Book Reviews by Matthew Blackburn
Europe-Asia Studies , 2021
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Fitzpatrick adds to the already abundant literature on how the USSR was ruled under Stalin. In an... more Fitzpatrick adds to the already abundant literature on how the USSR was ruled under Stalin. In an innovative and fresh approach to the era, the focus is on those around Stalin at the highest levels of the Soviet leadership, what she terms 'Stalin's team'. This constitutes something of a break from her previous studies, which did much to develop the picture of everyday life in the USSR from below. In this book, Fitzpatrick treats us to the fruits of her attentive archival work, which she has handled with the skill of a seasoned social historian, bringing new aspects of the dusty, insular world of Kremlin to life. In doing so she places this world in its rich human context in a manner accessible to the general reader. Renowned in her previous work for bold and convincing revisionist positions, here Fitzpatrick challenges the traditional view of Stalin's immediate colleagues as servile lapdogs and yes-men to the all-powerful leader. Instead, fresh evidence is offered that supports the revisionist view of Stalinism; that Stalin was not omnipotent in wielding power but had to work with a team that retained an ability to influence proceedings and often act as a constraint on Stalin, even if it never seriously attempted to challenge his leadership In following the members of this team, such as Molotov, Kaganovich and Mikoyan, we can see how informal patronage networks and key personalities functioned in a kind of Soviet 'old boys network.' This is a dynamic of serious importance to understanding how the USSR was ruled in this period, surely more vital than than any consideration of the formal Soviet institutions of the time. Fitzpatrick presents a coherent and relatively stable team working under Stalin that survived not only the tumultuous times of his rule but went on to rule the country after his death from 1953 to 1957. While the concept of 'Stalin's team' offers new horizons for discussion and possible reassessments of the Stalin and Post-Stalin era, Fitzpatrick has written this book for the general reader, with theoretical or historiographical discussions mainly confined to brief treatments in the introduction and conclusion. The book is an extremely engaging account of the men in this team; how they thought, worked, interacted with Stalin and survived in their positions. Fitzpatrick keeps our attention in a skilful manner, allowing us to play the fascinating role of voyeur within the Stalinist upper circle, and offering up remarkable, vivid and often amusing pieces of this reality. The book is structured in a chronological fashion. Chapters One to Four follow the emergence of the team from the 1920's, up until the start of the Great Purges, revealing the camaraderie of a rough and ready group of comrades with more proletarian and Russian roots than the cosmopolitan old Bolsheviks of pre-revolutionary émigré culture. This section shows how instrumental they were in Stalin's rise in the power struggle and also reveals their agency in Stalin's 'Revolution from Above'. In chapters Five and Six we follow the team through two very contrasting periods; firstly we have the Great Terror where we see the team disempowered as they cling on to survival, while secondly we have a very different picture of the war years when they are thrust into roles with great amount of authority and autonomy. Chapters Seven and Eight focus on postwar Stalinism when an older and less vigorous Stalin depended more and more on his 'team,' apparently to his own increasing frustration. We also can see how the team itself had evolved out of its rough and inurbane origins to more sophisticated lifestyles and roles. Chapters Nine and Ten follow the team after Stalin's death and offers an interesting new interpretation of the period between the death of Stalin and the rise of Khrushchev (1953-1957), a period that has been previously neglected by scholars. While the book undoubtedly opens up new ground in the study of the period, some issues arise from using the concept of 'team'. In the introduction, Fitzpatrick offers some insight to the nature of this 'team'; while it is not made up of powerless underlings, equally it is not to be seen as a body that seriously competes with Stalin for leadership. The central premise of the book is that this team was important and had serious influence on developments in Stalinist policies. This idea comes under some strain when we view the team during some vital moments; such as the launch of collectivization, the Great Terror or signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. Here there is little evidence of the team's cohesion and stability, collegiality and debate seem to go out the window as the team meekly swallows Stalin's line. The postwar period is presented as a
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Conference Presentations by Matthew Blackburn
This paper considers 'popular' or 'low' Geopolitics in Russia; in other words how people perceive... more This paper considers 'popular' or 'low' Geopolitics in Russia; in other words how people perceive their own country's geopolitics and role in the world. Recent changes in the international context and the territorial boundaries of the Russian Federation can be expected to influence how Russian identity is imagined and shaped. However, while there is apparent domestic support for an increasingly assertive and revisionist Russia, recent sociological data suggests very limited public interest in expansionism, be it in recreating the USSR, pushing forward with a political Eurasian Union or initiating an ethno-nationalist 'gathering in' of historic Russian lands. This paper relies on qualitative data from two levels; the first analyses a selection of State and Media discourse over the last two years while the second is based on interviews with 'ordinary' Russians from different social groups in two age groups, collected over one year in three different regions of European Russia. The data that emerged can shed light on three areas. Firstly, how Russians view the 1991 borders of the Russian Federation and how they have internalised challenges to these boundaries; be it in the addition of territory or in the potential breakaway of regions within the countries. Rather than backing a revanchist, neo-Eurasianist or ethno-nationalist ideological programme, pragmatic, status-driven and defensive attitudes predominate in justifying Russia's borders. Secondly, attitudes to the emerging concept of Russian world (Russkii Mir) are considered alongside attitudes to Russian speakers (russkoyazichnie) in the 'Near Abroad' and reflections on 'Russianness'. Contrary to some expectations, it does not appear that the civic definition of Russianness is giving way to an ethnic interpretation at this stage. The implications this has for the development of the Russian World concept will be considered. The third aspect concerns the seeming resolution of whether Russia should give priority to ties with Europe or the CIS with the realignment of Russia away from the 'West' and closer to the 'East'. While this ties in the discourse of Russia as a 'unique civilization' with a 'special path,' I would like to consider the isolationist aspects in this realignment and its connection to strivings to retain/attain 'Great Power' status. This is reinforced by respondents' definitions of Great power status, which are often set in terms of the earlier Soviet image: a powerful state proudly resisting encirclement and domination by a perfidious, hostile Western coalition intent on her defeat and partition. In conclusion, there is reason to suggest the current foundations of Russian 'low' geopolitics are Putin's brand of Russian nationalism. This entails the fusion of (a) Russia's civilizational uniqueness and special non-Western path (b) the mission to restore Russia's greatness on the world stage. At this stage, it seems concepts such as russkii mir, novorossiya or Russia's Eurasian destiny have not been unpacked and presented for popular use, and instead they remain vague or fuzzy concepts to Russia's mainstream audience.
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In order to study the shared ideas, values and interpretations of the past that constitute ‘colle... more In order to study the shared ideas, values and interpretations of the past that constitute ‘collective memory’, this paper examines what Bell (2003) referred to as ‘nationalist myth’: a story that ‘simplifies, dramatizes and selectively narrates the story of a nation’s past.’ 1 Employing a qualitative approach, the aim was to uncover dominant ‘myths’2 in the Russian collective memory, allowing respondents to define what is meaningful and significant in the collective triumphs or traumas, thus contributing to the picture of collective memory ‘from below’. Two generational age cohorts (80 interviews in total) were interviewed in three Russian cities from a variety of social groups in 2014-2015. What was revealed was how individual memories unite to offer a new interpretation of the political past, resulting in a strong positive myth about the era of 1900-1914. This was reinforced by consistent references to the current Putin era, which respondents also insisted was a ‘golden age’ for Russia in modern times. These respondents saw continuity between 1900-1914 and 2000-2014; in both eras Russia was/is a ‘normal European power’ that was/is ‘on the rise economically ’ and ‘respected by the other powers’. In terms of the definitive national trauma, an overwhelming majority viewed the 1917 October Revolution as a break or rupture (slom) in Russian history, wiping out the gains of 1900-1914. This myth of 1917 views revolution as inherently destructive and wasteful, which emerged a key shared value. Interestingly, a smaller but coherent sub-current emerged presenting the October Revolution in rather conspiratorial terms; here national interests were ‘betrayed’ and the ‘elite’ was divided, foreign interests organized a coup (pereverot) to ‘tear Russia apart’. This conspiracy theory remerged in discussions of the 1991 collapse of the USSR, with Gorbachev presented as a traitor in the pay of foreign interests. While this research has suggested the existence of key myths to certain key historical junctures, what remains unclear is how state historical memory policy will respond to integrate or commemorate these myths on the centenary of the Russian Revolution.
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Papers by Matthew Blackburn
Reconstructions of History, 2023
From the very start of war in Ukraine there have been persistent and recurrent predictions of sys... more From the very start of war in Ukraine there have been persistent and recurrent predictions of systemic collapse in Russia. This includes military exhaustion (Sly 2022), economic meltdown,1 mass protests2 and, inter-elite splits (Stanovaya 2022), all of which was to spell the end of Vladimir Pu- tin as president and bring about an end of the war. Such predictions of the ‘beginning of the end’ (Saradzhyan 2022) have proven to be premature and based on the view of pre-2022 foundations of regime stability as fragile. This essay offers an alternative viewpoint, examining factors of continuity and change in three key areas of regime stabilisation: (1) co-option and inter-elite unity; (2) mac- ro-economic stability and state capacity in governance; (3) legitimation narratives. All three areas have been invested in heavily by the Kremlin in the ten years prior to the launch of the Special Mili- tary Operation (SMO) in February 2022.
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Communism and Post-communism Studies, 2023
It is often asserted that the values and attitudes of Homo Sovieticus, marked in the rising "popu... more It is often asserted that the values and attitudes of Homo Sovieticus, marked in the rising "popularity" of Stalin, live on in contemporary Russia, acting as a negative factor in social and political development. This article critiques the argument that attitudes to Stalin reflect unreformed Soviet values and explain Russia's authoritarian regression and failed modernization. Our critique of this legacy argument has three parts. First, after examining the problematic elements of the Levada Center approach, we offer alternative explanations for understanding quantitative data on Stalin and the repressions. Second, we examine interview data showing that, for those with a pro-Stalin position, "defending Stalin" is only a small part of a broader worldview that is not obviously part of a "Soviet legacy." Third, we consider survey data from the trudnaya-pamyat' project and find common reluctance to discuss much of the Stalinist past, which we argue represents an agonistic stance. Thus, we interpret attitudes to Stalin within a broader context of complex social and cultural transformation where the anomie of the 1990s has been replaced with dynamics toward a more positive identity construct. On the one hand, the antagonistic mode of memory is visible in statist and patriotic discourses, which do not seriously revolve around Stalin but do resist strong criticism of him. On the other hand, we find many more in Russia avoid the Stalin question and adopt an agonistic mode, avoiding conflict through a "de-politicized" version of history.
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Cheering and Jeering on the Escalator to Hell: One Year of UK Media Coverage on the War in Ukraine, 2023
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the CC BY 4.0 license.
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Canadian journal of European and Russian studies, Feb 21, 2023
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Europe-Asia Studies
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Region: Regional Studies of Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia, 2021
Diana T. Kudaibergenova’s monograph is a welcome contribution to the study of nation-building, na... more Diana T. Kudaibergenova’s monograph is a welcome contribution to the study of nation-building, nationalism, and minority integration in Kazakhstan and Latvia, cases previously compared in landmark studies by David D. Laitin and Pål Kolstø.1 Kudaibergenova’s contribution moves beyond the paradigms dominant in the late 1990s and into the complex developments of the last two decades. The book’s central framework is “nationalizing regimes” and, with an ambitious and wide-ranging scope, it considers the political uses of nationalism in the two countries. The book brings the fascinating perspective of a researcher with extended experience of living in both countries to tackle challenging and vital questions of power, identity, and politics. With an innovative approach and a variety of empirical data on view, the author has assembled some fascinating insights into the contemporary development of the two countries examined. In conceptual terms, the framework of “nationalizing regimes” is explained in dense and, at times, hard to follow, theoretical language. The author argues that nation-building is “the most powerful space that guides political decision-making mechanisms post-1991” (5) and aims to explore why “the exclusiveness of a certain ethnic or national group” is made “the cornerstone” of political legitimation. By defining “nationalizing regimes” as “the politically defined power field of a regime guided by control and an obsession with nationalism” (6), the author leaves one wondering what is meant by “nationalism” and how this “field” will be accessed. In replacing Brubaker’s “nationalizing state” with “nationalizing regime” we do not move to a more coherent set of actors but toward a vaguer, less graspable “power field”: “the space of interchangeable positions of actors involved in the process of competing for power but also as elites relating to nonelites in the state” (11). This approach may prove confusing for some but may also be well received by others looking for a fresh approach to the study of nation building. If we accept that “nationalizing regimes are formed of the most powerful elites who manage to control and impose the specific discursive and nation-building outcomes” (7), the key question is how to access and examine these power elites. Unfortunately, the author does not include any table of those interviewed, their organizational affiliation, nor dates and locations. The book contains more in-depth quotes from those who are alienated and excluded than from the “powerful elites” determining policy and discourse.
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Europe-Asia Studies, 2016
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Post-Soviet Affairs, 2021
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Russian Politics, 2020
This paper explores how urban Russians perceive, negotiate, challenge and reaffirm the political ... more This paper explores how urban Russians perceive, negotiate, challenge and reaffirm the political configuration of the country and leadership in terms of the ‘imagined nation’. Based on around 100 interviews in three Russian cities, three main pillars appear to prop up the imagined ‘pro-Putin’ social contract: (i) the belief that ‘delegating’ all power into the hands of the President is the best way to discipline and mould state and society; (ii) the acceptance of Putin’s carefully crafted image as a ‘real man’, juxtaposed against negative views of the Russian ‘national character’; (iii) the internalization of a pro-Putin mythology on a ‘government of saviors’ that delivers normality and redeems a ‘once-ruined’ nation. The paper shows that those who reject these pillars do so due to differing views on what constitutes ‘normality’ in politics. This normative split is examined over a number of issues, leading to a discussion of internal orientalism and the limited success of state medi...
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Scando-Slavica, 2018
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Choice Reviews Online, 2016
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Nationalities Papers, 2020
Based on more than 100 interviews in European Russia, this article sheds light on the bottom-up d... more Based on more than 100 interviews in European Russia, this article sheds light on the bottom-up dynamics of Russian nationalism. After offering a characterization of the post-2012 “state-civilization” discourse from above, I examine how ordinary people imagine Russia as a “state-civilization.” Interview narratives of inclusion into the nation are found to overlap with state discourse on three main lines: (1) ethno-nationalism is rejected, and Russia is imagined to be a unique, harmonious multi-ethnic space in which the Russians (russkie) lead without repressing the others; (2) Russia’s multinationalism is remembered in myths of peaceful interactions between Russians (russkie) and indigenous ethnic groups (korennyye narodi) across the imperial and Soviet past; (3) Russian culture and language are perceived as the glue that holds together a unified category of nationhood. Interview narratives on exclusion deviate from state discourse in two key areas: attitudes to the North Caucasus r...
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Learning and Using Languages in Ethnographic Research, 2019
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National Identities, 2021
The normative binary of ‘good-progressive’ and ‘bad-retrograde’ nationalism, traceable to the civ... more The normative binary of ‘good-progressive’ and ‘bad-retrograde’ nationalism, traceable to the civic and ethnic dichotomy, is alive and well in studies of nationalism and populism today. This article underlines the insufficiency of this approach, firstly by examining three stances on the civic nation in the West, each of which rejects ethnic nationalism and reflect different fundamental concerns. Moving east, in Central Europe the binary is inverted and turned against ‘liberal cosmopolitans’; in Russia, the Kremlin’s ‘state-civilization’ project can be viewed as a distinct trend in nation-building for non-Western contemporary great powers.
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Central Asian Survey, 2019
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