Fact Paper on Southern

Africa No.10

APA,RTHEID'S

ARMYINNAMIBIA

SOUTH AFRICAS ILLEGAL

MILITARY OCCUPATION

?h

ffllJ

lnternational Defence & Aid Fund

1O4 Newgate

Street, London EC1A7AP,January1982

IN't'tjttNA't t(rNAt t,t I I Nt I ANlf .lllf l,UNll lgrt

This book is urpyrilllrl urrrh.r llr.. llr.nrr I rrlt.-ltit*t All tGlrtr gte
tese_rved. Apalt fiorn uny lrrtt rltrrllrr,' l,,r lhc ;lilputs 6f ;rtiVrlrt
study, IeSearch, criticisrrr ol t (.vr(.\1, ,t\ lrr,t rilll lrrrl rirIlpt tlrc l irFytElf l
Act, 1956, no part of this pulrlit';rlirrrr llrlv lr,' lFlrf nrlurorl, qt*rieil l-lf e
retrieval s-yste{n,_or transmitlctl, irr trrry lnnn rrt lrV dnl,nte6lttr dF$
ttonic-" electrical, chemical, ulcolliuli(.11, nlrt h 1rl, Ilr..l., ,,,iryirtg,
recording or otherwise without tho prior 1lr.rrriirrrlrrrr ,'j 1lss, , -,l,yilgfij
owner. Enquiries should be addresscd

kr tlrc

lrrrlrlillrr.r

CONTENTS
Chapter

Page

INTRODUCTION

1.
2.

The International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Alrica is u lrrrrrurnltnrlllt
organisation which has worked consistently for peaceful and corrslrsctlvc
solutions to the problems created by racial oppressiorrin Southern Al'rica.
It sprang from Christian and humanist opposition to the evils and injusticos 6l'
apartheid in South Africa. It is dedicated fo the achievement of free, d6mocratic,
non-racial societies throughout Southern Africa.

,.|

J.

4.
5.

6.

The objects of the Fund are:(i) to aid, defend and rehabilitate the victims of unjust legislation and

7.

oppressive and arbitrary procedures,

(iD to support their families and dependents,

(iii) to keep the conscience of the world alive to the issues at stake.
In accordance with these three objects, the Fund distributes its humanitarirrn rrrrl
to the victims of racial injustice without any discrimination on grouncls ol'nrt't..
colour, religious or political affiliation. Ttre only criterion is ihut of gcrrrrirr,;

need.

PRESENCE
THE MILITARY BUILD-UP DURING THE 1970's
THE MILITARY STRUCTURE
TRIBAL ARMIES
THE WAR
REGIONAL AGGRESSION
THE ARMED FORCES IN THE UN SETTLEMENT PLAN

59

REFERENCES

65

APPENDICES

71

SOUTH AFRICA'S EARLY MILITARY

TABLES
MAPS

For many^years, under clause (ii!) of its objects, The Fund has run a oonrl)r(.
hensive information service on affairs in Southern Africa. This includes viirr:rl
documentation. It produces a regular news bulletin 'FOCUS' on l,olilicrrl

R^epression in Southe_rn Africa, and publishes pamptrlets and books on all

of life in Southern Africa.
The Fund prides itself on the strict accuracy of all its information.

Fact Paper was prepared by the IDAF Research,

T4r
Information and Publications Department, who woukl
like to thank the London-based-Committee on Soutlr
African war Resistance for assistance with its compilation.
ISBN No. 0 9047s9 47 4

aspt:t.ts

9
16

29

42
52

14,75,40
17

,3637,53

PREFACE

This study provides detailed, comprehensive information about the nature and
of south Africa\ ille4l military occupation of Namibia, and the t"uy in
which the international-territory is qJed as a springboard for aggressive atticks
against neighbouring independent African countrids, the Front*Line states of
scale

Angola, Botswana and Zambia.

Tfr3 ne-ogle of Nami.bia are in effect occupied by a massive foreign garrison,
manifested-by one soldier to approximately every twelve Namibian"ad-ults and
children. This dramatic fact reveals the degree to which Soutfr Africa relies on
ove-rwhelming mil-itary power to maintain iti illegal control over Namibia.
In the face of the determined resistance of lhe Namibian people. under the
leadenhip of swAPo, the occupying regime has intensifiea'tepi"riion within
Namibia and is launching destruitive rrllitary attacks against ihe- Front Line
states with greater frequency than ever before. It is th; African propr, *rro
have to pay_ an enormous- and ever-increasing pticr in-i..-s'of human
suffering_ and loss of life. for each day by which s6uttr lfrica's iregal occupation
of Namibia is.prolonged - not to mention the gowing risr< or i
-";ot armed
confrontation in the region with unforseeable consequences.
An examination of the long _history of intemational negotiations with the
sout4 African regime about self-determination and indeperid.nr. io, Namibia

reveals

two

the pretoria

regime's urr oi deceptive

agreed ptoposaF being finally relect6d at
-buf
of implementation; followed not by
penlalties,
any
instead
-the
'gfitirg
encouragement to this process through
;-d rurther con-the

T1no,.-u.*..r,
the point

further

consistent elements:

resulting

in

each set

of

in order to entice preforia back to

neg6tiatinf table. Following
the rejection by south Africa at the Generra Meetin"g in jufi*iv iggt of th6
previously agreed United Nations ptan for the In?ependence o]
Namibia,
.
a new initiative
was organised by the western contact Group to take
cessions

greater account

of the apartheid regime's objections. pretoria has usid the time

to.-.implement its own "internaf settlemint" and to iurtrtr.-expand its

military strength in_ the region all aimed at destroying the nationwidi support
enjoyed _by_ SWAPO and subverting the ligitimate ispiiations of thi
Namibian

it is prec-isely beciuse kitoria ls airaia- of *

victory at the polls that it is denying the people oi Nu,niuiu-a
""rr*n"r*i"l
free and
ryryo
fair election.
p.e.9plr: Indeed

The south African regime continues to boast about its so-called strategic
importance to the west, and this claim is now being echoed in certain
fi;;;fri
quarters which pose new-dangen for the peace ani security of eirica.
In this

context the annexation by the pretoria

attention because of the importance of

*g-r of walvis'Bat ;;;d, ,p..irt

_prJs-erving the terriioiiai integrity or

\gmibia-. Also, the claims mide by South Africa io be operating as a western
ally in the south Atlantic will p: s-eriously affecteo ir it a6rr-noi-lia've control,
via-walvis Bay and the islands off the coasi over the Namibian coastiine _ which
today,,cqlnplises 60.per cent of the Atlantic coast controlled uv-Soutn
arri"u
overall.. Maximum vigilance will need to be exercised to ensure-that the
illegal
occupying rggrme is not permitted to retain an effective military and naval
foothold within an independent Namibia.
Th.is study .reveals the nature of South Africa's forced occupation of
Namibia
and should help to inform world opinion, on the uasis of esiatlirt .d-rurtr,
uuout
the great danger that the situation presents to internatior.r
il;;;ilsecurity.

lli' li'ril"l lj'ti'

I lr'r' r' I
, l,rr iirlr'ilr;rlrrrtr;rl (,0llt:clivg measures
l rl ri r; 'tiii I r ' "l il '' l'i it l',"'i,1,
llt"''11?:t,. tlr,- 1,,-'r, .'. ,r ('onilnits aggression to be
or is
rr 1"'i1 ;i'r' i,,i .i, i ,. rri. li iii.,,i., .r r,r,..r, rr ,i
tr,,. lrr.;rr r. I'l rc llrcts lgad one to an
itr'li lrill,rl,l,. ,,,n, ln.it,tr tlr,it tlr,- ,,,rulll
{ltlr;1t tr.Hllt(. lS gllilty On all thgse
Fr,lill,l'' t,'l ,rll ,'llrrr I ln.trl,. ,,r, lilr lrr lnrp,.ir: r.,i,i,.1lr,i
llt, ;r,.,r,:ciaiiLaUrUreS Such
.t.. r.r rrilrrilili ,.;ilt, li'tr. lr.l\., 1,,_,.n \.,.1r,,.r1
lr\ r r.tf ;llll \1,r.!l(. lll l)()WefS in the UN
('rrullr
,(ir.r ttr tll
tl
livr'tt tl r.;trlr,.r rvr.nl:, rltrl ttul rlr, ,;rr. lltr. rr.r r.1l l1;tl(,t lllVllslon
of SOuthem
A,rrgol;t
ttrli Arrlirr:.1 li.lrl.nrlrr.l lrrli I r;lr.rrl,l lr;rv,. rrr;rrlr. lltc world
.rlttr
aware
.l lltt' tlltltlit:ts Post'tl lry llrr':tlilir('s:;tv('lrt.lr;rvtr)ul .l llrr.Sr)ltllt
n lilican regime.
llo1,ygy1'1, wlrr-:rr llrc Sct.rrnl,y (',,'t1,,.-rl ltllrrrrl,l,:,1
1,, rrr,,rr.ly rlt.sr.rillrr South Africa
;ls lllo :lglll'cssior tllc Urrilctl Slrtlcs
Atlrrrinrslr:rlrrrr
rst.tl ils vcr, to block
-llt:rrgrur
lltis clcscription overl tlrough llrc
licsr>lutiorr tlit.l rrrt c,rrlrrl,i ,,,,y oalls for
sa nctions.

INTRODTJCTION
Namibia can militarily defeat SWAPO."

\otgt of

by General Mognus Molan, South African Minister of

conversation with Chester CYocker, (Jnited States Assistant
Secretory of State, I5lI6 April I9gI.1

Defence,

"It

General Magnus Mqlan, addressing a parad,e

base, 8

of

It is of vital importance that.t*,rg two agreed measures arc cl'l'cclivcly

implemented. Very soon the world will have toZh,i.x. bclwccrrr
pcnniilirrg tlrt,
South African regime to continue. to d.ly inlcrrurliorurl
.pilirrr .r
lrrrlrlic
acting
wcapon

lorrilory.

Abdul S. Minty

Director, World Campaien aeainst

Military and Nuclear Collabor"ution

with South Africa.

Namib ia,

in

April 1981 .3

Africa.;

an

the

at the Bloemspruit Afu Force

That Namibia is a^country under_military occupation is indisputable. In the

opening months of
it-appeared that the number of South'Afiican troops
in the territory had.1981,
reached i00,000
o". *tai.f io every tz
- approximately
members of the Namibian population.a
Tliis ratio represents one of the most
intense concentrations of military force in the world today.
The actual number of troops in Namibia fluctuates considerably, depending
on preparations for attacks into neighbouring Angola. Before .i.n of these
attacks, additional troops are mobilised and tiourdto Namibiu. fftir makes
it
difficult to reach an exact figure for any particular time.
South Alrica'.s nrilitary l'ruilcl-up in- Namibia has been accompanied by the
enforcement of ilrcrcitsiltgly ltarslr'uncl authoritarian security *.irur.r, to the
extent that, by 1981, lllorc tlr:rrr lJO pcr cent of the population *rr.liuirrg under
de facnt nrarlial law. l.ltis situalion. is a rcv.ealing pni.tt.r to the grorirlg
success
of the Narnibian.libr:ration struggle,.led_by tlie'South West lfrica"people,s
Organization (SWAPO), in chafienging
_Pretoria's domination. The growing
"on'full
number

The oil-producing countries have imposed an oil

embargo against South Africa
it is able to obtain all its requirements as u t*r"it
of the active collaboration
of several oil companies and tanklr fleet owner;.
oill;
a vital military commodity
for the South Afiican regime und *ithortlt;ir;;iartheid
war michine would
come to a dead halt.

y.

Def-ence

"one of the enemy's favourite methods these days is to question

I

presence of the Defence Force in South west

yet

ll is lto cxitllll('l:tliolr lo s:r.y llt:rl llrt. lrP:rrllrcitl rcgirrrc pt.cscnts

one of the
-irr
grcltlcsl llt|cltls lt.r iltlct ttltliotttl
l)crco ,,,rr'1 ,".,,,-ily
thc
crisis crcrtlctl by ils il.lcgrrl ()cclrl)aliorr ol' Nrrnibia-can only world today. The
iltttttccli:tlc ltttcl cotttplclc rcrrroval ol' South Afiican controlbe ended by the
from the inter_
naliorurl

without saying that we cannot control the South African

Dirk Mudge, Chairman of the Council of Ministers in

As long as the world community, which b.;;r; solemn and

sacred responsibilitv towards the people of Nami6ia, does
oir.rr;;;.-;il oliigation wtth
and urgency, ii too is t.rponrible for""t grave situation
Itolo]t
which exists
in Namibia. one of the most ihameful andthepersistent
forms
collaboration with the south African t.gi-. 'i, the corrtinueaof external
supply of
weapons' spares'- components and ammunition to the
South African Defence
Force through disguis-ed export procedures and direct
una inali..l transport
routes. It is remarkable that the South African iegime
is noi short of any
weapons or other resources, despite the existence of an
international arms
embargo. Without this slpport if would find it impossible
to maintain and
expand its military build-up in Namibia and could ..itu-iv
conduct
attacks of the present type and scale againsl Angola rtra
""tFront
otr,.i
Line
States.

ca prr b il it

in

interview on South African radio, 30 June 19tj.2

u.lio"r.

in timc tcl avoid enorlttotts ltttnxrrr."srrl'li:rirrg rrrtl ;rvt.rl

catastropltc. Tltc llrrclrl irnposcrl lry Sorrlh Ali it.:i's rrr:rssivt, rrr irrrpcrrrlirrg
rrrililrrry Srrildtlp is tttltclc vcry rttrtc:lt ln()r(' g',,u,' lry ils :rt'tlrrisiliorr ol' rrrrclclrr

goes_

r.emarks

Force and the South African police.',

The failure of the international community to take

timely action to counter
the threats posed by the south ,trrican iegirne lun
ottrv serv; t; encourage that

regime into even more_aggressive and despeili.

it takes to solve the Namibia question, the less South African

will be required- there. We will reach a stage where internal forces in

"The lo1ge1
p_resence

armed personnel kept

alert. complete with arsenals of

sophisticated weapons,_ fighter airtraft and military hardware, casts considerable

doubt on the claim thai the guerilla war in Namibia ir;i;spliaaic, towintensity character. The continuing militarisation of the territo.f ;i the same
time confirms South Africa's commitment to a strategy of conflict and

aggression, directed both at SWAPO and,the neighbouring Fr;;t

Une States, as a
means of "resolving" the long-standile Namibiai settlem"ent dispute. South African troops_ invaded Nimibia
1915, ending 'i6rr* decades of

in

German colonial contiol. From 1919, Namibia was admlnistered by Souili

Africa under a C Mandate of the League of Nations on behalf of Great Britain.
In 7966, its mandate to administer tie territory was terminated by the United
Nations General Assembly, the successor to_the'League of Nations
1971,
South Africa's continued occupation of Namibia "was declai.O ,'andin
ifirg.f bV tt.
International Court of Justice ieated il
Hagu_e_.,International nJgotiations
for a settlement,. involvrlB the united J?rg
Nationsj swApo; tii;^'S;;ti African
government, the African Front Line States and the Westertr po*ri, have
been in
progress since
,1971. South African intransigence, and the relucta".. of Western
powers to apply effective pressure, have res]ulted in the repeatrO iuiruir of
these

negotiations.

ii.,;,,'.,,' ;;.:;;.;l',, ",,,. , ;,,,1,";;:l;,,,ji'r:::i'f iil] i,ul,l,liiJilr"8$J:?

Itl:;ll': lt'l'ttr"tl'rlril',,,,r1r-rrirl,'<,lilt 4lrl -Eflrr+-rlrEigttanl glitt,kcrting-Namibia
lrrrl;r\ i:r tl:;r'rl lr\ 'r,rqill1 ,1 lrl,.r - ..11111er1 ln]r e+ .la ;t lr;lst. l0r attacking
ttf tfltlriltttittll Att1i,'l,r rrtt ;t rl:tlll l,,r',i,, rl:=rlf rrl lttp lltr- al, ln r,r'lrttollli<j structurg
llt;tl tr, pir;trltt,rll\, ('ln{'rlii.r r;' trr llr,'qr,rrl llrl;.1rc-rrrlr-rrr r- yr,1lr,,l.,tttrl ,.ltlsillg fear and
t'ottltt,s-ton llrlrttlqlt,rttl llrr. :,lullrrrl1 1,1,,r11g,,=i 1,,1 1i,,- tr,Elnn rf r ;f wlff]le, SOUth
Alllt:tt 's ltrilrl;rr-y l)t(.li(.n( (. t.otr:; ltlulr.:i .r llrrr.,rl ln trrl,.rtr,rlt,,rr;rl
l)(.llCC Of thg
u I lttosl scriousllt:ss.
'l'llc Soutll Aliicarr Arrtty lttttl l'olict'rrr N;rrrrrlx;r t.rl;ry;rr(.r1
llr(. l6rt:li.6rttof
Jfe 9t.1t.e apparatus of control- T'lrcir opcrurtiorrs ovcrslurrlow tlrr. rl;rily lil'c of'all
r , ,,;,',,',"i,,

black Namibiant

have prompted nearly one tcrrtlr

ol

tlrt: lr.pul:rii,,rr to flee

?nq
into exile. Pretoria
has nevertheless been engaged for a r,uu.rbt:i ol'ycurs i1 a
concerted public relations exercise to convince the outside world that
fundamental changes of a different kind are taking place in Namibia
namely
that power and authority are being devolved to bhck Namibians -and th;t
apartheid and racism are- being_abolished by legal statute, preparatory to the
granting of full independence. In the constitutional and administrative sphere,
these moves culminated in the establishment, on I July 19g0, of a South
African-sponsored Council of Ministers in Namibia whose membeis now ostensibly constitute t[e government of the territory. In the sphere of defbnce and
security, South Africa has built up what now purports tb be an autonomous
multiracial "Namibra\" a:my
nolice force - the South West Africa Territory

Force (SWATF) and the South-a!{

West Africa Police (SWAP).
South
Africa,
in
brief,
is
endeavouring
to continue to rule Namibia by proxy.
_ has
It
constructed a smokescreen of constitutional ancl legislative 'refbrms' io
conceal its real activities in the _ territory.s It has englneered pauses and
stalemates in the international settlement negotiations to "further entrench its
miltary.occupation. During the first six months of 1981, the scale and intensity

of

South African attacks against the People's Republic of Angola reached a

unprecedented since the independenie war bf lg75-76d, while inside
Na[r_ibia, the conflict continued to intensify.
This- fac^t Paper, which complements'and expands upon an earlier Intcrnational Defence and Aid Fund publication on the South African arnrccl lirrccs.7
describes the apartheid military machine in Namibia. Clraplcr"s I rrrrtl ll tlocurut:rrl
the historical origins of Pretoria's military occuplrtioir :rrrrl llre lrrriltl rrp ol
troops in the territory during thc 1970s, prrr'liculrrrly tlrrrirrg:rrrrl lirllowirrg, llrt:
general s!1ike by bllrck Nuntibirrrr worl<crrs llrrouglrorrl llrr: cotrrrlry in 197\ll).
Chapter lll clcscriltcs lltc vrtriorrs rrrrits ol'llrc Sorrllr Al'ric:rrr rrrrrictl lirlccs and
police prcscnl in llrc lcrrilory wlrilc ('lrlrplcr lV tlctrls willr tlrc growtlr, under
Scluth Af.riclrrr tlirccliott rtrttl corrlrol, ol'1r lrngo ol'irrdigcrr.rus ariry and police
units_ c_trrnpriscd ol' bl:rck N:rnribiarrs arrd tltcir cvcntual incorporation in the
South Wcst Aliica Tcrritory liorce and South West Africa Poiice. Chapter V
examines
published rccords and the reality of SWAPO's guerilla war igainst
_the_
the apartheid .regime and its army. South Africa's strategy of.aggressioi and
subversion against the Front Line States is reviewed in Chapier Vt w-nle Chapter
VII examines the implications of the continuing South African military UuitOup in Namibia for the prospects of a negotiated transition to independence,
peace and majority rule.
p_eak

I.SOUTHAFRICAS EARLY
MILITARY PRESENCE
South Africa first established a military presence in Namibiain 1915. Although
the war in Namibia today is often presented as of comparatively recent origin,
the South African military liave been used to subdue resistance on various
occasions since the earliest days of South Africa's occupation. During the period
between the two World Wars, the foundations of the contemporary military
structure in Namibia began to be laid. In violation of the terms of the Irague
of Nations Mandate, which expressly prohibited the setting up of military bases
in the mandated territory, South Africa was involved in building various military

installations'and carrying out military exercises in Namibia

in the late

1950s

and early 1960s.1

Until 1915, Narnibia was under German colonial control, which had been
imposed through military conquest between 1892 and 1907, after the AngloGerman Agreement of 1890. This Agreement established the present boundaries
of the territory, to be called German South West Africa. Britain retained the
enclave around Walvis Bay which it had annexed in 1878.2
ln l9i-5, during the First World War, South African troops acting under
Britislr orclors occupied German South West Africa, bringing it under South
African rnilitary rulc until the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. The Germans
had nevor cslublislrccl cornplete cclntrol over the whole colony, leaving the
northerrr arcas (rrorllr ol' tlrc so-callecl l)olice Zone) unpoliced. Their military
subjugation ol' tlrc lloprrluliort irr tlrc l)olicc /,<tne, however, had been ruthlessly
efficietrt, involvirrg tlrc rlclth ol'ovcr (r0 pcr ccnt of the inhabitants.3
Thc Sorrlh Al'ricun inlcnliort wus to artrtcx tlrc territory, but opposition from
the [Jnilccl Slatcs lccl lo a conrpronrisc arrangenrent whereby, in 1919, South
Africa was givcn control o1'Narlibia undcr a class C Mandate of the League of
Natiolrs. Under the terms o1' the Mandate, South Africa's duty was to prepare
the territclry for eventual self-determination and to "promote to the utmost the
material anO moral wellbeing and social progress of the inhabitants".a In
practice South Africa proceeded to incorporate Namibia effectively into the
Union of South Africa,encouraging white immigration into Namibia and continuing the land theft that had already deprived the Atiican population of much
of their land under German rule. By 1928, the white population in Namibia had
reached 28,000, double the 1913 figure, and nearly all viable farming land had
been reserved for and taken by whites-s At the end of the 1930s, the African
popula.tion, estimated at 253,000, retained 17 million hectares of land while the
Europeans, estimated at 31,000, had taken possession of 3B million hectares.o
Following the German pattern, South Africa introduced iaws to restrict
Africans' political rights and to ensure a supply of cheap labour. By 1912, the
German colonial settlers had, through a series of "native decrees", forced all but
200 of the eligible Africans in the Police Zone into wage labour.7 By means of
the Native Administration Proclnmation of 1922, South Africa introduced the
Pass Laws into Namibia. These required all blacks travelling outside their prescribed areas) or "native reserves'l to have a permit and to show it on demand to
any police officer.B

ll' lrtlr,l llr, r'lntitri ir,riii, ri l.ri"..,l,rn ,lltrl lr,,11, e r rrilltol ltovcrgd thg ultimate
1'tt,tt,ltrlur ,,1 ',rrrtllr .\lti, ,til lilr\ir I trriltl,rr\ f rrtr r, lltt.; fV;tS flSCd tO bfing the
llilllltr'tll lilll ,'l l,/.rrttllri't rttl,i,r ',r,illlr r\ltir,ttt r rrttlilrl ;iltrl lilstg;yllrarsanufobgr
ul rr'1,,'lllnrr:; 1r1. .,,., l tnl., nl l lri' N,rtrrtlri,1g1 1t.n1rl*,
lrr lt) ll'. ;l \v;lt lt;trl 1,t,,1..,'tr uul lri'l\t:','tt lltr' l'r,r1111,11,..,. (.Xl)llllding their
( ()l(lny nl n n,iol;r, ;rrr,l llr,' llLrv,ur\..,un,1. 11r,. .,r,, orrrl l.rrlir.:.I ( )v;rrrrlro tribe. 7,000
I'otlttgttes(: lro()l):i tleslro.ytrrl llrr'lll.rv;nry,nn;l;ntrr\,, lrtllllrl.i n(.;nly 5,000 Africans.
lrr l()17, llrc Sottllr Alric;nrs inl(:rv()n(r(l rrr llrrs lr'rrlr.r tlr:;lrulr.orr llrtl pretext of
tll'l'cring protcctio.lr to tltc tJkwurryrrnuts- 'l'lrc IJliwrr,,.y,,,,,,i k,,,1i Mrurtiume, was
forced to accept protection" fiorn the SouLlr All'icurrs, wlrri;rgrcctl with the
Portuguese on a border line which split the Ukwanyamas'traditioual lur)cl. When
the Ovambos refu^sed to recognize ihis arbitrary fiontier, a punitive expedition
led b,V South Africans was organised and over a hundred Ovamboi killed,
including Chief Mandume who had been a powerful anticolonial leader. From
that time, Ovamboland was fully colonized and split between the South African

and Portuguese colonies.e

Resistance in the north

to South Africa's colonial authority did not end with

the death of the Ovambo king, Mandume.In 7932, the South African Administrator in the capital, Windhoek, was obliged to call on military assistance from
Pretoria to secure his authority in the region. Ipumbu, Chiel of the Ukuambi
people of northern Namibia, with 800 well-armed men under his command, had
for a number of years resisted control from Windhoek. His defiance aroused a
more widespread spirit of resistance.
_ Unwilling to commit troops to the campaign, the Administrator called in
South African Airforce bombers to reinforce a number of armoured cars.
Ipumbu's kraal was bombed, and bombed again after he and his men had
managed to escape unharmed. They were eventually obliged to submit, and
Ipumbu himself _w_as taken captive and imprisoned.l o Sam Nujoma, now
President of SWAPO, remembered how in his earliest childhood, he had run out
into the open
to see the bombers overhead that had destroyed the Chief's
'
capital.l

Resistance to the brutal colonial regime also erupted among the black communities in the Police Zone. The Bondelswarts, a small mixed Nanm conrnrunily,

rebelled lrgainst (among other things) thc inrposiliorr ol'rur cxorbitrrrrtly lriIlr
dog tax. It hacl bcen imposcd in olclcr lo lirrcc llro lirntlclsw:rrls, wl',, *,i,vivi:tl
by hunting glrrnc witlr pucks ol'tlogs, irrlo w:rgt: lrrlrorrr. Wlrtrrr llrcy rclrt.rrlctl irrlo
a dcl'cnsivc lrutgcr ort rt ltill lo1l. llrr:y wot: rrllrrr'kctl lry Sorrllr Alrlicrrrr lroolls trrrtl
bottlbctl lty rttilil;ry rtircrrl'1. Ovt'r l(X) pt'oplr'wt'rr: killctl rrrrtl .-l(r8 wounclccl or
lrtk_ctt. 1lrisott0t.1? ln lt)^1.5, rr:sislrrrrt't'' lrrlrrr rrrrollrcr srrrull conrrlur"rity, the
llclrollollr0rs, wirs rtlso llrttllrlly srrpprcssctl.'l'lrcy prolcstcd against land robbery,

cxorbilitttl {itxitliolt ruttl llrc tlcslrrrclion ol' tltcir community's autonomy,

lo llrc Sorrtlr All'icalr Printe Minister and the League of

scrttlirtg ctttissurics

Nltliotts itt Gcttcvit. ltt rcsporrse, Soutlr Al'rican troops completely surrounded the
Rehoboth area and llew three bombers over the township to force the rebels to
surrender. Hundreds were arrested and disarmed and many imprisoned.l3
Sgch periodic acts of military aggression on South Africak part, intended to
subdue the black population, accompanied the development of a military

structure which reflected Pretoria's de l'acto incorporation of Namibia into

South Africa as a fifth province, in defiance of its League of Nations Mandate.
6

As the area of responsibility of South West Africa Command, one of the nine

territorial commands of the South African Defence Force (SADF), Namibia was
treated as an integral part of South Africa, in tetms of the SADF structure.
A Regiment Suidwes-Afrika was established in Windhoek on I December 1939, the same year that South Africa extended its defence legislation
to Namibia, integrating the defence services of the two areas. On 1 December
1959, the strength of Regiment Suidwes-Afrika was 16 officers and 205 other
ranks. The staff consisted of SADF Permanent Force members. White Namibians
who had volunteered or, in more recent times, been conscripted into the SADF
to do their National Service, were transferred to Namibian-based Citizen Force
and Commando (part-time) units. The Regiment formed part of the South

African Armoured Corps of the Citizen Force, itself an integral part of the
SADF. From 1 January 1999, the Regiment Suidwes-Afrika was officially
renamed Regiment Windhoek.'*
Namibia has always been viewed as being

of strategic importance for South

Africa. South Africa's eagerness to annex the territory in 1919 stemmed from
the belief that it was vital to South Africa's security. It was largely the desire
to retain control over Namibia which persuaded General Smuts to sign the
Treaty of Versailles, whose terms he considered too harsh on Germany, and
likely to provoke dangerous resentment in the future.tu By the time of the

formation of the United Nations Organisation (UN) in 1945 and the replacement
of the Mandate system by the Trusteeship Council, Namibia was becoming an
increasingly valuable strategic asset within the region. The more farsighted saw
its potential as a defence, along with Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies,
against the tide of decolonizalion from the north which was to rise even more
quickly than the regime feared.l6
In 1946 South Africa requested the incorporation of Narnibia into South
Africa. The General Assembly of the United Nations refused, and South
Africa in turn refused to place Namibia under the Trusteeship System, but
agreed to continue to submit annual reports.lT In the late 1950s, as black

in South Africa, and the rest of Africa, began to give the South
African regime cause for increasing concern, Namibia received more

militancy

attention from the military strategists in Pretoria.

A Report of the Committee on South West Africals to the UN in 1960 gave
some indication of the nature of South Africa's military activity in the territory,
and expressed the growing concern felt by the Committee at the violation of
the Mandate.

According to the Committee, South Africa maintained, in addition to the

military camp in Windhoek, a military landing ground in the Swakopmund
district, and planned to establish a military training school in the eastern
Caprivi Strip. I-arge scale exercises took place in the eastern Caprivi between
3 and 26 August 1959, attended by South African defence officials. Two South
African Airforce squadrons with I 2 Harvard aircraft and one squadron with two
helicopters participated in tactical operational exercises from Katima Mulilo,
the administrative headquarters in the region. These exercises included border
patrols, low-level navigation, area reconnaissance signals, communications, search
and survival missionsThe Committee also reported a visit by the former Minister of Defence "to a
military camp during reconnaissances in the Kaokoveld" in north-western

Namibia in 1957. In June.l96^0, Sam Nujoma, president of SWApo, informed

the commission that South African militiry operations *rrc u.i.g-Jarried out
in an area in northem
northem Kaokoveld near the Kunene river. Add
piess inforAdditiona'i press
mation-stated that employees working on the construction of a canal in ovamboland had noticed a military air base on the border.
During 1959 and 1960, the SADF was reorganised to place greater emphasis

on internal security

measures,

_according to- the committee;s Report. The

committee expressed its belief that these measures, and the militarJ exercises
carried out in Eastern caprivi, frightened and disfurbea tle inrrariitants and
called on the South African governirent to cease tu"h .itit"ty r"ri.it6 ln tttt
Mandated Territory. The Committee also expressed its belief tliai;iitr .rtrutirnin the northwesterir 'Native' areas of the ieiritory and
T:r1
9l I militaryof^camp
the maintenance
a regiment of the Armoured corps of the citizen Foice in
the capital^of the Territory had increased the prevalring-;ntest in the
Territory". 19
South Atdca's
south
Africa's defence budget was increased in line with its greater military

activities.
acuvrues.

ln tvJv,
tn
1959, lr
it

increased by
lncreased

per cent and in 1960 by

l1 I pgl
bv aifurther
I o per
ne,
further l0

cent. Between 1960 and

ru ryoJ,
1965, a rlverolo
nverbla lncrease
increase was being
belng absorbed
ulro.t.a both
both'bv
by
clprral cosrs
costs includi"q
lncluolnq tn-e
th.. building
bulldrng up-01
up-of a local
rocal arms industry,
inou"stiv, an
a" in"r"ur.
increase ol
of
lfnital
almost lo0_ per cent in the number of trained full and part iime troops, and
new expenditures in Namibia.2o
,-.
Py t!. mid-1960s, the sADF had three bases in Namibia; at Mndhoek,
yvarvrs Bay
walvis
Day arro
and Katima
Narlma Mulllo
Mulilo m
in ille
the eastern caprivi..'By
caprivi.r, sv-1b6i,
1965, a new f,g
million military air base had been built at Mpacha near ruti'-u uuilr,o, as well
as one at Rundu,
there were airports at Windhoek
Rev
hoek, welvis
Walvis Bay,
Grootfontein
9nj) Rundu. and there
v crnnrfnn+pi.
and Ondanzua.22
ondang'a.22 rn 1964, the Soritr liii.un
be engaged in road construc.tion
proiects in the territory
construction projects
'"r,^,,r f,g
territorv costing ibout
tn
".,*irr.,o
g,1 1 99"5 road building-eqiipment worth f I 00,000
was'apparentty

"o*iiiiJi*i.r;il#;;ii;
fjli:1.
T,
llT::f;
:i:H:f ,i,l??ffi ff
:#j; jt#".tgt'"-'gil.'f,
parts
"?E"'ifi
of eastern Caprivi.

new dimen. Namibia's strategic value for the south African regime assumed ",113;J,',ti:
sions during this period. The.hostility of many countiies, particularly
in Africa,
towards the-regime's apartheid policy becamemore militairt after tlie massacre

at

on 2l March 1960. This allowed the regime to play on white

feap of a military threat from African states, in order"to rnrui. i,r,ii, unitv
in the face of increasing international isolation. This external
togethdr
shar-peville

with the start of armed struggle in south Africa.

frrrrur.,

as well ar
in',qncJ^.
- ---o---' increased
-- --the importance of Namibia as-a buffer territorv.2a
when SWAPO launched its armed struggli in Namibia in 1966, the south
Police
$f.1.:" were,
.(SAP) were given the tasri-of containing it. rwo rinits of the
JAL,I
however, sent. to ._ Mpa^cha and Rundu to provide airfield
protection.2s until the general strike
bf contract workers and oihe.s i., Namibia
in December l97l the sAP we.re in chalge of security operations in the territory,
though they found it increasingly diffiiult to cope. tit tt *itrgr, the military
was already waiting to take over.
"

II. THE M ILITARY BUILD-UP

DURING THE 1970s
The massive military build-up embarked upon by South Africa in Namibia
during the 1970s turned the territory into one of the most heavily occupiedin
the world in terms of the number of foreign troops relative to the local
population. This militarization drive, in origin a response to the growth of armed
resistance to South African occupation led by SWAPO, was punctuated by two
events. The first was the general strike in Namibia in l97ll12 and the second
the defeat of Portuguese colonialism in Angola and the advent of that country's
independence in 1975.

The strike action which was to lead to a general strike in Namibia began on
3 December 1971. lt was initiated by Ovambo contract workers from northern
Namibia, most of whom worked in Windhoek and Walvis Bay, and involved
between 13,000 (the official figure) and 20,000 workers.l The goal of the
strikers was the overthrow of the contract labour system. Most of the strikers
demanded to be repatriated to northern Namibia before they were prepared to
negotiate. This would enable them to survive on their plots of land without
being dependent on wages for the duration of the strike. It also suited the
authorities who preferred to remove the confrontation away from "white"
areas, and so by mid-January 19^72 over 13,000 workers had been transported
back to their homes in the north.z
I

The South African response, particularly in Ovamboland, was to crush

with armed force. Large police reinforcements were flown in from
South Africa, all public meetings were prohibited, strikers were arrested and
gatherings violently dispersed.r When it was discovered that over 100km of the
resistance

border fence between Ovamboland and Angola had been destroyed, patrols were
mounted. The South African Police (SAP) force in Namibia was deemed inadequate for this task. On 26 January 1972 the South African Defence Force
(SADF) was called in to assist and on 4 February a state of emergency was
declared in Ovamboland which was extended to the whole of northern Namibia
in 1976. The SADF took over the patrolling of the border with helicopters and

troop carriers and provided additibnal transport for the police.a

Portuguese

troops from Angola participated in suppressing resistance.

This marked the beginning of the active South African army presence in
Namibia. Up to this time, the South African Police had been used to contain
SWAPO guerilla incursions. ln 1972, when the SADF joined the police in the
north, SWAPO's armed activity was mainly concentrated in the Caprivi, although
it had also moved west into the Kavango River Basin.s In the years that
followed, as guerilla action intensified and the security situation for the South
Africans deteriorated, the SADF presence in the territory grew. By 1973,Ihe
SADF had assumed overall responsibility for counter-insurgency operations in
the border areas, while the SAP commitment remained at much the same level
as before.

The first large contingents of South African conscript troops arrived in

Namibia in February 1973.7,OOO were transported by frigate to Walvis Bay
and linked up with others in Namibia for large scale manoeuvres before moving
to the border.6 In May of that year, following the blowing up of an arms dump

by SWAIO ul Knlltttu Mttlllu, turullter hettallon of Natlonal Service conscripts

lnlo tlrc ('uprlvl,7 sAl)lJ rrctlvlty ovoR sl thls stace was not confined
Io the mllltary sphcrc. Durilrg rhc "hornoluhd" othnlc oloctl-ons in ovamboland
in August 1973, SADI" troops ln annourcd culs brcked up the policeinintimi
datory."pass raids", arr_esting over 300 pcoplc.E rheir elTo'rts, ho'wever, failed to
persuade more than 2.3 per cpnt of tlre efectorate to voto, due to a successful
wus rnoved

boycott campaign launched by SWAPO.e

l9]!.prgmpted by the fall of th-e Caetano regime that April in
^ By J.un9
Portugal,
the SADF had established itself sufficiently in Iiamibia to hnaily
take.complete control of the whole border area.io This meant not only

security oprations,

but also came to

include involvement

in

pro-

paganda and information services, the schools, medical provision and

oiher
aspects of. everyday life. The militarization of Namibia then proceeded at an
accele-rated rate, involving the building up of a military infrastiucture through-

out the territory, but particularly in the north. The increase in the num6er
of s_outh African _troops in the country was to require a massive mobilization
of Namibian and South African whites behind the war effort. At the same time

considerable effort was put into building up black tribal armies.

MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE
Until .the
-departure o{ tlS Portu,guese from Angola, spending on .new
military
itary installations
and facilities in Namibia
Namibia by the-South^Africai Defence

Force had been concenfrafed

concentrated mosflv
mostly in fhe
the lar
caprivi. The building of an air base
qt Mpa;hi t.,
il".#|.ill;
i;T#"#l?,?'"1iil't".1';
"ri.'Jv
decision had been
taken to spend R52 million on a tarred strategic
stratesic road from
Grootfontein to Katima Mulilovia Rundu, a distance of some g?Okrn.tl By
Sv
september of the following year the road building programme allocation had
risen ro
rrsen
to over R80
r(6u million,
miltlon, wnile
while a new
new base costing
costine R40
R40 milli
million was planned
nlanned for
--^^Lt^,-/-:
Grootfontein
as well as one qt^outjo, and a maj"or.*pinsion ottiri.
the Rooikop

r;;H;;;;#

base at Walvis Bay had

In late 1975,

started.l2

South African troops accompanied by foreign mercenaries

invaded 4rlgotu-_ Their penetration acrois the border from Namibii was preceded
by.a..rapid build-up of_ troops in northern Namibia, including the hrst.ever
mobilization of white Namibian citizen Force and Commando irnits for active
9ull
9n a part-time basis. This had necessitated a major programme to expand
facilities and bases. After their
_expulsion and retreit fiom- engola in March
1976, the South African troops did not return home but were oblrted to stay to
fight swAPo, whose activitiei had increased dramatically during i975. Attacks
gn 4nggb itself resumed in June 1976. Thus the town of Grooifontein, where
the sADF's Northern Supply command is based, was virtually transformed into

a military

camp including a transit camp capable of housing at least ten

battalions at any one time. ondangua was expanded into the largEst operational
headquarters in the north and thi small viilage of Ruacana ""hungrd ,ithin
months into a major base. Smaller bases were built and manned,-usually at
company strength, all along the^border and inland between Ruacana and Rundu,
particularly in the area around Ondangua and Oshikango.i 3
As a result of the rapid escalation of the war in iorthern Namibia in 1976
and' 1977, and the corresponding increase in the number of South African

of their

operations, the SADF soon outgrew its headIn December l97l it took over a new office complex,
occupying the whole building. At the same time- civil engineering work was

troops and the scale

quariers in Windhoek.

being'inc"reased at numerous-"itfields and bases,la while the military base -a,t

the naval facilities in the harbour were further expanded.ls
During the latter part of 1977 the SADF began supplementing its ground

Walv'is Bay and

incursions

into southern Angola with bombing and strafing raids in jet

fighter-bombers. The frequency of these raids has increased considerably since.

By 1976 the airfield at Ondangua had been enlarged to accommodate Mirages
and Impalas.l6 but within two years attack aircraft were also operating from
Ruacana, Grootfontein, Rundu and Mpacha. Even more extensive air strike
facilities were available at Windhoek and at Rooikop near Walvis Bay.17

In May 1979, the state ol de l'acto martial law (Security Districts

Proclamqtion AG9) which had replaced the earlier emergency measures in
November 1977, was extended from the northern "homelands' of Ovamboland.
Kavangoland and Caprivi further south as far as Windhoek. Under this Proclamation, police and army were given wide powers of arrest, search and
detention without charge or trial, and a number of restrictions could be imposed,
such as curfews and bans on meetings. Over half the country, inhabited by
80 per cent of the population, was thus brought under the control of the SADF
and the SAP /see Chapter V). The military build-up in the newly proclaimed
"security districts" proceeded on a scale unequalled since the 1975 invasion of
Angola.le Over 40 white-owned farms were identified as being at special risk
and given additional SADF protection.le
In September 1919 a start was made on a major new military base near
Okahandja in the north with the purchase of 20,000 hectares of farming land
east of the town. By December 60,000 hectares had been acquired for what was
to become one of the largest artillery practice ranges and training bases in
Africa.20 The SWA Military School is situated there.
At about the same time plans were far advanced for the upgrading of the
military base at Omega in the western Caprivi. Tenders were invited for the
construction of 62 ablution blocks, 96 sleeping halls and 450 wooden huts.21
SWAPO reported that several new bases were under construction at Kamanjab
and Omaruru (in the north west), Omupindi (near Ondangua), Andara (near
Rundu) and Ngwezi (near Katima Mulilo), while renovations and enlargements
to bases were in progress at Windhoek, Grootfontein, Walvis Bay, Ondangua,
Rundu and Mpacha.zz (Appendix A contains a list oJ bases in Namibia - see
also Map I ).

TROOP STRENGTHS IN NAMIBIA

By the time the transfer of complete control in northern Namibia from the
South African Police to the South African Defence Force had been completed
in June 1974, there were approximately 15,000 South African troops and
counter-insurgency police in Namibia.23 The number of troops was steadily
increased over the next 12 months as the intensity of the war was stepped up
by SWAPO. The outbreak of warinAngola between MPLAandFNLA/UNITA24
had prompted the South African government to accelerate the build-up of South
African troops in northern Namibia. In the second half of 1975 parttimeunits

10

1l

wuu r'rrlh,rl il|

rrgrurrrltlrr4l ,1,,,, tilt
rrI tilt
lrrr ilIptriltilrr41
lrrr lll
llte lllil
lltrl llRlor
llmO,Cndbythetime
8nd by the time the
theSADF
sADllrorir Attgttla
Atnola ltt
Attgola
ttr Merclt
f{etult 1976 rllot
f{rtult
wllhrlrswrt lronr
invasion- there
invasion,
hnd ryllhthnwn
hnrl
rllcr itl
ltr abortive invasion,
wero hn. orlhnetsd 15,000 South Afiloln troopt bmod ln Namibia.2s (The
lncron,ro ln Soulh Afilcen troup ttrnlth ln Nrmlbtr bctween 1970 and i980

ln Flgure l.)
of commltmcnt ol' lroopr to rcrvlcc outolde South Africa
rcquired not only the polltlcul mobllliatlon of whltc south Africans (and
Namibians), but also the expansion of thc commando (locol militia) network.
with troops deployed far away from their honre areas, *hite civiliani began to
guernnree
be
oe more exrensrvely
extensively lnvolveo
in
involved
ln an elaborate
in
elaDorate "clvll
delence" system
svstem to guarantee
"civil defence"
"secunty"-ln
"s^ecurity_" in South Atrica
Africa
itself.
The
principle
same
appiied
applied
to
t[e
the
south
South
ls lllustratod

Thls lcvcl

African Police. In order to free more of them for border duty, increased use was
made inside south Africa of the Police Reserves and the Reserve police Force
whose numbers almost doubled between 1971 and 1978.26 "Local security"
also received attention in Namibia; General Malan, then head of the SADF,
toured Namibia in July 1974 for the purpose of getting the organization of
commandos off the ground.?7 By August 1980 there were26 commando units

(norv called Area Force Units) in existence.Z8 In september 1974 General

Malan visited Namibia again to address a symposium on civil defence.Ze Besides
being involved in cadei training, white sihobl children were and continue
to be - involved in civil defence3o - during the general strike of r9jl12 school-

boys were used in Windhoek to maintain essential services.3l

_The victory of the MPLA in Angola had a major influence on both the
political and military situation in Namibia..It gave a tremendous boost to the
morale of the majority of Namibians by deri-ronitrating what could be achieved
by^ armed struggle and destroying the myth of the invincibility of the South
African armed forces. It was even more important to the milita.y struggle:

fgllowing Angola's

_i,ndepe-ndence, swAPo wis offered facilities in'Angoia]sz

ir
gave SWAPO's military wing PLAN (People's Liberation Aimy of
only
It
.lgt,
Namibia) the opportunity of operating on a front aimost 1,000 miles fong
across northern Namibia from the Kaokoveld in the west to the Caprivi in the

east,

bases

political reasons, to build up a "national multiracial army" in preparation for

i.independence".3T In practice this involved an intensive campaign to recruit
blacki: a year later theie were about 4,000 black Namibians under aqns in the

*iitr u ttigh proportion beinglsed against SWAPO combatants-38

1979 saw a further sharp intensification of the war. The number of contacts
between the SADF and SWAPO combatants, as reported by the SADF, doubled
to an average of one a day while the total nu-mbel-of incidents increased from
less than SO'O in 1978 to-over 900 during 1979:3s The extension of de J'acto
martial law to over half of Namibia in May 1979 was followed by the biggest
single military expansion since the invasion-of Angola.ao Approximately 5,000
Ci{izen Force reinforcements were recruited, bringing the total of military forces
in Namibia to approximately 60,000 personnel.4l The January 1979 intake of
National Servicemen had also been the biggest ever, involving over 20,000
SAitF,

conscripts.a2

The military build-up, which continued thereafter, was accompanied by an

increase in the frequency of South African ground and air raids into Angola.
These resumed in June l9l6,but during 1979 and 1980 increased considerably

1980 the number of troops in

Namibia under SADF control (i.e. excluding police) was variously estimated at

in both scale and frequency. By September

between 70,000 and 80,000.43

The military build-up in Namibia in the 1970s, and since 1973 in particular,
was obviously costly for the South African regime, although few figures are
R200 million
Julv 1979 Prime Minister Botha said it was costing R
available. In July
allowing
ng for
for a steady
yea;' to
a Jvsr
a
rv "guaiantee the security of SWA",aa which, *---"--'o'"^
inCrease during the previous six years, amounts to a total sum of about Rl,000
million since 1973. In November 1980 n'e said that South Africa had spent
R3,000 million on "infrastructure and defence" in Namibia.as Most would have
been spent since 1973, implying a total annual expenditure there at present of
possibly R500 million.

but also enabled swAPo to establish refugee camps and guerflla training
in Angola.

Another qh?lgJ il 4. situation in 1976 resulted from the co-operation

between
Detween
ween tne
the SADF,
JArJI,, UNITA
SA
UNll A and FNLA during the South Aliican
African iinvolvehent in
Angola. UNITA and FNLA units operated together with the South
I
Al'rican
invasio!- forces and installed administrations in each town captured fronr
MPLA.33 when the soulh Africans withclrew, the UNIrA foiies retreated
south with thenr, some as l'ar as Namibia, where they were retrained and
cquipped in caurps.slt up in Nanribia ostensibly to hous'e Angolan refugees.3a

Sincc then tlrc SADF has taken UNITA under its wing,lupplyinglfood,
cquipment and truining_as well as launching joint operations against towns
Irr south.castern Angola.36 (See also Chapter Vi).
As a result of the improvement_in the situation for swApo's guerilla fighters
in 1976, the armed struggle escalated dramatically. In May tgll tne feriod
of national service for sADF conscripts was doubied from one to two years.
At the same time the recruitment of blacks into the SADF was stepped up and
in August Major General J.J. Geldenhuys was sent to windhoek fo take over
swA
SWA Command and responsibility
resoonsibilifv for
for all military
militarv operations
nnerefions in Namibia.36
Nqfrihic 36
This involved a re-organization of the structure of military command in
Namibia (see Chapter III), nor only for military reasons, but also for
12

l3

TABLE

DEF'ENCE EXPENDITURE I 960_1981

Rnr

r960

44

teT

322

72

t972

335

1962
1963
1964

129

1973

472

157

1974

7072

210

1975

t96s

229

1976

1966

255

1977

1967

2s6
252
272
257

1978

1969

t970

at an) trre

time,

Rm

1961

1968

SADF STANDTNG oPERATIONAL FoRcE (rc. of troops under arms

DEFENCE EXPENDITURE, AND NUN\BER OF TROOPS IW NAMIBIA.

6'
6
z

I
z
200

va

1940
1976
2189

o
u
a

1.5

i
u
z

r.o

t50

-Iq

tr
o
z
c

23003
28003

1981

DFNCE EXPENOITURE

,l .o

1043
1408

1979
1980

2.5

srANotwo oPecATtoNAL

t
o

FORC

loo

2
o

^@

Notes:

l.

Figures from 1960 ro 1973, inclusive, are cash votes as indicated in the
Annual Estimales.
2. F-igures for 1974 through 1979 are those for total defence expenditure from
all
departments as published in the biennial whitr pup.. on

^government
Defence.
3. Estimates from Finuncial Mail (Johannesburg), 21

o.o-*
1960

t962

r95q

operatimal Force - Tade

Trops in Namibra - eElimates

l.g0

t972

tg76

1176

t978

lgSo

YEAR

SOlEgEl: Standin3

.1

1966 t968 tgTo

Z
grven

Decehce Expendit\rre

in cipter]I

- Table

TABLE 2ESTIMATED TOTAL STRENGTH OF SADF 1960-1979

960

1974

t979

I I,500

2l ,500

40,000

10,000

26,000

60,000

2,000

120,000

230,000

48,500

90,000

150,000

Civilians

6,000

I 1,500

14,000

TOTAL

78,000

269,O00

494,000

Standing operational force

I 1,500

47,sOO

180,000

Permanent force
National service

Citizen force
Commandos

Source:

l4

The Apartheid Ilar Machine,IDAF, 1980, page

4l
15

III.'I'HE M I LI'IARY STRUCTURE

A bcwlldcrlng. vrrloty of mllltnry,. parnmllltary end pollco units are deployed in
Numiblu ln deforrce of sou,rh Alrrcub lllojar_ociupatlon and the ipaitheid
ly_s.telrj some of the f.rces ln actlon ugalnsi tho roilJtanie rour'nrnt t.a uy
swAPo operate in a deliberately low-piufile, even .trnacsiin.-r.nner. It is a
far from.straightforwagd Jask to identify the main characteristics, functions,
command structure, and relationship to other units, of any of them.
_ since _1980, the overall_picture has appeared even more complicated, as
South Africa has embarked on moves t6wards the Namibian veision of an
"internal settlement"..In the sphere
,of the military una tt , po1i.e, these have
involved organisational
.and .structural, changes designed to gi'u. irr. impression
that Namibia has acquired
its. own "indepjndent,'"Defence"For..-u"o police,
and that- powgr- and responsibility for the defence of the territory are being
delegated to Namibians themselves. Namibia-ns are ostensibly- iaklng
trol of army and- police operations while the soutrr -Aiiiruri .ilit.r"y cori.;d
as adopting a.low profile prior to withdiawing-iompietely
ry"tr^.:. ir: q:,:enred

wnen rney wrll no longer be required andf or Namibia is granted rir ..inaepen".
In reality, the "internal settlement" public relations exercise conceals the fact
.
that the south African government i. pretoria- retains . fi;
tip-;;er all key
institutions _and significant developments in Namibia
u ioi'rn-of.control
exercised, above all, through the sbuth African police and military deployJ
throughout the territory.
.chapter_examines the command structure and organisation of the
^ Tt-t'r African
South
Defence Force
.(SADF) and south Africaf-i;t;; (sAp) i;
Namibia, and
dence

describes.the various military and paramilitary-*iis *o purumilitary police units deployed in the territoiy. chapter rv ro6m in-more detail
at the establishment by th9 south African iuthorities of ,.trib;i armies,, and
police units in the various 'homelands " from the I 970s onr"iai ,ut-inating
in
1980^-81. in__the inauguration of Namibia's own "independent"'defence
-west forles,
the south west Africa Territory Force (SWATF) anti the Soutrr
Africa

flanicntel
eibcon

Police (SWAP).

COMMAND STRUCTURE
overall control of military and police operations in Namibia has at various times
ostensibly_ resided in either Pretoria or windhoek. There have ueen
comparable
shifts in the relationship between the army and the police, unJ tr,.iii.rpective
spheres of influence, reflecting the growing demands placed ;" ih; apirtheid
defence
vsJem by !he. liberation Jtpssri As swApo's a.-eo-sirulgt. lru.
intensified, increasingly lare tracts of NamlUia have effectivety Ueen aeiignateO
as_operational areas and the "normal" functions of maintaining law and
order
subordinated to the demands of South Africa's overall -oi.tt"i,inrurg.n.y

strategy.

. B-efor9 19-72173, when the South African Defence Force began assisting
the south African Police in.Namibia in fairly large numbers, all militaiy activity
in defence of the territory"s borders was tfie reiponsibilitf oiSwA
in Windhoek.

t6

Kry
I Ua1* ar fovtc besas
oprationat
I gajor
ba3es
lniennational
bon&ns
,'gperational'

------ -

5cthanic
a

f-.\.

i\t\

ii!;'

r{
i

\.-.-

' il.ea
PnoposedDMZ

lnter-'homebM'
borders

l'i\artial law
aFecs

f.Aaih foad6

co-.nuna

t7

wlth thc sADF's lssurnprkrn of' lirll control over the "border areas" of
northsrn Namibia irr lt)74, liowcver, counter.lrrsur.gency and military operations
against SWAPO in these opcrationalurcus bccurne lhe rlsponsibilitv of i0l Task
Force in Grootfontein, ntxthern Nanribia. l0l Task Force was in turn directly

responsible to the Headquarters of the SADF in pretoria.l A distinction thus

emerged between the war in the north against SwApo, where pretoria exercised
direct -control through the army, and the maintenance of "law and order" in the
rest of. Namibia, exercised through the Divisional commissioner of the sAp in
windhoek, in turn responsible to the commissioner of the sAp and the Minister
of Police in South Africa.
. In August 1977, in an_e_ffort lo give the rnoves towards Namibials "independence" some substance, Major Genlral Jannie Geldenhuys was despatched to
windhoek oy"Fe $^outh Afrigan government with the misiion of establishing an

qpparently self-sufficient military infrastructure in Namibia, together with a

multiracial armyn.2 Geldenhuy_s, a former chief of Soutli Africa Army
staff op_e-rations, was no stranger to-Namibia, having served in the territory
froT 1970 ,to 1974, the latter part as officer comman?ing the SWA command

*national

in Windhoek.

,.Geldenhuys' arrival in Namibia precipitated a major re-organisation of the

military command structure. From 15 August 19j7,'mthtary iuthority for the
whole of Namibia was centralised in the Eros'Defence Headquarters in

windhoek. 101 Task Force at Grootfontein and the separate command which
l*9^"1r: existed.up tg-.thil time in Walvis Bay, were brought under the wing of
swA command in windhoek, headed by Geldenhuys. (T*o weeks laterion
1 September 1977, the walvis Bay enclave was annexed by South Africa and
amalgamated. for administrative purposes with Cape province)-.
,_ In.? highly.cri-tical editorial pultlstreo shortiy after Geidenhuys'arrival in
Namibia, the windhoek Advertiser remarked that "from all this r.rhuffling und
policy changes, one thing stands as clear as daylight; there is no imminent tloop
withdrawal from this territory. on the contrary- . . . one realises that pretoria
aims to build its military capabilities in South West Africa to the optimum".3
Through swA command, the sADn, and ultimately pretoria, c'ontinue to
exercise full control over all military personnel and ali military and counterinsurgency activity in Namibia
- including the activities of the south African
Police il the tenitory's operational a.eas, rihere they operate as adjuncts of the
army. This is so despite the further administrative and organisational changes
which have taken place since 19ll and which are describ6d in more detail-in
Chapter_IV, towards the. formal inauguration of Namibia,s ..own" army and
police force. changes in terminolofy have been used to reinforce the
impression that the command structures themselves have changed. Members
of the South west Africa Territory Force (SWATF) and the Souih west Africa
Police (SrilAP) remain part of the south Airican defence and security forces for
all practic-al purposes even while being depicted for public relationj reasons as

"independent".4
The military, paramilitary and police personnel deproyed in Namibia include
full-timers
1-timers and part-timers:
part-timers; profissionals.
pr
ls, volunteers
volunteeis and
an d conscripts;
conscrints. forces
fnre es
permanently based in Namibia, and forcess based in South Africa but doing
doi tours
of duty in, or seconded to Namibia.s A]l are ultimately controlled 6'y the
South African government in Pretoria.

l8

MILITARY SECTORS
Namibia can be divided into three military areas; the "operational area" in the
north, Walvis Bay, and the rest of the territory, for which the SWA Territory
Force formally has responsibility. Control is exercised from Windhoek, through
various sector headquarters, which in turn control and co-ordinate activities at
the numerous smaller bases in each sector. (The location of bases in Namibia

is shown in Figure 2 while all the bases and the units (described below) stationed
at them are listed in Appendix A.)
The "operational area" is divided into three sectors; Sector 10 (Kaokoland,
Ovamboland), Sector 20 (Kavangoland, West Caprivi, Bushmanland) and Sector
70 (East Caprivi) with respective headquarters at Oshakati, Rundu and Katima
Mulilo.6 The operational area, together with Walvis Bay, is under the authority
of the South African Defence Force.
The area for which the SWA Territory Force is administratively responsible
is divided into four sectors;
Sector
Sector
Sector
Sector

30
40

50 60 -

northern area, HQ at Otjiwarongo

central area, HQ at Windhoek
eastern area, HQ at Gobabis
southern area, HQ at Keetmanshoop

The enclave of Walvis Bay is a key element in South Africa's control of

Namibia as it has considerable economic and strategic value. It is the only deep
water port in Namibia, handling over 90 percent of export trade,T and is the
centre of Namibia's fishing industry. It also serves as the base for extensive
exploration for oil and natural gas.8 The naval base in the harbour is over 700
miles north of Saldanha Bay, the northern-most naval base on South Africa's
Atlantic coast, and together with the air force base at Rooikop nearby and
extensive army installations, makes Walvis Bay very important strategically.
The enclave is one of the most militarised areas in Southern Africa, with
at least 2,500 troops stationed within it.e South African Navy warships are
regularly in port. The SA Air Force base at Rooikop has all the facilities
necessary to service an air strike force and is also used as a base for coastal
air patrols. The 2 South African Infantry Battalion Group, one of the SADF's
elite units and the only one combining infantry and armour, is permanently
based in the enclave. It played a major role in the 1975176 invasion of Angola.lo
Other units include a recently-formed counter-insurgency section of the SA
Navy, the Marines, for seaward defence, assisted by diving teams, ship search and
explosives disposal experts and harbour patrol boats equipped with radar.l 1
Despite a United Nations Security Council resolution in 1978, calling for the
reintegration of Walvis Bay into Namibia, South Africa claims the enclave as
South African territory and has stated that it has no intention of giving it up.
This position stems from the annexation of the 434 square mile enclave by
Britain in 1878. From 1884 it was administered by the old (British) Cape
Colony and later by the Union of South Africa, until 1922 when administration
was transferred to the mandated territory of South West Afiica.12 In 1977,
during negotiations for independence with the United Nations, South Africa
unilaterally transferred the administration of Walvis Bay to the Cape Province,l3
bringing it under Pretoria's direct jurisdiction.
t9

MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

paramilltary forcos prosont ln Namlbia lnclude counter-insurgency
forges. (c-omb,lning army, pollco and alr forco), conventlonal forces (army, navy
and-alr_ force), and vpport forces (command, lo$stical support, service'uniti,
medical etc.). AII the-se armed forces deployed in the war alainst the nationai
liberation movement fall under the contr6l oi the south Africin Defence Force.
There are also a number of special units which operate more or less

Mllttary

and-

independently.

planning strikes into Angola and Zambia. Reconnaissance flights over Angola
have become a daily occurrencels and it is believed that the SAAF possesses
some of the most modern equipment and techniques for photo-reconnaissance
work.16

Mirage fighter jets, the F1 AZ and III EZ (see Appendix B for details of
aircraft and weapons used by the SAAF in Namibia) form the core of the
SAAF's ground attack force, armed with air-to-surface missiles.17 British SMK50
Buccaneers are deployed as bombers and ltalian-licensed Impala MkIIs also play
key ground attack role.
Transport Command of the SAAF plays a crucial role in enabling the army to
operate. It moves troops, equipment and supplies with large Lockheed C-130s
and L-100s, (similar to the C-130 but sold by the USA as "civilian'' planes),
and flies troops, particularly paratroopers, into action. It also transports key
personnel and small supply loads.
Muritime Command's main role in Namibia is to patroi the arid coastline from
its base at Rooikop.
Light Aircraft Command consists of a permanent operational wing and the
Air Commandos. The permanent wing is used in the "operational area" in
a

COUNTER-INSURGENCY FORCES
Most of the counter-insurgency forces of the SADF present in Namibia are
in the north of the country. This pattern is changing as the armed
liberation struggle gains momentum and the south African iuthorities find
themselves faced with guerilla attacks and sabotage in new areas further to
ihe south of Namibia. The slatA Territory Force irea Force units (formerly
called commandos), and various tribal units with counter-insurgency functioni,
for example, operate in the areas in which they are based, outside the northern
deployed

region.

fnf counter-insurgency forces comprise units of the Permanent Force (which

includes most South African Air Force personnel), the atizen Force, nitionol
servicemen, Commandos and various paramilitary police forces.
The citizen Force consists of south African soldiers who have completed
their national service but can be drafted for further periods of part-time or fulltime service.
The Commandos are local militias organised into units similar to a lightly
armed infantry battalion. They consist largely of volunteers, mainly rihit!
Namibian farmers.
standard counter-insurgency operations, which are closely co-ordinated with
the. activities^ of slecial units (see below), are geared towards stopping the
infiltration of guerilla forces and maintaining as widespread a military presence
1To_nglt the local population as possible. The sectors in the operationaf area are
divided into "battalion areas" which are further broken do*n into "company
areas'l Each company base maintains a force of between two and three hundrei
troops who are responsible for the continual patrolling of their region.la
SADF counter-insu
SADI
counter-insurgency forces
lbrces are
are assisted by police and, when overstretched, _by other SADF units of a more conventional kind. Helicopter-borne
troops and paratroop-s play an important role in counter-insurgency operations
and the army and air force are closely integrated for operational purposes.
The South Afican Air Force (SAAF) is depioyed in 6otli- a counterinsurgency_and a conventional role. It oqerates in Namibia from seven major
bases (see Map l)as well as numerous airfields, and through four commandjStrike, Transport, Maritime and Light Aircraft.
strike command in Namibia has two major responsibilities; reconnaissance
1n$ grogld- at_tack. High_ level and tactical reconnaissance are carried out by
British BAC Canberras (a1so used as bombers) and French Mirage III RZ\
and R2Z's (manufactured in South Africa). Reconnaissance work has become
a large part of the SAAF's task in Namibia as it is of particular importance in

particular, performing low level tactical reconnaissance, forward air control,

casualty evacuation and light transport. The Air Commando squadrons consist
of light civilian aircraft, piloted by their civilian owners, all volunteers, who are
trained to provide light support.ls
The role of the South African Air Force's helicopters in the war, in both
counter-insurgency and conventional operations, is indispensable. They are
used extensively in all SAAF's four Commands. Helicopters are particularly
effective when used in direct conjunction with army units, transporting supplies,

dropping and retrieving infantry patrols, providing air cover to foot and
armoured patrols, following up guerilla contacts and for casualty evacuation.
(See Appendix B for types.).

CONVENTIONAL FORCES
since the South African invasion of Angola in 1915, increasing use has been
made of conventional forces for cross-border raids into Angola and Zambia.
Usually termed "pre-emptive strikes" or "hot pursuit" oper,ations by South
Africa, these raids increased considerably in both scale and frequency during
l9l9 and 1980. Included in these attacks are strike aircraft, armoured units,
artillery, paratroops, and infantry transported by helicopter, transport aitcraft
and armoured troop carriers. (See Appendix C for details of weapons- and
equipment used by the Army in Namibia). Large numbers of troops are involved.
The-Angolan government estimated that in June 1980, immediately prior to- a
major invasion of Angola which took place during June-July- -there were 15
batialions with air sufport stationed in the Grootfontein area.le It claimed that
eight battalions (the- strength of a conventional brigade) took part in the
iniasion.2o Extensive use is also made of strike aircraft and helicopter gunships
operating independently of ground forces in attacking targets in Angola /see
Chapter V).

20
21

SUPPORT FORCES
Between one half and two thirdszl of all military forces in Namibia are believed
to be part of the support network. Support for operations in the north is centred
in Grootfontein, where the Northern Loistics command He is based. support
units are drawn from the Permanent Force, the citizen Force and natibnal
servicemen.

SPECIAL UNITS
while the standard counter-insurgency campaign is organised around
ound regionally
region
based patrol forces, an increasing number 6f
of Special
Special Anfts are beins
dJnlo,
being deployed,
both in Angola and in Namibia,_in an attempt to pre-empt guerilla'opeiations.
The growth.of.special^units in the past.few years has been iccompanied by in
increase in the level of atrocities carried out by south African forcis againsi the
-directly

population. These two developments are

related, for the expansion
of.special units signalled the SA regime's resolve to employ brute force in the
light of its failure to win its campaign for the hearts anl minds of the people.
lo^cal

32 BATTALION
These "elite unitso, many of which consist largely of mercenaries, fall under

separate command structure to standard counter-insurgency forces and

invariably do not wear SADF uniforms or carry standard weiponr. The biggest
and most active of these special units is known as 32 Battalion or the..BuTialo
Unit" and operates almosf entirely inside Angola. It is controlled, according io
information from deser-ters, by south Afiican Military Intelligence and "not
directly by the SADF. 32 Battalion is comprised of an estimat6d 9,000 black
Angolans wh9, as former members of the FNLA led by Holden Roberto, cogperate_d with the south African
lrryy dqring Angola's- transition to independence. It is under the command of white south Afiican officers, many of tirem
Portuguese-speaking, and includes a number of white mercenaries hom the

United States, Australia and Western European countries.22

The existence of 32_Battalion, formed in 1976, was denied by the SADF
until February_l98l, when a number of deserters gave public accounts of its
operations.23 The unit has its main base at Buffalo-, also known as Bagani. in
the western caprivi. It also operates from bases such as Rundu ana BenfianaF
The activities of 32 Battalion are describe d in Chapter IV.

with the South African government (and, incidentally, with the Caetano regime
in Portueal in_ a _pre-in-dependence alliance against the MPLA), and of the dipendence of the LINITA forces on the support of the SADF. Inlate 1975, at a time
when Angola was under attack from invading South African forces and overseas
mercenaries. P"W. Botha at that. time South African Minister of Defence.
crossed into Angola with a party of senior South African military personnel and
government ministers. They were photographed together with Savimbi and
members of his personal bodyguard at a location "deep inside Angola" in the
region of what was then known as Nova Lisboa.2s The visit and the consultations which took place between the UNITA leader and the South Africans

would appear _to have marked the onset of a client-patron relationship which has
continued to this day.
During the first years of independence, the Angolan government consolidated
its control over the traditional areas of support for UNITA, the central plateau

south-east, and launched a successful campaign against the remnants

guerilla forces in these areas.26 By the beginning of 1981, UNITA's
a,ctivities and presence inside Angola were largely confined to the remote
{uando-Kubango_ province in the south-east of ihe country bordering on the
caprivi strip, and elsewhere in the southern provinces wheie they op6rated in
close conjunction with the SADF, including the members of 32 Battalion.
The evidence of deserters from 32 Battalion at this time substantially reinforced
the_ picture that had already emerged during Angola's first five years of
independence, of UNITA as an appendage of the SADF- Its remaining gueriila
forces are heavily dependent on the SADF for training facilities and rea-r 6ases at
S.outh African military bases inside Namibia;logisticil support; transport facilities; arms, ammunition and supplies; technical asiistance and leadership.2T

"!{fht
of UNITA's

RECONNAISSANCE COMMANDOS
The Reconnaissance commandos (Recces), the south African equivalent of the
of Rhodesia, are special uniti consisting of

now'disbanded Selous Scouts

professional
including many from overseaS, who have to sign up f6r a
-soldiers,
minimum of three years._During this time they receive a thorough training in
parachuting, skydiving, deep sea diving, mountain climbing, unconventiJnal
and unarmed combat and advanced explosives.2s They are deployed in small
units assigned to specific combat tasks outside the framework-of standard
military operations and are a law unto themselves, being responsible only to
the Chief of the SADF.2e In operation they often do not wear SADF

uniforms and sometimes carry non-SADF weapons.3o

UNITA

SWA SPECIALIST UNIT

The UNITA guerilla forces of Dr. Jonas Savimbi (National union for the Total
Independence of Angola) can with considerable justification be described as a
lp_e_cial unit of the SADF. up to the time of Angoli's independence in November
1975, TINITA.was accorded status internatio-nally as one of three liberation
movements mobilising the.people of Angola for th-e struggle against portuguese
colonialism.
coloniausm. since
colonlalrsm.
Since
Since that .time, however, UNITA's standing (and that oI
oi the
FNLA) has dwindled. Evidence
has been'forthcoming or Suui.niii-*oiiaoor"tion

A further special unit with a permanent base inside Namibia and which has now
been formally transferred to the swA Territory Force, is I swA specialist unit,

22

comprised of "psychologically and physically handpicked" permanent Force

and National Service tracking and infantry men. Formed in January 191g, rhe
unit is based at oshivello and uses horses,350cc scrambler motor cyiles, tracker,
patrol and mine detection dogs, and indigenous San (Bushman) trackers to lead
follow-up operations after clashes between SADF parrols and PLAN units.31
LJ

KOEVOET
Koevoet_("crowbar"), a special unit officially operating as part of the South
African Police, engages in counter-insurgency operationl and acts as an assas-

sination squad against suspected SWAPO supporters (see below).

A large number of mercenaries previously employed in Rhodesia are now
operating_in \amibia. While some have been absorbed into existing SADF units,
such as the Reconnaissance Commandos, others are being deployed in new
special units, the details ofwhich are at this stage unclear.

RESERVES

PARAMILITARY POLICE
The numerous types 9f police present in Namibia are all armed, mostly with
automatic weapons. They complement the South African Defence Force in
the suppression of resistance to South Africa's illegal occupation and in effect

constitute a paramilitary force.

The prominent role played by the police within the overall counterinsurgency programme of the South African armed forces was highlighted in a
qtil_itary communique issued in March 1981 by the SWA Territoiy Force.
Colonel Nico Roets, Senior Staff Officer, announced in Windhoek on i2 March
that 58 SWAPO combatants had been killed by security forces over the
preceding two weeks- Ihe South African Police had accounted for 60 per cent of
of the

deaths, he said.32

souTH AFRTCAN

the South African

lolice (SAP). All members of the SAP receive counter-insurgency training, are
heavily armed, and equipped with military jeeps and South African Air Force

helicopter support. The major police bases are in Windhoek, Walvis Bay, Groot-

fontein, Oshakati and Ondangua.

Besides

"civil" policing, the SAP play a major counter-insurgency

role,

including "border duty". The SAP first moved into the operational area in
Namibia in 1966, and until llune 1974, shortly after the fall of the Caetano
regime in Portugal, had the main responsibility for patrolling the northern
border with Angola. These duties were then to a large extent taken over by the
SAD{^but the SAP returned to the border on an operational basis in January
1976.33

SAP members

of all

races are specially trained at a centre outside Groblersdal

in the Eastern Transvaal. After six weeks of training they return to their
stations
stations in South Africa
Africi and Namibia to await call-up
call-uffor:'border dutv".3a
ty" -sa

In the operational area the SAP's counter-insurgency units are deployed in

numerous bases with an average strength of thirty or forty troops. They operate
in close liaison with SADF counter-insurgency structures with pariicular
gatherinq. They
emphasis on lnlorrnatton
empnasrs
information gatnerlng.
gathering.
Thev
lhey can be
be best described as a militarised/
counter-insurgency wing
counter-insursencv
wins of the Security
Securitv Police.35
, Since 1980, South Africa has taken steps to establish an "independent" police

force in Namibia, the South West Africa Police (SWAP), under the fbrmal
control of the SWA Administrator General and the Council of Ministers in
24

In order to free more police for "border duty" or riot control in the townof South Africa and in Namibia, a volunteer Reserve Police force was
established in 1961 , to assist with ordinary police duties on a part-time basis.36
ships

Its members, who are civilians, are attached to almost every SAP station and
most have had previous military or police experience. A different reserve force,
the Police Reserue, established in l9TP7 consists solely of ex-members of the
SAP and is in many ways similar in concept to the Citizen Force of the SADF.
All ex-SAP members are required by law to serve in the force for unlimited
periods in times of emergency, if ordered to do so. Those who served less than
five years as regulars may also be ordered to serve 30 days each year for five
years after resigning.

SECURITY POLICE

POLTCE (SAP)

Of the various police forces deployed in Namibia the largest is

Windhoek, rather than the South African Commissioner and Minister of Police.
On 1 September 1980, authority for the SAP in Namibia, with the exception
of the Security Police and the national intelligence seryices, who remain directly
answerable to Pretoria, was handed over to the Administrator General. Seven
months later, on 1 April 1981, the SAP formally relinquished the responsibility
for policing Namibia to the new SWAP force. Members of the SAP are now
officially serving in Namibia "on secondmenl". (See Chapter IV for a full
description of the creation of the South l'lest Africa Police).

The Security Police, who form part of the SAP, have a large detachment on duty
in Namibia, concerned mostly with the detention and interrogation of political
opponents of the regime. Besides the gathering of intelligence, this work also
serves the purpose of intimidating political opponents. Like other members
of the security forces, all police have been given extensive powers. They can
detain people for up to 30 days without access to legal counsel. There has been
substantial evidence that torture is employed almost on a routine basis by the

Security Police during interrogation.

RAILWAYS POLICE
In September 1979 the South AJrican Railways Police were included in the
definition of "security forces", giving them the same status and powers as the
SAP and the SADF. The force was enlarged a few months later with the
formation

of

the Railways Police Reserve Force, similar

in

concept

to

the

SA Police Reserve.s

MUNICIPAL POLICE
White-controlled municipalities have their own Municipal Police force, mainly
responsible for dealing with "security" in the towns. All armed, they include
such forces as traffic police.3e
In March 1978, for example, the Windhoek City Council was reported to have
2s

il'J
be i;i,liif,,J'#,",11,,:o*,,f111ff,:,j:;
responsibre ror rhe'pr.rection
l::lipg,,, an industriar-commando, to
i'relevan
5'
other
"i "il'Jti
servicesi ir
"iriii.ip.rli;:li;:liTir?T#?ii,";,1!
auring
rj"g" ii.i'jr.
r.i.ris."ffir"iitv
City Council provided
::ll:L_t:l_"y.ntt r"rui..,
orovirterr funds
ri,nrr" ioi
F^-

Y.lliil,i,'f:ff1,J,Yry;
unii-*ii'
,'fj
l#ll',li,T.,.u,1,"?llJl11:,rnJ
Katutura
",ii',J
-workers' compound3d

j it#. t tj,l
.j1t'-ll':^^yu1 l 9,, l on g."r deem ed de quate ro r the
jl:H"":Hf;:;i1:,:::',:ii'L,:"*r""ll.:Fr#i'a;H:",:,xx?ni""ifi
"l|o,}*',?
Pt"

;Jl;
ff
:ill1;#Xf
ll#lnl:*-,,.,,,:,.hi!&q;fi;Tl',ffJ:ji;$:,ffi
;*"l'jrl
fJ*e"l'%'J5;ltll'"i:::'-;1"k1':'i.*;;;';.)J::'Hiif;:?;3t#*11
rsu tu conslst or 5u uvambo
l'Sptqt4 Constables", drawn from'irr.'triil"i""ur
in the norrhern regions
,i"tr-4ilpii'i;i.';";
ro he ,nrra, ,r.- ^^__^!.olic.e
g^rr?(!,{":r*:.1{;i.:lq:iff
:#"#:ff ':'f ,"f Jil,1.";:'*?T,,':n?t:
ff ;i:fl :Jli
f #;Il*..+I:,."".^,:,9:,,{:;r;;;;;;dil;,;t;#'.?ff
"i;"'T;';ff"dilJ"8ffiIi
i'1illl,i"ilf;"lll,f,,::::T:"^9,11:-q.':t
although
.1" ^;i^'i+;
they fell under the.riii"ritv'"f til
SApt;
COMPANY POLICE
compounds attached,to specific factories
-it and mines are also policed in manv
i,tploy.A-Uy

cases by companv ootic3,

;11,ff*fiifilii;"itt'

"i"'iiii*

.-nrr

to^regulate visiiors and workers

F;;#';ec'uriry ri,.,ii',i-'r,l,Joui ,niro.,ea

TRIBAL POLICE
In the ovambo and Kavango bantustans, tribar porice,
controned by the
bantustan authoriries
.and noi Jbj;;;";;' aepartmenral ;.gri;;;;; or pubric
scrutiny. have existed.,::l.:_
n..i"lir.;il;;;,;.rrmilitary
lh: iriiv"lslb,
training from south African instructors
ano uesiaes.bein!';r;il;d;guards
all tribar chiers, harassrlo.iltti. ir"i'
for
p"iiti.uropp?n.nirlrtliiiuur pori..
were extensivelv used i9r^!1is purpose
durihg'rhe-el;;ii;;;,i;; irriciuurnuoruna
Legislative councir in rsii. [i]".;ir^";ilfEtic
-e.ting, herd by SWApo and
forcing people to turn out ro
iriurt poti.-e also

control and guard duties.

""t..;l'iri.

undertake border

lji#.';' :l'?; :;J2::; ilz::|, ::'l: j ? ?9:, uni ts o r spec";lfia t po tic e,som tim es
:"",iff iiT#,i1TT
;'"?T:iJi"fl :#i1"!'{.::""u:ii,.*s:t.;i,;:i;r"#f
iJ,li;;,l.'.?,*'jr,i:";,?'',i:1:r,il?i:i:r:*;:'fi:_;i:'l,1''"J:.?;'f"il:.i
for
example, completed i
';J,+::::Hil'J,l#,'l'.:?::::::,,,1*'::::i!"#iJ:ili;il?
e

l['b'il',f

in defence services and ,.law ;;d

;;;;;;;

HOME GUARDS
In the ovambo bantustan, a quasi-police unit
known as the Home Guards has
established a reputaiion ror uioi.ni"u"i
'ffi'
behaviour towards the
civilian popularron. Nrhough
;;;;;."".""tro'ed
Iike tribar miliria in rerms of
26

upon to enforce the law"

o.ganisati
isation and may be called

j5

A.l:4ing official of the r,rrtheran world Federation who

visited Namibia in
Iuly
y 1979, however, stated afterwura.
fterwards that
tlri-..it-"ii
,o
r^-^-- an-v
"there is
-^-L1^-- - of.
rs .^
no ronger
longer
^-.. ,.r"[f.r..
anv
semblance
order or ir,. iri. .i'r"; j; dffifr;:j"h"":"te
population.is"t"t"['v
"f
of rhe arh*,erl, hnr'ar :ii;]"fl.9:111d;
Ihr
t"_lli,IF;.'r
"]]rr.rnrr.y
-o;;;;
ljj1"":j3',:_ry.l?,y:.
comprised
of young l{:19
black. drop-outs oi 6;li,,i^Jiii,i;;1i'1',##:"f,:l'd
.
;;;;;'.'iL"-'rl,r"r"Tl;
uneducated, unemploved and live hv onod.1., o-,1 avni+^.-^_r
tr
sood
p11z ano e"ci-t#ent. a,rn.d
^_-_,-- uunor,
Hl::tt"I:: known
fl.].Tily
di
ut,*rii,,'lili,iii"l#iiffil
:llT^"t11::lo'll:.1,
9.i,i,i.'itti,e
appears..to u, ii,pi".iie ffi;';i,,t ffi;
ffi: ;ilil
e'^"Jl' Guards
;;::-,1 gi'-.1,,1oy
assembled rrb-

;l

", pu.ir-;Tl#

Il,,"ui"1,
tribes
".46

;il;;' iljH;#";:ili;:

A unit which has fast gained notoriety is the Koevoet. While

officially a
police unit, this force coniists oi uia.t fru,nibian
.elite,
troops
who
receive
special operations training at 5 Reconnairr"n.r'cil.;;"
;"il;iri th.i, ,ol.

is best described as a Namibian equiuaGni

"r:z ii.ii.ri* iiZr'inopt*

vl.

SPECIAL TASK FORCE

Prior to the inaueuration.of the South west Africa porice
(SWAp) itself /see
Chapter IV). the ritest police r"rr t" u. io*.a
was the speciar Task Force. rt
was first mentioned in the Namibiun^prrs
in'august r9g0 when a constable of
the Special rask Force_appeared ueiore itre wr""ort".t-la"girmirlJbourt
on u
charge.aT T.he wiianoek obseivii-described
the unit at the time as
ryil.]
oerle
of "young white thugs'..4
rn lolnrised
Februarv lggl
df the Special rask Force, Louis conrad
_,a--constable
Nagel' aged 2b, was given
a six year prisorl term, hat of

ii'susJenaea, on
convicrion or curoahre" homicide. 'H."rr!J"rr,.i-;;;
dil.j'u'tt'ul"f'run in u
windhoek street during an argument..rn purring
sentence. the judge stated that
Nagel's behaviour *ar'u
or the JJu.otion and training which
he had
^rerilt and
received in rhe porice force
*r,r.r,"rrrl--;;

hi;";;e,*iiiir,i,

rd

SPECIAL POLICE

(See also Chapter tV).

as having a police function. rn June

?icili:i:"Af",fl;19-_officjflr^..cul,d-r.g
g s o ;ir,- we ;i ;i.i;.. ft ;ilii j I #ff ;r,lji :tf,
gf
f*r",xi,
d :^lTlliain
Home
Guard ::,
in Ovamboland"is
also-a potce

tr,t

ut

to serve his country". According to evidence given

,eflciencv
tn
camera, Nager?.*i!tngness
had been trained to ..identify-and eriminate
swApo terrorists,,.
Giving evidence ror rhe defence, a ptv.r'"l"drt
o..rri.J Nrgli;;;;normut uut
said that members of rhe.Task F"ri;';;;".r";ikery
ro be ..good boys,,. Nage|s
defence lawyer stressed that "u good roiafur;-ougtrt
to have ..psychopathic and
sociopathic tendencies", as theJe *.r.
lrutitr.s that made for fearlessness.ae

CONSCRIPTION AND CALL_UP

the ages of 18 and 30 in South Africa and
Namibia are
fl,_ryl*.:t*.b.",y:.1
requlred
ired bv taw
perrorm lwo years
w to
ro perform
of nati
natronar-s"eltlil",ffi"sHtrxtff#
^two vears
Defence
p.l;"" 7^,^1i,llnce Force: _or
police
or South
South African
African
(or thejr.-Namibian
the
^r^-,",^- equivalents,
"'i"

*-*"

:i*l:

*t'-.g T#l
91ll?::

l.:.:::.

3i;;
il H;' ini i,l'
is ?i,
lollowed
),Xil Ti,"
by r;H
2ad ITJ:
days'I ll;,li
servicei
lo
c.91,"'u"a.1
?"*,
;;i;;.;d,il;JJ$."X;';:
l( 1n,

eight
:iff l'"3x,iT',inini?Il-"1,1:::;.rtrl.{il;ril;:##rb"ffiT:ll;:1iy'i:;
years). In addition, o.i,tng

i;;;;1.il;;i,, 1;:; #nT:'.:ii:H.ilil i:l

27

fu,tv
.for -indefinite_periods when requirements demand. They
^:gll,j"lll_
are
then placed
on the
N.ational Reserve, liable. to
.cill-up in an emergency up
h-r the age of
*operational"65. ln practice, most of the'annual call-ups'aie fo; ;i;;., months,
duty, 30 days of which are regarded,

it the discretion of the

"continuous training" camp.
,rlr two. year period of national seriice cohsists of an initial nine months
training period, followed by,active service. The sADF ,rrim rrruuilv
on national
service troops in Namibia; the national service period ;ur-in;;.;.j
from one
year to its present length in 1971 in order to rilieve the uuio"n
oir.rvice on
citizen Force troops. The annual call-up commitment was also i*rrurro
in 1977
clear indication of the. military situation in Namibia
-thea use
souir, lirica, since
part-time soldiers hai a serious effeci on "ro
;h; ;;;;;;;
SApF,

as the annual

.of
supposed to

and was
have been^reduced u_y
doubling or tne naiionJ-;;;i* period.
!ry
There have been hints from the SADF that thJnational ,r*ir. period
is to be
further increased to three years, in an attempt to ulieviate irri, p-ti.-.r"
In october 1980, south Africa extended national service ti- Nu.nitiun
,nut.,
^
.Tilt"e.roups.between the ages of 16 and 2s.
in
ise;ch;p;;;ii;
South
Ar'ca ltsefi there is
no.conscription of blacks into military or police
service). Prior to the r.yet,
inrioducrion of universar ;;;;;ii;;;;'L'iu.'ii'nuriuiuns
perform-ed "national servic.e"
.as volulteers, being given tr,.'opiion alter two
years of either continuing in the
SADF as frot'ess?o"nirJ
to civilian
life, with no further commitments. Given itt. higr, level"i'rrt"inlii
of unempioyment in
Namibia..^amongst unskiiled workers in particu%r,-."a"irr.'rriiiiv.ry
rrigi,
wages of'fered by the sAD.t-: it is nor surprising itiui-itir"fir.iiJ.'nuo,orn,
measure of success in.recuiting "volunteeri". Some."u'npfr.
of
"in the kind of
"volunteering" which is forced- on.
Namibians ui, g-iu.n
v.
Taly
onlr police forces in Namibia in which .onr.rrpti-r.;;;;biapter
fhg
the SAp
and the South West. Africa, potice. (SWApi, C;il;ip;;;^ ;;"the
SAp
commenced in the mid-r970s5r and there are now an eitimated
l,00ti*1l;;
conscripts being drafted into the SAp each vear.
All members of the SAp and SWAp are liable to be called out of their
normal duties for periods of "border service', in the
.reas. They
are selected from among members nominated by each divdi;;iHQ.s;"
"prr"ti"""r

gllt

IV. TRIBAL ARMIES

south Africa's attempts to build up air ostensibly "independent" defence force
in Namibia, organised on tribal lines and reflecting the apartheid regime's overall
bantustan policies, first took a significant practicil form in 1974,-whena Bushman Battalion was inaugurated in the north-east of the territory. concerted

efforts have since been made to recruit members of the various blacli "population
groups" in Namibia into police and military units, culminating, in octob6r 19g0,
in the extension of conscription to black Namibian males.

h-eing- por_trayed in South African publicity material as part of a

..-,Wh4g
"Namibian" police force and army, the various-indigenous units that have been
established are fully incorporated into the South Airican military machine and
are ultimately controlled from Pretoria. This remains the case despite some shifts
of emphasis in the south Africp regime's approach in recent yearr reflecting
the growing_pressures of the liberation strug$e and internaiional-settlemenT
initiatives. Up until 1977, the south African Defence Force (sADF) concentrated its efforts on building up separate "homeland armies" and police
forces for each of the elev-en black "population groups" in Namibia, together
with one multi-ethnic unit.l The idea was to mov5 towards placing the "Eomeland armies" under the control of the respective bantustan "l^eadersl'. Following
the anival of- Major-General Geldenhuys in the territory and the military rel
organisation that ensued (see chapter III), this approach was abandoned in
favour of control directly from windhoek by the sAbp, with the various tribal
units forming part of the new "national army" of Namibia.2 kss emphasis has
b-een placed on retaining. the,uniethnic character of most of the units, although
those based in the operational areas remain relatively exclusive.
. Although_the, recruiting of blacks into tribal units has been taking place
throughout South Africa
11 well as Namibia,3 it is being pursued partilcuiarly
energetically in Namibia. This is not only because of thJeicalation of the war
and .thg- shortage of . troops in the SADF, but also for political reasons,
principally related to the question of independence for the teiritory and south
Africa's desire to be seen to be moving towards "self-government" for the
Namibian population. South Africa's recruiting efforts ha-ve been concentrated
on blacks, both because the white population in Namibia is already being used
to its limit in the security. forces, and as part of the regime's bittle f6r the
"hearts and minds" of black Namibians'against the liberation movement

SWAPO.

Historically, blacks have served as police in South Africa and Namibia since
lle
.lasJ.century, and have always constituted a large proportion of the sAp.
Until fairly recently, they _ occupied only junior rinki and were not armed,
although senior
senior NCOs might
mieht carry
cairv pistols
oistols-and
he familiar
femiliar wirh
and be
with rifles
rifles. rn
In rl,a
thj
SADF blacla served only
Iy as unarmed
unarme orderlies and auxiliaries, being employed
rployed
by the Department ofI Defence and
a
not as members of the
the S,IOF.
itr"
F. The
decision to arm black
was
directly
related to guerrilla activity, and
.police
black_ police stationed in the Eastern caprivi in Namibia were involved in
armed clashes from as early as 19663 'The first comprehensive counterinsurgency and rlot training programme for blacks was only introduced at the
beginning_ of
however. The_ initial group of 294 triinees subsequently
-1912,
became the first
blacks to fight alongside-whiie troops in sAp operations in
28
29

Rhodesiu und Nunribia

-rlrnrcd

in 1972!

T'lrc carlicst indication that blacks were being

lbr "nornral" police dutics in Soutlr Aliica and hence by implication,

Namibia, is a SAP repbrt that during I 974175, <)88 blacks received basii trainin[
in handling firearms, besides_a gr<,rup ol'246 who received training the same year

for "anti-terrorist activities ".6

Combat training for Africans duly commenced in 1974 at the South African
Army Bantu Training Centre, which has since been renamed the 21 Battalion.
It is based atLenzin the Transvaal,30km from Johannesburg.T

sAN (BUSHMEN)
The first black ethnic unit was formed in Namibia in 1974, when a San
(Bushman) unit, now called 201 Battalion, was established in a remote part of
the Caprivi Strip. By September 1971,2,000 San men, women and children were
reported to have been gathered together from the region and accommodated at a
SADF army base. The men underwent training as soldiers while the women were
taught to knit, sew and cook by a number of white Angolan exiles. A school,
medical clinic, shops, bakery and a clothing factory had been established by the

South African army

in addition to

housing, according

to South African

press

reports at the time.e

These and subsequent SADF-inspired reports of the army's relations with
the San population emphasised the "welfare" aspects of the training programme.
Th-e fact that a policy of involuntary or enforced removal had 6een put into

effect was obscured. The San were allegedly free to come and go as they
pleasedf the entire Caprivi area, however, had been placed under mirtial law in
March 1976.

OVAMBO AND KAVANC.O

were formed among the Ovambo and Kavango (l0l
and 202 Battalion respectively). ln Kavango, an initial 82 reciuits

1975, battalions
Pu.ilg
Battalion

began training in November 1915 under south African army instructors.

Recruits in Ovamboland, similarly, underwent an initial period of training
within the ovambo bantustan before being transferred to the Lenz military
base.lo

In January 1976, the existence of these units was revealed when a SADF
spokesman disclosed that the newly formed ovambo and Kavango battalions
were already taking part in operational duties. Later that month a SADF report
of a clash between the SADF and SWAPo combatants referred to black soldiers,
who were members of the "border area authorities", being involved.l 1

SWAPO itself dates the Transkei's involvement from at leasl 791'7.13 In August
1980, 70 men from the Ciskei were reported to be completing a paramilitary
police training course prior to being sent to the border on active duty.14 Ciskei
was described at the time as "the first national state in South Africa to send its

citizens to fight alongside the South African Defence Force in the operational
area"'15 accoiding to a deserter from 32 Battalion, however, (see Chapter III),
troops from South Africa's bantustans were deployed on border patrol in
northern Namibia prior to 1978. Jose Belmundo, an Angolan who served for
four years with 32 Battalion, told an international commission of inquiry in
Luanda in l98l that the bantustan troops had made use of 32 Battalion's
Buffalo Base while he and his fellow soldiers were on their annual vacations.
After suffering significant losses during engagements in 1978 with SWAPO
guerillas, he said, the bantustan troops had been kept back from the border
zones of Namibia.l6

REHOBOTH AND CAPRIVI

Within Namibia, plans for tribal units within the other bantustans took

OTHER ETHNIC UNITS

During 1977, training courses fbr recruits fiom among the Damara, Nama,
Herero, Tswana and Coloured "population groups " commenced or were reported
to be imminent. A military training base was also due to be established within
the Bushman "homeland" itself, near Namibia's north- eastern border with
Botswana.le Commandant J.T. Louw, the officer in charge of the ethnic training
programme, explained that the SADF would train an initial intake of up to 160
men from each "population group". During the training period leaders would
be identified who could eventually start training their own people. The troops
would not be controlled by the respective "homeland" authorities however,
but would fall under the command of Major General Geldenhuys, who had
arrived shortly before to take up his post in Windhoek.2o
ln 1979, a South African military magazine disclosed that a unit also existed
in Kaokoland, comprised of members of the Herero and Ovahimba tribal

TINITS FROM SOUTH AFRICA

groups.21

infantry t1o9ps of the SA Cape Corps also did operational duty in

Namibia during 1976.t2 That same year, Africans in the armed forces were
made members of the SADF and all the bantustan battalions were formally

41 BATTALION

C_oloured

incorporated into the SADF.

There is evidence that black troops from the Transkei and other South
African bantustans have been deployed in Namibia in the war against swApo.
30

shape

during 1976. In November of that yeat, a group of 50 Basters began training

near Rehoboth under SADF and white commando instructors, as the nucleus
of a Baster Commando unit. The first intake, who were reportedly equipped
with fatigue uniforms and Rl rifles, were mostly young men, but included at
least one Baster who had served in the South African Army during World
War 11.17 A battalion of Caprivians, initially based at Katima Mulilo in the
eastern Caprivi, was subsequently moved to Mpacha.18

Major General Geldenhuys, appointed as Officer Commanding SWA in August

1977, was directed to build up a multiracial defence force in Namibia. The main
development immediately following his arrival was the creation of 4l Battalion
(now called 911 Battalion) comprising five companies made up of Damaras,

3l

Hereros, Tswanas, Namas, Basters. Coloureds, San (Bushmen), Ovambos and

generally presented as Namibia's first fully integrated. indigenous

Hllffi#$,

The separate tribal units continued alongside, and in January 1978 it was
announced that recruiting for all of them wai to be suspended as ihey were now
up to full strength and ready to move into a final phase bf operationai training.a
NUMBERS
Within South Africa and Namibia

as a whole, a total of approximately 12,000

African, Coloured and Indian troops had been trained by the S.IOF 6y t9Zl,
most of _mqry !.qg employed on a pernanent basis. This figure compiisbd an
estimated 5,000 Namibian troops, 1,000 in the Transkeian Defenie Force,
1,000 in the Bophuthatswana National Guard, 600 non-bantustan African
troops,
lroops,4.000
4,000 Coloured troops and 750 Indians.2a
Indians?a During
Durins 19'19
cnd 1980,
19Ro ae
1979 and
renewed and stepped-up programme of recruitins
recruiting in Namibia more fhan
than
doubled the number of black Namibian troops to approximately 10,000, or
ltlf th9 total strength of the South west Africa Territory Force (iee below'and
Table

3 ).

TRIBAL POLICE
In addition to training black Namibians for army units, South Africa is also

concentrating on building up black paramilitary police forces, notably the Home

Guards and special constables. The sAP has been training tribal pblice forces
since 1973 when the first 150 Ovambos began a couisefs and has been
eqgippilS them with automatic weapons since 1975?6 By 1974 a Kavango
police force was in existence, being^used mainly to controi ,.border" posts 6n
roads in and out of Kavangola!r.c1.27 There are now Kavango, Heriro and
Ovambo Special Constable units2s and black police are being promoted to
officer rank as p_art of this programme. considerable resources are being diverted
to the Special constables. The 1980 Police Vote included R8 million for this
purpose, R2 million of which was for arms.2e

TRAINING CAMPS
In February 1981 , South African journalists who were invited to the operational

area by the Police Directorate of Public Relations filed some of the firJt detailed
of the police training schemes in progress in the north. Brigadier Bert
_r_e-ports

of the counter-insurgency unit, toldlournalists

that the police had built a number of base camps where local residents were
being trained in crime prevention, the maintenance of peace and order and
Wandrag, second-in-command

counter-insurgency work. Training lasted for three months and was being geared

to the day when the SAP would

be withdrawn from Namibia foil6iing

settlement and the advent of independence. An undisclosed number of people

were being trained, but the response to the invitation to recruits had been '-'so
overwhelming that the police are unable to accommodate them all because of
a lack of facilities.'ao
32

Police base camps were reported at this time to be in existence in Hereroland, Ovambo, Kavango, Caprivi and Kaokoland, the last the most recent. Most
of the camps had been set up in 1979?1 During the trainingperiod, journalists
were told, recruits who showed "leadership qualities" were taken to South
Africa where they received further instruction and also attended the counterinsurgency training at Maleoskop base. Once training was completed, the black
police were sent to various areas to protect kraals and headmen as well as doing
"normal' police work.32
The "voluntary" nature of these police training schemes appears particularly
questionable in the light of the youthfulness of many of the recruits. Throughout training camps in the north, journalists commented on the "amazing"
number of youths, some only 12 years old, who had already been in the camps
for two years, i.e. presumably joining at the age of 10 in some cases.33 The boys
were brought to the training camps by their fathers or headmen. Although 16
was the minimum age stipulated, the boys were allowed to complete initial
training and used for tasks around the camps. At a police training camp near
Oshakati, a l6-year-old constable was serving as an instructor over considerably
older men and had killed _two alleged SWAPO guerillas in the two years he had
already spent at the camp.3a
In March 1981, the l|indhoek Obsener published a photograph of a l6-yearold police Special Constable in Windhoek City Centre, dressed in a camouflage
shirt and forage cap and carrying a G3 submachine gun. He had joined the police
a year earlier and received two months training before being issued with his
weapon, which he used, he said, to kill "terries".3s
The Home Guards' activities, too, appear even less related to "normal" police

work than the other black police forces. Most of the recruits appear 1o be
young unemployed men who have acquired a reputation for violence and indiscipline (see Chapter III). The long term effects of the activities of these
various police units on the fabric of Namibian society would appear to be
substantial.

NUMBERS
An accurate estimate of the total number of police of various kinds operatingin
Namibia is not possible, as few official figures are published for non-SAp black

police, and no separate figures for Namibia are given for the SAP or SA Railways
Police. In addition, the greatly increased recruitment of black police in Namibia
during 1979 and 1980 makes an estimate even more difficult. On the basis of
the figures given in Table 4, there are an estimated 7,000-10,000 police in
Namibia, over 90 per cent of whom have the status of "security forces".36

THE SOUTH WEST AFRTCA TERRTTORY FORCE (SWATF)

Since the arrival of General Geldenhuys in Namibia in August 1977, South
Africa has been working towards a situation where the SADF will be declared
by Pretoria to be in Namibia "on secondment". It will have been "invited"
there by the "Council of Ministers" in Windhoek to assist the latter's "own"
armed forces. By wearing Namibian uniforms, the South African troops will
become indistinguishable from Ndmibians. This scheme, which his far33

reaching implications for^ar internationally agreed settlement formula involving

the formal withdrawal of South Africa's occupying forces, came to fruition oi
!_4.qg$ 1980, with the inauguratlo4 of the Sriutli West Africa Territory Force

(SWATF). A-substantial numSer of SADF units, headquarters, battalions, field

regiments and area forces were transferred to the defence authorities in Namibia
to form the basis of the SWATF, together with the indigenous defence units
established in the territory under South Africa's programme of bantustan re-

cruitment (see above).

south Africa nevertheless retains full control over Namibia's defence and
ry9gqty under these arrangements. The SWATF is simply a section of the
sADF and is due to remain so until Namibia achieves its lormal independence.
The sADF itself continues to play the m4or role in the territory in launching
counter'insurgency operatijns a_gainst swAPo and attacks against Angola-,
Zambia and Botswana, the Front Line States bordering Namibia.

control over Namibia's defences, and is supposed to be consulted about

operations, particularly raids into neighbouring states, the SWATF's authority
does not extend to either Walvis Bay or the "operational areas". In matters
concerning Operational Command, the General Officer Commanding the
SWATF, Major General Lloyd, is required to refer to the Chief of the SADF
rather than to the Administrator GeneralSz The scope of the terms "Operational
Command" and "operational areas" is not clearly or publicly defined.
Overall planning and liaison between the SADF in Namibia and the SWATF
was due to be undertaken and controlled by a Joint Defence Committee from
August 1980.43

SWATF STRUCTURE
CONTROL OF SWATF
The steps leading up to the inauguration of the SWATF parallel developments in
the constrtutlonar
tne
constitutional and administrative spheres. In september
September 1979
Se
l97b it was
announced that a SWA Defence Force was being created of "people who were
either natives of or served in a permanent capacity in the Terriiory".37 1ht
statement added that "if the Republic of South Airica is approach6d and the
two parties (South Africa and the government of "independent" Namibia) find
agreement,^the. possibility is no-t excluded that seconded (south African) defence
units may find themselves in swA." The "independent"'government wbuld also
decide whether the new uniforms, specially designed for tl
ttre SWA Defence
Force, would also be worn by seconded members ofthe S,q.Op;
Duull aller, uen. ueloernuys announceo tnat tnere would be a4u per cent
increase in the number of Namibians doing "border duty', during 198b, in an
effort to reduce the number of South African troops on duty by up to 50 per
cent- even if
if there was
wAs no
nn international
internafinnel agreementbn
aorepmpn+ nn Namibia.Sg
Namihir 39 At
l+ +t".
cent,
the same
"^*time pressure was growing from the leader of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance
Dirk Mudge, for compulsory military
rutary training
tralnmg to be introduc_ed
lntroduc for all
{PTA),
Namibians. The reason given
ei
was that it would instil "national pride"-ao
pride"-ac
on I July 1980 the swA Administrator General announcedihe establishment
of a separate defence department for Namibia. This came into operation on 1I
Apggrl with the inauguration of the SWATF. In terms of Proclamation AG l3l,
administrative control over 66 units of the SADF (a total of approximately
20,000 lroo,ps) was transferred to the swA council of Ministers in winotroeti,
under the south
South African-appointed
African-apoointed Administrator General
SWATF hai
hqq
General. The swATF
its own budget
budeet provided by
bv South Africa but administered in windhoek,
Windhoek and
nnd its
fts
own uniform.
The General officer commanding (Goc) the SWATF (Major General charres
t{oyd, w-ho replaced General Geldenhuys at the end of tlad), doubles as head
o_f the "SWA Department of Defence" with the title "secretary of Defence".al
He also acts as the commanding officer of all SADF troops depl6yed in Namibia.
changes in nomenclature conceal the fact that the old SWA command of the
SADF survives intact for all practical purposes.
Although the SWA council of Ministeis in windhoek now ostensibly exercises

The SWATF consists of six components:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

commandinfrastructure
permanent force infantry component

citizen force (most of whose members arc part

motorised infantry brigade)

of a conventional

commando network (26 Area Force Units)

logistics and administrative component

training wing

A seventh component, an airforce, was due to be formed using I SWA Squadron

(light aircraft air commando) as a core unit. The three fighting components are
organised into an Area Force and a Reaction Force. Each of the 26 Area Force
units is responsible for the security of its surrounding area and draws its
personnel from the local population. The Reaction Force is responsible for
conventional and semi-conventional operations, although personnel of both
types of unit are given counter-insurgency training. Reaction Force units are intended mainly for use in dealing with large groups of guerillas as well as in
counter-insurgency operations beyond the capabilities of in Area Force lJnit.4
In March l98l it was reported that the SWATF had been granted approximately 850 hectares of prime development land in the area south of winilfioek,
for the erection of its military headquarters.as

THE SOUTH WEST AFRTCA POLTCE (SWAP)

Moves to formally establish Namibia's own police force have followed the
creation of the SWATF. On 1 September 1980, responsibility for the South
African Police (sAP) in Namibia, with the exception of the secirrity branch and
the national intelligence services, was handed over to the Administiator General

and the Council of Ministers.a6

The first of April l98l saw the formal inauguration of the South west Africa
Police (SWAP), headed by the former Divisional Commissioner of the SAp in

34
35

150

HUI
!

hi+a

t ZAMBTA
n

t.

r.f

M09AIY\EDEs

KS:f,i'
Sesheke

lucl!''':f
ry'-gvl'
n-^liG'

t r.nr.
ita-_t

NAMIBIA

OTJIWAR,ON60
,J

.-i"urn**aqno!
f___
___l

$E

60rswANA

2oc

ia), provincial cagitals

(Anoolal
-\

THE MAIN
WAR AREA

^-^:
o r{ain bases cnd torm, $r..ibi"), rrrai"
Intq6631lorral bocaecc
rbnal
and bonaec of "opelat
' - irea'
- - - "Horneland" bondens
rttain roads (rnos+ cF'the,rr.tatced)'

ff,1;lj

{:+#

Rail,rsay tines

l;)"oe"

2r'

o, 6p t" ,tp lpt kilornctcr:

g
to
too tsg r+o nilce
I SfnS Stcikc Cortrnanzl t\cadlua'ters
z\-^- Rivecr
gl{trt Cana\r and watc'c6igetir'eS

36

37

Namibia, Major General Dolf Gouws. Members of the SWAP were due to receive
their own uniform - already issued to the SWATF - and were immediately informed that their salaries would be higher than those of their SAPcounterpaitsf 7

Major General Gouws, himself one

of

the first policemen to accept a

.,not yet
permanent position
-with the SYN, explained that the SWAp was
completely independent of the South African Police in the sense that a large
1upb9r of the policemen currently serving here still belong to the south Africin
Police". The SWAP would continue to seek cooperation and support from south
Africa. Policemen would eventually be trained in Namibia ana ure territory's
ow-n police college was under construction, but for the time being Namibian
policemen would continue to be trained in South Africa. Mem6ers of the
SAP_currently_ serving in Namibia would be given the choice of retuming to
South Africa, being seconded to the SWAP, oi3oining the SWAp. There wduld
be no racial discrimination in the swAP and colour would not stand in the way
of promotion. The titles of ranks would be revised, and the new force would bi
h91de$ by a commissioner, d9p_uty commissioner and assistant commissioner,
ryi4 tttq ranks of major generalf brigadier and colonel respectively. Gouws concluded by^ noting that Namibia had "consulted police fbrces triroughout the
world" before commissioning the SWAP.

CONSCRIPTION
The extension in January 1981 to black Namibians of compulsory miliiary
service as part,of South Africa's efforts to build up the SWATF, provoked mais
gpposition and a sigrrificant upsurge in.the,n-umber of refugees crossing into the
Front. Line States. By the second week of January 1981fan additioial 5,000
Namibian refugees, many of them men of working age and contract workers
arxious to avoid the draft, had arrived in Angola.ae
A proclamation issued by the South African State President in october l9g0

extended_liability for military service to all Namibian males between the ages of
16 and 25, in terms ofathe Defence Act of l9571o This was said to-be in
response to a requ_est frdm the DTA-controlled "National Assembly,, in Windhoek in August.sl According to the Administrator General, the need to
introduce compulsory national service for all population groups was one of the

most important reasons for the formation of tli,: SWnfp,

because

"circumstances differ from those in South Africa"s2 compulsory service would

"give erp_r_ession to the feeling that, in this field as well, the eniire population
of South west is handling its own interests" and that it is not, "as sdmi hostile
elements put it, . . . the Boers who are defending SWA:'53
_^The_enabling legislation soon began to be put into effect. During october
1980, the Department of National Education was reported to have senl circulars
around the schools, instructing the principals to register all boys due to reach the
age of 16 in 1981, for purposes of conscription.sa
. Majol General . Charles Uoyd announced in November that call-up
instructions for national service in Namibia during l98l had been posted off tb
selected young men.ss In the event, young men r-esident in the forir bantustans

of

Kaokoland, Ovambo, Kavango and Caprivi were excluded from the

grounds that supply would otherwise exceed demand. A
spokesman for the swATF f'urther explained that the aim of the call-up was to

draft, on the

38

feed and strengthen Area Force Units which had replaced the former commando
system of training. Such Area Force Units did not as yet exist in the northern
regions.56 Men from the four bantustans in question were instead officially
requested to volunteer for service with the tribal battalions already in edstence
in their respective areas. There was comment in the press at the time that the
decision not to call up anyone resident in the northern operational areas really
concealed the fear that these regions were too sympathetic to SWAPO.s7
The initial intake, comprising an estimated 2,000 men58 from the White,
Coloured, Nama and Damara "population groups", were called up for two years
from mid-January 1981. Theywere required to report at the Rooikop military
base in Walvis Bay for an initial three months training with 2 SA Infantry
Battalion under SADF instructors. They were then due to remain in Walvis Bay
until the end of 1981 for infantry and artillery trainingand service in armoured
car units before being posted to SWATF units for the second year of their calluP.s9

Whites comprised about 20 per cent of the first intake, which was split into
three companies - including a "leader goup" with a higher educational
standard, consisting mostly of whites, and an all-black company of conscripts
with education below Standard Eight.@

FORCED RECRUITMENT
The call-up papers were accompanied by a warning that failure to report for
duty rendered the offender liable to a prison sentence of up to six months or a
R200 fine. Despite confident statements by military officials, it was apparent
that many of those called-up had ignored the instruction. In February 1981, the
Windhoek office of the Lutheran World Federation reported that young men
were being taken off the streets and forcibly sent for military service because
only a few of those called-up had reported for duty. Those making enquiries
about their conscription were being immediately enlisted.61 SWAPO reported
that students from secondary schools in the north were being forcibly enlisted,62
and that South African soldiers accompanied by municipal police had toured
homes

in Windhoek, Okahandja, Tsumeb, Swakopmund,

Walvis Bay, Keetman-

shoop, Otjiwarongo and other towns, distributing notification letters to

eligible males.o" Students were issued with exemption letters but informed that
they must still join the army on completion of their courses.64
PROTESTS
There were widespread protests against conscription from political parties,
churches and individuals inside Namibia at the end

of 1980.65 On l4 December,

between 2,000 and 3,000 SWAPO supporters attended a rally in Katutura

township and shouted "No, no, no" to the proposed call-up system. One
speaker said that the Namibian people would be committing national suicide if
they joined the army. "The so-called enemy is your own brother who was forced
to leave the country because of oppression. The enemy of the South African
army is SWAPO. Who is SWAPO? SWAPO is the people366
Refugees were reported to be arriving at SWAPO transit camps in Angola at
the rate of 500 a week in early 1981,largely prompted by the draft.67
39

TABLE

uNrr
l0l llrttrlion(ll5 Bn)2
102 Bltldlon (37 8n)
201 Bsltrlion (31 Bn)
202 B.tt8lion (34 Bn)
203 Brttrlion (36 Bn)

3.

ETHNIC AND MULTI-ETHNIC UNITS IN THE SWATF

ErHNrc

cRoup

Ovrmbo
Ovahimba. Herelo
Son (Bushman)

Kavango
San atrd

otheD

701 Eattalion (33

Bn)

Capriviad

911 Battalion (41

Bn)

Multirthnic. lncludes
Tswanasr Damaras,
Namas, Baste$,
Hereros, Whites and
Coloureds. plus a few
San and Oiimbos.

Damqraland

Al'Ua

AREA

(BASE)

19783

800

{Omega)
Kavangoland (Rundu)

1974

700

--.
West

Caprivi

Bushmanland
(Tsumkwe)
Last Capnvl
(Mpacha.)
in
Windhoek.
Brigade, HQ

Damaraland

Hereroland
(Okakarara)

Katutura AFU

Henrro3

Windhoek

Rietlbnrein At'U

Herero
(Mbanderu?)

Hereroland

Aminius AFU

Tswana3

Tswanaland3

Nama

Namaland
(Gibeon)3

Baster

Rehoboth3

Rehoboth

AIrU

units. Leaderahip'

trained at Lenz near

Johannesbure. Each
consists of fo"ur
infantry companies.

Mostlv-Perm-'Forci
but include'\olunrier\signed up tbr two
two years..National
Senice".

Southof "operational Fivemulti+thnic-mororied

area". Part of 9l SWA infantrv comoanii:s. Trainid/

Windhoek

SWATF Band, I SWA

Sp@ialist Unit, SWA
Military School. SWA
Scryhes School.
various service units
and HQ staff'.

.il^y$,e$,

t915

Khomasdal AF'U

AF'U

?il*B;

Ovamboland(Olunu) Erhnic."homeland"
based, liAit infantry,
Kaokoland(Opuwo) countbr-insurgencv

Hercroland AI;U

Nmaland

DEscRrprroN

tUis)3

(Rietfbntein)

l,000

t97s

1,000

1911

800

1977

800

tg't

2,000

based ar Ouriosundu,

Narubis, Nadaspoorr,
Drimiopsis and-Hour;loed.

Lo,cally rccruiled. IiBht

tnlantry counterinsurgency units. ol SADI

Commddo type (called

Commrndo. hahre the

SWATr set uD). Mostlv
set up in i97617. Larri
number of Herero AFU s
due to prominence of Herero
leader Rapuo at the time
- used as Drivate armv/

2,000

bodyquards. Streneths varv

cqnsiderably, + lo0-600:

(Aminius)

V.THEWAR
For over 60 years Namibia has been subjected to repressive, rucially discriminatory laws and economic exploitation onthe part of South Africa,-enforced by

y:tipy

and paramilitary violence. Since SWAPO began the armed struggle in

1966, however, the escalation of the war has increasingly challenged the re-gime's
control, and together with the political mobilisation of Namibians behind the
call f9q lib,e,q1tiog, has exposed its illegitimacy even more clearly. The struggle
y1C9q 9y SWAPO and its armed wing, the People's Liberation Arhy of Nami6ia
QLAN), against South Africa's illegal occupation entered a new pirase in 1976
after the- vfgto{ of trIPLA in Angola. It fias escalated to the sfage where an
estimated 100,000 South African troops, reinforced by 10,000 paramilitary
police,1 are unable to defeat it.
This
looks at how the war is being fought in practice. Firstly, in the
-Chapter
realm of information and propaganda, both sides, the South African miliiary and

swAPo, have an interest in conveying their own successes and the iosses
experienced by their opponents. An examination of available press reports and

All non{ombstanl units in the SWATT (as well as permanentlv-based SADI.

non{ombatant units) employ blackr in varying degrecs.

TOTAI:

1.000

0,t 00

NOTES (Table 3)

The information in this Table was obtained from the Namibian and south
African newspapers, Paratus (an SADF publication) uia ir-"a Forces
.

c-ommuniques indicates a steady intensification and expansion oT guerilla activity

despite South African claims, repeated from time- to time, ltrat SWlpOt
military capacity has been irretrievably damaged if not destroyed. The

realisation gn the part of members of the south African military hierarchy that
ultimately this is a war that South Africa cannot win probably explains wiy the
regime's_ forces have come to rely increasingly on unterhand and intimiditory
tactics directed against the civilian population, as a way of suppressing support
for the liberation movement.

(September 1980).

REPORTING THE CONFLICT

l.

$pproximate. In$i-rdes those-who, on completion of two years'.,National

Service", returned to civilian life.

2.

Designations in plrentheses are those by which the units were known prior
to the creation of the SWATF.

3.
4.

Assumed.
Area Force Unit.

5. The total number of troops.organised in the swATF is approximately 20,000

(wo 9.8.80). out of a toial w-irite population in south dfrica oiarouno4.5
million, approximately 5g0pg0, i.e. just over l0 per cent, are memben of
one or other unit of the SADF (,The Apartheid llir Machine,IDAF, op.cit.-,
Table VII). It seems reasonable'to assume a similar p.r..r,t.g" in NurniUii
popularion estir_ate{ at 100,000
!yh_il.- 125,000), living a dgure of aboui
10,000 whites in the SWATF- Thus there are approxi;;tet/ilre iame number
of black troops.

1976

During 1976 PLAN began operating in strength throughout the northern part of
ovambo and (to a lesser extent) Kavango. operationJin ilre caprivi, where the
wgl h1q been largely concentrated until then, were also stepped up. The number
of incidents reported by the South African Defence norie (sn-nn) was more
than three times the total for the previous ten years,2 and the number of South
African security force casualties reported also exceeded the total number reported
killed since 1966. ln Apnl 1976, four South African soldiers were reported
killed and seven wounded when a PLAN unit ambushed a convoy near Eenhana,3
(see Map 2/ and soon after the telephone link with the north was cut in Ovambo.a
In May, Ovambo, Kavango and Caprivi were declared "security districts" under
the control of the SADFs and plans for the clearance of a 1,000 metre wide "no
man's land" free-fire zone along the entire length of the Namibian/Angolan
border were announced.6

. A masive military operation was then launched, the biggest up until then
inside Namibia,T to eliminate all guerilla activity. clashes wdre reported as far
south as Tsumeb and otavi,s but according to a deserter from the SADF who
had been involved in operations east of oshikango in May and June: "we were
told that we wouldn't be allowed to go home until the irea had been cleared,

40
41

TABLE 4. POLICE FORCES IN NAMIBIA AND ESTIMATED STRENGTHS

POLICE FORCE

l.

LOW

STRENGTH
HIGH ESTIMATE

ESTIMATE

SAP/SWAP, living in

2,7001

3,s00

2. SAP doing border duty

1,0002

1,500

2,0003

3,000

Namibia or "on
secondment"
(effectively

as

part ol

sADF)

3. SAP: Special Constables

4. Railway Police

2504

350

5. Tribal Police

8005

1,000

6. Other (Security Police,

6006

800

7,3507

10,150

company security,
municipal, etc.)

TOTAL
NOTES

l.

Based on the ratio of SAP (including reserves) to population in South Africa.

Total SAP strength,
strenqth, 72,000 (The Apartheid llar Machine, IDAF, 1980, page
43); total SA population, approximately 27 million; population of Namibia,
approximately one million. The higher estimate takes into account the level
of conflict in Namibia.

2.

In l9'74, when the SADF took control of the "operational area" in Namibia,

there were about 1,000 SAP doing border duty (The Apartheid llar Machine,
page 54). This commitment is not likely to have increased substantially since,
as it was the strain on SAP resources which had led to the deployment of
the SADF.

The Minister of Police revealed in Parliament (House of Assembly Debates,

3.3.80) that there were "a few thousand" of these "ethnic special constables"
in Namibia.

of Railway Police (and reserves) in South Africa, i.e.,

5716 (House oJ'Assembly Debates, 11.2.80), and taking into account the

4. Based on the number

level of conflict (e.g. in northern Namibia locomotives are now armourplated

see Chapter

V).

5. This estimate of present numbers is based on the fact that in 1973 there were
already 300 Ovambo tribal police in training ,(CT 2l .9.73). There are also
tribal police in Kavangoland and Caprivi.
6. No published figures available for any of the forces in this category.
7. The number of non-Namibian residents included in this total is even more
difficult to estimate, but is probably about 2,000-2,500 (+ 800 'ordinary'
SAP/SWAP, + 1,200 SAP on border duty from SA, ! 100 Railway Police,
+ 150 *Others' - most of them Security Police).

but by the time we left the level of SWAPO activity was at least double what it
had been when we arrived." e Engineer teams engaged in clearing the free-fire
zone were constantly attacked and it was reported that many of the roads in
the north were no longer safe for travel.lo The llindhoek Advertiser observed
in June that "the (white) farming community as a whole are panic stricken." 11
In July 1976, a PLAN group began operating in the "white" area between
Otavi and Otjiwarongo and clashed several times with South African Police
(SAP) units.12 Soon after, another larger group engaged the SAP near Tsumeb,
prompting the Minister of Police to appeal to the press not to publish information on such incidents in "white" areas, as it caused the (white) farming
community to panic "unnecessarily."l3 At the same time PLAN reported a
successful attack on a base at Omboloka in the north of Ovambo, at which
was stationed a unit consisting of SADF, UNITA and ex-Portuguese army
mercenary troops (probably from 32 Bat"t4lion). A number of these troops

In August several clashes were

reported in the Otavi and Otjiwarongo areasls and one near Omaruru, in which
an SAP tracker died.16 The l|indhoek Advertiser reported that large parts of
Namibia, including the central region, had been infiltrated by up to 80 PLAN
combatants, and that "action was expected" by mid-September.17 As expected,
PLAN was very active in this area, and seven engagements were reported around
Kamanjab, Omaruru, Otavi and Outjo.18
During October and November 1916, PLAN reported nine major engagements
in northern Ovambo, including three attacks on SADF bases, during which 35
SADF personnel, including 15 UNITA troops, were killed.1e The year ended
with three security force casualties reported in December, the highest number
admitted by South Africa since April.20
were killed and a helicopter destroyed.'*

1977
One of the notable differences between SADF and PLAN reporting of the war
has been that PLAN reports frequently claim large numbers of SADF vehicles
destroyed, while SADF reports rarely mention this aspect. An interesting
glimpse into the likely extent of the damage inflicted on the SADF's vehicle
fleet during 197611 was provided in a report in the Windhoek Advertiser in April
1971 on the activities of 14 Field Workshop Regiment in Grootfontein. This
unit was responsible for the repair of vehicles from the Ovamboland and
Kavangoland sectors of the "operational area" and dealt only with very badly
damaged vehicles. This was emphasised by the commanding officer when he
praised his unit for having repaired over 600 vehicles in the first three months of
1971 .21 Whether some of these were damaged during the previous year was not
revealed. PLAN reports (although not comprehensive) listed 90 SADF vehicles
destroyed or damaged between January and June 1977.22
In June 1977 PLAN attacked the South African Air F-orce (SAAF) base at
Mpacha in eastern Caprivi, and reported that its mortars and rockets had
knocked out or seriously damaged over 20 aircraft, most of them helicopters,
as well as a number of trucks, while 26 SADF troops had been killed.23 The
SADF confirmed the attack but gave no information about damage, beyond

denying any casualties.2a Soon after, a PLAN attack on a car in which the
for SWA was travelling r'ear Ruacana was reported,

Commissioner General

43

but with little damage claimed and no casualties.2s PLAN revealed that the car
had in fact been pait of a convoy consisting mostly-of niltj?ty escort vehicles
and that several troops had been killed and wounded.26 The SADF claimed
ih.t Junr 1972had been a "quiet- month with PLAN tending to avoid contact
i"iitt tnr SAOF, but stepping rip its political activities amongst the population.zT
During May, the South-Airican government hq{ been obliged to double the
period"of niiional service for whitei to two years'28

'

In July 1977 a successful sabotage operation !v a PI-AN sapper unit severed

the hish tension electricity transmission line from the hydroelectric power
statioriat Ruacana.2e During the month more armed clashes were rgported.bY
the SADF than during any month since July of the previous year. The number
of incidents had dou6led by September.3o However, PLAN was said to be still
concentratins on political rathei than military activity, according to the SADF
This was clearly the official line at the time. When
Chief of Intilligence.sl
-the Director
General Operations of the SADF, indiscreetly
General Black,
revealed in a speech at a business executives' dinner in October that the SADF
was involved in over 100 engagements with PLAN per month,32 his remark was
immediately repudiated by General Geldenhuys, the newly appointed GOC in
Namibia. Iie d-eclared thit this was not a true reflection of the situation as
PLAN fighters were "avoiding contact at.all costs".33 That PLAN was very
active in the non-military field was not disputed, however. The Rand Daily
Mail, for example, published a report in October 1977 describing how people
in Civamboland were being medically treated by guerillas and were boycotting
state hospitals.3a

Another relevant aspect of SADF policy in war communiques concerns the

reported siting of incidents. While PLAN communiques give precise details of
th'e location oI eu.ty operation reported, the SADF rarely does, usually referring
to the "operational aiea". When heavier casualties than usual are reported,
however, the battles are almost invariably said to have taken place "on the
border".PlAN casualties appear to be exaggerated in these cases to "balance"
those of the SADF. Thus in October 1977, according to reports in the British
and Namibian press, a large PLAN detachment (80 strong according to the
SADF), attacked the SADF base at Eenhana and subsequently fought protracted
battles'between the base and Ondangua,]s causing seven (admitted) SADF
deaths.36 The SADF, however, stated that the 80 PLAN troops had been intercepted just south of ihe border and fightingtrad continued for 36 hours with the
eilN group retreating into Ango{a. There .the SADF had come under fire
from tliree bifferent PLAN baseslnd replied with ground and air forces which
killed 61 of the 80 PLAN troops.37 swAPO dismissed this figure as "ridi-

culous".s

1978
During 1978 SWAPO stepped up its armed struggle, particularly.afte-r the SADF
raid a"nd massacre of Naniibian- refugees at Kassinga, Angola, in May and th^e
aecision by the regime in June to un-dert4ke registration of voters in Namibia3e
in preparaiion for its own internal elections in December.
44

The number of sabotage operations by guerillas which were disclosed by the

SADF, for example, increased ten-fold. South Africa itself intensified its raids
into Angola; the operations against Kassinga and other settlements on 4 May
1978, in which the SADF claimed to have killed 800 PLAN combatants,au
being the most dramatic illustration of this. The 800 combatants in fact included
more than 600 refugees, almost half of them children, slaughtered at Kassinga.
As the internal elections drew nearer, the war intensified. In August 1978,
PLAN launched a major attack on the SADF base at Katima Mulilo, with
rockets, mortars and automatic weapons, inflicting extensive dama_ge and numerous casualties - the SADF admittad ll dead and l0 wounded.ar (Usually no
mention is made of the wounded, as it is SADF policy not to reveal figures of
numbers wounded)i2
Even before the Kassinga raid, in April 1978, the security situation in the
north had, from South Africa's point of view, deteriorated to such an extent
that the provisions of the May 1976 legislation had to be further extended to
allow for wider powers of arrest and detention.a3 The security forces were
already empowered to detain people indefinitely without trial, to search any
premises without a warrant and to seize "evidence" without compensation, and
were immune from civil or criminal legal action.aa
During October 1978, according to the SADF, more incidents occurred than
in any pievious month of the 12 years of the war.as Statements such as these,
while reflecting the intensification of the war, were also useful in justifying the

large South African military presence during the run-up to the December
elections, especially in Ovambo and in the towns, ostensibly to "allow elections
free from intimidation."46 According to the regime 2,500 Citizen Force and
Commando troops were drafted in specially for the elections to act as "election
protection teams.'47

1979
In spite of, or more probably because of, the internal elections,the war intensi
fied further soon after. The regime reported a "dramatic increase in SWAPO
activities" during the first two months of 19'79, including 17 successful sabotage
operations (aimed mainly at telephone and electric powe-r lines and military
water supply installations) and 14 landmine explosions. One of the most
effective sabotage operations was carried out in February when, a few hours
after the commissioning of the hydroelectric power station at Ruacana, and
with one of the other two power stations in Namibia (in Windhoek) out of
service for maintenance purposes, a PLAN unit blew up a number of pylons
five miles south of Ruacana, plunging most of Namibia into darkness. The
SADF could find no trace of the saboteurs'escape route but concluded from
evidence near the scene that they had camped near the pylons for two days
until the electricity was switched on.as
PLAN reported over 300 security force members "killed and wounded"
over the period December 1978 to February 1979, as well as two bases
destroyed and over 40 vehicles irreparably damaged.50 Claims of this
magnitude by PLAN regarding the number of South African casualties need to
be assessed in the light of evidence from other sources. flor example, a recent
deserter from the SADF, who served in Namibia for three months during 1979,
was required with other members of his unit to pack the corpses of South
45

African troops into green plastic bags for transportation bacK-to South Africa.
He himself dealt with about 30 corpses over a six week period.sr

electricity supply from Ruacana was cut from April onwards.6T Reports in
South African newspapers referred to the situation as "frightening" and as

having "deteriorated markedlyl'

SADF communiques themselves became even more open to question. When
PLAN launched a major attack on the Air Force base at Ondangua in May 1980,

The llindhoek Observer reported in March 1919 that an 8O-strong PLAN unit

had infiltrated the Otavi area, and had been reported (by the

newspaper's

sources) as having been seen chatting to black shoppers in Otavi.s2 A month

later the newspaper carried another report on "infiltration" of "white" areas
by an "alarming number" of PLAN guerillas, but was prevented by the SADF
from revealing the number involved. The report offered an explanation of why
so few of the PLAN fighters responsible for attacks were apprehended - they
were apparently ordinary civilians by day, working in Tsumeb, Kombat
(between Otavi and Grootfontein) and Windhoek, who were driven to secret

bases the night before, the SADF reported no

damage"-6e The llindhoek Observer ran a heavily (but
clumsily) censored report two weeks later, however, which listed two aircraft
destroyed, one seriously damaged, deaths, injuries and fires.7o The editor
remarked that the SADF's wide use of "D notices" served on newspapers for
censorship purposes prevented reporting on most of the war.
In February 1980 the South African Railways announced that it was to put
armoured locomotives into operation north of Otjiwarongo,Tl and R141,800
was requested in Parliament for armour-plaling.72 In April, after the powerlines
from Ruacana had been sabotaged for the second time within a fortnight,
SWAWEK (SWA Electricity Supply Commission) refused to repair it again until
military protection could be guaranteed.T3 There were suggestions that a "no-go
strip" should be cleared along the line,Ta but it was still out of commission
months later, forcing the regime to embark on a costly link line to the Cape
Province grid, in South Africa.7s Another successful sabotage operation in May
destroyed the 100m long low level bridge over the Kwashigambo River near
Oshakati. Despite what must have been a thunderous explosion, locals in a
settlement less than 300 metres from the bridge insisted that they had "heard
nothing".76 In October the Tsumeb Mining Corporation advertised fbr security

after attacking three large SAP

casualties and

rendezvous points at night, where arms, ammunition and combat uniforms had

been hidden. After carrying out their mission, they would be picked up again
two or three nights later and driven back to their homes.s3
The SADF no doubt had such nocturnal activity in mind, amongst other
factors, when on 10 May 1979 the "security district" laws, then covering the
"operational area" in the north, were extended south to Windhoek, affecting

ovir half the country (see Map 1/.54 This brought over 80 per cent of the
population of Namibia under de facto martial law and was immediately followed
by-a substantial military build-up in the new "security districts". Over 5,000
Citizen Force troop reinforcements were brought in, bringing the SADF strength
in Namibia to an estimated 60,000.55 More than 40 white-owned farms were
given special SADF protection.so SAP and SADF armoured vehicle patrols in
iowns were increased, bantustan ministers, senior chiefs and other apartheid
functionaries were given specially trained personal bodyguards (102 of these
functionaries were later reported to have been "assassinated" during 1979,
compared to about 100 during the previous 13 years)i7 kraals were fenced off
forming "protected villages" and all white farms were linked to the SADF's
MARNET (Military AreasRadio Network) systemSs
Despite these preventive measures, by the end of 1979, PLAN activity all over
the northern half of Namibia was still on the increase, with the SADF admitting
that PLAN operations were now occurring in Kaokolandse and that numerous
clashes and aits of sabotage had taken place even south of Windhoek.6o The
numbers of almost all types of incidents had doubled during the year compared
to 1978, according to the SADF.61 Rumours that the main Tsumeb/Ondangua
road was under PLAN control were denied by General Geldenhuys, but he conceded

this time involved expensive outlays on security.Ts

The security forces no longer claimed to be able to effectively guarantee the
safety of transport for their civilian supporters. In February 1980, Brigadier
Meyer, Chief of Staff SWA Command, denied that his troops failed to protect
farmers and pursue insurgents, but admitted that the SADF would have to
saturate all the ranching regions north of Windhoek with troops to be able to
guarantee security, and that the SADF did not have that number of troops
at its disposal.Te

ascribed
Angola, an

it

as "one of the quietest periods ever experienced."

compounds) who had

experience in one or other

"infiltration" by PLAN to an alleged shortage of food in

explanation regularly offered after any sharp intensification of the war'
Similarly, a SADF review of the fortnight 16-3 I December 1919, during
which, inter alia, seven engagements, 1l PLAN deaths and five SADF deaths
were reported, described

(for its labour

to have at least two years'

of the security forces.77 Mining around Tsumeb, one
of the three towns (Otavi, Tsumeb and Grootfontein) marking out what has
become known amongst the regime's supporters as "the triangle of death", by

guards

that the road was regularly attacked and mined.62 He

increased

"little

1981

of the Geneva Pre-Implementation Meeting on Namibia at the

beginning of 1981 heralded a further stage of the conflict. On 15 January,
the day that the talks finally broke down, South African forces attacked a unit
of the Angolan army stationed in Cuamato, Kunene Province, Angola, and
occupied the town for two days before being repulsed. Major General Charles
Lloyd, Officer Commanding South African forces in Namibia, subsequently
told foreign journalists who had been taken on a tour of the Namibian border
regions that in future South African troops might engage in direct battle with
the Angolan army. He warned that the SADF would step up its operations
against SWAPO bases in Angola even if this meant clashing with Angolan
The collapse

63

1980
During 1980, the SADF conceded a 50 per cent increase in casualtiesfa vehicles
travelling north of Otjiwarongo travelled in convoy and petroleum tankers
moved u-nder armed escort (following several attacks and a strike by drive-rs).65
Further areas were placed out of bounds for newspaper correspondents.6o The
46

47
+-

government forces.so The press tour itself, and a number of further specially
arranged trips for South African and overseas reporters which followed, were in
part a response to revelations about the scope and character of South Africa's
aggression against Angola, made to an International Commission of Inquiry. in
Luanda at the beginning of February 1981.81
A further substantial build-up of South African military forces in Namibia
took place during the first three months of 1981. In a press statement in
January, SWAPO warned that the increase in troops and military hardware in the
territory was on a scale exceeding even that which took place before the
Kassinga raid and massacre of 4 May l9l8P2 In March, the London Sunday
Telegraph reported that Western intelligence sources had confirmed a build-up

of

troops

in

Namibia and the arrival of more howitzers and armoured cari.

The newspaper gave a figure of 20,000 for these troop reinforcements.s3

A number of successful sabotage attacks and other missions by SWAPO

combatants during April and May 1981, however, showed that these largescale preparations for war on South Africa's part were still failing to halt the
armed liberation struggle. One important reason for the ineffectiveness of South
Africa's military strategy in this
this respect is undoubtedly the close relationship
that has been built up between PLAN fighters and the local civilian population,
enabling tfie
enabllng
the torrner
former to merge rnconsprcuously
inconspicuously lnto
into the latter.
At the end of March 1981, for example, guerillas destroyed part of the
telephone line between Ondangua and Oshakati,
Oshakati. only
onlv 400 metres from the
South African air-base and army camp at Ondangua. According to the llindhoek
Observer "guerillas are walking around at night, passing the (Ondangua) airbase at 200 metres. Many find their way into town dressed as civilians to carry
out reconnoitering, and to gqil intelligence especially on the movements of army
equipment and personnel."84 A week later, SWAPO saboteurs blew up one of
the two maj_or road bridges between Ondangua and Oshakati, rendering it unserviceable.Eb A major South African army operation was launched in the
area south of Tsumeb at this time, in an attempt to track down insurgents who
had distributed a large number of SWAPO leaflets, copies of the movement's
constitution, the PLAN journal The Combatant, and other information. Rail
tracks had also been blown up in two different places.86 The Windhoek Observer
estimated that there were 220 insurgents in the area between Otavi and Tsumeb
(located 68 kilometres apart) divided into up to 60 groups of three to four
people. A local resident said that the insurgents were believed to carry knapsacks
filled with leaflets and instruction material for farm labourers rather than food
and ammunition. The South African response was to set up a temporary strike
base at Tsumeb from which army and police units in armoured cais, reionnaissance aircraft and helicopter gunships were deployed.sT
On 4 May 1981, the third anniversary of the Kassinga massacre, the Okalongo

and Ogongo military bases were attacked by PLAN combatants. The army
headquarters in Windhoek confirmed the raid while a spokesman for the Ovambo

bantustaq_government
said that a number of people had been injured by
-swAPo
itself claimed that many Sorith lfrican soldiers irad beeir
killed or wounded and that the bases themselves had been destroyed.se
shrapnel.ss

48

THE SOUTH AFRICAN RESPONSE

South Africa's strategy in Namibia has had four main aspects. It has attempted,
by military force, to destroy PLAN in Namibia. This effort has been increasingly
coupled with sustained attacks on neighbouring African states, notably Angola,
aimed not only at PLAN bases, supply lines and SWAPO refugee camps, but
also at controlling the southern part of Angola and destabilising the Angolan

government and administration (see Chapter VI/ T\e regime has, secondly,
pursued a repressive policy inside Namibia, aimed particularly at SWAPO,
with the aim of destroying its political organisation, and of intimidating all anti
South African resistance. The third prong of the strategy has been an attempt to
build up a credible but compliant political alternative to SWAPO, namely the
Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA). This effort has included the creation of
an army and police force supposedly under the DTA's control (see Chapter IV).
lastly, the SADF has been promoting what has come to be generally known
as its "hearts and minds" campaign, in which troops are used in civilian jobs and
the SADF plays the role of a "rural development" agency.eo
South Africa's military build-up in Namibia has been described in Chapter II.
In spite of the regime's publicly declared theory that the combatting of "insurgency" requires a strategy that is 80 per cent political and only 20 per cent
military, the state of military siege that now exists in Namibia testifies to its
inability to translate this strategy into practice. Having failed to seal the border
with Angola and Zambia by clearing a 1,000 metre wide "free fire zone" along
its length, building bases all along it and stepping up patrols, the SADF concentrated during the 1970s on developing its "quick reaction" capability. As early
as 1912 use was made of San (Bushman) trackers in "follow-up" operations.el
The nomadic, hunting way of life of the San people (now ended) had developed
them into highly skilled trackers. A special unit, the 1 SWA Specialist Unit, uses
horses and motorcycles for increased mobility.e2 The most important tool in
the SADF's counter-insurgency campaign, however, is the helicopter. All
permanent bases, of whatever size, have helicopters (mostly French Alouettes
and Pumas) stationed at them or within easy reach.e3 Patrols making contact
with PLAN units use radio to alert helicopters to lead follow-up operations and
to evacuate casualties, as well as provide air cover.ga

INTIMIDATION
The support which PLAN receives from the population in the areas in which it
operates is the major obstacle which the SADF faces. Thus the SADF has intensified its campaign of intimidation, notably in Ovambo where there is
evidence that the Home Guards and Special Constables, in particular, terrorise
the population at will. Some idea of the calibre of these forces can be gained

from an incident which occurred in November 1980. A group of

Special

Constables had been drinking heavily at a cuca shopss at Ohuta in Ovamboland

when one of them decided to settle an argument with his automatic rifle. He
shot and killed five of his colleagues and wounded four more, as well as killing
a civilian.e6 SWAPO has nevertheless reported that not all of the members of
the security forces are voluntary recruits, and that a significant number have
defected to PLAN"eT

49

The incidence of murder, rape and assault on the part of South African and
South Afiican-controlled forces in Namibia, both white and black, has been ex-

tensively documented by church and humanitarian bodies, the Windhoek

Observer weekly newspaper and SWAPO itself.e8 Many military bases and police
camps in the operational area are believed to incorporate detention camps or
cells where interrogation and torture are carried out on suspected guerilla sympathisers, captured combatants and persons abducted during raids into Angola

ind othei Frbnt Line States.ee

The use of paramilitary security forces disguised as PLAN guerillas has been
extensively documented by SWAPO. One unit in particular, known locally as
Koevoet (see Chapter

III) concenhates on counter-insurgency operations, assasin the name of SWAPO. According to SWAPO, the

sinations and sabotage

Koevoet unit was responsible for burning down church buildings at five places
and destroying boreholes at several villages, its members disguised each time as
PLAN fighters.loo
The Koevoet unit has allegedly been used as a "death squad"'by the South
'ican regime.
African
resime. In June 1980 a'death list'of prominent Namibians allegedly
alleeedlv
targeted for assassination by South African forces or agents was published
by an Ovambo language chqrch newspaper, Omukwetu,
JmuKweru, ano
and suDsequenily
subsequently also
by the llindhoek Observer.lol Two oof those on the list were killed in 1980 by
bv
"unknown" assailants; both were wealthy SWAPO sympathisers. The editor of
Qmukwetu fled Namibia soon after the report, in fear of his life.1o2
The Evangelical Lutheran Ovambo-Kavango Church (ELOC), which publishes Omukwetu, has been the target of attacks apparently perpetrated by
South African forces, agents or sympathigers. In November 1980 the ELOC
printing press at Oniipa near Oshakati, responsible for printing Omukwetu, was
blown up shortly after midnight and the building and works completely
destroyed. The press had previously been destroyed by a similar bomb blast
inMay 1973.
The Bishop of ELOC reported that movements of SADF vehicles and unidentified armed persons had been observed near the printing works before the
explosion, and noted that with a curfew in operation from sunset to sunrise,
only military personnel were allowed to move around at night.103 The Lutheran
World Federation, commenting on the report, noted that "it is evident that the
SAP do not intend to press for an early investigation".lo4
The officer in charge of Koevoet, Brigadier Dreyer, denied any Koevoet
involvement in the attack on the church press.1os In an interview with the
lUindhoek Observer, Dreyer stated that his task was, in association with the
armed forces, and in consultation with them, to "locate insurgency and counter
it". According to the lUindhoek Observer, Koevoet is thought to be res_ponsible
for 60 to 70 per cent ofguerillas killed in the operational area each year.l06

THE "HEARTS AND MINDS'' CAMPAIGN

Since the end of 1976 the SADF has been pursuing various image building
activities in Namibia as a benign "development" agency. SADF personnel have
been increasingly taking over posts in the schools, hospitals, medical and other
public services in northern Namibia. These developments have been prompted
by security considerations in the first instance but they also reflect the failure
50

of the apartheid

system

to

promote trained personnel from among the

indigenous black population, coupled with the increasing reluctance of white

civilians to accept employment in the northern operational zones. Water
projects, road building schemes and agricultural development projects are also
administered by armed SADF personnel.
The success of this approach in winning support and cooperation from the
local population appears to have been very limited: Particular problems have
been encountered in the schools, where many of the "teacheis" are in fact
armed troops. At the Petrus Kaneb Secondary School, for example, constant
clashes were reported between pupils and SADF teachers. In August 1978,700
pupils went on strike in protest at the presence of the soldiers and the parents
formed a Black Parents Society to back up their children's demands for their
removal.loT

Even the SADF has admitted the failure of its "hearts and minds" strategy
in Ovambo, where almost half the population of Namibia lives. An army officer,
Colonel Martins, told journalists in February 1981 that "in Ovamboland I'm not
sure it does much good because of the large number of SWAPO there."1G
Reporters visiting the^area on an army public relations trip seem to have agreed
with his assessment.loe It would appeu that in Ovamboland,the 'hearts and

minds" campaign has since been largely abandoned.

One of the biggest projects of the SADF in this campaign is amongst the
San people in north eastern Namibia. At bases in the Wesiern Caprivi at Omega
and in "Bushmanland" at Tsumkwe, the SADF has set out to "civilise" the
San whose traditional nomadic way of life as hunter-gatherers in the Kalahari
desert of Namibia and Botswana has been ended by the fencing of land for
ranching and by the military situation in Namibia. With no alternative available,
the San have been driven by economic necessity to turn to the SADF, which
has taken full advantage of their plight by turning all the men into soldiers.
Military service has become effectively compulsory as the only alternative to
extinction.llo Alternative employment in tliese camps, which-house virtually
the entire San community of Namibia and increasing numbers from
Botswana,lll is only provided for women and for men too old or young to
hg4t. The school at the Omega camp is staffed by National Service conscripts,
and wives of SADF officers train the San women in domestic skills and handi
crafts production. There is also a health clinic which has reportedly reduced the
infant m-o-rtality rate from 10 a week (total population 2,000) to two or three a
month.l12 Agricultural training is compulsory and 'Justice" is dispensed in
military courts.113 (See also Chapter IV)
The problems faced by the SADF in its "hearts and minds" campaign in most
areas of Namibia were spelt out by a junior SADF officer in an interview with an
Israeli film crew in 1977. "We want to win the favour of the local population",
the lieutenant stated, " . . . I believe it is in the interests of the local population
that we tell them what is right and what is not right, and not the terrorists. Their
aims we do not agree with their aims." Asked, "You don't agree with
their aims, but the peoplq do?", he admitted, "Yes, this is the problem; this is
what the war is about."114

5l

VI. REGIONAL AGGRESSION

Attacks on civilian installattons and personnel form an integral part ofthe South
African strategy of aggression against the African Front Line States, notably
Angola Zambia and Botswana, the two other independent African states
bordering Namibia, have also been attacked with increasing frequency since
1976. Zimbabwe, Mozambique and other countries in the region are likewise
exposed to South African policies of economic and military domination and
aggression. Namibia, itself illegally occupied, is used as a base for what amounts
to a coordinated attempt to destabilise the governments of neighbouring
countries, through economic sabotage and tactics of intimidation, subversion
and harassment.

Details of South African raids from Namibia into the Front Line States can
be found in other IDAF publicationsl; this chapter is intended simply to
indicate a number of general trends and to describe some of the military tactics
and units employed.

ATTACKS ON ANGOLA

By the middle of 1981, the material damage to Angola as a result of South

African aggression over the five and a half years since independence in November 1975 amounted to over US $ 7 billion. Well over half of this total was

accounted for by attacks in the period from June 1979 onwards, i.e. twoyears
out of the whole. In the three years 1978 to 1980, 1800 people, mostly civilians,
were killed and 3000 wounded.2 Major South African Defence Force (SADF)
raids into Angola include the attack in May 1978 on the Kassinga refugee camp
and other Namibian settlements further south, in which over 600 Namibians, the
vast majority of them unarmed, were killed. Between 200 and 300 people were
taken as prisoners back into northern Namibia, of whom at least ll8 remained
in incommunicado detention without charge more than three years later (the
Kassinga detainees).3

During 1979 and 1980 SADF activity in southern Angola increased to such
an extent that large conventional formations frequently began to be mobilised
in northern Namibia for major raids.a A number of large scale incursions into
Angola occurred, notably in June 1980, when "Operation Smokeshell" was
carried out. This, according to the government-controlled South African
television news, involved the biggest combined operation by South African
forces since World War II, namely three infantry brigades, three squadrons of
Mirage IIIs, Buccaneer bombers and other hardware.s The operations commenced on 7 June 1980, when 3000 ground and airborne troops, supported by
helicopter gunships and fighter bombers moved in and occupied large parts of
two southern provinces. The South Africans penetrated 140 km into Angolan
territory and in the course of a series of actions killed at least 378 Angolan
civilians.o Areas of Kunene province were still occupied by South African

::I::::::::i OPRATIONALAREA
,,,,,,,,,:,::,

occuelto nautata

::i:iil:: ARAS ATIACKEO tN ANGOLA

o
a

sEcroR ANo BATTALTON H.Q.

MAJOF EASES

MAINMILI'AFYROAD
O'HER ROADg

forces a month later.

At the end of

June, the Angolan government reported that a further

of the South African invasion was taking place, with new columns of
armoured cars advancing towards Kuando Kubango province.T The invasion

escalation

53

52

jn earry July, but

cross.border raids.
lllii"l,X,li
,1ll':,":,:: !J,j:f:'.llI",::,
".;#l'#JJ.1
i
y),
#
il!,""i:
ll I f.l I
t.,*.
:: t:::;;
hecunre
virtually
aaily: occurrence.
"

;;;il ft:fi

jT:

.a degrce
,ll,ilr#:.1*:i,T
{rricp attacks on Angora reached
intensitv n1,1,-:,t1i:t*"fh
and contin'i,y ;.i-;;;;i;;:il:#:il".:
fiTili#:.J:?

'f

t)tr'1975'-76.8
/o.- The
rhe areas
practically abandoned

of Angora
Aneola horderino
bordering nn
on r\romir-i^
Namibia *.r"'..po.i.d to be
by the- civitran-poo-ulJtion
population because
h""",,"c ^r
c^.-r,of constant
^^r.-+^-+ South
African attacks.s
At a press conference orr r3 Jury lgg l, the Supreme
Miritary commander in
Namibia' Maior Generat chariesll"vilii-,ai.utrd
South
AfriJa,slnrenrion to
escalate the ivar in Namiuruln;; "#;i#.I,,r,
n.* ,ta.;;'i"","r,i.r., major air
and ground attacks inlg Ansola,
ation zambia as well would
- ."J-uvilpri.
become routine and comm6np-tu"r.
c"rir*t'-u;td ;iJ'li r"rri'u. -military
policv in future to strike- at swnio u"r.J
insia6 e"gJ. IrJt""i
of

dr;;

individual guerillas inside Namib;.

pursuing

t""tics
militarv power had been.destrovea-id siirtrv would continue until SWApo,s
rf,;;;;;;;.i,,"g'its
escalate attacks

pran, to

on
29 lulv t98r' the eng6tan ui"irtii"r T.*;i.i';;",#H;;;riivasion.
illtrn., reported that Sourh African
troops, comprising an iiranity-uGeJ,
; illtoris.a infantry b;;.ili;", and two
mixed battarions of mercenaiy
souur-ai;r* ;i;il;'r,i['lii"rpi"d

on Angora, ure"sabr'

-?

seven
towns in southern Kunene province. Impala
iet aircraft and puma and Alouette
helicopter sunships were. providing riil,I*r.'a..orJinj
,i'rh;;;;"nique, rhe
South African foices had'set up u'."n'n,uni post
at Mulemba,30 km from the
Namibian border. and, had
;;tt"g of sman towns easr and north of
the provincial capirar ondjiva.'A. b"tld;;i of
.rroops along rhe Namibian/
Angolan border hid been ieported in the'previo_us
-.liruir
weeks, ind the Angoran
Ministrv of Defence had listed
aiir
flights
made by South African afucraft rnsia. engotu
during June lggl, as well as nine
air bombings, three

.".;tJ';

;;;.

.ri5

;;;;;;ce

airborn. arsaults una .?".nu.i

An increase in airborne attacks u"a i..iui-rrronnaissance
"Fg;;;;i;u;;kr.;,
has been a notabre
reature of the South efrlgan rtiut.gv
&;i;r;
;Ti.;;;

economv has been devastaring. Rccoiding"toir.

{nsoiu.-irr-.
s.ziriury

Angora,s

;i;h;r\,ipL; workers
Party' Lucio Lara' the e"e^o1"un-go*--""nt was
devoring over 50 per cent ot.its
budget ro de'ence in r 9i0' riunai.Jr-'or trucks
thai should ' be used for
agriculture, health work and educatio;;;;.
uerng oivertel^i"rin, *.r effort,
and youth were being conscripted to ngtrt-r: SEARCH AND DESTROY MISSIONS
Much of the death and destruction caused during
south African attacks into
Angola is the work or speciat f;;.r;-;;;Jrr,iZr.,-ji-iir;;il;;;

6aseo in the
caP1i1i, plays.a maior rdre. uLJlitrr.'ir"lf;o*n
about the acriviries of other
special units is described in previous chapters.
The activities of 32 Battarion
became widely^known after.the_pubii.1ti"i ,n
February rggr of evidence from
two deserters from the unit. Tievor fO*uiJr, a British
mercenary who had
served with 32Battarion for a number
o;;iil'ifi',#irnterviewed
in a television programme and by 1r. siiti;h p..r, ,,irrir."ii**i.i.unoo,
u
lormer member of the FNLA and an Rnsoian. appeared
before an International

"i.""ii*

ollnquiry in Luanda.15
souti African
_maintain that 32 Battalion is used
primarily for operations against-il^iiry
swipci--gre.iilas, they n;;ffi;i;, openry
Commission

Though the

admit that members of 32.Battalion spend much

time inside Aneola.ra
It is apparenr rrom rhe ."i09,*.9fa5;;'rt.;:as wellofastheir
reporrs rrorn ,i-,Ji,n"g;run
government and others, that 32 Battalion
is used ui'.tuuirv ,".iuriurri-ioi
operations
inside Angola,,directed primarilyat

,"J..;;#; targets and

involving indiscriminite destruction or-inJ m.ans
of production,'rnu* killings
and terror tactics. 32 Battalion atso ptays a key
..middle
as a
man,,between
the regular South African ,r.rd ?;iJ androle
uNITA.
It
has at least two
companies deproved
Angora at
]nsije.
.any rime. Its ."i"-lp.i^tilnal front is
ci"iri."

Kunene province. where it is .r-riport.A-L'j, rnem_Uers

S+ fiirlr"op Battalion
and South Alrican Air Force squuoronr uu'r.a
"f
,to;A;gr;'i"
Namibia.
32 Battalion members q.
"""r,'i,
Kuando-Kubango
province where
thev serve as instructors in .rlriiip];tJ-i"uNrrA'bai;;; l;k;';;rii""i"'i,i,

5o"rl.,,"ns with
LINITA- when working,with LiNITtiir;;;;
are issued
47 rifles as^used by uNtrA, u"o unro.ntin.ule uniforms. with chinese_made AK
carrv anv rorm of personar idenrification ,od ;-il;;;f";;They are forbidden to
d."i.ffiwned,, by
the SADF in the ev'ent. of capture. wh.n'olrtuting
t"g.irr.i
witr,iegura,
smr
unils, regular SADF uniformjand .tunAuiO-irupons
are used.
Much of 32 Battalion's activity *rrrt, of ,*.rp,
across large areas or.trre
$ngolan. countryside in '.search ;"4-a;;i;;;-;r-".r.j;;;;i"Ji!rl,ionr. :or.
Belmundo stressed that the main til;'was
against in, to"ur Angolan
population. "we wreaked total destruiti"r
said. "villages. schools, hospirals. rrlrny *.i. "i-."&yffi;;; oirTpath,,, he
tiil.o, u6iii'f;";ir;;l carrle. we
had very strict instructions io atta.r< uia oes-troy
everything

we came across.,,15
"pr.s,
Trevor Edwards provided
fiiitirn
and ,i.aia
graphic
descrip.tions of operations in which he had-leirn
inuoru.o,'Juring,hi.r, women
and children had been shot.and kiileo, anJ
civilrans tortured ro ericit information
about swApo. on one suctr mission,lirr.r.'"ii,.ikid.';;;;;;p"ani
startec to
. some of them were completely naked. They'd
i"iJ" ir,ri, .l"thes off to
show they weren'r armed. w. stuit.o sii""ti"e.
w. shot this young girl. She must
have been about five. And we rrtor tt.i-iuL.r."w.

-rlir,

tt.

mn

Some

of the interrogation

Edwards said.

was

,ri"iru";,';;;i"1ii.,r.

captur_ed civilians and others,

take the rocars for questioning.
",ethem.
As soon as we,re finished

heavy.-s".*ti.i,r
ih".-. ;"ath;-:';;;n
them. We ve ei; Aiii;"/ government
oretr"y

It's. rough. We just b.ut

-kill

with them, we

carried oui'on

soldiers and taken

them back.to base for proper qr.siioning."
"sometimes you hav_e__to
do it to thJ children to make the adults talk.
There
was a l2-vear-old bov. we wanted to tnow-wtrat;&;;"g;ilfri,,"unt.o
r,i,
mother to tark' so -L tied hT rp i*.'..r,i.trn
with his wrists up behind his
back, strapped to his ankles. rrreir *.-p'iavei'water
polo with him, put him in
this kind of dam and pushed.him auo,ii-fui-him
sink. Every

so ofien we took
him our' He wourdn'i
*.t'-hi.self. The ,noih., didn,t tell us
1u.t
..ry..
f..
any_thing. In the end we jusi left him in
tt . *ai., and he drowned.,,1 7
Edwards's evidence-"srrea consiaeiit'L"rieht
militarv strength of UNrrA, l.*.lin."ru.i "; rh. Ehii"g ability and
or"ir.,.r.?'rir"oJrl..ibed an
attack by two companies of 32"rBattalion on on-angolun
intended to rake tire town on uNrrAt ilh.rf:'::1l; ur*y'lul."at savate,
iilii liii,io in the
south-easr (of Angota)where their tribe-is
in-i'ti,.y
can probably defend them_
se-lves. but rhey can'r go out and take
ro,n.*i.,.r. rii"su"ii.. w.'ao'ii ro, tr,.-,
because it improves their^ bargaining position
. there were no swApo at
Savate' It was a base for A"g"i;
;;?rir..n'i'roroiers and

we knew that when

54
55

ln there."l8 When the battle was over, two UNITA representatives

clalmcd the town for UNITA.
The SADF subsequently issued a public denial of Edward's accounts of
atrocitles committed '5y members of 32 Battalion, and claimed thal all soldiers
ln the operational area were required t_o^ sign a special undertaking to "refrain
from misdeeds against innocent people".le
Jose Belmundo stated 6efore the International commission of Inquiry that
32 Battalion was divided into a number of different and specialised units and
that its operations inside Angola ranged from small commando raids against
SWAPO guerillas, attacks on Narnibian refugee camps and units of the-regular
Angolan army, through to large-scale "cleaning-up" operalions d-irected at the
locil civilian population. He maintained that members of 32 Battalion and other
South African forces operating in Angola had used the 155mm G5 howitzer
since at least June tgZg. this-crucial-piece of heavy artillery was acquired by
South Africa with the assistance of the Space Research Corporation and other
agencies in the West and is capable of being adapted to carry a tactical nuclear

camp at Sialola, 28 km into Zambia. Twenty four people were reported killed'
and many injured .2e This began a period of intensified SADF activity in the area,
with numerous air space violations, attacks on camps and clashes with Zambian

warhead.2o

brought cultivation to a standstill and caused widespread malnutrition.3s

In April 1981, thousands of Zambian nationals and Angolan_refugees in the
west of^Zambia were reported to be staiving because roads leading to the area
had been heavily landmined by South African tloops, preventing the distribution
of food and other services.36 The President of SWAPO, Sam Nujoma, told the
Zambian press at this time that SWAPO cadres had arrested a number of South
African agents who had been detailed to infiltrate SWAPO in both Zambiaand
Angola. Sime of the spies, he said, had confessed to being in the pay -of the US
Ceritral Intelligence Agency (ClA) and the South African Department of National

wo wont

A correspondent for the London Daily Telegraph who flew into southern
Angola with members of 32 Batt?lion in March l98l calculated that there were
at least 200 South African soldi6rs, comprising four platoons of 32 Battalion,
inside Angola at that moment.21 Commandant Ferreira, interviewed-b-y the
correspondent, told him that 32 Battalion "obviously". used "a bit of force"
againsi local people during operations. He did not deny th_1t the incident
described by Edwards, in which nine adults and children were killed (see above),
"could have happened."22
32 Battalion is a unit of the South African armed forces and is not part of the
SWA Territory Force. According to Commandant Ferreira, its members "carty
SWA documents to move around the Territory, but they are not citizens of
swA."23

ATTACKS ON ZAMBIA AND BOTSWANA

SADF activity in Zambia has also been persistent. In 1975 the SADF began
collaborating-with the so-called Mushala gang, allegedly trained by South
Africa and operating in north-western Zambia.2a ln 1976 South Africa admitted
that Adamson Mushala, its leader, had spent most of the previous year in
Namibia with the SADF, but claimed that he had subsequently become "a
nuisance and an embarrassment to us."25 The Mushala gang became active
against the Zambian security forces as well as cooperating with the SADF in
altacks on SWAPO bases and refugee camps. In 1976 it was reported to have
blown up a bridge in Zambia's Nor,th Western Province, burnt a number of
villages, lttacked a mission hospital, detonated bombs in Lusaka and been
involved in skirmishes with the Zambian army. In June 1976 four Zambians
were convicted of recruiting men in l9l2 to go for training in Namibia with the
object
of overthrowing the Zambian government.26
-From
1971, when four Zambian soldiers were killed and two wounded bya
mine in the area, the SADF began planting landmines on the Zambian side of the
Zambezi, the border with Caprivi.2T Another Zambian soldier was killed in the
area by a mine in 1976.28
In July 1976 SADF helicopter gunships from Caprivi attacked a SWAPO

security forces being reported. One Zambian soldibr was reported killed.3o In
Augusf 1978 members of the Eastern caprivi battalion reportedly took part in
a raid into western Zambia?l
In March 1979 SADF jets and helicopters attacked targets in south western
Zambia, killing seven people.32 later in the year they moved into the area west
of the ZambeTi in the south west of the country, reportedly remainir g there
almost continuously, supported by tanks, armoured cars and aircraft,33 until

October I 980, wheri the Tambiangbvernment reported having driven them out.s
In February 1980 Zambia had reported attacks by SADF aircraft and_ troops
and called an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council on 10 April which
condemned Soutlh African aggression and passed a resolution demanding the
immediate withdrawal of all South African troops from Zambia- The occupa-

tion of the south western area was reported to have driven people away'

Security (DONS). They had been working with "elements

of the Mushala

gang and other CIA agents" in Angola, Zambia and South Africa, he said. Others

had been picked up in Botswana.3/

South African aggression against the Front Line States throughout the region
intensified in the opening months of 1981, following the break-down of the

Geneva Pre-Implementation Meeting on Namibia. In Botswana, a number of

incidents involving South African troops were re,ported on the border with
Caprivi, at Kazangulu and in the Chobe game park.s
As is the case with attacks against Angola and Zambia, the South Africans
appear to operate a two-pronged strategy against Botswana, involving both

regular SADF forces and covert or "special" units incorporating mercenary

troops. ln May 1981, the Vice-President of Botswana, Lenyeletse Seretse,
publicly attacked those Botswana citizens who had allegedlJ^ enlisted in the
South African army and were now engaged in fighting SWAPO.3e

MERCENARIES
Mercenary recruits and abductees from a number of African countries including
Zambia,'Zimbabwe and Mocambique, are apparently trained at a number of
centres in South Africa, including Durban and Pretoria, for service in specialized
units intended to carry out subversion and sabotage against the Front Line
States. Jose Belmundo, of 32 Battalion (see above), stated that he attended a
non-commissioned officer's training course in Pretoria which included five
Mozambicans, two Bushmen and more than 10 members of the Rhodesian
57

Sclous Scouts. Zambians,

he said, were being organized and trained for

operations against the SWAPo leadership in Lusaka. 3l Battalion established

by the SADF among _the _San (P.yshmen), was also responsible for conducting

operations in Zambia, he alleged.ao

An Angolan citizen captured by south African forces in 1979 was taken

back to Namibia and South Africa and subseq'rlntly underwent military training
at Dukunduku in Natal, the base of Numbei Five'Reconnaissance cornmandol
The trainees were later deployed in Namibia on operations against swApo in
which they were themselves disquised as swAPo guerillas.+t- other deserters
have related similar stories on retuining to the Front Une States.
overall, the South Africans make use of a wide variety of units and forms
of aggression in their efforts to destabilise the Front Line States as is the case
- strategy
inside Namibia itself. The combined effects of the South African
are
most apparent.in Angola. By the middleof 1981, a total of 800,000 Angirlans
were estimated to have fled from their homes or been otherwise affect-ed by
drought and the South African raids into the southern provinces.42

VII. THE ARMED FORCES IN THE

UNITED NATIONS SETTLEMENT

PI-.,AN

The role of the South African forces in Namibia is central to any process aimed
at bringing about the independence of the territory through free ilections. The
intense South African
presence in the country clearly complicates the
search for a settlement.'rmilitary
. ln -practice, all attempts to_reach a negotiated settlement for the territory
have been frustrated by south Africa's iefusal to terminate its illegal occupation, including the diimantling of its military presence in Namibia,-both by
deploying qrmy and.police reinforcements from South Africa, and by setting
up new units comprised of Namibians and integrated into the south Africai
Defence Force (SADF) and south African poli; (sAp) command structures.
various administrative and structural changes have been implemented in the
army and police under the guise.of dllolving power to Namibians and preparing
the territory for independence (see Chapteiivl. rnese changes, togeihei witi
other South African-devised "'reforms" in the constitutionil,-legiilative and
administrative spheres, have been initiated by pretoria in defiance 6f successive
united Nations directives and pushed ahead without reference to the content
of international negotiations. Their effect has been to seriously reduce thC
chances of .any independence agreement on the territory being successfully

implemented.
South Africa's mandate to administer Namibia was terminated by the United
Nations in 1966.2 After ten years of fruitless efforts by the UN to assert its
lqtlgrity in Namib]a, tL. uN lecurity council unanimouily adopted Resolution
385 in January 1976. This called on South Africa to withdraw ifs iilegal admini
stration from the territory and allow free elections as a prelude to indelpendence.
The Resolution did not specify- in detail how Souih Africa was io comply
with its deqran{1, beyond calling for "free elections under the supervision and
control of the United Nations" and the "necessary machinery wiihin Namibia
to supervise and control such elections". No mention was made of south African
troops or police forces.
.T9 deflecJ- growing international pressure, south Africa promoted its own
solution for Namibia, based on a tribal formula. In August lgj6,theTurnhalle
conference, a south African.sponsored gathering oftribal chiefs, proposed
elections designed to consolidaie south Africa's -bantustan policies. swApo
and other political parties opposed to the ethnic basis of the^Turnhalle would
automatically be excluded. The constitution drawn up by the Turnhalle con-

ference provided for the pemanent division of th6 Namibian people into
arbitrary "population groups" governed by "homeland governmentsi'.3 The
UN was unable to take effective action to counter this mo-ve. In october 1976,
1ry9., Britain and the uSA, the three permanent western members of the
uN Security council, vetoed a security council resolution seeking to impose
a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa and denounce thi propbsed
internal elections. Renewed_ attemp-ts to place the issue of an arms'.-^b.rgo
and limited economic sanctions before the security council and force south
s8

59

ro

Al'rica to agree to UN-controlled and supervised elections were again frustrated

!y the Western members. In order to avoid another embarrassing veto, the USA,
Britain, France, West Germany and Canada, formed the Western' '.Contaci
Group' in 197.7, offering to negotiate terms with SWAPO and South Africa for
the independence of Namibia on the basis of Resolution 385.4
After several rounds of talks with the South African government, the
Turnhalle representatives and swAPo, the contact Group su6mitted its "proposals for a Settlement of the Namibia Situation" to the UNinApril 1978.5 It
outlined conditions for a ceasefire, followed by a three month transition period
du_ring which provisions concerning the South African and SWAPo armed iorces,
rgfugees, repressive and discriminatory legislation, etc., would be implemented.
This would be followed by a four month long election campaign, theilection of
a constituent Assembly which would adopt a constitution, ihe completion of

While continuing to profess its willingness to implement the Western Plan,

South Africa in fact ignored its demands and unilaterally proceeded to hold
"elections" in Namibia in December 1978. While UN Security Council and
General Assembly resolutions condemned these developments, the Contact
Group continued to resist pressure from African countries to impose sanctions
on South Africa.

Although negotiations continued, South Africa effectively prevented any

the withdrawal of ali South African personnel and independenie by 3l

December 1978 at the latest.

The whole process,_ while being monitored by the UN through a Special

_
Representative assisted by a Transition

Assistance Group (UNTAG) witn a

military and civilian component, would be run by the existing'administration in
Namibia, headed by an Administrator General appointed by South Africa. The
role of the Special Representative and UNTAG would be to monitor South

African administered elections by "satisfying (themselves) at each stage as to the

fairness and appropriateness of all measures affecting the political process'. The
responsibility for "law and order" would remain with the ",eiisting police
forces" who would be *limited to the carrying of small arms- and accompanied
"when appropriate" by UN personnel to "ensuie (their) good conduct..
The provisions with respect to UNTAG, the South African forces and ..other
organized forces" in Namibia included the following:

The restriction of South African and SWAPO armed forces to base

following a ceasefire.

Within three months, the phased withdrawal of all but 1,500 South
African troops. These 1,500 to be restricted to Grootfontein or Oshivello
or both, and withdrawn after certification of the election.

*
*
*

Demobilization of citizen forces, commandos and ethnic forces, and the

dismantling of their command structures.
SWAPO personnel outside of the territory to return peacefully.

by raising new objections. It refused to accept SWAPO bases inside

Namibia; SWAPO insisted that there could be no conCession on this issue. In
November 1979 proximity talks were held in Geneva to consider a proposal
which had originally been suggested by the late President Neto of Angola involving the establishment of a 50 km wide demilitarised zone (DMZ) on both
sides of Namibia's borders. The DMZ proposal as submitted at Geneva had subsequently been elaborated by representatives of the Contact Group and South
Africa, but without consultation of SWAPO, and bore little resemblance to the
original idea. The DMZ was only to be demilitarized in respect of SWAPO forces,
since the proposals provided for:
progress

l*"

I'
.

five South African bases in the Namibian part

area ofradius 5 km around each base;

an

three bases in the Angolan part, for Angolan military units only, and;
one base in the Zambian part, for Zambian military units only.

No SWAPO personnel were to be allowed in any part of the DMZ. As a

further concession to South Africa, units of the SAP would accompany UNTAG
patrols monitoring the Namibian part of the DMZ.e South Africa and SWAPO
continued to disagree on the issue of SWAPO bases in Namibia while Angola and
Zambia objected to the proposed monitoring of SWAPO bases in their countries
by UNTAG.
After further talks in February and March 1980 between South Africa,
SWAPO and the Front Line States, and UN officials, the UN Secretary General
considered the problems to have been resolved and suggested 15 June 1980 as
a target date for the UN/Western Plan to go into operation.lo South Africa's
response, which had been delayed until after the independence elections in
Zimbabwe, was to raise new demands, disquised as "questions for clarification".
The regime demanded:

A military section of the UNTAG to ensure observance of the above pro- to be established by the UN Secretary General in consultalion
with "all those concerned with the implementation of the agreement."

20 South African bases inside the DMZ, i.e., an additional I 5;

visions

South Africa accepted the proposals in April 1978, with reservation over the
status of Walvis Bay.6 SWAPO accepted the plan in July.7 In August, the UN
Secretary General's Report on the Implementation of the Western Plans was
published and on 29 September 1978 it was adopted by the UN Security
Council through Resolution 435.

of the DMZ, including

the majority of UNTAG personnel to be deployed in the DMZ;

consultation with Jonas Savimbi's UNITA over the DMZin Angola;
derecognition by the UN of SWAPO as the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people;

termination of all UN funding for SWAPO;

60
61

--:

no ellbct to be given to UN resolutions "favouring SWAPO" and;

equal treatment for the "internal" parties in Namibia.

ln addition, some general criticisms were made of the UN's and the Secretary
General's alleged "lack of impartiality" in its dealings with SWAPO on the one
hand, and the "internal' parties on the other.ll A few weeks later South Africa
launched 'Operation Smokeshell", an invasion of Angola apparently aimed not
only at provoking a negative response from SWAPO while at the same time
putting pressure on Angola, but also at strengthening UNITA's claim to be

included in consultations. This was to be achieved through the installation of

UNITA forces in captured towns in theDMZ.12
In spite of these provocations, delays and new demands, not uninfluenced by
the result of the election in Zimbabwe,l3 SWAPO demonstrated its commitment
to the implementation of Resolution 435 by further conceding:

i;li''

!i

..it

had risen to 100,000.20

This massive military build-up reflects, in the first instance, the growing
threat posed to the South African occupation of Namibia by SWAPO's liberation
struggle. Within the region, it is a telling pointer to the rapidly growing scale
of South African aggression against neighbouring African states. During 1980,
South African military operations against Angola showed a 69 per cent increase
over 19J9.21 In June I 98 I , the Central Committee of the MPLA Workers Party
reported that over the first six months of 1981, South African aggression against
,fng9!a_!1d_reached "a degree of intensity and continuity" not surpassed since
lhe I 97 5-7 6 invasion.22
Over the same five year period, South Africa enlisted, trained and equipped

an estimated 10,000 Namibian members of the South West Africa Territory

20 South African bases in the DMZ, and;

Force (SWATF). In addition, a variety of quasi-official paramilitary groups made

their appearance in the territory. These developments attracted little publicity

overseas and were pushed ahead despite condemnation from the majority of

five of UNTAG's seven battalions to be deployed in the DMZ.

The I"IN Secretary General assured South Africa of the UN's determination
to be completely impartial in its dealings, and pointed out that the Western

Plan, which had been accepted by South Africa, made

ilt,

the South African forces, which had invaded Angola in an attempt to unseat the
MPLA, were finally repulsed, there were estimated to be 16,000 SouthAfrican
troops in Namibia.le By March 1981, following the reported despatch of a
further 20,000 troop reinforcements, armoured cars and howitzers, the number

no

provision for any parties other than the I-IN, South Africa and SWAPO to be
involved.la Nevertheless South Africa, after delaying a further two months
before responding, and having achieved satisfaction on all its original demands,
now focussed on alleged UN "partiality" to SWAPO and blamed SWAPO's
"heinous' acts of violence for the delay in implementing the Plan. South
Africa demanded that the "leadership in the territory' be included in all future
consultations as a precondition for South Africa's co-operation.l5
The Secretary General respondedl6 by pointing out that the issue of "partiality" and the "internal" parties would be solved as soon as a ceasefire was
signed, as all parties would then be on an equal footing, and the question of
"violence" would also disappear. He proposed sending a LIN mission to South
Africa to work out a tim6-table for implementation-of Resolution 435. The
mission duly visited South Africa in October 1980, but the so-called 'question
of the creation of trust'was raised again by the South African government,lT
and no dates were set. Instead, another meeting was agreed to, described as
"pre-implementation talks", to be held in January 1981. Under the chairmanship of the UN, the Geneva Pre-Implementation Meeting was intended to bring
South Africa and SWAPO together to iron out residual obstacles to the implementation of Resolution 435, to achieve independence for Namibia by the
end of 1981. The talks were in the event utilised by South Africa mainly as an
opportunity to promote its "internal leaders" through the world's press. The
meeting broke down with South Africa refusing to agree to elections.ls SWAPO

United Nations member states.

The UN Settlement Plan for Namibia, endorsed in Resolution 435, provides
for the demobilization of the citizen forces, commandos and ethnii forces
("tribal armies') in Namibia and the dismantling of their command structures.
"Territorial" forces are not mentioned. In 1980, however, shortly before the
inauguration of the SWATF, the retiring head of the armed forces in Namibia,
Major. General Geldenhuys, told journalists that members of the indigenous
SWA/Namibia army and police units were "permanent residents of the territory and cannot be expected to withdraw from it as required by Resolution
435". He pointed out that "these SWA units can also not be disbanded because
they are in the service of the State and are dependent on their service for a
livelihood".23
By the middle of 1981, the years of negotiations had produced no discernible evidence of any willingness on South Africa's part to relax its military
grip on Namibia. On the contrary, the dangers to the peace and territorial
integrity of the entire region were, by all yardsticks, continuing to increase remorselessly.

however remained committed to Resolution 435.

Over the five years which elapsed between the adoption of UN Security
Council Resolution 385 in January 19'16 ard the collapse of the Geneva PreImplementation Meeting, South Africa increased the number of troops deployed
in Namibia more than five - fold. At the beginning of 1976, when
(t2

63

FOOTNOTES AND REFERENCES

The following abbreviations are used:
BBC

British Broadcasting Corporation Monitoring Service

CT

Cape Times, Cape Town

cir

The Cjtizen, Johannesburg

DD

Daily Despatch, East London

DN

Daily News,Ihrban

Debates

House of Assembly Debat es, Cape T ow n

Focus

Focrs on Political Repression in Southern Africa,

IDAF news bultetin

FT

I- inanc ia I T im es, Lnndon

LWI

Lutheran Woful Informatbn, Geneva

MS

Morning Star, landon

RDM

Rantl Daily Mail, Johannesburg

SExp

Sunday E xpress, Johannesburg

ST

Sunday Times, Johannesburg

ST (Lon)

Surulay Times, lnndon

weekly airmail edition, Johannesburg

Star

^Slar,

S. Tel

Sunduy Tclegraph, London

Tcl

Dail.v'fclcgmph, lnndon

?|rc 'fmrcr. krrrdurr

Vad

Die Vod<'rlarul, Johannesburg

WA

llind ho ek

wo

ItliruJ ho ek O b server,

Ad

ve

rt iscr. Windhoek

Windhoek

ln text:

64

SWAPO

South West Africa People's Organisation

SAAF

South Aliican Air Force

SADF

South African Defence Force

SAP

South African Police

SWATF

South West Atrica lerritory lorce

SWAP

South West Africa Police

65

Ilt

lNTlOl,l'(TrON
M.ilNtatthun

il (itilwruthDt

rnd ruhFquoiltly I!!kcd

Ith('

.t

,Vdt 9,4,N1,

2.7 .t1t

prcpa,cd
to thc prels.

by US officials

All rllir!ilcq
rrfcronco to
to t()up rtrcn8th in the texl refer lo mil.
lltty lotcot only ond excludc thc police,
llrty.lorcor
mlice excepl
excenr where
whe,p

1.

rlrlrd dlfflr.nrlv.
Supo'r Adminirtrative Secrelary inside Namibia, Axel

Johrnn.t,
Johrnnol-rcportcd
rcportcd in.
in a pcrmnai communiarion (Deccnrbcr
rnrbcr l9EO)
rnlbcr
1980) that a member
member of the
me
lhe SADF, after
afler com_
complatlnS r tour of duty in northqn Namibia in December,
hrd glvcn
calimat4 of 100-0OO
dvcn an cstima-te
IO0,OOO troons
The Sunday
tundn,
trcops. The
Telegraph
,.t.Xrupn
rslimated
estimated, thal
rnat there
rhal
rhe;e were
Inere
frop, Estwareo
were i0O.O00
IUU.0(JU troooilrooDsln_cfuding pzrzmtlilaty police. deployed in Namidia

(S.

Irl

t9
20.

2t.
22.

23.

22.J.81)

Namibb: The Constitutiorul haud - A reiltu of recent

lqol atd odministrurive changes introducd undo South
Afilqn ocrupo.irh, IDAF Briefing paper No. 2. July

t981.
Ststement of the Central Committee of the MPLA
Worken'-Party issued at the end of its plemry meetingfrom l7-20June 1981.
The Apotheid Wat Mrchine - The Strength and Depbyment
the South Aficon ,amed foices. IDAF ,

-of
April 1980.

25.

The Committee on South West Afriq was set up by the

United Nations General Assmbly in 1953 to pursue
negorialions wilh Sourh Africa to place Namibia under
the Trusleeship of the United Naribns. The Commiilee
was charged with eMmining information available on
Namibia and petirions submil ted by rhe inhabitanls, and
was asked lo repoil to the General Assefibly on condirions in lhe Terrilory.A Trust Betratd, ibid.. p.12.
Reporl of the Commirtee on South West Afn@ lo the
United Nations ( 1 960), intSouth West Afri@. A Ttayestv
of Ttust, op.cit., pp. 244 - 248.
Th-e AWtheA llot Ma(hine, Fact Paper on Soulhern
Africa No. 8. IDAF. tnndon. t980. p.t 6 and p.4t.
sT 19.t2.65.
Ibid
South .West Afii@, A Ttove$y of Ttust. op.cr?., p.250.
D.R. tnwin. Causes ond ospects of rhe guwth oJ h?
South.AfiiMn Defence Force and the military industtial
@mplex, 1960 to 1977, M.A. Dissertarion, Universjty of
York, Centre for Southern Afri@n Studies, 197?.
WA 11.12.79, quoting Gen. Geldenhuys, who sid that
lhe units (presumably Permanent Force) had been senl
'vhen Mr started". This is assumed io refer ro the
launching ot the armed struggle by SWAPO in I 966.
THE

ll.
12.
13.

Namibia Todat, Organ of SWAPO of Namibia, SWApO

Depl. of Information and Publicily. Luska (Zambn).
Oct/Nov l97l
GN 28.6.73
Ibid

AFRICAS EARLY MILITARY PRESENCE

87.

plofile,

SWAPO._Deparlment of lnformation and publi;ily.

Lueka (Zambia), 1978, p.8.
J.H.P.Serfontein. /V4dDi4: Rex Collings. London. I 9?6,
p.21.
Namibia the Facts, op.cit ., p.lO.
J.H. Wllington,
lH.
Wellington, Sorrh
Soarh htest
lile$ Aftiu
Aftica and
ar hs human issucs,
Oxford University Press, I 967, DJ | 2
Namibia
Namibia - the Facts, op.cit.. p.9.
ibid., p.l0
R. First,
Ft$, Sorr,
I
West Afii@, Penguin Afrion Library,
London,
London. 1963,
19b3, pp. 98-100,
98-t00, Sw)pO tnfomailon o;
SlttAfu: An Histbrical Profle, op.cit., p.8.
utamooaM
O
Ovambobnd
ta mb o h rd. upqotans,
p to t in s, Augusr
Opnotions,
Auguit 19.12:
l9J2': Reporl
Report of Col
Col.
.O
van Ryneveld to Chief of Geieral Staff.
Sraff. Unlon Defencr
Defence
Force,15.12-1932.
Randolph Vigne, A dwelting place of our own
- The
s-tory of theNomibian Nation, IDAF, tgj' (reved) p.18.
Naryibia
NamtDa
the Fad\
hacts, op.cit., p.l0.SWAn
p.lO,StttAN tnforinition
Inlomation
- An Hi$oti@t hoiite. op.cit., p.9.'
on SWArc;
The Nomibians of South West,4/ncs, Minoriry Righrs
Group, 1978,
1978. pp.A-e,
pp.8-s, SWlrc
SWAPO tnfomtion on St+ipo,
An Hisotiel Profile,
b, op.cit., p.9.
p
Sour h Weil Afii@, Travesty
Tlavesty of Ti
Trut, op.cit., p.246.
F. Troup,
Troup. So!r,
Sort, Afiiu;
Afriu; An Histotiot
Histt
Inircductbn,
Eyre Methuen, london,1972, p.228
ibid., p.286. ln addition, there was als a relarivelv larse
white popularion, many of whom had links wirh Souih
Afrie,
Afrie. and although Namibir as a whole was
Aln.
w e@nomielly underdeveloped. lhe whites had begun lo accum.
Uy
ulate wealth from diamonds and karak;l sheep
sheen pelts.
netrr
The
Ihe black
black populatjon was, of cour*. valuable
ble boih
both in
Namibia and for South Afrie itself as a surce of chqp
labour.
A Trust Betruled: Namibia, United Nations, New york,
1974, pp.6-7.

29.
30.

llA

31.
32.

FT t2).76

?l
34.
t<
36-

Rrl
11.

18.8.73
T 1.8.74
cT 14.6.'74
Stat 17.2.13

9.
10.

38.

14.8.75

The

Arytheid

GN 6-5.78;WA 7.9.78:BBC 5A.79:NoAftimn

1979: ttlt2 | 7.5.80 (Anicle by Basit Davidmn).

!dv

AWthed

h)ot Machine,

4t.

op.cir., p.63

was a SWAPO

GN t9.5.79

45.

u.

THEMLNARY

The

u.

FT9.12.',17

wA 2a.to-77

wA 2.8.17.

3.

,t,,f 16.8.77. Thc lhcn cditor of thc lttitulhoek Advertirq

lhnrcs Smith, ii now editor of thc antiaparthcid ,/il|dktck Obww.

4.

RDM I

5.

a. l"ull-titilc ptolcssftrilah hds&! p.tnsil.t|l.v ilr Noiltihio

include the SADF Perrrancrrt Force Hcarlqulrlots
Staff in Windhoek !nd Groolfonlein: severtl aupport
lnits lsee Appeuli, ,4/ of the SADF. the SADI.
Permancnt Force pers)nnel al Walvis Bay, lhe pernranenr Force leadership corps of the SWATF, the
tribal baltalions of lhe SWATF, J2 Batralion. the
various tribal police forces and other locally-based

18.

l9
20

2l

22.

23.

Private inteiliew (1980) with ex-SADF soldier who

was based at Ondangua at the time.

Some Aspects of the South Afiien Mititary Occupation
of Namibia..papil prepared b] rhe preparatury Cummiilee wirh the assisrance uf the Commitlee 6n South
Afriqn War Resistance. Lnndon, (COSAWR). for the
Internarioml Conference in Solidaritv wirh the Struscle
o[thePeopleof Namibia, Paris, I l.ljSepl. 1980. *
FT 2l .5.79

RDM t4.5.19
ltlO 1 5.9.79 antl 1 5.1 2.79
lr)A 21.11.'19. The location of the base was advertised
simply as 'lilestern ( apilvi', but il is clear lhat it is the
one ar Omega. By lhe late 1970s rhere were close on
3.500 p@ple housed al rhe base. 700 San (..Bushmen')
male oldiers of 201 Battali(,n (formerly 3l Ballalion),
700 wives. 250 dependents, t,400 children and JOd
white troops - in fact about ll0 percenl of the enrire
population of lhe Wesrern Caprivi ( t/,{ 22.9.77 and 2'1.
I l 79). The SADF'S 'civic action" programme ws hard
At work in the camD see ChaDtq V
Namibia To4ay, op.cit" Vol. 4 (2), 1980.
Alii@ ConfaentuL Irndon, 7.9.73. This is an estimate
for September 1973, and does not offer any breakdown
of this figure. The following suggested breakdown takes
into accounl the 7.000 lroops reporled to have arrived
in Walvis Bay in Februdy lq73 \noted above), Ihe
battalion moved to the Capdvi soon after and those already io Namibia:
Non-operatronal troops in Namibian Cilizen
Force and Comandos
Combal troops in'bperational area'
Support troops in'bperalional area'
SAI counler insurgency lroops
SWA Comand
Walvis Bay

TOTAL

4,000
3,500

4,000
1,000
500

2,mO
I5,OOO

T 2.9.7'7

t4.

18.

19.

.7

.8O: WA

Mochine, op.cit., p-62

police.

Service conscripts.

d. S^ADF Nariohol Sovice consoipts. Consisring of

South Afrin whitesand Namibian blacks and w6res,
they are mostly basd in South Afri and in the 2
SA lnfanrry Bartalion Group al Walvis Bay. Smll
numbers of @nscripts doin{ iheir mlioMl s;rvice in
SAP also do operatioml dutv.

e. SADF Natiorul Senice ',volunteos.. The* are part

of the ethnic and bantustan units.
l. Patttime forces on louts of duty in Namibb but
based in South Ati@. SADF Ciriten Force unils and
Commandos. Most of the milirary forces in Namibia
ar m @legories c. d. and f. and paramililary police
lorces rn

stegory a.

Television interview with Trevor Edwards. British merceEry who worked in 32 Batlalion, broadcasl on rhe
ptotmmme Ty Eye by Thames Television, 29. l.gl .
For a full accounr of 3.2 Baltalion, as submitted to the
Second Session of lhe lntrmlional Commission of
lnquiry into the Crimes of the Racist and Apartheid
Regime in Soulhern Afrie. se Foas Soeciil lssue
l.I-o- ?. !DAF, April t981. See atso. for e'xample, fT
12.2.81 for SADF admissions.
Special lssue No.2 op.cit.

Fodr
25.

.ttl

b. ParLtime fotc6 bdsd in Namibia. These are the Citizen Force and the Comando units of the SWATF,
the SWAP Resene force and the Namibian-based
members of the SA Railways Police Reserve.
c. Full-time prcfe$ioruls on tours oI dury in Nomibia,
but based in South Aftr'a. The major portion of these
troops are members of the SADF. The SA Air Force
also has a significanr presence both in operational
squadrons and back-up units. Others in thi; etesorv
include SA Nary pirmnnel in Walvis Bay, -Se,i'
counter-insurgency units, the Reconmissnca Com_
mandos, Perronent Force service units and permanent Force Officers and NCOS leading National

lnteryiew with South African amy deserter, July l98l:

detdled- desription of all thi units and weapons
systems of the Soulh Afrien Almy, Air Force and Navy
@n be found in lre,4 Wtheid Wd Mtchine, op.cit.
,AC L8.80. See also Foos Special Issue No. ): ,4zgola.
lahtinS.4 Wthed, IDAF News Bulterin April I 98i.
&tatas(Jourml ofSADF), Nov. t978.
The AprtheiC Wil Machine, op.cit., p.26. The de$ription of the SAAF 6mes fiom this source.
One such Air Comando. preqously I l2 Squadron. has
been lransferred to the SWA Tqritory Fore and re_
named I SWA Squadroniit is intended ai lhe core of lhe
future air force of indepondent Namibia. /r/O 9,8.80).
MS 28.6.80
6trl/ 1.7.80, see Chapter Vl for detailrThe exact ratio oi support to combar troops is not
known, The ratio in rhe US forces fighting in'Viermm
was l7:l in a highly mechanised wa.. TheSADF boasts
a very low (undisclosed) wio, ln Some Aspects of he
SouIh Afti@n Milit@y Octupation of Wamibio. oj.cit.,
an estimated ratio of l:l is used. An eslimate of.2tl is
given. by S. Ceryasi in So&r/' Afri@\ llar on Namibia,

unpublished paper, 1976.

STRUCTURE

15.

Stat 21.'1-79

Bulletin of the. Aflice lnstiture of South Afica.P,etona

No. 6/7.1977 p.185.

23.

Apothed llu

p.l2.

13.

ence.in September 1980 estimated 75.00O (Some aspects

forcesBBC 30.7;79
BBC 4.t1.80

rhe Facts. op.cit.,

12.

of th.e Sdth Afiien Milirary Ocdpatbn of Na;ibia,

op.cit.), See also @muni@tion from Axel Johannei
(Introduction, fn. 4). All these cstimates exclude police

t4.

17.

ll.

esrimte.

The

16.

10.

In June 1980, the Angolan government's estimate ws

60.000 l/r,ts 28.6.80). A paper prepared for a @nfer-

RH t9.9.74

op.cit. p.61.

Sore Aspects of rhe South Afii%n Milituty Occupation

of Namhia, op.cit., T^hle II. By the end of t980, rhe
number of troops had probably i;creased to 3,500.
The Aryheid Wat Mochine. op.cit., p.64.

)l

12.

lqat Machine,

Namibia

l0_2.80

13.

Arythed

8.

wA 2.8.71

FT 21.5.'.t9
Gff 19.5.79. The total

the different Sectors is based on

Forces (lolAnnesburq). SeDt. 1q80.

GN 7.a.78

wA t.a.77
The

of

The desc.iption

Armd
"1-

16.
17.

lllat Machine. op.ciL, p.S1

Fo@r Nov- 1976

sr

42.
43.

6.

15.

Gonje and Cronje. op.cil., pJ2

39.

&.
I

p.83
Debates, 1.2.72.

Nahibia the Fa.ts, IDAF. london. 1980. pS.

S_h)APo Infomtion on SWAPq; An Hdo;ica!

28.

of Namibia, \DAF,

Ibd.

2.
3.

2'1.

MILITARY BUILD-UP DURING THE 1970s

G. Cronje and S. Cronje, The lilorke6

Article 4 of the lrague of Nations'Mandate states: The

military training of the natives, otherwise than for rhe
purpose of interml police and the lo@l defence of the
territory,_ slnll be prohibited. Furthermore, no military.
or naval baes shall be established for fortifications ereited in th territory. '"The Defence Position',. by R. Gott
in:
-South.Weil AftiM, Ttavest, of Trust, (ed.i R. SeSal
and R. Firsl. Andre Deutsch. tpndon, lq6?. p.249. in.

26.

1?

II.

Ipndon 1979. p.82.

lbid. p32

SOUTH

25.

The MPIA ('?opular Movement for the Liberation of

Angola') ms ultimtely sucessful in defring South
Afril attempts lo thwart Anpola's transirion Io independence, and fomed rhe g6vernment of the post@lonial Peoplet Republic of Angola. The FNLA
('N*ional Front for the Liberation of Angola-l and
UNffA ('Union for theToral Independence oi Angola.)
were riEl guqilla movements which collaborared
closely-with the South Africans during Angola's econd
Mr ofliberation and transition to independ-ence.
The AWthent War Machine, op.cit., D:61
lbid. Table lX and Table X. o45ltA r9.7.74
Sorc aspects of the South Afrieh Militat! Ocrupailon
of Namibb op.cit.
wA t6.9;14

2'7.

24.
29.
30.
31.

32.
33.
3435.
36.

37.
38.
39.

Two photogaphs taken ai the end of lq75 were pub_

lished. in Dr Burget. 5.2.j'1. The first showed Jbnas
Savimbi with P.W. Borha. Soulh African Minisrer oi
Pgfclce: Gen. MA. de Malan, head of the South Africm
lil forgcl L-t. Gen. A,J. van de Vent.r, Sourh Afiican
C'hict oJ Staff; Jannie de Wet. South African Commissioner__Gcncral for Namibia: and J.C. Heunis, South Afri-

car. Ministcr for Economic Affairs. The second showed

P.W.. Botha. Ceneral Malan and lwo others from the
South African [Erty, with membeB of Jonas Savimbi,s
penonal. bodygua.d. The photographs were reproduced
n AnttAryttheid NewJ, lrndon. Mav I 9gl.
8BC t6.6.80.
Evidence submirted by rhe head of the Office of Reconmissnce and Inlelligence of the Angolan armed forces
and olhet wilnesses to the Second Sassion of the lntqnatioml Comission of lnquiry into the Gimes of the
Racist and Aparlheid R.gime on Southern Africa. remr.
ted in Focas Special lssue No. l, April l98ll inieniiew
with Trevor Edwdds oD.r'l
Soldiet of Foilune (uin ). .lrtv t gZS.
cT t7.9.79

cN 3t.8.'t6
Parutu' Itly 1979.
wA t3.3.8t.
The

Daily N Ns (T

anza nia

2.

.8

Fods.No. 26. January/February I q80. p.q

lnrerview with South African army desirrer. July l9g I

;
I he A p@ r heid Wat Mdchine, op..it - D.4j.
Police Amendmenr Acr. No-5i- t96i
Polie Amendmenl Act. No.94: 1972

wo Lt2.79.

Even traffic police. iI seems, regard lhemselves as ..secu.

forces". A leller in the Vlindhoek Obsemer o[
30.8.80 from a reader in Tsumeb complained aboul rwo
'\enior' rraffic officersin the White arlas in lhe..nonhsearching cars and questioning the drivers about dia_
mond smugglirg,'.terrorists. and other malters. The
two had also allegedly been harassing contract
contracl workers
at a recruiting point

rity

67

=:

4t)

1t.
4.t.
41,

W/l )..1.18.
lto 2.t\)10.

42.

RDM

No. :h. January/Fehruary lqEO. p.c.

IJnitcd Natirrns (i)mn]issioil rtn Human Right\. L/CN.

43.

Ibid

44.
45.
46.

wA 2.t0.19.
wA t6.6.1U.

Armed Forces, op. cit.

wA 21 .3.8L
Proclamation AG I 16.29.8.80.

4'7.

48.

cT 24.8t.
wA/cT 2.4.81.

LWt 20t19.
w0 9.8.80.

49.

LWI3l8t.

50.
51.

wo 25.1o.80.

/'id.r

4/tIri?..r.t.71r.
44.
45_

46.
41.
4li.

$.
50.
51.

ry
I
2
3

wo iba.
wA 2'7.2.8t.
Paratus Supplement Augusi 1980.
Stat 26.l0.'14.
Debates9.5.79.

52.
53.

54.
55.
56.

57.

TRIBALARMIES
wA

-58.

.77.
I .8.7't.

22.',t

wA
For information on the recruitment of black troops in
South Afiica. *e The Apailheid lUar Machine, op.th.,

59.

Chapter 5.

T 20.5.61, reporting

an official Sourh African announoement that one black membet of the SAP and a whire

60.
61.

colleague had been wounded in an incident with a guerilla

near Kalima Mulilo in the Fastern Caprivi. (lr is nor clear

62.

whelher any black police were sent lo Namibia from

South Africa in counrer-insurgency unils before Iq72, or
whelher it was only those recruiled in \amibia who wer e
5.
6.

given weapons training).

Soulh Afrien Police,4 nnual

'7.

Parutus lune l9'79

8.

RDM 12.9.17;lr'A

9.

Repnrt,1975.

Ibid.

Iba.

12.
13.

Frrczs No. 8, January 1977 p.14.

t4.

BBC 22.8.80.

15.

lbid.
Foas Special Issue No.2, April l98l p.9.
Foas No.8, January 19'17 p.14.

18.
19.

Ibid.
tbid.

wo

20.'7.79.
No. 12. Septemher

lbas

1977 p.15.
20.

21.

22.
23.
24.

Iq"?

p.7. No.

lJ,

November

Foas No.

12, ibid.
Paratus, Jantary 1979. In other contexts, including representation at the Turnhalle constitutional talks. the SWA
National Assembly and the SWA Council of Ministers. the
South African authorities appear to have phased out the
ldea of a separate Kaokoland population gnrup' anr.l
'homeland', and have amalgamatei rlie Ovahim-ba wirh rhe
Herero for cbssiliation purposes.
Foas \o.25. November-Decernber 197., p.6.
wA 9.t ."t8.
The Apothcil War Mdchiue,t)p.cit, p40. ln Augusl l(r7r)
"lroops llom the SWA Commanrj' were reporled tu malc

lrA t1.6;76.

15.

16.

t7.
18.
19.
20.

2t.

lttA 2. lO.'79 : llo 2.8.uO.

27.

Debates 3.3.8O
Cit 2.2.81 .

28.
29.
30.
31.

intensive six week training course at Windhoek's Central

Police Station. They were promoled to the rank of lieutenant I l,VA ). -3 .7 9 , 25 .4 .7 9).
DN 2.2.81 .
Cit 2.2.81.

32.
33.

34.
35.

23.
24.

25.
26.

No.

(.)

January

1981.

39.
40.

wo 8.9.79.

4t.

38.

thid.
RDM 18.10.19.

42.
43.
44.
45.

wot59'79.

Atnted F-olces (Johannesburg) September 1980.

55.
56.
s',t.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

64.
65.

66.
61.

Sce

role

wA t6.6.71,88C 3.8.77,
wA 14.6.77.

wA 1t

.5.7'7

BBC 13.'1.77.
See note 2.

wa

12.9.',1'7.

cT 26.1O.77.
RDM 28.1O.77.

Namibia+he Facts, op.cit., p-62.

Stat 24.3.'79.
BBC 30.I l.'l 8i Debdtes 6.3.79.
Debates 11.5.79
wA t9.4.',18.
Fo@s No.5, July 1916,p.16.

08. F7 r 2.2.8

sr

10.2.80.
Debates I1.5.'19
For example, see RDrl,

WA 28.5.'79,

llo

ll2.

D/ir'21.10.80.

l14.

t|/A 2'7.il.19.
SWAPO press release, 16.1.78;

|3.

2.79.
10.3.79, 14.'1.79:
8.1

RDM

1'1,9.79,

others.
sr I0.2_80.

WA 4.1.8O. (The SADF deaths were not mentioned in the

review, although they had been reported earlier.)
In off icial communiques.
Afica Bute@ Fact Sheer, no. 63, May/June I 980.
r/o 10.5.80.
GN 12,6,8O. There have been no reports since of the line
being used again for more than a lew weeks at a lime.

Alh.o Bureau Fact Sheet, op.cit.

79.

lbid.

80.

GNIF-T 7.2.81.
For a detailed accounl

vl.
l
2.
3.

4.
5.

7.

9.

t0.

of the second se$ion of the lnteF

national Commission of inquiry inl(' lhc Crime\ ol lhc
Racisi and Aparlheid Regime in Soulhern Afrrea. see

Special lssue No. 2, April I glt I .

SWAI'O press slrtcmerl. t,ondon l-l.l.til.

lir(ur

.Sn,/:J..l.til.
hto |.4.t11.

ll.

12.
13.

14.

It6.

tt.

8q.

hto 16.4.t{t.
t/(, ').5.X t.
Whilc all lbur of lhcse ar.ss rrc important parts of the
South African strategy in Namlbia, only the strictly
mililary aspects are dealt with jn this Fact Paper. Morc
infomation can be obtained from other IDAF publicatioos, in particular Focus, Ndmibio-the Fdcrs, (1980), and
The Constitutional Fnud, Occasional Brieling No. 2,
July-August 1981.
The Aryilheid llar Machine, op.cit., p.62.
See Chapter

lll.

For example,

it

was reported

in May 1980 (IyO 24.5.80)

lhal the road berween Ondangua and Oshakati had bases

all along it. several miles aparl, all of which had an air
component. The area is one of the most densly popu-

in

ltr)ndon on

94.
95.
96.

97

of

REGIONAL AGGRESSION

Fczs, various issues. in parlicular Special lssue No. 2,

April l98l: Remembet Kassing Testimony ofa Sur

See

vr'vol, pape. included in IDAF Fact Paper No.9, July 198 l.

FoaJ Special Isue, op.cit
Remember Kassinga. op.cit.
See Chapter ttl.
Gnr' 14.6.80; Briefing by Office of Reconnaissance ano
Infomation of the Angolan amed forces, Luanda,
February 1981, reported in Fo@s Special Issue No. 2,

lated in Ovambo and nightly patrols are mounted on

road with amoured cars and powerful search lights.

Focff Special I$ue op.cit.

Statement by lxcio lara, Secretary of the MPLA Workers
Party, on Luanda radio, 30.6.81.

8.

r{:.

possession

op.cit., p.5.
6.

wA 20.10.80.

lt2.
81.
It4.

film in th

IDAF.

^nd

Ibid

wo 24.s.80.

111.

llO. To the Point (lohannesburg) I 2.9.80.

ll L k)tswana Daily News 31.7.80.

RDM 14.5.'19

wo 4.4.t11

statement 20.1 1.80.

lo9.|bid.

76.
7't.
'18.

tO.e.'77.

Tel 17.6.77 .
SWAPO statement LlEl'|1162, issued
2t.6.77.
wA I .7.'17.

to3. tbid.
l0/l. Lutherun llotld Fedqation

GN 19.5.79.

AJiica Butedu F-act Sh?et, No. 53. May/Jun | 980.

92
93

wA I 1.4.71.

I'1.3.'19-

tlto 12.4.'19.
FT 1t.5.79.

'15.

8t.

00. SWAPO pres releas 6/80, Luanda, I 5.7.80

wo1.6-80.
lb.ls No.33, March-April 1981, p.9.

tot.

72.
73.
74.

9l

2.

wo

DD 21.8.80.
RDM 30.s.80.
wo t7.5.80_
hlA 25.2.80.
cT 20.2.80.
wA 24.4.80.
wo 26.4.80.

68.

,)0,

wA e I t 6
wA 23.1t.16.
Ibid.
lttA 3 t.8.'1 6,10 I I 3.9.7 6.
BBC 15. t t.1 6. 2t\.t 2.7 6.

DN2.2.81.
wo 14.3.8t.
For an estimate of the number of non,Namibian residents
included irl these totals, see Table 4, note 7.

41

lo5. wo4.7.81.
t06. ltto 18.7.81lo1. l1/A 1.9.7a.

14.8 ;l6.
I t ft l7o l2'7 .8.7 (t.

34, RDM 7.t0.',1',7.

35. FT 31.Io.1',t., WA t.l 1.7',1.
36. TIGNItrA/FT 3t.tO.77 .
37. Ihid
38.
wA 1-It.71.

37.
39.
40.

Resate/, Bulletin of the Committee on South African War

Resistance, London, No. 7, 1980.

RBC 10.e.11.

29.

36.

102.

14; hT I2.'7.76: BBC

21.4;74.

Ibil. ln March Iq7g. )even blacl porreemen beqme rhe

firsl to qualify ar officers rn Namibia lollowing rn

Debates 6.3.79.
t4/o 3.3.79.
htA 2a.2.79.

69.
10.
71.

THEWAR

wA tls.'7.'76.
Stat 17.1.76.

13.

l/A

32.

t9.2.81.
SWAN) Infomattutn atul Comment. Vol.

12.

2'7.

33.

Lwr

Je\cribed a\ emanrling
from the SADF, but not referenced, have been compiled
from media reports of SADF slatements.
3.
wA 234.76.
4. RDM 12.6.76.
5.
wA 20.s'16
66 T 20.5.76.
7.
wA 29.6.768.
Ibitl.
9.
Thc A pothLil Wat Machine t,p.L| .. p.b:.
10. 'RDM 1O.6.16.

26.

30.
31.

RDM 2431.

63. The Combatar?t Vol. ll No.6,

64. Ibid
65. WO 29.t1.80, 13.12.80; r/,1 1s.12.80.
66. h/AIRDM 15.t2.80.
61. The Combatant, op.cit.

up one third of the forces deployed in the operalional

area uf northern Namibia (Sf lq.8.7q).
cT 2t.9.',|3.
wA 12.10.75.

25.

wA 27.8.80.
l//A 2t.8-80.
Ibid.
wo 29 .lt .80.
wA 2t.t1.80.
To The Po,nt 5.1280.
wo t3.12.80.
SWAPO source, quoting Colonel Nioo Roets, SWATF
Senior Staff Officer.400 volunteers were also reported at
lhis time lo havc sitsneJ up tor lw(' yea15 milita;y setvi(e
(ti/,4 rs.l.8r).
RDM 2.4.81. A report in lhe Windhoek Adrenis?r
(3.4.81), however. stated that the servicenen would be
posted to units in South Alrica during I 982.

11.

Ibid.

54.

L See Chapter lll and Clapter lV.

l. All casualty anJ uther Jati\ti(s

Foas No. 3, March 1976 p.l2

Debates 9.3.79.

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

10.
11.

t6.
t7.

.7.80.

December 1980.

V.
22.e .17

$.

ahe

'fhe RDM 21.10.80, for eiample,

described- in detail
follow-up operations in the Kama;iab area.
The ltral name for whal are krown elsewhere in Southern
Africa as 'trading stores', general stores in remote areas.
CI I 3.1 I .80. There have been numerous such incidents in
recent times.
Information and Comment, bulletin of SWAPO Western

GN 29.7.8r.
See FoclJ Special l$ue op.cir. for a full account of the
evidence presentd by Jose Belmundo; se also Chapter lll.

Sf

24.8.81; The existence of 32 Battalion, although

not at thal timtidentined by that name, was revealed by
the Angolan authodties in 1976, when three UNITA
guerillas were captured while on patrol inside Angola and
prgsentd lo the press. They stated that their main
training base was located at Pica Pau, in the Caprivi strip,
and was msnned by South African and Portuguese
offioers. Th guerillas were eX-UNITA and FNLA
supporters and operated mainly in Angola! KuandoKubango province. They were known as the Resistance
Military Command (fbcus No. 7, November 1976,p.16).
A South African soldier also captured at that time by
Angolan forces after he had crosed into Angola from his
base at Bagani in rhe Caprivi, was probably a member of
32 Battalion. The main ope.ational base of 32 Battalion,
known as Buffalo Base, was lo@ted 15 kn from the
bridge at Bagani, linking Kavango with Caprivi. Pica Pau
(Woodpecker) Base is about 5 km from Buffalo Base.
Both were established in 19'76. 32 Battalioo, formed
following the retreat from Angola of th SA invasion
force which had attempted to thwart the advent of independence in November 1975, comprises an estimated
9000 former members o[ FNLA, lhe great majority being

black Angolans. According to commandant Deon

Firreira, Oflicer Coinmariding 32 Battalion in 1981, the
included 12 white Portuguese who had
subsequently left 1s.trp 24.8.8 l.) 32 Battalion is believed
to include a number of former Rhodesian security force
unit originally

members, including the Selous Scouts. who left Zimbabwe

following the lancaster House seltlement and indepenin-April 1q80. According to Commandant Fer.iira.
21 fo.eign white NCOS and one officer from this source
joined 32 Battalion on one year contracts in 1980.
Platoons in the unit are commanded by white South
Africans, al least some of whom are Portuguese.speaking.
The official language of the Battalion is Englistr. South
African volunteers for the unit are recruited from the

Europe Office, London, May 1980- (Reporting an inter

view with a defector from lhe Koevoet

dence

unit).
The reports are too numerous to list. A fairly comprehensive report on such incidents can, however, be found
in Nomibu Update 15.1.7e, published by lhe United
Srates Narional Commlltee ol the btheran World Federalion, New York. l-ur other recenl reporls see lbaj (e.g.
No. 35. luly Augusl lq8l) and SWAPO lnloma'tio'n
dnd Comment.
e.E. see Remembet Kassinga and other papen on political prienerc and detainees iil Namibia, IDAF Fact Paper
No. 9 (l 981); li).es Special lssue no. 2, April 1981.

by the Central Committee of the MPLA

Worke6 Party, Lunda, 20.6.8 1.
Statement by the Provincial Commissar of Mocamedes
kovince, Angola, rep orted, by BBC 6 .6 .81 .
WO 18.7.81 : BBC I 5.7.81.
Communique issued by the Ministry of Defenc of the
Peoplo Republic of Angola, 29.7.8 l; C/1r' 3 I .7.8 l.
Statefrent

amy

15.

leadership school at Oudtshoorn; the Battalion

includes South African national setricemen as well as
members of the pemanent force. /S.aJp 4.5.81.)
Focus Special I$ue, op.cit.

wA a t1'7a

69
68

.__

t0.
l'1.
lN,

lq,
,0,

l,

12.

(;& ,le

thu

t.il,

llA

RIIN t4,1.76.

18.
10.
J0,

.lt,
.t

2,

.14.
.15,
.16.

l?

lt.

12.

7'r, l0,,l,lll.

14,
2tr.

I0.

(1',)6. LNr

2.1,

]J,

9.

lha.
,fl'22,J,t t.
li{!r llplchl luno r4t.t1t.
17.6.A1.

13.

FT t2.3.80.

14.

Securily Council, S/l 40l l, 20 6 80.

Security Council, S/ l4l 39, 29.8.80.
Security Council, S/14184, 19.9.80.
Scurity Council, 5114266,24.11.80. Further Report of
lhe Secrelary Ceneral concerning rhe lmpiemenauiion of
Security Councrl Reslulion 435 1 1o73fun6 4J9 (1978)

15.

t6.
t1

wA 2tr.7,76.
/'irrvr Nrr.7. Nov. 1976, p,15,
(T 7).6.14
wA t8.6.76.
htA 12.7.'16.
cN t2.8.76.

DMZ proposals for SWA Namibia, in Africa tnsight, (Vol.

r0 (2) 1980.
Namibia: the F-actsop.cit., p.66.
Security Council. S/13935. I 2.5.80.
An8olan Ministry of Defence communique, 26.6.80.

Concerning the Quesrion

18.

19.

wo 2t.10.78.

)n

hT 13.3.79.
Ncw AftiqnDec. t980.
RDM 2t.t0.80.
Ntw AtitenDec. 1980.

2r.

Lh4 1418t,9.4.8t.
Tlmes of zambia I7.4,81. ln Februar! lg8l. an inquesl

22.
23

G.ir'l6.l.8l.
Fods No.6,

of Namibia.

Sept. 1976, p3.

22.3.8 I ; Foas No. 34. May-June I 98 l. p. L
_relase by rhe Embassy of rhe People's itepublic
Angola in France. 203 81.
BBC 23.6.81 .
To The Point 15.8.8O.
S

lel

Press

of

APPENDD(
APPENDX A
SECURITY FORCE BASES AND TJNITS PERMAI\EMLY
STATIONED IN NAMIBIA
Al1 the units listed have been transfdred to the SWATF unless
otherwise indicated. Mediel and administrative units and
supply bases are not listed.

Windhoek

SWA Comand HQ (non SWATF)

SWATF HQ
SWA Brigade HQ
9l I Battalion HQ
9l Armoured Car Rgl
9 I Composite Field Rgl
9l Maintenance Unit
Alta Feste Area Force Unit
Khomasdal Area Force Unit
Air Force Base
I SWA Sqn

9l

inlo lhe dealh of the alleged Lusaka Slrangler, believed

for the murder of a rcries of w-omen in the
Lrgka area, heard police claims that the deceased had

rcsponsible

been employed by lwo members of the Mushala gang to

commit the murders to divert the attention of tie Zambian armd forces from

Zmbia\

North Western province

Gtoolfontein

lSBC 2.3.8t')38,

39.

4.

41.

swATF)

Evidence to the lnternati;Ml Comission of lnquiry.

Faar Special Issue, op.cil., p9. tn July 1981, rh; tjs
mercenary recruiting frag zine Soldier oI Fonune included an obituary ro John Murphy. a US mercenary who
had served wilh the Rhodesian Selous Scours befori ioining the South African army\ parachule barralion and Lter
the Number One Reconmissnce Commando at Durban,

fuea Force Unil

Air Force Base
Ruqcana

terrorisls' (Sodie, o/ Fonune !uly

Zantbia Dailv Mait 30

Kaokoveld @lN HQ

Air Force

Base

SAP HQ and Detention Centre

lq8ll. -

Ondangua

THE ARMED FORCES IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Rurulu

Population 1.250,m0 (estimated). militarv 100.0m tesri

mated), police 8,000. The number of ciiilians amed rn
defence of South Africa's occupation is extremely high as
well. and many wilh no officiai conneclron wilh ihe;ecurily forces are supplied with weapons by them. The ltlinrlhoek Obsener..commenting on the facr lhat DTA supporlers are supplied wirh automalic weapons by rhe SADF.ion
cludeJ thar "there is no denial roday thar ihe privare arse.
nalsof the private armies far exceei rhe fire power in rhe
hands of the police". (llo 9.6.79).
Ceneral Asembly Resolution 2145 (xxi). (l14 for: l
againsr Portugal and Soulh Africa; J abslenlions_

Fnnce, Malawi and Britain). Confirmed by Sffunly

Council Rsolurion 264 (tJ for 2 abstenrionj Franci,
Britain) oJ 1969. declaring South Africat presence in

Namutoni

91

Orururu

9l 2 Battalion
Area Force Unit

Okakueio

Etosha

Outio

Major base
Area Force Unit

Otii\|drongo

Major base

3 Battalion

Are

Force Unit

Okakaraa

Hersoland Area Force Unit

Uis

Damanland Area Force Unit

Gobabis

Area Force Unit

Swakopmund

Area Force Unit

Rehoboth

Area Force Unit

Amfuius

Area Force Unit

Army Base

Rl

SETTLEMENT PLAN

Major base
I SWA Specialist Unit

Area Force Unit

101 Engineer Support Unit (non-SWATF)

101 Workshop (non-SWATF)
I 6 Mairtenance Unit (non-SWATF)
Transil Camp for SADF unils

described as a "highly secret unit. . . responsible for foi

many raids into Angola and Moqmbiqueleatnsl SWAPO

42.

Northern Supply Comand HQ (non-

Fo.u s No. 34. Mav-June 198 I . D.2.

BBC 25.5.81 .
Foos Special Issueop.cit., p.8.

Oshivello

Ovambo COIN HQ
85 Technical Services Unit (non-SWATF)
Air l.'orce Base
Kavango COIN

tlQ

Afdnos

Bo Nossob Area Force Unit

Stompilea

Anob Area Forc Unit

Mailental

Area Force Unit

Air liorce Bosc

Gibeon

Namaland Area Force Unit

Katimo Mulilo

Caprivi COIN HQ

Bethanien

Area Force Unit

0kahandio

SWA Military School

Area Force Unit

Keetrunshd)p

Area Force Unit

Ludeiltz

Area Force Unit

Karusbutg

Area Force Unit

20: lhttrlion

32 Butlalkrn (non-SWATf )

l'/alvis Bay

SA Infantry Battalion Croup lnon.

SWATF)

Omega

Rooikop Air Force Base

SA Nary Base

Oranjemuhd

Area Force Unit

201 Battalion

Rietfontein

Area For@ Unil

Area Force

Namibia illegal.

Namibia rhe Fa(ts; op.cil., p.60. These proposals were

rejected by the UN. rhe count;ies of the EfC airC SwapO.
The draft @nsrilution. drawn up by the Conslilurional
(tlmmiltee of rhe Turnhalle Conference in Windhoek,
provided for I I ethnic gorerments, ach sparately
-

by a [Erlicular elhnic group. A 60-member

Natiom_l As*mbly wouid be formeii from appointed dele.
gates of each ethnic group. lt would have siiictlv limired
powere and ould only rsch decisions by consenius. Thus
the basis would be laid for a complianl goverment which,
while formally independenl. would acl-ually be conrrolled
-elected -

by South Afri@. (/bir'.. p.60). This objective

been abandoned bv Sourh Africa

4.
5.

has

account of these talks and of all negotiatiom

1976 can be found in Namibio: the tbcts, 6p.cit.
Se Chapter lU.
b_il_ed

6.
't.
8.

srill not

Ibd. p.60.
Surity Council. S/126J6, l0 April 1978. A more

Namibi4: the Facts, op.cit., p.72uN Seuriry Council. S/l 28)7, 2c Aupsl | 978.

de_

sire

32 Bailahon (non-SWATFI

Khows Hochlan!)

Mpacho

701 Battalion
Air Force Base

Othet large bases include

Eenhona

32 Battalion (non-SWATF)

Olunu

l0l

Tsumkwe

203 Battalion

Baga

ni/ Buffalo

Nkongo

A ndara

Oshigamb(
Oshikango

{lnit

tavi
Tsumeb

Battalion

Opuwo

Otjovtulu

company,9l I Battalion

02 Banalion

Karuniab

company,9l I Battalion

Drimiopsis

compatry,9l I Battalion

Navaspoort

company,9l I Battalion

The

lftation of the following SWATF units

is

not known

I
I

SWA Signal Rgt.

SWA Engineq Rgt.
I SWA Mediuh Wotkshop
16 Engineq Sqn.
SWA Services School

I SllA howst Unit

company,9l I Battalion

70
71

APPENDIX B
IOUTH AFRICAN AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT IN SERVICE IN

INDEX

NAMIIIA

Aldft

Note: Certain units of the armed forces are designated bv numbers.

These are listed immediately below. at the beginnins of the Index.

Soue of mmufsdue/

liene

Miragc (lll and Fl )

lmpala Mk 2

France

Canbcr18

U.K.

bckhccd C-l30and Ll0O

Transll C-l 60
Douglas C47

France

SE-3 l3 and SE-316 Atouette

SA-330 Puma
SA-321 LSuper Frelon

France
France
France

Cessna I85
AM.3CH Bosbok and Atlas Kudu

U.S.
U.S.

I
2

Unit 23,49.
SAlnfantryBattalion 19.
32 Battalion 22,23,31,54-56, 58.
4l Battalion 3l -32.

Italy
u.s.
u.s.

SOUTH.AFRICAN ARMY

Angola, South African attacks on Chapter VIamy South African, numbers in Namibia 3, 9, I I

13,19,32,42,48,6243.

Souce of hanufactue/

liene

Rl Asgult rifle
R4 Assult rifle
Bren light machine qun

MAC lighr machineiun

Vickers machine eunBrowning,30 & 5b machine sun
Uzi sub.machine gun
60mm & 80mm mortar
ul0mm grenade huncher
Grenades and mines
I06mm Recoilless rifle
Milan anri-tank missile

Belgium
Israel
U.K.
Belgium
U.K.
U.S./Belgium
lsrael
France
U.S.

Belgium/France/UK
U.S. / Israel
France / F.R.G.

Centurion tank
Panhard AMI 245

UJ(.

G5 | 55mm field howitzer

l4omm field gun
90mm field gun

U.S.
U.K.

Unimog troop caftier

Magirus Deulz hqw vehicle
Land Rover
J"up
Ratel armoured personnel carrier

F.R.C.
F.R.C.
U.K.
u.s.

Tactiel comunications
Air @mmunitions

France

31.
Battalion 32.
Special Police 26,32.
12,

Grootfontein 8, I l.
Mpacha 11,43.
Ondangua 8, I l, 47, 48, 55.

Canada

ux.

sA.

UK/F.R.G./lsrael
France/Nethqlands
[4ng distance and microwave colms . UJ(.
Radar
U.K.

IN

Rundu I l.

l,

Home Guard 26, 27, 32, 33, 49.

Intelligence, South African military 22.
Kaokoland

r*ruits

31.

conscription 38.
Kamngo
tribal police 26.
Battalion 30.

Walvis Bay 8, I

rsruits

bases

WEAPONS AND EQI-JIPMEM

W@pons

Tlearts and Minds'Campaign 50-5 l

Herero

air force, South African in Namibia 6, 20-21, 43, Appendix B

/ ltaly

Ruacana I I

FNLA 12,22.

54 Paratroop Battalion 55.

/ F.R.G.

APPENDIX C
SERVICE IN NAMIBIA

SWA Speialist

19.

Windhoek 8, I l.
air force, SWATF 35.

Spaial Constables 32.

consription 38.

Area Force Units, (seealso Commndos) 20,35,39.

Koevoel 24,27,50-

Baster

Marines

Commando 31.
Battalion 32.
lols-ryana, South African attacks on Chapter VI, 56ff.
Buffalo Unit see -?2 Banalion.
Bushmen 51,58.
trackers 23,49.
Battalion 29, 30, 3 I , 32, 58.

mercenaries lO, 22, 24, 43, 54, 57-58.

military bases and installations.
South African in Namibia 7,8,
6l -{2, Appendix A.
Andara I l.
Bagani 22.

Cape Corps, South

Africa 30.

Caprivi

Ballalion 31.
conecripti(,n 3ll.
Citizen [.(trce 7, lt, 10, 13, 20,22,27,21J, 3S,45, 63.
Coloured

r4ruits

31.
Battalion 32.

Units) 7, lO, 12,2j,45,63.

companypolice 26,47.
oonscription, Jee rational sen ic e counter-insurgency forces 20, 24.
rccruits 31.
Battalion 31.

8,10,13,47.

Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) Chapter VU.

equipment, military, used in Namibia Appendix C.
aircraft 6, 7, I l, 20-2t, 48, 52, 54, 5i, Appendix B.
amoured cars 6, 10,21 ,48, 57.

helicoptem 7. q, 21. 24. 48. 49, 5 2, 54.

horses 23.
jeeps 24.

motorcycles 23.
nuclear warheads 56.
tanks 57.

Katima

Mulilo

8, 31,45.

Mpacha 8,11,31.
Ngwezi I I.
Ogongo 48.
Okahandja I l.
Okalongo 48.
Omboloka 43.
Omega I l,51.

Omupindi

Ondangu

l.

10, I 1,48.

Ostrivello 23.

Outjo

10.

Rehoboth 31.

Damam

artillery 21,48,56.
dogs 23.

Caprivi 7,10.
Eenhana 22,44.
Grootfontein lO, 11,22.

Omaruru I l.

conscrjption 39.
Commandos (see a/so Area I'btce
command structure 16.

consription 39.
defence spending, in Namibia

19-

Ruacana 10Rundu I 1,22.

Swakopmund 7.
Tsumkwe 5 l.

Bay

8, 10, I

Mushala gang

56,57.

Walvis

l,

39.

Windhoek 7, 8, I l, 35.
military sectors 19.
Municipal Police 25,26Nama

recruits 31.
Battalion 32.

conrription

39.

national service, for Namibians 27-28,38ff.

national servicemen, South African 9, 12, 13,

20,22,23,2"t-28,51.

navy, South African I

l,

9.

73

Qvuhinha ye Kaokiland.
Ovambo
Spocial Conslables 26, 32.

tribal police 26.

HomeGuard 26,27,32.
Battalion 30, J2.
conscription 38.
Pemanent F orce 20, 22, 23, 35.
police bases, South African in Namibia 24,33,47.
police, numbers in Namibia 33. Table 4.
Police Reserve I 2, 25.
Railway Police 25.

Rrconnaissance Commandos 23, 24, 2'1, 58.

Regiment Suidwes-Afrika 6. 7.
Reserye Police I 2, 25.
San see Eushmen.

Srcurity Police 25.

South African Defence Force (SADF), move into Namibia g.
South_African Police, in Namibia 9, I 2, 24, 25, 2g, 2S _30, 43, 6 l SWA Command 16, 18.
SWA Police (SWAP) t8. 24. 25. 28, 35lf, 63.

SWATerritory Force (SWATF)

numbers

of

33fi63, Tabte3.

32-

originsof 13, I8, 19,32.

Special Co_nstables (see also Sprcial
Special Police 26.
Special Task Force 27.

Appendix A.

police) 32,33,49.

sprcial units 22,24.

support forces 22.

tribal amies (see a/so und.er names of ethnic groups) Anpter IV passim,
bantustans, South African 3O-3 l.
tribal police (seealso Home Gwrd) 26,32.
Tswana

rruits

31.

Battalitrn 32.

UNITA r2, 22_23,43,55. 56.6t.

UNTAG Chapter

Vll.

Zambia, South African attacks on Chapter

74

VI, 56ff.

A Selected List of
IDAF PUBLICATIONS

fl.50
NAMIBIA - THE FACTS
by lDAF Research, lnformation and Publications Department.
(198O,1Oopp illust.l.
, gives a detailed account of the exploitation of a country and its
people, from its early colonization by the Germans to its present illegBl occu-

pation by South Africa".

- THE LEVELLER

THE SUN WILL RISE

f1.20

Statement from the Dock by Southern African Political Prisoners

Edited by Mary Benson
lrrvired and enlarged 1 981 , SOpp illust.l

'tlh arc Namibians and not South Africans. We do not now, and will not in
thl future, recognise your right to govern us, to make larnn for us in which we
hlw no say; to treat our country as if it were your property and us as if you
warc our maste6".
- Extract from Herrnan Toivo Ja Toivo's statement;

SWAPO. he was sentenced

hland.

in 1968 to 20

a founder member of
years imprisonment on Robben

FACT PAPERS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA produord lnreuhrly rnd drl wlth toplcel lrrrc and .vents in Southem

Alrbr. Thry hav. t.t.nd.rd prlot ol 60p, md rrr

ayalleble on itanding order,

THE APARTHEID WAR MACHINE The Strensth

And

Deployment Of The South African Armed Forces.

Frct Pepor No.8 by IDAF Research, lnformation and Publications Department.
(1980,76pp illust.)
Companion paper to No. 10: "A crisply informative pamphlet which maintains or surpass$ the high standard of this series".
NEW STATESMAN

REMEMBER KASSINGA - And Other Papers On Political Prisonen

And Detainees ln Namibia.
Fact Paper No. 9. by IDAF Research, lnforrnation and Publications Depertment,
{1

981 , 52pp).

political repression in Namibia under South African occupotlon,

and includes first-hand accounts of the detention and torture suffered by
Namibian men and women arrested for their support of the national llbrrirlon
movement, swAPo.
Describes

Availablo from
lnternational Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Afrlcr, Putrllcntlont l)rlrt
I 04 Newgete Stroet, London ECI A 7AP.

PRINTED BY HYLTON ALCOCK & DAVE NEAL.I ONIX)N IgIII