KRISHNA THE NYAYA CONCEPT CHAKRABORTY OF SVABHAVIKA A HISTORICAL SAMBANDHA: RETROSPECT Vrsagana, an early samkhya teacher formulated for the first time a definition of inference: ‘Szmbandh~d ekasmrit pratyak$it ~e@ddhiranumdnam “r [inference is the establishment of the other from the one on the basis of a relation (between the two)]. This definition of inference clearly points to a relation holding between the hetu and the siidhya serving at the root of inference. &arakrsna defines inference as a ‘cognition derived through the previous knowledge of the relation between the hetu and the s&ihya, (Tallirigalihgi~ piuvakam SK. V.). Gotama in his Nygyastitra 1.l-5 characterises inference in a similar vein: Inference is preceded by that (tatpfirvakam), which the commentator VZtsyHyana explains as ‘the knowledge of the mark and that of the relation between the mark and mark-possessor.2During Vgtsyayana’s time the question as to how this relation can be ascertained had not been raised and he considered his duty to give his opinion on the same. He prefers the terms 1i;Zgaand tirigin, for such logical concepts as vy@pyaand vy@zzka have not yet taken a concrete shape. But still he is conscious of the value of joint method which has, in a later period, been accepted as determinant to the ascertainment of universal relation. He’is also conscious of the services rendered by positive (sapok.=) and negative (vipaksa) instances. Vztsyzyana also informs US how through different stages knowledge of universal relation makes inference possible. In Trilocana we meet with a more comprehensive theory of Vyapti ‘pervasion’. The old tradition of co-existence was replaced by a more consciously well-defined relation. Trilocana rejected the theory of external association and laid greater stress on the internal aspect of this relation; it is not merely a mechanical but a natural relation (Svabhiivika sambandha). Unfortunately no work of Trilocana has come down to us except a number of fragments preserved by JtianaSrimitra and Ratnakirti. It is clear that Trilocana had a far reaching impact on the contemporary logicians and Vgcaspati clearly admits his indebtedness to this doyen of logicians3 Trilocana asserts that if the relation of two terms (i.e. the hetu and the sadhya) is natural (Svrfbtivika) it will have the status of universal concomitance Journal of Indian Philosophy 5 (1978) 385-392. AN Rights Reserved. Copyright 0 1978 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht. Holland. 386 KRISHNA CHAKRABORTY (vylTpti). By a natural relation he meansa relation not vitiated by any condition.4 The concomitanceof the hetu and the sadhya dependsupon only that relation which servesto exclude the opposite possibility and also the presence of any condition.’ Non-concomitancecan be effective only when there is a condition nullifying the natural relation. Henceit is evident that where there is non-concomitancethere must be the existenceof a vitiating condition. There may be doubt as to whether the hetu is vitiated by a condition or not, but such doubt is removedby the observationof the nonexistence of the condition. From this it is obvious that in Trilocana’s opinion also, like the old NaiyZyikas,repeatedobservationis an accreditedmeansfor the ascertainment of universal concomitance(vyZ@) betweentwo facts. Trilocana opines that after repeatedobservationof co-existenceof two entities we mentally associate all individuals belonging to two particular groups on universal basis.Henceit is evident that Trilocana banks upon internal perception (tirzu~ prutya@~)~ asresponsiblefor the ascertainmentof the universal concomitance(vy@ri). But JtXnaSrWitra and Ratnakirtti, however, do not find any necessityof seekingthe servicesof mental perception. They retort that such an attempt would be a fruitless endeavourin view of the fact that the determination of universal concomitancehas been proved to be the outcome of the determination of causality. They, therefore, point out that repeatedobservation cannot on its own account certify the invariability of this relation. It is quite impossibleto cover all instancesbelonging to different spaceand time by simple observation. JRHnaSrimitrafurther retorts that if absenceof any condition is considered to be the sole criterion in the determination of a natural relation, the relation betweensmokeand fire can never be held to be natural. If the relation is natural, it would hold good reciprocally. But smokemay be intrinsically related to fire, fire is not to smoke.Only when fire is associatedwith carbohydrate it generatessmoke. Hencethe relation between tire and smoke would not be natural but conditional. Another objection againstthe SvtibhZvika sambandha is: The concept of svZbhEviku sambandha involves the fallacy of mutual dependence(unyonytiSraya). Sincesvfibhlivika sambandha, which is regardedas the non-deviating relation, would stand asthe criterion of non-deviation in universal relation. But causality, asdeterminant of Vy@ri, would be quite free from this charge. Trilocana points out an inherent inconsistency in the position of the NYiYA CONCEPT OF SViBHiVIKA SAMBANDHA 387 Buddhist. To the Buddhist reality consists in absolute particular (Svalak~~). And this absolute particular is the object of our perception. Perception and non-perception which are regarded as the basis for the ascertainment of universal relation have reference only to this absolute particular.7 All other generic attributes are results of our imagination. And under this theory of reality, causality cannot fit in. Ascertainment of Vj@i~ti has a reference to the generic attributes inherent in two sets of individuals. But this class character does not find the support of the Buddhists and as such it would be hardly possible to assert any relation between two sets of individuals. Here the Buddhists, however, may make capital out of their pet theory of apoha (negation) and reply that the relation holds good between that which is different from non-tire and that which is different from non-smoke. And thus the universal reference of the avinl?bhciva sambandha can be maintained. But this reply also does not fare better in view of the fact that the question would naturally arise as to how this universal relation is known. Perception is no guarantee, since the scope of perception extends upon an absolute particular. Inference being grounded on perception cannot also help much. Hence the Buddhist cannot gain any ground in his case for the ascertainment of universal relation by resorting to the theory of apoha so long as he remains an ardent follower of the theory of Svalak!apz. But the Buddhist is not to be so easily assailed. He admits two types of valid cognition: Perception and Inference. And these two types of valid cognition differ sharply from each other with regard to their respective objects. The object of perception is the absolute particular, while the object of inference is the generic feature.8 Inference possessespragmatic efficiency and this makes inference a valid means of cognition. In inference the object is presented not in its particular aspect but in its general aspect. This Universal relation may well stand as the object of this inference. Trilocana further retorts that the object of inference is a construction of our imagination having no objective basis. Universal characters are also unreal fictions and as such any relation founded upon this universal feature can never have any pragmatic value. It is a more logical decision therefore to hold that universal relation is ascertained through repeated observation. And the function of mind is directly involved in this act of ascertainment. So far as presentation of Trilocana’s theory by JiGnaSrimitra is concerned, it should be pointed out that Trilocana speaks here of the method of ascertainment of vy@pti through mental perception (m&zsa pratyakpz). 388 KRISHNACHAKRABORTY Jayantabhatta also refers to this view.g The introduction of mental perception in the concept of vy@fi by Trilocana shows a definitely opposite trend to that of the system introduced by DignHga. The concept of kj@ti in Digniga’s system appears to be more ‘extensional’ in character, since it is based on observation of co-existence and non-observation of non-co-existence between two sets of individuals. But Trilocana’s theory of Sviibhiivika Sambandha has behind it a different tradition of logic. He lays more stress on an innate relation and hence may be termed as ‘intensional’. It is the relation between two types of reals” and not between two types of construction of imagination. In Nygya logic the universal relation has a real basis and it holds between two real entities. This Svtibhtiika Sambandha of Trilocana is in no way akin to Dharmakirtti’s concept of ‘SvabhZvab pratibandhah’t’ but on the other hand, as we have already seen12,is the absence of any vitiating condition. This is a real relation (vZsfava pratibandha) forming the ground of the concept of pak;adharmatfi, which demands that the reason as determined by a real relation should exist in the subject of the inference. Thus vy@fi in Trilocana’s view should be characterised by two inherent attributes - firstly, it is a relation on the real plane holding between the universals and secondly, it should be free from any vitiating condition. Ecaspati, a worthy disciple of Trilocana, faithfully interprets and elucidates the concept of his teacher. It is evident that Vacaspati in his formulation of the concept of Vyapti definitely worked under the influence of his teacher Trilocana. He also speaks of Svfibhtiika sambandha, and his interpretation slightly differs from that of Trilocana. He looks at this concept more or less superficially when he says that it is an eternal relation i.e. to say a relation where one term cannot exist without the other. He speaks also of the absence of any condition cupidhi). He develops this idea by raising a question which finds more detailed treatment in Udayana’s work, viz., how to eliminate the possibility of an imperceptible vitiating condition. His solution is as follows: if one always suspects that his meal is poisonous he will not be able to take his meal at all. Likewise if one doubts ahvays about the existence of a contradictory possibility, all practical behaviour will come to a standstill. When any real instance of the absence of concomitance is not found, doubt with regard to a contradictory possibility will be ruled out. Doubt relates to a real entity, e.g. ‘is it a man or a tree’ where both the two terms denote something real. This happens in view of the fact that doubt involves recollection, which pre-supposes primary cognition - and, in fact, cognition NY.iYACONCEPTOFSV.iBHiVIKASAMBANDHA 389 of something real.13 Thus the plea of doubt as to whether an imperceptible condition exists is ruled out. It is worthnoting in this connection that Vacaspati is more realistic in attitude than Trilocana. He does not accept that the universal relation is ascertained mentally, since mind which is an internal sense-organ serves as an instrument of the perception of internal entities only. He categorically asserts that the universal relation or the natural relation is apprehended by external sense-organ. But VC&tspati accepts the viewpoint of Trilocana that the natural relation is ascertained through repeated observation of co-existence and it is the repeated observation which is the unique cause of the ascertainment of universal concomitance. One point deserves our attention in this connection. It is the concept of tarka. Although VEaspati does not provide us with any concrete idea of this concept, which can only be found in the works of Udayana, still he is conscious of the services which can be rendered by this sort of indirect reasoning. Wicaspati says that if the hetu, being intrinsically related to the scdhya, could exist without the latter then it would have forgone its own nature.14 Here we find a clue to the concept of tarka, although it has not been worked out by Vacaspati in detail. He does not seek the services of tarka for the removal of doubt, but to him tarka is requisitioned only to show that the Svijbhtivika sambandha, which has been ascertained by other means, is a necessary and constant relation. Udayana follows the tradition of Trilocana and Vacaspati in defining Vyapti as a svabhitvika sambandha. By svHbhiivika sambandha he also means absence of any vitiating condition. r5 To him Sviibhiivika sambandha is a negative element by which the reason is determined. But Udayana’s characterisation of SvabhCka sambandha is more pragmatic and in him this concept has attained a concrete shape. Three points deserve our attention in this connection. He takes into account the earlier theory of repeated observation and fits in it the concept of tarka by asserting that repeated observation is strenghthened by tarka l6 Secondly, Udayana defines and formulates the concept of UpLidhi. r’ Udayana’s concept of Vyapti is fundamentally intentional. He, for the first time shows that Vyiipti is a relation not merely between two classesbut between two sets of individuals determined by two different class characters. It is also noteworthy that Udayana in his two earlier works, the NyiiyakusumMjali, and the Atmatattvaviveka does not indulge in a detailed discussion of the part played by repeated observation, with which he is engaged in his later work Tcitparyaparihddhi. Here he points out that 390 KRISHNA CHAKRABORTY repeatedobservationhastwo functions: a) absenceof condition is known by it, and b) the presenceof condition which checksthe ascertainmentof V~@ti is also ascertainedby it. ‘*With regardto the old question of the doubt regarding the presenceof an imperceptible condition Udayanareplies that such doubt would arise only when a perceptible condition exists. None doubts the presenceof fictitious entities.r9 Udayanaalso offers a slashingcriticism of the Buddhist theory of causality and essentialidentity asdeterminants of avinlfbhliva relation. He points out that there are innumerable caseswhere two entities are causally related or related through identity but no avinifbhtiu relation is generally ascertainedby them e.g. fire and the ashesof fire, or the fire and the rays of fire. The positive aspectof Udayana’scontribution in this context is a characteristic definition of Upridhi,zo aswell asa functional definition of it.*’ In fine, it should be observedthat Udayana’stheory of Svribhlviku sumbandha is the last stagein the evolution of this important concept, which for long remaineda dominating feature in the NyHyaschool. He worked under an atmospheretotally different from that of the Buddhists. The formulators of Svabhffvika Sambandha had to work out their theory within a realistic ontology, which acceptsuniversals(S~m&zpz) and abh@u ‘absences’asreal entities. Udayanais the last teacher of this old school of thought and at the sametime may be regardedasthe initiator of a new school of logic which is marked by rigorous attempts to provide us with more logical and formal definitions of VjMp?i. Gzlcutta ABBREVIATIONS ATV JlW NB NBH NM NS NV NVTP NVTT RK YD - ktmatattvaviveka Jtiinahimitra Nyiyabindu Nyiyabh5sya Nygyamafijari NyayasGtra Nyayavtittlka NyHyavtittikatitparyapaGuddhi Nyayavtittikatiitparyatika RatnakirttinivqndhGali Yuktidipika NYAYA CONCEPT OF SVABHAVIKA SAMBANDHA 391 NOTES ’ Quoted in YD, cf, also NV, p. 302. Dignaga is said to have refuted this definition in his yrtti on the Pran@asamuccaya. Vide Stcherbatsky, Buddhist logic, Vol. I, p. 265. ’ liirgaliitginoh sambandhadarianam lirigadar&nam c?ibhisambadhyate. NBH, on NS 1.1.5. 3 trilocanaguriinnitamZrg5nugamanonmukhaih NVTT, p. 226. 4 Upldhirahitam Sambandha . . . RK, p. 99. ’ UpPdhirahitam Sambandham atikramed iti . . . RK, p. 99. - - -. 6 Bhiryodarianasahayena manas%taijatryanam sambandho grhito bhavati . . . RK, p. 99. ’ nanu so’ pi kasya pram@asya visayah, na t&at pratyaksasya, svalaksanavisayatvat tasya. napy anuminasya, tasyapi tatplrvakatvat. RK, p. 99. * tatra pratyaksasya svalakS;u?arirgrrThyamadhyavaseyam ca sZmPnyam. JNM, p. 166. ’ NM, Part I, p. 111. ” Sldhyasamanye nibetavye tena vastavapratibandhasya vihsasya siddhih. JNM, p. 240. ‘I Sa ca pratibandhaf? sadhye’rthe lingasya vastutas tgdidatmyatddhyarthad utpattes ca. NB, p. 30. ‘* dhirmo na agnim vyabhicarati, tadvyabhicare dhuma upadhirahitam sambandham atikramed. JNM, p. 161. I3 na tvadrstapirvam api, vibqmrtyapekso hi sar%ayo nasmrter bhavati. NVTI, p. 310. I9 Svabhavatai ca pratibaddhi hetava& svasadhyena yadi sadhyam antarena bhaveyuh, svabhriviit eva pracyaveran NVTT, p. 310. I5 “Kah punar ayam pratibandhah. Svabhavikasambandhah. “Kah svabhavarthah” Nirripadhitvam ATV, p. 403. l6 bhliyodarinas%hiy akam icaran aniittaras tarkah. ATV, p. 404. ” “Kah punar iipzdhih. SIdhyaprayojakam nimitttitaram. Kim VPasya laksamuir.” “Sadhanavyapakatve sati tidhyavyapakatvam. ATV, p. 403. I8 bhiiyo bhiryah sahacaritayoh apyupalabdhayoh kayoScidarthayor vyZbhicaranusandhanamatrena veti - NVTP, p. 332. ” VyabhicZraSariklpi darsanayogyopadhyadhini . . . NVTP, p. 332. ‘a Sadhyaprayojakam nimitttitaram - ATV, p. 403. *’ SHdhanIvyapakatve sati Sadhyavyapakatvam. - ATV, p. 403. BIBLIOGRAPHY Dharmakirtti, Nyc?yabindu, with sanskrit commentary by Dharmottarlcarya (Chowkhamba sanskrit series) Benares, 1954. Gautama, Ny~yadar&ma; with the bhasya of Vatsyayana, the v%rttika, of Uddyotakara, the tatparyatIka of Wicaspati and the pariiuddhi of Udayana Vol. 1, chap. 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