Responses
by the state, business
and civil society
THE
CORONAVIRUS
OUTBREAK
in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine
Authors Ekaterina Pierson-
Scientific editor Andrei Yeliseyeu
Lyzhina, Oleksii Kovalenko
Language editor Paul Hansbury
ABSTRACT
The different responses to the first wave of COVID-19
in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine between March and June 2020
largely reflected the political regime, economic structure and
social conditions in each country. The personalist authoritarian
regime in Belarus partly explains the state’s irresponsible
policies, stemming from president Lukashenka’s personal
views on COVID-19. The Russian and Ukrainian authorities
took the pandemic more seriously and this met greater
satisfaction among citizens. In dealing with the pandemic,
they solicited the help of the oligarchs. While – volunteers,
as well as initiatives by civil and private business, – played
an important role in all three countries, their role was crucial
in Belarus where there was a denial of the crisis at the state
level. In both Russia and Belarus, where national votes were
held during the first wave of the pandemic, the epidemiological
situation was used as an excuse for political restrictions and
fraudulent vote counting.
CONTENTS
I. STATE RESPONSES
1 | Contrasting state responses and Belarus’s risky approach
4
2 | Effect on leader approval ratings
7
3 | Regional response in Belarus and Russia
8
4 | Regional disobedience in Ukraine
9
5 | COVID-19 and the authoritarian agenda
10
II. BUSINESS RESPONSES
1 | Belarusian businesses initiating almost 300 projects
12
2 | Russian SMEs reinforce support by large public and private companies
13
3 | Ukrainian president Zelensky’s reliance on large industrial groups
14
III. CIVIL SOCIETY RESPONSES
1 | Strong response by the Belarusian civil society
15
2 | Russia: volunteers doing their part
17
3 | COVID-19 solidarity movement in Ukraine
18
CONCLUSIONS
20
About the Authors
21
About the EAST Сenter
21
I.
STATE
RESPONSES
1
Contrasting state
responses and
Belarus’s
risky approach
During the first wave of the spread of the coronavirus, Russian and Ukrainian authorities limited international air travel
and took measures similar to those in most EU member
states. They mandated self-isolation of confirmed cases,
encouraged social distancing, banned public events, either
closed schools or encouraged them to move their activities
online, and imposed lockdowns. Ukraine’s strictest measures, which included the suspension of public transport,
closure of schools, daycares and businesses, began in early
March and lasted for over two months.
In contrast, Belarus’s response was very weak. The stateowned media did not run a visible and coherent campaign
concerning self-isolation, nor did it encourage social distancing. There were occasional official statements and
advertisements promoting social distancing among the elderly, but these were overshadowed by the dominant narrative which downplayed the risks of coronavirus infection.
There was no nation-wide ban on public events in Belarus,
and the top football and hockey leagues continued uninterrupted. School vacations were prolonged for two weeks
in April, however the state authorities avoided mentioning
the grave epidemiological situation as the actual reason.
5
In very rare cases local and regional authorities adopted some social distancing measures. On 30 March the Viciebsk city executive
committee published the most comprehensive set of measures which included
a ban on exhibitions, fairs and presentations
indoors, closing entertainment venues
by 11pm, and mandating the introduction
of distance learning in universities. However, even this decision was only belatedly
adopted after carefully censored information about the rapidly developing epidemic
in Viciebsk became publicly available.
The Belarusian authorities’ approach was
to test suspected cases, trace their contacts
and isolate the sick; a strategy which quickly
proved unsuccessful compared to South
Korea and Singapore’s application of similar
measures. A WHO expert mission, which
visited Belarus on 8–11 April, concluded that
the number of COVID-19 cases in Belarus
was “growing rapidly” and issued recommendations to strengthen physical distancing measures, including postponing large
gatherings. However, the state-owned media
selectively reported the mission’s findings
and the state authorities largely ignored
the recommendations. The website Covidmonitor provided a more detailed chronology of the statements, actions, and reactions
by Belarusian state bodies and monthly
reports for the period up to June 2020.
Minsk’s approach towards the 9 May military
parade, on the occasion of the 75th anniversary of the victory against Nazi Germany,
was starkly different from that of Moscow
and Kyiv. Despite calls by the WHO mission
for a postponement of this event, as well
I. State Responses
as EU High Representative Joseph Borrel’s statement that allocation of coronavirus-related funds from Brussels will be linked
to fulfilment of WHO recommendations,
the parade was held as usual. Administrations of public universities and management
of state-owned enterprises reportedly forced
students and workers to fill the stands. However, aside from the packed stands, far fewer
people attended than in previous years.
In Ukraine, in place of the cancelled parade,
President Volodymyr Zelensky laid flowers
by the Eternal Flame in Kyiv and the regional
authorities congratulated veterans. Russia
postponed its military parade to 24 June and
limited the 9 May events to an airshow.
Belarus’s state policies largely stemmed
from Lukashenka’s personal views
on the coronavirus. In the early stage
of the epidemic, the Ministry of Health
favoured distance learning at schools
and spoke about the monitoring of mass
gatherings in its official Telegram channel.
However, soon after Lukashenka’s controversial statements on the virus the ministry
changed its rhetoric. After Lukashenka
publicly claimed that no one in Belarus had
died from coronavirus, each ministry’s post
speaking about coronavirus-related deaths
consistently claimed that all the deceased
had “a number of chronic diseases”.
As a counter-argument to calls for a ban
on mass public events, the ministry pointedly
asked, “Why are independent journalists
and experts, who actively advocate cancelling mass events numbering more than
100 people, gathering at a reception
of over 300 people organised by the embassy of a European country?”
I. State Responses
6
Although the Belarusian Ministry of Health
did not publish any mortality data for 2020
as of October, the Ministry passed monthly mortality data for January–June 2020
to the United National Organisations, which
made them available at the UNdata portal. It follows from the analysis of this data
that the most likely total number of excess
deaths in April–June 2020 made up around
6,730. Hence, the death toll due to the
COVID-19 outbreak must have been grossly
minimised in Belarus’s official reports which
estimated 398 deaths from coronavirus
in April–June 2020. The COVID-19 epidemic
trends in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine differ,
although questionable credibility of coronavirus-related official data, particularly for
Belarus, should be borne in mind.
Graph 1. New weekly confirmed COVID-19 cases
in late March – mid-October 2020
Ukraine
40 K
30 K
20 K
10 K
0
Belarus
6K
4K
2K
0
Russia
80 K
60 K
40 K
20 K
Source: Based on the European Center for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) data
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Belarusian state-owned TV channels
employed a range of propaganda tricks.
They repeatedly ridiculed the coronavirus
pandemic and countermeasures to it,
portraying the former as a “special operation” by external forces. They asserted that Belarus enjoys a world-beating
health care system to combat epidemics, alleging that the panic and psychosis around the pandemic is worse
than the coronavirus disease itself, and
claimed that world leaders acknowledged
their erroneous policies and started following Lukashenka’s example. An online
survey conducted in late March and early
April across 58 countries found that 86%
of Belarusians considered the measures
taken by the state authorities ineffective,
second only to Turkey.
2.
Effect on leader
approval ratings
Russia’s initial pandemic response was
fairly mild and coincided with preparations for a referendum on constitutional
amendments. The vote was expected
to go ahead on 22 April and large-scale
rehearsals of the 9 May military parade
took place. Russia bolstered its response
after Vladimir Putin, clad in an orange
protective suit, visited a Moscow’s hospital on 23 March. He addressed the nation on the health situation the next
day. Although Putin’s approval rating
dropped slightly during the pandemic,
this was largely due to the controversial
I. State Responses
vote on the constitutional amendments
rather than dissatisfaction with the country’s management of the pandemic.
In Belarus, Lukashenka’s controversial
and arrogant statements, which included victim-shaming and irresponsible
coronavirus-related policies, must have
contributed to the erosion of his approval rating. This was particularly painful
in the run-up to the presidential election. Although no precise assessment can
be made given the absence of independent
sociology in Belarus, live streams by independent media showed many Belarusians
voicing discontent about state coronavirus policies as they signed in support
of oppositional presidential candidates.
A representative poll of Minsk residents
conducted by the Institute of Sociology
of the Belarusian Academy of Sciences
throughout March and early April 2020
showed that Lukashenka’s trust rating
then amounted to 24%.
In Ukraine, Zelensky’s popularity started
falling before the pandemic’s emergence
following the introduction of a number
of unpopular decisions. These included
opening up the Ukrainian land market
and partial removal of a moratorium
on the disposal of agricultural land, and
a prisoner exchange with Russian proxies in eastern Ukraine. By the beginning
of the COVID-19 crisis in March, Zelensky’s approval rating fell below 50%;
it had stood at 73% in September 2019.
Many Ukrainians subsequently attributed
the severe social and economic impact
I. State Responses
8
of COVID-19 to reshuffles in the Ministry of Health and the unpreparedness
of state institutions. People were especially unhappy with Ukraine’s longserving Interior Minister Arsen Avakov
whose public support rating dropped
to just 12%. This drop in support occurred despite the ministry’s increased
budgetary support during the pandemic, at a time when the state reduced
the funding of several other ministries.
When it comes to sharing bad news
concerning COVID-19, Putin has delegated this role to other state officials
such as Moscow’s mayor, Sergei Sobyanin, who was appointed the head
of the coronavirus-related working
group in the State Council. Lukashenka
has shared the media space with Natallia
Kachanava, the head of the upper chamber of the Belarusian parliament, and
Uladzimir Karanik, the Minister of Health.
The Belarusian ruler has made no hospital
visits, sending the mentioned deputies and
other top officials instead. For the purposes of populist legitimisation, Lukashenka staged meetings with bureaucrats
in which he criticised them for the lack
of medical equipment.
Ukraine’s president visited a number
of hospitals treating COVID-19 patients
located in different regions. In June, Zelensky stated that he had considered infecting himself with the coronavirus “to show
Ukrainians how dangerous this disease is.”
He has shared the spotlight with the chief
sanitary doctor, Viktor Liashko, and
the Minister of Health Maksym Stepanov.
3.
Regional response
in Belarus and Russia
The state authorities in Russia and Belarus gave regional and local authorities
some discretion in handling the coronavirus situation. After 2 April in Russia
the delegation of power to the regions
was increasingly visible with each governor presenting a regional report to Putin
in a series of online conferences. However, the distribution of financial resources
remained centralised.
In Belarus, a number of districts adopted
extra measures to counter the spread
of the COVID-19, usually when hospital
capacity was overwhelmed. For instance,
the Belarusian district of Dokshytsy temporarily closed schools and the cities
of Viciebsk and Hrodna restricted mass
gatherings. Stricter measures, such
as the obligatory wearing of masks in public indoor spaces, were introduced at later stages (typically late May/early June)
in Iuye district (Hrodna region), Kirausk
district and the city of Babruysk (Mahileu
region), and in Braslau district (Viciebsk
region). These additional measures
were not accompanied by a coherent information campaign and no one strictly
enforced them.
A stay-at-home regime was implemented
in sixteen Russian administrative entities. The strictest regime was introduced
in Moscow and the Moscow region from
late March to early June. On 7 April,
I. State Responses
9
the Minsk authorities adopted far softer
countermeasures which included a requirement for companies to hold online
meetings and seminars, the closure
of library reading rooms, the separation
of clients in restaurants, and the suspension of visits to nursing homes. Coronavirus-related information on city administration websites in Belarus was either
absent or ill-presented.
Residents in Moscow and the Moscow
region had to order permits online
in order to leave home. These permits
were linked to the electronic passes
used on public transport: a resident
without a valid permit would find that
his/her usual electronic ticket did not
work at the ticket barrier in Moscow
Metro. All schools were closed and
the only exams allowed were graduation exams. People older than 65 and
other vulnerable groups were placed
in obligatory isolation. The cafes and
restaurants were closed except for
home delivery orders. The few public places that remained open, such
as banks, food stores and pharmacies, installed plexiglass windows and
the staff were obliged to wear masks
and gloves. The organisations were
supposed to take regular temperature
checks of employees and clients.
In Moscow the authorities allowed
dog-walking but prohibited adults from
outdoor walks with children. Permission to take outdoor walks was not
restored until 1 June, but certain rules
applied until 9 June. The public wide-
ly mocked these rules. For instance,
apartment houses were divided into
sections and the inhabitants had assigned days for walking, while sport
activities were permitted before 9am
and required the wearing of a mask.
People who did not respect these
measures received hefty fines. Moscow’s lockdown rules were therefore
similar to those implemented in France
and Spain. In Russia, the relaxation
of lockdown measures, as in EU countries, consisted of multiple phases.
4.
Regional disobedience
in Ukraine
In Ukraine, the quarantine measures during the first four months of the epidemic
were taken solely on the national level,
which is unusual for Ukraine. It was only
at the end of June that the government
handed over responsibility for supplementary measures to local authorities.
The situation spiralled out of control
when certain local authorities openly
disobeyed quarantine measures imposed by Kyiv. With the number of cases
growing in Ukraine throughout March
and April, regional leaders in Odesa,
Cherkasy and Kharkiv decided not to follow nationwide measures hoping to gain
in popularity among the local population. In early May, Odesa mayor Hennadiy Trukhanov, despite national provisions, ordered preparations to begin for
the tourist season.
I. State Responses
10
Kharkiv’s mayor, Hennadiy Kernes,
disobeyed the Ukrainian government
decree “On preventing the spread
of COVID-19 coronavirus in Ukraine.” This
decree, adopted on 11 March, required
all educational institutions and daycare centres to close. He also ignored
the government’s decision to shut
down public transport “in the interest
of Kharkiv’s inhabitants”.
Cherkasy mayor Anatolii Bondarenko,
in turn, decided to reopen the local
economy before the rest of the country. He eased quarantine restrictions for
some entrepreneurs and, when the police initiated criminal proceedings against
him for his actions, claimed that he was
not afraid of law enforcement agencies.
Zelensky reacted by calling Bondarenko
a “criminal” and a “populist”. Ukraine’s interior minister, Arsen Avakov, promised
serious consequences for Bondarenko’s actions, however criminal investigation had not brought concrete results
as of late September 2020.
The national government struggled
to discipline these instances of blatant
disobedience because the lockdown
measures violated citizens’ constitutional rights. Unless the government were
to declare a nationwide state of emergency, which would override many of those
constitutional rights, it had a weak case
against the city mayors. the imminent
local elections (October 2020) are widely
believed to be an additional factor motivating some mayors’ criticism of the unpopular lockdown measures.
5.
COVID-19 and
the authoritarian agenda
In each of the three countries national
votes took place during the pandemic.
In Belarus the most active part of the political campaign leading to the 9 August
presidential election took place during
the first wave of COVID-19’s spread. Irresponsible health policies at this time contributed to the erosion of Lukashenka’s approval rating. The Ukrainian local elections
took place on 25 October amid a quickly
spreading second wave.
Russia scheduled its vote on constitutional amendments, including the proposed
removal of term limits which would allow
Putin to run again for two more six-year
presidential terms, for 22 April. the ballot
was deferred because of the pandemic,
finally being held from 25 June to 1 July.
Later on, from 11 to 13 September, that
is in between the two waves of COVID-19,
Russia held regional elections in 28 of its
85 federal subjects, as well as local elections in many Russian cities.
Belarus’s authorities used the pandemic
to justify their authoritarian practices. First,
Belarus limited the presence of international election observers under the pretext of risks associated with COVID-19.
In reality the lack of a timely invitation
to ODIHR OSCE more than two months
after the announcement of the election was
unrelated to coronavirus, but the Central
Election Commission (CEC) nonetheless
11
asserted that invitations to foreign election
monitoring missions were not extended
due to the inability to provide for everyone’s safety in the pandemic situation.
Second, the CEC made domestic election
observation all-but-impossible by limiting
the number of observers at a polling station
to five people on the main election day and
just three people during the early voting
period. Government-controlled observers
normally had priority over independent
observers, thereby making genuine election
observation almost totally non-existent.
Local and precinct election commissions,
formed by local and regional authorities,
included only a negligible number of opposition members: two of the 1,989 members
of precinct election commissions were
opposition party members.
Third, polling stations tried to prevent
voters from photographing their ballots
by installing curtain-free polling booths.
This violated the secrecy of the voting.
the formal explanation for this invoked
epidemiological reasons, suggesting that
removing curtains around ballot boxes
minimised virus transmission risks. This
way the authorities attempted to undermine the Holas (The voice) civic initiative
which asked voters to upload photographs
of ballots online. Instead, the authorities’
measures facilitated a massive election
fraud. Lukashenka was officially declared
a winner with 80% of the votes, whereas
an analysis by the Novaya Gazeta newspaper shows that excluding “anomalous”
voting districts from the official tally would
see Lukashenka’s vote share drop to 43%.
I. State Responses
Furthermore, the authorities restricted
lawyers from access to political prisoners and banned or impeded relatives
from sending parcels to those detained,
nominally due to rules introduced
to combat COVID-19.
The above mentioned restrictive measures went hand-in-hand with frequent
disregard of epidemiological rules by election commission members as reported
by independent observers and particularly so by law-enforcement agencies and
penitentiary bodies – the latter placed
over a hundred post-election protesters
in a single prison cell.
In Russia many criticised the early lifting
of restrictions. They argued that the purpose was to push ahead with the referendum on controversial constitutional
amendments. By extending the vote over
seven days, and regional elections over
three days, the voting procedure became
more susceptible to a fraudulent count.
the early voting and the wide use of mobile
ballot boxes made ballot stuffing easier
and contributed to unprecedented election
fraud. the authorities insist these measures
aimed at preventing overcrowding and
reduced the risk of spreading COVID-19.
It is noteworthy that Belarus and Russia,
despite invoking COVID-19 in the ways
described, provided approving observers
to each other’s elections. the CIS election
mission chaired by Russian Sergey Lebedev praised Belarus’s election, whereas
Belarusian observers voiced no criticism
of the national vote in Russia.
II.
BUSINESS
RESPONSES
1
Belarusian
businesses
initiating almost
300 projects
According to information collected by the Covid Economics in Belarus project, by mid-July at least 220 Belarusian companies had gathered assistance of over
US$2 million. The majority of support initiatives were
concentrated in the Minsk region (170), followed
by the Viciebsk region (44) which has been the most
affected region outside the capital. Roughly an equal
number of initiatives were registered in the remaining
four regions of the country.
This is not complete information on the financial assistance provided by businesses. For example, it was
separately reported that by late May a charity account
belonging to the Belarusian Ministry of Health received
around US$2.4 million from businesses and citizens;
a quarter of donors were individuals. Additionally, Belarusian businesses transferred over US$1.7 million to doctors
either directly or through the #BYCOVID-19 project and
other civic initiatives.
Around 150 projects initiated by companies representing the hospitality industry, retail and other
economic sectors provided various pro bono services.
These included the delivery of hot meals and beverages
II. Business responses
13
to medical workers and the provision
of washing machines and other goods
to hospitals.
Over 100 projects concerned financial
donations of various sizes. Whereas
some donated through specialised
NGOs, others coordinated via messenger services and provided assistance
to medical institutions directly. Both
large businesses (e.g. banks, telecommunication companies or petrol station
chains) and smaller ones (e.g. amusement arcades) provided hospitals with
medical and protective equipment.
The IT, industrial and banking sectors
were particularly generous. As of late
July, EPAM made the largest contribution of financial aid, amounting
to US$275,000. Other major donors
included the Coca-Cola Company
($200,000), BPS Sberbank ($150,000),
SK hynix ($150,000) and Belagroprombank ($120,000). Vizor Games pledged
US$103,000, while Melsoft Games,
Itransition, Easybrain and Currency.com
each provided US$100,000 in the fight
against COVID-19.
A significant part of financial and pro
bono support by Belarusian businesses
was coordinated through authoritative
NGOs, particularly Imena foundation
and BYCOVID19 initiative. As the results
of one poll among Belarusian NGOs (April
2020) showed, such partnership contributed to higher trust in business towards
the civil society, which was traditionally
low in Belarus prior to the epidemic.
2.
Russian SMEs reinforce
support by large public and
private companies
Russian companies donated funds to combat COVID-19 as well. RUSAL, Russian largest manufacturer of low-carbon aluminium,
financed the construction of seven medical
centres for EUR €36 million. Metalloinvest
also donated around EUR €22 million for
the construction of hospitals in a number
of Russian regions. Russian oligarch and
billionaire businessman Gennady Timchenko donated EUR €31.5 million in the form
of medical goods for hospitals. Other large
Russian public and private businesses such
as Norilsk Nickel, Sberbank, USM Holdings
and others, as well as a number of oligarchs
including Vladimir Potanin, Mikhail Freedman, Oleg Deripaska and Alisher Usmanov
also made donations for fighting COVID-19.
The Moscow-located Kommunarka hospital
treating Covid-19 patients received twenty
cars and a minibus from a car manufacturer.
This and other hospitals also received free
food deliveries and fuel. In addition to direct
financial assistance, large, medium, and
small businesses provided pro bono goods
and services such as free lodging, transport,
shoes, clothes and care products for doctors.
According to the Social Media Index produced by Russian company Medialogiya for
the period between 16 March and 7 June,
the National Media Group launched the most
visible online initiative. The initiative was
focused on supporting Russian SMEs during
14
the COVID-19 pandemic. Other significant
initiatives included Sberbank’s project constructing a mathematical model of COVID19’s spread and Mail.ru Group, Yandex and
Tochka’s assistance funds for SMEs. The same
index showed that in the category of pro bono
services to medics, the three most visible
initiatives on the internet were organised
by Burger King, Yandex and McDonalds.
3.
Ukrainian president
Zelensky’s reliance on large
industrial groups
Instead of focusing on cooperation with
civil society organisations and volunteer
initiatives in combatting the coronavirus
epidemic, Zelensky continued to rely heavily
on the large financial and industrial groups
as his predecessors did. The pandemic consequently increased his dependency on them.
Since Ukraine’s independence, these groups
have been filling in the gaps in Ukraine’s institutional capacities, providing financial and
technical assistance in exchange for preferential treatment by the authorities. In this way
they have also secured popular support for
the political parties they sponsor.
When Ukraine introduced quarantine
measures in March, President Zelensky summoned the wealthiest businessmen, trying
to coordinate with them on the state’s response to the pandemic. Those business
leaders included the industrialist Rinat
Akhmetov, former Privatbank owner Ihor
Kolomoyskyi, pipeline business owner Viktor
II. Business responses
Pinchuk and the owner of Ukraine’s largest
construction company Oleksandr Yaroslavskyi. Zelensky asked the oligarchs for financial aid worth US$440-470 million. Moreover, he assigned them geographical areas
of responsibility and asked them to organise
anti-crisis centres in their allocated regions.
Political consequences aside, the strategy
was relatively successful. Most of the businessmen responded with alacrity, delivering around US$25 million in aid by the end
of April. These funds helped procure testing
kits, ventilators, personal protective equipment and disinfectants. Billionaire Rinat
Akhmetov took responsibility for several
regions, including the parts of Donbas controlled by Ukraine and also Zaporizhzhya, Lviv
and Ivano-Frankivsk regions. Viktor Pinchuk
volunteered to be responsible for Dnipropetrovsk oblast where his assets are located.
Ihor Kolomoyskyi was less eager to contribute to fighting the pandemic, wanting first
to regain control over his bank. The chances
of returning control over the country’s largest
lender Privatbank to its former owners, and,
consequently, any willingness of Kolomoyskyi
to contribute to fighting COVID-19 crisis, vanished in May 2020, when Ukrainian lawmakers passed an “anti-Kolomoyskyi law.”
While other oligarchs did not demand
immediate political bonuses in return for
their help, the situation with Kolomoyskyi
should alarm the Ukrainian authorities.
Unconditional financial assistance from
large financial and industrial groups
is hardly possible in a country where
the distribution of public resources has
systemically benefited the wealthiest.
III.
CIVIL SOCIETY
RESPONSES
1
Strong response
by the Belarusian
civil society
Belarus’s state policies concerning the pandemic have run
counter to the expectations of the public. An online survey
conducted by SATIO in late March 2020 among residents
aged 18–64 showed that 70% of Belarusian respondents
favoured the suspension of mass events and 56% supported the temporary closing of educational institutions.
According to SATIO’s mid-April online survey, 74% deemed
it necessary to suspend mass events, 71% wanted better
state communication about COVID-19, and 52% wanted
to see the closing of all education institutions among state
countermeasures. The same poll established that 65% of respondents favoured more comprehensive social distancing
measures, whereas 24% thought the development of herd
immunity was the best approach. These surveys revealed
that the public was mostly concerned with a possible collapse of the health system, declining salaries, and shortages
of medication and personal protective equipment (PPE).
In response to very limited state policies, a large
part of Belarusian society declared a so-called “people’s quarantine”. A number of civil initiatives and popular
Telegram channels promoted social distancing measures. The Belarusian independent media widely covered
III. Civil society responses
16
mobility trends around workplaces declined
by around 20–25% compared to January
according to Google COVID-19 Community
Mobility Reports. Due to physical distancing
interventions by the authorities of Russia
and Ukraine, workplace contacts, the use
of public transport, and attendance to retail
and recreation in these two countries were
reduced to a larger extent than in Belarus.
the issue and questioned the adequacy
of state measures. The late March online
poll found that Belarusians had begun
doing their shopping and participating
in public events less frequently, put travel
plans on hold and started practising other
social distancing measures. By early April,
attendance at restaurants and shopping
centres, the use of public transport and
Graph 2. Mobility trends amid the first wave of coronavirus
outbreak in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine
UKRAINE
RUSSIA
BELARUS
Retail & recreation, %
40
0
-40
-80
-80
Retail & recreation, %
Public transportation, %
40
0
-40
-80
Workplaces, %
40
0
-40
Source: Based on the Google COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports, 2020
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III. Civil society responses
17
Within three months of the coronavirus
emerging in Belarus, the BYCOVID-19 civic
initiative assembled around US$360,000,
mostly through crowdfunding platforms
MolaMola.by and Petitions.by, and delivered PPE to hundreds of hospitals across
the country. BYCOVID-19 relied on specific
requests from medical institutions rather
than making unsolicited deliveries. Dozens
of other, smaller crowdfunding initiatives
were registered and managed to collect
financial assistance for medical workers.
The strong response by NGOs increased
Belarusian residents’ level of trust towards
civil society, businesses’ trust towards
the NGOs as well as trust between NGOs,
one April poll showed.
In order to facilitate cooperation with
the state authorities and public hospitals, BYCOVID-19 spokespersons Andrei
Stryzhak and Andrei Trakchou abstained
from criticising the authorities for inadequate coronavirus-related countermeasures. Although the state authorities
largely tolerated BYCOVID-19’s activities,
occasional inadequate measures were
reported despite the high importance
of the civil initiative for public health.
It was reported, among other things,
that the deputy chief doctor of Shumilina regional hospital was summoned
to the prosecutor’s office after she
wrote about a deficit of PPE in a Telegram channel and put out a call for
assistance.
Belarusian state-owned media did not report on civil society’s response to the epidemic, wholly ignoring BYCOVID-19’s
activities. Instead it focused on the sporadic assistance provided by GONGOs
(i.e. government-organised “NGOs”) like
the Belarusian Women’s Union, the Belarusian Republican Youth Union and
the Belarusian Federation of Trade Unions. Following the August presidential
election and post-election crackdown,
many key figures from BYCOVID-19 and
similar initiatives were either repressed
or temporarily left the country to escape
repressions, which will likely weaken civil
society efforts in combatting a second
wave of the pandemic.
An online questionnaire conducted in May
and June showed that the pandemic had
caused many Belarusian NGOs to realise
the importance of reorienting their activities. Belarus’s civil society organisations
noted an increased demand for educational and career support, legal advice and
social services.
2.
Russia: volunteers
doing their part
Russian society was more satisfied with
the measures taken by its authorities than
Belarusians. Levada’s survey in late May,
based on a representative sample of urban and rural residents across the country and conducted by computer-assisted
telephone interviews, showed that 65%
of respondents approved the anti-coronavirus measures taken by the president
and government, whereas 63% completely
III. Civil society responses
18
or partly approved the measures taken
by regional authorities.
The public’s assessment of Russia’s healthcare system was pessimistic though.
An earlier Levada survey (March 2020) revealed that 52% of respondents were unhappy with the situation in Russian healthcare and just 9% assessed it as good.
Media reports about the deficit of PPE
strengthened civil society’s awareness
about existing problems in the healthcare
system and prompted NGOs and progovernment organisations to step in and
help to deal with COVID-19.
A number of charity funds including
“Pravmir” and “Sozidanie” raised money
for PPE, while opposition-minded NGO
“Open Russia” focused on assisting doctors. The latter’s initiative received quite
a lot of criticism on social media though,
on account of the fact that aid was being
solicited from ordinary people when
the country has many oligarchs.
“We are together” – a civil campaign – recruited tens of thousands of volunteers
in 85 Russian regions and partnered with
small and large businesses. A smaller initiative, Memedic, sent 700 volunteers to six
hospitals in Moscow and one in Cherkessk.
Their assistance included cleaning hospital grounds, compiling statistics about sick
patients, and doing laundry and dry-cleaning for doctors and patients. Meanwhile,
a volunteer network, “Makers against
COVID-19”, produced PPE for doctors and
delivered them coffee machines and food.
3.
COVID-19 solidarity
movement in Ukraine
In the wake of the coronavirus pandemic, many of the same people and organisations that volunteered at the outbreak of war in eastern Ukraine in 2014,
began collaborating with businesses
and local authorities to supply PPE
to hospitals. Numerous fundraising
initiatives appeared in Lviv, Kyiv, Odesa,
Poltava, and other cities, in partnership
with local NGOs. Being highly trusted
by the population, volunteer organisations posted information on social
media about donations received and
expenditures.
Ihor Liski, a Ukrainian entrepreneur, and
Maksym Bakhmatov, advisor to the mayor
of Kyiv, created The Kyiv Volunteer Headquarters which aimed at coordinating
donations for procuring PPE and other
medical equipment for Kyiv hospitals.
By the end of July, they had raised almost US$50,000. The Kyiv Volunteer
Headquarters also joined forces with
businesses to purchase lung ventilators
and surgical equipment.
By the end of June, Fabricator/FabLab, an innovation laboratory in Kyiv, had produced
and dispatched over 30,000 face shields
to hospitals across the country. Examples
of regional initiatives included a Volunteer’s Union in Dnipro, which provided
information about the quarantine regulations and supplied medical equipment,
19
and an initiative in the Odesa region for
the production of medical gowns made
of laminated spunbond fabric. The Odesa
region project was initiated by Anzhelika
Derevtsova, owner of the Ukrainian fashion
brand I Want What I Can Do. The charity
fund Starenki helped vulnerable, isolated
older people and provided social workers with protective gear across Kyiv,
Lviv, and Dnipro.
Design engineer Andrii Pavlov launched
the online service no-covid.org.ua to help
doctors with free transport through a network of drivers in Kyiv. A similar initiative
was started by a group of displaced people
and Donbas war veterans in the Donetsk
oblast. They provided transport for at least
400 people weekly to hospitals, including
both medical personnel and patients.
III. Civil society responses
The Ukrainian Volunteer Service stepped
forward with a different approach, matching
volunteers and people in need of assistance
through the Pandemic Relief Centre. By late
April, over 500 volunteers from across
Ukraine signed up as the Centre’s members.
The Ukrainian Volunteer Service also created volunteer safety instructions and a public database of 80+ organisations and initiatives, to provide help to people and medical
workers during the COVID-19 epidemic.
The advocacy and charitable non-profit organisation Patients of Ukraine also served
as a coordination centre for businesses
and private donors willing to contribute
to the common cause. It raised around
US$550,000 for PPE and other medical
equipment by June and made deliveries
to the hospitals in most acute need.
CONCLUSIONS
The different responses to COVID-19 in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine have largely reflected the political regime, economic structure and social specifics in each country.
The Belarusian authorities continued
to damage the image of a paternalistic
state which cares about the needs of its
population. The personalist authoritarian regime in Belarus very well explains
the state’s irresponsible policies, since
the policies adopted stem from Lukashenka’s personal views on COVID-19. In this
situation, the highly-developed IT sector
and dynamic civic initiatives were still
able to make significant contributions
in the fight against the pandemic by financing hospitals, supplying PPE and providing
various pro bono services. The authorities
widely used the COVID-19 pandemic to justify their authoritarian practices and enable
massive vote-rigging in the presidential
election. Inadequate measures by Belarusian state authorities and Lukashenka
personally seriously undermined their legitimacy and largely contributed to unprecedented opposition political mobilisation
both during and after the election.
In Russia, the oligarchs and large
state-controlled companies played
a noticeable role in assisting the state
authorities in dealing with the coronavirus. At the same time a number
of large private companies, networks
of volunteers and grassroots initiatives
also did their part. Although sociological
surveys showed that over a half of Russians approved of the measures taken
by the central and regional state authorities, Vladimir Putin’s approval rating
eroded slightly during the first wave
of COVID-19 infections. At the same time,
the pandemic facilitated election fraud
in Russia’s constitutional referendum.
In Ukraine, the state authorities relied
on the oligarchs to a great extent in dealing with the pandemic, though the voluntary sector, which developed considerably after 2014, made an important
contribution as well. The imminent local
elections in Ukraine contributed to episodes of disobedience by city mayors
towards central government’s lockdown
orders. Despite these acts of disobedience,
in general management of the response
to COVID-19 in Ukraine was no less
centralised than in Belarus and Russia
where the state authorities gave regional and local authorities some discretion
in dealing with the crisis.
About the Authors
Ekaterina Pierson-Lyzhina
is a PhD candidate at Université libre de Bruxelles.
Her current research focuses on Belarusian foreign
policy. She is also a part-time teaching assistant at
Université libre de Bruxelles.
Oleksii Kovalenko
is a research fellow at the EAST Center. His current research
interests are peace studies and conflict resolution with
the focus on Eastern Europe, disinformation and propaganda,
and other asymmetric nonlinear tools of interference.
About the EAST Сenter
The Eurasian States in Transition Research Center (EAST Center)
is an independent, interdisciplinary think-tank focused on postSoviet and east European studies. The EAST Center’s mission
is to produce high quality research on disinformation in Central
and Eastern Europe, domestic and foreign policies in the eastern
European countries, and the Eurasian Economic Union.
All EAST Center studies and other publications are available
on our website at www.east-center.org