Haideh Moghissi Islamic Feminism revisited1 One year has passed since Iranian people in many millions poured into the streets protesting the rigged presidential elections that reinstituted Ahmadi Nejad in office for the second term. The powerful yet remarkably nonviolent protest movement, in particular the images of beautiful young women at the front rows of street demonstrations, their clearly secular appearances, their courageous encounters with police and plane-clothed thugs and the killing of a young woman Neda Aghasoltan whose murder was captured on camera, mesmerized the world. These images helped challenge the long-held perceptions about religious soaked ‘Muslim’ women or the political and/or emotional attachment of people to Islamic state and its practices and intentions. Also they helped silence, temporarily at least, the cultural relativist academics and commentators who since the mid-1990s were beating the drums of the end of secularism in Iran and who tried to push Islamic feminism, as the only homegrown, locally-produced and hence culturally suitable project for changing the lot of women in Iran or indeed in Muslim-majority countries. The ebbing of the street protests under brutal pressure of the security forces which has pushed underground all forms of oppositions, however seem to have resuscitated the supporters of Islam-as the Middle Eastern version of liberation theology. For over a decade the proponents of the idea through their ‘field research’, documentaries and reports and in total disregard of the loud voices of overwhelming majority of urban women (and men), with or without faith inside Iran, wittingly or 1 Parts of this paper has appeared in Spanish Journal Culturas, No 7/mayo 2010, pp. 59-71. 1 unwittingly lobbied on behalf of Islamists’ projects, so they now won’t allow evidence to stand in the way of their argument. This argument has a market in the west as the reintroducing a stale debate over the potentials of Islamic feminism for Iranian women, on Persian-language BBC television program, Pargar suggest. Regardless of the intentions of the producers, and the value of arguments of one of the die-hard supporters of Islamic feminist project in that debate, it seems a further elaboration of the key points in the debate over this issue might still be in order. This is what I will do in the rest of the paper. Islamic feminism, as a concept, used to distinguish a brand of feminism or the activities of Muslim women who seek to reform, in women’s favour, social practices and legal provisions that rule Muslim societies found currency in the mid 1990s. Amidst many reports on extreme forms of restrictions imposed on women in Muslim societies, it was encouraging to see that the focus had shifted to speak of the spirit, the strength, the resilience and the agency of Muslim women. The reality of women’s resistance against rigid religious and cultural practices and their ingenuity in finding ways to cross the maleserving legal and social boundaries must be recognized, recorded and discussed as they give heart to others who struggle against different forms of domination and oppression. What was and still is disturbing though has been lack of balance in most of affirmative accounts of Muslim women activism. Many proponents of Muslim women’s agency and Islamic feminist projects, often avoid any discussion of oppressive gender practices and seem to disapprove of a critical analysis of the Shari’a-based reforms that are central to Islamic feminist agenda. My concern has been and continues to be that the uncritical acceptance of Islamic feminism as a new 2 libratory project in Islamic societies is not in the service of women’s cause.2 The push for promoting Islamic feminism, I fear, is not really opening new possibilities for feminists to hear different voices and to encourage, welcome and learn about new ideas and divergent strategies in specific cultural and political context. It is not to engage in a mutually respectful and constructive dialogue, promoting a climate of critical thinking within feminism, finding common grounds and strategizing to achieve specific goals that empower women and elevate the struggle for gender justice. The euphoric emphasis on Islamic feminism reflects, rather a romanticized notion of Islam and Islamic frame as an alternative way of being and acting for change to the detriment of all secular projects. It has an intimidating and silencing effect, and discourages a serious dialogue about possibilities and limitations of feminist projects of different sorts for Muslim societies. To many secular feminists in and from Islamic cultures, including the present author, this tendency reflects an essentialized notion of women in Islamic cultures as an undifferentiated crowd, united by their faith, regardless of whether or not they are practicing Muslims. They are all ‘Muslim’ because they live in Muslim societies and that explains it all. Obviously, if we consider women in Muslim societies as different and take that difference to be absolute and final, and see Islam as the only defining factor in their identity and their lives, we will not listen or even hear many voices that are raised against the authority of Islamic scriptures and its legal practices in defining people’s social and moral actions. Such frame of mind obscures the diversity of women’s class status, ethnic origin, rural or urban location, social and moral standards and different aspirations and life-choices that are 2 I have discussed this in more detail in Feminism and Islamic Fundamentalism: The Limits of Postmodern analysis (1999a). 3 granted to women everywhere else. This is the result of pure imagination. Indeed, ‘imaginative geography and history help the mind to intensify its own sense of itself by dramatizing the distance and difference between what is close to it and what is far away’, as Edward Said noted.3 Overlooking many different factors that divide rather than unite women in Islamic cultures, the tendency sometimes appear as a push to force Islam on women and to treat the skeptics as outsiders to their own culture. One wonders if the use of the term, ‘Christian women’ or for that matter, ‘Christian feminism’ as a frame of reference for identifying all women and all feminists in the western, Christian societies would be as acceptable and justified as the identifier, ‘Mulsim women’ used in reference to women in the Middle East. This totalizing tendency is not confined only to academic settings. After participating in a debate on CBC Radio about Hejab and women’s legal rights in Islamic cultures, the moderator asked me wouldn’t I have more credibility if I stayed within the boundaries of ‘my culture’ and used an Islamic conceptual framework to discuss women’s rights issues. Obviously, my critical views about gender politics and sexuality under Islamic rule irritated him as they did not fit his perceptions and expectations. This was not my first experience with individuals inside or outside academy who feel uncomfortable, even resentful of arguments which diverge sharply from accepted and internalized conceptions of ‘Muslim women.’ They expect that people from Muslim societies to represent their societies’ cultural values, the main ingredient of which is assumed to be their Islamic content. That is why they tend to take as authentic and representative of the cultural values of a community only the voices that reflect the dominant religious ideology. 3 Said, E. (1978), p.55. 4 Only the voices which fit the perceived ideas and expectations regarding Islam and women from Muslim societies are considered as the insiders’ voice and deserve to be heard. In other words, some people have the right to cultural representation and some don’t, depending on whether or not what they say confirms pre-existing images and expectations about a society or a community. In the occasion I mentioned above, I was seemingly out of line with my own culture. After all, as a woman from the Middle East, I was expected to remain true to my ‘culture’ -- and Islam is supposedly all that there is to my culture. Not only had I committed the mistake of drawing attention to differences among people from Muslim societies on Islam’s gender practices, but, by speaking critically of those practices, I had transgressed the intellectual and conceptual line which protects critical thinking as the domain of Western scholars. Feminism now includes many brands, both conservative and radical, religious and atheist, heterosexual or non-heterosexual, white and non-white, issueoriented or holistic, individualistic or community-oriented; feminists hail from the North and the South. So it certainly has room for yet another brand of feminism which is self-identified or identified by others as 'Islamic feminism.' I think this point needs no further argument. The concern is about the careless and totalizing use of the term ‘Muslim women’ which throughout Muslim societies encompasses distinct groups of women. The Islamic feminists’ agenda is not necessarily embraced by all of them. Even less by secular women who might or might not practice Islamic rituals in their daily life but do not see a need for the interference of religion in civic life. They do not believe in the applicability of Shari’a in this time and age and have divergent views on obstacles to the best strategy to achieve gender equality. For example, elaborating 5 the identifier, Islamic feminism in the context of gender politics in Iran, I have suggested that the term as it is often used by some Iranian academics include different groups of politically-active Muslim women, whether or not they embrace feminism. I have argued that in their hands, the term Muslim woman turns into precisely the sort of ‘one size fits all’ concept which flatten the diverse material conditions and ideological configurations experienced by the Iranian female population. 4 They include, for example, a group of Muslim female elite, torch bearers of the Islamists, with very rigid, traditional views on gender issues. They accept Islamic Shari'a and its promises for women’s rights tout court. Ayatollah Khomeini's daughter, Farideh Mostafavi and her associates in the Society of Women of the Islamic Republic,and the Malakeh Yazdi, daughter of former chief Justice, Ayatollah Yazdi, and female Hezbollah, who have been used to attack other women in demonstrations and closing down of newspapers since Iran’s 1979 revolution, are a few examples. The second group of ‘Muslim women’ are also part of the established order, if only slightly more removed from the points of command. Education opportunities and newly acquired involvement in public life have brought them face to face with their male counterparts' masculinist values and demeaning practices. I have argued that this group’s activities, regardless of political intentions, are a hopeful sign; they may help get the regime that they support to remove some gender-based educational and employment barriers. Former parliament deputies, such as Maryam Behroozi, Marzieh Dabbagh, A’tegheh Rajaei, Fatemeh Haghighatjou and others in their circles can be counted among 4 For more discussion of the subject see Moghissi, H, 1999b 6 this group. Then, there is the third group who, while loyal to the Islamic regime and the values for which it stands, are critical of its treatment of women and try to soften its gender-oppressive policies. These women hope to reform Islamic Shari'a in favour of women and these are the ones who one may identify as Muslim feminists. That is, Muslim women, who, while embracing Islamic ideology as liberating, are genuinely trying to promote women's rights within the confines of Islamic Shari'a, and propose a more moderate and more female-centred interpretation of the Quran. The editors of women’s journals, like Zanan and Farzaneh, including Shahla Sherkat and her associates represent an example of this groups. I should add, however, that the term, as it was used, also included many secular women who for lack of any other allowed discourse, have had to use Islamic discourse to articulate women’s demand. The feminist lawyer and human rights activist, Mehrangiz Kar, who has now been forced to take residency in the United States, is a case in point. That is also true of the Noble Peace Laureate, Shirin Ebadi, despite the fact that in her post-Noble interviews for political expediency, she often feels compelled to stress her Muslim identity. In any case, my point has been that all these different diverse and often opposing categories of women should not be identified as Muslim women as the term denotes specific relations and perceptions. To cloud differences among these women and suggest that, because they are active on gender issues, regardless of the goal of their activism, they are ‘feminist’ activists is, at best, misleading. For the ‘agency’ of some of them is positively damaging to feminists’ struggles for gender equity, dignity and basic 7 human rights. This is not to deny the importance of specific historical and political context within which ‘agency’ should be defined or to discard even the smallest gains beneficial to women, such as increase in women’s public presence in the schools and workforce that they achieve under rigid Islamic rule. But neither should the agency be redefined in such a broad sense to erode the importance of conscious resistance against domination. Let me see If I can elaborate this point further. Generally, the emphasis on agency, it is suggested, has been a rhetorical device in sociology to counter deterministic accounts of human activity. It has been a means to celebrate the independent power of the individual in relation ‘to whatever might be cited as a possible constraint upon her.’ 5 Hence, even when we are simply following rules or norms we manifest our agency. It is perhaps based on this understanding of the notion of agency that Saba Mahmoud, for example, proposes that agency should not be taken as ‘a synonym for resistance to relations of domination,’ but as ‘a capacity for action that historically specific relations of subordination enable and create.6 I would however, like to propose a different account of agency –one that takes ‘individual powers to reason and to choose’, and the ability ‘to behave as independent, autonomous human beings,’ more seriously than Mahmoud defines notwithstanding the fact of ‘the susceptibility of individuals to social influences and pressures.’7 Which is to say that feminism represents a moral vision and a 5 Barnes,B. (2000), pp.48-49. Saba Mahmoud, cited in Saliba, T (2002) ‘Introduction’, Gender, Politics, and Islam, in Saliba, T, C. Allen and J. A. Howard, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, p. 4. 7 Ibid, p. 50. 6 8 movement central to which are the struggle for personal and social transformation and activism on behalf of one and on behalf of women as a group to change legal and cultural constraints and gender practices in favour of women. Agency can mean acting ‘”otherwise” than in conformity to the status quo.8 Put it simply, the element of conscious action against forces of domination has to be retained in our definition of agency. That is acting not only by but for women. Besides, the question of who benefits from women’s agency should be of particular importance in the context that agency is ‘acting on behalf of women as a group.’ Otherwise women’s expression of agency is celebrated each time they leave the house to participate in religious practices, or in demonstrations, following orders or rules set by religious leaders or the state, even when they function as auxiliaries or agents of patriarchal domination and control. As is well-known, women can be used effectively in the production and exercise of the most undemocratic, misogynist values and policies, and in the rise and consolidation of fascist-type movements and regimes. This agency, if such it is, does not deserve validation and blessing, except by those who benefit from it to consolidate their power and control over others. In other words, the intent and the content of the agency should matter. Having agency for women should include moving in the direction of identifying the forces that limit our capacity to have control over our lives and to make informed choices within specific cultural and political context, to transform the conditions that reduce and weaken that capacity. Obviously, resistance against domination is 8 Kegan Gardiner, J. (ed.)(1995)Introduction, p.2. 9 central to this definition of ‘agency’ regardless of the form and the intensity of the resistance. One of the major complains of some of the authors who have entered the debate about Islamic feminism is that the secularist side (including the present author) is dismissive of Muslim women’s agency. Asma Barlas, for instance, writes, angrily, that in my book, Muslim women “come across as wretched dupes…they have no agency or independence.”9 And that I find it hard to approach Islam with an open mind because I am an ‘Iranian’ and my ‘standpoint epistemology’ prevents me to be open minded. Aside from this extraordinarily poor logic of dismissing an argument because of the person’s national origin, it simply is an inaccurate reading of my argument, to say the least. The charge that secularists ‘are disdainful of the agency of Muslim feminists’, ‘unappreciative of women’s resistance’, and that they consider as futile the efforts of Muslim feminist scholars, is also made by another author, Valentine Moghadam10 in her presentation of bits and pieces of the debates over the issue among Iranian feminists. I would argue that this is a rather careless if not a deliberate misrepresentation of the range of views that Moghadam identifies as anti-Islamic feminism. In fact, the present author was among the very few who, in early 1990s, rejoiced the emergence of voices of protest coming from the ranks of the Muslim women who had been essentially mobilized to present Islamic role models to the younger generation of the female population. I noted at the time: 9 10 Barlas, A. (2002) p. 5. Moghadam,V. (2002). pp. 15-52. 10 ‘The resistance of women from within the regime against the gender-based discrimination or even Islamization methods indicates a reawakening of women and their will to change their conditions.’ And I added that ‘women’s resistance and protest, in any form, is reason to rejoice for all Iranian feminists.’11 A more evenhanded reference to my argument would have shown that even in critiquing the Islamization policies of the clerical regime in Iran, I was quick to stress women’s resistance: None of what has been said, however, is to suggest that women have been the passive victims of the Islamization policies in Iran. To be sure, women since the Revolution have been at the forefront of the struggle to secure democracy for Iran.’12 Discussing the compelling social and economic realities of the country and the resistance of women as the drive behind demands for gender equity, I have used the metaphor that Islamic government has not opened the gates to women, women have jumped over the fence.13 I speak of ‘women’s resistance’ as an indication of ‘women’s reawakening and their will to change their conditions,’ acknowledging and validating women’s activism in its many forms, as an outcome of their conscious, intelligent, and admirably well-thought of strategy to push back Islamization policies. By contrast, Moghadam focuses on the ‘agitation (my emphasis) by activist Islamic women’ as the reason for lifting certain restriction on women in the fields of education and employment.14 Worse, in her account of women activisms, not a single word is said about the resistance of hundreds of thousands of secular women who in words and deeds have challenged and 11 12 13 14 Moghissi, H.(1994) pp.184-85. Moghissi,(1999)pp. 118-19. Ibid, p.183. Moghadam, p. 20. 11 continue to challenge the legal and moral authority of the Islamic clerics. Continuous battle over Hejab that is still fought in streets of Tehran and other major cities between Islamic morality police and young women, after a quarter century of its imposition on women is a case in point. The difference between the two positions is that Moghadam and other promoters of Islamic feminism in Iran placed fantastic hopes in the transformation of the Islamist regime, particularly in a handful of Muslim female elites like Faezeh Rafsanjani, daughter of former Iranian conservative president, as the embodiment of Islamic feminism in Iran. By contrast, the secularists stressed the resistance of ordinary women and the campaign of the activists, without using the identifier Muslim feminism, in the context of the country’s contradictory social and political system. My concern has been that over-excitement about Muslim women’s agency and pushing for the agenda of Islamic feminism, presenting it as the revolutionary and workable feminist strategy for the Middle East, reflects reduced expectations about what is achievable, or necessary for women in Islamic cultures. This is, in my view, a defeatist position. If Islam is seen as the only constituent ingredient in the culture of a region as diverse as the Middle East, then Islamic feminism seem not only workable but desirable as the only culturally viable alternative to west-initiated feminism. Hence, only the voices that use Islam and Islamic framework as their reference point, are considered as authentic and representative of women’s agency in Muslim cultures. Identifying feminist secular project’s as ‘Western’ Homa Hoodfar, for example, places all her hope in Islamic feminists as, according to her, they ‘challenge and reform the Islamic doctrine from within rather than 12 advocating a Western model of gender relations.’15 Worse, secularists projects for women’s liberation are condemned because, Therese Saliba’s words, they ‘treat religion in general and fundamentalism in particular as a problematic tool of oppression used against women, rather than as a viable form of feminist agency.’16 Another author, Anuvar Majid suggests that ‘secularism and the idea of separation of state and church are Western phenomena, and a new form of Orientalism, which cannot be superimposed on Islamic cultures.’17 Hence, a redefined Islam is the viable alternative ‘to the unrelenting process of Westernization and the sometimes extremist practices of fundamentalists.’ From this mindset Islamic feminism would naturally seem as ‘the best platforms from which to resist the effects of global capitalism.’ The author ’s reference to Iran, as the successful example of his proposed ‘redefined Islam’, makes it clear as to what sort of Islam its redefined version will be. Margot Badran even advises that though Islamist movements are patriarchal and oppressive to women, but women can find room to maneuver within the less extremist Islamist mainstream. To follow her suggestions, all we have to do is widen our definition of Islamism in order to see “more liberal and progressive manifestations or radical (in a positive sense) potential of present political Islamic movements.”18 Obviously, here we are not dealing with Islam only, but with Islamism, about which ‘open-mindedness’ is urged. It should be clear why there is a concern that the rise of Islamic feminism and its academic celebration as a new libratory ideology is not as 15 16 17 18 Hoodfar, H.(1993), p. 17. Saliba, ‘Introduction’, p.3. Majid,A. (1998), p.353. Badran,M. (2001), p.48. 13 innocent as it might appear. In fact, as Nadje Al-Ali argues, the portrayal of Islamists as the only alternative force to increasing western encroachment, in the extreme manifestations of this tendency, means that these scholars ‘have been actively, if unwittingly, engaged in muting those groups and individuals who have opposed or reacted against Islamism.’19 But no political development in the last while has convinced me that these concerns and earlier probing into the nature of Islamic feminism as a transformative ideology and movement have been superfluous.20 We still need to analyze what kind of 'Islam' and what sorts of relations with it are presumed? Do we mean 'Islam' as a medium uniting women and the supposed cosmic power, in response to personal, gender-specific needs, or does the term instead entail a prescribed set of ideas, teachings, texts as applied to women, indeed an entire preestablished moral and legal order? And how could religion, in this case Islam, which is based on gender hierarchy be adopted as the framework for struggle for gender democracy and women's equality with men? And if Islam and feminism are compatible which one has to operate within the framework of the other? These are pressing questions that need to be addressed in a serious dialogue about the limits and possibilities of alternative feminist projects in Islamic cultures. But Miriam Cooke, among others, seem to think that asking these questions is to conflate Islam and Islamic fundamentalism. Would that mean that , we should avoid a critical engagement with Islamic feminism or with Islam, for that matter, lest we may sound critical of Islam itself for the stubborn survival of gender discrimination in Muslim societies? For as Leila Ahmed proposes, what matters is Islam’s ethical, 19 Al-Ali, N. (2000), p. 25. I have analyzed these points at length in my book on Islamic feminism (1999) op.cit 20 14 egalitarian voice not its legalistic voice.21 But I would argue that in Muslim societies, particularly with the rise of Islamism, it is Islam’s legalistic voice that is heard, listened to and obeyed often by force of coercion to the detriment of women. In fact, my concern has been that the scholars who harbour heady enthusiasm for Islamic feminism often neglect the crucial distinction between Islam as a legal and political system and Islam as the spiritual and moral guidance. By focusing on the later they unwittingly soften the sharp edges of the former. It may be that Islamic feminism works ‘in ways emblematic of postcolonial women’s jockeying for space and power’ as Cooke suggests, and that ‘the term Islamic feminist’ might be an invitation to us ‘to consider what it means to have a difficult double commitment: on the one hand, to a faith position, and on the other hand, to women’s rights both inside the home and outside.’22 But in my view, we still need an analysis as to how these double commitments are going to express themselves in a non-contradictory and non-self-negating manner in a real life situation. Presumably, Islamic feminism is not a philosophical concept to be debated only in an academic setting. It is a transformative ideology and a movement for addressing gender injustices in Muslim societies. Like any other revolutionary or transformative project, to be effective, it needs to have a clear and realistic assessment of its own weaknesses and its strengths, identifying foreseeable obstacles and a well thought of strategy for how best to implement its agenda. An analysis of the complexities and contradictory aspects of the ‘double commitments’ of Islamic feminism is crucial if it is to be the winning project in the 21 22 Ahmed, L. (1992), pp.238-9. Cooke, M.(2001), pp. 57-59. 15 political battle against the forces of oppression. My point simply has been and is that jubilation over Islamic feminism would not allow impassionate analysis of the limitations and constraints of Islamic feminism as a ‘revolutionary project’ for women’s liberation in the Middle East. For example, it is perfectly legitimate to point out, as Qudsia Mirza does, that the idea of equality and its implications for the concept of sexual difference or sameness does not seem to inspire Islamic feminists to interrogate their own frame of reference. By refusing to incorporate the notion of difference in their own theorization and by presenting themselves as indigenous and authentic, untainted by western concepts, Mirza rightly argues, Islamic feminists bypass the need for recognizing the heterogeneity of Muslim societies, inevitably, considering irrelevant the concerns of women who are at the political margin of these societies.23 Also entirely pertinent is the argument made by Shahrzad Mojab that ‘there is nothing sacred about veiling’ and that it is completely proper to criticize the veil, as a symbol of male domination and state power in Islamic societies, ‘even if all Muslim women voluntarily used it.’24In fact it is quite appropriate to extend our critique to the Quran itself for the situation of women. As Ghada Karmi proposes, even though the Quran is not a misogynist document but it confirmed and legitimized the existing patriarchal structures in Arab societies. Besides, Karmi suggests, the 23 Mirza, Q. (2002), p.13. 24 Mojab, S. (1998), p. 20 and 26.See also Shahidian, H. (2002), Chapter Three. 16 seemingly contradictory verses that send mixed messages must be viewed in social and historical context and not as eternally applicable and unchanging.25 Seen in this context, no legal tradition or cultural practice should be protected against a feminist critique simply because it has persisted for many centuries in Muslim societies or because the majority of the population has accepted them as just and appropriate, or as inevitable. After all, unequal gender relations and women’s inferior cognitive capacity and subordination in private and public domains were also viewed as normal, just and appropriate in Western societies, before sweeping economic and political forces of change altering the situation consistently in the last Century. Moreover, given the fact that doubting and questioning Islamic legal practices are life-threatening activities in almost all Islamic societies, and the critical individual can be persecuted for blasphemy (Kofr), the responsibility for opening a dialogue about these issues falls on the shoulders the Middle East scholars, inside or outside academy, who live in the west, free of such threats. Over-emphasis on the Islamic frame for women’s rights struggle in the Middle East is to assume that feminism in the region to be a unique, particular and an exceptional category within the global feminist movement. Legal and social equality for women everywhere has been linked to transformation of socioeconomic structures, secularism, legally-protected toleration of difference, recognition of and respect for individual freedoms and an acceptance of the individual’s moral agency and ability to make own choices. But to proponents of Islamic feminism even in 25 Karmi, G. (1996), pp. 69-83. 17 absence of such developments achieving women’s rights seem plausible, provided, of course, we reduce our expectations to fit the limits defined and implemented by a handful of Muslim elite in Muslim-majority societies. In other words, it is only when a feminist agenda for the Middle East is concerned that complacency and a dutiful following of social rules and norms are recommended. Obviously these scholars know what is best for women in Islamic cultures, and what is best for women is based on what they think they know about women in Islamic cultures. Therefore, female seclusion, coercive imposition of sex-segregation and Islamic veil should not be seen as symbols of male control over female sexuality and moral conduct, emblematic of the objectification of women. They should not be regarded as instruments to limit women's activities or to punish women for their imagined, omnipresent, active sexuality. Instead, we are advised to see the Islamic veil, for example, as a tool of female empowerment, 26or a 'creative alternative' developed by women to increase their participation in public spaces or as an anti-consumerist claim for women's right to modesty27 which protects them against sexual harassment.28However, I think it is quite reasonable to ask why is it then that after 30 years of the imposition of mandatory veiling on Iranian women, ceaseless resistance against Islamic veil has continued and its observance has to be monitored through the use of police force and various legal and paralegal measures. Is it not that 26 Hoodfar,H. (1993)op cit. El Guindi, f.(1996) ‘Feminism Comes of Age in Islam’in Sabbagh, S. (ed.) Arab Women: Between Defiance and Restraint, New York:Olive Branch Press. 28 Abu Odeh, L. pp.30-32. 27 18 millions of young women who defy the veil code despite all threats and violent punishments do not see Islamic veil as the tool of women’s empowerment. No doubt the intention is to draw attention to Muslim woman’s moral agency and to challenge the colonial mentality that saw veiled women as nothing but victims of male aggression. But the point is that in the past, the most extreme examples of Muslim women’s oppression were used to demonize Islam and Muslims in general, and at present the lives of Muslim female elites and upper-and upper-middle class women are being made an example of independent-minded, gender-conscious Muslim women who choose veil on their own free will and do not face any barriers in social and political life. Behind such assertions is the notion that people in the Middle East are more religious than the rest of the world and that the rise of Islamist regimes and movements reflects this religiosity rather than being the result of social, economic and political problems. If we go down this slope then perhaps religion should also be considered an appropriate frame for the women’s movements in countries like the United States, where, religious beliefs and the political influence of Christian Right, such as the Moral Majority, are as noisy and energetic as the Islamic fundamentalist movements in Iran and Egypt. Evangelicals in the United states are estimated at forty to fifty million, and over two hundred Christian television stations, and 1,500 Christian radio stations mobilize disenchanted Americans to support fundamentalist Christian values 29. However, to my knowledge, no secular feminist scholar in the United States supports a religious program for improving women’s rights in that country although the discourse of commercialization of women’s body 29 For an elaborate discussion of the Christian fundamentalism in the United States see David S. New (2002) 19 and their reproductive capacity, and the sexual exploitation of women and increases in various forms of gender-based violence are not irrelevant to some of the feminist discourses. United States feminists do not forgive the Christian fundamentalists for their opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment or for their call for a constitutional restriction on abortion and legalization of prayers in public schools. It is curious that some of them find virtue in Islamisiztion policies in the Middle East. Why is a return to religion’s bosom with its clear-cut social and sexual division of labour and legally imposed gender roles good only for women the Middle East? In fact, this double standard explains why apart from women who are devoted to Islam and Islamist projects, the most confident support for the suitability of Islam to women’s rights comes from outside of Islamic societies, chiefly from secular women (and men), the western or western-based scholars of Middle Eastern origin, who in any case do not live in Muslim societies. The very simple point in the analysis of Islamic feminism from a secularist position, is that women’s resistance to patriarchal domination in Islamic cultures must be supported and assisted regardless of the form it takes. But, as I have argued elsewhere, the best way to support the struggles of women in the Middle East is not to erase differences among them or to play down the basic distinction between secular and Islamist visions. To privilege the voice of religion and celebrate 'Islamic feminism' is to highlight only one of the many forms of identity available to Middle Eastern women, obscuring ways that identity is asserted or reclaimed, overshadowing forms of struggle outside religious practices and silencing the secular voices which are raised against the region's stifling Islamization policies. Nor should the support preclude a critical engagement with the Islamic feminists’ 20 projects. In fact, a critical engagement with Islamic feminist projects would demonstrate the recognition and respect for Muslim women’s political and moral agency and sends a clear signal that Muslim feminists are considered competent partners in the debate over the limitations (or prospects) of a religious frame for woman’s liberation. A paternalist silence and unconditional support for their agenda signals the opposite. 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