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This is a translation of the table of contents from Maurice Merleau-Ponty's first book, "La structure du comportement". This TOC is more detailed than the one provided in A. Fisher's English translation, and lays out the structure of the text with greater clarity. Page numbers are given for the English translation and the original French.
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Symmetry-Breaking Dynamics in Development2017 •
This article surveys and synthesizes dynamic systems models of development from biology, neuroscience, and psychology in order to propose an integrated account of growth, learning, and behavior. Key to this account is the concept of self-differentiation or symmetry-breaking. I argue that development can be understood as a cascade of symmetry-breaking events brought about by the ongoing interactions of multiple, nested, nonlinear dynamic systems whose self-organizing behaviors gradually alter their own anatomical conditions.
2006 •
This paper outlines the earliest writings of Maurice Merleau-Ponty: his proposals in the early 1930s to study a synthesis of science and philosophy as well as his first text, The Structure of Behavior (completed in 1938, published in 1942). The first section of the paper traces the historical development of his thought from a simple championing of the sciences (in contrast to the dominant neo-Kantian philosophy of the time) to a strongly critical stance toward any kind of reductionism in psychology. The second section describes how Merleau-Ponty’s critique of psychology’s overestimation of the ability to localize the causes of behavior leads him to limit the reach of scientific psychology. In conclusion, it outlines how his early idea of structure in psychology is offered as a solution to poles of naïve materialism in the sciences and abstract intellectualism in philosophy.
Child Psychology & Pedagogy: Maurice Merleau-Ponty at the Sorbonne
Child Psychology & Pedagogy: Maurice Merleau-Ponty at the Sorbonne--page proofs complete2010 •
Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy
Sense-Making and Symmetry-Breaking: Merleau-Ponty, Cognitive Science, and Dynamic Systems Theory2013 •
From his earliest work forward, Merleau-Ponty attempted to develop a new ontology of nature that would avoid the antinomies of realism and idealism by showing that nature has its own endogenous sense which is prior to reflection. The key to this new ontology was the concept of form, which he appropriated from Gestalt psychology. However, Merleau-Ponty struggled to give a positive characterization of the phenomenon of form which would clarify its ontological status. Evan Thompson has recently taken up Merleau-Ponty’s ontology as the basis for a new, “enactive” approach to cognitive science, synthesizing it with concepts from dynamic systems theory and Francisco Varela’s theory of autopoiesis. However, Thompson does not quite succeed in resolving the ambiguities in Merleau-Ponty’s account of form. This article builds on an indication from Thompson in order to propose a new account of form as asymmetry, and of the genesis of form in nature as symmetry-breaking. These concepts help us to escape the antinomies of Modern thought by showing how nature is the autoproduction of a sense which can only be known by an embodied perceiver.
2001 •
Research in Phenomenology
The Elemental Past (2014)2014 •
In a 1951 debate that marked the beginnings of the analytic-continental divide, Maurice Merleau-Ponty sided with Georges Bataille in rejecting A. J. Ayer’s claim that “the sun existed before human beings.” This rejection is already anticipated in a controversial passage from Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, where he claims that “there is no world without an Existence that bears its structure.” I defend Merleau-Ponty’s counterintuitive position against naturalistic and anti-subjectivist critics by arguing that the world emerges in the exchange between perceiver and perceived. A deeper challenge is posed, however, by Quentin Meillassoux, who argues that the “correlationism” of contemporary philosophy rules out any account of the “ancestral” time that antedates all subjectivity. Against Meillassoux, and taking an encounter with fossils as my guide, I hold that the past prior to subjectivity can only be approached phenomenologically. The paradoxical character of this immemorial past, as a memory of the world rather than of the subject, opens the way toward a phenomenology of the “elemental” past. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions of the absolute past of nature and the anonymity of the body, as well as Levinas’ account of the elements at the end of the world, I argue that our own materiality and organic lives participate in the differential rhythms of the elements, opening us to a memory of the world that binds the cosmic past and the apocalyptic future.
Human Studies
Merleau-Ponty's Immanent Critique of Gestalt Theory2017 •
Merleau-Ponty's appropriation of Gestalt theory in The Structure of Behavior is central to his entire corpus. Yet commentators exhibit little agreement about what lesson is to be learned from his critique, and provide little ex-egesis of how his argument proceeds. I fill this exegetical gap. I show that the Gestaltist’s fundamental error is to reify forms as transcendent realities, rather than treating them as phenomena of perceptual consciousness. From this, reductivist errors follow. The essay serves not only as a helpful guide through parts of /The Structure of Behavior/ for newcomers, but also offers a corrective to recent trends in philosophy of mind. Such influential commentators as Hubert Dreyfus, Taylor Carmen, and Evan Thompson have, I argue, risked serious misunderstanding of Merleau-Ponty’s view, by mistakenly treating “circular causality” as central to Merleau-Ponty’s own acausal (dialectical) view of forms.
Forthcoming in _The Development of Perception in Merleau-Ponty_, edited by John Russon and Kirsten Jacobson. University of Toronto Press.
The “Entre-Deux” of Emotions: Emotions as InstitutionsIn the _Phenomenology of Perception_, Merleau-Ponty claims that “passionate feelings and behaviors are… in fact institutions.” My aim in this essay is, drawing upon Merleau-Ponty’s mid-career writings, including the lectures on institution, to bring out the full force of this claim. My focus is on the more personal side of institutions—that is to say, transformational moments within our personal and intersubjective lives where a new configuration of meaning and a new form of agency is inaugurated—and on what Merleau-Ponty calls the “subterranean logic” of this development. The development involved is “subterranean,” as we will see, insofar as these transformational moments come in some sense from beyond the subject and are not simply the result of the subject’s own constitutive powers. The notion of institution is thus yet another way in which Merleau-Ponty seeks to criticize and offer an alternative to intellectualism, with its idea of a constituting subject.
2001 •
Perception and Its Development in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology, Eds. Kirsten Jacobson and John Russon
On the Nature of Space: Getting from Motricity to Reflection and Back Again2017 •
2005 •
2012 •
Encyclopedia of Cultural Theory
Henri Bergson (Encyclopedia of Cultural Theory, forthcoming)Semiotica
Biological Roots of Musical Epistemology: Functional Cycles, Umwelt, and Enactive Listening2001 •
2014 •
Philosophy and Medicine
Dimensions of Embodiment: Body Image and Body Schema in Medical Contexts2001 •
LANGUAGE AND SEMIOTIC STUDIES Vol. 7, No. 3
"The Semiotics of Axiology and Communicology", LANGUAGE AND SEMIOTIC STUDIES, Vol. 7, no. 3 (2021), Special Issue Editor: Richard L. Lanigan (FULL TEXT — ALL ARTICLES)2021 •
George Spencer-Brown, Fifty Years of the Laws of Form
KLEIN BOTTLE LOGOPHYSICS, THE PRIMEVAL DISTINCTION, SEMIOSIS, PERCEPTION AND THE TOPOLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESSInvestigaciones Fenomenológicas
Pluralities without reified Wholes : a phenomenological response to Hans Berhard Schmid’s collectivism2011 •
Theory & Psychology February 1, 2000 10: 23-30
The Sleeping Subject: Merleau-Ponty on Dreaming2000 •
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SEMIOTICS
Ernst Cassirer's Theory and Application of Communicology: From Husserl via Bühler to Jakobson (2017)2017 •
2017 •
2011 •
Fiorenza Toccafondi, ed. Filosofia e scienza. Punti d'incontro passati e presenti (Firenze, Le Lettere, 2012)
True Realism Requires Representations: Enactivism versus Gestalt Theory1993 •
Journal of New Music Research
Music cognition, semiotics and the experience of time: Ontosemantical and epistemological claims2004 •
Continental Philosophy Review
Gallagher, S. 2008. Intersubjectivity in perception2008 •