PHOTO CREDIT: LOVE FRANKIE INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG A STUDY INTO THE CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR BUILDING RESILIENCE TO ONLINE THREATS February 18, 2020 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The study was conducted by Love Frankie’s research and insights team for Harmoni: Towards Inclusion and Resilience Activity, implemented by Management Systems International, Inc. (MSI), in collaboration with Love Frankie and Search for Common Ground, and in partnership with Indonesian civil society organizations and government agencies. Research design, fieldwork management, analysis and report writing were led by Hannah Perry. Farah Putri provided substantive assistance in all phases of the research. Adma Sari provided interviewing support, while Vicky Aulia Febrina provided moderation and translation support. Yeyen Soedjoko assisted with desk research, and Ploy Khongkhachan with literature review. Love Frankie Research Director, Galen Lamphere-Englund, provided peer review, editing and final report design. The team was also supported by Harmoni Migrant Program lead, Alva Siregar; Harmoni Strategic Communications Advisor, Ruici Tio; Harmoni Senior Technical Advisor, Umelto Labetubun; and MSI Senior Advisor Lynn Carter. Several key informant interviews were also conducted by Alva Siregar and Umelto Labetubun. Special thanks to those who have contributed technical expertise and in-depth contextual knowledge of the situation for migrants living in Hong Kong, namely, the International Organisation for Migration; Dompet Dhuafa; the International Domestic Workers Federation; the Taekwondo Association; the Islamic Union; Police Attaché; Yayasan Peduli Kasih; AKU Indonesia; Migrant Care and Nava Nuraniyah. Thanks also to the Field Resources Consulting (FRC) team who supported with the recruitment and management of the respondents to the online community component of the study during a difficult fieldwork environment in Hong Kong. Importantly, thank you also to the respondents who shared their time and perspectives as part of this study. CONTENTS ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................................II EXECUTIVE SUMMARY......................................................................................................... 4 BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................... 4 PROJECT AIMS ................................................................................................................................. 4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY........................................................................................................... 4 FINDINGS ........................................................................................................................................ 4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR P/CVE AND RESILIENCE SUPPORT ...................................................... 7 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 9 METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................................................. 9 KEY FINDINGS ...................................................................................................................... 10 DEMOGRAPHIC OVERVIEW: THE INDONESIAN MIGRANT POPULATION ............................................. 10 INTOLERANCE AND EXTREMISM IN THE HONG KONG MIGRANT COMMUNITY ............................ 11 ONLINE FRIENDSHIPS, DATING AND MARRIAGES WITH VIOLENT EXTREMISTS ............................... 17 ECONOMIC EXCLUSION AND THE APPEAL OF THE ISLAMIC STATE ...................................................... 19 CHARITABLE GIVING AND FINANCING EXTREMISM ...................................................................................... 19 INDONESIAN MIGRANT WORKERS IN 2019.................................................................. 21 MOTIVATIONS .................................................................................................................................................................. 21 LONG-TERM GOALS ....................................................................................................................................................... 21 INCOME, SAVINGS AND CHARITABLE GIVING .................................................................................................. 22 DAY-TO-DAY ACTIVITIES IN HONG KONG ........................................................................................................ 24 SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES ...................................................................................................................... 26 INTERNET ENGAGEMENT ............................................................................................................................................ 30 ROLE MODELS AND INSPIRING FIGURES .............................................................................................................. 31 SUPPORT FOR INDONESIAN MIGRANT WORKERS .................................................... 33 INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT IN HONG KONG ...................................................................................................... 33 RAISING AWARENESS AND ENGAGING WITH MIGRANTS - APPROACHES AND REACH .............. 36 CONCLUSION....................................................................................................................... 38 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR P/CVE AND RESILIENCE SUPPORT ................................................................... 38 ANNEX A: METHODOLOGY.............................................................................................. 40 RESEARCH QUESTIONS ................................................................................................................................................. 40 ANNEX B: SOURCES ........................................................................................................... 45 REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................................................................... 45 MIGRANT SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS MAPPING ............................................................................................ 49 MAPPING SPEAKERS TO THE MIGRANT COMMUNITY IN HONG KONG 2010-2019 ......................... 53 INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | i ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS AMCD Asian Migrants Coordinating Body ATKI Asosiasi Tenaga Kerja Indonesia (Association of Indonesian MIgrant Workers) BMI Buruh Migrant Indonesia (Indonesian Migrant Workers) BNPT Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (National Counterterrorism Agency ) BNP2TKI Badan Nasional Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia (National Agency for the Protection and Placement of International Migrant Workers) CVE Countering Violent Extremism DD Dompet Dhuafa DDHK Dompet Dhuafa in Hong Kong DDI Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia EOC Equal Opportunities Commission FKMPU Forum Komunikasi Mu’minat Peduli Umat (Communication Forum for Muslim Community) FPI Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defender Front) FRC Field Resources Consulting FSM Forum Silaturahmi Muslimah Hong Kong HKSAR Hong Kong Special Administrative Region HTI Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia IMA International Migrants Alliance IMSA Indonesian Muslim Student Association IMWU International Migrant Workers Union IOM International Organization for Migration IPAC Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict IR Intermediate Result ISIS Islamic State Group JBMI Jaringan Buruh Migran Indonesia (Indonesian Migrant Workers Network) JI Jamaah Islamiyah KJRI KOTKIHO Konsulat Jenderal Republik Indonesia (General Consulate of the Republic of Indonesia) Koalisi Organisasi Tenaga Kerja Indonesia di Hong Kong (Coalition of Organization for Indonesian Workers in Hong Kong) KTKLN Kartu Tenaga Kerja Luar Negeri (Foreign Worker Identity Card) LGBT Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender MCA Muslim Cyber Army MSI Management Systems International NGO Non-Governmental Organization NU Nahdlatul Ulama PDV Persatuan Dakwah Victoria PJTKI Perusahaan Jasa Tenaga Kerja Indonesia (Indonesian Manpower Services Company) PRT Pembantu Rumah Tangga (Housemaid) ii | INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG PT Pelaksana Penempatan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia Swasta (Implementing Private Indonesian Manpower Placement) PVE Preventing Violent Extremism SBMI Serikat Buruh Migran Indonesia (International Domestic Workers Federation) USAID United States Agency for International Development VE Violent Extremism VEO Violent Extremist Organization INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | iii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY BACKGROUND Against the backdrop of a rise in organizations promoting intolerant attitudes and violent extremist (VE) ideologies in Indonesia and globally online, United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) Harmoni: Towards Inclusion and Resilience Activity (Harmoni) launched to build resilience among Indonesian communities identified as potentially vulnerable. Harmoni staff designed its Intermediate Result (IR) 3 strand in 2018 specifically for migrant workers, including a substrand of activities specifically for female domestic workers in Hong Kong. A report published in 2017 described at least 45 Indonesian migrant workers from Hong Kong as violent extremists (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict [IPAC] 2017b; Harmoni Program Description), prompting this focus. However, migrant-supporting organizations in Hong Kong have raised questions regarding whether the migrant community warrants concern. PROJECT AIMS This study explicitly seeks to inform the design of activities under the Harmoni IR 3 substrand that focuses on the Indonesian, female domestic worker community in Hong Kong. Within this scope, it seeks to provide context, fresh insight and some synthesis to diverging perspectives about this group in 2019. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY Throughout this study, the research team faced numerous constraints—namely, difficulties building trust among respondents in Hong Kong regarding the intentions of the research and political upheaval there, which affected the team’s ability to conduct fieldwork and meet with migrants face-to-face.1 This report’s approach reflects the team’s best efforts in these circumstances. The research team conducted a comprehensive literature review and desk research in Bahasa Indonesia and English, including academic reports from security and development journals, gray sector research conducted by rights-based organizations and online platforms that seek to target and engage migrants.2 We conducted key informant interviews in July 2019 and a survey in October 2019 with six migrantsupporting organizations in Hong Kong. Forty-five female migrant workers were subsequently recruited for a moderated online community discussion in Bahasa Indonesia over a three-week period in September 2019. This sample reflects the demographics of the population—the almost entirely female composition of migrants based in Hong Kong. FINDINGS Our findings suggest that the migrants characterized as a potential threat in 2017 were likely to be extreme outliers in the community (IPAC 2017b). In addition, our research has identified possible One migrant-supporting organization commented that, after the media reports about ISIS in Hong Kong in 2017, “we became very careful because we don’t want that to happen again. It’s not just us who became worried, but also the Hong Kong citizens.” 2 Annex B: Sources references the full list of online platforms included. These are platforms identified via key informant interviews, migrant references and keyword search. 1 4 | INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG vulnerabilities and strategies for preventing and countering violent extremist (P/CVE) ideologies among Indonesian migrant workers, even if exposure is likely limited. 1. WORKING CONDITIONS ARE EXTREMELY TOUGH, BUT RESISTANCE AND RESILIENCE ARE PALPABLE Reports by humanitarian and rights-based organizations lobbying for improvements to migrant rights protections emphasize the general socio-economic vulnerability of migrants. Networks led by migrant workers have used this evidence to mobilize and advocate for regulatory reforms in employment contracts. This activism has resulted in significant progress in commitments toward protections for migrant workers rights at a multilateral level and within Indonesian governmental reform, though further work remains to implement proposed changes to directly benefit Indonesian migrant workers in Hong Kong.3 While it’s fair to emphasise migrants’ vulnerability to exploitation in the private homes of employers in Hong Kong, this position does not typically influence levels of vulnerability to VE in terms of their beliefs and values (Krueger & Maleckova 2002). Furthermore, a network of community groups, institutional support services in Hong Kong and migrant solidarity groups are already making significant efforts to tackle possible economic vulnerabilities. 2. CHARITABLE GIVING WOULD BENEFIT FROM GREATER SCRUTINY Domestic workers donate a varying portion of their earnings to those who suffer from poverty, natural disasters or conflict (most often in Palestine). While this portion varies, it is likely to be extremely small in monetary terms given the low wages afforded to workers. Most entrust the decision regarding the end beneficiary of the money to others. For example, some channel funds as their monthly zakat through established organizations like Dompet Dhuafa (DD), some via their families or mosques in their home community and others to natural disaster or humanitarian organizations. Most use a non-banking service to send remittances home and for their charitable giving (e.g., via a food kiosk or Indonesian restaurant, rather than using fee-based bank transfers, internet or mobile banking). Though there was no evidence of money knowingly being sent to violent extremist organizations (VEOs), respondents did not show a detailed understanding of how they might verify organizations’ intentions; instead, they often trust recipients to act in good faith. As such, migrants may risk being lured to provide financial support for illicit or corrupt organizations. 3. SMALL RELIGIOUS STUDY GROUPS PROVIDE WELCOME FRIENDSHIP, BUT MAY ALSO BE A SOURCE OF VULNERABILITY TO VE Multiple community-led groups, according to online references, offer either a hybrid of social activities and religious practice or purely Quranic study. Such groups appear to give workers a strong sense of solidarity and social support and, on some occasions, the chance to hear Islamic speakers provide religious instruction and guidance. Progress exemplified by Global Compact for Migration, agreed to in 2018, and the new Indonesian Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers (PPILN) law, agreed to in 2017. 3 INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | 5 It is difficult to evaluate the content or ideologies of such study groups, given their closed and tightknit nature. Thus, it is essential to strategize ways to nudge and support such groups to act as a potent force for resilience to VE ideologies rather than a potential vehicle for VEO recruitment. 4. FEW DEMONSTRATED AN INTEREST IN POLITICAL OR RELIGIOUS CONTENT ONLINE Working long hours each day, the time that migrant workers spend online to relax and communicate with friends is significantly less than the average eight hours minimum Indonesians spend online at home every day (GlobalWebIndex 2018). In addition, unlike their counterparts in Indonesia, few suggested having any interest in discussing politics or an appetite to consume content relating to conflict or violence. Instead, workers want to relax, seek entertaining and funny content or learn new skills and seek inspiration via YouTube. Respondents did not mention any extremist or VE groups when discussing negative content online or dangerous or harmful groups in Hong Kong.4 When exposed to video content that captured conventional VEO narratives such as the violence affecting Syrian or Palestinian Muslims, migrants responded with sympathy and empathy rather than anger, resentment or a desire to act and prevent such actions. 5. ONLINE DATING MAY REPRESENT A RISK VECTOR Online dating via Facebook or other social networking sites appears to be a fun activity for some, representing a way to make friends with women and men. However, migrants shared numerous examples of online relationships with men turning sour, reflecting the need to remain cautious to deceptive users using romance to disguise a goal of extracting money. If VEOs and their recruitment wings recognize this vulnerability, migrant women may be targeted. However, at this stage, no respondents indicated having suspicions regarding ideological motivation among those seeking friendship online. While one organization is said to be tackling online safety, this did not appear to be a defined need that migrants are seeking. 6. DESPITE RESTRICTIONS, MIGRANT WORKERS ARE HIGHLY SOCIAL Social life is significantly restricted, with migrants often sharing a room with a family member of their employer (e.g., an elderly person or child) and frequently unable to observe religious practice. Most workers use their time off socially, with friends and in established religious and social groups (e.g., Majelis Ta'lim Az-Zahra or Majelis Taklim Yuen Long).5 Most have contacts in Hong Kong before they arrive, through pre-departure training or family networks. A range of organizations and communityled groups offer religious study, social activities and vocational skills training, with well-known locations as well as online groups to facilitate introductions. This indicates a highly inclusive environment for those who may otherwise feel isolated at home with their employers. Respondents were not asked or prompted to discuss VE content they had seen online directly; this was to avoid a loss of trust in the research engagement overall. Instead, respondents were invited to identify who they would describe as a “Defender of Islam”; discuss whether Muslims are treated fairly in Hong Kong, Indonesia and around the world; and disclose who might be an enemy of Islam. Respondents also viewed videos with narratives often deployed by violent extremist groups and were invited to suggest their familiarity and response to such videos; none suggested having an appetite to watch such content regularly, instead suggesting they prefer to avoid such sad or violent content. 5 Section on Social and Religious Activities of this report details such groups further. 4 6 | INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG 7. INDONESIAN MIGRANT WORKERS FOCUS ON RAISING FUNDS FOR THEIR FAMILIES IN INDONESIA Migrants are motivated to take up two-year contracts (or more) in Hong Kong to pay off debt, save for long-term security, and pay the day-to-day costs for their own family in Indonesia. Despite female domestic workers being paid below minimum wage in Hong Kong, they typically send at least half of their income home each month, motivated by the knowledge that they can return there to a more stable future. Contrary to suggestions that migrants have comparatively high disposable incomes, respondents appeared highly motivated to save as much money as possible to assure their family’s security and happiness. Migrants maintain healthy relationships and regular communication with their families. Their monthly remittance payments demonstrate their commitment to return home as soon as they have accrued enough savings. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR P/CVE AND RESILIENCE SUPPORT 1. FINANCIAL DONATIONS Given the risks of charitable donations contributing to nefarious actors such as VEOs and the prevalence of Facebook users seeking to deceive migrant workers online (under the guise of online dating), financial literacy training with modules on the above would empower migrants to channel their donations safely. Enrich, a non-governmental organization (NGO) focused on financial education, has a robust online presence and could be well-positioned to scale up or adapt existing programs to further its impact. Corporate providers like Mandiri Bank who already run a successful entrepreneur training program may also be in an excellent position to improve financial literacy. Harmoni should clarify the existing content of these financial education modules to identify possible partnership opportunities for targeting the potential vulnerabilities relating to charitable giving and new online friendships. 2. ONLINE RELATIONSHIPS Migrants should improve their resilience to ill-intentioned online users, from con artists to potential VEO recruiters, who may operate under the guise of forming positive friendships or relationships. Advice regarding relationships needs to stem from an authentic and trusted voice for women online. For example, the highly visible SuaraBMI.com, a website specifically for Indonesian migrants, could offer guidance regarding online safety. Alternatively, influencers like Merry Riana, a female entrepreneur and educator, could play a positive role by advising on signs to watch for when dating online. 3. RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION Migrants should receive clear and structured guidance on trusted, moderate sources of Islamic instruction when seeking to manage their own Quranic study group. The Islamic Union, an Islamic charity that supports the welfare and religious practice of Muslims in Hong Kong, may already be acting in this role. In that case, they would be in a strong position for ensuring that sources of guidance go beyond verification to assist in community-based P/CVE efforts actively, to helping legitimately counter violent ideological narratives that group members may be exposed to. Harmoni, or other qualified actors, should clarify the existing approach taken by the Islamic Union, if any, to assess any gap in or appetite for such a role. 4. NETWORKING INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | 7 Migrant community groups are highly inclusive, however in order to ensure their benefits reach a wider audience, they could improve on their online advertising to ensure new migrant workers are attracted to their respective groups. Indonesian philanthropic organizations that have sufficient reach into migrant communities could be used to facilitate community networks in Hong Kong and can act as an online nexus for improving online signposting and offering strategic communications training or support for community group leaders who engage with migrants. 5. RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE AMONG EMPLOYERS: Migrants face a varying level of religious discrimination or intolerance in their working and living environments. Harmoni should consider using existing activist workers’ rights networks, like the International Migrant Workers Union (IMWU), to develop religious tolerance campaigns with employers as the target audience in mind. Employers’ restrictions on religious practice risk fostering resentment, which VEOs could instrumentalize in the future. The act of facilitating conversations about religious tolerance as part of the development of a campaign could be another means to develop resilience and community integration. It also would provide migrants with the opportunity to counter suspicions raised about their beliefs directly. 8 | INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG INTRODUCTION This report presents the findings of a study on female Indonesian migrant workers6 in Hong Kong conducted by the organization Love Frankie on behalf of the Harmoni program in 2019. As determined by the design of the Harmoni program, this study explicitly focused on female Indonesian migrants living in Hong Kong and employed as domestic workers (working and living in their employer’s household).7 METHODOLOGY Harmoni staff designed its IR 3 strand in 2018 specifically for migrant workers, including a substrand of activities specifically for female domestic workers in Hong Kong. The findings of this research will inform the design of activities under the IR 3 that aim to build the resilience of Indonesian migrant communities to intolerant and VE ideologies and recruitment by groups supporting such ideologies.8 To provide evidence-based recommendations for activities that could achieve this outcome, the research seeks to answer questions developed and validated internally around possible migrant vulnerabilities and resilience to intolerant or extremist actors. Harmoni broke the study into four distinct phases to allow findings from one phase to inform the design of the next. Annex A: Methodology details the full research design. 1. LITERATURE REVIEW The Love Frankie team conducted a review of academic literature in February 2019 that explored the Indonesian migrant population living in Hong Kong during the last 10 years. 2. KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS Between July 26 and 30, 2019, the research team conducted three key informant interviews face-toface with organizations and community groups that engage with migrants in Hong Kong, including Dompet Dhuafa in Hong Kong (DDHK), the IMWU and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). 3. ONLINE QUALITATIVE RESEARCH WITH MIGRANTS In Phase 3, Love Frankie sought to conduct focus-group discussions with female Muslim domestic worker migrants in Hong Kong (n=45). Due to political unrest between July and October 2019, Harmoni amended the research design to enable respondents to participate in the qualitative research more efficiently over a more extended period of time and via an online community environment including video and narrative stimuli. Annex A: Methodology provides detailed sampling criteria. 4. DESK RESEARCH AND SURVEY In October 2019, to supplement our findings, individuals from migrant-supporting organizations completed a survey describing their current services to migrants and perceptions of vulnerability to VE among the migrant community: Islamic Union, Yayasan Peduli Kasih and IMWU. We also conducted further online desk research to review services provided by migrant support organizations and events facilitated by migrant community groups. The Indonesian population in Hong Kong is 98 percent female (2016 Household Census, Hong Kong Statistics 2018). Domestic work is the most frequent form of Indonesian migrant labor (BNP2TKI 2018). 8 Violent extremism refers to engaging in, preparing or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic and political objectives (USAID 2011). 6 7 INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | 9 KEY FINDINGS DEMOGRAPHIC OVERVIEW: THE INDONESIAN MIGRANT POPULATION Since 2002, Indonesia has had an anti-terrorism law, revised a year later. The Indonesian migrant community represents a significant proportion of the global Indonesian population and is the third largest migrant population in East Asia (World Bank 2017: 2). Estimates indicate that there are at least 9 million Indonesian migrant workers globally, representing almost 7 percent of the nation’s total labor force (ibid). Domestic work is the most common form of Indonesian migrant labor (Indonesian Agency for the Placement and Protection of Migrant Workers [BNP2TKI 2018]). Hong Kong represents the third most popular destination for Indonesian workers who registered and migrated in 2018. Of the 264,092 documented by the Indonesian Agency for the Placement and Protection of Migrant Workers (BNP2TKI), 21 percent achieved placements in Hong Kong through BNP2TKI, below two other developed East Asian markets, Malaysia (34 percent) and Taiwan (27 percent), but above Singapore (6 percent) and South Korea (3 percent) (BNP2TKI 2019).9 Indonesian migrants are significantly more likely to be female, particularly those migrating in the last four years. In 2018, 68 percent of migrants were female, compared to 54 percent in 2013 (BNP2TKI 2019). The Indonesian population in Hong Kong is also overwhelmingly female at 98 percent (Household Census 2016; Hong Kong Statistics 2018). Those documented are also only slightly more likely to be married than single. In 2018, 44 percent were married, compared to 38 percent single and 18 percent widowed. Indonesian migrants typically originate from rural areas, with a majority coming from Java (65 percent) (World Bank 2017: 21). The following table outlines the point of origination in 2018 for locations yielding 2 percent or more of those registering for migrant labor placements around the world (BNP2TKI 2019: 24): NUMBER OF REGISTERED MIGRANTS PERCENTAGE OF ALL REGISTERED MIGRANTS Jawa Timur 60,714 23% Jawa Tengah 56,100 21% Jawa Barat 54,740 21% Nusa Tenggara Barat 32,121 12% Lampung 17,910 7% Sumatera Utara 17,887 7% Bali 4,172 2% LOCATION Most Indonesian migrants (more than two-thirds) also originate from more impoverished areas, those with a higher poverty rate than the national average (World Bank 2017: 22). They also typically have low educational attainment levels. Between 2014 and 2019, more than 68 percent of ILO considers the actual volumes of migrant workers to be between two and four times the number recorded by BNP2TKI, because of levels of undocumented migration (ILO, 2013: 3). 9 10 | INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG Indonesian migrants gaining placements via BNP2TKI had not progressed beyond middle school (BNP2TKI 2018). INTOLERANCE AND EXTREMISM IN THE HONG KONG MIGRANT COMMUNITY Research by the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) in 2017 indicated that the Hong Kong migrant community might indirectly support the development of VE views or be vulnerable to the outreach efforts of extremist organizations. This section highlights the drivers of these concerns and highlights how they intersect and contrast with findings in 2019. PAST WARNINGS Two IPAC studies released in 2017 identified a range of ways that women, and specifically domestic workers, may engage in VE. The first IPAC study, Mothers to Bombers: The Evolution of Indonesian Women Extremists, identified and named women who had been formally charged with offenses, including domestic workers. Evidence is based on direct interviews, trial testimonies, social media communications on public sites and analysis of jihadi tracts (2017a: 2).10 This report identified one former Hong Kong migrant worker, Ika Puspitasari, who had been arrested and charged in 2016. While in Hong Kong, she had given money to fund an attack and then, once her visa expired, volunteered for a bombing plot in Bali (2017a: 23). The second IPAC study, The Radicalisation of Indonesian Women Workers in Hong Kong, identified 45 anonymous female migrant workers (former or current) in Hong Kong as “radical.” This was based on analysis of official reports, social media monitoring and direct interviews (IPAC 2017b: 12).11 Specifically, this report identified three migrant workers (known in the report as Ayu, Ummu Yasir and Ghalia) who had enabled, through funding and logistical support, ISIS activities in Syria while working in Hong Kong (IPAC 2017b: 13-15).12 Another four migrant workers (called Najma, Shahida, Devi and Ifa) are identified as “radical maids” who were connected to Ayu and traveled to Syria in 2014 and married foreign fighters (2017b: 15-16).13 And finally, one migrant worker (called Nur in the report) became the second wife of Adi Jihadi, “a jihadi of impeccable extremist lineage” (2017b: 16).14 While the second IPAC report clearly states that the number of migrants likely to be engaged in VE activities in Hong Kong is “tiny” (0.029 percent) relative to the 153,000 Indonesian migrants working there at the time, the findings from this single study were alarming enough to generate multiple news stories across Western and Hong Kong-based media (Carvalho 2017; Chew 2017; Nuraniyah 2017). This reporting appears to have provoked some frustration and contestation among some migrantsupporting organizations (key informant interviews, July 2019). For the scope of this study, a critical ambiguity remains: how the role and experience of being a migrant worker, in the Hong Kong community specifically, might influence the development of VE attitudes and behaviors among the individuals concerned. This evaluation of causality is a vital It is not clear how many interviews were conducted, with who, and when or what time period was used to capture the activities of the individuals concerned. 11 As above. 12 Evidence is based on an interview with ‘Serving Islam Team’ study group members (a group the three had attended), an interview with Ummu Yasir directly and a review of Ayu’s social media activity between 2015-2016 (IPAC 2017b: 13-15). 13 Evidence is based on an interview with the head of GAMMI in 2017. 14 Evidence for the classification of this individual migrant worker is not yet clear. 10 INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | 11 clarification for the migrant community as a whole and for the design of Harmoni’s activities that intend to prevent other migrant workers in Hong Kong following an extremist path. TARGETING OF MIGRANTS BY VEOs Migrant workers may be at higher risk of being recruited to VEOs if such groups target them, either online or offline. This section evaluates the possible level of targeting and recruitment efforts in 2019. ONLINE TARGETING Analysts have predicted that VEOs, such as ISIS, are more likely to target female migrant workers instead of their counterparts in Indonesia because of the women’s relative independence, international outlook and knowledge of English (Rizka Nurul, Institute for International Peace Building quoted in Chew 2018; IPAC 2017a). Further, evidence shows that ISIS itself expanded its online recruitment strategy to women (as well as men) between 2015 and 2017 (Bryson 2018). However, our analysis has not identified any evidence that ISIS has directly and proactively targeted Indonesian migrants online. OFFLINE FACE-TO-FACE TARGETING IPAC has highlighted concerns regarding religious and political figures who have visited Hong Kong and printed materials that they handed out in Victoria Park to engage migrant communities directly (IPAC 2017b). Across networks of migrant workers and religious study groups, a range of organizations hold events and invite speakers to engage their members and broader groups of attendees. However, following a review of the events and speakers indicated by other reports and those published online, two speakers might be a cause for concern, both of whom visited more than five years ago: − Insan Mokoginta was invited to speak at a mass pengajian at Kowloon mosque by Birrul Walidain in 2010. He is described as a Chinese Indonesian Muslim convert, founder of Salafist VOA-Islam, and Mahfudz Dahlan, a member of Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (DDII), an organization that “facilitated the spread of Salafist and Islamic Brotherhood political thoughts in Indonesia since the 1980s and is deeply anti-Christian,” and a former member of the Salafi jihadi group KOMPAK (who had trained in Mindanao) (IPAC 2017b: 5). − Felix Siauw, associated with Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and author of a book banned by the Indonesian government on the global caliphate, was invited to speak in 2013 by the Indonesian Muslim Student Association (IMSA), an organization for those studying at the Hong Kong campus of St Mary’s University in the Philippines (2017b: 9). IPAC has described IMSA as Salafist (ibid). Siauw was invited again in September and October 2014 by Majelis Dzikir Ilham Hong Kong (MDZ Facebook page 2019).15 Our analysis has not identified any speakers following 2014 who condone support of a global caliphate, a caliphate in Syria or Indonesia, or any VE ideology.16 In terms of print materials, Birrul Walidain, a street library in Victoria Park established in 2006, caused concerns because of its historical links with anti-Christian advocates and because it was said to have IPAC 2017b: 8 Annex B: Sources contains the full list of speakers identified who have been advertised to speak to the Indonesian migrant community since 2010. 15 16 12 | INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG some members who contributed blogs to the now-banned Arammah.com website (IPAC 2017b: 5).17 However, it is not clear if this library continues to maintain these connections or if its materials might be a cause for concern in relation to religious tensions or conflict.18 No respondents mentioned the library during research in 2019. News reports in 2015 referred to a leaflet circulating that advertised an event with an ISIS logo.19 A second leaflet may have directly encouraged sympathy for the Islamic State. However, the same source has indicated concerns about the veracity of reports about both leaflets (South China Morning Post 2015). Again, no migrant-supporting organizations or migrants themselves raised concerns about leaflets of this nature in 2019. THE APPEAL OF VEOs AND THEIR NARRATIVES Analysts have identified numerous potential reasons why female migrant workers might be motivated to seek out VEOs in response to narratives disseminated to develop attitudes toward extremist ideology or causes. This section explores possible indicators showing the appeal of VEOs among the migrant community. AWARENESS AND APPEAL OF VEOs IN GENERAL A small but significant proportion of Indonesians support ISIS or other VEOs. One study in 2015 found that 4 percent of Indonesian participants had a favorable opinion toward ISIS, and 10 percent of those had heard of ISIS and did not consider them a threat (Pew Research study 2015; Zahid and Wardah 2017). Islamic Union (Hong Kong) indicated that between 2014 and 2015, “some migrants” appeared “sympathetic to Islamic radical groups such as ISIS” based on seeing ISIS flags or other related pictures on individual migrant workers’ Facebook pages (survey, October 2019). Thus, it is possible that in 2019 a proportion of migrant workers in Hong Kong still supported VEOs such as ISIS or other forms of VE ideology. However, it was difficult to identify any evidence of this in 2019. Islamic Union have observed that the indicators of support for a VEO noted in 2015 are no longer visible (survey, October 2019). Among migrant workers interviewed in the community, when invited to discuss any organizations or groups that migrant workers thought were “defenders of Muslims or Islam,” none mentioned VEOs.20 Similarly, none mentioned VEOs when asked which groups represent risks, concerns or danger in Hong Kong. No respondents suggested any awareness of groups or individuals with VE views. Nor did they mention groups that had a noticeable online presence. Most indicated that they were not aware of any group they could describe as “risky or dangerous for migrants to join.”21 Some migrants did describe a group that they thought was “negative” or “heretical” and “did things that shouldn’t be done,” but identified them visually based on “a uniform” and demeanor. This may be the same group 17 One such provocative author is “Yuliana S,” based in Hong Kong, who wrote for popular Salafist takfiri jihadi news sites, including Voice of Al-Islam (VOA-Islam) and Arrahmah.com, between 2006 and 2016 (IPAC 2017: 6). 18 Another library based in Victoria Park called Lentera Sukses Organisasi (LSO), advertised via KOTKIHO and established in 2009, seeks to empower migrant workers through loaning books for a small fee. But no connection has been found between this organization and Birrul Walidain. 19 The event was said to discuss the “errors of the Shi’ite branch of Islam” (South China Morning Post 2015) 20 This is a translation of the exact question wording. The online community (Task 13.9) question was: “Siapakah tokoh pembela muslim dan Islam menurut kamu?” 21 This is a translation of the exact question wording. The online community (Task 7.7) question was: “Apakah ada kegiatan/kelompok/organisasi yang kelihatannya aneh atau berbahaya atau menurut kamu mempunyai niat tersembunyi yang tidak baik bahkan berbahaya bagi migran untuk bergabung? Bagaimana kamu menggambarkannya?” INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | 13 that other respondents described as dressing provocatively or “tomboyish,” individuals who appeared to like or sell drugs or cigarettes, those who had tattoos or women who appeared to be gay.22 Based on existing evidence, the visibility or awareness of VEOs like ISIS appears to be much diminished relative to five years prior to this study.23 ENGAGEMENT WITH NARRATIVES CONNECTED TO VE Numerous sources have indicated that a degree of support for VEOs has likely been generated by outrage and upset regarding attacks on Muslims around the world. For example, the Islamic Union indicated that situations such as “the plight of the Palestinians, discrimination against Rohingya or Uyghur, racism against Muslims in Europe” all might generate “sympathetic feelings” toward VEOs like ISIS (Survey, October 2019). IPAC has expressed concerns that a wide range of Indonesian Muslims were using “Jihadi social media pages” (e.g., on Facebook, Twitter or Telegram) to follow the war in Syria carefully (IPAC 2017b: 12). Strong feelings of sympathy and intense engagement with such conflicts could translate into seeking out extremist content, in turn translating to positive support for ISIS and similar groups while moving along a pathway to VE. Building on this hypothesis, the study explored migrant workers’ level of engagement with conflicts involving Muslims around the world. ENGAGEMENT IN THE ISRAEL/ PALESTINE CONFLICT: When invited to discuss who might be “enemies of Muslims,” the most frequent response (11 migrant workers) referenced Israel and its conflict with Palestine, although other responses were wide-ranging.24 Migrant respondents indicated that Israel: “unjustly commits acts that kill many Muslims and children” (migrant worker [MW], 30, E. Java); “always tortures the Muslims” (MW, 29, C. Java); is “really cruel” (MW, 27, E. Java); and “lack[s] … humanity” (MW, 28, C. Java). When discussing five videos presented in the online community, 10 migrants highlighted their sympathies with Palestinian Muslims who were prevented access to Al Aqsa mosque.25 In this context, migrants reflected their responses in terms that described sympathy and empathy rather than a desire to commit violence. For example, one migrant worker who indicated that she sometimes sees such videos reflected that: “We must deliver Islam peacefully … Israeli militants are so cruel towards Muslims. I can't bear to see my fellow Muslims being tortured. I hope justice will come soon. … Differences in views are common. The solution is to respect each other” (MW, 41, E. Java). Four migrants also suggested that they donate money to charitable causes that support Palestinian victims.26 Their motivations to donate indicated a general desire to help those in need rather than explicitly seeking to support or defend Palestinians. One migrant worker commented that her “heart is touched when there are people who are living in difficulties” (MW, 40, E. Java), and another that “we as humans must help each other” (MW, 27, C. Java). Overall, although migrant workers appear to be aware of and engaged with the plight of Palestinian Muslims, this engagement is presented in terms of sympathy rather than a desire to act retributively. Moderators sought further details here, but respondents avoided providing them. Though none of the respondents indicated an awareness of IPAC’s research or media coverage regarding the risks of migrant workers turning to violent extremism, it is possible that respondents deliberately avoided mentioning any VEOs to protect the reputation of the wider migrant community, as well as their personal employment and visa security. 24 The online community (Task 13.11) question was: ‘Siapakah musuh muslim dan Islam yang harus diwaspadai?’ 25 Online community (Task 10.9-10). 26 Online community (Task 12b.2). 22 23 14 | INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG RESISTANCE TO COMMUNISM: Opposition to communism is a dominant political narrative in Indonesia, following a long and violent resistance to the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).27 Nine migrant workers described “communism” or “communists” as an enemy of Islam. Some indicated they hold communist views to be incompatible with Islam, for example: “In my opinion, communism values include Islamic teachings that deviate from the religion of Islam itself” (MW, 35, C. Java); “[communism is] very oppressive and insults Islam” (MW, 33, C. Java); and, “Islam recognizes God, while communism doesn't” (MW, 34, E. Java). Others suggested that communism conflicts with their national identity as Indonesians; for example: “[communist] understanding[s] … are incompatible with Pancasila and the Indonesian people” (MW, 49, C. Java). In the context of describing ‘defenders of Islam’, the subject of communism made another appearance.28 Two migrant workers referenced Gus Maksum Jauhari, who was responsible for the mass-killing of Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) supporters in 1965-66, as a defender.29 One stated that he is “a warrior who eradicated the communists” (MW, 35, Central Java). Overall, while hatred toward communists has led to violence in Indonesia historically, our analysis has not indicated that support for this ideology was tied to a particular VEO in 2019. ENGAGEMENT IN THE CONFLICT IN SYRIA: When discussing five videos presented as stimuli to the online community, eight migrants commented on a video reporting news from Syria that represented a child’s grief (BBC 2016).30 Much like comments responding to the video regarding Palestinian Muslims, migrant workers expressed sympathy and regret rather than anger. For example, one migrant worker stated, “I can only pray for them and wish them the best” (MW, 26, E. Java). Others reflected on their own good fortune, relative to those in Syria. For example, one migrant commented, ”It makes me feel blessed with the condition of my life” (MW, 49, C. Java). Despite this sympathy, no migrant workers suggested that they donated money to “oppressed Muslims in Syria” when prompted with a list of causes.31 Engagement with this narrative appeared to be limited, particularly when compared to other negative situations such as Palestine or natural disasters. DEFENSIVE OR NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARD CHRISTIANS: Indications emerged that some migrant workers in the community may have negative attitudes toward Christians, though these were indirect and few. Two migrants referred to the pope or the Catholic Church as a body that has insulted Islam in the past. Two other migrant workers said they consider Ustadz Abdul Somad a “defender of Islam.”32 News reports have indicated that Ustadz Abdul Somad has made intolerant remarks regarding the Christian faith (CNN Indonesia, 2019). However, another migrant worker referred to Ustadz Abdul Somad as someone who has criticized or been offensive to Islam in the past and concluded “I don’t like him” (MW, 29, C. Java). So, in this case, a controversial individual appears to split opinion. In 1968, President Suharto took over from President Sukarno‘s Old Order regime, following a contested coup by the PKI and a battle with PKI members between 1965 and 1966. Under Suharto, supporting the PKI or communism became illegal in 1966 (Anderson 1998: 287). 28 The online community (Task 13.9) question was: “Siapakah tokoh pembela muslim dan Islam menurut kamu?” 29 The entire PKI leadership were executed while the guilt of the PKI involvement in the coup was still under dispute. As a result, 20 million PKI supporters were left essentially “defenseless” to the massacre that followed (Anderson 1998: 287). 30 Online community (Task 10.9-10). 31 Online community (Task 12b.2) 32 Ustadz Abdul Somad is regarded as a “conservative hard-liner.” 27 INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | 15 OFFENSE TO ISLAM: When asked to give examples of who may have insulted Islam in the past, four migrant workers mentioned individuals who had been publicly charged for insults or hate speech by Indonesian courts. Sugi Nur Rahardja, referred to in the community as ‘Gus Nur,’ was referenced by two migrants. At the time of the fieldwork, he was undergoing court proceedings for uploading a video in which he criticized the ‘NU Youth Generation,’ a moderate, mainstream Muslim organization. He has since been sentenced to 1.5 years in prison (Detik 2019). The former Jakarta Governor, Ahok (Basuki Tjahaja Purnama), was also mentioned by two migrant workers. He too has been sentenced by the Indonesian courts to imprisonment, on charges of blasphemy toward Islam.33 Given that the state supports this critique, such references by migrant workers in the community are relatively insignificant. MODERATE ‘DEFENDERS OF ISLAM’: Overall, rather than highlighting violent extremists as defenders of Islam, respondents were more likely to highlight moderate and mainstream individuals or groups. For example, Muslim organization Nahdlatul Ulama or individuals like KH. Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) or Anwar Zahid, or individuals who had personal significance in their Indonesian home community.34 Two migrant workers also referenced a moderate religious figure familiar to the migrant worker community specifically, Gus Miftah.35 Individuals with a prominent media presence and views that are described by some as moderate and others as conservative were also mentioned (by individual migrants). They include Ustadz Jefry Al Buchori,36 Ustadz Adi Hidayat37 and Ustadz Hanan Attaki,38 who founded the Pemuda Hijrah movement, which, while conservative, is maintained as a tolerant movement (Jakarta Post 2019). When discussing who might constitute “enemies of Islam” or individuals who might have insulted Islam, some migrant workers were also quite resistant to the idea that anyone could be an enemy to or insult the religion. Rather than point to “Communists” or specific individuals (highlighted in other sections of the report), seven migrant workers suggested that there were “no” enemies of Islam, with one commenting that “the biggest enemy is ourselves” and another that “we have to protect ourselves from bad feelings” (MW, 22, East Java; MW, 28, East Java). Another commented: “no Muslim or non-Muslim leaders insult each other's religions, instead they respect each other” (MW, 28, E. Java). (A LACK OF) INTEREST IN RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL DEBATE In general, migrant workers included in the research appeared to have minimal perspectives on debates relating to conflicts involving Muslims globally and appeared to struggle to discuss such issues in any detail. This is likely linked to, as highlighted below, a lack of interest or appetite to discuss or engage in political content in general, not just more severe political or religious violence. This aligns with Ahok’s comments received significant news coverage in Indonesia, particularly prior to his sentencing and in the run-up to the Jakarta election. His comments spurred mass protests in Action in Defence of Islam (Aksi Bela Islam) in Jakarta. These protests united two major groupings within it as “Salafi-inspired activists” and “conservative traditionalists” who have been described as having “little in common theologically or strategically” (IPAC 2018b: p1). 34 The online community (Task 13.9) question was: “Siapakah tokoh pembela muslim dan Islam menurut kamu?” 35 Regular speaker organized by Majelis Dzikir Ilham Hong Kong who actively counters violent extremist narratives. 36 Spiritual musician and Ustadz who regularly appeared and gave sermons on mainstream TV channels. Popular among young people before dying in a car accident in 2013. 37 Ustadz Hidayat is an active Islamic scholar with academic credentials in universities in Java and Libya. He has over 2.5 million Instagram followers and founded Akhyar TV to share sermons. 38 Ustadz Attaki founded the Pemuda Hijrah youth movement, which some have used as an indicator of a shift to more conservative Islam. Others offer that it does not indicate intolerance to other beliefs. He has a significant Instagram following of over 6 million. 33 16 | INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG Islamic Union’s observation that “Indonesian migrants in Hong Kong are here to work and are quite focused with that [rather than religious or political debate or activism]” (survey, Oct 2019). When discussing topics that preoccupied their concerns in general, religious or political conflict was just one of many issues highlighted rather than a burning, front-of-mind issue. For example, respondents mentioned concerns about of from natural disasters or environmental challenges more broadly, along with domestic violence victims, health issues or migrant labor rights. These issues appeared to be absorbed as among many difficulties experienced by humanity rather than a singular focus. Migrant workers within the online community were asked to watch numerous videos relating to challenges that Muslims in other countries face.39 Five migrant workers suggested that they “often” see videos like that, while 21 said they “never” or “rarely” see them. Even among respondents who commented that they “sometimes” or “often” see such videos, respondents indicated that they resist or avoid viewing such material because of its upsetting nature. For example: “I often find the video on Facebook — on religious sites. I don't really like violent sites like this. Although there are many messages inside that we can take, I don't have the heart to see them” (MW, 25, E. Java). Overall, migrants appear sympathetic to stories from countries where Muslims are suffering in conflict, but there does not seem to be any particularly active interest or appetite in such topics. Feelings of sympathy do not appear to translate into anything stronger, such as feelings of enmity or threat, which can often be detected in discussions with those who continue living in Indonesia. When summarizing typical topics migrants discuss with family and friends in Indonesia, none mentioned typically discussing politics or religion. Most suggested they typically discuss their work, cooking and recipes, funny things they have seen or noticed, travel and fashion or beauty. Even when highlighting topics that cause disputes between migrant workers and their families at home, only one person suggested having argued about politics when they disagreed on their choice of president in the national election that year. The majority suggested that they prefer not to discuss politics due to a lack of interest or knowledge. For example, some suggest that it is “none of our business. The most important thing is how we can work well, and our family in Indonesia is fine” (MW, 47, E. Java). Others commented that “I have never discussed politics” because “I don't really understand politics” (MW, 35, C. Java) and “I don't want to debate it” (MW, 30, E. Java). Those who did discuss politics indicated their interest in their choice of president in the national elections, “once in a while, during the election” (MW, 35, W. Java) or during discussions regarding the “development of the country’s economy … and fuel prices … rising” (MW, 30, E. Java). No participants indicated that they might be interested in engaging in discussions regarding VEOs or other political-religious ideological activism. ONLINE FRIENDSHIPS, DATING AND MARRIAGES WITH VIOLENT EXTREMISTS Becoming a member of and identifying with a small group of, say, childhood friends who possess VE views—even if not initially known to the initiate—is a strong predictor of that individual ultimately also participating in VE actions (Atran 2016). Meanwhile, some analysts have hypothesized that migrant 39 See Annex A: Methodology for links to videos. INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | 17 workers in Hong Kong could be drawn to VE through meeting and developing friendships with terrorists online. One analyst suggested that migrants might be attracted by the perceived “social status” of someone who appears to “deserve respect” (Huda quoted in Chew 2018). Others suggest that individuals might “admire these men as heroes and sympathize with their cause” (Nuraniyah quoted in South China Morning Post 2017a). Online dating and marriages might then “secure the commitment and connection … in the movement” (Nuraniyah 2018). Online marriages, meanwhile, have been interpreted as “alliances” and a means of facilitating safe carriage to Syria (Chew 2017; IPAC 2015; 2017a). Online friendships and dating were explored with migrant workers in the online community.40 Sixteen migrant workers stated outright that they do not seek friendships online, indicating that they “prefer to befriend real people, face to face,” “tend not to trust online friends” or simply “do not need to” (MW, 28, E. Java; MW, 43, E. Java; MW, 35, C. Java). Twenty migrant workers suggested that they do make friends online or have done so in the past, including five who look exclusively for female friendships. None of these respondents mentioned using Telegram or encrypted platforms to find friends, instead referring only to Facebook, Instagram or WhatsApp. Migrant workers described looking for friends who “can respect me,” are “good friends, polite and mature,” are “happy to chat,” or who can “make me feel comfortable and accept me as I am” (MW, 27, C. Java; MW, 25, E. Java; MW, 25, E. Java; MW, 30, E. Java). Thirty-three migrant workers in the online community had heard of someone having a relationship with an individual they met online, and seven included themselves personally. Experiences were mixed. Three migrant workers described them in favorable terms: “I got a very positive thing from my online boyfriend. He asked me not to wear clothes that are too sexy … to protect the good name of my family … how we should respect parents” (MW, 22. E. Java). “Initially, the man was fond of me. But then I began to be captivated by his very simple personality. From him I know that men [can] treat women well … by giving advice, guiding and protecting. … He really fought for this love. Finally, when I took time off and returned to Indonesia, the man came to propose to me. For me this is very positive” (MW, 25, E. Java). “From what I hear, usually those who do online dating will take their relationship to a more serious direction, and get married” (MW, 29, E. Java). Seven migrant workers indicated that such relationships can end up becoming financial scams. For example: “From what I hear, online dating is very detrimental. Many of my friends have been frauded, and they have spent a lot of money on it” (MW, 29, E. Java). “Most of them always ask for money and then disappear and block our Facebook” (MW, 41, E. Java). Following discussions of feelings of loneliness and frequency of contact with home, respondents were asked: (Task 9.5) Have you ever tried to find new friends ... online? [prompted responses]? (Task 9.6) How do you find friends online? (Task 9.7) How was the experience? Have you ever heard stories from other migrant workers about this? (Task 9.8) Have you / someone you know had an online relationship with someone you never met? (Task 9.10) Have they ever asked you to do something for them? 40 18 | INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG “My friend had an online boyfriend and he forced her to send money. He promised to marry her, but it turned out to be a lie” (MW, 49, E. Java). “There is a migrant worker in Hong Kong who is in a relationship with a migrant worker who works in Korea. They got acquainted through social media. Then, the one in Korea came and visited Hong Kong. They rent hotels, and he seduces [her] … to pay for everything. When that person returns to Korea, their relationship ends … and [he] disappeared” (MW, 25, E. Java). As highlighted, migrants are familiar with making new friendships online though they have mixed feelings and experiences of how online relationships develop. Any caution shown appears to be purely in relation to feeling emotionally hurt or related to financial scams. None of the respondents attempted to indicate where money scammed from them might be spent, indicating a lack of awareness about whether the money was being channelled to a VEO or not. Despite this, the fact that many migrant workers are open to forming new relationships online is an indicator of vulnerability. If VEOs and their recruitment wings have recognized this vulnerability, then migrant women may be targets. ECONOMIC EXCLUSION AND THE APPEAL OF THE ISLAMIC STATE The 2018 World Migration Report, in an evaluation of any correlations between migration and VE, indicated that radicalization could be a symptom of economic, political or cultural exclusion, which some Indonesian migrants experience in Hong Kong (IOM 2018: 216-17).41 IPAC has also identified in their interviews with deportees that a critical motivator for supporting ISIS and moving to Syria could also be economic, i.e., the belief in a secure job, free education and health care for their families (IPAC 2018). Thus, economic exclusion in Hong Kong and the potential opportunity to earn a stable income in a caliphate state, as a supporter of ISIS, could have been a motivator for a migrant worker in Hong Kong, prior to the collapse of the caliphate. However, as highlighted below in the context of motivations, Indonesian migrants have moved to Hong Kong to secure jobs and financial stability for their families in Indonesia. Their primary long-term goal is to secure financial independence and capital to enable a return to Indonesia and their families. For economic enticement to VEOs to be an appealing prospect, ISIS or other VEOs would need to prove to be more financially viable and politically secure than the solution migrant workers have worked toward and made considerable sacrifices to secure. Overall, it is difficult to identify how economic exclusion as a driver along pathways to VE can apply to the Indonesian migrant community in Hong Kong. CHARITABLE GIVING AND FINANCING EXTREMISM Some, including DDHK, have expressed concerns that some migrant workers might be sending financial donations to VE actors. DDHK suspects that migrants do this “without knowing the organization that well” and as such, these donations should not be assumed to be a direct indication of VE (DDHK Interview, Jul 2019). IPAC also indicated that “Indonesian … overseas domestic helpers [were or are] … also regular contributors to Islamic charities linked to extremist organizations” (IPAC 2017a: 6).42 Other scenarios included: migrants fleeing from violent extremism; recruitment from refugee camps; and the infiltration of terrorists into migrant and asylum flows. 42 It is not yet clear how IPAC came to this conclusion or what data it’s based on specifically. 41 INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | 19 It is difficult to deduce charitable intermediaries (beyond DDHK) or the exact beneficiaries of charitable giving based on interviews with migrant workers in 2019.43 Migrants appear to prefer to give funds directly to small, community-led organizations connected to their homes, or via a family intermediary. For example, one migrant worker commented “[I give donations to a] mosque in my village because I know the conditions there and know the people” (MW, 49, E. Java), while another stated, “Usually I send money to my family in Indonesia and ask them to donate it to people in my neighborhood” (MW, 22, E. Java). While such an approach suggests an appetite for donations to go to a familiar or trusted source, some migrants commented that they are happy to trust others’ decisions about how best to distribute aid. For example, one migrant worker commented: “When we donate money, we don't need to think about it anymore. Everything is the responsibility of those who distribute the aid” (MW, 47, E. Java). Another remarked that “all organizations can be trusted [with donations]” (MW, 28, E. Java). When asked if they need a report letting them know where their donation had gone, 17 migrant workers selected the provided multiple response answer of “no, I don't think evidence is needed because I believe in the organization / people I give money to.”44 This response suggests that a significant proportion of migrant workers implicitly trust organizations embedded in their community and respect such informal relationships. However, it also suggests a wider vulnerability to organizations that may abuse that trust. If one of these organizations were an intermediary for a VEO, it would be reasonably easy for them to indicate to a migrant worker that their donations support Palestinian Muslims or victims of a natural disaster when actually they are channelling funds for VE purposes. Thus, migrant workers may benefit from a greater awareness of the risks of their donations going to VEOs, and learn to exercize greater scrutiny when choosing the beneficiary of their charitable giving. IPAC refers to Azzam Dakwah Centre, Baitul Mal Ummah, Baitul Mal Al-Izzah, Infaq Dakwah Center and Gerakan Sehari Seribu (Gashibu) as pro-ISIS charities (IPAC 2017a: 19). 44 Online community (Task 12a.13) 43 20 | INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG INDONESIAN MIGRANT WORKERS IN 2019 MOTIVATIONS MOTIVATIONS FOR BECOMING A MIGRANT WORKER The leading motivator among Indonesians for becoming a domestic worker in Hong Kong is to increase their household income (Latief 2017; Constable 2009). These individual motivations reflect the more extensive regional economic shifts and national demographic, political and economic changes triggered in the 1990s. Indonesian government policies from this period, including promoting the export of female labor, led to a significant increase in migrant flows to developed markets across East Asia (Constable 2009). Today, significant differences in wages remain between Indonesia and East Asian countries—on average four to six times higher in East Asian countries—giving a strong incentive to migrate for work (World Bank 2017). All motivations for becoming a migrant worker as described by our 45 respondents in 2019 were financially related. Respondents highlighted the importance of saving and paying off debt as their highest motivator. Most respondents emphasized the need to save money for their family, specifically for their own parents or husbands and children in Indonesia. A smaller proportion described the need to pay off debt for their parents or their own immediate family. When describing conditions at home, many indicated that available earnings were not enough to cover day-to-day bills, or that the longer-term debt of their household was a concern. For example: “because of the economy … [my income] was not enough for daily needs” (MW, 28, C. Java); “in Indonesia, Surabaya … The salary was insufficient for my own and my family's needs” (MW, 25, E. Java); and “before [my income] … was sometimes not enough for daily needs, let alone saving for the future” (MW, 33, E. Java). Respondents also indicated being aware of others from their communities who had migrated to work and had shown proven benefits to their families back home. For example: “My neighbor had been a migrant in Hong Kong for six years and her financial situation improved. She now has a groceries business [back in Indonesia]” (MW, 28, C. Java), while another stated, “I had friends and relatives in Hong Kong and … judging by their work, the economy is more advanced [there]” (MW, 25, E. Java). In keeping with other comments, a final respondent noted that “through my neighbors [in the village], I learnt that in Hong Kong the salary difference is quite large compared to working in my area. That’s what made me interested” (MW, 33, E. Java). All described their time in Hong Kong in terms of a stop-gap and not a life-long solution. LONG-TERM GOALS Migrant workers described a consistent vision of financial stability and independence back in Indonesia as their long-term goal. A significant majority indicated their hope to return to their home communities once they have paid off debt and can continue providing for their families. A considerable proportion of migrants aim to establish their own business or develop other mechanisms for financial independence into old age, such as owning a farm, running a boarding house and even employing others. One migrant worker commented: “[Long-term] I want to have my own home … to have the capital for a business” (MW, 30, E. Java); another wants to “manage finances, saving and doing business at home for needs that come later” (MW, 26, E. Java). Though financial factors dominate logic, migrant workers closely associated stability with a feeling of true independence and the ability to secure their own family’s happiness and well-being—including INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | 21 their own parents, husbands and children. One migrant worker described success as the ability to “make a family happy and look after themselves as well … [It is] identical with money” (MW, 28, C. Java). One migrant worker also indicated that she sought “to employ/absorb the workforce and reduce the amount of unemployment around them” (MW, 25, E. Java). Overall, migrant workers appear to have a clear vision of their goals and hopes for their future back in Indonesia. MOTIVATIONS FOR CHOOSING HONG KONG AS A DESTINATION Hong Kong was described as the first-choice destination for nearly half of the migrant workers interviewed, and was second to Taiwan or Singapore in other instances. The most consistent rationale for preferring Hong Kong to other locales was financial: Migrant workers felt that the salary was higher and the economy more stable. Other reasons included perceptions of it being a safe country and it has proper regulation for the protection of migrant workers in terms of being able to take days off. Language comprehension—prevalence of English-speakers—also factored into decisions. Taiwan was also described favorably because of salaries but was differentiated from Hong Kong on the basis that employers in Hong Kong are said to be “very friendly.” “Taiwan and Hong Kong [are dream destinations]. Many Indonesians choose to work in either of those two countries for their high salaries” (first-time MW, 25, E. Java). Saudi Arabia is consistently described as the least desirable destination to work in, though some also express concerns about Malaysia. They describe concerns about poor working conditions and limited protection for migrant workers in Saudi Arabia. Some bemoan workers being “treated like slaves” and becoming victims of rape. Employers in Saudi Arabia were frequently described as “cruel.” One respondent commented that: “Saudi Arabia is an Islamic country, but the citizens are immoral and most of them can't appreciate their maids.” The financial benefits combined with safety and security appear to be much more critical to Muslim migrant workers than religious affinity. INCOME, SAVINGS AND CHARITABLE GIVING INCOME AND WORK CONTRACTS Migrant workers’ earnings per month are set in a contract before their departure and agreed on with the employer via the private employment and placement agencies in Indonesia and Hong Kong. Indonesian migrant workers are categorized as a distinct economic group in Hong Kong law, even from other migrant workers such as Filipinos, and are excluded from Hong Kong’s Minimum Wage Ordinance (IPAC 2017: 2). This results in Indonesian migrant workers being paid below the minimum wage: on average, US$517 per month in 2014 (Amnesty 2014). This is more than double the average salary of Indonesian migrant workers in the Middle East or Malaysia (World Bank 2017: 32). Though none of the respondents in our 2019 study indicated concerns about their current pay, Amnesty International and the IMWU consider typical contracted payment conditions as noncommensurate with workload (IMWU survey, Amnesty 2014). Migrant workers are notably worse off in their first six to seven months of their contract in Hong Kong because they must pay a proportion of their salary back to the employment and placement agencies. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) regulation is meant to ensure a cap of a payment of 10 percent of the first month’s wages (roughly US$55); in reality, migrants frequently pay more than 50 percent of their salary (over US$380) on a monthly basis for the initial seven months 22 | INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG (surpassing US$2,100) (Amnesty International 2014; World Bank 2017: 36). Because many migrant workers struggle to pay such large sums, workers describe being locked into debt with their placement agency from the outset (Amnesty 2014). IMWU also indicated that placement agencies could often obtain and then refuse to return workers’ official documentation such as their personal graduation certificates so that migrants struggle to move on from their jobs (IMWU interview, July 2019). The two-week employment work visa requirement, where migrants cannot go more than two weeks without a work contract or risk being deported, prevents many migrant workers from ending contracts with their employers out of fear that they will not find a new contract quickly enough. This causes many migrant workers to endure abusive working environments, for risk of being deported or returning without fully repaying their recruitment fees (Amnesty 2014). Migrants are in highly dependent positions with their employers, with limited capacity to gain financial independence. However, the work of rights-based organizations over the last decade appears to have made significant progress in informing and mobilizing Indonesian migrants to advocate for their rights as workers. For example, domestic worker trade unions like the IMWU and Asosiasi Tenaga Kerja Indonesia (ATKI) have facilitated and enabled a new politically empowered group that can regularly mobilize for better rights protections, not just nationally but in transnational spaces (Rother 2017: 969-970). Such developments are reflected among respondents in 2019, nearly a third of whom voluntarily indicate knowing their rights. One commented: “My contract is clearly written according to Hong Kong immigration rules. [If I did not receive my] full salary? We are official, legal workers, so we must receive a full salary” (MW, 49, C. Java). Another suggested that if she felt her “rights are not fulfilled” then she “must report to the agency” (MW, 27, E. Java), and yet another said ”the salary is our right after we do our obligation for one full month” (MW, 25, E. Java). Conditions remain difficult for Indonesian migrants, and individual cases of employer exploitation continue to emerge, yet local unions and workers continue to develop strategies to enable a sense of agency while making progressive gains to labor rights over time. FAMILY SUPPORT AND PRESSURES Migrant workers surveyed highlighted that they send most of their income each month to their family to cover bills and build savings in Indonesia. The majority of respondents indicated that they send at least 50 percent of their salary, and some above 75 percent, to their families every month.45 Though it appears that employers pay all workers in cash, most workers seem to deposit the money in an Indonesian bank account in Hong Kong, then use a “non-banking” service to transfer funds home each month. The majority appears to prefer this non-banking service, e.g., using a food kiosk or restaurant-based service, though a small proportion pays the fees to use mobile banking or an ATM-based service. The practice of sending money home to the family appears regular and reasonable, but it is also a subject of worry for workers. The most consistent reason for migrant respondents to fight or argue with their family in Indonesia was money. This would suggest that despite maintaining long-term placements, financial problems can remain at the front of mind for workers and their families. 45 This aligns with the World Bank remittance study in 2013-2014 (World Bank 2017: 36). INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | 23 CHARITABLE GIVING Migrant workers surveyed frequently engage in charitable giving. Those who engage with DDHK, an Islamic philanthropic organization, often contribute as much as 10 percent of their salaries to charity each month (DDHK interview, Jul 2019). Among migrant workers in 2019, around a third suggested they gave monthly zakat and several specifically mentioned DDHK. A slightly higher proportion give donations to victims of natural disasters. Some also donate to those in Palestine46 or victims of poor health in Indonesia.47 As with transferring money to families, most migrant workers interviewed in 2019 suggested they used a non-banking service, generally via a food kiosk or restaurant, to make charitable donations. It is not clear if this is direct to a beneficiary or if families in Indonesia are asked to make donations on behalf of workers. Numerous respondents described their preference to give to beneficiaries in Indonesia and specifically those in their community, for example, via their own mosque. Migrant workers can also quickly become beneficiaries of fundraising, for example, if they face an exploitative or abusive working relationship, or need food, shelter and legal assistance on short notice. DDHK considers migrant workers not just fund givers but also zakat beneficiaries when they’re not paid appropriately or if they experience abuse (Latief 2017: 224). DDHK will “collect funds from fortunate migrant workers, or what can be referred to as ‘migrant philanthropy’ to support unfortunate fellow migrants in Hong Kong,” as section on Support for Indonesian Migrant Workers in this report describes in more detail (Latief 2017: 248). DAY-TO-DAY ACTIVITIES IN HONG KONG All domestic workers live in their employers’ home. Living arrangements and the nature of the work heavily influence migrant workers’ sleeping patterns, their ability to observe religious practices, communication with others or access to the internet and attendance of activities in-person outside of the household. LIVING ARRANGEMENTS AND THE DOMINANCE OF WORK A migrant worker having her own room in her employer’s home was possible, though certainly not typical, in 2019. Just under half of those interviewed shared a room with another member of the employer’s family, either a child or older relative under their care. Most accepted this situation as part of the job. Those who shared a room with a member of the family mainly indicated that they were able to gain privacy when they needed it but did sometimes struggle with lack of sleep. One commented that while “my boss treats me well” and “my privacy is … maintained,'' her “problem is lack of sleep because I have to sleep with babies” (MW, 41, E. Java). Others suggested that while “I share a room with an employer's daughter … in my opinion, it is very safe and pleasant” (MW, 25, E. Java) or that “I stay at the employer's house and share a room with an old lady. My accommodation [needs] are well fulfilled. My privacy is also well preserved” (MW, 49, E. Java). However, one respondent highlighted a more outlier case of not having her own room at all: “My job now is cleaning the employer's house and cooking. I cannot sleep well … and lack the rest time. I sleep on the sofa. I feel neutral; not happy nor suffering.” The section on appealing VE narratives includes further analysis on motivations to support Palestinian victims. Using a prompted list, no migrant worker respondents in 2019 suggested they gave money to “Muslims in Syria.” The section on appeal of VE narratives explores this theme further. 46 47 24 | INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG The difficulty such individuals have with resting or accessing privacy on their own terms shows the extent to which migrant workers remain responsive to the needs of their employer and household. Domestic workers’ day-to-day activities prior to a 2014 study were typically highly restricted to work-based tasks and they can be “on-call 24 hours” per day (Amnesty 2014). This observation remains true today, as respondents described waking to prepare and serve breakfast between 5 a.m. and 8 a.m. and returning to bed only after clearing the evening meal and putting dependents to bed, between 9:30 p.m. and 11 p.m. Most indicated they were able to rest for an hour or two in the afternoon, so they worked typically between 12 and 14 hours a day.48 TIME OFF The overwhelming majority of workers interviewed receive at least one day off a week, typically over the weekend.49 Some were even able to visit friends while running errands. However, three respondents mentioned that they receive less time off, just a day or two a month. While clearly exploitative and against Hong Kong’s Employment Ordinance, this is a much smaller proportion than the over 50 percent of migrants who reported receiving no rest day at all in 2012 and 2013 (Amnesty 2014). ADDITIONAL JOBS Most migrant workers interviewed suggested that they had not taken on additional work or moneyearning activities during their time in Hong Kong. Most were aware of such options, but respondents suggested that they did not have enough spare time to take on further work or preferred to use their spare time to rest instead. Still, one in nine respondents indicated that they had taken on additional work. At least three mentioned selling items via an online shop, and one said she had taken on additional hours via her existing employer, e.g., at his office. FREEDOM AT HOME: COMMUNICATIONS AND RELATIONSHIPS Most migrants interviewed said that, during the working week, they could use their phones and the internet easily. Numerous migrants explained that they had access to the household internet and could readily call family and friends as needed, though some described intense frustration, with calls being cut off frequently. Others suggested that their ability was more constrained, doing so only in the evenings or when their employers were out of the house. Despite these constraints, at least half of respondents (including those who had contracted away from home for over a decade) indicated that they spoke to a family member or friend from home in Indonesia every day. None of our respondents suggested they were unable to access their phones or the internet during the week. Overall, this indicates that while the amount of time online is limited, and significantly less than the average minimum of eight hours spent online by Indonesians at home, online access during the week is achievable on a regular basis for most (GlobalWebIndex 2018). FREEDOM AT HOME: RELIGIOUS PRACTICE Employers appear to take a firmer attitude toward religious practice in their home. DDHK has highlighted the difficulties that some migrants face in observing their religion, particularly in terms of having space to pray and being required to eat the same food as their employer (DDHK interview, This is lower than the “average 17-hour days” documented by Amnesty International during fieldwork in 2012 and 2013. This discrepancy could be because workers in this period were sampled by Amnesty via migrant support organizations and thus may represent those in the worst conditions, or because working conditions may have improved after significant lobbying for improvements in employer practices over this period (Amnesty International 2014). 49 IMWU indicated that some placement agencies require workers to pursue vocational training during their time off in their first three months, and some are obliged to pay extra for it. None of our respondents mentioned this (IMWU KII Interview). 48 INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | 25 July 2019). This aligns with a survey in 2013 that suggested that nearly a third of workers were prevented from practizing their own religion at home (Amnesty 2013). Religious practice appears to be difficult for around half of the migrants interviewed. In terms of prayer practices, around a third indicated that they were able to do so without difficulty. However, many suggested that they needed to ask permission, needed to do so secretly or were simply not allowed to pray. Such constraints appear to stem more from the attitudes of the employer than issues around workload. For example, the employer is “afraid to see prayer” (MW, 25, E. Java) or “afraid of … [the] white mukena” (MW, 49, C. Java), or simply states that “nothing can be worshipped” (MW, 28, C. Java). Thus, some migrant workers face heavy restrictions on their religious practice during the week. In addition, numerous migrants commented on their need to cook and often consume pork when sharing meals with the household. While this is not a proscribed requirement in their contract, it is clearly a frequent habit of Hong Kong households and thus an expectation for domestic workers to perform without discussion. Overall, most respondents who raised the issue of restrictions on religious practice described it as a manageable and straightforward downside of the nature of their work. However, others suggested that this caused them some personal discomfort. SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES FRIENDSHIPS IN HONG KONG A high proportion of migrant workers appear to remain in regular contact with friends they had made during their training in Indonesia and through their recruitment/placement agency once they have arrived in Hong Kong. This remains the case for migrant workers who have been based in Hong Kong for between four and 10 years and does not appear to be limited to recent arrivals in the city. Some migrant workers also indicated that they had friends in Hong Kong from before they became migrant workers, such as relatives, school friends or neighbors from their original communities in Indonesia. This indication of existing transnational networks also connects with a further finding that numerous migrants who travel to Hong Kong receive a recommendation from existing contacts who already work there. Migrants frequently emphasized that their Indonesian friends in Hong Kong are also Muslim. This may have been raised to underline a sense of reliability and trust, or because it emphasizes the type of activities they pursue together, such as religious study groups and attending the mosque for prayer. Migrant workers suggested that if they were to avoid anyone in Hong Kong from the Indonesian community, it would be due to that person’s desire to borrow money. Numerous respondents commented that they try to avoid people who like to take out bank loans or ask to borrow money from them. Though none of the respondents indicated that they would avoid friendships with anyone of a different faith-based or political view, some expressed concern or fear of anyone who took drugs or appeared to be engaging in sex work. 26 | INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG SOCIAL ACTIVITIES AND SPACES During their free time, most migrant workers rest, spend time with friends outside the household, observe their religious practice and learn or pursue interests including sports, dance, cooking, fashion and make-up. Victoria Park in Causeway Bay has been described as a particularly prominent destination during migrant workers’ free time, as “one of the most important social gatherings for Indonesian maids” and “hugely popular” (IPAC 2017: 4). The gatherings in Victoria Park are a combination of: “a source of emotional support and community” and the space appears to represent a vital combination of social and religious activities (ibid). For example, migrants can combine more formal meetings for noon prayers, recitations of the Quran and lectures from an Ustadz with informal sessions such as sharing celebrity gossip or discussing problems with their employer or at home with their families. Because of this mixture, it can be challenging to separate the religious from the social activities of domestic workers in Hong Kong within this space. Migrants in 2019 frequently mentioned parks, along with other meeting places, including mosques, the shopping area Mong Kok, Mei Foo plaza and dedicated spaces for exercizing, e.g., for running, yoga, gymnastics or dancing. SOCIAL NETWORKS AND GROUPS A wide-range of community-based migrant worker networks appear to facilitate social and religious activities in a way that is much more informal than the “services” or “activities” described in the migrant support services section that follows (section on Support for Indonesian Migrant Workers). Media reports suggest around 200 associations, although it is challenging to confirm exact numbers, particularly given that activity seems to fluctuate dramatically year to year (New York Times 2017). Some of these groups appear to be exclusively religious and for the purposes of Qur'anic study. However, a significant proportion offer a hybrid of religious and social activities, highlighting how migrants can develop community ties and social or economic skills while observing their religious practice. This combination reflects both the interests of many migrants, and a dedicated strategy on the part of Islamic philanthropic organization DDHK, which frequently acts as a facilitator, partner and funder of community groups in Hong Kong, including the secular. DDHK aims to protect migrant workers from the influence of non-Muslim or risky organizations in Hong Kong through developing a sense of solidarity among Indonesian, Muslim migrant workers.50 In an interview in 2010, the director of DDHK’s branch in Hong Kong explained that it sought to protect and empower women migrants and thus “have started to address the ‘cause’ and the ‘symptom’” by creating “agents of social change” through offering activities intended to empower and build social relationships between migrants themselves (Ghofur quoted in Latief 2017: 246). The following organizations reflect this hybrid combination of religious and social activities51: NAME Forum Silaturahmi Muslimah Hong Kong (FSM)52 PUBLIC ROFILE REACH Advertized on DDHK Only 501- 1,000 members (according to DDHK) ACTIVITIES Islamic teaching English language Sewing classes Risky in this context, as interpreted by DDHK, could also mean Christian missionaries. It is not possible to indicate whether such groups are moderate or otherwise based solely on their public profile. 52 Held at branches in Causeway Bay, Tuen Mun and Yuen Long. 50 51 INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | 27 NAME PUBLIC ROFILE REACH ACTIVITIES Majelis Taklim Yuen Long53 Collaborate with DDHK, Nahdlatul Ulama and KJRI. 201-500 Facebook followers Islamic teaching (An-Nahdliyah method and Tauhid) every Sunday. Arabic music classes A blog to facilitate donations for “the poor” Persatuan Dakwah Victoria (PDV) Member of KOTKIHO and managed under the Islamic Union of Hong Kong Open Facebook page 201-500 Facebook followers Public lectures for Islamic teaching with prominent speakers. Religious teaching classes. Training for workers related to entrepreneurial skills. Overseas travel. Haloqah - ‘Circle’54 Advertised on DDHK and coordinated with Islamic Union Multiple open Facebook pages 201-500 Facebook followers for different pages (for each daily Haloqah, or circle) JDU Firdaus Advertised on DDHK 50-200 Facebook followers Islamic studies Comedy events Hijab decorating competition Ikatan Warga Muslim Indramayu Cirebon (Muslims Society from Indramayu and Cirebon) (Wamic).55 Advertised on DDHK and Facebook 50-200 Facebook members Islamic studies under the advice of Islamic Union Hong Kong; held on Sundays. Fundraising, e.g., for a house refurbishment. Hong Kong Muslimah Migrant Workers Sisterhood Association (IPMH) Advertised on DDHK Closed Facebook group Unknown Islamic studies and entrepreneurship training (a savings and loan service is said to be available). Unknown Islamic studies Shelter and advocacy support Entrepreneurship workshops Health workshops Komunitas Migran Indonesia (KOMI) Advertised on DDHK Islamic study groups for migrant workers held daily, with one altogether on Sundays, “Halaqoh Bersatu.” Sewing classes Groups that are more explicitly and exclusively religious include:56 NAME PUBLIC PROFILE REACH Majelis Ta'lim Az-Zahra57 Private Facebook page. 12,200 Facebook followers Majelis Dzikir (MDZ) Ilham Advertised on DDHK and via open Facebook page Member of PDV 6,000 Facebook followers ACTIVITIES Islamic teaching Public events on Islamic teachings inviting prominent Muslim figures (conservative and moderate) Held at MT Al-Hidayah, Ning Road, Yuen Long. Held at Masjid Ammar Wan Chai. 55 Near the canteen in Victoria Park, Causeway Bay. 56 It is not possible to indicate whether such groups are moderate or otherwise based on their public profile alone. 57 Held at Tin Hau bus terminal. 53 54 28 | INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG NAME PUBLIC PROFILE REACH Al-Istiqomah International Moslem Society (AIMS) Member of the Indonesian Muslim Migrant Workers Association in Hong Kong (GAMMI-HK) 400 attended the ‘masjid tour’ in 2019 Forum Komunikasi Mu'minat Peduli Umat (FKMPU) Advertised on DDHK Open Facebook page Salikul Lail58 Advertised on DDHK only 30 members (according to DDHK) Islamic studies from 11 p.m. to 1 a.m. weekly and via online web-conferencing with Indonesian teachers Invite prominent teacher annually Young Kartini59 Advertised on DDHK About 15 members, according to DDHK. Islamic studies under the guidance of pesantren / boarding school - An-Nur Soditan Lasem, Rembang, Central Java. Al-Hikmah Advertised on DDHK private Facebook account Unknown Islamic studies, library and public lectures. Held during weekends and holidays. Events: “halal bi halal” in conjunction with Eid Mubarak and Kartini’s day to celebrate women’s empowerment. Majelis Taklim Sabtu Taipo60 Advertised on DDHK only Unknown Islamic studies held on Saturday and Sunday at 3PM Under 50 Facebook followers ACTIVITIES Islamic teaching, tours of mosques in Hong Kong and public lectures Religious study group Some groups are purely social; for example: NAME Sanggar Budaya PUBLIC PROFILE Private Facebook account Publicized via news media Liga Pekerja Migran Indonesia (LiPMI) Open Facebook page Yogya International Club (YIC) Advertised on DDHK and open Facebook page Irsyad Geperbumi61 REACH ACTIVITIES 2,000-3,000 Facebook followers Preserving Indonesian traditional art and culture 1,000-1,500 followers Political activism among migrant workers Indonesian flag ceremony Traditional costumes fashion show 500-1,000 followers Entrepreneurship and cooking 50-200 Facebook followers Loan and sell books to Indonesian migrant workers publicly Collaborate with Irsyad publication in Indonesia Musical group that perform rebana Held near the basketball courts in Victoria Park, Causeway Bay. Based in Causeway Bay, Tin Hau. 60 Held under the Tai Po Cungsam bridge, Taipo Center. 61 In front of the Indonesian market store in Causeway Bay. 58 59 INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | 29 NAME Association for Indonesian Society and Former Domestic Workers (Amanah) PUBLIC PROFILE REACH Open Facebook page Briefly mentioned on KOTKIHO Facebook page 50-200 Facebook followers ACTIVITIES Fashion and Dance SENSE OF AGENCY AND STATUS AMONG SMALL COMMUNITY GROUPS IN HONG KONG Though some of the community groups described above appear small, with just 10 to 15 members, and from the outside it may appear that the community is quite fragmented, their existence enables individual migrant workers to take on leadership roles. These roles, such as “meeting organizer” or “secretary,” confer status and a sense of agency to their lives in Hong Kong (Rother: 968). Such groups may appear secretive or suspicious to those with concerns about the development of terrorist cells. However, it’s likely that such groups enable and strengthen friendships and trust, without a sense of a need to communicate externally or be transparent concerning their activities. INTERNET ENGAGEMENT USE IN DAY-TO-DAY LIFE As highlighted, spending time browsing the internet does not feature prominently in the descriptions of free time by migrant workers. Where respondents did discuss the internet, it was in the context of calling or messaging with close friends and family, reading specialist migrant worker media like SuaraBMI or learning (through YouTube videos). Few suggested having sufficient time or desire to use their limited free-time browsing websites or speaking with people they don’t know.62 Instead, migrant workers suggested that their time off is their “opportunity to meet friends” and so they “only focus on going out, eating out, making jokes with friends” and that that “makes me forget the internet” (MW, 40, E. Java). Another that she tries to “forget the internet because I want to be happy by meeting friends or sightseeing” (MW, 27, E. Java). When describing their use of YouTube, nearly all indicated that this was for learning skills such as cooking or languages. While few explicitly mentioned using YouTube for religious study, some mentioned specific Ustadz they like to follow online (see “Role Models and Inspiring Figures”). ONLINE ENGAGEMENT When describing the type of content migrants engage with online, i.e., liking or sharing content with their friends, “funny things” was the most popular. Aside from the humor, migrants indicated that they typically liked or shared content relating to education, cooking and food, music, travel and their working conditions in Hong Kong. None suggested that they shared anything of a political or religious nature in this context. Migrants indicated a wide variety of content that they found offensive or frustrating online. The most frequent theme was a strong dislike of content that reflected disputes or acts of violence within families, between parents and their children. Some respondents commented on how they disliked seeing parents mistreat their children or vice-versa. 62 30 SuaraBMI.com’s Facebook page launched in 2015 and has 467,000 followers. | INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG Some respondents also commented on their frustration when seeing information about hoaxes or offensive political or religious content. However, this was a small proportion of the overall group and does not appear to be a reliable or consistent concern across the sample. A high proportion of migrants appear to be members of a group specific to migrant workers63 either on Facebook or WhatsApp, as well as using the same apps for private chats and discussions with friends. Such groups appear to be separate from the online presence generated by offline groups whose central mode is offline activity (see below). Some migrants also appear to enjoy specific groups for cooking, sport and business purposes. The use of the migrant workers' community groups appears to have numerous benefits. Some have used them for “finding work in Hong Kong” (MW, 22, E. Java), learning “the latest news, [in] Hong Kong situation etc.” (MW, 28, C. Java), to “know the conditions of fellow migrant workers” (MW, 34, E. Java). They are also used to gain help and inspiration, provide opportunities to vent “about employers” (MW, 26, E. Java) as well as arranging offline meet-ups and making friends. ROLE MODELS AND INSPIRING FIGURES Respondents highlighted numerous individuals whom they found to be a good source of inspiration or guidance in their day-to-day lives. Some have prominent online profiles, whereas others appear to be based much more on their day-to-day, direct relationships. More than one migrant worker in the online community highlighted the following individuals either as a source of inspiration or as someone they regard as a “defender of Islam.” Where the individuals have visited Hong Kong to speak, the specific organization who invited the speaker has been indicated. NAME ONLINE PRESENCE PROFILE AFFILIATION TO ORG IN HONG KONG RELIGIOUS GUIDANCE Merry Riana Inspirational, Indonesian female entrepreneur who shares motivational videos on YouTube Prominent YouTube channel - over 2m subscribers None known _ Ustad Sholeh Mahmud (‘Ustad Solmed’) Prominent Muslim preacher in Indonesia. He hosted a TV show (201516) discussing Islamic values Instagram - 341k Persatuan Dakwah Victoria Y Gus Miftah A Muslim preacher known for his activities in nonconventional places such as in night clubs or in migrant communities. Instagram - 794k Majelis Dzikir Ilham Hong Kong Y Ustad Hanan Attaki Muslim preacher with a focus on issues affecting young people. Instagram - 7.8m Majelis Dzikir Ilham Hong Kong Y KH. Anwar Zahid Muslim preacher known for his humor. Instagram - 59k followers Majelis Dzikir Ilham Hong Kong Y Ustad Adi Hidayat Muslim preacher known for his intellectuality and Instagram - 2.4m None known Y 63 Examples of groups include the Indonesian Migrant Workers group and Suara Migrant Indonesian Workers in Hong Kong. INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | 31 NAME PROFILE ONLINE PRESENCE AFFILIATION TO ORG IN HONG KONG RELIGIOUS GUIDANCE contribution for community service and international Islamic sermon In addition to those described above, some migrants also suggested that they benefit from speaking to a family member such as their father or sister for religious guidance or a teacher from home. This highlights that, for some, religious advice is safeguarded quite carefully. 32 | INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG SUPPORT FOR INDONESIAN MIGRANT WORKERS This section highlights the range of support services available to migrant workers in Hong Kong in order to support the identification of possible gaps, opportunities or partners for future Harmoni programmatic activities. INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT IN HONG KONG Organizations engaging with migrants at different stages of their experience and the services they provide can be categorized into the following broad groups. Organizations understood to be operating these services are summarized in the table: NO. DETAILS 1 Supporting the recruitment, training and placement of migrant workers 2 Providing security and physical safety support to Indonesians in Hong Kong 3 Advocating for and on behalf of migrants regarding legal and rights-based issues and offering rightsbased education 4 Providing emergency housing, healthcare advice and psycho-social counselling 5 Providing vocational skills education and social activities 6 Providing religious education, activities, sermons and study groups 7 Building resilience to violent or extremist narratives Service areas 1, 3 and 5 to 7 summarized above are described in further detail below. RECRUITMENT, TRAINING AND PLACEMENT Private recruitment agencies and the Indonesian Agency for the Placement and Protection of Migrant Workers (BNP2TKI) typically coordinate with Hong Kong placement agencies to train and place Indonesian migrants with employers. Ownership of the training curriculum and delivery is understood to be undergoing a transition to the government and the ‘Law on the Protection of Migrant Workers’ is intended to offer better regulation of the practices of private agencies and migrant worker contracts (GFMD 2019; UN Women 2019). Prior to these recent reforms, rights advocates in Hong Kong have raised strong concerns about the role of these agencies and the extent to which they are regulated to protect the rights of workers on their workload, pay and freedoms in their role. For example, concerns have been raised that the role of the agent reflects “an attitude of control [rather] than of assistance” (Rother 2017: 962). The training has also been described by some migrant activists as: “a form of brainwashing, where you have to give yourself in… they teach you how to obey” (Interview with Hong Kong migrant activist quoted in Rother 2017: 964). However, as highlighted above, progress does appear to be forthcoming. In 2019, migrants indicated that they felt satisfied by the training they had received prior to commencing their role in Hong Kong and that the agent continued to play an important role. When asked where migrants would turn to if INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | 33 they faced a problem in Hong Kong, e.g., with their employer, the worker’s agent (“P.T”) (together with the Indonesian Consulate) was highlighted most frequently: “If there is a problem then I contact the agent. If there is no response, then the Consulate or the police” (MW, 30, E. Java). “Alhamdulillah, until now I have no problem, and if there is a problem, we can go to the agent or consulate” (MW, 38, E. Java). “If I have a problem with an employer, I ask for help from the Agency, so that it is explained and does not cause misunderstanding between me and the boss” (MW, 49, C. Java). While there are limited examples of placement agencies actually being used, their frequent mention underlines the amount of trust afforded to them in their relationships with migrant workers, alongside migrants’ friends and families based in Hong Kong or in Indonesia. NGOs, religious study groups or informal community groups were also mentioned for this role but very infrequently. In terms of the benefits of the training, at least half of the respondents suggested that they still return to the notes or guidance books they received during their training, particularly for practizing their Cantonese or checking vocabulary, as well as for checking specific recipes. Workers also indicated that they benefited from some advice shared by their employer as well as YouTube videos to continue improving their skills.64 When recommending what other aspiring migrant workers should focus on, the majority of those interviewed recommended developing skills in languages and cooking. RIGHTS-BASED ADVOCACY AND SUPPORT A broad range of organizations work on longer-term campaigns to improve workers’ rights in Hong Kong, as well as direct one-to-one advocacy support and advice for individual cases. Organizations assisting in this way include the Konsulat Jenderal Republik Indonesia (KJRI); the IOM; Serikat Buruh Migran Indonesia (SBMI); Migrant Care; Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC); HELP for Domestic Workers; Pathfinders; Koalisi Organisasi Tenaga Kerja Indonesia di Hong Kong (KOTKIHO); Kabar Bumi; Justice Centre Hong Kong; and Christian Action. Such organizations often mobilize together to achieve change, uniting across religious and secular lines, and empowering migrants to play an active role. For example, during Ramadan in 2011, IMWU, DD and the Indonesian Migrant Workers League, and others organized a seminar entitled: Dengan Semangat Ramadan Melawan Perbudakan Modern untuk Mewujudkan Perlindungan Sejati bagi BMI (With the Spirit of Ramadan [we] Fight Against Modern Slavery in Order to Provide a Comprehensive Protection for Indonesian Domestic Workers). Secondly, during the ‘Junk WTO’ counter-event held parallel to the WTO Ministerial Conference in 2013, migrant organizers from Hong Kong launched the ‘C 189 Campaign Toolkit’ which contained ‘The Foreign Domestic Workers’ Guide to Organizing’.65 This toolkit explained how migrant workers can self-organize from the steps of ‘social investigation’ and ‘contact building’ to ‘organizing a group’ and ‘formalizing the organization’ (APMM 2013; Rother 2017: 968). Furthermore, organizations like IMWU often heavily rely on migrant activist volunteers over the weekends. Volunteers and activists can wear = badges exclaiming: “Reject outsourcing” and “Give us holidays and rest days.” 64 The YouTube channels Cooking Mama and Nikmatul Rosidah were specifically highlighted for providing additional cooking training as well as pages called “Popular Hong Kong Cuisine” on Facebook. 65 Organized in support of the ILO Convention on Decent Work for domestic workers. 34 | INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG Some migrant workers highlighted that they would welcome a community peer support group for exchanging concerns or ideas for how to resolve problems in their workplaces or for migrants who have just arrived in Hong Kong, much like a face-to-face version of the ‘Suara BMI’ Facebook group. These comments indicated not just an appetite to improve rights but also to support one another to do so as a mutually-reinforcing community. This approach to organizing and self-organizing by the labor movement reflects a drive to support one another as migrants mutually. It also shows that a migrant can be simultaneously vulnerable in a private space in a Hong Kong household while also being a respected activist, political organizer and friend in the public space of Hong Kong (Rother 2017:960). It also demonstrates how, when it comes to migrant workers’ rights and protections, there is an active and thriving network already. Separately, IMWU has suggested that its approach to promoting “unity among Indonesian migrant workers” can act as a means for building resilience to VE messages (IMWU interview, Jul 2019). “They have a strong bond with their friends, and it serves as a community-based safety net against violent extremism” (ibid). VOCATIONAL SKILLS INCLUDING FINANCIAL EDUCATION A number of organizations offer vocational skills training including entrepreneurial skills and/or financial education, for example Mandiri Sahabatku, Enrich, DD and Pathfinders (Enrich website 2019; DDHK interview, Jul 2019; IMWU interview, Jul 2019). Such skills appear to be particularly popular among migrant workers. When invited to suggest what their ideal community group or support service might be, the most common area was support for developing entrepreneurial skills such as creating and selling products that could be sold online. Though one migrant worker suggested that: “there are a lot of communities that teach us to be an entrepreneur,” she was still interested in forming a “community about business and stuff that I do right now [like selling products online]” (MW, 29, C. Java). Mandiri Sahabatku was referenced which engages 2,000 annually (Enterprise Asia 2019). Other respondents commented on a desire to learn or improve their language skills, cooking skills or beauty and make-up skills. RELIGIOUS STUDY, PRACTICE AND COMMUNITY BUILDING A range of organizations offer the opportunity to pursue religious study as a group and offer additional social activities, reflecting the broader, multi-faceted appetite and needs of migrant workers. For example, DDHK offers Quranic study as well as classes in make-up, sewing, computer skills, financial literacy and English language. DDHK is not alone: organizations like the Islamic Union and AKU Indonesia also combine both. When invited to indicate which organizations offered services or support to migrants in general, Dompet Duafa was the second-highest reference, second only to the Indonesian Consulate. Migrants indicated that fellow migrant workers had recommended this organization to them. “I know about the organization from friends in Hong Kong. I learnt that they do activities that add knowledge and a lot of lessons about Islam” (MW, 41, E. Java). “I know this activity from fellow BMI friends. They offer recitation activities, then collect donations or assistance in the form of money, and later distribute [them] to the poor” (MW, 40, E. Java). INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | 35 DD has very intentionally developed a capability to offer this range of services, beyond narrower definitions of Islamic philanthropy or religious study. It describes itself as a “social organization” and one that “holds social activities... invites speakers to educate the BMI about religion and formal education. We create a religious community. During their days off, we invite them to gather in parks and make study groups” (DDHK Interview, Jul 2019). In interviews with other analysts, DDHK has indicated that “building solidarity among migrants has become the priority of the DDHK program, under which social and moral awareness among migrants are a necessity for helping each other evolve” (Rother 2017: 248). This facility to coordinate and develop groups and mutual solidarity is regarded as an accurate translation of Islamic values and messages. P/CVE APPROACHES Two initiatives have been identified to date, though in general there appear to be very few current or consistent initiatives seeking to prevent or counter VE ideology directly. This may stem from the view that there is limited risk of such ideologies being supported or circulated among the migrant community. As highlighted above, there are also organizations, like the Indonesian Consulate, the Islamic Union and DD, who offer other kinds of support which may indirectly also assist in P/CVE. Peduli Kasih has indicated that it is currently collaborating with INFEST to organize Indonesian migrant workers in Hong Kong to establish a P/CVE working group to “provide media management training to prepare to be an ‘agent of peace’ and develop counter-narratives to extremist propaganda online” (Survey, Oct 2019).” AKU Indonesia, the National Alliance for Indonesia, facilitates well-publicized talks from prominent Indonesian figures in Hong Kong. This has included a lecture in 2017 by Dedy Mulyadi, the Mayor of Purwakarta, who gave a speech on diversity specifically for Indonesian migrant workers in Hong Kong. The press release about the event indicated that the event’s purpose was to increase Indonesian migrant workers’ understanding of the fight against extremism. There are initiatives seeking to counter extremist ideology, but they appear to be ad hoc. Given that organizations such as Islamic Union suggest that there are limited signs of support for ISIS in 2019 and that migrant-supporting organizations remain sensitive to suggestions that there may be cause for concern or a need for resilience-building or counter-extremism activities, it appears unlikely that any other organizations will organically develop their own programming in this area. RAISING AWARENESS AND ENGAGING WITH MIGRANTS - APPROACHES AND REACH Migrant workers indicated a number of ways in which they first heard about different migrant support organizations. Most commonly, awareness is said to stem from fellow migrant worker friend recommendations, be it in person or online via Facebook. Agents from placement agencies also play a prominent role in recommendations. Some migrants suggested that their placement agency had recommended the Consulate and DD to them for support but did not mention if they received recommendations from the same source to any other organizations. The IMWU has separately highlighted concerns that private placement agencies deliberately do not share information about support organizations because of concerns that migrant workers will mobilize against them. The presence of different support organizations online and their online approaches to engagement with migrant workers differs significantly. Organizations like the Indonesian Consulate and DD have audiences of between 150,000 and 170,000 respectively, whereas organizations such as Migrant Care, 36 | INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG Infest or AKU Indonesia have below 10,000. This highlights essential differences in the capacity of different organizations to influence migrants using online communications approaches or engagement methods. It also highlights the benefits to organizations like DD that offer a broad range of activities that offer wide-reaching appeal to different corners of the migrant community. INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | 37 CONCLUSION While our research has identified possible vulnerabilities to VE ideologies among Indonesian migrant workers, the migrants characterized as a potential threat in 2017 were likely to be extreme outliers inside the community as a whole (IPAC 2017b). There are three areas where migrants may be vulnerable to VE: charitable giving; online dating and small off-line religious study groups. Though there was no evidence of charitable donations knowingly being sent to VEOs, respondents did not show a detailed understanding of how they might verify the intentions of their beneficiaries. Instead, they often trust recipients to act in good faith. As such, there is a risk of migrants being lured into providing financial support for illicit or corrupt organizations. Online dating may also represent a risk vector. While none were perceived as ideologically motivated, migrants shared numerous examples of where online relationships with men had turned into a disguise for the purpose of extracting money. Should VEOs and their recruitment wings recognize this vulnerability, migrant women may be targeted. Small religious study groups could also be a potential vehicle for VEO recruitment. Such groups appear to give workers a reliable source of social support and, on some occasions, the chance for religious instruction and guidance. While it has been challenging to evaluate the content or ideologies of such study groups, it is crucial to strategize ways to ensure such groups act as a potent force for resilience to VE ideologies. Overall, while there are areas of vulnerability, there is limited evidence of risk of support for VE among the Indonesian migrant community in Hong Kong. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR P/CVE AND RESILIENCE SUPPORT 1. FINANCIAL DONATIONS Given the risks of charitable donations contributing to nefarious actors such as VEOs and the prevalence of Facebook users seeking to deceive migrant workers online (under the guise of online dating), financial literacy training with modules on the above would empower migrants to channel their donations safely. Enrich, an NGO focused on financial education, has a robust online presence and could be well-positioned to scale up or adapt existing programs to further its impact. Corporate providers like Mandiri Bank who already run a successful entrepreneur training program may also be in an excellent position to improve financial literacy. Harmoni should clarify the existing content of these financial education modules to identify possible partnership opportunities for targeting the potential vulnerabilities relating to charitable giving and new online friendships. 2. ONLINE RELATIONSHIPS Migrants should improve their resilience to ill-intentioned online users, from con artists to potential VEO recruiters, who may operate under the guise of forming positive friendships or relationships. Advice regarding relationships needs to stem from an authentic and trusted voice for women online. For example, the highly visible SuaraBMI.com, a website specifically for Indonesian migrants, could offer guidance regarding online safety. Alternatively, influencers like Merry Riana, a female entrepreneur and educator, could play a positive role by advising on signs to watch for when dating online. 38 | INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG 3. RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION Migrants should receive clear and structured guidance on trusted, moderate sources of Islamic instruction when seeking to manage their own Quranic study group. The Islamic Union, an Islamic charity that supports the welfare and religious practice of Muslims in Hong Kong, may already be acting in this role. In that case, they would be in a strong position for ensuring that sources of guidance go beyond verification to assist in community-based P/CVE efforts actively, to helping legitimately counter violent ideological narratives that group members may be exposed to. Harmoni, or other qualified actors, should clarify the existing approach taken by the Islamic Union, if any, to assess any gap in or appetite for such a role. 4. NETWORKING Migrant community groups are highly inclusive, however in order to ensure their benefits reach a wider audience, they could improve on their online advertising to ensure new migrant workers are attracted to their respective groups. Indonesian philanthropic organizations that have sufficient reach into migrant communities could be used to facilitate community networks in Hong Kong and can act as an online nexus for improving online signposting and offering strategic communications training or support for community group leaders who engage with migrants. 5. RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE AMONG EMPLOYERS Migrants face a varying level of religious discrimination or intolerance in their working and living environments. Harmoni should consider using existing activist workers’ rights networks, like the IMWU, to develop religious tolerance campaigns with employers as the target audience in mind. Employers’ restrictions on religious practice risk fostering resentment, which VEOs could instrumentalize in the future. The act of facilitating conversations about religious tolerance as part of the development of a campaign could be another means to develop resilience and community integration. It also would provide migrants with the opportunity to counter suspicions raised about their beliefs directly. INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | 39 ANNEX A: METHODOLOGY RESEARCH QUESTIONS The findings will inform the design of activities (under Harmoni IR 3) which aim to build the resilience of Indonesian migrant communities to intolerant and VE ideologies and recruitment by groups supporting such ideologies.66 In order to provide evidence-based recommendations for activities that could achieve this outcome, the research seeks to answer the following questions: 1. What are the possible migrant vulnerabilities and challenges in their environment and incentives which may, in turn, motivate or expose them to engagement with intolerant or extremist actors? a. Who are the different actors who share intolerant or extremist ideology who may seek to recruit or engage Indonesian migrants in Hong Kong? What are their different messages or narratives, and how might they appeal to migrants? b. What are the potential motivations for migrants to be susceptible to extremist recruiters or ideologies? c. To what extent are migrants exposed to these narratives and to what extent do they agree and/or engage with them, and why? 2. What are the Indonesian migrant community structures, relationships, and how can we describe their use of media and communications? a. What is the demographic make-up of the Indonesian migrant population living in Hong Kong? b. What are the motivations for Indonesian migrants to work in Hong Kong, and to what extent are these goals currently realised? c. Which media and online platforms do migrants turn to for different forms of communication and information? 3. What are the different ways in which organizations or individuals offer support to migrants? To what extent do they utilise online platforms and media/ communications, and what are examples of these? a. To what extent do current organizations offering services to migrants seek to engage on issues relating to intolerant or extremist ideologies or actors? b. What are the current approaches used by organizations engaging with migrants to support them, including pre, during and post their departure? The study was broken down into four distinct phases to allow findings from one phase to inform the design of the next. 1. LITERATURE REVIEW The Love Frankie team conducted a review of academic literature that explored the Indonesian migrant population living in Hong Kong in the last ten years in February 2019. 66 Violent extremism refers to engaging in, preparing or otherwise supporting ideologically-motivated or justified violence to further social, economic and political objectives (USAID 2011). 40 | INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG 2. KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS Between 26 and 30 July 2019, three key informant interviews were conducted face-to-face with organizations and community groups who engage with migrants in Hong Kong, including Dompet Dhuafa in Hong Kong (DDHK), the International Migrant Workers Union (IMWU), the IOM. 3. ONLINE QUALITATIVE RESEARCH WITH MIGRANTS In Phase 3, Love Frankie sought to conduct focus-group discussions with migrant respondents. Due to significant political unrest between July and October 2019, the research design was amended to enable respondents to participate in the qualitative research more efficiently over a more extended period of time, via an online community environment. COMMUNITY STRUCTURE TASKS TOPICS SAMPLE 1 About you All 2 Motivations for becoming a migrant worker All 3A Motivations for migrating to Hong Kong First contract migrant workers 3B Motivations for migrating to Hong Kong Non-first contract migrant workers 4 About the work and skills needed All 5 Challenges and support available in Hong Kong All 6 Day-to-day life in Hong Kong and at weekends All 7A Offline support system - friends, activities, groups All 7B Online support system - friends, activities, groups All 8 Communication with and about Indonesia- sending money, topics (politics/ religion) All 9 Finding friendship and love online All 10 Exploring online narratives through different videos All 11 Challenges and obstacles pre-departure and during the stay in Hong Kong All 12A Hong Kong life - Challenges in managing your money (Earnings, expenses, charitable donations) All 12B Online petitions and trusted/non trusted organizations All 13 Risks and threats for migrants All 14 Advice for upcoming migrants All STIMULUS In order to explore interest and engagement with different online narratives and content, five different videos were selected from online forums.67 As part of Task 10, participants were asked to watch all five videos within the platform before proceeding to questions. 1. Detik.com video reporting on China’s Xinjiang moslem concentration camp (Detik.com 2018) Videos were carefully chosen to ensure they reflected key topics raised in extremist narratives but were themselves not inflammatory or reflecting extremist views. Three are from mainstream news organizations, one from an NGO and one from a YouTuber who actively seeks to counter extremist narratives. 67 INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | 41 BBC News video of a child in Syria when his friend told him that his friend has died (BBC 2016) 3. ACT Foundation video reporting on the restricted access to Al Aqsa mosque by Israel (ACT 2019) 4. Video by YouTuber and counter-extremism activist ‘Aab Elarimi’ discussing fairness: ‘We are sometimes not fair’ (Elarimi 2019) 5. NET News coverage of Rohingya Muslims fleeing Myanmar (NET News 2017) 2. 4. DESK RESEARCH AND SURVEY In October 2019, to supplement our findings, individuals from the following migrant-supporting organizations completed a short survey describing their current services to migrants and perceptions of vulnerability to VE among the migrant community: Islamic Union, Yayasan Peduli Kasih and International Migrant Workers Union (IMWU). We also conducted further online desk research to review services provided by migrant support organizations and events facilitated by migrant community groups. SAMPLE Based on pre-designed criteria, the qualitative research engaged 45 female, Muslim, domestic worker migrants. These criteria included: • Migrants who were aged 18 to 30 years old (n=22) and 31-50 years old (n=23) • Migrants who were single (n=21) and married with children (n=24) • Migrants who were first-time migrant workers, i.e., in their first contract (n=22) and more experienced migrant workers, including those who have had more than one contract in Hong Kong (n=14) and those who have worked in other countries prior to Hong Kong (n=9). • Migrants from Java only, including East Java (n=31), Central Java (n=11) and West Java (n=3)68 • All Muslims, some of whom are affiliated with the NU (n=21), Dompet Dhuafa (n=4), a Qur’anic study group (n=4), an ad hoc group (n=12), or outside of any organized group (n=4). The following table demonstrates how these quotas were reflected in the panel groups: DETAILS AFFILIATION IN HONG KONG AGE/ LIFE STAGE MIGRATION EXPERIENCE PANEL 1 11 women 10 women Mostly active in religious group/community or affiliation Mostly active in non-religious group/community or affiliation 18-30 y.o. (single / before marriage) All 1st-timer migrant workers Respondents were specifically sampled from particular areas of Java in order to offer a level of cultural homogeneity and a reflection of where the majority of migrants come from. 86 percent of Indonesian migrants worldwide come from either Java or Nusa Tenggara (World Bank 2017: 21). 68 42 | INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG DETAILS AFFILIATION IN HONG KONG MIGRATION EXPERIENCE AGE/ LIFE STAGE PANEL 2 6 women Mostly active in religious group/community or affiliation 6 women Mostly active in non-religious group/community or affiliation 6 women Mostly active in religious group/community or affiliation 6 women Mostly active in non-religious group/community or affiliation 25-40 y.o. (married w/ 1-2 children) 40+ y.o (married & had returned to Indonesia for a break at least once) All experienced migrant workers (in Hong Kong/ overseas) Each panel also included a mix of those who were: • Happy or unhappy with their work conditions and current employer. RECRUITMENT AND FIELDWORK Migrants were invited to participate in the online panel via face-to-face recruitment in key public meeting hotspots between 30 August date and 14 September 2019. Respondents were invited to participate in an online community between Saturday 14th September and Monday 30th September - including three Sundays which are most typically the ‘day-off’ for migrant workers and when they are most likely to gain internet access. Respondents were invited to participate online, via a mobile or computer-based device, from wherever they were comfortable. Respondents were also given the option of participating from a private room at two FRC office locations in Hong Kong. Respondents had the opportunity to ask questions of the moderator or FRC team at any time and received a cash payment upon completion of the discussion. The discussion was moderated in Bahasa Indonesia and respondents were requested to create an anonymous online profile, rather than identify themselves to one another. ANALYSIS Data from the online community phase was translated into English, before being analysed for key themes and insights in English. This analysis was triangulated with findings from the other phases in line with the overall research questions highlighted above. The Bahasa Indonesia moderators then reviewed the analysis for interpretation. APPROACH TO VE QUESTIONING AND LIMITATIONS While the community guide was explicitly structured to elicit information pertinent to our research questions subtly, migrant worker respondents were not asked directly about or prompted to discuss VE groups or VE online content directly at any stage of our research. Given strong concerns among migrant-supporting organizations about trusting researchers working on subjects relating to VE, INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | 43 researchers sought to create conditions where migrant respondents could speak as comfortably and truthfully as possible about groups and content to which they had been exposed. As such, respondents were asked open questions on a variety of topics, including: ● What content and groups they like to engage with online day-to-day, for what purpose, for different topics, for Indonesian politics and religion, and when feeling negative or low (Tasks 5, 6, 7 and 12) ● Their perceptions of the treatment of Muslims in Hong Kong, Indonesia and around the world, who they would describe as a ‘Defender of Islam’ and who might be an enemy (Tasks 8, 10, 12, 13) ● Perception and approaches to particular activities that were hypothesised by the research team as areas of risk: online dating and charitable giving (Tasks 9 and 12) ● Their perception and familiarity with online video content that presented narratives often shared by VE groups. (Task 10) ● What negative content or individuals they had been exposed to online or around Hong Kong (Task 12) None of the migrant worker respondents indicated an awareness of IPAC’s research or media coverage regarding the risks of migrant workers turning to VE, nor were migrants asked to discuss this research or coverage directly. However, there is a strong possibility that respondents were aware of these suspicions and as such, might have deliberately avoided mentioning any VEOs in order to protect the reputation of the broader migrant community, as well as their own personal employment and visa security. 44 | INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG ANNEX B: SOURCES REFERENCES ACT Foundation (2019) “Tutup Masjid Al-Aqsa, Israel Pukul Jemaah Palestina.” YouTube, 13 March 2019. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HFXiGdFvTKs Amnesty International (2013) Exploited for profit, failed by governments. Indonesian migrant domestic workers trafficked to Hong Kong. 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Available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/11/17/in-nations-withsignificant-muslim-populations-much-disdain-for-isis/ PDV (2019) “Persatu Dakwah Victoria.” Facebook, no date. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/persatuandakwah.victoriapdv?fref=search&__tn__=%2Cd%2CPR&eid=ARBt65Y7CQZcXfOdwCqWV-Kiyd84BZWLlmhJTFi1lIJm97OUrCAw5xoj5vfQ4O1fQxV_lFjTncj7wzg Rother, S. (2017) “Indonesian migrant domestic workers in transnational political spaces: agency, gender roles and social class formation” in Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 43:6, 956-973 The News Lens (2017) “ZiQing Low Taiwan Deports Indonesian Worker for Possible ISIS Ties.” The News Lens, 1 March 2017. Available at: https://international.thenewslens.com/article/62634 The News Lens (2016) “Indonesian Migrant Workers Reported to be Joining IS.” The News Lens, 24 Mar 2016. Available at: https://international.thenewslens.com/article/38873 INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | 47 UN Women (2019) “Gaining protection for Indonesia’s migrant workers and their families.” UN Women.org News, 12 July 2019. Available at: https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2019/6/feature-story-ofchange-protection-for-indonesias-migrant-workers USAID Policy (2011) The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency: Putting Principles into Practice. Available at: https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdacs400.pdf Wirdana, A. (2017b) “Ignoring Women Jihadis in the Ranks of Asia’s Islamic State a Fatal Mistake.” South China Morning Post, 19 July 2017. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/weekasia/society/article/2103070/ignoring-women-jihadis-ranks-asias-islamic-state-fatal-mistake World Bank (2017) Indonesia’s Global Workers: Juggling Opportunities and Risk, A World Bank Indonesia Report. Jakarta: World Bank. Yun, M. and Kim, E. (2017) “An Ethnographic Study on the Indonesian Immigrant Community and its Islamic Radicalisation in South Korea” in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Journal, Vol. 42: 3. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2017.1374672 Zahid, N. and Wardah, F. (2017) “Survey Finds Sentiment Against Islamic State Rising in Indonesia.” VOA News, 26 May 2017. Available at: https://www.voanews.com/a/survey-finds-sentiment-against-islamic-state-risingin-indonesia/3889620.html 48 | INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG MIGRANT SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS MAPPING ORGANIZATIONS OFFERING DIFFERENT TYPES OF SERVICES NO. SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS OFFERING THIS SERVICE 1 Supporting the recruitment, training and placement of migrant workers Indonesian Agency for the Placement and Protection of Migrant Workers (BNP2TKI) Private company recruitment agencies and brokers (in Indonesia) Training centres (in Indonesia) Hong Kong placement agencies (under the jurisdiction of the HKSAR authorities) 2 Providing security and safety support to Indonesians, including migrant workers Police Attache Indonesian Consulate (KJRI) Advocate for and on behalf of migrants regarding legal and rights-based issues and offer rights-based education Indonesian Consulate (KJRI) IOM SBMI Migrant Care EOC HELP for Domestic Workers Pathfinders Dompet Dhuafa KOTKIHO Kabar Bumi (Keluarga Besar Buruh Migran Indonesia) Justice Centre Hong Kong Christian Action (Hong Kong) Provide support in terms of emergency housing, healthcare advice and psycho-social counselling Pathfinders KOTKIHO Justice Centre Hong Kong Christian Action (Hong Kong) Dompet Dhuafa (shelter in Causeway Bay) Islamic Union (shelter) Yayasan Peduli Kasih (shelter) Providing support direct to migrant workers in terms of vocational skills education and social activities Taekwondo Association; AKU Indonesia; Yayasan Peduli Kasih (often collaborates with DDHK); Enrich (financial education and self-confidence) Pathfinders (financial education and spotting scams) Dompet Dhuafa (make-up, sewing, computer skills, financial literacy, English language) Suara BMI Golpindo (Indonesian Women’s Sport Association) MandiriI Sahabatku 3 4 5 INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | 49 NO. SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS OFFERING THIS SERVICE 6 Providing religious education, activities, sermons and study groups69 Dompet Dhuafa (sermons, Qu’ran reading training) The Islamic Union KOTKIHO (Koalisi Organisasi Tenaga Kerja Indonesia di Hong Kong) AKU Indonesia 7 Building resilience to violent or extremist narratives Migrant Care AKU Indonesia 8 Indonesian-based support for those considering being a migrant worker or returning to Indonesia Migrant Care INFEST Kabar Bumi (Keluarga Besar Buruh Migran Indonesia) Indonesian Agency for the Placement and Protection of Migrant Workers (BNP2TKI) ONLINE SOURCES The online platforms of each of the institutions offering support for migrants is captured below. INSTITUTION WEBSITE FACEBOOK TWITTER INSTAGRAM YOUTUBE BNP2TKI http://www.bnp2tki.go. id/ Yes Yes Yes Yes Christan Action Hong Kong http://www.christianaction.org.hk Yes No No Yes Dompet Dhuafa http://www.dompetdh uafa.org Yes Yes Yes Yes Enrich Hong Kong https://enrichhk.org Yes Yes Yes Yes Equal Opp Commission Hong Kong https://www.eoc.org.h k No No No Yes HELP for Domestic Workers https://helpfordomesti cworkers.org/ Yes Yes No No Infest https://infest.or.id Yes (inactive) Yes Yes Yes Indonesian Consulate (KJRI) https://kemlu.go.id/hon gkong/id Yes Yes Yes No Indonesian Domestic Workers Federation http://sbmi.or.id/ Yes Yes No No 69 It was not possible to identify the content of the religious instruction or sermons 50 | INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG INSTITUTION WEBSITE FACEBOOK TWITTER INSTAGRAM YOUTUBE Justice Centre https://www.justicecen tre.org.hk Yes Yes Yes Yes Kabar Bumi http://kabarbumi.org Yes No No No Mandiri Sahabatku http://www.pokjarbhs m.com Yes Migrant Care http://www.migrantcar e.net/ Yes Yes Yes Yes Pathfinders http://www.pathfinders .org.hk Yes Yes Yes Yes Suara BMI https://www.suarabmi. com/ Yes Yes ONLINE ENGAGEMENT MEASURES The online reach and level of activity and engagement of the institutions supporting migrants on key online platforms are captured below: FACEBOOK INSTITUTION YOUTUBE FOLLOWERS/ MEMBERS POSTS/ MONTH AKU Indonesia 1,195 30 per month BNPT2KI 21,771 Christan Action Hong Kong Dompet Dhuafa FOLLOWERS POSTS/ MONTH 60 per month 522 1-2 per month 5 4-5 per month 57 3-4 per month 190,462 30 per month 7,400 4 per month Enrich Hong Kong 7,537 15-17 per month 53 1-2 per month EOC Hong Kong N/A N/A 460 3-5 per month HELP for Domestic Workers 8,615 2-3 per month N/A N/A 171,155 100-150 per month N/A N/A 3,064 100-150 per month N/A N/A Indonesian consulate (KJRI) Indonesian Domestic INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | 51 FACEBOOK INSTITUTION YOUTUBE FOLLOWERS/ MEMBERS POSTS/ MONTH FOLLOWERS POSTS/ MONTH 83 Inactive 172 9 per month Justice Centre 4,389 15-20 per month N/A N/A Kabar Bumi 6,200 5-7 per month N/A N/A Mandiri Sahabatku 19,000 20-25 per month Migrant Care 4,947 5-6 per month 36 0-1 per month Pathfinders 5,491 9-10 per month 50 1-2 per month Suara BMI 383k 100-150 per month Workers Federation Infest 52 | INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG MAPPING SPEAKERS TO THE MIGRANT COMMUNITY IN HONG KONG 2010-2019 This list has been compiled following a review of the online platforms connected to the migrant community groups listed, above e.g., their Facebook or YouTube platforms, as well as any media coverage mentioning these organizations in Bahasa and English language. Posts were included from the last five years (2014 to 2019). INVITED BY AKU Indonesia Forum Komunikasi Mu'minat Peduli Umat (FKMPU) Persatuan Dakwah Victoria (PDV) NAME BIO DATE Budiman Sudjatmiko PDI-P politician & member of the Indonesian House of Representative (2014-2019) Student activist during the New Order regime, was captured and imprisoned due to his political activity Social media influencer Nov-19 Ustad Wijayanto Humorous national TV show host Former lecturer and academic background in anthropology, sociology and Islamic education. Now manages Pondok Pesantren BIAS and pursues da’wah outreach overseas May-18 Dedi Mulyadi Current members of Indonesian House of Representatives for policy on environment and forestry, agriculture and marine. Former mayor of Purwakarta regency- where he implemented policy for providing religious facilities for all religions. Former West Java governor candidate in the regional general election in 2019. Aug-17 Habib Ali Zaenal Advisor of the Cinta Rasul International Community promotes the teaching of Prophet Muhammad. Educated in Palembang and Yemen. Oct-19 K.H. Hafidzul Hakiem Noer (Gus Hafid) Advisor of Masjid Syubbanul Muslimin and the sholawat group Syubbanul Muslimin who spread Islamic teaching through art. Believes in the importance of integrating nationalism and religious teaching. Completed his education in Lirboyo Islamic boarding school and Yemen. Sep-19 Oct-19 KH. Abdur Rochim, M.Pd.I (Ki Joko GoroGoro) Spreads Islamic teaching through Javanese culture, specifically wayang (traditional puppet). Originates from Demak in Central Java - known for its strong religious education. June-19 July-19 Ustadz Aswan Faisal Fame is linked to his brother who is a prominent Muslim preacher, Ustadz Jeffri Al-Buchori. Ustadz Taufik Syahniar No background available Ustadz Ahmad Bahir AlGhazali YouTube video of him singing Shalawat has significant following INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | Apr-13 53 INVITED BY Majelis Ta'lim Yuen Long/ Majelis Dzikir Ilham Majelis Ta'lim Yuen Long Majelis Ta'lim Yuen Long, Persatuan Dakwah Victoria Majelis Dzikir Ilham Hong Kong 54 | NAME BIO DATE Ustadz Ahmad Fauzi Qosim Member of Corps Da'i Dompet Dhuafa (cordofa), a group of Muslim preachers under Dompet Dhuafa. Delivers Islamic values and teachings through Dompet Dhuafa's YouTube account and national radio and TV. May-13 Ustad Sholeh Mahmud (Ustad Solmed) TV host discussing Islamic teaching and values Public Prabowo supporter in last election. During Ahok contraversy, supported conservative Muslim community against Ahok May 13 Habib Noval bin Muhammad Alaydrus Descendant of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). Student of Darul Lughah wad Dakwah Islamic boarding school in Pasuruan. Evie Tamala Prominent Indonesian dangdut singer popular in 1990s. Now shifted to supporting da'wah of Muslim preacher. Habib Segaf Baharun Hasan M.H.I Dean of Islamic Religion Institute Darullughah Wadda'wah, Pasuruan, East Java and Advisor for an Islamic boarding school. Apr 15 KH Abdul Muhaimin Karim Known as the ‘Father of Indonesian migrant workers in Hong Kong.’ Teaches classes and Qur'an recitation workshop for Indonesian migrant workers organizations and other public as part of Islamic Union in Hong Kong. Contributing writer to the Indonesian tabloid, Intermezo and Suara Indonesia and Dompet Dhuafa Hong Kong's magazine, Iqro' and Noormuslima. Advisor for the Halaqoh activities at Ammar Mosque, Wan Chai. International Islamic University, Islamabad graduate came to Hong Kong in 1997 Oct-13 Aug-14 May-16 Oct-19 Syech Abdul Qadir Assegaf Prominent Muslim preacher from Solo, Central Java Religious sholawat performer with group, Ahbaabul Musthofa. Sep-14 Sep-19 Dec-19 Yahya Zainul Ma'arif (Buya Yahya) Advisor of Pondok Pesantren Al-Bahjah in Cirebon. Al-Bahjah has subsidiaries including TV, radio, publications and educational institutions Sep-19 Dec-19 Ummi Fairuz Ar-Rahbini Wife of Buya Yahya who utilises Facebook and Telegram to facilitate Islamic teaching and values relating to women. Dec-19 Ahmad Muwafiq Nahdlatul Ulama member and advisor to Islamic boarding school in Sleman, Yogyakarta. Former assistant to former President KH. Abdurrahman Wahid. Oct-19 Jan-20 INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG Sep-14 INVITED BY Az-Zahra NAME BIO DATE ‘Gus Miftah’ ‘Preacher of the Marginalized Community’ due to his targeting of homeless people, punks, and sex workers. Full name: Miftah Maulana Habiburrahman Nov-19 Jan-20 Ulin Nuha Master of traditional Javanese puppet who preaches about Islamic teaching through his puppet show. Jan-20 Fauzi Rizal AlMunawwar Son of the founder of Al Muqorrobin, a majelis taklim and an Islamic boarding school in Kendal, Central Java. Dec-19 Sayyid Seif Alwi Ba'alawy Muslim preacher and direct descendent of Sunan Gunung Jati (one of the revered nine saints of Islam in the Java island). Member of Nahdlatul Ulama. Oct-19 Ustad Nuruddin AlIndunissy Trainer in Ruqyah – an alternative healing method for diseases caused by unknown medical ailments. Founder of Rehab Hati to facilitate training or ruqyah session. Oct-19 Anwar Zahid Prominent figure from Bojonegoro, East Java. Board member for Pondok Pesantren Attarbiyah Islamiyah Assyafi'iyah in Bojonegoro. Member of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Dec-19 Jan-20 Ustad Hanan Attaki Lc. Popular YouTube channel where he discusses verses of AlQur'an and its meaning on issues affecting young people. Some have concerns about his relationship with Felix Siauw and support for the Caliphate. Sep-19 Felix Siauw Converted to Islam in 2002 when he studied at Bogor Agricultural Institute and known for his absolutism in Islam. His book about Khilafa was banned from distribution. Supporter of HTI, an organization legally banned in Indonesia. Sep-14 Oct-14 Ali Zaenal Abidin Al Hamid Indonesian muslim scholar also famous in Malaysia. Studied at Darullughoh Wad Da'wah in Pasuruan, East Java, Al-Azhar University, Cairo and Universiti Islam Antarabangsa, Malaysia. Currently finishing his doctoral degree at the university. Saleh M. Al Jufri Supporter of diversity and inclusivism. Former Arabic-Indonesian interpreter from Solo, Central Java. Advisor of Darul Musthofa Islamic boarding school in Karanganyar, Central Java. Novel Al-Athos Muslim preacher popular in Cirebon, West Java Associated with the Asatidz Al-Bahjah Cirebon, the same institutions as Buya Yahya. Leads Al-Wasilah TV, YouTube channel, and weekly WhatsApp discussion groups INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | Oct-19 Nov-19 55 INVITED BY Liga Pekerja Migran Indonesia (LiPMI) NAME BIO Irfan Wahyudi Lecturer in media and communication studies and Head of International Program Division at Airlangga University, Surabaya, East Java. Research fellow at Edith Cowan University with specialization in media activism, migrant workers diaspora, and social media engagement. Tsamara Amany Politician for Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI) - one of the highest votes from Jakarta and overseas. Often invited to do political debate on national TV during the election period in 2019. Romo Heribertus Hadiarto Chaplain of the Indonesian Catholic Community in Hong Kong. Supports discourse on nationalism, diversity and inclusivism. Actively supporting the Hong Kong movement in opposing the extradition law. Dato' Muhammad Zainul Arifin Politician for Islamic political party, PPP Legislative candidate in 2019, Special Advisor to the PPP faction in the House of Representatives. Focuses on religious and social issues for Commission VIII Nana Irlisa Rahmadiana Politician for Gerindra and Prabowo supporter. Chief Editor of Economic Review magazine. Imam Subali Politician for PKB - pro-migrant worker righthe ts in role as ‘Deputy of the Indonesian Migrant Workers Guard’ Former migrant worker in Saudi Arabia Unsuccessful legislative candidate in Jakarta Educated at Islamic Religious Institute Al Aqidah, Jakarta Zuhairi Misrawi Politician for, PDI-P Author, and an intellectual figure from Nahdlatul Ulama and Director of Moderate Muslim Society. Author of books promoting inclusivism, pluralism, multiculturalism, and Islamic teachings. Muhammad Umair Al Mumtazah Background unknown Ahmad Hasan Abbas Caretaker for the Masjid Tiban-Turen in Malang, East Java. | Jul-19 Feb-19 Apr-19 Mar-19 JDU Firdaus 56 DATE Ustadz Syukur Romansah Background unknown Azzkar Jaka Swara Leader of Pondok Pesantren Fathul Qur'an, Depok, West Java. Regular speaker on national TV and public events. INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG Mar-19 Nov-17 INVITED BY NAME BIO DATE Musthofa Sayyidi Baraqbah Prominent Muslim figure in Jogjakarta. Mar-17 Ustadz Saiful Anwar Qur'an reciter often invited by the Indonesian migrant workers communities to discuss the meaning and understanding of Qur'an. Jul-16 Oct-19 Dec-19 Jan-20 INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | 57