Dialectical Jesus Elena Ficara Philosophy Department, Paderborn University elena.ficara@upb.de To appear in J. Rutledge, Paradox and Contradiction in Theology, London: Routledge. Dialectical Jesus That Christian religion has a rational core, perfectly compatible with our basic moral convictions, was stressed, famously, by Kant in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone and shared by Hegel in Life of Jesus. That the logic of rationality is in some sense contradictory, and requires questioning the validity of traditional logical laws such as the Law of Non Contradiction, is a specifically Hegelian insight, systematically developed in the conception of Vernunftlogik (literally: the logic of reason, also called conceptual, speculative or dialectical logic). Importantly, for Hegel Vernunftlogik is the logic of philosophical, as well as religious truth, and truth, philosophically and religiously intended, involves contradictions. In this paper, I present Hegel’s account of the “unification of the opposites” implied in Christian religion, as developed in the early fragments on Christianity (Frankfurt 1798) and highlight some of its logical and metaphysical features. Keywords: dialectics; unification of the opposites; true contradictions; Hegel; metaphysics; logic; Christology 0. Methodological Remarks In what follows I argue for a dialectical interpretation of Jesus’ thought and nature, in a meaning of dialectics that I derive from Hegel and the Hegelian tradition, and which will become clear in the next sections. In order to do this, I present Hegel’s reading of the figure of Jesus in one early text on Christianity, written in Frankfurt around 1798.1 As a preliminary methodological remark it is important to keep in mind that, in the writings of this period, we do not have the complete treatment of dialectics that is 1 Hegel Werke 1, 324f. The text is the result of the fusion, carried out by Nohl (the first editor of Hegel’s early theological writings) of several Hegelian fragments on Christianity in one single text titled by Nohl himself “The Spirit of Christianity”. See for more details on the problems in Nohl’s reconstructive work Jäschke 2020, XVf. presented in the later published works (as, for example, in the last paragraphs of the Preliminary Considerations in the Logic of the Encyclopeadia, Hegel Werke 8, 168ff.). Yet what these early texts present for the first time is the logical core of dialectics, namely the idea of the unity of the opposites, and the view that this unity is the expression of truth. For this reason, they are unanimously considered crucial for a reconstruction of the development of Hegel’s dialectical logic (Düsing 1976) and are important for my aims, for various reasons. First, in them the relevant methodological aspects concerning the nature of dialectical contradictions2 emerge from the analysis of concrete examples of the contradictions involved in the nature and message of Jesus. Secondly, they are important for “going to the roots of dialectics”, that is, for seeing where the Hegelian dialectical idea comes from, and what were the original motivations that brought Hegel to develop a dialectical logic. Examining the development of an idea is, in the methodological approach I favour (the approach of Entwicklungsgeschichte and Begriffsgeschichte, now revitalized in some works on conceptual genealogy for analytic philosophy) essential for understanding the logical structure of an idea.3 2 I call dialectical contradictions the contradictions that are the specific topic of Hegel’s dialectics. Some aspects concerning their logical behaviour and metaphysical bases will become clear in what follows. 3 It is also important to preliminarily take into account that, although the core dialectical insight about of the unity of the opposites is discussed in these texts, there are specific differences between its treatment in these texts and the mature dialectical idea. Düsing (1976, 51) stresses that the religious truth as the unification of the opposites has, in the early Hegel, a non-logical nature (it is seen as a matter of faith, which pertains to the sphere of feeling). Lukács (1973 II, ch. 6) shows that the specific text on Christianity I am going to consider in what follows oscillates between the view that reflection – the logic of the intellect, based on 1. Introduction In the texts on Christianity written in Frankfurt around 1798 (Hegel Werke 1, 324ff.), Jesus’ thought and action are seen as revelatory of a new justice, of a new relation between people and the law, of a new way of understanding the laws and this relation. In the Sermon on the Mount we see Jesus directly attacking the laws, his speech is an attempt, elaborated in numerous examples, to strip the laws of legality. What Jesus says involves a species of paradox, the declaration to the multitude of eager listeners that they have to expect from him something wholly strange, a different genius, a different world (Hegel Werke 1, 324). The new justice, the new relation to the laws is “paradoxical”. As I will show, the core of the problem is logical. Jesus’ thought and actions require, for Hegel, thinking in contradictions. This is the reason why what Jesus says is felt and seen by the multitude of listeners as challenging and paradoxical. Jesus’ views are not only paradoxical in a meaning of paradox as conveying ideas that are against common sense (Sainsbury 2009, 1f.), they are paradoxical in a stronger meaning of the word, i.e. in that they involve endorsing contradictory views, in a way that will be made more explicit in what follows. More specifically, the logic underlying Jesus’ message requires the unification of contradictory opposites a and not-a. Significantly, it also implies the rejection of trivialism, i.e. the view that everything is true. the Law of Non Contradiction (LNC) – is to be annihilated in order to reach the religious truth (which, in turn, would be seen as shrouded in a “mystic, non-logical fog”) and the specific dialectical idea that reflection is a necessary moment to get to, and internal to, the religious truth. I agree with Lukács on the presence, in the early writings, of the specific dialectical idea and focus, in my analysis, on the passages in which it is most evident. In what follows, I present some examples of the unifications of opposites that, for Hegel, are a characteristic trait of Jesus’ message and nature. I conclude by focusing on the nature of the unification and its logico-metaphysical features. 2. Examples 2.1. First Example: the sermon on the mount or the opposition between law and inclination Jesus begins the Sermon on the Mount [Matthew v. 2-16] with a species of paradox. [He] unambiguously declares to the multitude of expectant listeners that they have to expect from him something wholly strange, a different genius, a different world. There are cries in which he enthusiastically deviates directly from the common estimate of virtue, enthusiastically proclaims a new law and light, a new region of life whose relation to the world could only be to be hated and persecuted by it. In this kingdom of heaven [Matthew v. 17-20], however, what he highlights is not that laws disappear but that they must be kept through a righteousness of a new kind [my emphasis], in which there is more than is in the righteousness of the sons of duty and which is more complete because it supplements the deficiency in the laws [Ausfüllung des Mangelhaften der Gesetze] (Hegel Werke 1, 324-325). Jesus’ words are provocative and paradoxical. Jesus seems to overturn the extant laws, yet, as Hegel stresses, this does not mean that the laws disappear. This is a preliminary hint at the non trivialistic nature of Jesus’ new rationality. Let’s re-read the last passage: what [Jesus] highlights is not that laws disappear but that they must be kept through a righteousness of a new kind [my emphasis], in which there is more than is in the righteousness of the sons of duty and which is more complete because it supplements [Ausfüllung] the deficiency in the laws (Hegel Werke 1, 324-325). The point is now to understand what this justice or “righteousness of a new kind” — which is more complete than the old justice — consists in. This supplement [Ausfüllende] he goes on to exhibit in several laws. This expanded content we may call an inclination so to act as the laws may command [my emphasis], i.e., a unity [Einigkeit] of inclination with the law [my emphasis] whereby the latter loses its form as law [my emphasis] (Hegel Werke 1, 326). Hegel calls the unity of law and inclination “what supplements the law” [Ausfüllende]. What does the unity of law and inclination, or the supplement [Ausfüllende] of the laws consist in? This correspondence of the inclination [with the law] is the pléroma of the law, i.e. a being, which, as it was said in the past, is the complement of the possibility [my emphasis] because possibility is the object as something thought and universal; being [is] the synthesis of the subject with the object, in which the subject and the object have lost their opposition; in the same way the inclination [so to act as the law may command] [is] a virtue in which the law (which Kant always calls objective) loses its universality and the subject loses its particularity and both lose their opposition (whereby in the Kantian virtue this opposition remains and the one becomes the dominating element, the other the dominated one) (Hegel Werke 1, 326). The correspondence or unity of the law (L) and the inclination (I) is said to be Pleroma and Complementum possibilitatis Pleroma is the Greek word that stands for that which fills or with which a thing is filled. It is said of those things which a ship is filled with, freight and merchandise, sailors, oarsmen, soldiers. In the New Testament, it stands for the body of believers, as that which is filled with the presence, power, agency of God and of Christ. Hegel thus conceives the relation between law and inclination in terms of the ancient idea of pleroma, which he also connects to pre-Kantian metaphysical idea of being as complementum possibilitatis. Being is for Hegel complementum possibilitatis in the same way in which the inclination is the complement/supplement of the law – the realization of the law in the concrete life, actions and words of the individuals. “Being” is, accordingly, called a “synthesis”, intended as the unification of the universal and “objective” L and the particular and “subjective” I. In this perspective, the synthesis can also be seen as “virtue” intended as the inclination to act as the law commands. The inclination to act as the law commands is a synthesis in which the law (the universal) ceases to be universal as opposed to the particular and the inclination itself (the particular) ceases to be the particular as opposed to the universal. In other words, if we consider the case in which the law (the moral instance) is: “visit your parents on Christmas eve” while the inclination is to go to a club and dance, then there are two possibilities. If I follow my inclination and go to the club, or I act following the law even if I do not want to visit my parents, then the law is incomplete. I am still a particular, separated from the universal. The universal (the law) is separated from me and my inclination. In the second setting I love being kind, it is my inclination; I visit my parents and dance with them, or propose to go all together to the club and dance all together. In this case the law is “fulfilled”, completed, enriched, I “fulfill” it with my inclination. I and L go hand in hand, are not opposite anymore. Inclination and law are different and opposite elements, which, however, lose their opposition in the unification. Hegel writes: The correspondence of inclination with the law [my emphasis] is such that law and inclination are no longer different; and the expression “correspondence of inclination with the law” is therefore wholly unsatisfactory because it implies that law and inclination are still [what they were without their unification]. [...] In the fulfillment of the laws [Komplement der Gesetze], the laws, duty etc., cease to be the universal, opposed to the inclination, and the inclination ceases to be particular, opposed to the law (Hegel Werke 1, 326-327). Inclination and Law are opposites. And yet, they are unified. Their unification is different from a mere correspondence relation of two terms. Rather, it is such that the opposites, in engaging in a relation with each other, lose their nature of opposites. Schematically, we have: The opposition between the inclination/the particular (I will call it P) and the Law/the universal (which I call U). and The coincidence or unification of P and U. Through the unification P ceases to be P as opposed to U, and U ceases to be U as opposed to P. 2.2. Second Example: the opening of John’s Gospel or the opposition between God’s humanity and God’s divinity In the same early writing on Christianity Hegel examines the beginning of John’s Gospel, pointing out that it entails a series of assertions (“God was the logos”, “in the logos was life” etc.) that are “only apparently sentences”. They have a sentential form, and this means that in them a property (“being life”) is said to belong to a subject (“God” or “logos”). However, Hegel’s view is that from a strictly sentential point of view they seem meaningless. More specifically, in John’s Gospel Jesus is defined “not only as God’s son, but also as man’s son”. “The son of God is the son of man” is not a normal sentence, for Hegel (Hegel Werke 1, 378). In it two incompatible predicates, being divine and being human, are “enigmatically” put in relation to each other: the connection between the infinite determination [divinity] and the finite one [humanity] is enigmatic, because this connection is life itself. Reflection, which produces division in the realm of life, [distinguishes] between the infinite and the finite life, and it is only the limitation, the finite considered in itself, which produces the concept of humanity as what is opposed to the divine; beyond reflection, in truth, in contrast, there is no [limitation] (Hegel Werke 1, 378).4 The connection of humanity (H) and divinity (D) is said to be 1) enigmatic and 2) life. 1) It is enigmatic from the point of view of reflection, the intellectual point of view that keeps H and D apart: according to it D excludes H and vice-versa, and it is not possible to be both. The truth is the unification of the two incompatible properties. 2) The unification is said to be life, and more specifically life as the unity of the divine and the human life. Schematically, we have: 4 For Lukács (1973, 312f.) this passage is revelatory of the non-dialectical approach to the unity of the opposites because it says “beyond reflection” and focuses on “life” (a non-logical structure) as the instance through which the opposites are unified. For my aims, what is important in this passage is that Hegel specifies the distinction between truth as the perspective that unifies the opposites and reflection as the perspective that separates between them. The theological reference point of this “paradoxical logic” (see also the third example) is the Council of Chalcedon (see on Hegel’s logic and the Council of Chalcedon Wendte 2007, 5f.). – The point of view of reflection according to which the unification between D and H is impossible and – The point of view of truth according to which D and H are unified. 2.3. Third example: John’s Gospel and the relationship between duality and unity On the double and unitary nature of God Hegel writes: Knowledge posits […] two natures of different kinds, a human nature and a divine one, a human essence and a divine one, each with personality and substantiality, and, whatever their relation, both remaining two because they are posited as absolutely different. Those who posit this absolute difference and yet still require us to think of these absolutes as one in their inmost relationship do not dismiss the intellect on the ground that they are asserting a truth outside its scope. On the contrary, it is the intellect which they expect to grasp absolutely different substances which at the same time are an absolute unity. Thus they destroy the intellect in positing it. Those who (i) accept the given difference of the substantialities but (ii) deny their unity are more consequent. They are justified in (i), since it is required to think God and man, and therefore in (ii), since to cancel the cleavage between God and man would be contrary to the first admission they were required to make. In this way they save the intellect; but when they refuse to move beyond this absolute difference of essences, then they elevate the intellect, absolute division, destruction of life, to the pinnacle of spirit (Hegel Werke 1, 380). While Hegel distinguishes, in the first example, between the old and the new justice and, in the second, between the point of view of reflection and the point of view of truth, here he distinguishes between two positions concerning the relationship between unity and duality in God. In both, what Hegel calls “the intellect” (and which goes hand in hand with the instance of “reflection”) plays a crucial role: it is the perspective that distinguishes between determinations, defines them as distinct from one another, and rejects contradictions. We could say, it is the logic based on the Law of NonContradiction and the Law of Excluded Middle. The first (a) accepts the nature of God as both two and one. In it, the intellectual point of view “destroys itself by affirming itself”. For the second (b) the nature of God is two and not one. In it, the intellect is elevated to the highest norm. Schematically, Hegel distinguishes between: a) those who see D and H as contradictory determinations (absolute Verschiedenheit – absolute difference) i.e. as properties that cannot be thought/put together, and yet put them together (they see them as two and one at the same time). The intellect is not eliminated, which means: the opposites maintain their nature of opposites. Yet, they are unified. The intellect is destroyed in the very moment in which it is posited and b) those who see D and H as contradictory determinations, i.e. as properties that cannot be thought/put together, and do not put them together (they see them as two and not one). This is the apparently consequent position, yet it elevates the intellect (the logic that admits LNC and LEM as valid) to the highest instance, and this implies some sort of “death” “absolute division” “destruction of life” 3. Conclusion In what follows, I hint at the aspects of the dialectical account of the figure of Jesus that are interesting from the perspective of the logic and metaphysics of true contradictions. 3.1. Are the Christological opposites Hegel writes about (L and I, D and H) contradictory opposites? Is their unification true? Evidently, the determinations that are discussed in the three examples (L and I, D and H, unity and duality) are contradictorily opposed to each other (the content of the Christian message is said to involve the unification of properties and predicates that are “absolutely different” and “cannot be unified” and is called “enigmatic” and “paradoxical”) and their unification is true (the unification of the opposites expresses “the point of view of truth”). As it is evident in the three examples, the idea that the unification of the contradictory opposites conveys truth is different from the view that everything is true. The point of view of reflection (which follows LNC), insofar as it is established as the highest normative instance, is simply wrong (see example n. 3). Moreover, Jesus’ message “strips the laws of legality” but this does not mean “that the laws disappear”. Rather, it implies that the laws are fulfilled, accomplished, realized via their unification with their opposite (the inclination). All this puts Hegel’s analysis in the tradition of non-classical logics (especially paraconsistent logics) and of discussions about logic revision.5 It also puts it in the vicinity of the proposals of an analysis of Christianity in the perspective of glutty logics 5 I have argued elsewhere for the view that Hegel’s dialectical logic is one important historical and philosophical root of paraconsistent logics (Ficara 2021b) and that one of the reasons of the importance of Hegel’s dialectical logic for contemporary logic is its contribution to discussions about logic revision (Ficara 2019). (see especially Beall 2021 and 2022) and conjunctive paraconsistency (d’Agostini 2021 and 2022).6 3.2. What does it mean when Hegel says (first example) that the opposites lose their nature as opposites, when they are unified? In the first and second example, L and I and D and H are contradictorily opposed to each other insofar as they are outside of the unification, and are said to lose their opposition when they are within the unification. Does this mean that the unity Hegel writes about (and that for him is the expression of the truth about the Christian God) is a unity of elements one of which is not the negation of the other (in a preliminary meaning of negation as contradictory forming operator) and that in these unities there isn’t anything that “contradicts” anymore? The question concerns the meaning of negation and its relation to truth, as well as the meaning of contradiction and its relation to truth in both dialectics and in general, is extremely thorny and the object of controversies.7 I limit myself here to one consideration about the third example, in which there are aspects that can help, although marginally, to address the question. 6 For Beall 2021 the Christian message conveys true contradictions and requires a paraconsistent logic (especially: FDE); for d’Agostini 2022 the idea of the unity of contradictories in Christ’s being both divine and human (as suggested in the Athanasian Creed) supports the idea of conjunctive paraconsistency (d’Agostini 2021) according to which true conjunctions of contradictories do not admit of simplification. 7 On the disagreements among logicians concerning the meaning of negation see Wansing 2007, 415ff. and for an overview on the disagreements about Hegel’s notion of negation see Ficara 2021, ch. 14. For a weakening impact on negation due to the case of true contradictions see d’Agostini 2021, section 3.1. and Beall 2006. The third passage highlights the relation in which the opposites stand to each other within and without the unification and can be useful to better show the Hegelian standpoint. Two possible accounts of the opposites are identified: the first – in the scheme of section 2.3. it was called b) – in which the opposites (unity and duality) are kept separate, is the consequent but wrong one; the second – called a) in section 2.3. – in which they are unified as what cannot be unified, is the really challenging and paradoxical one, and is the true account of the Christian message. In the second, the first is “maintained”, although it is not “the last word” (the last word is the unification). Clearly, the basic elements of what will then be the mature dialectical and speculative logic, and the method of dialectical negation are here at work. The question about the formal counterpart of the dialectical negation cannot be addressed here.8 For my aims, it is important to underline that the third example confirms that dialectics involves some sort of strong incompatibility between the opposites, whereby, to use Croce’s metaphor in 1906, “the life of the one is the death of the other” and that only their challenging and paradoxical unification is the true account of the nature and message of Jesus. 3.3. The role of simplification in dialectical Christology Possible connections between the conjunction in the Hegelian account of contradictions and paraconsistent logics have been highlighted in Beall&Ficara 2014 and, with special reference to truth and paradoxes, in d’Agostini&Ficara 2021 and d’Agostini 2022b. In these works, it has been argued from different perspectives that Hegelian contradictions are conjunctions for which the classical logical rule called simplification does not hold, 8 For the meaning of negation in dialectics and dialetheism see Ficara 2014 and Ficara 2021, ch. 14. and, as such, have a specific impact on paraconsistent logics. The failure of simplification can be confirmed for the cases of Christological contradictions I have dealt with in the previous sections.9 Classically conjunction works according to the rule called simplification, which implies that if “Berlin is cold and Berlin is cool” is true, then 9 The conjunctive paraconsistent approach to logic and metaphysics proposed by d’Agostini 2021 and applied to Christological contradictions in d’Agostini 2022 perfectly matches the Hegelian idea that only the unification of the contradictories is true, while their separation isn’t. Up to now, Beall has not stressed this element in his groundbreaking Christological writings. There are hints at the failure of simplification in Beall’s contradictory Christology (Beall 2022, 5 writes for example: “As I see the matter, [conciliar] writers, divinely inspired, were as puzzled as the rest of us by what they wrote. It’s not a case of magically moving pens (e.g., as in Harry Potter’s discovery of Tom Riddle’s schoolboy diary); it’s a case of hard thinking and reflection leading, via divine inspiration, to apparently contradictory claims. The situation is very common, particularly in theology. The writers recognized that, for example, saying only that Christ is human leaves important truths out, but, on the other hand, saying only that Christ is divine leaves important truths out – and so, divinely inspired, they said both, even if the result is an apparently contradictory being (viz., incarnate god) whose true description is thereby apparently very difficult to understand”. The passage fits the Hegelian idea, and is in line with the conjunctive paraconsistent approach to logic and metaphysics proposed by d’Agostini 2021. However, the logic proposed by Beall in 2021, for which simplification holds, does not correspond to this idea). “Berlin is cold” is true too. How does this relate to dialectical Christology? In the examples, Hegel distinguishes between two positions, (1) and (2), which he calls in different ways: (1) Old, “reflection”, two but not one, death and (2) New, truth, two and one, life. (1) stands for the separation of the opposites and (2) for their unification. In this light it is evident that the separation of the contradictory opposites in Christological contradictions is false, while its unification is true. This is expressed metaphorically by Hegel, in that he calls the separation “death” and shows that the unification implies life, and the birth of something new. This approach implies “thinking in contradictions” and promotes the life of thought which is one and the same as grasping the religious truth. The three examples also contain elements that illuminate the metaphysical reasons why simplification fails, in dialectics. From Hegel’s analysis of the specific cases of Christological contradictions the idea clearly emerges that the unification of the contradictories concerns the relationship between the U and the P in a state of affairs and the instantiation of the U in the P (the instantiation of the law in the inclination, and of divinity in Jesus’ humanity). Hegel refers to this tie as the function of pleroma in the New Testament, which he also calls complemetum possibilitatis and Komplement der Gesetze, meaning that, through its unification with the P, the U (the law, the divine nature) becomes a living entity. The “and” that links the two opposites in a true contradiction is to be seen as the logical expression of this tie.10 In this perspective, the reason why simplification fails for Christological true contradictions becomes evident. It is because Christological contradictions are the expression of the fundamental tie that links the universals and particulars in the Christological reality that we cannot simplify them: if we did, we would not have anything to think at all (we would be left with a “blind” particular or an “empty” universal). Acknowledgements I am grateful to Franca d’Agostini and Jc Beall for their illuminating insights on the connection between truth and conjunction in dialectical contradictions and its impact on paraconsistent (glutty) logics, to Aaron Langenfeld for valuable feedback on the theological background of the dialectical interpretation of Christianity, as well as to the audience at the Logic and Religion Congress (Warsaw 2017) and to the participants in the Logic Reading Group (Paderborn University, Winter 2022) for their helpful comments on a previous version of the paper. 10 The idea of the unification of the opposites as the tie that joins the U and the P in a state of affairs goes hand in hand with the analysis of the metaphysical bases of Christological contradictions proposed by d’Agostini in 2022 (see especially point 3 of the “Hypothesis” presented at p. 16f. according to which: “Truth (truthmaker theory) is saved”). For d’Agostini 2021 and 2022 the failure of simplification is rooted in metaphysics. The present analysis shows that, in the dialectical account of Christological contradictions, we can find the reason why simplification, in the case of true conjunctions of contradictories, fails. The unification is the expression of the U’s fulfilment through the P, and of the tie that is necessary for something to exist, be real, and so to be truth-apt. References Beall, J. C. (2006), Negation’s Holiday: Aspectival Dialetheism. DeVidi and Kenyon (eds.) A logical approach to philosophy, Münich: Springer, 169–192. Beall, J. C. (2021), The Contradictory Christ. Oxford Studies in Analytic Theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Beall, J. C. (2022), Ten objections to contradictory theology. To appear in J. Rutledge, Paradoxes and Contradictions in Theology, London: Routledge. Beall, J. C., Ficara, E. (2014), Hegelian Conjunction, Hegelian Contradiction. 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