
savings, but for basic and emergency needs and debt payments iv.
With the continuous spates of onerous price hikes of basic utilities, tuition fee increases and privatization of services and
hospitals, and in the wake of the devastation brought by supertyphoon Yolanda and other calamities, remittances are
expected to barely support families.
Further, although annual OFW remittances increased amid the global economic crisis, its growth rate has been
decreasing in recent years. From a 25% record growth in 2005, it dropped to a lowest 5.6% in 2009, a year after the
global economic erupted. In the US where 50% of remittances originate, the growth rate had decreased from 7.8% in
2008 to 7.3% in 2009. It had a slight increase to 7.9% in 2010 but has been suffering a steady decline since the US debt
crisis ensued.
A closer look at the trend in remittances during Aquinos term will show that there was a nominal increase in remittance
inflows, but its growth rate is another matterv. According to BSP records, the growth in OFW remittances slowed to a
five-year low last year. On November 2014, remittances were lower by 7% compared to Octobers growth rate, marking
the lowest expansion since January 2009. The BSP attributed the slow pace of growth to the depreciation of the
Philippine peso against the US dollar. However, the continuing decrease in growth rate is a constant worry for the
Aquino government. If the trend continues, the government will be in big trouble because remittances account for
approximately 9% of the GDP.
Under the Aquino administration, the number of OFWs leaving the country increased from 2,500 daily in 2009 to 4,884
in 2010, and increased further to 6,092 by early 2015, according to data from the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE). In 2013, POEA data showed that the Aquino government has breached the two million mark in deployment of
OFWs for a year, the highest record in history.
According to IBON, the number of OFWs deployed far outpaced the jobs generated domestically. Meanwhile, the
Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) reported that the number of locally employed Filipinos was only 1.02 million in 2014,
or an average of 2,805 additional employed in the country daily.
Aquino recently bragged about a supposed decrease in OFW deployment in recent years and attributed it to the national
economys inclusive growth. Indeed, POEA data showed that there had been a decrease in OFW deployment, but only
in the fourth quarter of 2014. According to POEA data, 1.7 million OFWs were deployed during the last quarter of 2014,
or 4,508 leaving daily. Deployment data nine months prior, however, pegged the number of OFWs leaving daily at 5,200.
So far, no government data is available on OFW deployment for the year 2015 to support Aquinos claimvi.
In the past six years, there had been a steady increase in the number of new hires and re-hires of land-based and seabased workers deployed. POEA data (2009-2013)vii clearly shows that the number of land-based workers deployed
increased by 34.52%, or by 32.93% for new-hires and 35.26% for re-hires. For seafarers, there was also an 11.11%
increase in deployment from 2009 to 2013. Combined with the growing number of irregular OFWs who leave the
country through backdoor means, even the overall government figure of deployment does not in any way support
Aquinos claim that migration has considerably lessened during his presidency.
Of present, overseas Filipinos are scattered in at least 239 countries situated in at least six continents, namely, Asia,
Australia, North America, South America, Africa and Europe. The biggest population is located in the United States (3.5
million based on the 2010 US Census); next is Saudi Arabia (1.8 million based on POEA data); and Canada (639,686 based
on Commission on Filipinos Overseas data). There is also a big concentration of Filipinos in the United Arab Emirates,
Australia, Qatar, Malaysia, Japan, United Kingdom, Hong Kong and Singapore. In the Philippines, about 50% of the total
population is remittance-receiving or OFW households. Data sourced from the latest 2012 Family Income and
Expenditure Survey (FEIS) shows that all income groups and households have OFWs. A majority of OFWs belong to
middle class families, specifically the lower middle class, while low and middle class families have a quarter each of
OFWs.
Majority of OFWs are still deployed in Saudi Arabia, UAE and Hong Kong. Most are in the service sector working as
domestic workers, hotel and restaurant staff and caregivers, in manufacturing as factory and production workers, while
a few tens of thousands are working abroad as professionalsviii ix.
Seafarers still constitute the biggest sub-sector of OFWsx. The Philippines is still one of the biggest maritime countries,
with Manila still in the list of the biggest most important ports in the world. According to the International Labor
Organization (ILO), the Philippines is still the top source of seafarers. An estimated 8,000 to 10,000 seafarers are added
to the total deployment every year.
In fact, OFW deployment has picked up considerably despite ongoing crises in host countries to date, policies such as
the Nitaqat or Saudization, stricter immigration policies and criminalization and deportation of millions of
undocumented OFWs. If the government is attributing a so-called reverse migration due to these factors, then it is
right on spot. Since 2010, thousands upon thousands of OFWs in distress have been deported or forcibly repatriated
back to the country due to civil unrests, calamities, economic instabilities and other similar factors in migrant-receiving
countries.
With the continuous repatriation of distressed OFWs from Saudi, Egypt, Syria and Libya, and the deportation of
undocumented OFWs in Europe, Canada and the United States, then a reverse migration phenomenon could be
expected in the coming months. But to attribute a reverse migration due to so-called inclusive growth is outright
deceitful and misleading. With the record-high unemployment rate and the lack of a comprehensive and sustainable
reintegration program for returning OFWs, a so-called reverse migration will not be tantamount to the Aquinos claim
that OFWs have been opting to come home for good. Filipinos will not be stopped from being forced to leave the
country in search for greener pastures abroad. And so the cycle continues.
Further, the Aquino administration contradicted itself on claims of supposed improved local job generation resulting in
reverse migration when it has further tailored the public education system for a more aggressive labor export
program.
The K to 12 education system of the Aquino administration systematically targets the countrys young labor force. It is
aimed mainly to reinforce cheap semi-skilled youth labor for the global market and would only mean more OFWs who
are younger and more trained to be docile, cheap laborers abroad in exchange for remittances.
According to the Department of Education (DepEd), the K to 12 will improve chances of youth employment since 18year-old graduates will be employable even without a college degree. The DepEd plans to achieve this through a socalled specialized Senior High program that focuses on a curriculum that will enable students to acquire Certificates
of Competency (COCs) and National Certifications (NCs)in accordance with Technical Education and Skills Development
Authority (TESDA) Training Regulations. These certificates, without doubt, will be in compliance with requirements for
overseas deployment, not much different, for example, from the Arroyo administrations TESDA-accredited
Supermaids program.
What the K to 12 system is doing is undermining the youths very significant role in nation-building. Instead, it is
boosting cheap semi-skilled youth labor through a so-called professionalization of the young labor force mainly for
labor markets abroad but unfortunately ignoring the very causes of forced migration namely, lack of local jobs, low
wages, landlessness and poor social services.
The youth suffer the highest unemployment incidence compared to other age groups. Almost half of the unemployed
are 15 to 24 years old while almost a third are 25 to 34 years old. Young workers, mostly semi-skilled, make up
approximately 10.7% of the total Filipino labor migration program.
Another systemic negative impact of the labor export policy is the social costs of migration.
Millions of families continue to be separated resulting in the heartbreaking social costs of migration. Children of OFWs
have been deeply affected by the conditions in which their parents or relatives are forced to work. The 2000 Census on
Population and Housing Various estimated the figure of children aged 0-14 at more than two million, while at least 15%
of Filipino families have children growing up without either a father or mother. With the continuously growing number
of OFWs leaving the country, this figure has surely increased tremendously.
While the government has recognized the serious social costs caused by extended physical separation of such as
psychosocial difficulties among children of OFWs, there is also a serious lack of action and assistance for them. Based on
Migrante Internationals work with children of OFWs, they are mostly unaware of the living and working conditions of
their parents or loved ones, particularly the difficulties they abroad. They feel abandoned and/or isolated from other
children. The lack of parental figures have pushed them to dropping out of school, drug addiction and other anti-social
activities.
chronically low wages, the CCT cannot be deemed as a main economic project that can and has redeemed families from
destitution.
Massive landlessness and bogus land reform
The Aquino administration is also second place in terms of poor land distribution among post-Marcos regimes. CARP, or
Republic Act 6657, was passed in 1988 by former Pres. Corazon Aquino as the centerpiece of her administrations
professed social justice legislative agenda. It was initially effective for 10 years and was extended for another 10. By its
deadline in 2008, some 1.2 million hectares of agricultural lands remained undistributed to farmers. It was further
extended through RA 9700, more popularly known as CARP with Reforms (CARPER), when Aquino took office in 2010.
CARPER was supposed to have expired last June 30, 2014.
The Philippines is now at the helm of implementing the longest-running, and most spurious, agrarian reform program in
the world. It comes as no surprise that despite protests and declarations from farmers that CARP had failed them, a
haciendero president like Aquino is still now advancing the passage of yet another law extending the effectivity of the
CARPER.
Now, after 27 years, CARP remains a failure, an insult to farmers and a bogus land reform scheme. These land struggles,
highlighted by the continuing toil of farmers and farm workers in the Aquino-Cojuangco-owned Hacienda Luisita,
intensified under the Aquino regime despite statements by DAR and Malacanang that claim otherwise. The fact is CARPs
failure is rooted in its very orientation. It is not about free land distribution, which is the core program of any genuine
land reform. It is not pro-farmer because it gives primacy to landlord compensation from the state whilst requiring
farmer-beneficiaries to pay for the very land that they have been tilling for generations. What it is, fundamentally, is an
agreement and connivance between the government, landlords and big corporations, with the government successfully
acting as comprador.
Inclusive growth for the rich
In truth, the supposed economic growth has not translated to economic relief for the people but rather to more wealth
for a privileged few. According to the National Statistical Coordinating Board (NSCB), poverty incidence in the country
remained unchanged, recording a 27.9% poverty rate in the first semester of 2012. Compared with the 2006 (28.8%) and
2009 (28.6%) first semester figures, the poor quality of life that minimum wage earners can afford has not improved at
all since Aquino took office.
The NSCB reported that 22 out of 100 families were estimated to be poor in the first semester of 2012 while 13 out of
100 Filipinos lived in extreme poverty during the same period. Based on the latest SWS survey last January 2014, 54% of
10.9 million families now consider themselves poor, with perception of poverty rising nationwide. According to a latest
survey by IBON, conducted from January 19 to 30, 2015, some 64.6% or more than six out of 10 Filipinos consider
themselves poor.
The gap between the rich and the poor has also further widened, with the income of the top one percent of families
equivalent to that of the bottom 30% of households (IBON). According to Forbes, 11 of the richest Filipinos made it to its
top billionaires of the world, enjoying a net worth of USD$13.2 billion as of March 2013xii.
To douse unrest and dissent and to evade responsibility, the Aquino administration, like previous administrations, has
resorted to a more aggressive and intensified policy to seek job markets abroad. Hence the Aquino administrations
active lobbying for job markets and signing of bilateral agreements with host countries in the past five years. Labor
export provides a tempting alternative to the unemployed and underemployed. The government is not obliged to
create jobs that offer decent wages.
Thus, the number of OFWs has increased significantly since Aquino took office. By 2012, at least one-fourth of the
countrys labor force has gone abroad to find work. According to the Labor Department, there are now 12 million OFWs
abroad. Migrante International pegs the number of overseas Filipinos between 12 to 15 million, to include
undocumented OFWs.
Six years of Aquino is undisputably the worst years for OFWs and their families because the economys dependence on
labor export has become unparalleled under the Aquino administration.
The situation has become so alarming that the US government, for non-altruistic reasons, had warned the Philippine
government to get its act together lest it remains under Tier 2 of the US Department of States Trafficking in Persons
Report.
In 2012, the Aquino regime pursued cosmetic reforms, among them signing the Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons
Act, which upgraded the Philippines to Tier 1, meaning that the country has complied with the minimum standards for
the elimination of trafficking.
The amended Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act, otherwise known as Republic Act 10364, defines trafficking of persons as
the the recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of
persons with or without the victims consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat, or use
of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having
control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or
sale of organs.
This definition of trafficking in persons sets a very thin line between human trafficking and illegal recruitment,
especially for our OFWs.
Government efforts have hardly scratched the surface of the anti-trafficking campaign, however much it lauds itself in
the media. For one, it only has 17 anti-trafficking prosecutors in the Department of Justice and 72 prosecutors in
regional DOJ offices.
And though it has set up the Inter-Agency Council against Trafficking in Persons (IACAT), it has only received and
persecuted a handful of human trafficking for investigation since 2010xiv. Compare this, for example, with an average of
1,500 cases, involving thousands of individuals, yearly that Migrante International receives, majority of which are related
to human and sex trafficking, illegal recruitment and drug-related cases.
The ratio of resolution of cases of human trafficking/illegal recruitment in agencies such as the IACAT or POEA are close
to nil, with most of perpetrators or recruitment agencies being given mere administrative sanctions only to be able to
operate again.
Also, many victims, with the help of Migrante International and other concerned organizations, have filed charges of
violations of RA 10364. Unfortunately, the government lacks the political will to fully address the cases. There are also
reports of immigration and police officers who are coddlers of trafficking syndicates but, so far, no public or government
official atany level has been prosecuted.
Budget cuts
Aquinos annual national budget is one concrete manifestation of the governments thrust to further intensify the
governments labor export policy while prioritizing profits over people.
During Aquinos term, funds for direct services for OFWs were slashed in the National Expenditure Program. For fiscal
year 2012, budget for OFWs only got a less than one percent share (0.17 %) in the P1.8 trillion national budget.
Direct services for OFWs from concerned agencies, namely specific items under the DFA, DOLE, POEA, Department of
Justice (DOJ) as lead agency of the IACAT, Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO) and the Office of the President (OP),
were decreased. Budget for OFW welfare and services in the said agencies suffered an 18% cut (P792 million) from
2011s sum of P3.8 million. This translated to a pitiful per capita spending of P261.83 for the 15 million overseas
Filipinos.
In his Presidentail Veto Message last December 2014, Aquino included the Legal Assistance Fund (LAF) in items in the
General Appropriations Act 2015 placed under conditional implementation and subject to the approval of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM). The presidential veto also called for a creation of a so-called special
fund for the LAF, suggesting that funds for the LAF will be sourced elsewhere other than what is stated in the law.
Republic Act 8042, amended by RA 10022, or the Magna Carta for Migrant Workers requires a P100-million LAF in the
annual national budget sourced from the following: P50 million from the Presidential Social Fund, P30-million from the
Contingency Fund of the President and P20-million from OWWA. Since 2010, only an average of P30 million has been
allocated for the LAF.
Moreover, based on DFA disbursement reports, the DFA has at least P6 billion unused funds from 2010 to 2013. A large
chunk of so-called savings were from the underspent allocations for the Overseas Absentee Voting (OAV) and the
Assistance to Nationals (ATN).
During the 2014 budget hearings, the Commission of Elections had expressed dismay over the Department of Budget
and Managements (DBM) scrapping of the proposed P89.6 million budget for OAV registration in the 2015 NEP. Since
2010, the Aquino government has not allotted a single additional centavo for the implementation of the OAV, it has
remained at P43.4 million since fiscal year 2010. This year, as previously in 2013, is a crucial year for OAV registration
and implementation due to the upcoming 2016 elections. Migrante International fails to fathom how the OAV budget
could have been underspent, or even how the government expects to reach as many overseas absentee voters for
2016 with the present OAV budget.
From 2010 to 2013, only 34% of the appropriations for the OAV was used. As for the ATN budget, disbursement totalled
only to P741 million while P19 billion was allocated for the budget item protection of national interest of Filipino
nationals abroad.
These were the same period when funds for the anomalous and unconstitutional Disbursement Acceleration Program
(DAP) were accumulated.
While funds for welfare and services for OFWs decreased, increases were made on the DOLE and POEA budgets mainly
for their marketing and job placement purposes despite declarations from Aquino in past SONAs that these agencies
would focus on local job generation and more incentives for returned OFWs to address forced migration.
One major consequence of budget cuts on OFWs direct services and welfare was the closure of ten embassies,
consulates and posts in different countries around the world. As of July 31, 2012, embassies in Caracas in Venezuela;
Koror, Palau; Dublin, Ireland and consulates general in Barcelona, Spain and Frankfurt, Germany have ceased to operate.
Embassies in Stockholm, Sweden; Bucharest, Romania; Havana, Cuba; Helsinki, Finland; and consulate in Saipan in
Northern Mariana Islands closed down on October 31, 2012.
In Tanzania, for example, where hundreds of Filipino seafarers are in jail for illegal fishing, there is no Philippine post.
The closest embassy OFWs in distress could run to is the Philippine embassy in Kenya. The embassy in Kenya, on the
other hand, covers 12 other African countries. In Saudi Arabia where there is an estimated 1.8 million OFWs there are
only two Philippine posts, an embassy in Riyadh and a consulate in Jeddah. Most of Migrante Internationals cases of
human and labor rights abuses, mysterious deaths, jailed OFWs and OFWs on death row are in Saudi Arabia. Posts in
Saudi Arabia have also been reported not accessible to Filipinos in Saudi provinces. Hong Kong and Singapore, with
more than 150,000 OFWs each, only have one embassy.
Needless to say, the closure of posts is highly impractical and outright insensitive to the plight of OFWs when the
Philippines aready has a shortage of posts abroad. It is unfortunate that the Aquino administration is assailing embassies
and consulates, the only support system of Filipinos abroad, for so-called austerity measures and at the expense of
welfare services for OFWs.
State exactions
Under Aquinos term, state exactions from OFWs were further institutionalized and aggravated through Aquinos signing
of Administrative Order 31. AO 31 legalizes state exactions and taxation on OFWs by effectively calling on all
government heads and agencies to rationalize the rates of their fees and charges, increase their rates and impose new
fees and charges.
Since 2010, the government had imposed numerous other fees from OFWs pre- and post-departure the increase in epassport fees, mandatory Pag-Ibig contributions, Philhealth premium cost hike, mandatory medical insurance, Affidavit
of Support fees, to name a few.
A study by Migrante International estimated that the Aquino government collected an average of at least P26,267 from
every overseas Filipino worker (OFW) processed by the POEA in 2010. This amount was higher than the average P18,000
the government collected before 2010. If 4,500 OFWs left daily to work abroad, the government earned an average
P124 million a day, or roughly P45.26 billion in 2010, from processing fees and other costs shouldered by OFWs.
With the recent increases in the Philhealth premium, NBI clearance fees, e-passport fees, and the mandatory insurance,
among other requirements for the Overseas Employment Certificate (OEC), the average cost for every OFW predeparture has reached an average P30,000 by 2014xv.
Aside from hikes in costs of requirements for the OEC, other fees and tax schemes being imposed on OFWs include the
P550 terminal fee, the affidavit of support (AOS) in UAE, Macau and some parts of Europe and the discriminatory P75
Comelec certificate of registration, other onerous fees charged to seafarers and entertainers, and House Bill 3576
dubbed as the forced remittance bill, sponsored by OFW Family Partylist Rep. Roy Seneres.
Ironically and unsurprisingly, the further institutionalization of state exactions and tax impositions have not translated to
improved welfare services for OFWs in distress. Unresolved cases of OFWs continue to pile up at the POEA, National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), OWWA, the DFA and POLO-OWWA in Philippine posts abroad. OFWs are plagued
with an assortment of issues and problems throughout the entire migration cycle. The Aquino governments ability to
uphold and protect the rights and welfare of OFWs in distress has lagged behind its apparent success in money-making
schemes.
State exactions have caused OFWs and their families to become debt-ridden, contributing greatly to the widespread
landlessness, joblessness and poverty of many. It is not unheard of for peasant families to mortgage or sell their small
parcels of land or to submit their children to unpaid labor just to be able to pay loan-sharks or produce the sum needed
to pay for exorbitant pre-departure and placement fees.
Dismal rights and welfare program
The Aquino government has highly praised itself for its supposed efforts to work with labor-receiving governments to
formulate both formal and informal agreements meant to ensure that OFWs conditions are within nationally- and
internationally-accepted standards. These, however, are more wishful thinking than reality.
The efforts and outcomes are uneven. On one hand, efforts are systematic, sustained and deliberate on regulatory
matters facilitating the departure of OFWs and receipt of remittances. These have resulted in record numbers of
Filipinos overseas. On the other hand, efforts are spotty, partial and erratic on matters relating to giving migrants
protection and support at home or abroad.
There is even a lack of accurate, comprehensive and timely information about migrant workers. During the height of
repatriation efforts in Syria in 2012, for example, the OWWA and the DFA offered conflicting information on the average
deployment costs needed to negotiate with Syrian employers for the release of OFWs from their contracts. The OWWA
said that it had set the average deployment costs at USD$2,500 per OFW while the DFA pegged it at USD$3,000 to
USD$4,000. Even the figures for total population of OFWs in Syria did not match. The same case can be said in the
ongoing repatriation of stranded OFWs in Saudi Arabia. Simply put, efforts will continue to be futile if concerned
agencies cannot even agree on basic facts.
All these highlight the steady rise of violations of migrants rights. Many OFWs and migrants organizations have gone so
far as to characterize the government as criminally negligent in its repeated failure to take primary responsibility in
protecting migrants and their families. Despite these, the Aquino government continues to promote labor export. While
it is true that compared to other labor-sending countries the Philippines has a relatively sophisticated and welldeveloped legal framework to protect the rights and welfare of migrants and their families, this has largely been pushed
by force of circumstance of the rapidly increasing numbers of OFWs that have been victimized by violations of rights and
the resounding clamor of a growing number of OFWs, their families and advocates who have managed to organize
among themselves.
Even measures deemed significant by government such as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act,the AntiTrafficking in Persons Act and the Overseas Absentee Voting Act have not been implemented and fulfilled systematically
under the Aquino administration. Cosmetic reforms are certainly no match to gargantuan problems emanating from the
labor export policy, rendering these laws toothless, if not inutile. Hence, no amount of legislation can offer full
protection, much less deter recurring problems of maltreatment, insufficient social and welfare services, government
failures and violence against OFWs.
Misuse, abuse and corruption of OWWA funds
The OWWA Omnibus Policies (OOP) or OWWA Resolution No. 038, passed and implemented on September 19, 2003, for
instance, continues to be in force to this day.The OOP stipulates the renewal of OWWA membership per contract.
Before the OOP, a one-time contribution of the $25 membership fee meant a lifetime membership for OFWs. When the
OOP was implemented, failure to pay and renew the $25 mandatory contribution per contract (usually every two years)
meant that an OFW is not entitled to programs and welfare services by the OWWA.
The OOP also limits the benefits and welfare services entitled to OFWs among its provisions are the termination of
OWWA membership upon expiration of employment contract; restriction of voluntary membership to two years;
selective repatriation of migrant workers in times of crises, epidemics and wars; and the granting of the sole deciding
authority to the OWWA Board of Trustees with regard the management of OWWA funds.
Also, the OOP discriminates against OFWs according to status. Under the OOP, only active members of OWWA could
avail of the services and benefits consisting of a life insurance for natural death, insurance for accidental death, disability
benefits, scholarship programs, repatriation andreintegration. Others, such as medical insurance and health benefits,
have either been privatized or taxed from OFWs and/or employers.
The OOP has since been declared anti-migrant and a money-making scheme. Support mechanisms should be put in
place to accommodate welfare needs of OFWs and their families, regardless of status. This is the OWWAs constitutional
mandate. Even OFWs who were terminated, have become undocumented or those who have decided to come home for
good should be entitled to OWWA benefits.
Unfortunately, the OOP has been recently been institutionalized and enacted into law by Aquino through the OWWA
Charter Act or Republic Act 10801.
There is also a lack of comprehensive and sustainable reintegration program for returned OFWs. What the Aquino
government offers are mere dole-outs and band-aid solutions that are not long-term solutions to unemployment, low
wages and lack of social services.
Most of the governments reintegration programs for returned OFWs are made up of loans and one-time livelihood
programs. Most recently, returned OFWs from Libya, Syria and Saudi Arabia have been complaining about the P2 billion
OWWA reintegration program that Aquino inaugurated in 2011 because of its stringent requirements for collateral and
onerous interest rates.
Aquino also failed to investigate allegations of misuse and corruption of the OWWA funds. The plunder case filed against
former president Arroyo for misuse and corruption of OWWA funds, for instance, was initiated by private citizens
andorganizations and not the Aquino administration.
Migrante has long been calling for a full audit and an immediate and independent investigation of OWWA funds in
light of many unresolved issues of abuse, misuse and corruption.
In 2011, a report by the Commission on Audit (COA) revealed that OWWAs overseas officers failed to remit more than
P21 million in collections to OWWAs Land Bank-Manila dollar account during the last ten years. The Land Bank also
charges a 1% management fee per annual deposits made by the OWWA. This contradicts reason: money deposited to
the bank should be earning interest and not the other way around. If so, where did the money go?
In 2006, then AFP Chief of Staff Roy Cimatu botched a rescue mission funded by OWWA during the Lebanon crisis. The
OWWA released P150 million for the repatriation of OFWs but out of the 6,000 OFWs there, only 1,000 were repatriated
by Cimatu. The incident prompted several Senate hearings and it was then discovered that P6.8 billion of OWWA funds
were transferred to the Development Bank of the Philippines and Landbank of the Philippines (P3.4 billion each) without
any consultations with the OFW sector.
Former solicitor general Atty. Frank Chavez also filed a case at the DOJ against former president Gloria Arroyo for alleged
misuse, re-channel and charge to OWWA funds various projects that had nothing to do with OFWs, among them the
supposed evacuation of Filipinos from Iraq, Kuwait and Afghanistan in 2003. No actual evacuation took place.
These cases remain unresolved and shelved, and calls for a full audit have been ignored by the Aquino administration.
Double standard foreign policies
Throughout his presidency, Aquino has been criticized for his double standard foreign policies. More often than not,
such policies have had direct effects on the welfare and well-being of OFWs in their host countries.
In the case of the Sabah dispute, the Philippine governments passivity and lack of political will to protect national
interest virtually emboldened and gave license to Malaysian forces to attack and launch violent crackdowns on Filipino
nationals.
Sabah is one of the most common destinations of trafficked Filipinos, mostly women. It is also one of the most common
transit points of trafficked Filipinos on their way to other parts of Asia. As a result of the Aquino governments refusal
to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Sabah claim, crackdowns conducted by the Malaysian government against Filipinos
became more rampant.
In its handling of the Sabah conflict, the Aquino government exposed its double standards and contrasting motivations
and interests vis a vis the Spratlys and Panatag Shoal issues. It remains aggressive in the Spartlys issue to promote and
justify increased US troops presence in the Asia-Pacific region while it is passive in the Sabah issue to appease Malaysia
which plays a lead role in the ongoing peace negotiations between the MILF and the Philippine government.
The same can be said on how the Aquino government handled the conflict with Taiwan with regard the alleged killing of
a Taiwanese fisherman by the Philippine Coast Guard in 2012. OFWs in Taiwan suffered the backlash of the Aquino
governments callous, incompetent and undiplomatic handling of the issue. The Aquino government attempted to justify
the killing by asserting that the Taiwanese fisherman poached on Philippines seas. Only later did it conduct an
investigation when OFWs in Taiwan were getting the brunt of attacks.
On the other hand, the Aquino administration was lenient with the US Navy for damaging the Tubbataha reefs. Aquino
said that the US Navy showed sensitivity by apologizing. He also refused to address questions on the US ships
presence in Philippine seas and instead said that he saw no reason to involve the contentious Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA) in the Tubbataha issue.
While continuously harping on how the government is ready to defend sovereignty amid territorial disputes, Aquino
nevertheless showed his puppetry and subservience to US economic and territorial interests.
The Change OFWs Want to See: Radical Changes and Reforms for OFWs
Proposals and recommendations to President-Elect Duterte
To genuinely address the problem of forced migration, economic policies should focus on developing the national
economy by advancing local industries, agriculture and basic services.
Migrante International fully supports the call and struggle for national industrialization and genuine land reform as the
ultimate solution to the problem of forced migration and to end the labor export program. These are the fundamental
changes and reforms OFWs want to see in a Duterte presidency.
Towards this goal, OFWs present the following 10-point doables that President-elect Duterte can implement with
political will within his first 100 days to serve as confidence-building measures with the OFW sector, to wit:
1. Prosecute outgoing Pres. Benigno Aquino IIII and DBM Sec. Florencio Abad for allegations of re-channeling and
utilizing OFWs Legal Assistance Funds to the anomalous Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP), as well as
other counts of criminal neglect against OFWs, particularly in the case of Mary Jane Veloso and OFWs who have
been executed abroad under Aquinos term;
2. Conduct a full and independent audit of alleged abuse, misuse and corruption of OWWA funds, from the term of
former Pres. Arroyo to present;
3. Immediately order the release of OWWA funds to thousands of righful OWWA claimants;
4. Recall all abusive and erring officials in all PH posts, especially Ambassador Ezzedin Tago of Saudi Arabia and
Consul General Roberto Manaol of Indonesia;
5. Revamp all involved officials in the tanim-bala extortion scheme, from officials to personnel of the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) and
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA);
6. Investigate notorious recruitment agencies and their coddlers in government, and prosecute and hold criminally
accountable convicted traffickers, particularly, Kristina Sergio and Julius Lacanilao, traffickers of Mary Jane
Veloso, and Isidro Rodriguez, trafficker of at least 300 Filipino teachers;
7. Re-establish all PH posts closed down by the Aquino government, and create new posts where there is an
existing clamor by OFWs, particularly in Nagoya, Japan and Alberta, Canada;
8. Revoke the imposed P550 terminal fee and abolish the irrelevant and money-making Overseas Employment
Certificate (OEC);
9. Revoke the POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seamen; and,
10. Push for the inclusion of CAHRIHL, international conventions and norms, obligations of states under
international law to respect the rights of migrants and labor in school curricula.
Below are other policy changes and government actions that OFWs are pushing in the Duterte administration:
On accountability of erring and abusive officials:
Conduct a full revamp of embassy officials and PH posts whose track records indicate dismal welfare services and
protection of OFWs, particulary Saudi Arabia and other parts of the Middle East;
Investigate and prosecute abusive and erring officials in the exercise of their duties,
Create a peoples monitoring system on the conduct of government officials as mandated by RA 8042.
On OWWA funds:
Increase funds for on-site services, OFW shelters here and abroad, and expand services and benefits to all migrant
workers and OFWs in distress, regardless of status;
Investigate the alleged misuse and diversion of OWWA funds, anomalous investments, electoral fraud and corruption;
Investigate OWWA Funds sourced from the US$25 contributions and interest income of investments; the anomalous
investment of the Smokey Mountain Participation Project Certificate (SMPP); unremitted OWWA collections and unliquidated cash advances; and, loans extended to government and recruitment agencies, among others;
Investigate funds allotted to the P2-billion reintegration package inaugurated by the present administration;
On illegal recruitment and human trafficking:
Push for an independent body to track down and investigate trafficking syndicates and erring recruitment agencies and
push for their speedy prosecution and the imposition of stiffer penalties;
Conduct extensive education information and dissemination on illegal recruitment and trafficking from the barangaylevel and up, and;
Push for an independent investigation of the involvement, directly or indirectly, of government officials, especially those
from TESDA, DOLE, POEA, OWWA, BI, NAIA, airports and ports and DFA.
On OFWs in jails and on death row:
Increase the annual P100M Legal Assistance and P100M Repatriation Fund for migrant workers and OFWs in distress
through the General Appropriations Act as mandated by Republic Act 8042 or the Magna Carta for Overseas Filipinos
and Migrant Workers Act of 1995, as amended by RA 10022;
On protection of land-based OFWs in distress:
Establish Philippine posts and labor and welfare posts in countries where there are none, additional posts in countries
with large concentration of OFWs, and the re-institution of posts that were closed down due to the present
administrations austerity measures;
Establish a special court for migrant workers;
Create support mechanisms that will ensure easy access to justice for OFWs here and abroad;
Push for additional labor arbiters, hearing officers and lawyers here and abroad;
Indemnify all victims and their families, including filing of cases against abusive and erring officials with the Ombudsman,
the Committee on Human Rights and other legal remedies; and
Create a migrants desk at the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and establish additional POEA adjudication
offices in provinces.
Push for more accessible and fund-assured protective mechanisms for women and minors to include interventions, legal
representation and litigation costs; and push for the establishment of additional safe shelters for women and minors
with in-house social workers, doctors, psychiatrists as support services to victims of rape and sexual abuse and
maltreatment.
On protection of seafarers:
Establish on-site programs in concerned Philippine Embassies and Consulates;
Conduct dialogues concerning mechanisms to ensure protection of seafarers with concerned governments and the
International Transport Federation (ITF) where major destination seaports are located (Singapore, Rotterdam in The
Netherlands, Hamburg in Germany, Hong Kong); work closely with existing church institutions with seafarer ministries
and other NGOs for easy access of social services including on-site visits in their ship carriers;
Enact a genuine Magna Carta for Seafarers, in compliance with the newly ratified International Maritime Convention
(2006).
Migrante International firmly believes that a Department of OFWs should be committed and oriented towards these
goals. It is very open to work closely with the Duterte administration to ensure that this thrust is realized in the next six
years. It will continue to push for genuine participation and representation of OFWs in government to ensure the
realization of this thrust.
A genuinely progressive and socialist society should work towards the eradication or necessity of such a department,
and instead, strive for a society in which families do not need to be torn apart just to survive. ###
ANNEX
i
ii
Amount of Remittance
$18.76 Billion
$20.12 Billion
$23.80 Billion
$25.1 Billion
$26.93 Billion
$29.7 Billion
2012
42.6%
9.2%
8.1%
5%
2013
9,905.5
879.9
2,109.7
1,320.5
2014
10,374,084 (43%)
4.7%
4.5%
4.1%
903.6
1,263.2
1,063.9
309.9
622.5
555.3
981,882 (4%)
1,714,446 (7%)
1,178,262 (5%)
2,525,882 (10%)
1,394,706 (6%)
490,971 (2%)
694,095(3%)
472,081(2%)
iii
Relationship of Remittances to Other Philippine External Income(Source: BSP, ADB, WORLD BANK, DOT, INQ7)
iv
vi
vii
viii
ix
2010
2011
2012
2013
41,835
61, 598
54,617
53,840
1,439
10,706
7,242
154,535
1,122
120,647
4,440
341,966
4,950
14,115
8,932
201,512
1,757
141,215
3,641
437,720
3,241
13,960
9,346
222,260
1,563
146,448
7,140
458,575
1,947
12,893
9,220
230,030
2,233
147,776
6,949
464,888
2012
2013
96,583
12,082
8,789
8,606
12,133
7,833
8,407
9,293
5,059
142,689
17,236
12,238
9,826
6,847
7,010
9,177
10,101
8,026
155,831
15,655
14,892
10,575
10,493
9,987
9,657
9,128
8,213
164,396
16,404
14,823
9,539
12,082
11,892
8,594
6,466
7,767
4,399
168,782
341,966
5,287
209,283
437,720
6,344
207,800
458,575
7,090
205,835
464,888
xi
xii
xiii
Executive Summary of Death Row/Candidates for Death Row/Jailed Cases of OFWs being handled by Migrante International
(Updated as of June 7, 2015)
Profile of the cases:
Migrante International is currently handling and monitoring 18 cases involving 35 overseas Filipinos (11 women and 24 men) in six countries
(Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Iran, China, Indonesia). Majority of whom (13) are in Saudi Arabia.
The nature of the cases are:
1. Drug-related: 5 (Veloso, Aquino, San Juan, Madurog, Mayari)
2. Murder: 6 (Rosario et al, Zapanta, Gonzales et al, Cruzado, Dacanay, Dalquiz,)
3. Embezzlement: 2 (Azares, Matibag)
4. Homicide: 1 (Magtoto)
5. Others: 21 (Theft - Parilla, Serious physical injury - Sia, Human trafficking - Carbonel, Immorality - Lalis)
Death row: 7 (Veloso, Zapanta, Gonzales brothers, Arcilla, Dalquiz, Rosario)
Candidates for death row: 3 (Dacanay, Madurog, San Juan)
Jailed (life imprisonment/serving jail terms): 25 (3 life imprisonment)
Of the five drug-related cases, four were victimized by drug syndicates. Interestingly, one of these cases (San Juan) involves a licensed recruitment
agency (First Select, still in Philippine Overseas Employment Administrations roster of licensed agencies and currently operating). Of these cases,
two were already given convictions: Veloso was meted the death penalty while Aquino was given life imprisonment. The others are still under trial
but two (San Juan and Madurog) are most likely to be given death sentences due to the volume of drugs reportedly found in their belongings as per
existing laws in their respective host countries (KSA and China).
Of the murder cases, three admitted to the crimes on account of self-defense Dalquiz and Rosario were almost raped by their assailants while
Zapanta was beaten up by his employer because of his failure to pay rent. They are presently in different jails abroad as death convicts. In the case
of Rosario etal, the four OFWs from whom Rosario asked for help were sentenced to several years of imprisonment. Zapanta was asked to raise
blood money, the deadline of which has already lapsed in November 2013. Cruzado, on the other hand, was provoked by her victim. She was
sentenced to life imprisonment.
The Gonzales brothers, Arcilla and Dacanay all vehemently denied the charges against them. In the Gonzales et al case, one of them was forced to
confess to the crime after they were tortured during police interrogations. Because of this, three of them were given capital punishment. In the
case of Dacanay, she firmly claimed innocence and said that she was a victim of attempted rape by the real perpetrators. Her case is still under trial
but the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) admitted in a dialogue with Migrante and her mother Editha that she is a candidate for death row.
Of the two cases of embezzlement, Matibag is still serving several years of imprisonment while Azares has already finished his jail term but remains
in prison because his company is awaiting payment of the amount he was accused of stealing. Both of them denied the accusations.
Of the other cases, three were already handed out convictions. Magtoto was sentenced to life imprisonment with a blood money of SR300,000;
while Carbonell, whose violation was raised from illegally picking-up passengers to being implicated on human trafficking, was sentenced to
one-year imprisonment.
The other cases are still on trial.
Philippine Governments response to the cases:
Based on the information gathered by Migrante through its interventions, the DFA and consular offices did too little, too late in securing and
ensuring the rights and welfare of these Filipinos. They also gave limited and impassive attention to the concerns of the families who continue to
desperately seek their assistance:
1. Absent representation and intervention in the period of arrest and investigation. In almost all of these cases, the concerned embassies failed to
assist or visit the apprehended OFWs to ascertain their conditions, secure their rights and provide sufficient legal assistance and advice.
In the case of Veloso, the Philippine Embassy in Jakarta was only able to visit Mary Jane on July 28, 2010, three months after her arrest
and a month after Indonesian authorities informed them that the investigation had been completed and the case files had been turned
over to the public prosecutor (June 24, 2010). It was only on the last visit that they were able to hear/get her account.
Worse, in the case of Rosario etal, the Philippine Consulate in Jeddah refused to take custody. According to Rosarios account, when he
stabbed the two men who were forcing him to have sex with them in self defense, he immediately ran, bruised and bleeding, to the
Consulate. Because he was denied custody and assistance he went to his friends instead.
2. No private lawyers were provided during the phase of prosecution. They relied mostly on the counsels supplied by the governments of the host
countries. The general pattern of these cases show that the Philippine government only hired private lawyers AFTER the convictions have been
meted out. In all of these cases, the Philippine government only procured private legal services for capital offenses and none were given for the
relatively minor crimes. In almost all instances, they failed to provide competent translators, as in the case of Veloso.
In the case of Aquino who was arrested on 3 October 2009, he was advised by the fiscal (November 15, 2009) that if he still had no
defense lawyer within 20 days the court would hand down a sentence of 10 to 20 years imprisonment. This urgent concern was
immediately relayed by the family and Migrante to the Philippine Embassy and DFA. The Embassy simply replied that, based on their
knowledge, the Iranian government provides legal assistance to foreigners and that they expect the same assistance will be provided to
him. They also mentioned that they have not yet been informed if the case had already been brought to court and that they still needed
to verify the imminent verdict.
In the case of Gonzales etal, they were only given a private lawyer to appeal their case two years after they were arrested (April 2006)
and almost a year (April 2008) after the verdict was delivered (July 2007). The family held much hope in the appeal because there were
strong evidences to support their innocence. Surprisingly, the Court of Appeals upheld the death sentences on the Gonzales brothers and
Arcilla and increased the jail terms of the others from 8 to 10 years.
3. In cases where OFWs were given the death penalty or life imprisonment, the common track of the Philippine government was to appeal for
executive clemency while not considering other possible legal options when there are strong indications that the OFWs were/are innocent. In
the case of Veloso, for instance, it had not been clear what grounds were stated in the appeals made by Pres. Aquino to Pres. Widodo, if they were
based on assertions of her innocence and being a victim of drug syndicates or simply perfunctory written appeals. Statements made by the
Indonesian Attorney General during Aquinos last-minute appeal that signified the Philippine governments intent to make Veloso a witness against
her traffickers (Why only now?) strongly suggest otherwise.
In the case of Veloso, when the Indonesian Supreme Court upheld the death sentence, Pres. Aquino only sent a Letter of Clemency
(August 2011) to President Jokowi and did not instruct the embassy to strategize thoroughly for a judicial review despite proposals to
explore the trafficking angle from Velosos embassy-hired Indonesian lawyers. The first petition for judicial review was only made in
January 2015. The petition was denied due to lack of merit and did not pursue the track that Mary Jane was a victim of drug trafficking
syndicates.
This limited strategy was also employed to cases involving blood money. The Philippine government came in only during the stages of
having to raise the blood money (usually costing millions of pesos), again after conviction, instead of exploring ways to acquit or reduce
the sentences of the OFWs. This track, prevalent in cases in the Gulf region, placed the sole burden of raising blood money on the families
or private entities (as in the case of Dondon Lanuza) and, in fact, absolved the Philippine government from any responsibility.
In the case of Zapanta, the aggrieved family pegged a blood money worth SR5 million or roughly P55 million, an amount impossible to
acquire by the Zapanta family (or any common family) who are poor farmers from Central Luzon. The Philippine government-hired lawyer
did not pursue the self-defense argument and did not engage the many witnesses that would have supported Zapantas claim. Instead,
what the DFA did was to open a bank account calling on the public to help raise the blood money, and left it to the family to monitor and
organize fund-raising efforts. Zapanta himself, in an interview with the local media last year, said that he was resigned to his fate and that
any and all funds that could be raised just be given to other OFWs on death row.
In the case of Cruzado, the Philippine embassy did not appeal her case on grounds of her mental state. While in prison, she suffered a
mental breakdown and is still presently undergoing treatment. The Philippine Embassy in Kuwait is well aware of her situation. Although
her death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment, her family, who only subsists on vending cooked corn, does not have any means
to pay the blood money worth KD10,000.
4. Families of the jailed OFWs were kept in the dark and were not actively engaged in the processes of the cases. In several incidents, DFA legal
officers were not sensitive to the situation of the families some even resorted to derogatory insinuations.
In all of these cases, because of the desperation and grave concern of the families for the security and welfare of their loved ones, they
regularly visited or called the DFA to request for updates and/or report any information that they were able to gather. But the case
officers just dismissed them/their reports with the following standard responses: (1) they do not have updates; (2) to just follow-up
again; and/or, (3) the person in charge is away/on leave/not present, instead of giving them substantial advice on how they can
coordinate with the government in the resolution of the cases of their loved ones.
In the case of Dacanay, her mother only knew of her predicament a month after her arrest through a phone call from a friend. Since then,
she went back and forth to the DFA and other government offices since July 2013 until early of this year but was not able to get any
substantial response. She was even able to meet Philippine Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Ezzedin Tago last year but again was not supplied
any information. It was only through a dialogue facilitated by Migrante with DFA officials and DFA case officers last March 24 that they
revealed Dacanays case status as candidate for death row. They agreed to provide a written report to the family but are yet to fulfill
their promise.
In the cases of Aquino and Veloso, relatives experienced derogatory insinuations from DFA personnel. DFA legal officer Bert Manayao
told Aquinos mother that her son should suffer in prison even though his case is still being heard. DFA legal officer Patricia Mocom, after
failing to assist the Veloso family in their passport applications, belittled the familys financial capacity to travel.
Conclusions and Recommendations:
1. There is a general state policy of neglect and apathy for OFWs facing criminal charges abroad, and their families.
2. OFWs facing criminal charges are denied due process and criminalized EVEN BY the Philippine government.
3. Philippine government comes in only AFTER conviction, and even then, selective assistance is only limited to cases meted capital punishment.
4. The DFA has not been transparent, and in majority of these cases clueless, in the on-goings and processes faced by OFWs from the time of
arrest to conviction. Most of these cases they learned only UPON REPORT to the DFA of the families themselves, instead of the other way around.
5. Philippine government should actively evaluate what it can do domestically legally as part of legal assistance for OFWs, especially those
victimized by illegal recruiters and traffickers, as in the Veloso case.
6. Philippine government should conduct a transparent FULL AUDIT of how funds for legal assistance (LAF) and assistance to nationals (ATN) are
utilized for these cases, as stipulated in Republic Act 8042, amended by RA 10022, or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.
Particularly, there is an urgent need to investigate why the intended allocations for the LAF have been decreasing since 2010, as well as the
Presidential Veto of the LAF for the 2015 national budget.
7. Congress is urged to also look into the closure of at least 10 Philippine posts/embassies in 2012, supposedly as part of the governments
austerity measures. The closure of Philippine posts in some countries has a direct negative effect on the provision of legal assistance to OFWs
facing criminal charges abroad.
8. Congress is urged to summon, investigate and sanction negligent and callous embassy and DFA officials who treat OFWs and their families
seeking legal assistance as mere nuisances. On the other hand, there is a need to increase and train more competent and compassionate case
officers and embassy officials in the spirit of genuine public service. ###
xiv
P80,000 to
P120,000 per
shipping containerxv
1.2 billionxv
ii.
Charge (in
pesos)
iii.
Standard in the
Philippines (in
pesos)xv
iv.
Exaction (pesos
per transaction)
(ii iii)
v.
Overcharging
% (iv/ii
x100%)
1661
1278
4598
100
200
950
1561
1078
3648
94%
84%
79%
SAR130
SAR100
SR360
Passport renewal
SR240
3065
950
2115
69%
SAR115
1469
200
1269
86%
SAR100
AED460
AED240xv
1278
6004
3133
115
950
950
1163
5054
2183
91%
84%
70%
QAR109
1434
100
1334
93%
QR240xv
3160
950
2210
70%
/
QR100xv
360
1310
200
1110
85%
KD7.5
3934
200
3734
95%
KD18
2835
950
1885
66%
HKD200
1224
200
1024
84%
HKD20
HKD80
122
490
/
200
290
59%
HKD297.5
HKD800
HKD480
1824
4906
2934
/
950
950
3959
1984
81%
68%
SGD42.5
1416
200
1216
86%
SGD153
SGD102
5096
3398
950
950
4146
2448
81%
72%
NT1000
/
NT4500
NT2000
1419
300
6387
2839
200
100
950
950
1219
200
5437
1889
86%
67%
85%
67%
CAD202.5
CAD75xv
CAD33.75
6701
2525
1117
950
950
200
5751
1575
917
86%
62%
82%
CAD33.75
CAD81
1117
2680
/
/
Passport renewal
Passport replacement
Authentication/NBI Clearance
Exit Clearance
USD60
USD160
USD25
/
2873
7661
1197
100
950
950
200
1923
6711
997
67%
88%
83%
AUD108
AUD207
AUD45
3565
6833
1485
950
950
200
2615
5883
1285
73%
86%
87%
1400
4455
60%
82%
975
83%
1400
975
60%
83%
Australiaxv
Passport Renewal
Passport Replacement
Acknowledgement/notarization/authenticat
ion/oath/certification/NBI Clearance
Translation fee (per page)
AUD45
Italy, Netherlandsxv xv
Passport renewal
Passport replacement
Travel document fee (w/o valid passport)
Affidavit/SPA/authentication/ /travel tax
exemption/NBI clearance
Translation fee
EUR54
EU103.5
EU27
EU22.5
2350
5405
1410
1175
950
950
/
200
EU22.5
1175
Germanyxv
Passport renewal/replacement
EUR54
2350
950
Authentication and notarization
EUR22.5
1175
200
Remarks: huge difference between fees in the Philippine and in Consulates (=exactions)xv
Table 4. Comparison across Embassies on State Exaction of Consular Fees
Country
Passport
Passport
Authentication
renewal
replacement
Qatar
70%
Not provided
85%
Australia
73%
86%
87%
Saudi Arabia
69%
79%
84%
UAE
70%
84%
86%
Singapore
72%
81%
86%
USA
67%
88%
83%
Hong Kong
68%
81%
84%
Canada
62%
86%
82%
Italy
60%
82%
83%
Netherlands
60%
82%
83%
Taiwan
67%
85%
86%
Kuwait
66%
66%
95%
Germany
60%
60%
83%
Average % of
66%
80%
85%
overcharging
Police
Clearance
93%
NBI Clearance
87%
94%
86%
83%
83%
67%
85%
85%
Average % of
overcharging
83%
83%
82%
80%
80%
79%
78%
77%
77%
77%
76%
76%
68%
80.2%
Name of fees
Foreign currency
Pre-departure
Trade/Skill Test
/
Medical Examination
/
Processing feexv
/
PDOs
/
Abroad period
Hong Kongxv
Placement fee
HK$18,000.00 to HK28,000.00
Taiwanxv
Placement fee
/
Brokers service fee
TWD1,800
Contract breaking charges
Up to TWD2,000 x 12 month
Early termination penalty
TWD20,000
Temporary room and board
TWD4000
Temporary residence compulsory TWD2500-3000
toiletries
Malaysiaxv
Placement fee
NPR 5,000 10,000
New Zealandxv
Placement fee
Up to USD15,000
Qatarxv
Placement fee
QR3500
Kuwaitxv
Placement fee
/
Singaporexv
Placement fee
/
Australiaxv
Placement fee
Up to USD13,000
USAxv (example agency: Universal Placement International (UPI))
Placement fee
Up to USD8,000
Marketing fee
Up to USD1,000
Certificate of Eligibility
Up to USD595
Lawyers fee
Up to USD3920
Seminar
Up to USD55
Employment visa processing
Up to USD2,000
Table 7. State Exactions on Recruitment Agencies
Fee
SET UP FEES:
a. Filing Feexv
b. License feexv
Total of State exactions
Corporate income taxxv
Pesos
300
2500-5000
5000-10,000
100+
90
Up to 1500
Up to 3000
30+
Up to 171,428
51428
Average of 140,000
2561
34,143
28,452
5690
Up to 4268
42000
768
10243
8536
1707
1280
Up to 4410
1323
Up to 716,000
214,800
45,882
13,765
Up to 54,000
16,200
Up to 147,000
44,100
Up to 620,577
186,173
Up to 381,894
Up to 47,737
Up to 28,403
Up to 187,127
Up to 2626
Up to 95,473
114,568
14321
8521
56138
788
28,642
480
360
109,343
41,093
321
529,161
Foreign currency
Pesos
TWD2376
TWD225
TWD215
30% deduction from salary
3380
320
306
30% deduction from salary
1 year: 15,903
2-year: 25,444