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Citizenship, Ethnicity and
Nation-States
S I N I Š A M A L E Š E V I Ć A N D J O H N A . H A L L
INTRODUCTION
For most of human history, class, gender and
social status were the central pillars of exclusion, polarization and conflict. Today, however,
it is the question of legitimate membership in
a particular state that determines an individual’s social standing. As every African or East
European knows very well when approaching
the European Union, passports determine
social position. The speedy, control-free, blue
line for European citizens (and unofficially for
Americans, Canadians, Australians and members
of other stable and ‘respectable’ polities) stands
in stark contrast to the slow green line facing
those who arrive from the rest of the world. At
such moments a wealthy businessman from
Morocco or Ukraine realizes how much worse
is his social standing compared to that of a
dole-dependent single teenage mother from
Ireland or a New Age traveler from Belgium.
The possession of a particular passport symbolizes the power of the modern state and its
legal and material embodiment in citizenship.
However, this profoundly contemporary legalistic underpinning of citizenship, important
thought it is, does not reveal the internal
complexity of states. It frames nation-states as
inherently stable and culture-free legislative
entities. In order to understand the novelty of
contemporary citizenship we will have to engage
both historically and geographically with the
question of internal cultural diversity.
A central presupposition of this chapter is
that the relations between citizenship and ethnicity can only be understood once we realize –
as is beginning to happen in contemporary
sociology – that the nation-state is not some
sort of static entity. We begin of course with
abstract discussion of the three terms in the
title. But attention then turns to three particular social realms in order to introduce historical and comparative evidence that will allow
light to be cast on the theoretical issues raised.
Something must be said about European
history since its historical record did most to
create the conceptual equipment at work in
social science. Attention then turns to the
United States, the most powerful nation-state
in the history of the world, in large part to
suggest that this social formation is not as far
removed from European experience as its selfimage might suggest. This discussion of the
core of liberal capitalist society serves as a necessary backdrop to an all-too-brief consideration of the condition of the vast majority of
humankind. There can be no more urgent
need than that of determining whether the
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South is doomed to follow in the footsteps of
the North. If there are reasons to fear, let it be
said at once that there are rational reasons to
hope. A final preliminary point must be made.
A particular approach is taken here, namely,
one that privileges political explanations on
the ground that cultural forms are more consequence than cause of general social development; justifications for this view are offered
throughout the chapter.
CITIZENSHIP
Historically, citizenship grew out of popular
demand for civil, political and social rights.
The classic account of T.H. Marshall (1963)
saw this development in evolutionary terms –
from acquiring the rights to free speech, worship, property ownership and justice (civil
rights) in the eighteenth century via the securing of the right to vote and stand for office
(political rights) in the nineteenth century to
finally obtaining protection for disadvantaged
groups via development of the welfare state
(social rights) in the twentieth century.
Michael Mann critically extended this analysis by emphasizing historical particularities
and contingency in the development of citizenship in Europe and America. While Marshall’s
analysis had some empirical backing in the UK
it could not properly explain development of
citizenship elsewhere. The extension of citizenship rights, in Mann’s view, was historically determined by the interests of political, economic
and military rulers who were in control of the
particular state apparatus. Hence the political
elites in the United States and the UK were
constrained by the early development of economic liberalism and expansion of the civil
rights (in the American case also due to the
popular participation in revolution) which
led to the development of the constitutional
model of citizenship with the institutionalization of repression ‘only for those who went outside the rules of the game’ (Mann, 1988: 192).
In absolutist states such as Germany, Austria,
Japan and Russia due to the dominance of agricultural production and the limited size of the
working classes the rulers (church, nobility and
monarchs) were in a position to deny universal
citizenship rights to all the other strata in society
and were eventually forced only to concede
limited civil (but not political) rights to the
bourgeoisie. According to Mann, other European
states moved from contested to merged models
of citizenship through deep social and political
conflicts between monarchists and clerics on
the one hand and secular liberals and socialist
revolutionaries on the other (as in Spain, Italy
and France), or this struggle went through
negotiated social change with the eventual victory of an alliance between small farmers, working classes and bourgeoisie (as in Scandinavia).
Bryan Turner (1994) has expanded this analysis even further, arguing that both Marshall and
Mann have neglected the impact of social movements, different religious traditions and the possibility of creating a citizenship from below. In
his view various forms of citizenship have
develop in a dialectical and parallel interplay
between the elite pursuit of control of the state
and decisive actions of civil society groups. He
builds his theory of citizenship around the
dichotomies of private vs. public and active vs.
passive, arguing that specific historical circumstances have determined the form and content of
particular citizenship frames. Thus, American
and French citizenship developed through revolutionary experience by popular pressure from
below leading to an active understanding of citizenship; in contrast, the passive citizenship of
England and Germany has its roots in the relatively peaceful way in which it was given from
above (whether through the negotiation of competing elites as in England, or by a paternalist
authoritarian state employing an instrument of
modernization as in Germany). The historical
route taken by these states as well as the contents
of particular religious traditions had a decisive
impact on general attitudes to public and private
spheres. Hence state-suspicious, privately oriented Protestantism had a direct impact on
American citizenship, being at once active, individualist and apprehensive towards the state.
In contrast, French Catholicism and secular
Enlightenment-shaped collectivism privileged
the public over the private sphere, and led to a
collectivist and statist but very active model
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of citizenship. English Protestantism with no
revolutionary tradition but with very developed
civil society led to passive and private citizenship, whereas limited political rights coupled
with Protestant ethics and authoritarian paternalism led to even more passive and private
citizenship in Germany.
Feminists have also contributed to understanding of citizenship (Butler, 1993; Walby,
1994). Their emphasis is on describing the
modern forms of citizenship in terms of the
institutionalization of gender-biased norms.
For one thing, the timetable by which women
were accorded rights differed from that of
men, thereby putting Marshall’s model in
question. For another, feminists argue that
social and political rights gained through the
development and expansion of the welfare
state in the West were historically linked to a
male-centered life cycle and its corresponding
norms that privilege continuous, uninterrupted full-time employment and with profound disregard for the feminine life cycle
(with pregnancy, maternity, menopause and
menstrual periods). The criticism has been
particularly leveled against the strong classical
liberal distinction between the public and
private sphere where public was traditionally
identified with active, productive and socially
recognized work (male), while private was
relegated to passive, unappreciated and unpaid
domestic work (female).
Although all of these approaches have
contributed significantly to understanding of
citizenship they all share one pronounced
weakness. The leading approaches on citizenship have focused primarily on class, gender,
religious background and social status in
attempting to explain individual differences
between societies and have largely neglected the
central question of the relationship between
citizenship and cultural difference. There are
many questions that need to be addressed here.
Are universalist premises of citizenship incompatible with cultural particularities of ethnic
and national group claims? Is multiculturalism
a viable alternative to the melting pot ideology?
What is the relationship between modernity
and cultural homogeneity? It is questions such
as these that make it essential to discuss the
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nature of ethnicity and nationalism – and then
to provide a sketch for an historical and
comparative sociology of the advanced and the
developing worlds.
ETHNICITY
Although the term ‘ethnicity’ has its roots in the
Greek ethnos/ethnikos, which was commonly
used to describe pagans, that is non-Hellenic and
later non-Jewish (Gentile), second class peoples,
its academic and popular use is fairly modern.
The term was coined by David Riesman in 1953
and it gained wider use only in the 1960s and
1970s (Glazer and Moynihan, 1975). However,
from its inception ‘ethnicity’ has remained a ‘hot
potato’ of sociology. Four distinct issues can
usefully be highlighted.
First, although the term was coined to make
sense of a specific form of cultural difference
it generally acquired a rather different set of
meanings. While Anglo-American tradition
adopted ethnicity mostly as a substitute for
minority groups within a larger society of the
nation-state,1 the European tradition regularly
opted to use ethnicity as a synonym for nationhood defined historically by descent or territory.2 At the same time both traditions shared
a joint aim to replace until then a very popular,
but with the Nazi experiment heavily compromised concept of ‘race’. Nevertheless, popular
discourses in both Europe and America have
‘racialized’ the concept of ethnicity, that is ‘race’
was largely preserved (in its quasi-biological
sense) and has only now been used interchangeably with ‘ethnicity’.
Secondly, the collapse of the colonial world in
the 1950s and 1960s brought even more confusion on questions of race, culture and ethnicity.
The homelands of former European colonizers
have quickly become populated with the new
postcolonial immigrants who were visibly different. Following now American popular and
legislative discourse, these groups have also
become defined as ‘ethnic’ thus simultaneously
preserving old definitions of historical ethnicity
by descent or territory (for example, Welsh,
Flemish, Walloons and Basques) with the new
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definitions of ethnicity as an immigrant minority
(for example, Pakistani, West Indian, Sri Lankan).
Thirdly, the fall of communism and the
break-up of the Soviet-style federations along
‘ethnic’ lines and the emergence of ‘ethnic
cleansing’ policies in the Balkans and Caucasus
have further complicated these definitional
issues. With wars on former Yugoslav soil, the
term ‘ethnic’, through the extensive and influential mass media coverage of ‘ethnic wars’, has
degenerated into a synonym for tribal, primitive, barbaric and backward.
Fourthly, the ever-increasing influx of asylum seekers, refugees and economic migrants
to Western Europe, America and Australia who
do not necessarily express visible or significant
physical, cultural or religious difference to their
hosts, and their legal limbo status (for example, waiting for the decision on asylum) have
relegated the term ‘ethnic’ to a quasi-legislative
domain where ‘ethnic’, just as in the days of
ancient Greece and Judea, refers again to noncitizens who inhabit ‘our land’, that is, to second
class peoples.
To clarify all these misuses and misunderstandings one has to explain who exactly is an
‘ethnic’ and what ethnicity stands for in contemporary sociology? First, ethnicity as used
in contemporary sociology is a broad enough
concept to accommodate distinct forms of social
action defined in collective-cultural terms.
Unlike ‘race’, which is an epitome of a folk concept, often constructed in an ad hoc manner
by social actors who are themselves trying to
make a sense of their everyday reality, the concept of ethnicity allows for sociological generalization without affecting particular instances
of it. Although there is a clear genetic and
physical variation between human beings such
as skin colour, hair type, lip size and so on, as
biologists emphasize, there are no unambiguous criteria for classifying people along the
lines of these characteristics. Any such classification would artificially create groups where
in-group variation would be greater than its
presumed out-group variation. In other words
‘race’ is a social construct where phenotypic
attributes are popularly used to denote in-groups
from out-groups. Since there is no sound biological or sociological foundation for its use in
an analytical sense one should treat it as no
more than a special case of ethnicity. Hence,
when the term ‘race’ is used in a popular discourse it cannot refer to a ‘sub-species of Homo
sapiens’ (van den Berghe, 1978: 406) but is
applied only as a social attribute.3
Secondly, since it was commonly acknowledged that the classics of sociological thought
had little or nothing to say about ethnicity,4
sociologists had to turn to anthropology and
in particular to the seminal work of Frederik
Barth (1969) in order to explain the power of
cultural difference, both historically and geographically. Before Barth, cultural difference
was traditionally explained from the inside
out – social groups possess different cultural
characteristics which make them unique and
distinct (common language, lifestyle, descent,
religion, physical markers, history, eating
habits, etc.). Culture was perceived as something relatively or firmly stable, persistent and
definite. Cultural difference was understood
in terms of the group’s property (for example,
Frenchmen have possession of a culture distinct from that of Englishmen). Barth’s work
provided nothing short of a Copernican revolution in the study of ethnicity. Barth put traditional understanding of cultural difference
on its head, that is he defined and explained
ethnicity from the outside in: it is not the ‘possession’ of cultural characteristics that makes
social groups distinct but it is the social interaction with other groups that makes that difference possible, visible and socially meaningful.
In Barth’s own (1969: 15) words: ‘the critical
focus of investigation from this point of view
becomes the ethnic boundary that defines the
group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses’.
The difference is created, developed and maintained only in interaction with others (for example, the Frenchness is created and becomes
culturally and politically meaningful only
through the encounter with Englishness,
Germanness, Danishness etc.) Hence, the focus
in the study of ethnic difference has shifted
from the study of its contents (for example, the
structure of the language, the form of the particular costumes, the nature of eating habits
etc.) to the study of cultural boundaries and
social interaction. Ethnic boundaries are
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explained first and foremost as a product of
social action.
Thirdly, Barth’s research set a foundation for
understanding of ethnicity in universalist
rather than in particularist terms. Since culture
and social groups emerge only in interaction
with others, then ethnicity cannot be confined
to minority groups only. As Jenkins (1997: 11)
rightly argues, we cannot study minority ethnic
groups without studying at the same time the
majority ethnicity. The dominant structuralfunctionalist and modernist paradigm of postSecond World War sociology has traditionally
viewed ethnicity as a parochial drawback from
the past that will largely disappear with intensive industrialization, urbanization, universal
national education systems and modernization
(Parsons, 1975). Ethnic difference was understood in rather narrow particularist terms. But
if ethnicity is understood more generally in
terms of social interaction, culture and boundary maintenance, then there is no culturally
and politically aware social group able to create
a credible narrative of common descent, without ethnicity. In other words, as long as there
is social action and cultural markers to draw
upon (for example, religion, language, descent
etc.), there will be ethnicity. And this is indeed
where sociology comes into play.
Although Barth has provided a groundwork
for the elementary understanding of ethnicity
his approach fell short of accounting for political and structural repercussions in the organization and institutionalization of cultural
difference. Why, when and how do individuals
and groups maintain the ethnic boundaries? In
trying to explain these questions post-Barthian
sociology has drifted in different directions.
Rational choice theory focused on individual
motives and choices (Banton, 1983: Hechter,
1992). Viewing individuals as utility maximizers who struggle over limited resources, rational choice sociologists believe that ethnicity is
no more than an advantage that can be used
for individual gain. Speaking the same language, sharing the religious tradition, myths of
common descent or any other form of cultural
similarity help actors unite, making the price
of collective action less ‘expensive’. Michael
Hechter (1992) argues that ethnic groups
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maintain their inter-group solidarity in two
principal ways: by providing benefits to their
members and/or by restricting and sanctioning their individual choices to prevent the ‘free
riding’. Hence collective action on an ethnic
group basis is most likely when individuals
can benefit from it or when they fear sanctions
from alternative behavior. Although successful
in emphasizing the dynamic and manipulative
quality of ethnicity, this approach has been
criticized, among other things, for neglecting the
structural conditions under which individual
choices are made (Malešević, 2002b).
Working within the similar economistic
tradition, neo-Marxist approaches emphasize
what rational choice theory neglects – the
structural determination of ethnic group behavior: the state’s role in reproducing and institutionalizing ethnically divisive conditions, the
function of racist ideology in preventing working class unity or the relationship between
economic inequality and ethnic identity
(Miles, 1984). While traditionally Marxists
have analyzed ethnicity as an ideological mask
that only hides class antagonisms focusing
almost exclusively on the capitalist modes of
production, contemporary neo-Marxism is
much more sensitive to autonomy of the cultural sphere. Recognizing limits of class analysis, contemporary Marxism (Solomos and
Back, 1995) attempts to widen its analysis of
ethnicity by directing its attention to the new
social movements and identities other than
class (Anthias, 1992). However, these are still,
just as in rational choice theory, couched in
antagonistic, economist terms where ethnicity
remains a second order reality, a tool of exchange
and coercion.
Symbolic interactionist perspectives are
overtly critical of such a view. Blumer and
Duster (1980), Lal (1995) and other interactionists argue that social action is often more
symbolic than economic and that ethnicity can
most adequately be studied and explained by
focusing on the individual and collective subjective perceptions of reality. In this perspective ethnicity is analyzed as a social process
through which individuals and groups acquire,
maintain, transform or change their ‘definitions of situation’. In Lal’s words (1995: 432)
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the perceptions of ethnic ties are ‘influenced
by the situation in which we find ourselves,
the presence of real or imaginary significant
others, and “altercasting” as well as positive or
negative value we assume a particular identity
will confer in a particular context’. Ethnic groups
operate through the ‘collective definition of
situation’ on the basis of which they participate
in the ongoing processes of interpretation and
reinterpretation of their experiences (Blumer
and Duster, 1980: 222). As often stressed by
interactionists, objective unequal distribution
of economic rewards or political power between
the ethnic groups does not necessarily result
in group conflict. It is rather the nature of their
mutual symbolic interpretations and collective
perceptions that determines inter and intragroup relations.
The view that human beings are predominantly symbolic, cultural creatures who create
their own worlds of meanings has been put
under scrutiny by sociobiologists. Sociobiology
starts from a simple and apparent fact that
humans are made of flesh and blood, that they
need to eat, drink, sleep and copulate, which
are features shared with the rest of the animal
kingdom. Culture is regarded as important but
is seen as being subordinate to nature since it
has developed from nature and is dependent
on changes in nature. According to sociolobiologists, just as animals, humans are genetically programmed to reproduce their genes.
When direct reproduction is not possible one
will reproduce indirectly – through kin selection. P. van den Berghe (1981) has persistently
argued that ethnicity is no more than an extension of kin selection. Ethnic groups are defined
by common descent and are seen as being
ascriptive, hereditary and generally endogamous. Since ethnic nepotism has biological
origins, it is argued that ‘those societies that
institutionalized norms of nepotism and ethnocentrism had a strong selective advantage
over those that did not’ (van den Berghe, 1978:
405). Sociobiology is the only sociological tradition that explicitly takes a primordialist
stance in the explanation of ethnic relations.5
Their view that ethnic groups are biologically
determined for in-group favoritism has been
subject to the critique of most other research
traditions, but power elite theory has provided
the most sustained criticism of primordialist
positions.
Power elite approaches argue that what is
crucial for understanding of ethnic relations is
focus on human beings as political rather than
biological animals. Brass (1994), Cohen (1981)
and others speak of ethnicity in instrumentalist terms. Nevertheless, this instrumentality is
not of an economic (as in rational choice
theory) but rather of a political nature and it
focuses more on the role of individuals and
groups in positions of power than on the
randomly picked utilitarian agents. Power elite
theories are developed around the two spheres
of human activity – power (politics) and symbolism (culture). Their argument is that cultural markers are for most of the time arbitrary
and what matters in ethnic relations is how,
when and by whom can these symbols be
manipulated to mobilize social groups. Symbols
are considered to be powerful mechanisms
of elite control because of their ambiguity and
emotional intensity. In this perspective conflicts based on ethnicity are explained as something that ‘arise out of specific types of
interactions between the leaderships of centralizing states and elites from non-dominant
ethnic groups especially, but not exclusively, in
the peripheries of those states’ (Brass, 1994:
111). Although clearly able to accommodate
some propositions of symbolic interactionism
(symbolism), rational choice theory (instrumentality of cultural markers) and neo-Marxism
(unequal position of social groups), this position has been criticized for treating ‘masses’ in
a passive, conformist and submissive way and
for neglecting the study of motives and values
behind the ethnic mobilization.
The approach that is most sensitive to the
criticisms raised above is a Weberian approach
to ethnicity (Collins, 1999; Jackson, 1982/3;
Stone, 1995). In fact, contrary to the commonly held view, Weber has provided a fairly
developed and articulated theory of ethnicity.
Moreover, Weber provided a definition and
analysis which allowed for a non-essentialist
view of ethnicity long before Barth’s pathbreaking study. If one reads Weber properly, it
is possible to see that Weber did not conceive
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ethnicity in terms of a ‘group property’ but
rather in terms of social action. Following his
ideal-type methodology Weber perceived of
all social groups as quasi-groups, emphasizing
their amorphous and dynamic potential. In the
same way ethnicity is understood as a potential
social attribute not as an actual group characteristic. Weber defined ethnicity in terms of
two key factors – (a) a belief of social actors in
common descent based on cultural differences
and (b) a political action through which this
belief becomes socially meaningful (1968:
385–98). What is crucial here is his view that
‘it is primarily the political community, no
matter how artificially organized, that inspires
the belief in common ethnicity’ (Weber, 1968:
389). Hence, this position anticipates Barth’s
emphasis on boundaries and even goes a step
further, accounting for a group mobilization
and linking it to some propositions raised by
power-elite theories. Furthermore, by introducing the concept of ‘monopolistic closure’
Weber’s theory of ethnicity has room for economic instrumentality broader than rational
choice type of analysis. Weber argued that ethnicity can often be explained by looking at how
individuals tend to close relationships by using
‘any cultural trait’ to ‘ensure economic opportunities’ for their group. This monopolistic
social closure of groups ties well into the symbolic interactionist emphasis on symbolism
since the Weberian approach stresses the link
between ethnicity and status. Ethnicity often
becomes a mechanism for the monopolization
of status honor since the sense of an ethnic
group’s honor is rooted in a belief of the group’s
superiority. As Weber has shown, quite often
low economic group standing is coupled with
high ethnic group status and vice versa (for
example, white manual workers vs. ‘blacks’ in
the United States, Fijians vs. Indians in Fiji,
Serbs vs. Albanians in Kosovo). These intergroup relations can also undergo swift transformation with the advent of charismatic
personalities who are often able to draw on the
power of emotional and value-rational social
action to initiate dramatic social change. The
link between charismatic authority and value
rationality is key for understanding the power
of popular appeal that ethnic nationalism can
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quickly generate (Malešević, 2002a). In this
way Weberian tradition is able to explain
individual and group motives behind the
ethnic mobilization. The greatest advantage of
Weberian tradition over its competitors comes
from a simple but crucial idea that although a
universal sociological theory of ethnicity is
possible, there is a multiplicity of ‘ethnic situations’. Ethnicity can overlap with status, class,
legal or political rights or with caste. As Rex
(1986: 14) points out, ethnic groups ‘may be
arranged in a hierarchy of honor, they may
have different legal rights and they may have
different property rights’. Weberian tradition is
the most systematic and synthetic approach
that anticipates the original Barthian argument
which explains ethnicity through the social
(inter)action.
NATIONALISM
The distinction which has had the longest
intellectual career within the theory of nationalism is that between civic and ethnic nations.
This was first introduced by Hans Kohn (1967)
and it has recently been given new life by
Rogers Brubaker (1992) in an impressive comparative study of French and German citizenship laws. The distinction contrasts French and
American nationalism with, above all, those
of Eastern Europe. In the former one can
become a citizen easily, by accepting local laws
and customs – with citizenship being given
as of right to anyone born on the territory of
the state. In the latter, citizenship rights are
reserved to those of a similar ethnic background. Although the situation has just changed,
a clear example of this latter situation was
Germany’s acceptance of ethnic Germans from
Eastern Europe and Russia who could not
speak the language – and its near refusal to give
citizenship to Turkish workers, even though
they could speak German and had quite often
lived the whole of their lives within that
country. It is not surprising that civic has come
to be associated with good, and ethnic with
nasty – a view particularly clearly articulated
by Eric Hobsbawm (1990).
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There has been conceptual advance beyond
this stark binary opposition. To begin with, we
should not accept everything that is implied
in the formula ethnic/bad, civic/good. There is
nothing necessarily terrible about loyalty to
one’s ethnic group, whereas civic nationalism
is not necessarily nice: its injunction can be
‘join us or else’. Of course, ethnic nationalism is indeed repulsive when it is underwritten
by relativist philosophies that insist that one
should literally think with one’s blood. Further,
civic nationalism becomes more liberal when it
moves towards the pole of civility, best defined
in terms of the acceptance of diverse positions
or cultures. Whether this move is so to speak
sociologically real can be measured by asking
two questions. First, is the identity to which
one is asked to accede relatively thin, that is,
does it have at its core political loyalty rather
than a collective memory of an ethnic group?
Second, are rates of intermarriage high? All
this is obvious. Less so, perhaps, is a tension
that lies at the heart of multiculturalism. In the
interests of clarity, matters can be put bluntly.
Multiculturalism properly understood is civil
nationalism, the recognition of diversity. But
that diversity is – needs to be, should be –
limited by a consensus on shared values.
Difference is acceptable only so long as group
identities are voluntary, that is, insofar as identities can be changed according to individual
desire. What is at issue is neatly encapsulated
when we turn to the notion of caging.6 If multiculturalism means that groups have rights
over individuals – if, for example, the leaders
of a group have the power to decide to whom
young girls should be married – then it becomes
repulsive. Such multiculturalism might seem
liberal in tolerating difference, but it is in fact
the illiberalism of misguided liberalism, diminishing life chances by allowing social caging.
This view is, of course, relativist, and it is
related to ethnic nationalism in presuming that
one must think with one’s group. Importantly,
the link to ethnic nationalism may be very
close indeed. If there are no universal standards, and ethnic groups are held to be in
permanent competition, then it is possible,
perhaps likely, that one group will seek to
dominate another.
If these are ideal typical positions, a powerful
stream of modern social theory in effect suggests
that some have greater viability than others. A
series of thinkers, interestingly all liberal, have
insisted that homogeneity, whether ethnic or
civic, is a ‘must’ if a society is to function effectively. John Stuart Mill made this claim when
speaking about the workings of democracy,
insisting that the nationalities question had to
be solved in order for democracy to be viable
(Mill, 1975). The great contemporary theorist of
democracy Robert Dahl has reiterated this idea
(Dahl, 1977). The notion behind all this is
straightforward. Human beings cannot take too
much conflict, cannot put themselves on the
line at all times and in every way. For disagreement to be productive in the way admired by
liberalism, it must be contained – that is, it must
take place within a frame of common belonging. Very much the same insight underlies
David Miller’s view that national homogeneity
is a precondition for generous welfare regimes
(Miller, 1995). This is correct: the generosity of
Scandinavian countries rests on the willingness
to give generously to people exactly like oneself.
But the great theorist of the need for social
homogeneity was of course Ernest Gellner. As it
happens, the explanation he offered for this ever
more insistently – that of the necessity of homogeneity so that industrial society can function
properly – is rather question-begging.7 But even
the most cursory consideration of his life suggests that he captured something about the
character of nationalism. Born into Kafka’s
Czech-German-Jewish world and forced into
exile in 1939, he returned in 1945 to find the
Jews murdered and the Germans being expelled.
A second period of exile ended when he
returned when communism fell – to witness on
that occasion the secession of the rich majority
from the Slovaks. Visceral experience underlay
his image of political space moving from the
world of Kokoschka to that of Mondrian – that
is, from a world in which peoples were intermingled to one in which national homogeneity
was established (Gellner, 1983: 139–40).
The claim of those variously stressing the
need for homogeneity amounts to saying that
we are very unlikely to have civil nationalism,
that is, that multinational entities are an
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impossibility. This is to say that constitutional
schemes – federal, confederal and consociational – from which civil nationalism hopes
so much are very unlikely to work. That has
certainly been a key part of the experience of
Europeans, as we shall see, for this has been the
dark continent of modernity, with homogeneity being achieved through repulsive means –
through population transfers, ethnic cleansing
and genocide much more than by voluntary
assimilation (Mazower, 1998). The key analytic
question within the theory of nationalism – a
question with immediate consequences for ethnicity and citizenship – is whether civil nationalism is a realistic social possibility. As noted,
this leads to a further question, that of whether
the rest of the world follows the European
example. If so, the future of world politics looks
set to bring us catastrophe, given the complex
ethnic intermingling of many states, particularly some of those in the developing world.
As it happens, there is a counter-argument to
the pessimistic view associated with Gellner’s
predominantly socio-economic causation.
Advances in sociology suggest that the character of social movements results overwhelmingly
from the nature of the state with which they
interact. This political sociology may well
apply, as noted, to working class behavior.
Liberal states that allowed workers to struggle
at the industrial level avoided creating politically conscious movements; in contrast, authoritarian and autocratic regimes so excluded
workers as to give them no option but to take
on the state. This general notion – that the barricades are so terrifying that reform is habitually
more attractive than revolution – has very large
applications. The case against Gellner is that the
politics explain nationalism as much or more
than socio-economic factors. More particularly,
the secessionist nationalism privileged by his
definition of nationalism results more from
a reaction to the authoritarianism of empires
than from the social inequality faced by a
culturally distinct group. Liberalism before
nationalism may allow for containment, that is,
respect for historical liberties might allow
multinational frames to exist.
It is important to stress here that it is liberalism which is at the core of the position that
569
stands as an alternate to Gellner’s sociology – for
we should not uncritically romanticize democracy. Tocqueville long ago pointed out that
majorities could in theory be tyrannical. Whether
he was correct or not about the United States,
there can be no doubt but that numerous
instances – for example, Protestant hegemony
in Northern Ireland from 1922 to 1969 – in
which democracy has been exercised freely and
fairly, and at the expense of minorities. More
generally, democratic participation is not
always a good in and for itself, despite the
recent vogue for civil society and civic virtue.
This suggests an equally important corollary.
Bluntly, democracy matters less than liberalism. Liberal regimes may achieve very great
stability by diffusing various conflicts through
society rather than concentrating them at the
political center. Pure democratic participation
will destabilize unless it is channeled through
social institutions which tend to contain, manage and regulate conflict. The Balkan Wars
of the past decade have demonstrated that
democratization does not necessarily bring
peace and prosperity. However, the collapse of
communism did not lead to violence in every
instance, suggesting that attention be given to
two variables (Snyder, 2000). First, political
leaders who imagine that a new world can only
bring their downfall may well be tempted
to play the nationalist card in order to stay
in power (for example, Milošević vs. Klaus).
Secondly, democracy may well lead to violence
if it lacks the institutional framework that
allows it to control its passions, that force it to
reflect. Snyder stresses in this context that
democratization clearly led to violence when
news comes from a single authority. And all this
is to say that in our own time a multinational
state, even with the benefits of the purported
lessons of the past, utterly failed to successfully
transform itself.
The paradox at work can be underscored.
The presence of institutions of conflict regulation can shape and channel, even perhaps tame
newly emergent popular pressures. In contrast,
authoritarian regimes are likely to create social
movements armed with total ideologies. The
contrast is between societies in which liberalism came before democracy and those in
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which democracy came before liberalism.
Our position as a whole is that of Tocqueville
(1955), the central tenets of whose masterpiece
are that liberalism and authoritarianism are
self-perpetuating. We need not be quite so pessimistic, for some authoritarian regimes have
become liberal democracies, but we should be
aware how difficult is that transformation –
and that the advent of democracy does not
necessarily entail sweetness and light.
STATE AND NATION IN EUROPE
Although it is important to note that nationalism was associated with horror in European
history, cognitive advance depends upon
explaining why this was so. After all, in the
middle of the nineteenth century Europe was
at the pinnacle of its power, confident that it
represented progress. The European balance of
power depended on the interactions of AustroHungary, Wilhelmine Germany, Imperial Russia,
Great Britain and France. The fate of the
Ottomans was very much part of the mental
world of these great powers; the position of the
United States came slowly to assume great significance, especially for Great Britain. If all this
suggested ebbs and flows of power and influence, no hint was present that this was the scene
for a new, great Peloponnesian War – a conflict
so visceral that it knocked Europe off the perch
that it held briefly as the leader of the world.
What were the essential contours of this conflict? Further, does understanding these variables allow us to suggest that the link between
nationalism and nastiness was contingent
rather than absolutely necessary?
The rivalry between these states was such
that the most immediate structural element at
work was that of the need to industrialize. An
obvious consequence that troubled ruling elites
was the emergence of working classes. In fact, a
whole series of sectoral divisions amongst workers meant that no unitary class existed inside a
particular state, let alone between them – at
least when workers were left to themselves.
Extreme repression of radicals combined with
liberal treatment of the rest famously created
in the United States a world in which workers
began to consider themselves as middle class.
Something of the same pattern had put paid to
the Chartists in England, but the presence of
some, albeit very limited, state interference –
that of the Taff Vale court decision which for a
short period prevented union organization –
ensured that class loyalty was created, that is,
socialism was avoided but a Labour Party
was created. In contrast, regime exclusion did
create socialist class unity. Anti-socialist laws in
Wilhelmine Germany created a movement
with political and industrial wings, formally
wedded to revolutionary ideas but in fact made
reformist by the speedy abolition of the laws in
question. In Imperial Russia autocracy differed
from authoritarianism in being at times even
more suspicious of capitalism (McDaniel,
1988). The fundamental factor at work was
regime policy. Militancy varied precisely in
relation to state actions: reformists came to the
fore as the result of the political opening of
1905, whilst revolutionaries triumphed inside
the movement once concessions were abandoned. The end result of these policies was the
creation of the only genuinely revolutionary
working class in human history. In a nutshell,
the historical record does indeed support the
political sociology of class that was outlined at
the start.
To consider industrialization only in terms
of its impact on class would be a mistake. Every
state sought an exactly similar set of industries
in order to maintain its geopolitical independence, and this in turn led to economic
tensions. The importance and character of
imitative industrialization is captured in the
marvelous demonstration by Gautam Sen
(1984) that every industrializing state in the
nineteenth century sought to have the same
basic portfolio of heavy industries – so as to
ensure its capacity for geopolitical independence, that is, its ability to produce its own
weapons. Differently put, states interfered with
markets. In this context, the elements of historical sociology that concern us here revolve
around three factors that explain the nature of
Europe’s twentieth-century disaster. Each
factor can be seen as an extension of the beliefs
of Max Weber, namely his visceral nationalism,
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his commitment as a Fleet Professor to an
imperial policy, and his insistence that the
empire’s conduct of German foreign affairs
was disastrous. And it should be said clearly
that these factors were at work in all the countries involved.
First, developmental states characteristically
felt weak when they ruled over a mass of different ethnic and national groupings. For one
thing, Britain seemed to gain strength from its
homogeneity – although this perception faded
once Home Rule politics made it clear that
Britain was in its way as composite a state
as were other empires. But the determination
to copy the ethnic homogeneity of leading
European powers had a further element to it,
namely that of seeking to strengthen the legitimacy of the state by playing the national card
against socialism. Accordingly, nationalism
comes to the fore at the end of the nineteenth
century as much from above as from below.
Perhaps curiously, nationalism had not been
enormously successful in the years before
1914. Geopolitical interference stood behind
the cleansing of perhaps 5 million Muslims
from the new Balkan nation-states (Mazower,
2000). This suggested of course that the stakes
of any general conflict, should it occur, might
well be very great indeed (Kaiser, 1990: pt 4).
But as long as the balance of power remained
in operation, nationalism had great difficulty
in breaking the established mould of state borders. A clear contrast can be drawn between
the logic of the situations facing different
empires (Lieven, 2000). Austro-Hungary quite
simply had no chance to become a modern
nation-state: the dominant ethnicity was simply too small to serve as a Staatsvolk. What
evolved in consequence was a situation, in
Count Taaffe’s words, of ‘bearable dissatisfaction’ (Lieven, 2000: 191). If the Magyars were
content, the Slavic nations within the Austrian
half were not terribly treated – for all that they
hoped that the monarchy would move towards
greater constitutionalism. Demands were contained, however, by a clear awareness of geopolitical realities. As early as 1848 the Slavs had
realized that to become small but unprotected
nations was to risk annihilation should Germany
or Russia be drawn into a power vacuum.
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The second factor can usefully be introduced
by saying, again, that nationalism is an essentially labile force, able to connect with and
deeply influenced by the social forces of any
particular historical moment. The reference to
Max Weber as Fleet Professor brings to attention the crucial fact that nationalism was, in
this period, linked to imperialism. There is a
sense in which Weber himself should have
known better. As Adam Smith had stressed
long ago, colonies could be more of a millstone
than an advantage. But it is very often the case
that what matters socially about economics is
less the facts in and of themselves than what
people believe to be the facts. In this case,
imperial dreams had a very considerable rationale. When Lord Roseberry admitted that the
British empire did not pay at the time, he went
on immediately to say that it might none the
less be absolutely necessary in the longer run.
It is the third factor, the nature of foreign
policy-making inside imperial courts, to which
attention must be given for an explanation for
the breakdown of order that then allowed
nationalism and imperialism to cause disaster.
A preliminary, scene-setting point is simply
that the late nineteenth-century European
great powers were engines of grandeur, whose
leaders habitually wore military uniform. The
difficulty that such rulers faced, however, was
that making foreign policy was becoming ever
more difficult. Jack Snyder has usefully suggested that foreign policy-making tends to be
rational when states are unitary (Snyder, 1991;
cf. Mann, 1993: ch. 21). Examples of such
rational states include the rule of traditional
monarchs, the collective domination of a revolutionary party so much in control of a late,
late developing society as to have no fear of
popular pressure, and the checks and balances
on foreign adventures provided by liberal systems. In contrast, late developing societies –
which combine authoritarianism with genuine
pressures from a newly mobilized population –
tend to lack the state capacity necessary to
calculate by means of realist principles.
The First World War was not a Clausewitzian
affair, in that statesmen lost control of policymaking. Industry applied to war in part explains
this, but still more important was the fact that
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a war of peoples needed justifications other
than the merely dynastic or territorial. The
chaos that resulted exhausted the European
fabric. It was this factor which made the peace
treaty disastrous. The lack of genuine geopolitical agreement encouraged the politics of
economic autarchy. The failure to solve the
security dilemma cemented the link between
nationalism and imperialism. This was the
world of Hitler and Stalin, of the horrors of
ethnic cleansing, population transfer, mass
murder, and of total war between the two great
revolutions of modernity.
The First World War had ended badly despite
the making of formal treaties. In contrast, the
Second World War ended well without formal
agreements. What mattered most of all was consideration given to power politics, that is, the creation of a secure frame within which economic
and social forces could then prosper. Spheres of
influence were established between two great
superpowers which very rapidly came to understand each other extremely well, not least
because the presence of nuclear weapons forced
them to be rational. Nationalism was ignored,
stability created. There were two elements at
work in the reconstitution of Europe (Maier,
1981; Ruggie, 1982). Europeans themselves
made a very major contribution. Fascism was
thoroughly discredited, beaten in its own chosen
arena of military valor. More particularly, French
bureaucrats, aware of the devastation caused by
three wars with Germany within a single lifetime, effectively changed France’s geopolitical
calculation. If Germany could not be beaten militarily, it could perhaps be contained through
love. The origin of what is now the European
Union came from a decision by the two leading
powers to give up their geopolitical autonomy,
by establishing genuine interdependence in coal
and steel – that is, in giving up the capacity to
make their own weapons. This move was made
possible by the second factor, the presence of
American forces. Europeans of course did a great
deal to pull Americans in – with Lord Ismay
famously arguing that foreign policy should seek
to keep the Americans in, the Russians out and
the Germans divided.
As Milward (1992) explains, European states
had sought, between 1870 and 1945, to be
complete power containers, unitary and in
possession of markets and secure sources of
supply. The fact that this led to complete disaster produced humility – which is not to say for
a moment that state power somehow lost its
salience. Rather, states discovered that doing
less proved to give them more, that interdependence within a larger security frame
allowed for prosperity and the spread of citizenship rights. Differently put, breaking the
link between nationalism and imperialism
enhanced rather than undermined state capacity. However, liberalism in Europe, from the
Atlantic to Ukraine, and including most of
southeastern Europe, is made easier because
very great national homogeneity has been established, in largest part thanks to the actions of
Hitler and Stalin.
The fundamental change in geopolitical
realities after the collapse of the Soviet bloc
certainly played a part in key developments
within the European Union, most notably that
of binding Germany within Europe by avoiding any German economic hegemony through
the Bundesbank. Still, continuities are more
important than new developments. For one
thing, this liberal democratic league has the
capacity, not least given that one cannot be a
member without respecting minority rights, to
consolidate liberal democracies in Central
Europe just as it did in Southern Europe a generation ago. For another, statist calculations
remain at play: the Franco-German condominium survives, whilst French determination
to balance Germany has led it virtually to
rejoin the NATO command structure. Perhaps
most important of all, there is no sign of fundamental change to the rules of the geopolitical game. The mere sign of worry, let alone any
threat of withdrawal, on the part of the United
States has seen Europeans own up to the fact
that they wish the American presence to continue, despite its varied imperfections.
Fascism had been defeated in the hottest of
wars. In contrast, the Cold War ended with a
whimper. The period since 1989 has made
crystal clear that the Soviet developmental model
was deeply flawed. For one thing, whatever the
benefits of initial heavy industrialization and
social modernization, there is now no doubt
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but that the absence of market mechanisms
doomed Soviet style economies to waste and
inefficiency. Socialism as a power system had
sought to establish its own channels of control,
thereby in effect continuing Tsarism’s distrust
of independent civil society. When power was
absolute, command-administrative methods
had great force. Once softer political rule came
to the fore, it became obvious that force was
linked to rigidity. If the lack of flexibility
caused problems, the inability to decompress –
that is, the inability of socialism to emulate
some authoritarian capitalism regimes in liberalizing from above – resulted from another
facet of an atomized society, bereft of social
institutions. Liberalization processes depend
upon the striking of bargains, often in some
round-table negotiations. Gorbachev’s difficulty was that there were no leaders of independent organizations, able to control their
members, with whom he could negotiate (Bova,
1991). In these circumstances, controlled
decompression was impossible. Democratization
took the place of liberalization. For another,
the national question can be seen to have occupied the new political space, and in such a way
as to put the final nail in a social world presumed until very recently to be powerful and
permanent. The reconstitution of the empire
by 1921 and its expansion in 1939 and in the
years from 1944 presented problems with
which the Tsars would have been all too familiar. Several systems of rule were again contained within a single political umbrella, with
the greatest difficulties again coming from the
inclusion of advanced Western nations whose
consciousness was so advanced as to make
assimilation impossible. The situation was in
fact worse than it had been for the Tsars: the
Baltic states and Poland had tasted independence, the Czechs knew that socialism was taking away their industrial lead, whilst a united
Ukraine, freed from fear of Poland and
Germany, concentrated all its ire on Russia.
But if the empire became an expensive burden,
it is important to remember that the nationalities did less to cause the breakdown of the
Soviet bloc than to make sure that reconstitution would be impossible. A political opening
increases noise. Nerve is required to put up
573
with new pressures, so that discontents take a
normal form – from revolution to reform. The
worst move in such circumstances is – what
Gorbachev did – to step backwards, to make
the newly vocal fear and thereby to confirm
them in their suspicion of the continuity of an
old regime. The interventions in Georgia and
Lithuania were accordingly utterly disastrous.
Yeltsin was given the cards by means of which
he was able to destroy the Soviet Union. Rarely
has a great power fallen so far, so fast.
THE AMERICAN MELTING POT
The discussion of nationalism in the abstract
suggested that civic nationalism was not necessarily as liberal as its defenders imagined. This
insight certainly helps us to understand the
Leviathan of the contemporary world. Bluntly,
the national experience of the United States is
not as different from that of Europe as it would
like to believe. Civic nationalism in America
has encouraged a melting pot, homogenizing
the many into a single unit. Differently put, the
United States is not a social world favoring
diversity. An initial consideration to that effect
lies in the simple fact that white Anglo-Saxon
settlers more or less exterminated the native
population, thereby establishing their own
hegemony. Further, the creation of the new
state placed a very strong emphasis on uniformity. For one thing, a Constitution was
formed, a singular set of ideals created, which
thereafter was held to be sacred. For another,
the United States was created by means of
powerful acts, usually directed from below, of
political cleansing. A significant section of the
elite – in absolute numerical terms larger than
those guillotined during the French Revolution,
and from a smaller population at that – that
had supported the Crown was forced to leave
(Palmer, 1959: 188–202).
Perhaps the most striking general interpretation of American history and society, namely
that proposed by Seymour Martin Lipset
(1996), is that which insists on the power of
these initial ideas, of continuity through continuing consensus. That is not quite right. If
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some alternatives were ruled out at the time
of foundation, others were eliminated as the
result of historical events. The two most important examples deserve at least minimal attention. First, we ought to remember that the
United States remained unitary only as the result
of a very brutal civil war. The Constitution had
of course recognized the different interests of
the slave-owning southern states, but the difference between North and South grew in the
early years of the republic. War destroyed that
diversity, with Lincoln trying at the end of
the conflict to create unity by means of such
new institutions as Thanksgiving. Of course,
the South did not lose its cultural autonomy
simply as the result of defeat in war, maintaining a key hold on federal politics well into the
1930s. None the less, over time the South has
lost its uniqueness, especially in recent years as
the result of political change and of population
and industrial transfers from North to South.
Since no one wants a second civil war of visceral intensity, there is no possibility of the
United States becoming a multinational society.
The second alternative vision was that of socialism, in one form or another. Revisionist
history makes it equally clear that there was a
genuine socialist stream of ideas and institutions in American history, represented most
spectacularly in the militant unionism of the
International Workers of the World. Further
proof of the strength of working class activism
can be found in the bitterness of labour disputes – whose end result was a very large number of deaths, second only to those at the hands
of the late Tsarist empire (Mann, 1993). This is
all to say that American ideals of individualism
and enterprise were not so powerful or so
widely shared as to rule out a challenge. Their
ascendancy came about for two fundamental
reasons. On the one hand, the fact that citizenship had been granted early on meant that
worker dissatisfaction tended to be limited, to
be directed against industrialists rather than
against the state – thereby limiting its overall
power. On the other hand, and crucially for
this argument, socialism was literally destroyed –
as is made apparent by that very large number of working class deaths. The recipe for
social stability, which worked in the United
States, is often the combination of political
opening with absolute intolerance towards
extremists.
It would be a mistake to leave matters at this
point. For the rosier and milder face of the coin
of American homogeneity can be seen at work
in American ethnic relations. With the clear
exception of African Americans, for the majority of Americans, ethnic identity is now, as Mary
Waters (1990) makes clear, a choice rather than
a destiny imposed from outside. Rates of intermarriage are extremely high, not least for the
first generation of Cuban Americans in Florida,
more than 50 per cent of whom marry outside
their own group.8 Ethnic identity has little real
content. It is permissible to graduate from
kindergarten wearing a sari as long as one does
not believe in caste – that is, as long as one is
American. There are severe limits to difference,
but similarity is now often achieved by much
more civil means. The powers of homogenization in the United States, deriving as much from
Hollywood and consumerism, of course, as
from the factors examined here, remain intact.
The melting pot still works, but it does so in a
far more benign manner.
SPLENDOURS AND MISERIES
OF THE SOUTH
It only takes a moment to think of issues in the
South affecting the transformation of states.
It may be that socialist China can manage to
transform itself, both because it placed perestroika before glasnost and because it has very
largely become a nation-state. More generally,
however, the North has washed its hands of the
South, much of which could drop off the face
of the globe without the purportedly global
economy even noticing (Hall, 2000). However,
despite all the talk about globalization diminishing the significance of ethnic and national
attachments, it seems that the opposite process
is taking place. First, one of the consequences
of more globalized economies is further expansion in migration from the South to the North.
Nevertheless, the new cohorts of migrants
differ significantly form their counterparts in
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the postcolonial era: in an environment of
instability and insecurity within a globalizing
world, assimilation and full citizenship in a
host nation-state is often replaced with alternative forms of political loyalties such as dual
citizenships, denizenships or living on the legal
margins of the asylum system (non-documented
immigrants, runaway deportees). Intensified by
the development of modern means of transport
and communication (Internet, mobile phones
etc.) on one hand and economic stagnation in
their home countries on the other, the new
immigrants often opt for retention of strong
ties with their countries of origin. These political, cultural and financial links are often fostered by the governments in the South, who
view their transnational emigrants as key source
of ‘remittances, investment capital and votes’
(Itzigsohn, 1999). Secondly, the changing
nature of the globalizing economy coupled
with the persistence of strong ethnic and
national ties with the South creates a situation
where new immigrants are less likely to develop
a stronger sense of cultural and political membership in the country of immigration. Rather
they are more prone to transnationalism, identifying with ethnic group attachments that
cross borders of a particular nation-state
(Kearney, 1995). However, one should not
overstate this largely economic-centered argument since the technical capacity of the states
in the North to control their borders and the
movement of people has also dramatically
increased. In other words, politics matters as
much as economics, if not more. One wonders
whether politics can in the longer run be so
subject to a new form of international apartheid
as is economics. The spread of weapons of
mass destruction, especially to states possessed
of the fiscal advantages given by the possession
of fossil fuel, first presented a crucial problem
in the form of Saddam Hussein. It is hard to
imagine that his will have been the last challenge, despite America’s much vaunted military revolution.
It is beyond our powers to do more than
note the salience of these issues. But the perspective that has been argued does suggest the
usefulness of considering the situation of
multinational regimes in the South. Given that
575
development seeks in its very essence to copy
the advanced, it behooves us to ask whether the
South’s twenty-first century will be as dark as
that through which Europe has just passed. If
there are obvious reasons to fear, there are –
remarkably – reasons for optimism. It should
be said immediately that the hope in question
is not mere wishful thinking, not the placing of
hope above analysis.
Some regimes in the developing world have
managed multinationalism far better than did
Europe. A general background condition was
an initial realization in some quarters that
imagination was needed so as to avoid disaster.
It was precisely because African borders were
absurd that it was, Julius Nyerere argued,
essential to maintain them. Equally importantly,
few states have an ethnic group of sufficient size
that it is able to even imagine complete domination of the territory – there being, for example,
perhaps 120 different ethnicities in Tanzania.
Politics are therefore pushed towards multinationalism for structural reasons. These circumstances have bred a remarkable substantive
achievement, that of the language repertoires
of some African states and, above all, of India.
David Laitin’s analysis of the Indian situation
suggests that a fully capable Indian citizen
needs a language repertoire of ‘3 plus or minus
1’ languages (Laitin, 1992). Two languages are
needed to begin with because India has two
official languages, English as well as Hindi –
for Nehru’s desire to produce a unitary and
monoglot society was stymied by the desire of
civil servants to maintain their cultural capital,
that is, the ability to function in English. A
third language is that of one’s provincial state.
But one only needs two languages when one’s
provincial state is Hindi-speaking. In contrast,
one needs four languages when one is in a
minority in a non-Hindi-speaking provincial
state. India is the most important exception
to Gellner’s generalization that homogeneity
is a functional prerequisite of modernity. This
is a remarkable institutional success story,
the creation of an Austro-Hungary that seems
to work. And this sort of linguistic arrangement has been complemented in many parts
of the developing world by a varied collection of agreements, habitually consociational
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and regional, which have allowed ethnic
groups to survive within a single shell. The
complex case of Malaya is a prime case in point
(Horowitz, 1986).
Language is of course only one of the markers that can be used as the basis on which to
homogenize peoples into a single nation, and
one can always fear – though not, to this point,
excessively – that religion could again serve as
the basis for terrible ethnic cleansing in India.
It is worth remembering in this context that the
full impact of ethnic superstratification is felt
during the process of modernization – which is
by no means complete in most of the world’s
polities. If hope has some descriptive base, the
fact that there have been many failures of
multinational federations – from Yugoslavia
and the Soviet Union, to the Caribbean, subSaharan Africa and British Central Africa –
should make us realize how very hard it is to
make such arrangements work. Still more
obvious are the genocidal horrors of Kampuchea
and Rwanda – in which other peoples behave
as did we Europeans in the very recent past. It
is hard to imagine that such actions, now visible on our television screens, will not have any
effect on the condition of those who inhabit
the more comfortable zones of the world.
deal of homogeneity. When one remembers
the amount of violence involved in creating
such entities, one must fear for the future of
the world. But this is an area in which a measure of hope is permissible, given the inventiveness of non-Europeans. Differently put, we
can hope that they will not copy us. And it
would be a terrible mistake to imagine that
nationalism is now a problem for others,
rather than for our own advanced countries.
Brendan O’Leary (2000) has recently pointed
out that federalism works best when it has at
its core a demographically dominant Staatsvolk –
the idea being that a ruling people, secure in
its position, will be perfectly prepared to allow
federal concessions. In the absence of such
demographic dominance, federalism only
works when consociational measures are
added, so as to join different communities.
Given that Europe, like Austro-Hungary,
simply does not have enough Germans, the
European Union would be well advised to
retain all the consociational deals that reassure
small states – as well as to find ways to give
representation to such stateless nations as
Catalonia and Scotland. Getting institutional
design right even in an economically advanced
and politically liberal Europe chastened by
memories of its horrible past is going to be
very difficult indeed.
CONCLUSION
Our intent in this chapter has been to sound a
cautionary note. When a society develops
institutions to regulate conflict early on, then
it is likely that emergent popular forces will
be absorbed within a liberal mould flexible
enough to tame and contain them. In contrast, democratization occurring before the
advent of liberalism is likely to lead to social
disruption, sometimes of the most repulsive
sort. Establishing liberal institutions in the
midst of fundamental social and political
change is very difficult indeed. The world
remains a very dangerous place – one in which
nationalism may continue to cause disaster.
For the characteristic political form of modernity remains that of the nation-state, whose
character does indeed revolve around a good
NOTES
1 For example R.A. Schermerhorn (1970) defines an
ethnic group as ‘a collectivity within a larger society having
real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared
historical past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of their peoplehood.’ (our italics).
2 Some good examples of misunderstandings in distinguishing between concepts of ‘nation’, ‘ethnicity’ and ‘state’
in literature are given by Connor (1978).
3 As Collins (1999: 74) rightly argues, ‘a sociological distinction between ethnicity and race is analytically pernicious because it obscures the social processes that
determine the extent to which divisions are made along the
continuum of somatotypical gradations. Race is a folk
concept, a popular mythology that elevates particular ethnic distinctions into a sharp break. As sociologists, our
analytical challenge is to show what causes placements
along the continuum.’
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4 See Guibernau’s (1996) analysis of Marx, Durkheim
and Weber’s treatment of ethnicity and nationalism.
5 Some structural functionalist interpretations of ethnicity (Geertz, 1963; Shils, 1957) are also regularly
described as ‘primordialist’, although as Ozkirimli (2000:
213) rightly points out, unlike sociobiology they do not
provide primordialist explanations but focus on the ways
in which ethnicity is popularly perceived. In other words,
they indicate how social actors themselves share the primordialist vision of ethnic reality.
6 The notion of caging is of course that of Michael
Mann (1993).
7 For a series of critical review on this point see most of
the essays in J.A. Hall (ed.) (1998).
8 We rely here on the research of Elizabeth Arias of the
State University of New York at Stony Brook.
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