Numbers 32 & 33 / 2020–2021
Journal of Indological Studies
(New title for Studies in the History of Indian Thought)
Articles
Masato F UJII, Soma and Surā: The Sautrāman.ı̄ in the Vedic Kingship Rituals . . . . . . 1
Andrey K LEBANOV, In search of the earliest commentary on mahākāvya:
The Laghut.ı̄kā of Prakāśavars.a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Yasuhiro O KAZAKI, Nas..ta in the Rhythms of the Saṅgı̄taratnākara
— Some Difficulties in Its Interpretation — . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Kiyotaka YOSHIMIZU, Prabhākara and Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent
on Vedic enjoinment (niyoga) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Prabhākara and Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent
on Vedic enjoinment (niyoga)
Kiyotaka YOSHIMIZU
1.
2.
3.
Introduction
Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent
How is a sense of duty evoked by “svargakāmo yajeta”?
3.1 The distinction between the enjoined person (niyojya) and the agent
(kart) of sacrifice
3.2 Prabhākara’s opponent who adheres to Bādari
3.3 The implication of a sacrifice’s subservience to its result in “svargakāmo yajeta” (Prabhākara)
3.4 Action as the binding factor (anubandha) of enjoinment (traditional
Mīmāṃsā and Prabhākara)
3.5 Eligible person (adhikārin) as another kind of binding factor of
enjoinment (Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent)
4. Two kinds of the directive on the eligibility (adhikāracodanā) for a fixed
(nitya) sacrifice, “svargakāmo yajeta” and “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta”
5. How differently do “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta” and “svargakāmo yajeta”
operate?
5.1 Defensive motivation to hold a fixed sacrifice after “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta”
(traditional Mīmāṃsā)
5.2 The operation of “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta” as a categorical imperative and
its analogical application to “svargakāmo yajeta” (Jayanta’s
Prābhākara opponent)
5.3 Incorporation (upādāna) of the utility of a sacrifice for the sake of the
accomplishment of enjoinment (niyogasiddhi) (Prabhākara)
6. Does Prabhākara uphold a defensive motivation to hold a fixed sacrifice?
6.1 Prajāpativrata
6.2 Prabhākara on the Prajāpativrata
6.3 Religious debt (ṇa) and fixed sacrifices
7. Concluding remarks
7.1 Two modes of eligibility for a fixed sacrifice: nityādhikāra and
kāmādhikāra
7.2 Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent’s deviation from Prabhākara
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Journal of Indological Studies, Nos. 32 & 33 (2020–2021)
Introduction
In his criticism of the Prābhākara theory on how the Vedic injunction (vidhi)
urges one to hold 1 a sacrifice through its operation called enjoinment (niyoga),
Prajñākaragupta (ca. 750–810), 2 the author of the Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkārabhāṣya (PVA), collects eleven alternative definitions of niyoga maintained by
contemporaneous Prābhākara scholars. 3 In the Prakaraṇapañcikā (PrP),
however, Śālikanātha says nothing about these definitions of niyoga. After
Śālikanātha’s authority was established in the Prābhākara school, these
definitions seem to have almost been forgotten both by the Prābhākara and
other opponent schools. 4 Prajñākaragupta, who most probably preceded
Śālikanātha chronologically, 5 provides valuable materials on them. His
explanations of the alternative definitions, however, are far from satisfactory.
Bhaṭṭajayanta (henceforth, Jayanta), 6 a Naiyāyika active at the later half
of the ninth century in Kashmir, is renowned for collecting a large number of
materials on lost philosophical works in his major work, Nyāyamañjarī (NM).
He was also highly influenced by Mīmāṃsā in formulating his theories of
language and scripture. In the chapter titled “Śabdaparīkṣā” (examination of
scripture), he outlines the Bhāṭṭa theory of bhāvanā and the Prābhākara theory
1
By “hold a sacrifice” (yajate), I mean a sacrificer (yajamāna)’s performance of a sacrifice
in contrast to a priest (tvij)’s “executing a sacrifice” (yajati). A sacrificer, paying sacrificial
fees, employs some priests to make them perform their parts of rituals.
2
Ono 2000: xi. Franco (2019) proposes that Prajñākaragupta’s terminus ante quem should
be assumed later than 810 because of the recent revision of the dates of Vidyānanda, a Jaina
who quotes the PVA. Inami (2021: n.1) also refers to the dates of Vidyānanda and points out
that Bhaṭṭajayanta quotes PVAS, 325,24, in NM I, 196,1–2: ekam evedaṃ saṃvidrūpaṃ
harṣaviṣādādyanekākāravivartaṃ paśyāmaḥ. tatra yatheṣṭaṃ saṃjñāḥ kriyantām.
3
See PVAO 28,12–19 (vv. 83–86).
4
Vidyānanda exceptionally quotes many portions from Prajñākaragupta’s digressions on
niyoga and bhāvanā in his Aṣṭasahasrī. They are collected and presented in Ono (2000: 89–
94). Among these portions, Vidyānanda includes the alternative definitions of niyoga (vv.
87–103) and two tetralemmas for their classification (vv. 104–105) (see Ono 2000: 89–90,
no. 14). Vidyānanda explicitly mentions the number of alternative definitions as eleven in:
so ’yam ekādaśaprakāro ’pi niyogo vicāryamāṇo bādhyate (Ono 2000: 90,22–23).
5
Verpoorten (2018: 3) assumes that Śālikanātha’s dates range from the end of the 8th to the
9th century. Cummins (2020: n. 107) notes that Udayana refers to Śālikanātha using the
epithet “Mīmāṃsaka from Bengal” (gauḍamīmāṃsaka) in Nyāyakusumāñjali (NKus) 253,8.
Śālikanātha is referred to by Vācaspatimiśra (the later half of the 10th century, see footnote
133). It might be the case that Jayanta and Śālikanātha did not know each other because they
were approximately contemporaries and lived far away from each other.
6
In his drama, Āgamaḍambara (ĀḌ), the author of the NM calls himself “bhaṭṭajayanta” in
prose (32,15; 122,17) and “jayanta” in verse (148,9; 228,20). In his commentary on the NM,
Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga (NMG), Cakradhara calls the author of the NM “jayanta” in
verse (NMG 1,9). For further information about the appellation “bhaṭṭajayanta” alias
“jayanta,” see Marui 2014: 23, n.1.
Prabhākara and Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent (Kiyotaka YOSHIMIZU)
93
of niyoga in order to refute them from his thoroughly utilitarian perspective that
regards the expected result (phala) as the sole incentive to take action following
an injunction. 7 In his explanation of the Prābhākara theory of niyoga, Jayanta
does not refer to Śālikanātha. 8 Instead, he records the older tenets discussed in
the Prābhākara school before Śālikanātha as he mentions the dichotomy
indicated in Prajñākaragupta’s alternative definitions of niyoga, namely
whether the essence of niyoga lies in incitement (preraṇā) or duty (kārya).
Comparing the theory of niyoga by Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent with that of
Prabhākara in his Bhatī (Bh.), the present article elucidates how the
Prābhākara school deviated from their founder, Prabhākara, in the theory of
practice before Śālikanātha’s innovation. It also reexamines what is required to
do as a duty in carrying out a Vedic enjoinment (niyoga).
2.
Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent
According to the Prābhākara opponent in the NM, the enjoinment (niyoga)
issued from a directive (codanā), the fundamental injunction of a sacrifice such
as “One who desires heaven ought to hold a sacrifice” (svargakāmo yajeta),9
incites one to take action evoking the awareness of duty, “I am enjoined to do
this” (niyukto ’ham atra). According to the Prābhākaras, this niyoga is what
Pāṇini calls vidhi as the central meaning of an exhortative suffix such as the
optative (lIṄ). 10 The niyoga revealed in the Vedic injunction is the norm
(dharma) that cannot be known by other means of knowledge. 11 Under these
Cf. NM II, 122,17–18: evaṃ hi yasya kasyāpi pravarteta sa ājñayā/ na ceha bālonmattādivacanāt phalavarjitāt // “Thus, indeed, under whosever command one may work, one
never [works] unrewarded being ordered by a child, a madman, and so on in this world.”
8
Cummins (2020: 205) summarizes Śālikanātha’s innovation of the theory of niyoga in two
points: (i) configuration of the apūrva as the object of obligation (kārya) distinguished from
the physical action of a sacrifice; (ii) hierarchical incorporation of the concept of bhāvanā as
subordinate to the apūrva. Both points are absent in what Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent
expounds upon in NM II, 104–121. Concerning apūrva, Jayanta refers to Kumārila’s concept
of the temporal apūrva as a sort of potency (śakti) and points out that the Prābhākara
opponent cannot resort to this concept in NM II, 126,10–14. Jayanta remarks that the
opponent metaphorically calls niyoga “apūrva” and “dharma” in NM II, 126,12: bhavanto
hy apūrvaśabdena dharmaśabdena ca niyogam evopacaranti. This remark may refer to
Prabhākara’s use of the term “apūrva” (Yoshimizu 1997: 96–99; Cummins 2020: 226–227)
in the traditional sense of the non-temporal apūrva (i.e., unprecedented or unique form of a
sacrifice; see footnote 41; Yoshimizu 2000).
9
In the Śabdaparīkṣā, how to interpret “svargakāmo yajeta” is discussed since NM II, 77,6.
10
NM II, 105,2–7. Cf. Aṣṭādhyāyī (A) 3.3.161: vidhi[-nimantraṇa-āmantraṇa-adhīṣṭa-saṃpraśna-prārthaneṣu] liṅ; 162: loṭ ca; 163: [praiṣa-atisarga-prāptakāleṣu] ktyāś ca.
11
NM II, 109,14–15: liṅartho hi niyogo vākyārthaḥ. sa eva dharmaḥ. sa ca na pramāṇāntaragamya iti.
7
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presuppositions, Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent proceeds to explain how the
same niyoga, the meaning of lIṄ, operates as an inciter (preraka) and turns out
to be the duty (kārya) to be performed. After rejecting a criticism that one thing
cannot have two operations, the opponent distinguishes the exhortative
operation of a word (śābda) and its further effect (ārtha) caused by this
operation.
NM II, 110,6–8: kathaṃ dvairūpyam asya śabdo vadatīti cet, maivam.
prerakatvam eva śabdārthaḥ, ārthaṃ tu kāryatvam. yato vidhir
evānuṣṭheyatayāvagamyate “ācāryājñāṃ karomi” “rājājñāṃ karomi” iti.
[Question:] How can the word [lIṄ] express a dual form of this (niyoga)?
[Answer:] Not so. The incitement (prerakatva) is the meaning of the word
(śabdārtha), whereas the [consciousness that] this is [my] duty (kāryatva)
is its further effect (ārtha) because one understands that an injunction is to
be carried out in the following manner: “I carry out the teacher’s
command,” and “I carry out the king’s command.”
When an enjoinment (niyoga) evokes one’s sense of duty, one cannot perform it
without grasping its scope (viṣaya). In other words, accomplishing an
enjoinment requires one to exert a particular form of physical activity through
one’s body. 12 When two people act as an enjoiner (niyokt) and an enjoined
(niyojya), there must be a scope (viṣaya), a certain action that the former
requires the latter to do. 13 The awareness that triggers this action is the sense of
duty (kārya), which is a further effect (ārtha) caused by the incitement
(preraṇā) that has directly been issued from the optative suffix as its meaning
(śabdārtha).
Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent also refers to other scholars (anye) who
assume a reverse relation between both forms of enjoinment, namely
incitement and duty: the main form of the enjoinment expressed by an
injunction is the sense of duty, whereas incitement is indirectly assumed for the
sake of the accomplishment of the duty.
NM II, 110,9–11: na hy ājñā ghaṭādivat svarūpeṇa kartuṃ śakyā, api tu viṣayadvārakaṃ
tatsaṃpādanam. “kamaṇḍaluṃ bibhhi” ity ācāryeṇājñaptaḥ kamaṇḍaluṃ bhtvācāryājñāṃ
ktāṃ manyate. “One cannot, indeed, perform a command in its own form, like [making] a
pot. One can accomplish it through its scope. For example, [a pupil] who was commanded
by his teacher, ‘bring a jar!’, thinks that he has carried out his teacher’s command by
bringing a jar.”
13
Prajñākaragupta also takes this triadic relationship for granted when he criticizes the
theory of niyoga. Cf. PVAO 16,15–17,4: introduction; 17,5–21: on niyojya; 18,1–20,14: on
viṣaya; 26,13–26,18: on niyojaka (=niyokt); 26,19–28,8: on the relationship among the
three; 28,9–10: conclusion.
12
Prabhākara and Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent (Kiyotaka YOSHIMIZU)
95
NM II, 110,16–20: anye tu śābdaṃ kāryatvaṃ niyogasya prerakatvaṃ tv
arthād ity ācakṣate. anuṣṭheyatā hi tasya nijaṃ rūpam. svasiddhaye sa tu
niyojyaṃ niyuṃjānaḥ preraka ity ucyate.
In contrast, others declare [the term] “enjoinment” (niyoga) directly to
mean duty and indirectly incitement. This is because its own form is that it
ought to be performed, whereas it is called “inciter” as it enjoins the
enjoined person for the sake of its accomplishment.
This alternative relation between incitement and duty is assumed on the side of
the enjoined person (niyojya), whereas the first is assumed on the side of the
enjoiner (niyokt), that is, the Vedic scripture. As incitement and the sense of
duty are inseparable from each other in both cases, one of them is indirectly
known when the other is directly known from the injunction. Therefore, this
opponent states that his position has no necessity to assume two distinct entities
for the two forms of enjoinment, incitement and duty, unlike the Bhāṭṭas. The
latter assume two kinds of bhāvanā, the verbal force of actualization
(śabdabhāvanā) and the intentional force of actualization (arthabhāvanā), on
the side of the inciting word and the side of the incited person, respectively. 14
Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent claims that his theory of niyoga is superior to
the Bhāṭṭa theory of bhāvanā in terms of the Mīmāṃsā principle of parsimony,
the simplicity of assumption (kalpanālāghava).
3.
How is a sense of duty evoked by “svargakāmo yajeta”?
3.1
The distinction between the enjoined person (niyojya) and the agent
(kart) of sacrifice
Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent distinguishes the enjoined person (niyojya) from
the agent (kart) of sacrifice, stating that one who has listened to an injunction
first becomes aware of being enjoined and then becomes the agent of action.
NM II, 106,14–16: “yajeta” iti śrute “niyukto ’ham” iti prathamam
avagacchati. tato yajate. tenāyam ādyaḥ saṃbandhaḥ. pāścātyas tu kriyāNM II, 110,20–111,2: tad idaṃ kāryatvam (corr. -tvaṃ) aparityaktaprerakabhāvam
asyāvagamyate. prerakatvaṃ cāparityaktakāryabhāvam ity anyatarad atra śābdaṃ rūpam
(corr. rūpaṃ), anyatarac cārthaṃ rūpam iti na bhāṭṭair ivāsmābhiḥ pratyaye gurur bhāra
āropitaḥ. “Thus, the duty of carrying out that (enjoinment) is known to be inseparable from
its inciting power. In contrast, the incitement [of the enjoinment is known] to be inseparable
from the necessity to carry it out as duty. One of these (dual forms) is directly expressed [by
the injunction], whereas the other is indirectly known [from the former]. Therefore, we do
not impose a heavy burden on the cognition [of the Vedic injunction] as the Bhāṭṭas do [by
assuming the verbal and the intentional forces of actualization (see NM II, 97,12–13)].”
14
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Journal of Indological Studies, Nos. 32 & 33 (2020–2021)
kartsaṃbandhaḥ.
Having listened to [an enjoinment] “one ought to hold a sacrifice,” one
first becomes aware that “I am enjoined” and then holds the sacrifice.
Therefore, this relationship [between the incitement and the incited person
(NM II, 106,12: praiṣapraiṣyasaṃbandha) 15] occurs first. The relationship
between the action and the agent occurs later.
Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent explains this distinction by comparing the
operation of the causative suffix (ṆiC) with that of the optative suffix (lIṄ) in a
sentence. In a sentence with a causative verb, “X causes Y to act (kārayati),”
the object Y automatically begins to act (pravtta) as an agent (kart) when a
causative agent (prayojaka) X operates on Y because X operates on Y’s
physical body. A causal relation can exist between two inanimate beings: for
example, a magnet causes a piece of iron to stick to it. By contrast, in a
sentence with an optative or imperative verb, “One ought to act (kuryāt)” or
“Act! (kuru),” the enjoined one does not begin to act immediately after the
enjoiner gives a command to act, but the former begins to act only after having
noticed the obligation to follow the latter’s command. The latter operates on the
former’s consciousness as an informant (jñāpaka). 16
3.2
Prabhākara’s opponent who adheres to Bādari
At first glance, this distinction appears to be obvious and unproblematic.
However, it can be traced back to Prabhākara forming a critical topic argued in
the Bh. on the Svargakāmādhikaraṇa, that is, Mīmāṃsāsūtra (MmS) 6.1.1–3. 17
This section discusses whether the sacrificial action (yāga) is expressed as the
means to attain what is called “heaven” (svarga) in the directive “svargakāmo
Cf. NM II, 105,7: anya evāyaṃ kriyākartsaṃbandhāt praiṣapraiṣyasaṃbandhaḥ. “This
relationship between the incitement and the incited person is totally different from the
relationship between an action and its agent.”
16
NM II, 107,8–11: na pratītibhedāt. anyā hi “karotu” “kuryāt” iti pratītiḥ, anyā ca
“karoti” “kārayati” iti pratītiḥ. prayojakavyāpāro hi ṇijarthaḥ, jñāpakavyāpāras tu liṅarthaḥ. pravttakriyāviṣayaś ca prayojakavyāpāro ṇijarthaḥ, iha tu tadviparītaḥ. “[To the
objection that enjoinment is a sort of causative operation, the Prābhākara replies:] No,
because cognition is different. Indeed, the cognition in ‘Act!’ and ‘Y ought to act’ is different
from the cognition in ‘Y acts’ and ‘X causes Y to act,’ because what the causative suffix
expresses is the operation of a causative agent (prayojaka), whereas what the optative suffix
expresses is the operation of an informant (jñāpaka). [In the former,] the causative suffix
expresses that the operation pertains to an action that is activated. In the latter, however, in
contrast, [the operation pertains to an action that has not been activated yet.]”
17
Jayanta summarizes the arguments about this critical topic in NM II, 79,5–20.
15
Prabhākara and Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent (Kiyotaka YOSHIMIZU)
97
yajeta.” 18 Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent can be said to follow Prabhākara in
considering the enjoined person (niyojya) the agent of a special kind of
cognition, and not an agent of physical action, because Prabhākara rejected his
opponent’s view that the person eligible for a sacrifice (adhikārin/adhikta) is
nothing other than the agent (kart) of that sacrifice. 19
Bh., pt. 5, 14,1–5: nanu ca tatrabhavanto vaiyākaraṇāḥ kecit kartāram
evādhiktaṃ manyante, yo yasmin karttayāvagamyate sa tatrādhikta iti
vadantaḥ. nādhikāro nāma kaścid arthāntarabhūtaḥ. … ayam evāsau
bādaripakṣaḥ.
Some honorable people acquainted with grammar think that the person
eligible [to hold a sacrifice] is nothing other than the agent [of the
sacrifice]. They state that one who is recognized as the agent of an action
is eligible for the action. There is no eligibility [for a sacrifice] that is
different from [being the agent of the sacrifice]. … This is precisely
Bādari’s view. 20
Prabhākara says this opponent to be an adherent to Bādari, an ancient
Mīmāṃsā scholar. The third Adhyāya of the MmS deals with how to
exegetically determine that a ritual element is subservient (śeṣa) because of
being beneficial to another element (parārtha). 21 MmS 3.1.3 records Bādari’s
view that a subservient element is restricted to a substance (dravya), its quality
(guṇa), and a preparatory action (saṃskāra). In his commentary on MmS 3.1.3,
Śabarasvāmin (henceforth, Śabara) adds that Bādari also held the sacrificial
action (yāga) not to be subservient to its result (phala) because it should be
performed for its own sake. 22 In MmS 3.1.4, this view of Bādari is immediate18
See footnote 127; Yoshimizu 1991 and Yoshimizu 1997: 212–225.
Prajñākaragupta records that his Prābhākara opponent distinguishes between adhikārin
and kart in PVAO 28,1–2: : athāpi na karttvenāsau preryate, kiṃ tv adhikāritvenaiva. na hy
akurvan kartā bhavati, adhikāritvaṃ tu yogyatayā. “[Opponent:] Or, [one who is enjoined
(niyojya)] is not incited [by the Vedic injunction to perform the action] as the agent, but only
as the person eligible [to perform the action] because, before performing an action, one
cannot be the agent, but can only be the person eligible for the action by virtue of suitability.”
However, Prajñākaragupta does not seem to have noticed this topic’s significance in the
theory of niyoga because he trivializes this critical topic by accusing the opponent of his use
of the expression “suitability” (yogyatā) (PVAO 28,2–8).
20
Cf. Yoshimizu 1997: 160, n. 32.
21
MmS 3.1.1: athātaḥ śeṣalakṣaṇam; 2: śeṣaḥ parārthatvāt.
22
ŚBh 660,3–4: bādarir ācāryo ’tra (i.e., MmS 3.1.3: dravyaguṇasaṃskāreṣu bādariḥ)
dravyaguṇasaṃskāreṣv eva śeṣaśabda iti mene, na yāgaphalapuruṣeṣu; ŚBh 661,4–5:
tasmād yāgo na śeṣabhūtaḥ kasyacid arthasya; ŚBh 661,1–3: sa hi puruṣārthaḥ, yad anyad
dravyādi, tat tadarthaṃ tasya śeṣabhūtam. sa tu na kiṃcid abhinirvartayituṃ kriyate. “As it
(i.e., the sacrifice) [directly] benefits a human being. The other elements, substance, and so
19
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Journal of Indological Studies, Nos. 32 & 33 (2020–2021)
ly refuted by Jaimini, who holds the sacrificial action to be subservient to its
result. 23 Both Śabara and Prabhākara agree with Jaimini, refuting Bādari. 24
Prabhākara also calls his opponent “acquainted with grammar”
(vaiyākaraṇa), probably in the honorific plural. This may be because in the Bh.
on MmS 3.1.3, the opponent reinforces Bādari’s view by applying the
grammarians’ theory of kāraka (action-participant).
Bh., pt. 4, 638,5–639,1: kiṃ ca kartviśeṣaṇam cātra svargaśabdaḥ (corr.
svarga(kāma)śabdaḥ), 25 na kartviśeṣaṇam īpsitatamaṃ bhavati “rājapuruṣaṃ paśye”tivat. ato na “svargaṃ kuryād” iti niyogaviṣayatā śakyate
pratipattum.
[Opponent:] Moreover, the word “svarga” in this (injunction) specifies the
agent (kart) [expressed by the personal ending of the verb “yajeta”].
What specifies an agent is not that which [the agent] most desires to attain
(īpsitatama), unlike [that which specifies an object (karman) such as the
king in the phrase] “Look at the servant of the king!” Therefore, one
cannot understand [the directive “svargakāmo yajeta” to state that heaven
becomes] the scope of enjoinment in such a manner as “One ought to
accomplish heaven.”
on, are subsidiary to that (sacrifice) because they are aimed at it. By contrast, that (sacrifice)
is never performed for the sake of producing anything else [including its result (phala)]”;
ŚBh 661,6–7: yaḥ svargaṃ kāmayate sa yāgaṃ kuryād ity etāvac chabdenopadiśyate,
nātmanaḥ parasya veti. svargaṃ pratīcchāmātreṇa svargakāma iti bhavati. “What is taught
by the words [of codanā] is that one who desires heaven ought to hold a sacrifice, and not
whether [heaven] belongs to oneself or someone else. It is thereby meant that one becomes
‘one who desires heaven’ only by virtue of the desire for heaven.”
23
MmS 3.1.4: karmāṇy api jaiminiḥ, phalārthatvāt.
24
Bṛh., pt. 4, 640,5–6 (on MmS 3.1.3): tasmāt sūktaṃ dravyaguṇasaṃskāreṣu bādarir (corr.
-iḥ) iti (opponent); 645,1–2 (on MmS 3.1.6): tasmāt sūktaṃ sūtratrayaṃ (i.e., MmS 3.1.4–6)
jaimineḥ (proponent); 960,4–5 (on MmS 4.1.2): nanu bādariṇāpi viniyoga evāsāv
upanyastaḥ. ata evāsau nirākṛtaḥ; 978,2–3 (on MmS 4.1.21): ata eva bādarer eṣā bhrāntir
(corr. -iḥ) dravyaguṇasaṃskāreṣv eva śeṣatvam iti. See Yoshimizu 1994a: IV and n. 64;
Yoshimizu 1997: 109–110, 121, 200–202, 283–295.
Ignoring the fact that Prabhākara repeatedly criticizes Bādari in the Bh., K. S.
Ramaswami Sastri (1956: xvi–xxv) insists that Śabara and Kumārila follow Jaimini whereas
Prabhākara opposes Jaimini and follows Bādari. He thereby anachronistically projects the
sectarian conflict between the Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara from medieval times into ancient
times. Kataoka (2011: 19–20) agrees with Ramaswami Sastri’s forced demarcation of
Mīmāṃsā scholars into two lineages from ancient times, the followers of Bādari (Prābhākara
School) and the followers of Jaimini (Bhāṭṭa School), reproducing the table of this
oversimplified pair of lineages (Ramaswami Sastri 1956: xxv) with his own chronological
dates of scholars.
25
juvimalāpañcikā (P), pt. 4, 638,20: svargaśabdaḥ; cf. Yoshimizu 1997: 290. n. 174.
Prabhākara and Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent (Kiyotaka YOSHIMIZU)
99
Kārakas are the six kinds of factors that participate in the formation of an
action. Among the kārakas, the object (karman) desired by the agent (kart) to
attain through action is expressed by a case suffix in the accusative. 26 For
example, in the phrase “rājapuruṣaṃ paśya” (Look at the servant of the king!),
the servant (puruṣa) is the object to be seen by the recipient of this order.
However, the king (rājan), who specifies this servant, also deserves to be
seen. 27 By contrast, in “svargakāmo yajeta,” the personal ending “ta” of the
verb “yajeta” is an expression referring to the agent of the sacrificial action, 28
whereas the noun “svargakāmaḥ,” which means “one who has heaven as an
object of desire,” ends in the nominative to specify this agent, without denoting
a particular kāraka. 29 As a component of a Bahuvrīhi compound, 30 moreover,
the word “svarga” merely contributes toward specifying the agent of the action
denoted by the verb “yajeta,” but it has nothing to do with specifying the object
of that action. Heaven is not expressed as something to be attained by action.
Based on this argument about kārakas, 31 Prabhākara’s opponent in the
Svargakāmādhikaraṇa differentiates the agent of the sacrificial action from the
agent of accomplishing heaven, and he asserts that “one who desires heaven”
would not become the former if heaven were the object to be accomplished.
Bh., pt. 5, 9,3–5: svarge ca sādhye svargasiddhau svargakāmasya karttvam na yāgasiddhau. na cānyatra vyāptasyākhyātāntaragatayā saṅkhyayā yogo bhavati. yathā pacatīti paṭhataḥ.
If heaven were the object to be accomplished, then one who desires
heaven becomes the agent of the accomplishment of heaven, but not the
accomplishment of sacrifice. [The agent] who is occupied with one action
is not connected with the number of a finite verb that expresses another
action, for example, one who reads [is not connected with the number of
the agent expressed by another finite verb] “He cooks.” 32
A 1.4.49: kartur īpsitatamaṃ karma; 2.3.1: anabhihite; 2: karmaṇi dvitīyā.
P, pt. 4, 639,5: yathā rājapuruṣaṃ paśyeti karmaviśeṣaṇaṃ rājā darśanenepṣito bhavati.
28
A 3.4.67: kartari [kt]; 69: laḥ [karmaṇi ca bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ]; 77: lasya; 78:
[tip-tas-jhi=sip-thas-tha=mip-vas-mas=]ta-[ātām-jha=thās-āthām-dhvam=iṭ-vahi-mahiṅ].
Cf. Yoshimizu 2012: n. 36.
29
A 2.3.46: prātipadikārthaliṅgaparimāṇavacanamātre prathamā.
30
A 2.2.23: śeṣo bahuvrīhiḥ; 24: anekam anyapadārthe.
31
Cf. P, pt. 4, 638,22–639,4; Yoshimizu 1997: 290, n. 175.
32
A predecessor of the opponent who holds the eligible person to be the agent of the
sacrificial action, not the agent of accomplishing heaven, is found in ŚBh 2097,5–7 (on
MmS 11.1.1): nanu ca naivātra svargaḥ phalaṃ śrūyate. svargakāmapadena tāvat
puruṣo ’bhidhīyate. yajetety anenāpi yāganirvttiḥ. tayor vākyena saṃbandhaḥ. kenedānīṃ
phalam ucyate. “[Opponent:] In this (directive ‘svargakāmo yajeta’), heaven is never
26
27
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To refute this “grammarian” opponent who adhered to Bādari, Prabhākara had
to make his theory of niyoga compatible with Jaimini’s view that the directive
“svargakāmo yajeta” is testimony to the fact that sacrifice is the means to attain
heaven and heaven is the purpose to be attained by sacrifice.
3.3
The implication of a sacrifice’s subservience to its result in “svargakāmo yajeta” (Prabhākara)
Despite their common differentiation between the enjoined person and the
agent of sacrifice, Prabhākara and Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent differ in their
ideas on how the enjoined person’s sense of duty is evoked by the directive
“svargakāmo yajeta.” In the Bh. on MmS 3.1.3–4, as mentioned above,
Prabhākara agrees with Jaimini refuting Bādari. In the Svargakāmādhikaraṇa,
he integrates the sacrificial action’s subservience to its result into his theory of
how the Veda urges human beings to hold the sacrifice. He criticizes the
adherent to Bādari as inevitably falling into circularity and dissolves this
circularity by considering that one’s awareness of being enjoined to an action is
based on the action’s relationship with the object of desire (iṣṭasaṃbandha). 33
Bh., pt. 5, 37,4–38,3: nanu ca liṅādibhyo ’nuṣṭhā(corr. -a-)nāvagatir
bhaviṣyati kim atrādhikāraḥ kariṣyati. kasya liṅādayo ’nuṣṭhānaṃ
jñāpayantīti (corr. -nti iti). nanu ca kartarīty uktam. ayuktam uktam, itaretarāśrayaprasaṅgād (corr. -āt) ity uktam. tathā ca kartur niyogo ’narthaka
iti. yadi hi niyogāt karttvaṃ karttve ca niyoga itī(corr: iti i-)taretarāśrayāpattiḥ. tasmān niyogād eva karttvam avagantavyam. niyojyāvagatis
tv anyata (corr. -taḥ) eva. sā ceyam iṣṭasaṃbandhād ity uktam.
[Opponent:] Once one may understand [a duty to] act through [the
exhortative verbal endings in] the optative and so on (A), what use might
the eligibility have [with regard to acting]? [Proponent:] We ask whom
[the exhortative verbal endings in] the optative and so on let understand [a
duty to] act. [Opponent:] We answer: The agent of the action (B).
[Proponent:] You incorrectly answered because you fall into circularity,
and enjoinment is meaningless for an agent. If [you say in (A)] one
becomes an agent because of being enjoined and [in (B)] an enjoinment
pertains to one who has already been an agent, then you fall into
expressed as the result [of sacrificial action]. The word ‘one who desires heaven’ denotes a
human being, and the word ‘ought to hold a sacrifice’ denotes the performance of sacrificial
action. They are syntactically related to each other. Now, which (word) could express the
result [of the sacrifice]? ” See Yoshimizu 1997: 163, n. 38.
33
See Yoshimizu 1997: 176–177, 221, 369–370; Cummins 2020: n. 50.
Prabhākara and Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent (Kiyotaka YOSHIMIZU)
101
circularity. 34 Therefore, it must be the case that one becomes the agent of
action only because of being enjoined, whereas one becomes aware of
being enjoined through another (factor). We say that this (awareness)
occurs through [the action’s] relationship with the object of desire.
Prabhākara does not transform “svargakāmo yajeta” into “svargam yāgena
bhāvayet” as Śabara did to secure the relationship between the sacrificial action
and heaven as a means and the purpose to be accomplished by it. 35 Instead of
this transformation, Prabhākara asserts that “svargakāmaḥ” and “yajeta” can be
syntactically connected (ekavākyatā) as a pair of words that denotes the
enjoined person (niyojya) and the scope (viṣaya) of the same enjoinment
(niyoga) only when the object of desire, heaven, can be accomplished through
sacrificial action. In other words, the relationship between the enjoined person
and the scope of the same enjoinment implies that the sacrificial action is a
means and heaven is its purpose.
Bh., pt. 5, 42,3–9: kāmyamānatvena svargaḥ puruṣaṃ viśiṇaṣṭīty uktam.
bhāvārthe ca niyoga ity etad apy uktam. seyaṃ niyoganiyojyaviṣayatayaikavākyatā. na vāyathārthatva (corr. -tve) ekavākyatā saṃbhavati,
niyogasiddhiś ca vākyārthaḥ. tatra tāvad yadi yāgasyaiva kartavyatā na
niyojyārtho ’nveti niyoge. atha kāmaḥ, ananvito viṣayaḥ syāt niyojyena.
tataś caikaniyogāvagatiḥ pīḍyeta. yāgaprādhānye cokto doṣaḥ. tasmāt
kāmapradhānatayaivai(corr. -va e-)kaniyogasaṃbandhaḥ.
[Proponent: In “one who desires heaven” (svargakāmaḥ)], it is stated that
heaven qualifies the [enjoined] person in the capacity of the object of
desire. [In “ought to hold a sacrifice” (yajeta)], it is also stated that there is
an enjoinment to perform the meaning of the verbal stem. The syntactic
connection (ekavākyatā) among these (i.e., the optative suffix lIṄ, the
noun “svargakāma,” and the verbal root “yaj-”) [comes to be established]
when they respectively refer to enjoinment, the enjoined person, and the
scope [of enjoinment]. However, if [“svargakāma” and “yaj-”] do not
express their meanings as they are [in their mutual relationship] (ayathārthatve), they share no syntactic connection. Moreover, the meaning of
this injunction is the accomplishment of enjoinment (niyogasiddhi).
Between these (i.e., the sacrifice and the object of desire), first, if only the
sacrifice is to be done, the enjoined person would not be associated with
enjoinment. Second, if [only] the object of desire (i.e., heaven) [is to be
34
35
Cf. P, pt. 5, 37,25–26; Yoshimizu 1997: 370, n. 336.
ŚBh 375,7–8: svargaṃ bhāvayet; 375,10–11: kena bhāvayet svargam, yāgādineti.
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brought about], the scope (i.e., a sacrifice) would not be associated with
the enjoined person. Then, the cognition of a unitary enjoinment
(ekaniyoga) would be damaged. Moreover, the flaw in the case wherein
the sacrifice is primary has already been mentioned. 36 Therefore, [the
enjoined person and the scope] are related to the same enjoinment only in
such a manner that the object of desire is primary. 37
According to Prabhākara, hearing the directive “svargakāmo yajeta,” one who
desires heaven becomes eligible to hold the sacrifice (adhikārin) feeling that
one is enjoined (niyojya), or in other words, being aware that it is one’s duty to
hold a sacrifice. Contemplating the sacrifice one is enjoined to hold, one comes
to realize that one can attain heaven through that. This realization is enabled by
the syntactic connection (ekavākyatā) of “svargakāmaḥ” with “yajeta.” After a
brief analysis, Prabhākara concludes that this syntactical connection is
established only when the sacrifice is thought subservient to heaven. Based on
this understanding of “svargakāmo yajeta,” Prabhākara argues with his
opponent who adheres to Bādari identifying the eligible person with the agent
(kart) of the sacrifice: One who is aware of being enjoined (niyojya), knowing
that the sacrificial action is the means of attaining heaven, understands that one
can carry out the enjoinment only through holding the sacrifice. Therefore, one
indirectly becomes aware of oneself as the agent of the sacrifice. 38
3.4 Action as the binding factor (anubandha) of enjoinment (traditional
Mīmāṃsā and Prabhākara)
Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent, however, does not see the need for the directive
“svargakāmo yajeta” to imply that the sacrificial action is the means to attain
heaven, because he only intends to secure the direct transition from the
injunction’s incitement to the enjoined person’s awareness of duty. This is seen
in his declaration that enjoinment (niyoga) has two binding factors (anu-
36
This may refer to the opponent’s circularity argument mentioned in Bh., pt. 5, 37,4–38,3.
This argument of ekavākyatā is related to Prabhākara’s theory of sentence-meaning
(anvitābhidhāna), as indicated in Bh., pt. 5, 43,1–6. See Yoshimizu 1997: 222–223; 377–
381; Cummins (2020: 223–224).
38
Bh., pt. 5, 35,7–8: kena voktaṃ yāge kattvam iti. yāge tv adhikāraḥ[,] tatsiddhyarthaṃ
cārthāt karttvam. “Who would say that [one who has heard ‘svargakāmo yajeta’ directly
realizes that] one is the agent of sacrifice? Instead, [what is directly brought to knowledge is]
the eligibility for sacrifice. For the sake of its accomplishment, it is indirectly [brought to
knowledge] that one is the agent of sacrifice.”
We may say that this assumption is based on arthāpatti. See P, pt. 4, 966,23: yasyādhikāraḥ śrūyate tasyādhikārānyathānupapattyā tatkarttā kalpyate.
37
Prabhākara and Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent (Kiyotaka YOSHIMIZU)
103
bandhas). The term anubandha appears in MmS 2.2.1. 39
MmS 2.2.1: śabdāntare karmabhedaḥ ktānubandhatvāt.
For each word [of action, i.e., each verb], the sacrificial action is
distinguished because [each injunction] finishes binding [exhortation to an
action by a verb].
The second Adhyāya of the MmS mainly argues on how to distinguish one
sacrifice from another exegetically. MmS 2.2.1 provides an essential criterion
that the finite verb in each injunction indicates a particular ritual action. For
example, in the Jyotiṣṭoma, the basic type of soma sacrifice, the injunction
“somena yajeta” enjoins one to perform the primary offering of soma-juice to
deities. Apart from this, there are other rituals such as the subsidiary offering
(homa) of ghee and the giving (dāna) of the sacrificial fees (dakṣiṇās). The
former is expressed by the verb “juhoti,” the latter by “dadāti.” 40 MmS 2.2.1
claims that each of these verbs expresses a unit of action distinguished from
one another. The reason for this claim is ktānubandha, which means that the
verb in each injunction operates to “bind” the scope of each exhortation to an
action so that it does not extend to the scope of the verbs in other injunctions,
as each verb expresses a particular form of action by its verbal root. In his
commentary on MmS 2.2.1, Śabara explains that yajati, juhoti, and dadāti each
express the duty to perform (kartavyatā) a particular action qualified by a group
of action-participants (kārakagrāma) without depending on other verbs. 41
39
See Yoshimizu 1997: 79, n. 94; Cummins 2020: 212.
ŚBh 461,6–7: asti jyotiṣṭomas tatra śrūyate, “somena yajeta,” “dākṣiṇāni juhoti,”
“hiraṇyam ātreyāya dadātī”ti. For the homa of ghee to be offered before distributing
dakṣiṇās, see Caland & Henry 1907: 289. For the giving of a piece of gold to a Brahmin of
the gotra of Atri, see Caland & Henry 1907: 293.
41
ŚBh 464,4–466,1: brūmaḥ. pratiśabdam apūrvabheda iti, śabdāntare karmabhedaḥ
ktānubandhatvāt, yajetety anena kevalasya yāgasya kartavyatocyate, na tu juhotiśabdābhihitasya dadātiśabdābhihitasya vā, śabdāntaratvāt. “We reply as follows: For each word
(i.e., each verb), there is a unique form (apūrva)* [of action]. The sacrificial action is
distinguished for each word because [each verb] finishes binding [enjoinment to an action].
The verb yajeta alone expresses that a sacrificial action (yāga) should be performed. It does
not express that [an offering (homa)] expressed by juhoti or [a giving (dāna)] expressed by
dadāti [should be performed], because these verbs are different”; ŚBh 466,13–14: dadātir hi
svena kārakagrāmeṇa ktānubandho na yāgaṃ homaṃ vānubandham apekṣate. “The verb
dadāti finishes binding [enjoinment to a unique form of action] by a group of actionparticipants without relying on yāga or homa as its binding factor.”
* This is the original meaning of the term “apūrva” in Mīmāṃsā. See Yoshimizu 2000.
In MmS 2.1.5, Śabara expounds on the primary apūrva thought to bring about the result, i.e.,
the apūrva of the primary offering. Including MmS 2.1.5, the entire MmS 2.1 forms an
introduction to MmS 2.2.
40
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The exhortation bound to an action is called “bhāva” in MmS 2.1.1.
MmS 2.1.1: bhāvārthāḥ karmaśabdās tebhyaḥ kriyā pratīyetaiṣa hy artho
vidhīyate.
“Words for action have bhāva as their meaning. Activity should be
understood from them. For this is the end (artha) that is enjoined.” (transl.
by Ollett 2013: 226)
Śabara renames this bhāva as bhāvanā and considers it a sort of exhortation to
make an effort (*yatna). 42 He also states that the finite verb in an injunction
expresses a particular action by its former part (pūrvabhāga/pūrvāvayava), that
is, its verbal stem, and bhāva by its latter part (uttarabhāga/parabhāga), that is,
its ending. 43 Kumārila derives this term “bhāva” in the sense of bhāvanā by
adding the causative affix “ṆiC” and the Kt-suffix “aC” to the verbal root
“bhū.” 44 With the phrase ktānubandha, MmS 2.2.1 states that the finite verb
in an injunction determines the scope of exhortation, in other words, the extent
of work that the injunction requires one to carry out.
Commenting on MmS 2.2.1, Prabhākara follows Śabara stating that
anubandha serves (upakaroti) to determine (parijñāna) the extent (parimāṇa)
of the action required by an injunction. 45 He also defines anubandha as the
relationship of the enjoinment in an injunction with a form of action as its
scope (niyogasya viṣayitā), comparing anubandha with anvaya, the association
of the verb with other words that denote action-participants (kārakas) in a
ŚBh 375,2–5: yāgādiśabdāś caite bhāvaśabdāś ca, yajyādyarthaś cāto ’vagamyate,
bhāvayed iti ca. tathā yateta yathā kiṃcid bhavatīti. tenaite bhāvaśabdāḥ, dravyaguṇaśabdebhyo dravyaguṇapratyayo na bhāvanāyāḥ. atas te na bhāvaśabdā iti. “These [such as
yajeta, juhoti, dadāti] are the words [that express a particular action] such as yāga,
respectively, and [that express] bhāva [in common]. From these [words], one realizes the
meanings [of the verbal root], such as the sacrificial action (yaji), as well as [bhāva in the
form] ‘one ought to bring something into being,’ in other words, ‘one ought to make an
effort (yateta) to bring something into being.’ Therefore, these are the words [that express]
bhāva. However, from the words for a material thing and its quality, one realizes a material
thing or its quality, but not bhāvanā. Therefore, they are not the words [that express] bhāva.”
43
ŚBh 462,10–11: yajetety asya pūrvo bhāgo yajatyarthaṃ bravīti, uttaro bhāvayed iti; ŚBh
466,6: yady api paro bhāgo bhāvanāvacanaḥ sarveṣu samānaḥ, tathāpy ekaikasya
pūrvo ’vayavo ’nyaḥ.
44
TV 374,20–21; Yoshimizu 1997: 68–69, n. 62; Ollett 2013: 228. Kumārila analyzed
Śabara’s concept of bhāvanā expressed by the verbal ending in the optative into two kinds of
bhāvanā, “verbal force of actualization” (abhidhābhāvanā, i.e., śabdabhāvanā) and
“intentional force of actualization” (arthātmabhāvanā, i.e., arthabhāvanā) (TV 378,20–21),
and he considered the latter a universal form of endeavor expressed in all kinds of finite
verbs (see Ollett 2013: 237–240). For Kumārila’s complicated arguments about the
denotation of arthātmabhāvanā, see Yoshimizu 2012.
45
Bh., pt. 3, 403,6–7: parimāṇaparijñāne hi śāstrasyānubandha upakaroti.
42
Prabhākara and Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent (Kiyotaka YOSHIMIZU)
105
sentence. 46 Therefore, we may safely say that Prabhākara holds the enjoinment’s anubandha to be expressed by the grammatical relationship between the
verbal stem and the verbal ending within a finite verb; the former denotes a
form of action, whereas the latter the operation of exhortation.
3.5
Eligible person (adhikārin) as another kind of binding factor of
enjoinment (Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent)
Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent, however, claims that there are two kinds of
anubandha. He brings forth another kind in addition to the enjoinment’s scope
(viṣaya) expressed by a verb.
NM II, 111,4–7: sa cāyaṃ niyogaḥ pratīyamānaḥ “yajeta svargakāmaḥ”
ity anubandhadvayāvacchinnaḥ pratīyate. yajyādināsya viṣayānubandho
dhātunocyate. “svargakāmaḥ” ity adhikārānubandhaḥ padāntareṇārpyate.
tatra ca svargakāmasyaivādhikāro nirvahati.
When this enjoinment is cognized from [the injunction], “One who desires
heaven ought to hold a sacrifice,” it is cognized as distinguished by two
binding factors. Its scope as a binding factor is expressed by the verbal
root such as “yaj.” The eligibility as [another] binding factor is presented
by another word, “one who desires heaven.” In this case, eligibility
pertains only to one who desires heaven.
The other kind of anubandha is the person entitled to the sacrifice (adhikārin).
According to this opponent, the word “one who desires heaven” (svargakāmaḥ)
merely causes one to become reflexively aware of one’s desire in order to make
one aware of being exhorted to hold the sacrifice. The directive “svargakāmo
yajeta” can secure an adhikārin as a second anubandha if the listener who
desires heaven notices “I desire heaven” because this reflexive consciousness
enables one to realize, “I am enjoined to hold this sacrifice because I desire
heaven.” However, accordings to this opponent, if one feels a sense of duty as
soon as one becomes aware of one’s desire, it is unnecessary to be informed
that the sacrifice is the means (sādhana) to attain heaven. As a result, this
Bh., pt. 3, 406,13–14: ayam anayor viśeṣaḥ. kriyākārakaguṇa(corr. guṇi)guṇyaidamarthyasaṃbandhitānvaya ucyate. niyogasya viṣayitāpattir anubandhaḥ. “The distinction
between them (i.e., anvaya and anubandha) is as follows: What is called association
(anvaya) is that an action and its participants are related to each other so that a subsidiary
element operates subservient to the principal one. What is called binding factor (anubandha)
is that an enjoinment pertains to [an action] as its scope” (cf. Yoshimizu 1997: 80, n. 95).
Although this definition appears in the opponent’s discourse, Prabhākara does not reject it in
the proponent’s discourse that begins with Bh., pt. 3, 408,9.
46
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injunction causes blind obedience on the side of one who desires heaven.
NM II, 111,7–12: yadi bhāvārthasya svargaṃ prati sādhanatvam avagamyate, evaṃ tarhi svargakāmenaivāsau kto bhavatīti svargakāmapadānvaye prāktana eva mārgo ’numantavyaḥ, na punaḥ svargādiphalapradarśanapūrvakaṃ vidheḥ pravartakatvam asvātantryaprasaṅgāt. na
hīdśaṃ śāstrasya dainyam, yat phalaṃ vinā puṃsaḥ pravartayituṃ na
śaknotīti. anyathā “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta” ityādāv apravartakaṃ śāstraṃ
syāt.
If the meaning of the verbal stem were held as the means for heaven, then
one would have to accept only the previous way [of thinking] concerning
the association of the word “svargakāma” [with “yajeta”] inasmuch as
that (sacrifice) is performed only by one who desires heaven [as the result
of the sacrifice]. Inciting [the listener], however, the injunction [of a
sacrifice] does not need to indicate its result such as heaven in
advance—[otherwise, it] would become dependent [on reward]. Indeed,
the scripture [of Vedic sacrifice] is not so weak as to be unable to urge
human beings without [indicating] its result. Otherwise, the scripture such
as “One ought to hold a sacrifice as long as one is alive” would not urge
one to act.
In his commentary on the NM, 47 Cakradhara does not explain how to interpret
“the previous way” (prāktana eva mārgaḥ) that would have to be accepted
(anumantavya) if the meaning of the verbal stem, that is, the sacrificial action,
was held as the means for heaven. However, taking into account that Jayanta
criticized Kumārila’s theory of bhāvanā before this Prābhākara opponent
appears in the Śabdaparīkṣā, we may say that the opponent maintains that if the
sacrificial action were the means for attaining heaven, the concept of niyoga
would become no different from Kumārila’s view that the injunction’s “verbal
force of actualization” (śabdabhāvanā) exhorts one to exert one’s “intentional
force of actualization” (arthabhāvanā) to attain heaven through the sacrifice.
Exposing his sense of rivalry against the Bhāṭṭa school once again, 48 Jayanta’s
Prābhākara opponent refuses to hold the sacrifice as the means to attain the
object of desire.
In addition, Jayanta’s opponent asserts that the Vedic injunction has an
independent power (svātantriya) to urge the listener to hold a sacrifice without
indicating its reward. As a clear example of the injunction that has this power,
47
48
Cf. NMG 147–148.
See footnote 14.
Prabhākara and Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent (Kiyotaka YOSHIMIZU)
107
he quotes another injunction, “One ought to hold a sacrifice as long as one is
alive” (yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta).
In the Bh. on the Svargakāmādhikaraṇa (MmS 6.1.1–3), however,
Prabhākara never says that the eligible person (adhikārin) is a second
anubandha of enjoinment, 49 which sounds to be an obedient functionary who
mechanically carries out an order with no spontaneity. Instead, as mentioned
above, he explicitly states that one’s awareness of being enjoined to an action is
based on the action’s relationship with the object of desire (iṣṭasaṃbandha)
(Bh., pt. 5, 38,2–3). After this statement, Prabhākara is confronted with his
opponent’s question: “Then, how does one become aware of being enjoined
(niyojya) after hearing ‘yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta,’ which refers to nothing as the object
of desire?” 50 Instead of answering this question, Prabhākara counters that his
opponent’s view spoils the operation of “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta.”
Bh., pt. 5, 38,9–39,4: ayam ucyate. yāvajjīvam iti yāvacchabdo nānveti
kartviśeṣaṇapakṣe. kathaṃ, na yāvajjīvaṃ prayogaḥ saṃbhavati. phalārthino vītāyāṃ phalecchāyām (corr. -yāṃ) aprayogāt, ato balān
nimittatvam anveṣṭavyaṃ jīvanasya. tac cādhiktasaṃbandha upapadyate
na kartsaṃbandhe. kartsaṃbandhe hi yāvad evoktaṃ yajeteti tāvad eva
jīvatā yaṣṭavyam iti yāvacchabdānupapattir darśitā.
[The proponent] replies as follows: The word “as long as” (yāvad) does
not associate [with another word “yajeta”] in the [opponent’s] position that
[being alive (jīvana) in “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta” as well as heaven in
“svargakāmo yajeta”] specifies the agent [of the sacrifice]. [Opponent:]
Why? [Proponent: In the opponent’s position,] it becomes possible that
one does not hold a sacrifice as long as one is alive because one who
wished for a result does not hold the sacrifice if one’s desire for the result
has vanished (vīta). Therefore, it should necessarily be reaffirmed
(anveṣṭavya) that being alive is an occasion (nimitta) [to perform the
sacrifice]. That is established when it (i.e., being alive) is held to pertain to
an eligible person and not to the agent. In the latter case, it was
demonstrated [in MmS 2.4] that the word “as long as” fails to indicate that
In the PrP, Śālikanātha also applies the term anubandha only to the viṣaya of niyoga (PrP
388,18; 453,4; 454,12), not to adhikārin or niyojya. However, “anubandhadvaya” is used in
P, pt. 5, 110,20 (opponent).
50
Bh., pt. 5, 38,4: yady evaṃ yāvājjīvādiṣu katham. kathaṃ vātra na bhaviṣyati. siddhavadupadeśāj jīvanasya. “[Opponent: ] That being the case, how [does one’s awareness of
being enjoined (38,2: niyojyāvagati) occur] concerning ‘One ought to hold a sacrifice as long
as one is alive’? [Proponent:] Why will it not occur in this case? [Opponent: ] Because being
alive is mentioned as if already established.”
49
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one who is alive ought to hold a sacrifice insofar as the enjoinment to hold
the sacrifice is issued.
As mentioned before, Prabhākara’s opponent held the eligible person for a
sacrifice (adhikārin/adhikta) to be the same as the agent (kart) of the sacrifice
because what is expressed as the object to be accomplished in “svargakāmo
yajeta” is only the sacrificial action, not heaven. Prabhākara thinks it
theoretically possible that one who formerly desired heaven has now lost the
desire. In that case, “svargakāmo yajeta” cannot operate on such a person. Then,
because the eligible person referred to in “svargakāmo yajeta” is purported to
be the agent of the sacrifice, which is the same as the eligible person in
“yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta,” the operation of “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta” would be blocked. 51
In this criticism of the opponent’s position, Prabhākara takes it for granted
that one should continue to hold a sacrifice as long as one is alive following
“yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta” even if “svargakāmo yajeta” does not operate, because of
the difference of eligibility between these two injunctions. He suggests this by
briefly stating, “it should be reaffirmed (anveṣṭavya) that being alive is an
occasion (nimitta).” With this terse statement, he alludes to a preceding section
of MmS 2.4 in which, as we will discuss in the following section, it is argued
how the injunction “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta” renders the listener eligible to hold a
sacrifice independently of “svargakāmo yajeta.”
4. Two kinds of the directive on the eligibility (adhikāracodanā) for a
fixed (nitya) sacrifice, “svargakāmo yajeta” and “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta”
In the traditional exegesis of Mīmāṃsā, both “svargakāmo yajeta” 52 and
“yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta” 53 pertain to the same fixed (nitya) sacrifices––such as the
Agnihotra and the new and full moon sacrifices (darśapūrṇamāsau). 54 On the
According to Śālikanātha, Prabhākara assumes that the opponent comes to regard
“yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta” as dependent on “svargakāmo yajeta.” Cf. P, pt. 5, 39,10–12: yadi
jīvanaṃ kartviśeṣaṇaṃ bhavati tadā svargakāmādhikārānupraveśitā, nādhikārāntaram. na
ca phalārthitayā yāvajjīvaṃ prayogas saṃbhavati. “If being alive specifies the agent, [the
directive ‘yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta’] enters into the eligibility of one who desires heaven, but does
not form its own eligibility. Then it becomes possible that one does not hold the sacrifice
aiming at the result for one’s whole life.” Cf. Yoshimizu 1997: 372, n. 367.
52
For its relevant sources in the Vedic literature, see Yoshimizu 2004: n. 6.
53
For its relevant sources in the Vedic literature, see Yoshimizu 2004: n. 10.
54
ŚBh 623,3–4: bahvcabrāhmaṇe śrūyate, yāvajjīvam agnihotraṃ juhotīti (corr. -ti iti),
yāvajjīvaṃ darśapūrṇamāsābhyām yajeteti (corr. -ta iti). Kumārila confesses that the exact
source of these injunctions cannot be determined in the extant Brāhmaṇas of the gveda
(bahvcabrāhmaṇa). See TV 623,14–15: bahvcabrāhmaṇe ’dhvaryubrāhmaṇe vā śrūyata
iti nātīvābhiniveṣṭavyam “As [Śabara intends to say that the injunctions at issue] are revealed
in the Brāhmaṇas of the gveda or those of the Yajurveda, one should not be overscrupulous
51
Prabhākara and Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent (Kiyotaka YOSHIMIZU)
109
one hand, the result of all fixed sacrifices is determined as heaven (svarga), the
object commonly desired by all people, unlike the result of elective (kāmya)
sacrifices, 55 that is, things of worldly value such as cattle, a son, a long life,
and glory, because they vary according to one’s practical demand in the world.
On the other hand, Aryan people are obligated to hold them periodically, the
Agnihotra at every sunrise and sunset, the Darśapūrṇamāsau at every fortnight,
as long as they are alive. 56
As mentioned above, Prabhākara calls “being alive” (jīvana) in
“yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta” an occasion (nimitta) to hold fixed sacrifices. Śabara also
states, “being alive is an occasion, not a time” (ŚBh 627,2: jīvanaṃ nimittaṃ na
kālaḥ), in the ŚBh on MmS 2.4.2. The first section of MmS 2.4 discusses how
to perform a fixed sacrifice when one follows the injunction “yāvajjīvaṃ
yajeta.” It is examined whether one should repeat a series of ritual actions in
one session that continues during one’s lifetime or perform the series only once
at every session that repeatedly occurs during one’s lifetime. The opponent
argues the former position, whereas the proponent argues the latter. As a result
of an exegetic examination of this injunction, Śabara rejects the former and
concludes in favor of the latter, saying, “being alive is an occasion, not a time.”
The difference between both parties can be illustrated in the following table. 57
MmS
2.4.1–6
opponent
proponent
as long as one
is alive
the word
“yāvajjīvam”
the word
“yajeta”
karmadharma
(itikartavyatā)
kartdharma
(adhikāra)
vidhāna
(vidhi)
uddeśa
(nimitta)
uddeśa
(anuvāda)
vidhāna
(vidhi)
relation to
“svargakāmo
yajeta”
exegetic
ground
dependent
prakaraṇa
independent
śruti
Within each injunction of a sacrifice, Mīmāṃsakas find a combination of
two linguistic operations: uddeśa and vidhāna. Uddeśa refers to an object that
the enjoiner, the Veda, is talking about by an injunction. This referent is
selected from the objects already known to the enjoined person. Concerning the
[about their source]”; cf. Garge 1952: 125.
I translate the three types of sacrifice, nitya, naimittika, and kāmya, as “fixed,”
“occasional,” and “elective,” following Freschi & Pascucci (2021), which, however, does not
inquire into the relationship between “svargakāmo yajeta” and “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta.”
56
MmS 6.2.23–26 argues that the fixed sacrifice should not be continuously (sātatyena)
performed; MmS 6.2.27–28 argues that it should be periodically performed when the
prescribed time has come (āgate kāle).
57
MmS 2.4.1 (opponent): yāvajjīviko ’bhyāsaḥ karmadharmaḥ prakaraṇāt “[What is
expressed by ‘yāvajjīvam’ is] lifelong repetition as a property of the sacrifice, because of the
context”; MmS 2.4.2 (proponent): kartur vā śrutisaṃyogāt “[It is] rather [a property] of the
agent [than that of the sacrifice] because of the connection with the direct expression.”
55
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referent of uddeśa, vidhāna informs the enjoined person of something new to
be incorporated (upādeya) into the scene. The words that become the subject
and the predicate in a sentence are grammatically determined. By contrast, in
the Mīmāṃsā exegesis, any injunction has room for examining whether its
component words operate as uddeśa or vidhāna in association with other
injunctions, if any, which play the role of the presupposition for the injunction
at issue. Applying the terms of pragmatics, a division of linguistics, we may
consider uddeśa and vidhāna “topic” (sentential topic) and “comment.” 58
Śabara explains both positions as follows: 59 If the finite verb “yajeta”
reiterates (anuvāda) a sacrifice that has already been prescribed, as the
opponent insists, the remaining portion “yāvajjīvam” comes to express a
property of that sacrifice (karmadharma), in other words, it prescribes how that
sacrifice should be performed. That means: “yāvajjīvam” prescribes that the
sacrificial session one began should be performed so as to continue till the end
of one’s life. In that case, as the sacrifice consists of a limited number of rituals,
one comes to repeat (abhyāsa) the series of rituals during this life-long session.
In contrast, if the finite verb “yajeta” enjoins (vidhi) a sacrifice that has not
been prescribed yet, as the proponent insists, the remaining portion “yāvajjīvam”
comes to express a property of the sacrificer (kartdharma). In other words, it
58
Among the three kinds of the linguistic term “topic,” namely, sentential topic, discourse
topic (i.e., a summary of a discourse), and speaker’s topic (Brown & Yule 1983: 70–94), the
present article confines “topic” to sentential topic, which is paired with its comment in a
sentence. The sentential topic is what the speaker talks about in a sentence to give the hearer
a comment about it as new information. The speaker selects a topic to talk about among the
referents previously mentioned. Therefore, the topic and its comment in a sentence vary
according to the context of discourse. For example, adducing sentence (1) “Eva went to
Prague,” van Dijk presents two possibilities of topic-comment analysis: “‘Eva’ would be
assigned topic function if (1) would be the answer to a question like “Where is Eva?”,
whereas ‘someone went to Prague’ would be assigned Topic-value in (1) after a question like
“Who went to Prague?”, and ‘x=Eva’ would be assigned Comment-value” (van Dijk 1981:
180). For the “givenness” and the “newness” of information in discourse, see van Dijk 1981:
179–186 and Brown & Yule 1983: 177–182.
In my earlier articles (2003 and 2004), I awkwardly translated uddeśa in English as “the
aim of orientation.” Now I have corrected it to read as “topic,” as I did in my later ones
(2006 and 2014).
59
ŚBh 623,5–8: kathaṃ karmadharmo ’bhyāsaḥ, kathaṃ vā kartdharmo niyama iti. yadi
juhotir anuvādaḥ, yāvajjīvam iti vidhis tataḥ karmadharmo ’bhyāsaḥ, yadi viparītaṃ tataḥ
kartdharmo niyama iti. “[Question:] how is [‘yāvajjīvam’ proved to be] a property of the
sacrifice indicating repetition? How is [it proved to be] a property of the agent [presenting]
restriction? [Answer:] If ‘juhoti’ is a reiteration, and ‘yāvajjīvam’ expresses an injunction,
then [‘yāvajjīvam’ becomes] a property of the sacrifice indicating repetition. If, on the
contrary, [‘juhoti’ expresses an injunction,] then [‘yāvajjīvam’ becomes] a property of the
agent restricting [the agent].”
Prabhākara and Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent (Kiyotaka YOSHIMIZU)
111
restricts (niyama) the occasion (nimitta) in which one becomes the sacrificer. 60
That means: after one finishes a session of a fixed sacrifice, say the Agnihotra
or the new and full moon sacrifices, one becomes the sacrificer again on the
next occasion, namely during the next sunrise and sunset or the beginning of
the next fortnight, as long as one is alive. In short, according to the opponent,
“as long as one is alive” (yāvajjīvam) implies the repetition of rituals during
one long-term session. According to the proponent, in contrast, it expresses the
recurrence of the occasion for another session of the sacrifice.
The exegetic ground for the opponent’s and the proponent’s analysis of the
injunction “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta” lies in whether this injunction is thought to be
dependent on another injunction of the fixed sacrifice, “svargakāmo yajeta.”
According to the opponent, the finite verb in “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta” reiterates
(anuvāda) the sacrificial action that is already enjoined by “svargakāmo yajeta.”
In other words, “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta” is an injunction of a subsidiary element
that forms a part of the “manner of the performance” (itikartavyatā) of the
sacrifice one has begun with a desire to attain heaven. 61 Therefore, the
opponent’s mode of thinking is based on the context (prakaraṇa) in which
“svargakāmo yajeta” forms the core of a ritual corpus accompanied by other
injunctions, including “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta.” According to the proponent, in
contrast, the finite verb in “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta” newly prompts one to hold a
sacrifice on every periodic occasion. In this position, because “yāvajjīvaṃ
yajeta” works independently of “svargakāmo yajeta,” the proponent’s mode of
thinking is based on the direct expression (śruti) of “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta.”
Judging from the comparative assessment of exegetic criteria, one should give
śruti priority over prakaraṇa in view of the principle of parsimony. 62 In the
present case, the opponent has to assume the verb “yajeta” to refer to repetition
(abhyāsa) as its indirect meaning (lakṣaṇā) because the repetition of a series of
60
Kumārila enumerates five kinds of the ritual elements that “cannot be incorporated”
(anupādeya), that is, occasion (nimitta), place (deśa), time (kāla), result (phala), and the
object of purification (saṃskārya) in TV 212,20–21 and 615,17 (Yoshimizu 2003: 16).
61
TV 624,11–12: karmastho hi kathaṃbhāvas tadaṅgam abhikāṅkṣati / kālopadeśapakṣe ca
tat tathaivopapadyate // “The quest for ‘how’ (i.e., itikartavyatā) that is possessed by the
sacrifice [already enjoined by ‘svargakāmo yajeta’] requires its auxiliary. Therefore, if one
adopts the position that [‘yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta’] teaches the time [taken by the sacrificial
session already enjoined], the injunction at issue can be construed only in this way.”
62
MmS 3.3.14: śruti-liṅga-vākya-prakaraṇa-sthāna-samākhyānāṃ samavāye pāradaurbalyam arthaviprakarṣāt. “Among direct expression, indicatory mark, syntactical connection,
context, position, and appellation, when two of them pertain to the interpretation of the same
(phrase), the latter is weaker [than the former] because [the latter] is more remote from their
purpose.”
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rituals is required in one session that continues throughout one’s entire life.63
In contrast, the proponent does not need to seek recourse to lakṣaṇā because the
direct expression of the sacrificial action by “yajeta” is enough to let one
perform the series of rituals once for every opportunity on recurring dates. 64
In this section of the Bh., Prabhākara merely summarizes Śabara’s
commentary without adding his arguments. However, he explicitly poses a
question of whether “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta” is unified with or different from the
kāmyaśāstra, and answers this question by saying that it is a different text
(śāstrāntara) because it is a directive on eligibility (adhikāracodanā) and not a
subsidiary injunction of time (kālavidhi). 65 With this kāmyaśāstra, we may
safely say that he thinks of “the ritual corpus concerned with desire” in which
“svargakāmo yajeta” forms the core determining the eligibility for the sacrifice.
Therefore, accepting the traditional position of Mīmāṃsā, Prabhākara finds it
possible that as an original directive (codanā), “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta” urges one to
hold a sacrifice independently of the operation of “svargakāmo yajeta.”
5.
How differently do “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta” and “svargakāmo yajeta”
operate?
5.1 Defensive motivation to hold a fixed sacrifice after “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta”
(traditional Mīmāṃsā)
ŚBh 625,1–2: tad etat pradoṣaparisamāptam agnihotram anabhyasya, na śakyate yāvajjīvanakālena kartum “It is impossible to perform [a single session of the Agnihotra] for one’s
entire lifetime without repeating the Agnihotra that was completed [last] evening”; ŚBh
626,1–4: jīvanaparimitaḥ kālo yas tena parisamāpayitavyam ity arthād abhyāsaḥ, sa hi
kartavyatayā śrūyate, na cāsāv juhotiyajatibhyām ucyate, lakṣaṇayā tu gamyate. yāvajjīvaṃ
juhuyāt, yāvajjīvam abhyasyed iti “[In the opponent’s position,] repetition results from the
meaning [of the injunction] that one ought to complete [a session of the fixed sacrifice]
spending one’s whole life, because [according to the opponent] it is revealed [in this
injunction] as a manner of performance (kartavyatā = itikartavyatā). This [repetition] is not
directly expressed by [such verbs as] ‘juhoti’ and ‘yajati,’ but can be realized by their
indirect meaning in such a manner as ‘one ought to hold the sacrifice as long as one is alive,
in other words, one ought to repeat [the sacrifice] as long as one is alive.’”
64
ŚBh 626,4–627,1: yadīyaṃ vacanavyaktir asya vākyasya, yāvajjīvam ity anuvādo juhoti
yajatīti ca vidhānam, ity evaṃ yajatijuhotiśabdau svārthāv eva bhaviṣyataḥ, yāvajjīvaśabdo ’pi jīvanavacana eva, nābhyāsalakṣaṇo bhaviṣyatīti “If this statement (yāvajjīvaṃ
juhoti/yajeta) is paraphrased as follows: ‘yāvajjīvam’ operates as a reiteration [of occasion]
whereas ‘juhoti’ and ‘yajati’ operate as enjoinment, then the words ‘juhoti’ and ‘yajati’ come
to express only their own meanings whereas the word ‘yāvajjīvaṃ’ is retained to express
one’s state of being alive, and does not need to express repetition indirectly.”
65
Bh., pt. 3, 607,10–11: yāvajjīvam agnihotraṃ juhotīty atra cintyate kiṃ kāmyāc
chāstrāntaram utaikam (corr. -ntaraṃ uta ekam) iti; Bh., pt. 3, 609,18–19: atrocyate,
adhikāracodanaiṣā na kālavidhiḥ. ataś ca kāmyāc chāstrāntaram (corr. -yāt śāstrā-).
63
Prabhākara and Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent (Kiyotaka YOSHIMIZU)
113
In addressing how one should periodically hold a fixed sacrifice after
“yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta,” the first section of MmS 6.3 argues that one should
perform at least its primary action, that is, the offering of the primary oblation
for a deity, on each occasion. 66 To enable the fixed sacrifice to be performed
periodically, this section allows one to omit the subsidiary rituals that are
unnecessary for performing the primary action, if one happens to be unable to
do them.
The sole manuscript of the Bh. is preserved in Asiatic Society of
Bengal. 67 Unfortunately, it lacks the Bh. on MmS 6.3. However, S.
Subrahmanya Sastri, the editor of the fifth part of the Bh. with Śālikanātha’s
MmS 6.3.2: api vāpy ekadeśe syāt pradhāne hy arthanirvttir guṇamātram itarat
tadarthatvāt. “[Proponent: As far as a fixed sacrifice is concerned,] the performance of some
[and not all] subsidiary rituals suffices because [only] when the primary action is performed,
the purpose (i.e., the result) [of the sacrifice] is established. The others are merely subsidiary
because they exist for the sake of the former.” Śabara lists the primary offerings of the new
and full moon sacrifices, that is, āgneya (puroḍāśa), agnīṣomīya (puroḍāśa), upāṃśuyāja
(ājya), aindrāgna (puroḍāśa), and sāṃnāyya, in ŚBh 1282,4–5 on MmS 4.4.29.
Śabara presents his own interpretation of the final part of MmS 6.3.2, “guṇamātram
itarat tadarthatvāt,” in ŚBh 1408,5–1410,1: guṇamātraṃ sarvāṅgaprayogeṇa bhavati. ko
guṇaḥ. sāṅgāt svargābhinirvttiḥ, pradhānamātrād idam anyat phalam. “The mere secondary [result] occurs by the performance [of a fixed sacrifice] with all subsidiary rituals.
[Question:] What is the secondary [result]? [Answer:] The accomplishment of heaven results
from [a fixed sacrifice] with all subsidiary rituals. The following (i.e., the avoidance of
committing a doṣa to be mentioned in MmS 6.3.3) occurs as another result merely from the
primary action.” See Yoshimizu 2004: 205. This “another result,” to which Śabara says
heaven is secondary, may refer to the avoidance of committing a fault (doṣa), which will be
mentioned in MmS 6.3.3 (see section 5.1 of the present article). Therefore, we can say that
Śabara is open to accepting a defensive motivation to hold a fixed sacrifice following “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta.”
However, Śabara also paraphrases MmS 6.3.2 in its original sense at the end of his
commentary in ŚBh 1411,1–2: darśapūrṇamāsaśabdako ’gnihotraśabdakaś ca pradhānapadārtho ’nyāny aṅgāni tadarthānīti. “The word ‘the primary’ [in MmS 6.3.2] refers to [the
sacrificial action] called ‘the new and full moon sacrifices’ and ‘the Agnihotra.’ [The part of
MmS 6.3.2 ‘itarat tadarthatvāt’ says] that other rituals are beneficial to that (i.e., the primary
action).” In this paraphrase, the word “tadarthatva” of MmS 6.3.2 is said to indicate that
subsidiary rituals assist the primary action. Therefore, we may say that the phrase “pradhāne
hy arthanirvttiḥ” expresses the performance of the primary action as a necessary condition
for attaining heaven. It is in the same manner as the anvaya of the anvaya-vyatireka (logical
association and dissociation) between fire and smoke, “where there is fire, there is smoke;
where there is no fire, there is no smoke,” expresses fire as a necessary condition for smoke.
The sufficient condition for attaining heaven is the performance of the primary action of a
fixed sacrifice together with all subsidiary rituals (see footnote 124). Apart from Śabara, who
anticipates MmS 6.3.3 in commenting on 6.3.2, we may say that “pradhāne hy arthanirvttiḥ”
indicates that one needs to periodically perform the primary action of a fixed sacrifice to
attain heaven.
67
Society Collection Manuscripts, Coll. No. (Old): III.B.125; Coll. No. (New): s.c.908; cf.
Yoshimizu 1997: 50–51.
66
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commentary, juvimalāpañcikā (P), extracts Prabhākara’s passages quoted in
the P, using bold letters. According to these extracts, Prabhākara complies
with Śabara’s arguments summarizing the proponent’s position as follows:
Bh., pt. 5, 129,4–5: tasmād anapagatādhikārasya yathāśaktyanuṣṭhānam
anuṣṭhānavido manyante, evaṃ yathāśaktyanuṣṭhānaṃ nityeṣv asti.
Therefore, those acquainted with the performance [of sacrifices] think that
one whose eligibility is not deprived [despite accidental deficiencies]
should perform [fixed sacrifices] according to their competence. In this
way, as far as the fixed sacrifices are concerned, [everyone should]
perform the sacrificial action according to one’s competence.
Among the proponent’s sūtras of this section, MmS 6.3.3 adduces the reason
why one should hold a fixed sacrifice periodically: if one neglects to do that,
one will commit a fault (doṣa). 68
MmS 6.3.3: tadakarmaṇi ca doṣas tasmāt tato viśeṣaḥ syāt pradhānenābhisaṃbandhāt.
Moreover, [one would commit] a fault if one does not perform it (i.e., the
primary action). Therefore, this makes a difference [between the primary
and the subsidiary actions] because [the fault of negligence] pertains to the
primary action.
Explaining this “fault,” Śabara quotes a Vedic passage from the Taittirīyasaṃhitā (TS), which warns a sacrificer that he will fall from heaven in the
afterlife if he ignores holding the new and full moon sacrifices periodically in
the present life. 69 Therefore, traditional Mīmāṃsakas, including Śabara, find a
defensive motivation to hold a fixed sacrifice following “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta” in
the avoidance of committing a fault. However, in the edition by S.
Subrahmanya Sastri, Śālikanātha says nothing about MmS 6.3.3 in the P on
this section. Therefore, in this section, we may safely assume that Prabhākara
remains silent about the fault one would commit if one neglects to hold a fixed
sacrifice. This silence, however, cannot be used to judge whether Prabhākara
68
For rendering the Sanskrit “doṣa” in this context, I adopt “fault” because “fault” implies
the responsibility for a mistake as seen in the phrase “It is not my fault.”
69
ŚBh 1411,5–6: pradhānātikrame doṣaḥ śrūyate, “ava vā eṣa svargāl lokāc chidyate yo
darśapūrṇamāsayājī san paurṇamāsīm amāvāsyāṃ vātipātayed” (TS 2.2.5.4: …amāvāsyṃ
vā paurṇamāsm vātipādáyati) iti. “It is stated in the Veda that one incurs a fault if one
ignore the primary action: ‘He is cut off from the world of heaven who, being a sacrificer at
new and full moon, the sacrifice either at the new or the full moon omits’ (transl. by Keith
1914: part 1, 151).”
Prabhākara and Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent (Kiyotaka YOSHIMIZU)
115
upholds the defensive motivation to hold a fixed sacrifice. To judge this, we
need other evidence, which will be discussed later.
5.2
The operation of “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta” as a categorical imperative and
its analogical application to “svargakāmo yajeta” (Jayanta’s
Prābhākara opponent)
In contrast, Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent declares the directive “yāvajjīvaṃ
yajeta” operating by a categorical (namely, unconditional) imperative. He
claims that “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta” would fail to urge the listener to hold the
sacrifice if the sacrificial action were considered the means to attain the result
because “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta” does not mention its result at all.
NM II, 111,14–18: kiṃ “yāvajjīvaṃ” ityādicodanāḥ phalaśūnyā eva. om
ity ucyate. na hi vidhiḥ phalam ākāṅkṣati api tu niyojyaṃ viṣayaṃ ca
“kasya niyogaḥ, kutra niyogaḥ” iti. te ete ubhe apy ākāṅkṣe paripūrṇe.
tatra jīvato niyogaḥ, yāge ca niyoga iti. ataḥ paraṃ phalakalpanaṃ
puruṣabuddhiprabhavaṃ bhavati na śāstrīyam.
[Question:] Do the directives (codanās) that begin with “as long as one is
alive” say nothing about result at all? [Opponent:] We say yes. The
injunction [of a sacrifice] does not expect its result, but [expects only] the
enjoined person and its scope, “To whom does the enjoinment pertain?”
and “What does the enjoinment urge one to do?” [In the directive
“yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta,”] both expectations are satisfied in such a way that the
enjoinment “pertains to [any]one who is alive” and “[urges one to hold] a
sacrifice.” The additional assumption of its result originates from a human
being’s consciousness but not from scripture.
Despite no mention of a result, the injunction “One ought to hold a sacrifice as
long as one is alive” (yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta) can urge a listener to act because this
injunction is equipped with two binding factors (anubandhas) concerning its
enjoinment: it specifies the scope (viṣaya) of enjoinment as “the sacrificial
action” and the enjoined person (niyojya) as “one who is alive.” With this
limitation on both sides, the directive “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta” can evoke the sense
of duty to hold the sacrifice in the listener’s mind, despite the lack of
information on its result.
Considering the argument on anubandha in section 3.5 of the present
article, we may say that Jayanta’s opponent claims that, like “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta,”
the directive “svargakāmo yajeta” also categorically operates only by
specifying the two anubandhas, viṣaya and niyojya, without implying the
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hierarchical relationship between the sacrificial action and heaven. Without
implying the sacrifice’s subservience to heaven, “svargakāmo yajeta” only
means “insofar as one desires heaven, one ought to hold a sacrifice,” on the
close analogy with “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta,” which means “as long as one is alive,
one ought to hold a sacrifice.” In other words, Jayanta’s opponent holds
“desiring heaven” in “svargakāmo yajeta” to be the sufficient condition for
being enjoined precisely like “being alive” in “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta.”
That being the case, to make one feel obliged to hold the sacrifice, the
Vedic enjoinment in “svargakāmo yajeta” does not need to imply the
attainment of heaven through sacrifice. For securing the enjoined person
(niyojya) expressed in the directive “svargakāmo yajeta,” Jayanta’s Prābhākara
opponent approves of subjectively assuming heaven to be accomplished by the
sacrifice. Despite this approval, he denies that this injunction exhorts one to
perform a sacrifice as the means to attain heaven.
NM II, 111,18–112,4: kāmādhikāre tu niyojyataiva anyathā svargakāmasya nopapadyata iti svargasya sādhyatvam abhyupagatam, na punar
vidheḥ phalārthatvāt. ata eva na tatra vaidhī pravttiḥ lipsayaiva pravttatvāt. āha ca “tasya lipsārthalakṣaṇā” iti. sādhyasādhanabhāvapratipādanaparyavasito hi tatra vidhivyāpāraḥ, na prayogaparyavasita iti.
In the case of eligibility based on desire, it is acceptable that heaven
should be accomplished because otherwise, it becomes inexplicable that
one who desires heaven comes to be enjoined. However, this is not
because the injunction aims at accomplishing the result. Therefore, one’s
activity toward that (i.e., attaining heaven) is not based on the Veda
because one has taken this action only because of one’s longing (lipsā).
Besides, [MmS 4.1.2] states, “the longing for that [which affords delight]
is characterized by the purpose (arthalakṣaṇa).” Indeed, [MmS 4.1.2
states] that the injunction’s operation toward that (sacrifice) ends up letting
one know the means–purpose relationship [between the sacrifice and
heaven], but it does not end up letting one carry out [the sacrifice].”
“Otherwise, it becomes inexplicable” (anyathā nopapadyate) is an Indian
version of modus tollens (if A, then B, but non-B; therefore, non-A) used for
applying arthāpatti, the exegetical pramāṇa that derives what is logically
implied (P) in an established affair (Q). The opponent thinks as follows: If the
sacrifice were not the means to attain heaven (non-P), then one who desires
heaven would not become enjoined (niyojya); in other words, he would not
have a sense of duty to hold the sacrifice (non-Q). However, one who desires
Prabhākara and Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent (Kiyotaka YOSHIMIZU)
117
heaven must be the enjoined person as a binding factor (anubandha) of the
enjoinment of the sacrifice (Q). Therefore, the sacrifice can be assumed to be
the means to attain heaven (P). This reasoning by arthāpatti formally runs as
follows: if non-P, then non-Q, but Q; therefore, P.
However, the opponent does not accept that the injunction “svargakāmo
yajeta” linguistically 70 implies that sacrifice is the means to attain heaven. 71
Rather, he concludes that this injunction does not urge one to hold the sacrifice
for the sake of heaven. The opponent’s conclusion, “the injunction’s operation
toward that (sacrifice) ends up letting one know the means–purpose
relationship [between the sacrifice and heaven], but it does not end up letting
one carry out [the sacrifice]” (sādhyasādhanabhāvapratipādanaparyavasito hi
tatra vidhivyāpāraḥ, na prayogaparyavasitaḥ), appears to utilize Prabhākara’s
way of speaking at the beginning of his apologetic defense to justify the Veda’s
having the section of a black magic called Śyena, a sort of one-day soma
sacrifice (ekāha), which one holds intending to kill one’s enemy. 72
Bh., pt. 1, 38,8–39,6: kartavyatāviṣayo niyogaḥ, na punaḥ kartavyatām
āha. kathaṃ tarhi “kārye ’rthe prāmāṇyaṃ vedasya” ity uktam. yuktam,
tadviṣayatvān niyogasya. ko ’yaṃ viṣayaviṣayibhāvaḥ. yasminn ayaṃ
puruṣo niyujyate sa tadviṣayaḥ. tasmān naiva vidhiḥ kartavyatām āha,
viṣayatayā tūpādatte.
Enjoinment has [a sacrifice] to be performed within its scope, but does not
70
In this context, I use “linguistic” in the sense of “relating to language,” not “relating to the
studies of language (i.e., linguistics).”
71
Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent distinguishes arthāpatti, a sort of propositional reasoning
based on logical implication (for Kumārila’s theory of arthāpatti, see Yoshimizu 2020), from
linguistic implication, including what Prabhākara calls “upādāna” (see section 5.3 of the
present article). To make a concession to the Bhāṭṭa and other schools of utilitarianism, this
opponent may have had recourse to arthāpatti in NM II, 111,18–19 (cf. footnote 38),
claiming that the subservience of the sacrifice to heaven is subjectively assumed to be
necessary by human reasoning, but not indicated by the Vedic injunction. However, this
concession might lead to inconsistency because, in the Arthāpattiprakaraṇa of the NM,
Jayanta records his contemporary Prābhākara’s view that the outcome of arthāpatti is
directly derived from words (NM I, 124,5: tam arthaṃ śābdam eva pratijānate; see Graheli
2020: 173–174). Moreover, Mukulabhaṭṭa, a Kashmiri rhetorician contemporary with
Jayanta, dichotomizes word’s indirect meaning (lakṣaṇā) without metaphor (upacāra) into
upādāna and lakṣaṇa, in terms of whether the word retains its own meaning by implying
something else. To illustrate this upādāna, he adduces a word’s reference to an individual
(vyakter ākṣepaḥ) and a stock example of śrutārthāpatti, “Fat Devadatta does not eat during
the day [therefore, he eats at night].” See Abhidhāvttamātkā (AM) on vv. 2cd–4ab; Keating
2019: 51–52 and 201–202.
72
Āpastambaśrautasūtra (ĀpŚS) 22.4.12: śyenenābhicaran yajeta “One who curses [one’s
enemy] ought to hold the Śyena”; see Mylius 1972: 591–593; Yoshimizu 1994b: n. 10.
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say that [the sacrifice] should be performed. [Question:] Then why did you
say that the Veda is the means for knowing what should be done (Bh., pt.
1, 20,10: kārye ’rthe vedasya prāmāṇyam)? [Answer:] I rightfully said so
because enjoinment has [sacrifice] within its scope. [Question:] What is
this relationship between the scope and that which has it? [Answer:] When
a person is enjoined [by the Vedic injunction] to perform something, that
thing is the scope of the (enjoinment). Therefore, the injunction does not
say that [the sacrifice] should be performed, but incorporates it into its
scope.
In the basic position of Mīmāṃsā, the Vedic injunction of a sacrifice does not
urge the listener to desire its result. A human being who spontaneously desires
an object becomes inclined to hold the sacrifice after finding it promised in the
injunction as the reward for holding the sacrifice. Based on human being’s free
will, Śabara exempts the Veda from the responsibility of the killing caused by
holding the Śyena sacrifice, and he puts this responsibility on the person who
held the Śyena, with a desire to kill the enemy. 73 Prabhākara’s statement,
“Enjoinment has [a sacrifice] to be performed within its scope, but does not say
that [the sacrifice] should be performed” (kartavyatāviṣayo niyogaḥ, na punaḥ
kartavyatām āha), takes over this traditional apologetics. The scope (viṣaya) of
the Vedic injunction of the Śyena consists of how to perform the sacrifice so as
to bring death to someone else, but this injunction does not compel one to
resolve to kill one’s enemy. To put the Śyena into practice, one needs to decide
to kill the enemy. Therefore, one who has succeeded in killing one’s enemy by
holding the Śyena should be judged in keeping with the secular law in charge
of murder. As the injunction of the Śyena does not force one to hold the Śyena
(kartavyatām āha), one cannot shift the responsibility onto the Veda. 74
5.3
Incorporation (upādāna) of the utility of a sacrifice for the sake of the
accomplishment of enjoinment (niyogasiddhi) (Prabhākara)
Because Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent says nothing about how “svargakāmo
yajeta” indicates that the sacrifice is subservient to its result, whereas
ŚBhF 20,17–19: naiva śyenādayaḥ kartavyatayā vijñāyante. yo hi hiṃsitum icchet,
tasyāyam abhyupāya iti hi teṣām upadeśaḥ. “śyenenābhicaran yajeta” iti hi samāmananti,
na “abhicaritavyam” iti. “Das Śyena-Opfer usw. wird nicht als etwas zu Vollbringendes
aufgefaßt. Die Belehrung darüber erfolgt nämlich in dem Gedanken: ‘Wer zu schädigen
wünscht, für den ist dies ein Mittel.’ Denn es heißt ‘Wer bösen Zauber üben will, soll mit
dem Śyena-Opfer opfern’, aber (es heißt) nicht ‘Er soll bösen Zauber üben’” (transl. by
Frauwallner).
74
See Yoshimizu 1994b: 488–490.
73
Prabhākara and Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent (Kiyotaka YOSHIMIZU)
119
Prabhākara maintains that this subservience is implied by the syntactic
connection (ekavākyatā) in this injunction, the former agrees with the latter
only partially. They merely agree in denying the idea that the Veda urges one to
hold a sacrifice by provoking one’s desire. 75
In the passage quoted in the foregoing section 5.2 (NM II, 111,18–112,4),
Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent concludes that the Veda does not prompt one to
carry out (prayoga) the sacrifice as the means (sādhana) to attain the desired
result. To corroborate this, he adduces a part of MmS 4.1.2 that characterizes “a
ritual element beneficial to a human being” (puruṣārtha).
MmS 4.1.2: yasmin prītiḥ puruṣasya tasya lipsārthalakṣaṇāvibhaktatvāt.
[One’s] longing (lipsā) for that which affords delight to a human being is
characterized by the purpose (arthalakṣaṇa) because of its inseparability,
The grammatical subject of the main clause is “tasya lipsā,” whereas the
Bahuvrīhi “arthalakṣaṇā” is predicated on this subject. MmS 4.1.1 declares
that this chapter investigates whether the ritual at issue is classified as
puruṣārtha or kratvartha. 76 Quoting a part of MmS 4.1.2, “tasya lipsārthalakṣaṇā” (in NM II, 111,18–112,4), Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent claims that
the trigger for performing a sacrifice in expectation of a reward lies only in the
longing (lipsā) for the satisfaction of one’s desire, not in the instruction of the
Veda (vaidhī). This view appears to be supported by Śabara, who
paraphrases “tasya lipsārthalakṣaṇā” as follows:
ŚBh 1194,4: tasya lipsārthena ca bhavati, na śāstreṇa.
The longing (lipsā) for that [which affords delight to a human being]
occurs by [one’s] purpose (arthena), and not by scripture.
However, Prabhākara finds this paraphrase by Śabara unsatisfactory. Śabara
explains that the motivation to undertake an action that brings about delight
Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent makes the traditional apologetics about the Śyena in NM
II, 112,6–114,14. NM II, 112,9–10: upāyamātram asyopadiśyate śyenaḥ. “śyenaṃ kuru” iti
tu na vidhiḥ prabhavati, jighāṃsāyā eva tatra pravartakatvāt. “The Śyena is taught to the
one [who desires to murder (112,7: jighāṃsu)] only as a means. The injunction cannot [order
one] ‘Perform the Śyena!’ because only the intent to murder makes one perform it (the
Śyena).”
76
MmS 4.1.1: athātaḥ kratvarthapuruṣārthayor jijñāsā. For example, the primary action of
the sacrifice, that is, the offering of the primary oblation to a deity, is “beneficial to a human
being” (puruṣārtha) as it brings about the result desired by the sacrificer who holds the
sacrifice. Because all the remaining rituals directly or indirectly assist the primary offering to
bring about the result, they are, in principle, included in the group called “beneficial to a
sacrifice” (kratvartha).
75
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(prīti) comes from one’s desire to pursue a purpose (artha), but not from the
Vedic scripture (śāstra). Prabhākara thinks that without Vedic scripture, one
cannot imagine how desirable heaven is and how one can attain heaven.
Therefore, he revises Śabara’s words by assuming that this “scripture” (śāstra),
which Śabara says to have nothing to do with the fulfillment of human
desire, only means an injunction that expresses the hierarchical relation (i.e.,
subordination, śeṣa) by a case suffix, 77 in other words, an injunction of
application (viniyoga). This revision indicates Prabhākara’s view that the
directive “svargakāmo yajeta” does teach puruṣārtha by implying the
attainment of heaven as the result of the sacrifice. 78
Bh., pt.4, 957,6–958,4: “tasya lipsārthena ca bhavati, na śāstreṇa” iti
viruddham uktam. na śāstrād te svargaḥ sādhyatayā pratīyate, kartgāmitayā ca. saṃbandhaśāstram aṅgīktyaitad uktam. arthaś ca niyogasiddhiḥ tac copādānam ity uktam. nanu ca kratvarthatāpy upādānenaivoktā. viniyoge satīty uktam. arthād eva hi puruṣārtha iti viśeṣaḥ.
[Śabara’s] statement, “The longing for that [which brings delight to a
human being] occurs by purpose, and not by scripture,” sounds
contradictory. Without scripture, heaven would never be cognized as that
which is to be established and attained by the agent. In saying this,
[Śabara] took an injunction of relation (i.e., application, viniyoga) into
account. [In fact, he] states that the “purpose” (artha) [in MmS 4.1.2] is
the accomplishment of enjoinment, which also incorporates (upādāna) [a
sacrificial action’s being beneficial to a human being (puruṣārtha)].
[Question:] It was also stated that [a ritual element is proved to be]
beneficial to the sacrifice (kratvartha) through incorporation. 79 [Answer:]
It was so stated on the condition that [the injunction at issue has the
operation of] application (viniyoga). Indeed, the difference of being
beneficial to a human being [from being beneficial to the sacrifice] is that
the former is proved only through the purpose [in the sense of the
accomplishment of enjoinment (niyogasiddhi)]. 80
According to Prabhākara, the ultimate purpose (artha) that definitively
For example, “He sprinkles grains of rice” (vrīhīn prokṣati) indicates that the ritual of the
sprinkling of water contributes toward preparing a cake made of grains of rice through the
operation of the case suffix of “vrīhīn” in the accusative (cf. A 1.4.49: kartur īpsitatamaṃ
karma; 2.3.1: anabhihite; 2: karmaṇi dvitīyā).
78
P, pt. 4, 958,7–8: viniyogaśāstram abhipretyedam uktaṃ nādhikāraśāstram.
79
See Bh. on MmS 2.2.13–16; Yoshimizu 1997: 101–108; 195–198.
80
See Yoshimizu 1997: 131–140; 323–325; Cummins 2020: 219.
77
Prabhākara and Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent (Kiyotaka YOSHIMIZU)
121
characterizes the sacrificial action as beneficial to a human being (puruṣārtha)
is not the satisfaction of a human being’s desire, but rather the accomplishment
of enjoinment (niyogasiddhi), that is, the Veda’s desire. Without carrying out
the enjoinment issued by the Veda, one cannot attain the object mentioned in
the injunction, no matter how eagerly one desires it. The eternal Veda requires
people to maintain the sacrifice tradition, but one who has fulfilled this
requirement becomes fit to gain the desired result. 81
With the directive “svargakāmo yajeta,” the Veda enjoins one who desires
heaven to perform the duty to preserve the Vedic tradition through holding the
fixed sacrifice, implying the attainment of heaven by one who fulfilled this duty.
In the passage quoted above, Prabhākara states that this implication can be read
in this very injunction through its operation called “incorporation” (upādāna). 82
In the Mīmāṃsā exegesis, the verb “upa-ā-√dā” and the noun “upādāna,”
literally, “taking up,” were used in the sense that the priest who executes a
sacrifice brings a ritual element into a scene of the sacrifice following an
injunction (vidhi). 83 Applying upādāna as his technical term, Prabhākara
defines it as a “requirement of enjoinment” (niyogākṣepa), 84 by which an
injunction can indicate that a ritual element is adopted for the sake of
something else, even without resorting to a case suffix. According to
Prabhākara, as argued in section 3.3 of the present article, the relationship
between the enjoined person (niyojya) and the scope (viṣaya) of an enjoinment
implies that the sacrificial action is a means and heaven is its purpose.
81
Prabhākara compares the person enjoined by the Veda (niyojya), the eligible person
(adhikārin) for the sacrifice, to a minister who serves a king pursuing his own benefit in Bh.,
pt. 5,36,1–3: loke ’pi ca anyatrādhikto ’nyat sādhayati. rājakarmasv adhikto ’mātyas
svārthaṃ sādhayati. tatsiddhyarthaṃ tu rājakarmaṇi karttvam. “In the world, too, [it is
observed that] one who is eligible for a task accomplishes something else—[For example,] a
minister eligible for royal service seeks after his own profit. However, for attaining [the
minister’s own profit], he becomes an agent of royal service.” See Yoshimizu 1997: 171. It is
to be noted that the king and his minister are not on an equal footing because the former
holds complete hegemony over what the latter should do in royal service. Śālikanātha uses a
more straightforward simile comparing the Veda and the niyojya to a master (svāmin) and his
inborn slave (garbhadāsa) in PrP 443,22–24.
82
With the upādāna by an injunction, Prabhākara also thinks of incorporating subsidiary
elements for forming a ritual system. For Prabhākara’s concept of upādāna, see Yoshimizu
1994a: II, Yoshimizu 1997: 101–107 and 131–148, and Cummins 2020: 213–220.
83
For the use of the concept upādāna in the traditional Mīmāṃsā exegesis, see Yoshimizu
2003, in which I translated upādāna as “integration.”
84
Bh., pt. 4, 956,5–6: kim upādānaṃ nāma. niyogākṣepa upādānam. tatktaṃ ca
prokṣaṇādeḥ kratvarthatvam. viniyogāt punar vrīhyarthataiva. “What is incorporation?
Incorporation is a requirement of enjoinment. The sprinkling of water is proved to be
beneficial to the sacrifice through incorporation, but because of the application [by the case
suffix of ‘vrīhīn’] it is proved to be beneficial only to grains of rice.”
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Prabhākara holds this linguistic implication as a sort of upādāna that works in
“svargakāmo yajeta.” 85
Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent refers to an example of upādāna argued in
the traditional exegesis, 86 but does not state that the sacrificial action becomes
known as the means to attain heaven through upādāna in the directive
“svargakāmo yajeta.” In this respect, this opponent can be said to ignore
Prābhākara’s attempt to prove that the Veda implies the attainment of heaven
through the sacrifice by devising the concept upādāna. 87
6.
6.1
Does Prabhākara uphold a defensive motivation to hold a fixed
sacrifice?
Prajāpativrata
MmS 4.1.2 cannot be considered the only definition of puruṣārtha because the
next section (MmS 4.1.3–6) holds a different kind of action, one that is not
destined to afford delight (prīti), to be included in the class of puruṣārtha.
MmS 4.1.3: tadutsarge karmāṇi puruṣārthāya śāstrasyānatiśaṅkyatvān,
na ca dravyaṃ cikīrṣyate, tenārthenābhisaṃbandhāt kriyāyāṃ puruṣaśrutiḥ.
“At the abandonment of that [happiness (i.e., prīti, KY)] (tadutsarge) the
[prescribed] acts [are conducive] to man’s purpose (puruṣārthāya),
85
The Bhāṭṭa school rejected Prabhākara’s idea of upādāna, claiming that there is no means
to determine the relation of subordination except for the six kinds of textual criterion of
application (viniyoga). Cf. Yoshimizu 1997: 147–148, n. 160.
86
Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent admits that the Vedic injunction has some operations in
addition to issuing an enjoinment (niyoga) in NM II, 120,8–10: anyāny api niyogasya rūpāṇi
vyāpārabhedād avagamyante. sa hi bhāvārthasiddhyarthaṃ tatsamartham artham ākṣipati.
“Because of the difference of operation, niyoga is thought to have other forms. Indeed, to
contribute to accomplishing the action [denoted by the verb], it requires something suitable
for that.” However, concerning the upādāna that does not depend on viniyoga, the opponent
merely refers to a traditional theorem of exegesis, the paśv-ekatva-nyāya (cf. MmS 4.1.11–
16; Yoshimizu 1997: 145, 332 [n. 139]; Cummins 2020: 217–218), in NM II, 121,1–6.
87
In the proponent’s part, Jayanta assumes his opponent’s argument that enjoinment
requires attaining the result. NM II, 126,16–17: tatraitat syāt niyogasiddhiḥ ākṣiptaphalasiddhir bhavati. viṣayādyanubandhāvacchinno hy asāv evānuṣṭheyaḥ. “On that point
[namely, against Jayanta’s view that only the result urges one to act (NM II, 123,7: prerakatvaṃ phalasyaiva)], the opponent may contend: The accomplishment of enjoinment requires
the accomplishment of the result because it (i.e., niyoga) can be carried out only when being
distinguished by its binding factors, namely its scope and [the enjoined person (niyojya)].”
The ākṣepa of result in this argument should be distinguished from upādāna. In this
argument, the opponent merely maintains that the ākṣepa of result is necessary for specifying
the niyojya, one of the two kinds of anubandha of niyoga.
Prabhākara and Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent (Kiyotaka YOSHIMIZU)
123
because the śāstra cannot be doubted (śāstrasyānatiśaṅkyatvāt); nor is it
intended that a material object (dravya) be prepared; 88 because of his
connection with that purpose (namely puruṣārtha) man[’s involvement] is
expressly mentioned in the authoritative text (śruti) with regard to the
[main] act (kriyāyām).” (transl. by Heesterman 2007: 289)
For the example discussed in this section, Śabara adduces a particular kind of
vow (vrata) named Prajāpativrata, which resolves not to see the rising sun and
the setting sun. 89 Quoting this vow, Śabara most probably refers to one of the
eight vows that are prescribed in the sixth Adhyāya of the Kauṣītakibrāhmaṇa
(KB, alias Śāṅkhāyanabrāhmaṇa) after a myth of Prajāpati. 90 These vows are
prescribed without mentioning delight (prīti) as its result. Nevertheless,
according to MmS 4.1.3, Prajāpativratas can still benefit a human being
because “the authority of the Veda cannot be doubted” (śāstrasyānatiśaṅkyatvāt). Although each injunction of Prajāpativratas does not mention what kind
of delight one can expect as the result of keeping it, one should trust that these
vows will somehow benefit a human being (puruṣārtha) because of the
absolute authority of the Veda.
ŚBh 1199,1–3: śāstraṃ cānatiśaṅkyaṃ pitmātvacanād api pramāṇataram, svayaṃ hi tena pratyeti, indriyasthānīyaṃ hi tat.
The [Vedic] scripture cannot be doubted. It is more authoritative than
one’s parents’ word because one understands through it oneself, as it is as
close to oneself as one’s sense-organs.
In this statement, Śabara declares that observing Prajāpativratas is a duty to be
unconditionally carried out. In the Brahmanical tradition, a student (brahmacārin) is given his second birth by his teacher through the initiation ritual
(upanayana), 91 and he should stay at his teacher’s house for study until
graduation. 92 While learning the Veda by heart from his teacher, who is the
88
MmS 2.1.8 argues that preparing the material objects to be used in the sacrifice is a
subsidiary ritual.
89
ŚBh 1198,9–10: nodyantam ādityam īkṣeta, nāstaṃyantam.
90
Cf. Kane 1974: 349–350 in “List of Vratas” and Kane 1977: 1234 in “Mīmāṃsā and
Dharmaśāstra”; Yoshimizu 1997: 140–143. KB 6.2–9 prescribes eight vows including the
fifth, “tasya vratam udyantam evainaṃ nekṣetāstaṃ yantaṃ ca” (KB 6.6; Sarma 1968:
6.3.12). The pronoun “enam” refers to the sun called “mahān devaḥ” in “yan mahān deva
ādityas” (Sarma 1968: 6.3.6). Cf. Manusmti (Mn) 4.37ab: nekṣetodyantam ādityaṃ nāstaṃ
yāntaṃ kadā cana; Bühler 1886: 547.
91
Cf. Atharvavedasaṃhitā (Śaunaka) 11.5.3 and Śatapathabrāhmaṇa (ŚB) 11.5.4.12;
Kajihara 1995: n. 12 and Kajihara 2018/19: 3.
92
Mn 2.108. Cf. Bühler 1886: 538.
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embodiment of the Aryan tradition, the student builds up his identity as a
member of the Aryan society. In this respect, Śabara holds the Vedic vow
(vrata) to be a part of public dharma that is more authoritative than one’s
private dharma, such as the word of one’s parents, because the Veda that one
has learned by heart from one’s teacher is a means of knowledge (pramāṇa) as
direct as one’s sense-organs.
Nevertheless, Śabara also remarks that one who observes Prajāpativratas
can avoid the harm (enas) capable of being caused by a powerful and violent
being in nature 93––for example, the sun.
ŚBh 1199,10–11: api ca, etāvatā hainasāyukto bhavatīti puruṣasaṃbaddho doṣaḥ kīrtyate, na karmasaṃbaddhaḥ.
Moreover, [the explanatory passage (arthavāda)], “One is set free from so
much harm (enas),” declares that [the negligence of this vow brings about]
a fault (doṣa) connected to a human being, not [a fault] connected to a
sacrifice.
The section of Prajāpativratas in the KB does not include this exact quotation,
which contains the word “enas.” However, KB 6.6 declares that one who keeps
this vow of not looking at the rising sun and the setting sun can protect oneself,
one’s offspring, cattle, and adherents from the harmfulness of the sun. 94 Śabara
may have considered that one who keeps this vow can avoid “so much harm”
(etāvat-enas), namely these various forms of harm capable of being caused by
the sun if one ignores it. 95 He also emphasizes self-responsibility for incurring
93
Cf. Bodewitz 2006: 269: “énas often did not denote sin (i.e. committed sin) as such, but
mainly referred to all kinds of evil which may but need not have been the result of
committed sins.” For more on the concept of “énas” in the Vedic literature, see Bodewitz
2006: 241–270.
94
KB 6.6 (Sarma 1968: 6.3.6–8): yan mahān deva ādityas tena na ha vā enaṃ mahān devo
hinasti, nāsya prajāṃ nāsya paśūn nāsya bruvānaṃ cana. “Since the sun is the great god,
thereby the great god harms him not, nor his offspring, nor his cattle, nor any one claiming to
be his.” (transl. by Keith 1920: 378).
KB 6 begins with a Prajāpati myth, in which Prajāpati happened to create a monster
with thousand eyes, thousand feet, and thousand fitted arrows, and this monster threatened
Prajāpati (Sarma 1968: 6.1.13–15). KB 6.2–9 continues the myth: Prajāpati saved himself by
giving the monster the names of the eight forces of nature, that is, water, fire, wind, plants,
sun, moon, food, and thunderbolts. In each of the eight sections, KB teaches that one who
keeps each of the eight vows can protect oneself, one’s offspring, cattle, and adherents from
the harmfulness of these forces, respectively.
95
TS 2.6.10.2 explains how severe punishments are given to one who reviles, strikes, or
draws blood from a Brahmin, concluding, “etvatā haínasā bhavati” (transl. by Keith 1914,
part 1, 217: “for so great is his sin”). Using this concluding phrase, Mīmāṃsakas might have
created the arthavāda,“etāvatā hainasāyukto bhavati.” Cf. Agrawal 1985: 57.
Prabhākara and Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent (Kiyotaka YOSHIMIZU)
125
the sun’s harmful effects by replacing “enas” with “doṣa” in his words.
It is also to be noted that Śabara considers the Prajāpativrata a positive
injunction, distinguishing it from prohibition (niṣedha/pratiṣedha) of an action.
In his commentary on MmS 6.2.20, he explains how a prohibition in the world,
for example, “One should not eat kalañja” (na kalañjaṃ bhakṣayitavyam), 96
differs from Prajāpativratas. The former merely prohibits one from eating a
kalañja when it happens to be close at hand. 97 In contrast, the latter, being
explicitly called vrata in the Veda, urges one to perform a mental action
(mānasa-karman) to uphold the resolution (saṅkalpa) of not looking at the
sun. 98 Since keeping this resolution following Prajāpativratas can be
considered a positive action, although not a physical one but a mental one, it
can also be considered equivalent to holding a fixed sacrifice following the
directive, “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta.” Thus, we may say, Śabara thinks that a
defensive motivation is shared by those who observe Prajāpativratas as well as
those who hold a fixed sacrifice following “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta.”
6.2
Prabhākara on the Prajāpativrata
In the Bh. on MmS 4.1.3, Prabhākara also proves that the Prajāpativrata is
puruṣārtha but not kratvartha. However, instead of arguing how it benefits a
human being as Śabara did, he points out that it has its own eligibility
(adhikāra). According to Prabhākara, whether an action is puruṣārtha depends
on whether its injunction determines independent eligibility, and having
independent eligibility is a sufficient condition for an action’s puruṣārtha.
ŚBh 1399,12–13: idaṃ hy upadiśanti “People give the following [dietary] instruction”: na
kalañjaṃ bhakṣayitavyam, na laśunaṃ, na gñjanaṃ ceti. Cf. Mn 5.5: laśunaṃ (garlic)
gñjanaṃ (leeks) caiva palāṇḍuṃ (onion) kavakāni (mushrooms) ca / abhakṣyāṇi dvijātīnām.
For the Dharma- and Ghyasūtras that include kalañja (red garlic?, cf. Bühler 1879: 63) in
the list of forbidden foods, see Benson 2010: 168, n.26.
97
ŚBh 1401,8–9: iha kriyā pratiṣidhyate, nākriyopadiśyate. “In the present case, [the
hearer] is prohibited from acting but is not instructed to make a non-action.” The function of
naÑ in “na kalañjaṃ bhakṣayitavyam” is prasajyapratiṣedha, not paryudāsa. See ŚBh
1399,16–17: evam ukte dvayam āpatati, yadi vābhakṣaṇaṃ kartavyam iti (opponent), yadi vā
bhakṣaṇaṃ na kartavyam iti (proponent).
98
ŚBh 1401,2–6: “tasya vratam” iti prakṛtya prajāpativratāni samāmnātāni. vratam iti ca
mānasaṃ karmocyate. “idaṃ na kariṣyāmī”ti yaḥ saṃkalpaḥ. katamat tad vratam.
“nodyantam ādityam īkṣete”ti, yathā tadīkṣaṇaṃ na bhavati, tathā mānaso vyāpāraḥ
kartavyaḥ. “The [eight] Prajāpativratas are recorded in the Veda, introduced by the phrase,
‘his vow is the following’ (cf. Sarma 1968: 6.2.8, 20, 32, 44; 3.12, 24, 36, 48). Moreover, a
vow is said to be a mental action, a resolution in the form, ‘I will never do this.’ [Question:]
How is that vow? [Answer:] ‘nodyantam ādityam īkṣeta’ means that one should activate
one’s mind not to look at that (i.e., the rising sun).”
96
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Bh., pt. 4, 966,4–6: prītyutsarge ’py etad uktam. adhikārāśravaṇe ’pi
adhikāro yuktaḥ kalpayitum na punaḥ kratusaṃbandhakalpanā.
[MmS 4.1.3 that begins with] “At the abandonment of delight” states the
following: Even if eligibility is not directly expressed in the Vedic text, it
is reasonable to assume eligibility [for the Prajāpativrata], but not to
assume its relation with sacrifice.
As mentioned in section 3.3 of the present article, according to Prabhākara, one
who has heard “svargakāmo yajeta,” desiring heaven, becomes eligible
(adhikārin) to hold the sacrifice if one recognizes oneself as enjoined (niyojya)
to do that. Then that person indirectly recognizes the necessity to become the
agent (kart) of the sacrifice for carrying out the enjoinment. In the
Prajāpativrata’s case, conversely, he considers it possible to assume eligibility if
the Vedic text indicates the existence of an agent who observes it.
Bh., pt. 4, 966,7–967,1: yathaivādhikāre śrūyamāṇe gamyamānatatkarttaiva nyāyyā. evaṃ gamyamānakartravagamāt adhikārakalpanaiva
nyāyyā.
It is reasonable [to assume] that one becomes recognized as the agent [of
an action] when one’s eligibility [for the action] is expressed in the Veda.
Similarly, it is also reasonable to assume eligibility [for the Prajāpativrata]
because someone becomes recognized as the agent.
However, this reverse assumption is justified only conditionally, namely, only
when there is no textual evidence for applying (vi-ni-√yuj) the action at issue
for the sake of some other action.
Bh., pt. 4, 967,1–3: kathaṃ tarhi kartradhikaraṇam. tatra hi viniyogo ’dhikārakalpanāyāḥ pratipakṣaḥ. iha tv (corr. tu) apratipakṣādhikārakalpaneti.
[Question:] Then, what about the section of the agent? [Answer:] In that
case, textual evidence for application (viniyoga) works as a counteragent
that blocks the assumption of eligibility [for the prohibition “One should
not tell untruth”]. However, in the present case, the assumption of the
eligibility [for the Prajāpativrata] has no such a counteragent.
MmS 3.4.12–13 is called the “section of the agent” (kartradhikaraṇa). In this
section, it is argued that the prohibition in the Veda, “One should not tell
untruth” (nāntaṃ vadet), is an injunction (vidhi) of a preparatory action for a
sacrifice, but not the reiteration (anuvāda) of a worldly instruction about human
Prabhākara and Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent (Kiyotaka YOSHIMIZU)
127
duty. This is because this prohibition is embedded in a chapter on preparing for
the new and full moon sacrifices; 99 in other words, it is understood from the
context (prakaraṇa) governed by the directive (codanā) concerning the new
and full moon sacrifices. 100 Therefore, the prohibition, “One should not tell
untruth,” does not have its own eligibility distinct from that of the new and full
moon sacrifices.
By contrast, in the KB, the chapter that prescribes the Prajāpativrata is
independent of other chapters dealing with Vedic sacrifices. 101 Since this vrata
is not understood from the context of any sacrifice, one can rightfully assume
its independent eligibility. A question then arises: How should one assume this
eligibility on the basis of the Vedic text? Prabhākara uses the explanatory
passage (arthavāda) “etāvatā hainasā viyukto bhavati” to determine the
eligibility for observing this vrata.
Bh., pt. 4, 967,3–968,1: kiṃbhūtaḥ punar atrādhikriyate. “etāvatā
hainasā viyukto bhavati” iti śravaṇāj (corr. -āt) jīvata eva vādhikāraḥ. ato
nityo ’yaṃ jīvanānupālanīyo niyamaḥ svadharmatayā.
[Question:] Now, what sort of person is eligible for this (Prajāpativrata)?
[Answer:] As it is directly expressed [in the explanatory passage] that one
is set free from so much harm (enas), the eligible person [for this
Prajāpativrata] should be one who is alive rather than [one who desires
heaven]. Therefore, this (Prajāpativrata) is a fixed (nitya) restriction to be
observed as long as one is alive because it is one’s norm (svadharma).
Although observing this vow does not bring about any delight (prīti), the
explanatory passage asserts that it protects one who observes it from the sun’s
99
TS 2.5.5.6: tásyaitád vratám: nnr̥taṃ vaden ná māṁsám aśnīyān ná stríyam úpeyān
nsya pálpūlanena vsaḥ palpūlayeyur etád dhí devḥ sárvaṃ ná kurvánti. “His vow is: he
shall not speak untruth; he shall not eat meat; he shall not approach a woman; they shall not
clean his raiment with cleansing stuff; for all these things the gods do not do.” (transl. by
Keith 1914: part 1, 194). Cf. Yoshimizu 2012: n.12 and n. 24.
100
P, pt. 4, 967,16–17: antavadanapratiṣedhe hi sādhikāraniyogasaṃnidhānāt tena
ghītatvāt prakaraṇena ca viniyuktatvān (corr. -āt) nādhikārakaplanāvakāśo ’sti. “In the
prohibition of telling an untruth, there is no room for assuming its eligibility because [this
prohibition] is embedded in proximity to an enjoinment that has its own eligibility, and it is
also applied within the context [of the new and full moon sacrifices].”
101
P, pt. 4, 967,17–18: iha tu anārabhyāmnānān (corr. -āt) nādhikāragrahaṇam astīti (corr.
-ti iti) nādhikārāntarasaṃbandho ’vakalpate. “In the present case, however, [Prajāpativratas]
are grasped by no [other] eligibility because they are handed down independently [of other
sacrifices]. Therefore, it is not appropriate to assume their relation to the eligibility for other
(sacrifices).” KB 6 is sandwiched between KB 5 on the Cāturmāsya and KB 7 on the Soma
sacrifice. The latter half of KB 6, KB 6.10–15, is the part of the Brahman priest and general
remarks on the haviryajña. See Keith 1920: 14–15.
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harm, which is capable of being caused owing to its negligence. Therefore,
Prabhākara construes this passage to imply that one should observe the vow
throughout one’s life because it is a warning that one would be committing a
fault whenever one neglects to observe this vow. 102
The disjunctive “vā” of “jīvata eva vādhikāraḥ” in the passage quoted
above may indicate that Prabhākara excludes the possibility of assuming the
eligible person for the Prajāpativrata as “one who desires heaven” (svargakāmaḥ). The Viśvajit-nyāya, discussed in MmS 4.3.15–16, is an exegetic rule
that if the entire text of a sacrifice mentions no result (phala), its result should
be assumed as heaven. Prabhākara may have considered as follows: If one
applies the Viśvajit-nyāya to the Prajāpativrata to assume its eligibility as
desiring heaven, it is theoretically left to one’s discretion to observe the
Prajāpativrata; even if one who does not desire heaven ignores observing it, one
would not have committed a fault. Then the explanatory passage that warns
against ignoring this vow would become fallible. 103
Prabhākara maintains that one should unconditionally observe
Prajāpativratas as long as one is alive, complying with the part of MmS 4.1.3,
“The [Vedic] scripture cannot be doubted” (śāstraṃ cānatiśaṅkyaṃ). For him,
the explanatory passage (arthavāda), “One is set free from so much harm”
(etāvatā hainasāyukto bhavati), does not indicate that the non-occurrence of
harm is the purpose to be accomplished by observing Prajāpativratas, unlike the
directive, “svargakāmo yajeta,” which implies that heaven is to be attained by
sacrifice. Prabhākara merely use this arthavāda to impose the duty to observe
Prajāpativratas on all Aryan people without exception.
In section 5.1 of the present article, we withheld the answer to a question
on MmS 6.3.3, that is, whether Prabhākara accepts the avoidance of committing a fault (doṣa) as the motivation to hold a fixed sacrifice following the
P, pt. 4, 967,21–23: asmin udāharaṇe “etāvatā hainasā pāpena viyukto bhavatī”ty
arthavādaḥ. tatra yadi jīvanavān adhikārī bhavati tadā nityatvād (corr. -āt) atrākaraṇe
vihitātikramadoṣa evainoyogo bhavatīti sālambano ’rthavādaḥ. “In this example, there is an
explanatory passage, ‘One is set free from so much harm.’ Based on this (passage), if one
assumes that a living person is the eligible person [for this Prajāpativrata], then [its
observation] comes to be fixed [for one’s whole life]. That being the case, if one does not
perform [this vrata at the designated time], one becomes connected with harm in the sense
that one commits a fault for ignoring the injunction. In this way, the explanatory passage
becomes ensured.”
103
This is Śālikanātha’s interpretation. P, pt. 4, 967,23–968,8: viśvajidādivat tu
svarge ’dhikāriviśeṣaṇe kalpyamāne kāmyasyākaraṇe ’pi na doṣaḥ. tatrārthavādasyātiparokṣā vttiḥ syāt. “However, if heaven is assumed to specify the eligible person [for the
Prajāpativrata], like in the Viśvajit, then one would commit no fault even if one does not
perform an elective action. In this case, the operation of the explanatory passage would
become very inexplicable.”
102
Prabhākara and Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent (Kiyotaka YOSHIMIZU)
129
directive “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta.” Comparing the argument on MmS 6.3.3 with that
on the Prajāpativrata, we may safely say that Prabhākara gives no importance
to the defensive motivation assumed by traditional Mīmāṃsakas for holding a
fixed sacrifice periodically and keeping the vrata throughout one’s life. In his
view, as the Prajāpativrata unconditionally orders one to observe the vow
because of its own eligibility, “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta” also unconditionally urges
one to hold a fixed sacrifice periodically because of its eligibility independent
of “svargakāmo yajeta.”
6.3 Religious debt (ṇa) and fixed sacrifices
Moreover, at the end of the Bh. on MmS 6.2, Prabhākara asserts that one
should hold a fixed sacrifice as long as one is alive because it is prescribed by a
Vedic passage that teaches how one can clear up one’s religious debt (ṇa).
Bh., pt. 5, 121,6–7: rāddhāntas tv (corr. tu) ṇadarśanam avaśyakartavyatāṃ sūcayati jīvanam adhikāriviśeṣaṇatayā jñāpayati. 104
However, the proponent [answers: The Vedic passage] that reveals
religious debt explains that [fixed sacrifices] are to be categorically
performed (avaśyakartavya), and it makes one realize that being alive
(jīvana) specifies the person eligible [to hold fixed sacrifices].
In his commentary on this section (MmS 6.2.31), Śabara argues that one’s fixed
(nitya) duties include the following: to hold a soma sacrifice, to initiate a
Brahmin boy into Vedic studies at his eighth year, and to beget a child. 105 To
prove their fixity, he quotes TS 6.3.10.5 with some modifications (ŚBh
1405,12–15). This enumerates the threefold debt (ṇatraya), which an Aryan
owes by birth and is obliged to clear by learning the Veda to please the ṣis, by
holding sacrifices to please the gods, and by begetting a child to please the
ancestors. 106 Śabara also adduces some injunctions that oblige one to clear
The manuscript of the Bh. (see footnote 67): rāddhāntas tu ṇadarśanaṃ jīvanam adhikāriviśeṣaṇatvena jñāpayati. The editor adds “avaśyakartavyatāṃ sūcayati” from the P.
105
ŚBh 1405,9–10: idaṃ śrūyate. somena yajeta, garbhāṣṭameṣu brāhmaṇam upanayīta
(Baudhāyanaghyasūtra 2.5.2; Agrawal 1985: 70), prajām utpādayed iti.
106
TS 6.3.10.5: jyamāno vái brāhmaṇás tribhír r̥ṇav jāyate brahmacáryeṇárṣibhyo
yajñéna devébhyaḥ prajáyā pitŕ̥bhya eṣá v anr̥ṇó yáḥ putr yájvā brahmacārivāsī́. “A
Brahman on birth is born with a threefold debt, of pupilship to the ṣis, of sacrifice to the
gods, of offspring to the Pits. He is freed from his debt who has a son, is a sacrificer, and
who has lived as a pupil.” (transl. by Keith 1914: part 2, 526). ŚB 1.7.2.1–5 adds the debt to
human beings (manuṣyèbhyaḥ), which one clears up by accommodating visitors and serving
food to them. Cf. Malamoud 1980; Mn 6.35–36; Bühler 1886: 558.
104
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each of these three religious debts. 107 To stress that their repayment is
compulsory, 108 he remarks that these injunctions are not connected with the
word “desire” (akāmasaṃyukta), which would impose the repayment on only
those who desire a particular object. Among these injunctions, moreover, he
includes the injunctions of the Agnihotra and the new and full moon sacrifices
with the word “as long as one is alive” (yāvajjīvam).
One begins to learn the Veda from one’s youth, but one can beget a child
and hold Vedic sacrifices only after getting married and gaining economic
strength. Thus, only a householder (ghastha) can clear the threefold religious
debt by inheriting the Vedic tradition from the preceding generation, practicing
and demonstrating it among the present generation, and handing it over to the
next generation in an Aryan community. Therefore, Prabhākara’s view that the
directive “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta” categorically urges one to hold a fixed sacrifice
can be traced to the Vedic and post-Vedic noblesse oblige required of the
householders who sustain Aryan communities. 109 That being the case,
Prabhākara’s silence about the fault (doṣa) one would commit in neglecting a
fixed sacrifice may indicate that he does not accept the defensive motivation
because this arises out of self-interest rather than the care of public welfare. 110
It is also to be noted that the idea that the directive “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta” issues a
categorical imperative is not original to Prabhākara but had been established
among the traditional Mīmāṃsakas since the time of the MmS.
ŚBh 1405,17–19: akāmasaṃyuktāny eṣāṃ pṛthag vākyāni bhavanti, vasantevasante
jyotiṣā yajeta (cf. ĀpŚS 10.2.5), yāvajjīvam agnihotraṃ juhoti, yāvajjīvaṃ darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṃ yajeta. tathā, vidyām adhīyīta. tathā, prajā utpādayitavyeti. For the ṇatraya in
Vedānta, see Brahmasiddhi (ed. S. Kuppuswami Sastri, Madras 1937) 27,17–19; 36,4–12.
108
Śabara explains that the duty to clear the religious debt is obligatory for all the upper
three classes. He holds the word “brāhmaṇa” in TS 6.3.10.5 for illustrative purposes (pradarśana) only. ŚBh 1406,5: brāhmaṇagrahaṇaṃ tu pradarśanārtham, jāyamāno brāhmaṇo
rājanyo vaiśyo veti.
109
MmS 6.1.40 allows eligibility for a sacrifice to a poor person (adravya), considering a
possible increase of income in future. Manu permits only the householder with at least three
years’ food reserves for all those who share his livelihood to hold a Soma sacrifice (Mn 11.7).
To promote the circulation of wealth into Brahmins, Manu allows a king to confiscate
property from the Vaiśyas who do not hold sacrifices despite being wealthy (Mn 11.11–14).
For similar provisions in the Mahābhārata (Poona critical edition, 12.159.5–7) and other
legal codes, see Bühler 1886: 575. For the criticism of stinginess and the commendation for
giving gifts, see Mn 4.224–235; Bühler 1886: 552.
110
In the Ṭupṭīkā on MmS 6.3.2, Kumārila explicitly rejects the defensive motivation to
hold fixed sacrifices from his soteriological perspective. He states that one who wishes
liberation (mokṣa) should perform them to eliminate the faults one previously committed
(Yoshimizu 2007: 206–207). This proactive attitude about the evaluation of the fixed
sacrifice in soteriology was inherited and reinforced by Maṇḍanamiśra.
107
Prabhākara and Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent (Kiyotaka YOSHIMIZU)
131
7.
Concluding remarks
7.1
Two modes of eligibility for a fixed sacrifice: nityādhikāra and
kāmādhikāra
In understanding Prabhākara’s theory of niyoga, it is crucial to clarify how he
integrated one’s reflexive awareness of desire into his interpretation of
injunctions. 111 Modern scholars have often ignored this point by
misunderstanding Prabhākara’s niyoga as a sort of categorical imperative even
in the case of “svargakāmo yajeta” since Stcherbatsky (1926). 112 Although
Prabhākara emphasizes a sense of duty (kārya) being evoked in one’s mind by
the Vedic exhortation called “enjoinment” (niyoga), he does not oppose the idea
that the sense of duty is closely related to a concern for attaining a result by
carrying out one’s duty. 113
Mīmāṃsakas claim the Veda to be eternal and to have been transmitted
among countless generations of Brahmins. According to them, the Veda exists
in advance to every individual. It teaches one extrinsically, through the
traditional system of education, about what to do in religious matters. 114 This
system plants a sense of duty in the mind of Aryan individuals who have
learned a Vedic corpus. Apart from fixed (nitya) and occasional (naimittika)
sacrifices, there are various elective (kāmya) sacrifices, which one who has a
For one who has heard the directive “svargakāmo yajeta” desiring heaven, the reflexive
consciousness of desire, “I desire heaven,” is necessary to become aware of one’s duty
realizing that “I am enjoined” (i.e., “It is my duty”). Self-consciousness works as a cognitive
node by which one’s attention turns from the object of desire to duty. Kyūma (2010) made
clear that Śālikanātha criticizes Dharmakīrti’s sākāravāda although he propounds his tripuṭī
theory (i.e., the notion that both cognizer and cognized represent both parts of cognition). We
may say that Prābhākara’s reflexive epistemology was not transplanted from Buddhist
idealism but devised within the school as a presupposition for the theory of niyoga. For
Prābhākara’s theory of ātman and desire, see Freschi 2007 and 2014b.
112
Stcherbatsky (1926) calls Prabhākara’s niyoga “die indische Lehre vom kategorischen
Imperativ,” even though he does not call it “Kantian” categorical imperative. The latter
emphasizes the autonomy of the will and requires one to behave only in such a manner that
one’s principle of behavior (i.e., maxim) becomes a universal law to which all human beings
will consent. Halbfass (1988: 326–327) paraphrases Stcherbatsky’s view of Prabhākara’s
niyoga: “Prabhākara, his great rival, found an “unconditional” sense of obligation, a kind of
“categorical imperative” for the Aryan, associated with the Vedic commands (vidhi). They
are simply binding “duty” (kārya), and not a mere means to an end (sādhana); the
constitutive meaning which they possess for the identity of the Aryan is only realized when
they are followed unconditionally.”
113
It is worthwhile to examine whether Mīmāṃsā argues “collective interest,” even
considering the limited strata of society. See footnote 109.
114
Freschi 2014a:156: “Mīmāṃsā authors uphold the externality of moral authority.” For
the Mīmāṃsā concept of the “authorless” (apauruṣeya) Veda, see Yoshimizu 2008.
111
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secular desire executes in the form of an ectype (vikti) of an archetyp (prakti),
which is, in many cases, a particular fixed sacrifice. 115 Although elective
sacrifice is a type of sacrifice that one begins to perform spontaneously to attain
a specific object of desire, one who has undertaken it cannot evade the duty to
complete the sacrifice. 116 One who has given up performing an elective
sacrifice halfway will incur social sanctions from cultured people (śiṣṭas). 117
Moreover, one who performs an elective sacrifice is obliged to follow all
details, including subsidiary rituals, precisely as prescribed in the Veda. 118
In contrast to elective sacrifices for secular purposes, every Aryan
householder with financial means must hold fixed sacrifices periodically.
Mīmāṃsakas distinguish the eligibility based on fixity (nityādhikāra) and the
eligibility based on desire (kāmādhikāra), 119 namely, two ways of being urged
115
For example, the new and full moon sacrifices are the prakti of other sacrifices with
cereal oblations (iṣṭis), and the Agniṣṭoma is the prakti of other one-day soma sacrifices.
Despite a kāmya sacrifice by one-day soma offering, the Śyena is also the prakti of other
curse sacrifices (abhicāras), such as the Iṣu (MmS 7.1.13–16; cf. ĀpŚS 22.7.18: samānam
itarac chyenena). For a list of the main praktis and their viktis, see Chakrabarti 1980: 136.
116
MmS 6.2.13: prakramāt tu niyamyetārambhasya kriyānimittatvāt. “Once one began [to
perform an elective sacrifice], one is obliged [to complete it] because its undertaking adds
momentum to perform [it to the end].”
117
ŚBh 1397,20–1398,1: yo hy ārabdham evaṃjātīyakaṃ na samāpayati taṃ śiṣṭā
vigarhante, prākramiko ’yam asaṃvyavahārya iti, śiṣṭavigarhaṇā ca doṣaḥ. “Cultured
people blame a person who has undertaken such an event but does not complete it, saying
‘He is a person who merely begins [a sacrifice], we should not keep company with him.’
Thus, being blamed by cultured people is [due to] one’s fault”; ŚBh 1259,16–19 (on MmS
4.3.24): upakramyāparisamāpayataḥ, tadanantaram evainaṃ śiṣṭā vigarhayeyuḥ, prākramiko ’yaṃ kāpuruṣa iti vadantaḥ. ye hi devebhyaḥ saṃkalpya* haviḥ, na yāgam
abhinirvartayanti, tān śiṣṭā vigarhante, tasmād avaśyaṃ samāpayitavyam. “If [a householder] does not complete a sacrifice that he has begun, cultured people would immediately
blame him, saying, ‘He is a shameful person who merely begins [a sacrifice].’ Thus cultured
people blame those who resolved to offer an oblation to deities but do not complete the
sacrifice. Therefore, one should categorically complete a sacrifice [even if the desire for the
result has vanished (vīta)].”
* At the beginning of a soma sacrifice, the sacrificer declares his resolution (saṅkalpa)
to hold the sacrifice. Cf. Caland & Henry 1906: 1–2.
118
MmS 6.3.8 (opponent): kāmyeṣu caivam arthitvāt “Also in the case of elective sacrifices,
one may perform it similarly [as one performs a fixed sacrifice (MmS 6.3.1–7)] because one
aims to attain one’s purpose [by the primary action]”; 9 (proponent): asaṃyogāt tu naivaṃ
syād vidheḥ śabdapramāṇatvāt. “Not so, because [the result] is not connected [with the
primary action alone] inasmuch as [that the primary action requires the assistance by
subsidiary actions] is enjoined in the scripture that is a valid means of knowledge.”
119
These two types of adhikāra of a fixed sacrifice have been discussed since the MmS.
Śabara distinguishes between naiyamikārambha and svargārthārambha in ŚBh 2018 (corr.
3008), 6–11 (on MmS 11.1.11; see Yoshimizu 2004: n.46). The pair of nityādhikāra and
kāmādhikāra was used by Śālikanātha in PrP 445,2 & 18 (nityādhikāra) and PrP 445,15 &
17 (kāmādhikāra), and by Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent in NM II, 128,12 (nityādhikāra)
Prabhākara and Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent (Kiyotaka YOSHIMIZU)
133
to perform the same fixed sacrifice in accordance with two kinds of directive
on eligibility (adhikāracodanā), “As long as one is alive, one ought to hold a
sacrifice” (yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta) and “One who desires heaven ought to hold a
sacrifice” (svargakāmo yajeta). These injunctions can work on the same
person; in other words, their operations are not exclusive, but “yāvajjīvaṃ
yajeta” operates independently of “svargakāmo yajeta.”
Nityādhikāra: Designating a fixed time as the occasion (nimitta) to hold a
new session, the directive “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta” categorically evokes a sense of
duty to hold it in one’s mind without implying a positive result of the
sacrifice. 120 It urges one to perform at least the primary offering on recurring
dates by any means, even using a suitable substitute (pratinidhi) for the
oblation material. 121 Analogous to the Prajāpativrata, the Vedic scripture also
makes one aware of committing a fault if one neglects to hold the sacrifice
periodically. However, Prabhākara does not accept the avoidance of committing
a fault as the genuine motivation to follow the enjoinment issued from
“yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta.” For him, one should follow it as long as one is alive
because of the sense of unconditional duty evoked by this injunction. This
sense of unconditional duty is not Prabhākara’s original, but a traditional idea
of Mīmāṃsā based on the Vedic and post-Vedic noblesse oblige, which was
imagined as the religious debt (ṇa) that Aryan householders (ghasthas) are
believed to owe by birth and obliged to clear up by contributing to the
continuation of the Vedic tradition in their communities.
Kāmādhikāra: Prabhākara assumes that everyone desires to ascend to
heaven after death. Prabhākara ignores those who wish to cease their
transmigration (saṃsāra) and attain liberation (mokṣa) by overcoming their
desire. 122 Assuming that everyone desires to ascend to heaven after death,
Prabhākara allows one to hold a fixed (nitya) sacrifice to attain heaven insofar
as one constantly performs at least its primary action on recurring dates
following the directive “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta.” 123 For one who desires heaven,
and NM II, 111,18, 112,13, & 114,15 (kāmādhikāra).
120
In PrP 445,2–12, Śālikanātha explicitly states that “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta” evokes the sense
of duty related to oneself (svasaṃbandhikāryāvagama) in one’s mind specifying the eligible
person by the word “as long as one is alive” without implying a result. See PrP 445,4–6;
David 2015: 589–590.
121
For the suitability of various pratinidhis, see MmS 6.3.27ff.
122
In Bh., pt. 1, 256,8–10 (Yoshimizu 1997: 7), Prabhākara contrasts Mīmāṃsaka (karmasaṅgin, “occupied with action”) with “one who wiped away stains” (mditakaṣāya, from
Chāndogyopaniṣad 7.26.2), who holds the consciousness of self and possession
(ahaṅkāramamakārau) to be conceiving non-self as self (anātmany ātmābhimānau, cf. Bh.,
pt.1, 230,7–9).
123
The operation of “svargakāmo yajeta” presupposes that one periodically holds the fixed
134
Journal of Indological Studies, Nos. 32 & 33 (2020–2021)
another directive, “svargakāmo yajeta,” evokes a sense of duty to complete the
whole sacrifice process, including all subsidiary rituals (sarvāṅga). 124 Feeling
this sense of duty to complete the sacrifice, one who desires heaven becomes
aware that one will attain heaven if the sacrifice is entirely performed. This
awareness of the means–purpose relationship between sacrifice and heaven is
enabled by the directive “svargakāmo yajeta” through its enjoinment’s
implication called “incorporation” (upādana), which lies in the syntactical
unity between “svargakāmaḥ” and “yajeta” requiring subsidiary rituals. 125
Prabhākara’s opponent in the Svargakāmādhikaraṇa denies that this
means–purpose relationship is implied by “svargakāmo yajeta,” claiming that
this injunction expresses the eligible person (adhikārin) for the sacrifice merely
as its agent (kart) of the sacrifice, and not the agent of the accomplishment of
heaven. Prabhākara holds this opponent to adhere to Bādari, who maintained
sacrifice following “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta.” See section 4 and footnote 66 of the present article.
Like in the case of a kāmya sacrifice (see footnote 118), MmS 11.1.11–19 (the third
section) argues that when one undertakes a fixed (nitya) sacrifice to attain heaven (ŚBh 2108
[corr. 3008],10: svargārtha ārambhaḥ), one ought to perform it with all subsidiary rituals
(ŚBh 2111 [corr. 3011],1–2: sarvāṅgopasaṃhāreṇa). Śabara explains this need of all
subsidiary rituals using a simile of the pigeons alighting together on a threshing floor (khala).
See ŚBh 2111 (corr. 3011),9–11: arthena yugapatprāpteḥ (a part of MmS 11.1.16). arthena
pradhānopakāreṇa khale kapotavad yugapat saṃnipatanty aṅgāni. tatra na ghyate viśeṣaḥ,
idaṃ prāpyata idaṃ neti. ataḥ sarvāṇi prāpyante. “[MmS 11.1.16 says:] ‘Because they
arrive all at once in view of their purpose.’ In view of their purpose to assist the primary
action, the subsidiary rituals arrive [at the sacrifice] all at once as pigeons alight [all at once]
on a threshing floor. No differentiation is found as to which one arrives, but which one does
not. Therefore, all [subsidiary rituals equally] arrive [at the sacrifice].” Note that by “arrival
all at once” (yugapatprāpti), Śabara talks about their being equally indispensable in the
program of the sacrifice, not their simultaneous performance.
Unfortunately, the portion of the Bh. on the eleventh Adhyāya of the MmS and that of
the P are missing. However, in the fragment of the Bh. quoted in the P on MmS 6.3.8
(see footnote 118), Prabhākara announces the argument in 11.1.11–19 as follows. Bh., pt. 5,
131,15–16: atrābhidhīyate. yadi kāryanirapekṣo ’dhikāraḥ phalaparyanteṣu syāt syād etad
evam. “[Proponent:] Here we reply. If the eligibility for the [fixed sacrifice] aimed at its
result were not dependent on that which is to be done (kārya), then that would be so (i.e.,
subsidiary rituals are not necessary) as [the opponent] argued”; 131,21–23: yathā ca sakārya
eva sakaraṇopakāra evopa(corr. eva upa-)deśopadiṣṭe pradhāne ’py adhikriyate phalārthī
tathā ekādaśe vakṣyāmaḥ. “Moreover, in the eleventh Adhyāya, we will discuss as follows:
one who desires the result [of a sacrifice] is eligible to perform its primary action only in
such a manner as it is accompanied by that which is to be done (kārya), in other words, by
that which assists the means [for accomplishing enjoinment (niyoga), i.e., the primary
action], even if [the primary action] is given in the direct teaching (upadeśa) [of a fixed
(nitya) sacrifice, not in the transferred teaching (atideśa) of an elective (kāmya) sacrifice].”
125
Prabhākara thinks that the Vedic corpus configures an “organism” by transferring the
enjoinment (niyoga) issued from “svargakāmo yajeta” into the prescription of subsidiary
ritual elements in viniyogavidhis. See Yoshimizu 1997: 119–131.
124
Prabhākara and Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent (Kiyotaka YOSHIMIZU)
135
that sacrifice is performed for its own sake. 126
7.2 Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent’s deviation from Prabhākara
When it comes to Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent, he inherits from Prabhākara
the distinction between the enjoined person (niyojya) and the agent of action
(kart) in stating that having listened to the directive, “svargakāmo yajeta,” one
who desires heaven becomes the agent of knowing one’s duty before
performing the sacrifice as its agent. However, he holds that like “yāvajjīvaṃ
yajeta,” the directive “svargakāmo yajeta” also has two binding factors
(anubandhas) of enjoinment, that is, its scope (viṣaya) and enjoined person.
Thereby he maintains that this injunction categorically urges one who desires
heaven to hold a sacrifice without implying that the sacrifice is the means to
attain heaven. He says nothing about the “incorporation” (upādāna) of the
sacrificial action’s subservience to heaven, which Prabhākara claims to be
linguistically implied in the enjoinment issued by “svargakāmo yajeta.” In
Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent’s view, because everyone desires to go to
heaven after death, all Aryan householders ought to hold a fixed sacrifice
following “svargakāmo yajeta,” precisely as they should do that as long as they
are alive following “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta.” This opponent may be said to uphold
people’s blind obedience to authority. In this regard, Jayanta’s Prābhākara
opponent deviates from Prabhākara and eventually approximates to
Prabhākara’s opponent, the adherent to Bādari, who regards the Vedic
enjoinment in “svargakāmo yajeta” as a categorical imperative. 127
This deviation may have occurred as a result of the increased sectarian
confrontation between the Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara schools of Mīmāṃsā. The
Prābhākaras may have attempted to differentiate themselves from the Bhāṭṭas
who emphasized the spontaneity in human action, by emphasizing the sense of
duty evoked from outside and ignoring the human spontaneity asserted in
This understanding of Bādari’s thought based on MmS 3.1.3 is a one-sided estimation.
For his unique thoughts about society and soteriology recorded in the entire MmS and the
Brahmasūtra, see Yoshimizu 2021.
127
In the MmS on the Svargakāmādhikaraṇa, the opponent (MmS 6.1.1) holds the directive
“svargakāmo yajeta” to declare that the sacrificial action is to be performed for its own sake,
whereas heaven is a sort of substance (dravya) to be used for action. Rejecting this position,
the proponent (MmS 6.1.2–3) asserts that this injunction prescribes the sacrificial action as
the means (karaṇa) to accomplish a purpose (artha), and heaven is to be regarded not as a
substance but as the delight (prīti) one aims to attain through one’s action. Therefore, the
theory of niyoga by Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent, who upholds blind obedience to
authority, could be labeled heresy within Mīmāṃsā but might have been welcomed by
authoritarian regimes in medieval India.
126
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Journal of Indological Studies, Nos. 32 & 33 (2020–2021)
Prabhākara’s theory. By the end of the seventh century, Maṇḍanamiśra (ca.
660–720) 128 had already alluded to this deviation in his Vidhiviveka (VV). In a
section of his debate with his Prābhākara opponent, 129 Maṇḍanamiśra asserts
that a human being, even if being enjoined by the authorless (apauruṣeya) Veda,
does not begin action because an enjoinment, unless issued by a reliable person
(anuvidheya), is nothing but incitement (pravartanā) and cannot impose an
awareness of duty (kartavyatāvagama) upon the listener. 130 Then he refers to
Prabhākara’s saying quoted above (section 5.2) about the Śyena sacrifice,
“Enjoinment has [a sacrifice] to be performed within its scope, but does not say
that [the sacrifice] should be performed (Bh., pt. 1, 38,8–39,6: kartavyatāviṣayo niyogaḥ, na punaḥ kartavyatām āha).” 131 By this reference, Maṇḍanamiśra points out a discrepancy between the opponent’s argument and this
saying of Prabhākara, which refuses to hold that the Vedic injunction of the
Śyena compels one to carry out this black magic.
In the Nyāyakaṇikā (NK) on the VV, one of his early works, 132
Vācaspatimiśra (the later half of the tenth century) 133 calls this opponent of
Maṇḍanamiśra “old Prābhākara” (jaratprābhākara). 134 This contrasts with the
name “new Prābhākaras” (navīnāḥ), 135 which he uses to refer to Śālikanātha in
128
See Thrasher 1993: 127.
VV 986,1–986,4 (G 76,8–77,2): nanu kartavyatāvagamāt pravttiḥ. avagacchati ca
niyukta “idaṃ mama kartavyam” iti. yas tv avagacchann apy anuṣṭheyaṃ nānutiṣṭhati sa
sattve ’py arthānarthaprāptiparihārayor ananutiṣṭhann iva na daṇḍair vāryyate. “[Opponent:] One [who has heard an enjoinment of action] begins to act, realizing that [the ordered
action] should be done. In fact, one who is enjoined realizes, ‘This is my work to do.’
However, if one, realizing that an action should be performed, does not perform that action,
such a [thoughtless] person cannot be subdued even by punishments like those who do not
perform an action even [knowing] that one attains something useful or evades something
harmful [if one performs that action].”
In addition to this, Kuroda (1989) found two fragments ascribed to the jaratprābhākara
in commentaries in VV 930,2–934,1 (G 69,3–9) and PrP 18,7–8.
130
VV 986,5–988,3: G 77,2–6; cf. VV 972,2–974,5 (G 74,10–75,4).
131
VV 988,4 (G 77,6): uktaṃ ca kartavyatāviṣayo niyogo na niyogaḥ kartavyatām āha.
132
See Acharya 2006: xxxi–xxxii.
133
Slaje 1986 : 274: “frühestens um die Mitte des 10. Jahrhunderts”; Acharya 2006: xxviii:
“flourished between A.D. 950 and 1000.”
134
Cf. Mishra 1964: 34. NK 988,13 (G 77,21): atraiva jaratprābhākaronnītārthaṃ guror
vacaḥ saṅgacchata ity āha “uktaṃ ca kartavyatāviṣayo niyogaḥ.” “What is presented by the
Jaratprābhākara is encountered right here by Prabhākara’s statement, ‘Enjoinment has [a
sacrifice] to be performed within its scope.’” In NK 988,15–990,3 (G 77,22–24),
Vācaspatimiśra distinguishes Prabhākara’s statement’s former half, “kartavyatāviṣayo
niyogaḥ,” and the latter half, “na kartavyatām āha.” He says that the former refers to the
incitement (pravartanā) that belongs to the enjoiner (niyoktur dharmaḥ), whereas the latter
refers to the duty (kartavyatva) that belongs to the enjoined (niyojyasya dharmaḥ).
135
NK 990,3 (G 77,25): navīnās tūnnayanti; Kuroda 1989: 84–89.
129
Prabhākara and Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent (Kiyotaka YOSHIMIZU)
137
the honorific plural. 136 Maintaining the priority of the awareness of duty
(kārya) in the process of comprehending an injunction, Śālikanātha integrates
endeavor (prayatna/kti) into this process as the means to accomplish the
duty, 137 which he also calls apūrva and asserts that it brings about the result. 138
He explicitly calls this endeavor bhāvanā. 139 Because of the lack of such an
attempt to partially integrate the theory of bhāvanā into the theory of niyoga,
Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent can safely be said to belong to what
Vācaspatimiśra calls jaratprābhākara, an older generation of the Prābhākara
school, but different from Prabhākara himself.
Abbreviations
A : Aṣṭādhyāyī. In Katre [1989].
ĀḌ : Āgamaḍambara. In Dezso [2005].
AM : Abhidhāvttamātkā. In Keating [2019].
ĀpŚS : Āpastambaśrautasūtra. In Garbe [1881–1903].
Bh. : Bhatī. In Ramanatha Sastri [1934‒36: parts 1 and 2] and Subrahmanya
Sastri [1962‒67: parts 3, 4, and 5].
G : Vidhiviveka and Nyāyakaṇikā. In Goswami [1978].
KB : Kauṣītakibrāhmana. In Lindner [1887].
KY : The author of the present article
MmS : Mīmāṃsāsūtra. In Subbāśāstrī [1929‒53].
Mn : Manusmti. In Olivelle [2005].
NK : Nyāyakaṇikā. In Stern [1988].
NKus : Nyāyakusumāñjali. In Vedantatirtha [1964].
NM : Nyāyamañjarī.
NM I : Nyāyamañjarī. In Varadacharya [1980].
NM II : Nyāyamañjarī. In Varadacharya [1983].
NMG : Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga. In Shah [1972].
PrP : Prakaraṇapañcikā. In Subrahmanya Sastri [1961].
Kuroda (1989: 88) identified this navīna as Śālikanātha on the grounds that the navīna’s
critical remark on the jaratprābhākara (NK 990,3–8; G 77,25–28) corresponds to P, pt. 1,
37,19–22.
137
PrP 452,3–17; Cummins 2020: 231–232.
138
PrP 440,22: śaktaṃ svargādisiddhaye; 441:3–4: yat kāryaṃ … tat … apūrvam iti gīyate.
139
PrP 452,7–8: prayatna eva … bhāvanāśabdenocyate. To distinguish his theory of niyoga
from Kumārila’s theory of bhāvanā despite its partial integration, Śālikanātha explains that
the exhortative verb in the injunction firstly (prathamam) lets the sacrificial action known as
the scope (viṣaya) of a duty (kārya), and then lets the action known as the means (karaṇa) to
accomplish the duty requiring the way of execution (itikartavyatā) (PrP, Viṣayakaraṇīya,
453,3–11).
136
138
Journal of Indological Studies, Nos. 32 & 33 (2020–2021)
PVA : Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkārabhāṣya.
PVAO : Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkārabhāṣya. In Ono [2000].
PVAS : Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkārabhāṣya. In Sāṅktyāyana [1953].
P : juvimalāpañcikā. In Ramanatha Sastri [1934‒36] and Subrahmanya Sastri
[1962‒67].
ŚB : Śatapathabrāhmaṇa (Mādhyandina). In Weber [1855].
ŚBh : Śābarabhāṣya. In Subbāśāstrī [1929‒53].
ŚBhF : Śābarabhāṣya on MmS 1.1.1–5. In Frauwallner [1968].
TS : Taittirīyasaṃhitā. In Weber [1871–72].
TV : Tantravārttika. In Subbāśāstrī [1929‒53].
VV : Vidhiviveka. In Stern [1988].
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Contributors
Masato Fujii
Professor Emeritus, Kyoto University.
Andrey Klebanov
University Assistant, Department of South Asian,
Tibetan and Buddhist Studies, University of Vienna.
Yasuhiro Okazaki
Instructor of Hiroshima Prefectural Yoshida High School.
Kiyotaka Yoshimizu
Research Fellow of Toyo Bunko; Former Professor of Tohoku University.
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