FRONTIERS OF LAW IN CHINA
VOL. 10
MARCH 2015
NO. 1
DOI 10.3868/s050-004-015-0010-4
ARTICLE
AN EGG VS. AN ORANGE:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF TAX TREATMENTS OF NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS
HU Tianlong ∗
This article focuses on the comparisons of the tax exemption schemes in the US and
China through a three-fold discussion. Despite the tremendous development of China’s
nonprofit sector, not many comprehensive studies have been completed on such reforms.
The tax treatment of Chinese nonprofit organizations, as a crucial component to
constructing a nonprofit sector, is unsophisticated and short of practical significance.
The expansion of the nonprofit sector in the past decades has resulted in many problems
concerning its tax framework: incoherently defined public benefit or charity purpose of
nonprofit organizations; the unavailability of an enforceable fiscal incentive system to
promote charitable donations, arduous and discouraging administrative procedure of
obtaining the tax exemption, burdensome requirements for the application and
registration of nonprofit organizations, such as dual management, high threshold of
capital endowment for foundations, and prohibition on cross-region development.
Moreover, from a jurisprudential perspective, in the Chinese tax context two cautions
are methodologically identified. First, the scarcity of decent comparative legal tax
scholarship in general does not support quality comparison. A shortage of paradigmatic
discourse shows the simultaneous existence of bluntly conflicting arguments, parallel
courses, and irregularities in analysis. Second, the tax cultural traditions as well as
social, political, and legal settings of a systematic tax governance framework should be
included in tax comparatists’ theorizations. A tax study ultimately has to be conducted
from a “big-picture” perspective, in which a tax system is embedded. Otherwise, a
comparative study may easily turn into a descriptive, mechanical, and perfunctory
analysis. It argues that a comprehensive tax transplant effort of valued ideas and
practices, although bold and uncomfortable for the recipient country at the beginning, is
what China needs to build a robust nonprofit sector.
∗
(胡天龙) Associate Professor of Law and Mingde Youth Scholar, Renmin University of China Law School,
Research Fellow, International Monetary Institute, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China; S.J.D.
(Michigan), LL.M. in International Taxation (Michigan), LL.M. (Michigan). The author thanks Professor
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah and WANG Liming for encouragements and comments. This project is supported by the
Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities, and the Research Funds of Renmin University of
China (14XNJ002). The author takes all errors contained herein. Contact: hut@umich.edu
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INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... 163
I. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND OF NONPROFIT SECTOR LAWS IN CHINA .......... 166
A. Historical Development ...................................................................................... 166
B. Summary of Current Laws and Regulations in China ......................................... 168
1. Social Organizations ....................................................................................... 169
2. Private Non-Enterprise Unit............................................................................ 173
3. Foundations ..................................................................................................... 174
4. Unregistered NGOs ......................................................................................... 175
C. Tax Treatment of Chinese NGOs ......................................................................... 176
1. Tax Treatment of Charitable Donations .......................................................... 176
2. Procedural Reform for Charitable Tax Exemptions ........................................ 180
II. CURRENT U.S. FEDERAL NGO TAX EXEMPTION SYSTEM — AN INSTITUTIONAL
AND THEORETICAL ANALYSIS ................................................................................ 182
A. The Exemption .................................................................................................... 182
B. Theories of Charitable Exemption ..................................................................... 184
1. The Traditional Public Benefit Subsidy Theory ............................................. 184
2. The Base-Defining Theory ............................................................................. 185
3. The Capital Formation Subsidy Theory ......................................................... 186
4. Donative Theory............................................................................................. 188
5. Summary ........................................................................................................ 188
C. Overview of Financial Incentives in the NGO Sector ........................................ 189
III. THE CHARITABLE TAX-EXEMPTION SYSTEM IN PRACTICE — A FURTHER
COMPARISON .........................................................................................................190
A. Formation and Registration .............................................................................. 190
1. U.S. ............................................................................................................... 190
2. China ............................................................................................................. 190
B. Recognized Exempt Purpose and Definition of Charity.................................... 192
1. U.S. ............................................................................................................... 192
2. China ............................................................................................................. 193
C. Requirement of Operation for an Exempt Purpose ........................................... 194
1. U.S. ............................................................................................................... 194
2. China ............................................................................................................. 194
D. Prohibition of Private Inurement ...................................................................... 195
1. U.S. ............................................................................................................... 195
2. China ............................................................................................................. 196
E. NGO Asset Management upon Dissolution, Termination and Liquidation ....... 197
1. U.S. ............................................................................................................... 197
2. China ............................................................................................................. 198
F. Tax Culture ........................................................................................................ 198
1. U.S. ............................................................................................................... 198
2. China ............................................................................................................. 199
CONCLUSION......................................................................................................................... 199
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INTRODUCTION
This article focuses on a comparative study of the tax treatments for the nonprofit
sector in the U.S. and China for three reasons. First, the development of China’s nonprofit
sector1 has been tremendous in the past three decades, but few comprehensive studies
have been initiated on reforming China’s nonprofit organization tax system — a crucial
component that binds nonprofit sector as a partner of the state. Echoing China’s success
in economic growth in past decades, literature on Chinese tax typically focuses on tax
incentives for foreign direct investment and tax policies catering to economic
development. Second, collaterally, the rule of law development in the past decade has
motivated new scholarship regarding the modernization of China’s charity sector with an
“all-in” charity code2 or cultivating expansive grassroots non-government organizations
(hereinafter “NGOs”). These idealistic studies, however, suffer from a lack of focus on
the tax treatment for the nonprofit sector and a consequently unrealistic understanding of
the legal and political settings in which Chinese nonprofit organizations operate. Third,
the studies of tax treatment of non-profit organizations share similar commercial
implications with those directly related to tax incentives and trade-related tax studies.
China’s integration into the WTO and the global trade system has been met with
complaints about national treatment and fair competition from both foreign and domestic
enterprises. A key issue arising is the gradual downplaying and elimination of preferential
tax treatment of foreign investment in China. 3 However, there is no substantially
1
See generally, Evelyn Brody, Institutional Dissonance in the Nonprofit Sector, 41 Villanova Law
Review, 433–440 (1996), discussing that the third sector often uses the terms “charity” and “nonprofit”
interchangeably; see also generally D.B. Robertson, Should Churches be Taxed?, Westminster Press
(Westminster), at 40–68 and Chapters II, III and IV (1968). The same problem exists in the limited research
as to the definition or literal description of “cishan” or “gongyi,” i.e. “charity” in China.
2
See generally QIN Peihua, 中国慈善法草案雏形初具 让慈善回归民间定位 (China’s Draft Charity Law
Is in Shape), available at http://www.china.com.cn/news/gongyi/2010-08/02/content_20620246_2.htm (last
visited Sep. 15, 2014).
3
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113
Harvard Law Review, 1573 (2000), presenting the relationship between tax incentives and revenue; Professor
Avi-Yonah examines the increased use of tax incentives as weapons in the international competition to attract
investment. Professor Avi-Yonah argues that the establishment of tax havens allows large amounts of capital
to go untaxed, depriving both developed and developing countries of revenue and forcing them to rely on
forms of taxation less progressive than the income tax. Professor Avi-Yonah contends that both economic
efficiency and equity among individuals and among nations support limits on international tax competition,
and he presents a proposal that accommodates the competing concern for democratic states’ ability to set their
tax rates independently. He proposes the coordinated imposition of withholding taxes on international
portfolio investment, with the goal of ensuring that all income may be taxed in the investor’s home
jurisdiction. Professor Avi-Yonah also proposes that multinational corporations be taxed initially in the
jurisdictions where their goods and services are consumed. Professor Avi-Yonah outlines that, both developed
and developing nations would be able to preserve the progressivity of the income tax and to broaden and
stabilize their tax bases in time to stave off the fiscal threat to the welfare state.
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meaningful tax law regarding the nascent NGO sector. Little thought has been given to
the economic and fiscal potential of NGOs as foreign investment vehicles. Aiming to
address concerns above through a comparative study,4 this part proceeds cautiously along
two distinct tracks.
First, modern tax studies are debated predominantly in Western terms such as
progressivity, equity, and efficiency, but in general the scarcity of decent comparative
legal tax scholarship fails to generate a “lively debate on comparative tax works and their
methodologies.”5 Meanwhile, “a shortage of paradigmatic discourse in comparative tax
invites the simultaneous existence of bluntly conflicting arguments, taking parallel
courses, yet never engaging each other.”6 Although some frameworks of comparative tax
studies have been proposed,7 they are more theoretical than practical.8 One pragmatic
concern with these frameworks is that only very limited areas of tax are forcefully
analyzable by tax corporatists. This embarrassment is particularly challenging to scholars
in the Chinese tax context who want to further explore the “tax transplant” methodology.9
In this connection, this article argues that a comparative tax study relating to China might
be better achieved by focusing on a “tax law sub-discipline” rather than on a specific tax
concept. One reason is that a tax concept, usually a transplanted vocabulary of western
origin, is too narrow to substantiate a patulous, meaningful, and productive comparative
analysis. The other reason is that specific tax provisions are contingent on their contexts
and not easily extrapolated to others. For example, an international tax concept at the
4
The literature on comparative tax and federalism is voluminous. See Reuven Avi-Yonah, Preface to
Comparative Fiscal Federalism: Comparing the European Court of Justice and the US Supreme Court’s Tax
Jurisprudence, in R.S. Avi-Yonah, J. R. Hines Jr. and M. Lang, eds. xvii-xviii. EUCOTAX Series on
European Taxation, (Kluwer Law International (Alphen aan den Rijn) (2007); Michael A. Livingston, From
Milan to Mumbai, Changing in Tel Aviv: Reflections on Progressive Taxation and “Progressive” Politics in a
Globalized but Still Local World, 54 American Journal of Comparative Law 555 (2006), Professor Livingston
is one of the topmost contributors of the comparative tax literature and has conducted extensive research; see
also Victor Thuronyi, Comparative Tax Law, Kluwer Law International (Frederick) (2004) for a detailed
account of comparative tax methodologies and comparison of tax systems of over 20 countries.
5
Carlo Garbarino, An Evolutionary Approach to Comparative Taxation: Methods, and Agenda for
Research, 57 American Journal of Comparative Law 677, 684 (2009) (“[t]here are three aspects related to the
peculiar nature of taxation that make comparative research particularly difficult: rapid legislative change; the
complexity of tax systems; and the heterogeneity of local tax concepts”); see also, Omri Y. Marian, The
Discursive Failure in Comparative Tax Law, 58 American Journal of Comparative Law, available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1404323, at 1 (arguing that there have been several efforts at defining a theoretical
framework for comparative taxation, but these efforts have been “largely ignored by everybody except their
own authors” leading to an ongoing “non-discourse” that characterizes the field) (last visited Sep. 15, 2014).
6
Id. Omri.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
See LI Jinyan, Tax Transplants and Local Culture: A Comparative Study of the Chinese and Canadian
GAAR, 11 Theoretical Inquiries Law, Art. 8, (2010) arguing the issues arising as to comparing a westernized
conceptions, available at http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol11/iss2/art8 (last visited Sep. 15, 2014).
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AN EGG VS. AN ORANGE
165
maximum can only throw in scrappy value to other major tax areas such as turnover tax
or income tax.10
Second, the specific cultural, social, political, and legal roots and contexts of a tax
governance framework usually are much less discussed or are even purposefully ignored
by tax comparatists. This “snooping” methodology inevitably provokes abundant
“contemptuousness” and skeptics from orthodox tax scholarship against tax comparative
studies. A tax study ultimately has to pay attention to the general cultural, social, political
and legal contexts in which a tax system is embedded. Otherwise, a comparative study
may easily turn into a descriptive, mechanical, and perfunctory analysis. The practical
and academic significance of comparative tax studies can hardly be achieved by a limited
comparison of the technical elements of a tax concept without anything more. Such
“big-picture” perspective nonetheless must be employed to conduct a comparative study
as to the Chinese tax context. The same rationale applies to studies of the impact of both
the rule of law development and China’s assimilation to the World Trade Organization
(hereinafter “WTO”) system as well. Therefore, this article further discusses the role of
philanthropic culture in its comparison between the U.S. and Chinese tax systems.
The development of China’s nonprofit sector11 has been marvelous, especially after
recent natural disasters, 12 the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, and various latest
celebrities’ donation scandals. 13 Regulatory deficiency in the treatment of nonprofit
organizations has alarmed China’s failure to maintain its tradition of state-centered social
provision and the exacerbation of economic disparities between rural and urban citizens.
Surges of grassroots NGO activity, millions of affectionate “netizens” during the natural
disasters, and devoted volunteers for the 2008 Olympic Games and Paralympics Games
have also exposed the malfunctioned administration and messed allocation of charitable
resources. Meanwhile, the Chinese government has seriously identified the indispensable
role played by the nonprofit sector in alleviating the bureaucracy, downsizing government,
stimulating wealth mobility, reducing regional inequality, and, ultimately, promoting a
harmonious society.
The current Chinese legal framework fails to establish an enabling and operative
nonprofit sector. Mostly, the state fails to regulate it through a potent tax system, creating
various tax preferences and ensuring no abuse of those preferences. Even if it had been
10
Id.
See Brody, fn. 1 at 436–37, discussing that the third sector often uses the terms “charity” and
“nonprofit” interchangeably. See also generally Reobertson, fn. 1.
12
See China Daily, Aug. 18, 2010, listing recent natural disasters that involving high casualty and
economic loss including the 2010 South China floods & Yushu Earthquake, Sichuan Earthquake in May 2008,
the southern China snowstorm crisis in early 2008, etc.
13
See ZHANG Ziyi Began to Address Quick Scandal, available at http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/hr/
content_display/world/news/e3i4fe3d67e44c8b3addc7a3a9589c41c58 (last visited Sep. 15, 2014).
11
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suggested that a comprehensive charity law should be enacted, the existing charity tax
laws and regulations sojourn discordant, anachronistic, and inoperative. What makes it
worse is that certain bureaucratic management and unprofessional administration have
jeopardized the incentives for and confidence in reforming the nonprofit sector.
The U.S. system on tax treatment of nonprofit organizations has been a
well-established and sought-after model for decades. It is regarded as particularly
appropriate for emerging NGO sections. This article proffers special emphasis on China’s
tax reform for the charity sector, which has expanded as a result of remarkable economic
growth and legal system reform. Although there is no single pattern fitting in various
global needs, the U.S. model provides quite established principles of federalism, fiscal
incentives and economic adaptability makes it a powerful system. This article compares
current nonprofit tax rules in China and those in the U.S. in practice and highlights
suggestions that may benefit charity tax law reform in China.
Following this introduction, Part II presents a brief overview of China’s current
charity laws and regulations, the historical development of charity tax laws and those in
practice, especially charitable tax exemptions. Part III outlines a number of institutional
and theoretical backgrounds of the current U.S. charity tax exemption systems. Part IV
highlights the institutional and practical similarities and differences between the China
and U.S. systems. Part V concludes with major findings by commenting on potential
nonprofit tax law reform in China.
I. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND OF NONPROFIT SECTOR LAWS IN CHINA
A. Historical Development
China runs according to a complex party-state system in a struggle within itself to
find its way to modernize the nonprofit sector. In 1950, China adopted its first law14 to
manage societal organizations; however, pre-Deng (pre-1978) social organizations are
government operated non-governmental organizations (“GONGOs”) and not “true”
NGOs based on the western definition. Those GONGOs15 are established and absorbed
into the party-state system as part of government branches. Leaders of those organizations
are either current or retired senior government officials and their staff enjoy the same
benefits and privileges of government officials. Apparently, GONGOs are exempt from
registration and administration requirements that are required of China’s NGOs.
The 1980s witnessed the development of a plethora of various forms of NGOs surging
14
See 社会组织注册暂行条例 (Provisional Procedures on the Registration of Social Organizations), the
first law governing social organizations and it remained effective until 1989.
15
Mostly, those organizations are semi-government entities, such as “the Chinese Communist Youth
League,” “the China Writers’ Association,” “the All-China Workers’ Union,” and “the All-China Women’s
Federation.”
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AN EGG VS. AN ORANGE
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from economic “reform and the open-up policy.” In response to liberalization in
economic development and the state-owned enterprises (SOE) modernization reforms, the
state has realized its shortage of capacity and resources to provide all necessary social
services to function as a rapidly reforming society. In the 1990s, the central government
proposed a “small government, big society” policy, transferring part of service
responsibilities that had come from the government to private or nonprofit sectors.
Following the party-state tradition, private and nonprofit sectors have consistently been
treated as auxiliary and subordinate agents of the state in bridging the gap between the
state and the people, especially in areas like poverty relief, elementary education support,
aging population welfare, and environment protection. Although the first authentic civil
society organizations debuted in somewhat embarrassed way in the early 1980s, they
have since shown remarkable potential to outshine the government as a major platform of
raising critique and promoting social welfare and justice. However, in sensitive areas such
as human rights, political reform, and religion, the government has territorially
maintained a very strict practice in monitoring related activities and did not likely allow
private sector or nonprofit sector to step into such realm.
In the second half the 1980s, the government was confronted by a clear and sweeping
economic development needs coupled with a rudimentary and obsolete system of NGO
management. In particular, the late 1980s witnessed a speedy promulgation of the new
Regulation on Registration and Management of Social Organization. Not surprisingly,
practical yet firm measures, such as dual management system, approval and management
of supervisory unit and membership requirements, all have been established since 1989,
and the scale of the NGO sector has risen and fallen according to rounds of re-registration
hurdles.
Despite the fluctuating 16 numbers of registered NGOs, legislation has been
unexpectedly friendly to the nonprofit sector in general. Coupled with the establishment
of specific government branch to manage societal organizations,17 the Article 35 of the
1982 Constitution recognizes the right to freedom of association and the General
Principles of Civil Law (GPCL) has categorized social organizations together with
government organs and public institutions that are different from commercial enterprises.
This tolerance continued for over 15 years and led to the 1998 promulgation of two
important pieces of legislation, most importantly the 2004 Regulation for the
Management of Foundation (hereinafter “Foundation Regulation,” or Jijinhui Guanli
16
MA Qiusha, The Governance of NGOs in China since 1978: How Much Autonomy?, 31 Nonprofit &
Volumtary Sector Quarterly, 305–306 (2002); see also 取缔非法民间组织暂行办法 (Provisional Rules
Banning Illegal NGOs) (promulgated by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, effective as of Apr. 10, 2010), targeting
mostly at illegal grass-roots based Qi-Gong movements.
17
For details of the nonprofit organizations management and government apparatus, available at
http://cszh.mca.gov.cn/ (last visited Sep. 15, 2014).
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Tiaoli), which even permits entry of foreign foundations.18 However, quantification of
growth of the nonprofit sector in China has always been difficult. A majority of NGOs
remain unregistered, or registered as for-profit entities’ to evade arduous administrative
proceedings, and many even dissolve before any formal registration procedure is taken or
completed.
B. Summary of Current Laws and Regulations in China
In China, NGOs19 are classified into three major categories: social organizations
(SOs or shehui tuanti), private non-enterprise units (PNEUs or minban feiqiye danwei),
and foundations (jijinhui), according to three important NGO legislations — the
Regulations on Registration and Management of Social Organizations (hereinafter “SO
Regulation” or Shehui Tuanti Dengji Guanli Tiaoli); the Provisional Regulations on
Registration and Management of Private Non-Enterprise Units (hereinafter “PNEU
Regulation” or Minban Feiqiye Dengji Guanli Zanxing Tiaoli); and the Foundation
Regulation. In particular, Chinese citizens may incorporate, manage, and participate in
SOs and PNEUs, while foreign citizens may only act as the legal representatives of a
foundation as permitted.20
The Bureau of Administration of NGOs (minjian zuzhi guanli ju) within the Ministry
of Civil Affairs (“MCA”) (previously the Department of Social Organizations or Shetuan
Si) is the primary official agency in charge of nonprofit organization and is responsible
for the registration and filings, detailing implementation rulings and interpretation of laws
and regulations in the nonprofit sector. Likewise, other government agencies join in
regulating NGOs in certain areas. Under appropriate delegation of authority, State
Administration of Taxation (SAT) and Ministry of Finance (MOF) have issued
regulations and rulings on the tax-deductibility of donations, tax exemptions or
preferences, and internal governance; 21 the State Administration for Industry and
Commerce (SAIC) coordinates non-public fund-raising foundations and certain for-profit
18
See Part I (B)(3): Foundation in this article.
See MA, fn. 16, the term civil society organizations (“CSOs”) is minjian or popular organizations. It is
also interchangeably be referred as NGOs. See Na La, 中国草根 NGO 的问责现状与问题 (Analysis and
Problems on the Development of Grassroots NGOs in China), discussing the literal meanings of NGO, CSO,
NPO, SO and Foundation (in Chinese), available at http://www.nporuc.org/ html/achievements/20090907/
167.html (last visited Sep. 15, 2014).
20
See Art. 24 of 基金会管理条例 (Regulations on Management of Foundations) (promulgated by the
State Council, Mar. 8 2004, effective Jun. 1, 2004), available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/200403/18/content_1372870.htm (last visited Sep. 15, 2014).
21
See Art. 29, 社 会 团 体 登 记 管 理 条 例 (Regulations on Registration and Management of Social
Organizations) (promulgated by the State Council, Oct. 25, 1998, effective Sep. 25, 1998) (hereinafter “SO
Regulation”), available at http://www.cnca.gov.cn/rjwbgs/ztxx/ldgzhbz/4570_4.shtml (last visited Sep. 15,
2014).
19
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AN EGG VS. AN ORANGE
169
activities conducted by NGOs; and the Ministry of Public Security may police NGOs for
certain criminal disobedience relating to national security.22 In addition, local MCA at the
provisional or city levels and other administrative branches promulgate various
region-oriented or industry-specific rules and regulations to manage local NGOs.23
1. Social Organizations
● Dual management requirement
The SO Regulations, PNEU Regulations, and the Foundation Regulations all require a
dual management structure. Each type of organization for nonprofit purposes, before it
files registration at the national or local level office of MCA, must first seek a
professional supervisory unit (yewu zhuguan danwei) to review (shencha) and approve
(pizhun) such registration, which later monitor NGOs’ operation, governance and
finances, etc. after its establishment.24 Although any government agency at the national,
provincial, or city level, or any certified GONGO,25 can act as an NGO sponsor, NGOs,
especially grassroots NGOs, do not have much luxury to select appropriate supervisory
sponsors. 26 In reality, many SOs remain unregistered or even underground simply
because the potential supervisory units deny such sponsorship or the NGO’s proposed
major purposes and activities do not fall within sponsor’s scope of duties,27 and operative
unregistered SOs risk criminal liability.28 Therefore, granting approval by supervisory
22
Id. Art. 35.
Beijing is considered to be the most conservative in NGO registration and management due to its
political sensitivity, while other provinces such as Yunnan and Guangdong take a relatively more liberal
approach toward NGO management.
24
See Arts. 6–9, 27–28, 民办非企业单位登记管理暂行条例 (Provisional Regulations on Registration and
Management of Private Non-Enterprise Units) (promulgated by the State Council and effective as of Sep. 25,
1998) (hereinafter “PNEU Regulation”), available at http://www.ha.xinhuanet.com/fuwu/kejiao/2004-03/29/
content_1869912.htm (last visited Sep. 15, 2014).
25
See Art. 6 SO Regulation.
26
See generally Na La, fn. 19; see also, HE Pengyu and Jillian S. Ashley, Opening One Eye and Closing
the Other: The Legal and Regulatory Environment for “Grassroots” NGOs in China, 26 Boston University
International Law Journal, 29 (2008) (hereinafter “HE and Ashley”). In practice, the dual management
requirement has proved to be the most difficult hurdle for grassroots NGOs to surmount in gaining legal
status. In order to secure the support of a government supervisory agency, the founders of an NGO must
cultivate personal relationships with government officials to develop trust and connections. From a
government agency’s perspective, acting as a sponsor to a grassroots NGO creates many new duties,
responsibilities, and political risks, but reaps few benefits. The extreme difficulty of finding a government
sponsor is widely considered to be the major reason why over 90% of NGOs in China are either underground
and unregistered or registered as commercial enterprises.
27
See SO Regulation, Art. 6.
28
See Art. 35 SO Regulation, stipulating that an unregistered NGO operating in the name of an SO could
be subject not only to civil, but also to criminal liability. According to Art. 54 of the Law on Public Security
Administrative Punishments, a person convicted under this provision could be subject to up to 15 days in
prison and a fine of up to RMB1,000. Given that many NGOs across China are not officially registered, this
provision could be viewed unfriendly to NGOs.
23
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[Vol. 10: 161
units is utterly discretionary,29 and there is no standard filing paperwork requirement on
obtaining sponsorship by an SO. 30 Potential government supervisory sponsors may
ostensibly stretch the approval process31 or demand unnecessary paperwork maliciously.
The dual management requirement creates several layers of problems reflective of
historical reasons for monitoring development. First, it may help offering Chinese citizens
reasonably accessible venues to the constitutionally protected rights to form all kinds of
associations.32 The nature of the supervisory units, however, usually dominates the scope
of the activities to be conducted by the application organizations or NGO candidates.33
Second, the dual management structure inhibits the dynamic development of responsive
associations for emergency situations.34 This drawback is particularly evident during the
time of emergent natural disasters. Many volunteers have to establish ad hoc NGOs to
conduct relief activities and they were not even able to find supervisory units within a
tight timeframe. Third, it prohibits NGOs from engaging in activities across multiple
sectors35. Usually, a supervisory unit is risk-averse and thus prefers approving NGO
sponsorship within its scope of designated responsibilities and very reluctantly oversees
NGOs that carry out unfamiliar activities. For example, a healthcare supervisory unit
usually would refuse supervising NGOs in the education area. Therefore, NGOs have to
be solely focused or functioned and are not flexible to receive donations from diversified
sources. Fourth, quite often NGO is manipulated as a vehicle during government internal
reshuffles to retain their redundant staff or retirees.36 Fifth, government agencies also
often set up GONGOs to raise external sources of funding37 and to disqualify private
applicant organizations.
● Constraints on repeated and cross-regional subsidiaries
A derivative of the dual management requirement is the “non-repetition” constraint.
In particular, the supervisory unit or MCA may deny the registration of a NGO if “in the
same administrative area there is already a social organization active in the same or
29
See generally GE Yunsong, On the Establishment of Social Organization under Chinese Law, 2
International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law (2000), available at http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/ijnl/vol2iss3/
art_2.htm (last visited Sep. 15, 2014); see also generally HE and Ashley, fn. 26, discussing a case study of
establishment of an eye care center.
30
Id. GE.
31
Id.
32
Karla Simon, Regulation of Civil Society in China, 32 Fordham International Law Journal 964
(2008–2009). Professor Karla Simon is a major contributor in the field of non-for-profit organization studies.
(hereinafter “Simon”).
33
Id., discussing that scholars complain about not being to form appropriate organizations for academic
studies.
34
Id.
35
See Na La, fn. 19.
36
Id.
37
See e.g. Simon, fn. 32 and HE and Ashley, fn. 26.
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AN EGG VS. AN ORANGE
171
similar area of work.”38 Taking SO as an example, the non-repetition provision stipulates
that in a particular area of activity, such as elementary education, only one SO in service
is allowed to operate in a given geographical region (city, provincial, or national),39
although the definition of “area of activity” is quite discretionary. It is well argued that the
non-repetition requirement has the merit of avoiding too many organizations “developing
without planning,” and possibly potential “malicious competition” among nonprofit
organizations.40
A further ramification of the non-repetition constraint is that an SO has to be real
name identification member-based and therefore often subjects its members to
surveillance.41 In addition, the SO Regulations prohibit cross-regional branching.42 For
instance, the administrative hierarchy of the supervisory unit delineates the geographical
application within which an SO can operate. If an SO wishes to reach out its registered
geographic region and branch a subsidiary or representative office elsewhere, it has to
obtain an approval in advance from its own supervisory sponsor and even the permission
of local MCA in the desired subsidiary location that oversees similar areas of activities.43
Literally, national SOs cannot establish branches in different provinces, although they are
merely permitted to conduct activities across the country.44 Moreover, SO subsidiaries
cannot set up second-tier subsidiaries and an SO legal representative (fading daibiaoren)
must not at the same time act as a legal representative for another SO.45
The non-repetition constraints coupled with branching restriction discourage
locally-registered NGOs to conduct activities across China, and suppress networking and
resource sharing among SOs. Moreover, an SO must not endanger or be in conflict with
the interests and safety of the state and the unity of all ethnicities, and must not violate the
38
See generally GE, fn. 29, citing The Interpretation of the Regulation on the Registration and
management of Social Organization and the Interim Regulations on the Regulation and Management of
Private Non-enterprise Units 36 (The Department of Politics and Law of the State Council & The Bureau of
Administration of Non-governmental Organizations of the Ministry of Civil Affairs eds. (1999).
39
See HE & Ashley, fn. 26 at 44–45, noting an example that, if there is already a national AIDS NGO, a
similar organization could register only at the provincial or city level. This limitation reflects the Party’s
corporatist view of the state-society relationship, considering SOs’ purpose to be to serve as a bridge between
the state and society by representing the interests of various constituent groups — for example, those with
AIDS or, more traditionally, women or the disabled — at a given administrative level.
40
See GE, fn. 29.
41
See SO Regulation, fn. 21.
42
Id.
43
For instance, a city-level SO can branch within the city, but cannot conduct activities outside of its
registered city. If an SO wishes to conduct activities in multiple cities of the same province, it has to seek a
provincial-level government sponsor and register at that level. And if an NGO wants to conduct activities in
cities outside its home province, to apply the language of the regulation literally, the NGO would have to seek
a ministerial-level sponsor and register a national NGO to legally carry out its mission.
44
See SO Regulation, Arts. 12 and 13.
45
Id. Arts.14 and 19.
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state interests, public interests, or public morals.46 Those requirements again reinforce
the deeply rooted concern to foster meaningful and controllable non-profit
organizations.47
● Exempted Organizations
Some organizations are exempted from the registration requirement according to
Article 3 of the 1998 SO Regulation. These organizations include those that participate in
political consultative meetings, such as the Chinese Communist Party-sanctioned eight
political parties and nine other associations including the All-China Federation of
Industry and Commerce, the Communist Youth League, and the All-China Women’s
Federation. Other exempted organizations include 14 well-known GONGOs, such as the
China Writers’ Association, the SONG Qingling Foundation, and the Red Cross Society
of China,48 just to name a few. These GONGOs are usually considered to have the same
status as administrative branches and are often viewed as part of the government
bureaucracy.
What is more interesting is the third clause of Article 3, which states that any
organization that is set up by a government entity or a GONGO and that conducts its
activities within such entity is exempted from registration. In practice, many NGOs
exploit this provision and struggle to gain semi-legal status by attaching themselves to a
governmental or semi-governmental entity that holds more liberal attitudes toward NGOs.
Higher educational institutions are a common example of such liberal entities that shelter
and sponsor NGOs49 and nonprofit organizations of a research and academic nature.
The legal status of a GONGO is a precious resource. Some GONGOs find it in their
financial interest to offer shelter to NGOs in exchange for membership fees and
management dues. The sheltered NGOs are thus exempted from registration. Sometimes,
GONGOs may even formally sponsor NGOs with a second-tier SO status by acting as
their supervisory units and allowing them to register with the MCA or its local bureau. A
nonprofit organization may take advantage of such an affiliation with and supervision
under GONGOs and gain legitimacy and important governmental connections, though
often at a high financial stake. For example, one GONGO under the MCA sponsors a
nonprofit organization and charges them annual membership fees as high as
46
Id. Art. 4.
See Na La, fn. 19, discussing that the highly restrictive provisions against pluralism, branching, and
networking are based on government concerns over an SO becoming a rival power and thus threatening the
reign of the Chinese Communist Party. For instance, national-level NGOs are presumably not able to register
at all and usually the most closely monitored and controlled by the central government.
48
A complete list of these exempted GONGOs is available at http://www.mca.gov.cn (last visited Sep. 15,
2014).
49
See e.g. Jude Howell, New Directions in Civil Society: Organizing around Marginalized Interests, in
Jude Howell eds. Governance in China, Rowman & Littlefield (Maryland), at 143, 155–65 (2004).
47
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AN EGG VS. AN ORANGE
173
RMB200,000.50
2. Private Non-Enterprise Unit. — The Private Non-Enterprise Unit (PNEU) vehicle,
first created by the 1998 Provisional Regulations on Registration and Management of
Private Non-Enterprise Units (PNEU Regulation), is a special NGO category in the
Chinese context. By definition, a PNEU is a privately-run noncommercial unit, and its
main purpose is to provide social services,51 mainly in the fields of education, public
health, technology, and sports. These facilities historically have been almost entirely
owned and operated by the state. Ever since the economic reforms starting in the late
1970s, private institutions have gradually proliferated and replaced government agencies
in running related organizations and PNEUs thus have come into the picture. The 1998
PNEU Regulation formally recognizes the legal status of these then state-operated now
privately-run entities and grants them nonprofit status. In practice, a majority of PNEUs
are for-profit entities in the areas of education and healthcare. The PNEU sector has
grown very rapidly since the promulgation of the PNEU Regulation. As of December 31,
2006, a total of 159,000 PNEUs have been registered,52 accounting for about 46% of all
registered NGOs in China, and roughly half of these PNEUs are private schools.53
Many key provisions of the 1998 PNEU Regulations mirror those in the SO
Regulation, such as the dual management system, non-repetition within the same
administrative region restriction, 54 and not surprisingly, similar broad and vague
languages subject to discretional interpretation by the state power. 55 One additional
restriction imposed on PNEU is that a PNEU may not set up branches even within
administrative region in which it is registered.56 As difficult as it is to substantiate, this
provision is suspected to envision the disadvantaged position of state-run noncommercial
organizations (e.g. schools and hospitals) in competition against PNEUs.
Traditionally, PNEUs aim to provide social services and thus are less politically
sensitive to the government. PNEUs are even encouraged and fostered as stated in a
recent MCA work report,57 and adopted by grassroots NGOs as a good vehicle to obtain
the nonprofit status and the associated legitimacy. Noticeably, the PNEU Regulation casts
50
See HE & Ashley, fn. 26 at 46.
See PNEU Regulation, Arts. 1 and 2.
52
See 孙伟林局长在全国民间组织管理工作视频会上的讲话 (Speech at the National NGO Management
Conference by SUN Weilin, Head of National Bureau of NGO Management), (Jan. 31, 2007), available at
http://www.mca.gov.cn (last visited Sep. 15, 2014).
53
ZHAO Yong, 民办非企业单位有关法律问题之思考 (Thoughts on the Legal Issues of PNEUs), in WEI
Dingren eds. 中国非营利组织法律模式论文集 (Collected Essays on the Legal Models of Chinese NPOs),
China Fangzheng Press (Beijing), at 220 (2005).
54
See PNEU Regulations, Arts. 5, 8, and 13.
55
See SO Regulations, Arts. 4 and 35.
56
See SO Regulations, Arts. 4, 13, and 27.
57
See fn. 52.
51
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out sincere efforts by the government to fashion a tiered-management structure for NGOs
and diversify NGO categories.
3. Foundations. — The 2004 Foundation Regulations marked a major step forward
for China’s NGO legal framework. Noticeably, for the first time, a foreign NGO, other
than a chamber of commerce, 58 could legally establish its presence in China as a
nonprofit entity.59 A foreign citizen, subject to a three-month residency requirement for
certain key management personnel, is able to incorporate and participate in domestic
private foundations.60 Foreign foundations are not allowed to raise funds inside China.61
Superior to the 1998 SO Regulation and PNEU Regulation, the 2004 Foundation
Regulation features some modern NGO prerequisites and standards — in particular,
management appointments, internal governance, donation and financial management. Not
surprisingly, the Foundation Regulations disappointed observers by keeping the dual
management,62 and a provincial level of government sponsor is required, which is more
restraining than the SO and PNEU regulations.
● Categories of Foundations and Capital Requirements
The Foundation Regulation elaborates separate treatment for domestic foundations
and for representative offices of foreign foundations.63 A domestic foundation is further
classified geographically as a national foundation and a regional (provincial) foundation,
and also classified either as a private or public foundation based on the sources of its
funds and donations.64 A national foundation, the representative office of a foreign
foundation, or any foundation whose legal representative is not a citizen of Chinese
mainland has to register with the MCA and secure the backing of a ministerial-level
government supervising agency or a sponsor recognized by the State Council.65
The minimum capital threshold to set up a private foundation is RMB2 million (about
$295,000),66 RMB8 million (about $1.18 million) for a national foundation, and RMB4
million (about $590,000) for a regional foundation.67 Local MCAs may at their discretion
impose higher initial capital requirements. The initial capital is presumably kept on book
58
See 外国商 会 管理 暂 行 规定 (Provisional Regulations on Management of Foreign Chambers of
Commerce) (promulgated by the State Council, Jun. 14, 1989, effective Jul. 1, 1989).
59
See 2004 Foundation Regulation, Arts. 6, 13, and 14.
60
Id. Art. 24.
61
Id. Art. 25.
62
Id. Art. 7.
63
Id. Art. 13.
64
Id. Art. 8; see also Na La, fn. 19, Chapter III.
65
Id., Art. 7. In particular, a foreign citizen may serve as a legal representative or Chairman of the Board
for a domestic private foundation, though it is yet to be seen whether this will be allowed in practice. At a
minimum, foreign citizens or citizens from Hong Kong, Macau, or Taiwan can assume important
management positions of a foundation and thus potentially control its operations in significant ways.
66
Id. Art. 8.
67
Id.
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AN EGG VS. AN ORANGE
175
and thus cannot be used for programming activities.
● Constraints on Cross-Regional Subsidiaries and Standards for Internal Governance
A foundation may set up branches upon approval of the MCA or its provincial branch,
and the civil affairs bureaus have the discretion to deny the application.68 The 2004
Foundation Regulation requires particular internal governance requirements, 69 such
as the board of directors formation,70 appointment of a supervisory official, 71 and a
legal representative.72 Moreover, the Foundation Regulation also elaborates financial
management standards, such as annual expenditure restraints,73 and capped management
compensation and capped overhead fees.74
4. Unregistered NGOs. — The taxing registration requirement, especially the
difficulty of searching for a “supervisory or administration unit,” encourages the
establishment of many de facto NGOs, including grassroots NGOs in China that do not
seek registration. In fact, the unregistered NGOs that operate openly and legally may well
outnumber registered ones.75 As mentioned above, a social organization can operate as
an internal organization of another enterprise and social organization without
registration.76 Some de facto social organizations incorporate themselves as corporations
and are treated the same way as a normal commercial enterprise. If a NGO can
demonstrate its nonprofit nature to the local governmental and tax authorities, even
though it is hard to prove, there might be some flexible and compromised accommodation
can be reached between NGOs and local MCA and SAT.
68
Id. Art. 12.
The SO and PNEU Regulations, in contrast, have almost none.
70
See 2004 Foundation Regulation, Art. 20, stipulating that the board must have between 5 and 25
members, for private foundations established using the assets of a private individual, no more than a third of
board members may be close relatives of that individual, and for other foundations, close relatives may not
serve simultaneously as directors no more than a third of a foundation’s board members may receive financial
compensation from the foundation.
71
Id. Art. 22, providing that the official cannot be a member of the board, a close relative of a board
member, or on the financial staff of the foundation.
72
Id. Art. 23, providing that the legal representative of the foundation may not concurrently represent any
other organization and a public or private foundation’s legal representative should be a citizen of Chinese
mainland if the foundation’s original funds are of domestic Chinese origin.
73
Id. Art. 29, stipulating that the amount of money spent annually by public foundations on public
benefit activities must not be less than 70% of the previous year’s income, and private foundations’ annual
expenditure must not be less than 8% of the surplus from the previous year.
74
Id. a foundation may not allocate more than 10% of its total expenditure to cover staff wages and
benefits and other overhead costs.
75
This article excludes secret, underground organizations that operate illegally for discussion for two
reasons: (1) The numbers are not collectable or verifiable in any official means; and (2) illegally operated
underground organizations are loosely associated and sometimes at best are motivated gatherings for spiritual
pursuit.
76
Often, those organizations reach beyond the scope of serving the affiliated enterprise or organization.
For example, in many universities, the affiliated social organizations are also serving the society in general
and the government will often just turn a blind eye to these types of activities.
69
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FRONTIERS OF LAW IN CHINA
Many NGOs, especially grassroots NGOs, simply do not exist as legal entities
because they never seek to register. However, some of these NGOs operate openly
(acknowledged by some governmental entities and officials) and are generally accepted
by the community. Since Chinese tradition favors a connections between people (guanxi)
and flexibility in resolving problems when relevant official process is burdensome and
costly, unregistered but well-connected NGOs will likely continue playing an important
role and leading to many administrative discrepancies and uncertainties.
C. Tax treatment of Chinese NGOs
China does not have a comprehensive tax code governing various forms of NGOs.
Charitable tax exemptions from major Chinese taxes are mostly based on the “nonprofit”
concept,77 which is prescribed and interpreted by scattered provisions within the various
tax laws and regulations. The China Trust Law (on charitable trust) and the Public Benefit
Donation Law (hereinafter “PBDL”) are a couple of laws passed by the National People’s
Congress governing NGOs.78
1. Tax Treatment of Charitable Donations. — As noted above, rules about income tax
treatment of donations scatters in various laws and regulation as shown below (see Table 1).
Table 1
Legislations on Tax Treatment of Donation
Date of Enactment
January 28, 1994
February 4, 1994
September 1, 1999
Legislation
Description
“Individual income donated to educational and other public
welfare undertakings” refers to the donations made by individuals
who have used their income for educational and other public welfare
Article 24 Regulations for
undertakings, and in areas suffering from serious natural disasters or
the Implementation of the
poverty, through social organizations or government agencies in the
Individual Income Tax Law
People’s Republic of China. The part of the amount of donations
of the PRC
that does not exceed 30 percent of the amount of taxable income
declared by the taxpayer may be deducted from his amount of
taxable income
Article 6(4) Provisional
Donations for community benefits and charitable donations by a
Regulations of the PRC
Taxpayer in a year are deductible up to 3% of the Taxable Income.
Enterprise Income Tax
Article 24 When donating property for public welfare
undertakings according to the provisions of this Law, corporations
and other enterprises may be given preferential treatment in
enterprise income tax according to the provisions of laws and
Articles 24 and 25, Chapter
administrative regulations.
IV Preferential Measures,
Article 25 When donating property for public welfare
PBDL
undertakings according to the provisions of this Law, natural
persons, individual businesses of industry and commerce may be
given preferential treatment in individual income tax according to
the provisions of laws and administrative regulations.
(To be continued)
77
See 2004 Foundation Regulations, Art. 2; SO Regulation, Art. 2; PNEU Regulation, Art. 2.
See generally in Leon Irish, JIN Dongsheng & Karla Simon, China’s Tax Rules for Not-for-Profit
Organizations, at 12–16 (2004), and in practice, registration with the MCA or its local branch in one of the three
recognized NGO forms guarantees exemption, even the local bureau of industry and commerce may consider
NGOs as for-profit commercial enterprises on a case-by-case basis and apply normal business tax rates.
78
2015]
177
AN EGG VS. AN ORANGE
(Continued)
Date of Enactment
Legislation
Joint Notice on Income Tax
Treatment of Donation by
July 12, 2000
Enterprises to the Red Cross
(SAT and MOF)
Joint Notice on Income Tax
Policies as to Perfecting
March 8, 2001
Experimental Works for
Urban
Social
Securities
System (SAT and MOF)
Joint Notice on Income Tax
Deduction as to Donations to
September 22, 2003 Five Foundations Including
the China Health Vehicle
Project (SAT and MOF)
Article 8, Joint Notice on
February 5, 2004 Education related Tax Policy
(SAT and MOF)
March 16, 2007
Description
Donations made to non-profit social organizations and state
apparatus (such as the Red Cross) by enterprises, social
organizations, and individuals should be fully deducted from taxable
income.
Charitable donations made to charitable organizations,
foundations, or non-profit social organizations by enterprises, social
organizations, and individuals should be fully deducted from taxable
income.
Charitable donations made to China Health Vehicle Foundation,
Sunzhifang Economic Science Foundation, China Charity
Foundation, China Legal Aid Foundation and China
Justice-Upholding Foundations by enterprises, social organizations
and individuals should be fully deducted from taxable income
Donations made to the educational institutions by taxpayers
through non-profit organization and state apparatus in China should
be fully deducted from taxable income.
In relation to the expenses from charitable donations incurred by
Article 9, Enterprise Income
Enterprises, the portion within 12% of the total annual profit may be
Tax Law
deducted from the taxable income.
Individuals and corporations can deduct their charitable contributions with some
constraints in China. For individuals, “personal contributions to educational and other
undertakings for public welfare shall be deducted from the taxable income in accordance
with the relevant regulations by the State Council.”79 The regulations there under define
donations as “donations by individual[s] of their income to educational and other
undertakings of public welfare, and to areas suffering from serious natural disasters or
poverty, through social organizations or government agencies in the People’s Republic of
China.”80 The regulations further limit the deduction to 30 percent of taxable income.81
According to the recent unified Enterprise Income Tax Law, which took effect on
January 1, 2008 and unifies the treatments between foreign and domestic enterprises,
enterprises are allowed to deduct up to 12 percent of taxable income for contributions to
causes for “public benefits and social welfare.”82 As stipulated in the Provisional Rules
and Regulations there under, causes for public benefits and social welfare are defined in
almost the same way as the Regulations for the Implementation of the Individual Income
Tax Law. The Enterprise Income Tax Law of the PRC (hereafter EIT Law) explicitly
states that donations directly to individual donees are not deductible. As of July 2006, the
MOF and SAT had only approve tax deductions for donors to sixty-two organizations,83
79
See The Individual Income Tax Law of the PRC, Art. 6.
See The Regulations for the Implementation of the Individual Income Tax Law of the PRC, Art. 24.
81
Id.
82
See Enterprise Income Tax Law of the PRC, Art. 9 (promulgated by the National People’s Congress,
Mar. 16, 2007, effective Jan. 1 2008).
83
See 慈善捐赠优惠政策 (Preferential Policy for Charitable Donations), available at http://www.
juanzhu .gov.cn (last visited Sep. 15, 2014).
80
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most of which are GONCOs. Donations to these twenty-six organizations are fully
deductible, but for the other thirty-six organizations, individual donors can deduct up to
30% of taxable income, and corporate donors up to 12% under the recently revised
Enterprise Income Tax Law, which increases the permissible charitable contribution
deduction for both domestic and foreign companies corporate donors from 3% to 12%.84
The Chinese tax laws and regulations require that for charitable contributions to be
tax-deductible, they must meet both a specific “cause” requirement and an organizational
prerequisite, i.e. to be tax deductible, such contributions have to cater certain causes as
well as to pledge (through) certain organizations. However, there is serious doubt about
how important a role the tax benefit consideration plays in individuals’ or corporations’
donation considerations.85 First and foremost, the MOF and SAT stipulate only a few
organizations that are eligible for receiving tax deductible charitable contributions.
Donations made to non-certified NGOs are not tax deductible. Second, due to the high
volume of activities in times of emergency, eligible organizations might have insufficient
human and financial resources to collect and manage donations. Third, the infrastructure
connecting individual income tax reporting and charitable deductions is weak.86 Finally,
the complicated administrative procedure may thwart taxpayers to claim such deduction,
the nominal value of which is insignificant in most cases.
In addition, although recent natural disasters in China have stimulated a round of
personal charitable donations, such economic endowments remain infrequent in China for
various reasons. First, the feeling of distrust still occupies minds of individual donors
regarding the likelihood of a reasonable and fair allocation of charitable donations.
Second, the absence of an estate or gift tax in China reduces the motivation for making
donations. Third, the government adopts an unsympathetic controlling practice toward
unregistered NGOs, which mostly are underground churches, religious groups, and
elderly care centers. Finally, corruption by government officials overwhelmingly impairs
their capacity to request further donations.
According to the PBDL, qualified public welfare organizations are allowed to receive
public welfare donations under the following conditions:87
i) activities carried out by social bodies and individuals to provide disaster relief, aid
for the poor, and giving support and assistance to the physically disabled;
84
See the EIT Law of the PRC, Art. 9.
See generally, 中国税务学会《关于进一步扩大内需的税收政策研究报告》 (Chinese Taxation Institute,
Report on Tax Policy Studies for Promoting Domestic Needs), available at http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/
n480462/n7921376/n7921576/n7921766/n7921902/8800885.html (last visited Sep. 15, 2014).
86
See generally Na La, fn.19.
87
See 中华人民共和国公益事业捐赠法 (Public Welfare Donation Law of the PRC), Art. 3 (effective as of
Sep. 1, 1999), available at http://www.gqb.gov.cn/node2/node3/node5/node9/userobject7ai1270.html (last
visited Sep. 15, 2014).
85
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AN EGG VS. AN ORANGE
179
ii) educational, scientific, cultural, public health, and sports undertakings;
iii) construction of environmental protection facilities and public utilities in society;
and
iv) other public and welfare undertakings in society that aim to promote social
development and progress.
Noticeably, the donations have to be made to certified public welfare social
organizations and public welfare private non-enterprise units under the Public Welfare
Donations Law. Therefore, the importance of achieving registration with the MCA as a
gateway to receive various benefits is foremost over other considerations in establishing
an NGO. The 2001 Trust Law provides for the first time some promising support to the
establishment of a public (charitable) trust (with certain limitations). In particular, the
purpose of trusts for charity and public interests should include poverty relief, emergency
relief, assistance to the disabled, development of education, science and technology,
culture, and sports, medicine and health welfare, and environmental protection. However,
the establishment of a public trust and trustee appointments for a public trust are all
subject to the approval and oversight of MCAs.88
As part of friendly legislations to the NGO sector,89 in January 2007, the MOF and
SAT jointly have released encouraging measures and rulings for promoting tax exemption
and deductibility. “All public benefit social organizations or foundations established upon
approval of the civil affairs administrative department” would be eligible to receive
tax-deductible donations, subject to a review conducted by MOF and SAT and is designed
to confirm the organization’s public benefit nature. 90 Therefore, the category of
organizations eligible for charitable tax exemption or deduction expanded to include
charities such as aging people care centers, ethnic minority education programs, and
88
See 中华人民共和国信托法 (The Trust Law of the PRC), Arts. 62, 64, 65, 67, and 70, which stipulate
that public trusts shall establish a trust supervisor. The trust supervisor is prescribed by the trust documents or
appointed by the public welfare authorities if there is no such prescription in the trust documents. The trust
supervisor has the right to file an action or establish other legal activities in his own name for the benefit of
the beneficiary. The duties of the trustee of a public trust have been enhanced. The trustee must make a report
about the disposition of the trust business and the status of the trust assets at least once a year. If the public
trust expires, the trustee must report the cause and date of the expiration to the public welfare authorities
within 15 days of the occurrence of the event forming the reason for expiration of the trust.
89
See generally Simon, fn. 32, noting that a comprehensive Charity Law is under discussion and is
intended to address multiple aspects of the regulation of charities in China, including tax deductibility of
donations. The MCA and MOF have sought broad input on the law, a draft of which was circulated for
comment in Sep. 2006. See also, International Centre for Civil Society Law, Comments on the Draft Charity
Law for the PRC, 5 International Journal of Civil Society Law 12, (2007) (Hereinafter the Simon:
Comments).
90
See 关于公益救济性捐赠税前扣除政策及相关管理问题的通知 (Notice Concerning Policy and Related
Questions on the Pre-Tax Deduction of Public Benefit Relief Donations) (promulgated by the MOF and SAT
jointly and effective on Jan. 8, 2007) (hereinafter “the 2007 Notice”).
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health care centers for the treatment of specific diseases.91 Moreover, in 2008 the MCA
upgraded its operations dealing with charity statistics and other charity activities from a
semi-independent “bureau” to a Ministry Department.92
A further reading of charitable tax exemption laws and regulations reveals that
passive investment income (interest and dividends earned on investments) of NGOs is
still subject to tax.93 Investment income has always been one of the major sources of
revenue for all NGOs, especially for NGOs in the U.S. However, interest income realized
by Chinese foundations, which are established with a high permanent capital requirement,
mostly end up being subject to EIT in the course of an NGO’s operation and existence.94
Therefore, the fragile availability of NGO revenue resources again will be hijacked,
resulting in actual reductions in charitable finances and low capital mobility. Although
this problem has not emerged severely within the SO and PNEU sectors, a responsive
ruling from the SAT should likely remove their fears in this connection.95
2. Procedural Reform for Charitable Tax Exemptions. — Messy and sometimes
opaque procedural practices are not foreign to the tax law field in China, and charitable
tax exemption is not an exception in this regard. In the 2007 MOF and SAT joint ruling, a
procedural scheme is provided but is too advanced to fully implement comparing with
existing tax administrative capacities. Still, smaller sized and more independent charities
all expect to see an easier fundraising. The murky procedure in this connection may also
challenge the domination of fundraising by the large government related charities such as
GONGOs and the municipal charity foundations.
According to the 2007 Ruling, tax deductible donations may be made to all public
“welfare social associations or foundations established upon approval of the department
of civil affairs of the State Council.” 96 Apparently, this welcoming gesture of the
government comforts donors in many ways, especially when deductions are permissible
for donations made to pass-through organizations 97 . Given the enormous economic
interests such as commissions or management fees available in pass-through
91
See 慈善捐赠优惠政策汇编 (Collection of Preferential Policy for Charitable Donations), available at
http://www.juanzhu.gov.cn (last visited Sep. 15, 2014).
92
See, China Adds Government Department for Charity Activities, People’s Daily Online on Sep. 11,
2008, stating that, in China, such escalation of administrative hierarchy means a lot in terms of management
authority, resources allocation and enforceability of NGO administrative regulations.
93
See fn.91.
94
See, e.g. WANG Biqiang, A Taxing Time for China’s Non-Profits, The Economic Observer Online on
Feb. 19, 2008.
95
See Simon, fn. 32, raising that the SAT has taken this issue under advisement and may soon release
new policies with regard to tax exemption of revenues earned on funds held by CSOs. A change to reflect the
recommendation in the Tax Report would be welcome.
96
See 2007 Notice, fn. 90.
97
For example, the All-China Charity Federation and the China Red Cross Society.
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AN EGG VS. AN ORANGE
181
organizations, such procedures for qualifying the organizations that are permitted to
receive tax deductible contributions are unlikely to be implemented in the near future.
Furthermore, to qualify as a public welfare organization to enjoy deductible
contributions, a confirmation letter from appropriate level of tax authorities is required.98
To obtain such recognition letters, an application should be filed with evidence that the
organization, inter alia, is non-profit, is established and managed consistently with the
law, may not distribute any surplus upon dissolution or termination,99 may not engage in
business activities unrelated to its public welfare purposes, has an oversight body that is
not “aimed at making private profits,” has an internal financial and accounting
management, and has a charter.100
The 2007 Ruling also stipulates instructions on handling donations and
communicating with its donors. Those instructions include that (1) No donor may
participate in the asset distributions or take ownership to such assets; (2) organizations
eligible for donation-based pre-tax deductions shall use public welfare relief for specific
purposes;101 and (3) a special voucher for public welfare relief donations must be used.102
The 2007 Ruling also prescribes procedures for donors to follow to claim deductions on
their tax returns. For instance, the donor must submit the certification by the authorities of
the donee organization; the original receipt received from the donee organization; and
other materials as required to be submitted.
The discussion of Charity Law again becomes indispensable. Many scholars have
expressed deep interests and completed extensive work toward the promulgation of a
comprehensive or “all-in” charity law 103 , which aims to embrace all valid factors
involving nonprofit organizations. For instance, the draft Charity Law provides that
current tax laws and regulations fail to detail the approaches by which nonprofit
organizations obtain licenses to engage in public fundraising. Article 24, Paragraph 2 of
the draft Charity Law 104 states that only organizations with a “[c]ertificate of the
certification for charitable organizations” may engage in fundraising activities from the
98
See 2007 Notice, fn. 90.
Id.
100
Id.
101
For example, education, civil affairs, other public welfare undertakings, or for the districts that suffer
from natural disasters or the poverty-stricken districts. Moreover, the non-profit public welfare social
associations and foundations, as well as the people’s governments at or above the county level and their
departments.”
102
The organizations must “separately use the vouchers for public welfare relief donations as uniformly
printed under supervision of the central or provincial public finance department according to the financial
affiliation, and affix their respective special financial seals; and shall issue receipts if any individual asks for
it for his donations.”
103
Rebecca Lee, Modernizing Charity Law in China, 18 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 347 (2009).
104
See Simon Comments, fn. 89.
99
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general public (shehui gongzhong). This does not apply “if laws or administrative
regulations provide otherwise.” Limiting public fund raising in this manner gives the
MCA control over the organizations that raise money from the public. This should
generally be seen as an important consumer protection, and thus it would be important to
enact similar rules in the draft Charity Law.105
As criticized by Professor Simon, the various other rules with respect to permits for
fundraising in the draft Charity Law (Articles 26 and 27) and the rules with respect to
public fund raising (Article 28) are, however, not detailed enough to protect the public at
the present time.106 While Articles 26 and 27 of the draft outline the licensing procedure:
“Certified charitable organizations” must apply at the MCA offices of the people’s
governments above the county level, it is unclear as to what information will be required
for a license, etc. In addition, it is important to note that in times of natural disaster, the
need for a license may inhibit some fundraising — this may prove to be problematic if
there are no organizations that have sufficient public trust to collect and disburse the
massive funds needed in cases like the one presented by the Sichuan Earthquake. It is
going to be important to put the Charity Law in place quickly so as to allow more
independent nonprofit organizations to obtain charity status and fundraising licenses.107
II. CURRENT U.S. FEDERAL NGO TAX EXEMPTION SYSTEM — AN INSTITUTIONAL
AND THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
The U.S. federal law of tax-exempt organization derives its authority from the
taxation powers of the Congress, and related tax provisions are codified in the Internal
Revenue Code (hereinafter the “IRC”). In general, a charitable organization is defined as
one that “pays no tax on its income and whose donors derive a tax benefit as a result of
their donations.108 The U.S. system adopts a classification method that lists objective
standards for qualifying organizations exempt from federal income tax.
A. The Exemption
The current language on NGO tax exemption appeared first in Section 501(c)(3) of
1954 IRC. The charitable income tax exemption refers to the statutory relief from the
obligation of certain nonprofit entities to pay income tax. Pursuant to IRC Section
501(c)(3), such relief is automatically offered to entities that are granted tax-exempt
charitable status upon application and approval. A variety of non-charity entities are also
entitled to income tax exemption.109 Moreover, charitable nonprofit organizations, unlike
105
106
107
108
109
clubs.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Besty Buchalter Adler, Rules of the Road (1999), at 3.
Other forms include social welfare organizations, labor organizations, business leagues and social
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practically all other tax-exempt nonprofit organizations, are the only tax-exempt nonprofit
organizations that are also eligible to receive charitable donations from the public,
entitling the donor to federal income tax benefits. The IRC provides that individuals and
corporations that donate money or property to charitable entities may be entitled to
receive a tax deduction when computing their own tax liability. The potential savings can
be quite significant depending on the amount of the donation, the type of property
donated, the income of the donor, and the type of charity to which the donation is given.
This ability to receive tax deductible donations from the public is the key federal tax law
distinction between charities and other tax-exempt nonprofit organizations.110
An interested nonprofit corporation should file an application with the IRS to obtain
the tax-exempt charitable status. Not surprisingly, such complex paperwork demands
accurate and ample information concerning organizational structure, principal activities,
financial assets, expected and past revenue streams, internal policies, and much more.
The IRS evaluates the information provided to determine if such proposed activities and
organizational structure are deemed “charitable.” Noticeably, the IRS, subject to later
judicial review, has sole discretion as to whether to grant or deny the applicant
tax-exempt charitable status based if the information provided on the organization’s forms
do not adequately comply with the law. The IRS may even revoke the “charitable” status
if the charitable entity does not operate in compliance with federal law. Accordingly, a
charity must often also update annual information reports to the IRS about its operative
activities after initial filings.
These extensive requirements on obtaining and maintaining tax-exempt charitable
status are only a few of the many aspects of the charitable tax exemption, including but
not limited to not paying federal income tax. Under the requirement of filing specific
forms to obtain the tax-exempt status, the forms required for tax-exempt charitable status
are much more complicated than those required for other tax-exempt nonprofit
organizations. Such added complexity is mostly due to the additional financial impact on
tax revenues because charities are also eligible to receive tax deductible donations from
the public.111 The IRS, by granting an organization tax-exempt charitable status, not only
saves the organization from the requirement to pay federal income tax, but also
communicates assurances to potential donors that donations will be used for charitable
purposes.
110
IRC Section 501(c)(3).
See David Brennen, A Diversity Theory of Charitable Tax Exemption — Beyond Efficiency, Through
Critical Race Theory, Toward Diversity, 4 Pittsburgh Tax Review 1, 3–5 (2006) (discussing that the added
complexity could be related to something that has nothing to do with dollars, or perhaps the added complexity
has something to do with the nature of charities in a market society, and the reason charities are eligible to
receive tax deductible contributions is that they are required to use these monies for charitable purposes, as
opposed to mutual benefit purposes as is the case with other tax-exempt nonprofit organizations.)
111
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B. Theories of Charitable Exemption
Traditional theories of the charitable tax exemption are principally based on concepts
of economic efficiency. These efficiency-based theories explain the charitable tax
exemption as either a subsidy by government for public goods, a necessary result of using
net income to define tax liability, or a means of compensating charities for capital
constraints. Other efficiency-based theories contend that the charitable tax exemption is
either a payment for an entity’s ability to garner donations or a means of compensating
charities for the risk they assume in providing public goods. Each of these economic
theories for the charitable tax exemption has its strengths and its weaknesses. They are
also useful in establishing the contours of the charitable tax exemption. However, these
traditional theories may contain less significant non-economic considerations, which,
ultimately, make them incomplete. This explanatory deficiency also means that these
efficiency theories cannot fully guide us in establishing the contours of charitable tax
exemption law.112
1. The Traditional Public Benefit Subsidy Theory. — The public benefit subsidy
theory views the charitable tax exemption as an approach whereby the government pays
organizations consistently engaged in providing public goods. In other words, charitable
tax exemption is offered essentially to “pay” or “compensate” private entities that supply
public goods and services as noted in Bob Jones University vs United States.113 The
theory fundamentally assumes that the government subsidizes certain “goods” or
“services” that the government either cannot or will not supply on its own due to various
constraints, such as constitutional constraints as to religion and political constraints as to
campaign support. Another assumption underlies this theory is that government, under
neutral principles, can determine what constitutes a public good or service for purposes of
the charitable tax exemption. Therefore, the government somehow takes exemption as a
form of financial support for charities.
The traditional subsidy theory alone does not fully validate the charitable tax
exemption. One problem with the theory is that it fails to justify why governmental
112
Rob Atkinson, Theories of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charities: Thesis, Antithesis and
Syntheses, in Paul Bater, Frit Hondius & Penina Kessler Lieber eds. The Tax Treatment of NGOs: Legal,
Fiscal and Ethical Standards for Promoting NGOs and Their Activities, Kluwer Law International (Frederick),
at 253–83 (2003).
113
See Brennen, fn. 111 at 68, arguing that charitable exemptions are justified on the basis that the
exempt entity confers a public benefit-a benefit which the society or the community may not itself choose or
be able to provide, or which supplements and advances the work of public institutions already supported by
tax revenues. History buttresses logic to make clear that, to warrant exemption under Section 501(c)(3), an
institution must fall within a category specified in that section and must demonstrably serve and be in
harmony with the public interest. The institution’s purpose must not be so at odds with the common
community conscience as to undermine any public benefit that might otherwise be conferred.
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financial support for charities has to be a tax exemption rather than a direct grant or
privileged access to resources. Meanwhile, this theory does not identify a coherent
protocol as to what goods and services are for the public benefit. For this instance,
although the neutral market principles might drive the process of deciding what benefits
the public,114 the “neutral” efficiency principle alone does not substantiate a basis for
understanding how a public benefit is determined.
2. The Base-Defining Theory. — By pointing out the insufficiency of the public
benefit subsidy theory, Boris Bittker and George Rahdert proposed the base-defining
theory, which essentially states that charities (and many other nonprofit organizations) are
not suitable targets of the income tax and thus should be exempt from income tax.
Specifically, Bittker and Rahdert argue on the economic aspects of the exemption:
“…[Charities] should be wholly exempted from income taxation, because [(1)] they
do not realize “income” in the ordinary sense of that term and because, [(2)] even if
they did, there is no satisfactory way to fit the tax rate to the ability of the beneficiaries
to pay.”115
The base-defining theory explains that measuring the income of a charity is a
conceptually difficult, if not impossible, task.116 By analyzing the sources of a charity’s
typical revenues such as interest on endowment, funds, membership dues, and
gifts/donations, Bittker and Rahdert summarize that, with the exception of interest on
endowment funds, charities simply do not realize revenues in of the type that constitute
taxable income117. Membership dues, gifts, and donations to the charity preferably would
be categorized as excludable gifts from members or donors. Moreover, the charitable
entity itself behaves as a mere conduit for passing the economic enrichment, which may
be viewed as excludable gifts to the charity’s beneficiaries.118
Another complicated factor necessitates counting deductible expenses incurred in
acquiring revenue. Bittker and Rahdert identified charitable expenditures as potentially
114
Id., Brennen presents that, in Bob Jones University, a private university was identified in the
charitable tax exemption statute as a public benefit-education, yet the Court held that the education in that
case was not entitled to exemption due to the presence of invidious racial discrimination. Brennen further
argues that efficiency analysis alone does not provide a rationalization for this aspect of charitable tax
exemption.
115
Bittker & Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 Yale
Law Journal 299 (1976).
116
Id., measuring an entity’s income by a determination of the entity’s gross income in excess of
expenses incurred in acquiring the income. Gross income is generally any economic enrichment that is
not excluded from income by Congress, and one common Congressional exclusion from income is gifts,
money or property given with “detached and disinterested generosity” is not usually treated as taxable
income.
117
Id. at 301–302.
118
Id. at 303.
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including items such as staff salaries and medical welfare programs for indigents. Firstly,
considering a deductible expense as an “ordinary and necessary expense incurred in
carrying on a trade or business” activity is self-contradictory because this treats
mission-focused charitable activity as a “trade or business.” 119 Further, even if the
definition of “business” includes providing charitable benefits, since ultimately all
revenues are committed to charitable purposes, leaving no revenue to insiders as profits, a
charity would essentially have no tax liability.120 Moreover, treating the expense as
eligible for the charitable contribution deduction is arguably unrealistic because either
structural impediments in the statute authorizing the charitable deduction or the necessary
zeroing out of income prohibits such deduction. Base-defining theory also concerns
applicable appropriate tax rates.121
Although the base-defining theory centers on an economic explanation122 of the
charitable tax exemption, it fails to address a few non-economic aspects aside from the
elimination of a financial obligation, such as justice and fairness in resource allocation
and opportunities for societal enhancement and betterment. More precisely, Bittker and
Rahdert’s thesis fails to fully address a few issues including the difference between a zero
or near-zero tax liability and a tax exemption, political activities and lobbying, the
definition of “charitable,” and private foundation rules.123
3. The Capital Formation Subsidy Theory. — In response to the base-defining theory,
Professor Henry Hansmann proposes his capital formation subsidy theory on charitable
tax exemption.124 Professor Hansmann explains that the rationale for the charitable tax
119
Id., see also Brennen, fn. 111 at 12–15, briefing that base-defining theory may well explain a few
inherent controversies with charities’ operation.
120
Id., net income-save for some instances of multi-year accumulations for specific purposes-would
always equal zero, resulting in no tax liability.
121
Id., Bittker and Rahdert argues that tax rates implicate conceptions of efficiency related to either the
“benefit” or “ability to pay” theories of taxation; and a charity’s income should be imputed to its beneficiaries
for rate determination purposes since it is most likely the beneficiary who would bear the burden of any tax
on the charity’s income.
122
See Brennen, fn. 111 at 12–15, presenting that, throughout their base-defining theory, Bittker and
Rahdert explain that, even if the federal income tax were to apply to a charity’s income, it is quite likely that
no tax revenue would result. See also generally Brody, fn. 1, however, Evelyn Brody explains quite well in
her sovereignty theory of charitable tax exemption: while most observers have described tax exemption as a
subsidy, a zero rate of tax differs qualitatively, not just quantitatively, from a one-percent rate of tax. Tax
exemption maintains an independent distance between charities and the state. Similarly, exemption differs in
an important political way from an equivalent system of direct grants.
123
Id., presenting that Bittker and Rahdert’s base-defining theory uses a similar type of non base-defining
(non-economic) analysis to fully account for the educational exemption for museums, colleges, and
orchestras.
124
H. Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income Taxation,
91 Yale Law Journal 54, (1981).
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exemption concerns the access of charities to capital markets.125 Professor Hansmann
argues that the tax exemption compensates charities for the lack of access to capital
markets, and such “capital subsidy” promotes “efficiency especially for industries where
nonprofit firms serve consumers better than their for-profit counterparts.” If markets
operate at optimal efficiency, and if nonprofit organizations are the most efficient
producers of “contract failure” goods and services, nonprofit organizations should be
subsidized to grow and expand as a societal unit.
A key to Professor Hansmann’s capital subsidy theory is the notion of contract failure
which “derives from the inability of some or most consumers to make accurate judgments
concerning the quality, quantity, or price of services provided by alternative producers.”
Professor Hansmann typically uses the American Red Cross126 to exemplify contract
failure in that nonprofit firms are more efficient than for-profit firms in circumstances of
contract failure.127
Professor Hansmann explains that constraints on the ability of nonprofit organizations
to obtain capital make their income tax exemption appropriate. With the three major
sources of funding for nonprofit organizations being debt, donations, and retained
earnings, unlike for-profit firms, charities do not have access to equity capital and cannot
issue shares. Nonprofit organizations also simply fail to obtain appropriate debt capital
due to high bankruptcy rates and operative risks involving loans, and donations are tricky
due to uncertainties and insecurities. Therefore, nonprofit organizations roughly should
rely entirely on retained earnings to operate and develop.128 Professor Hansmann further
argues that the exemption is necessarily based on the lack of access to capital and contract
failure experienced by nonprofit organizations. Similar to the base-defining theory, the
capital formation subsidy theory fails to articulate a few issues that have no necessary
connection to economic efficiency, such as exemption to commercial nonprofit
organizations 129 that produce simple standardized services, and the assertion that
125
Id., Professor Hansmann explains: [T]he best justification for the exemption is that it helps to
compensate for the constraints on capital formation that nonprofit organizations commonly face, and that
such compensation can serve a useful purpose, at least for those classes of nonprofit organizations that
operate in industries in which, for various reasons, nonprofit firms are likely to serve consumers better than
would profit-seeking firms.
126
See Brennen, fn. 111 at 19–20, arguing that, Professor Hansmann thinks nonprofit firms are more
efficient than for-profit firms in providing certain types of contract failure services because of the
non-distribution constraint. Consumers are not as concerned with nonprofit firms as they would be with
for-profit firms about donations being diverted to shareholders because nonprofit firms do not have
shareholders.
127
Id. at 19–21.
128
Id.
129
Id., Brennen points that Professor Hansmann’s view is the statement that “[t]here would obviously be
little point…in granting the exemption to a nonprofit hardware store.” Further, Professor Hansmann misses
that even a hardware store might provide the type of benefit, under certain circumstances, that society wants,
needs, or otherwise values.
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nonprofit hospitals should not be eligible for tax exemption.130
4. Donative Theory. — Mark Hall and John Colombo have developed the donative
theory of tax exemption.131 Tax exemption is considered a subsidy, which is justified
where neither the government nor the private market effectively provides a service that is
demanded by a significant number (but not a majority) of citizens.132 In order for the
government to assume a duty, there must generally be majority support. In the absence of
such support, the needs of significant sector of society may not be met. 133 A tax
exemption thus provides a way for the government to subsidize important services
without the necessity of majority support or the ability to control the organizations that
provide the services. 134 Voters support tax subsidies for services provided by
minority-supported organizations in which they have no interest because they, in turn,
receive tax subsidies for services provided by other minority-supported organizations in
which they do have an interest.135
Hall and Colombo use donations as a proxy for public support.136 For instance, an
organization taking enough public support may be viewed as important to a significant
segment of society, and such segment is not provided by the government or the private
sector.137 As such, the organization is entitled to tax exemption. The use of donations as a
measure of exemption-worthiness separates traditional nonprofit organizations from
for-profit institutions, which may also benefit society without receiving donations.138
5. Summary. — As the above rationales underlying the tax exemption have revealed,
130
Id., Brennen further argues that Professor Hansmann’s articulated reason for this assertion is the lack
of contract failure or need for capital evident in the hospital industry. It is important to realize-and this is a
point that Professor Hansmann and many others miss-that the value inherent in a particular form of charitable
organization may not be readily apparent by means of traditional efficiency analysis. Brennen also refers to
Professor Jill Horwitz’s empirical research concerning hospitals. Professor Horwitz concludes that-despite the
myriad of calls for ending tax exemption for hospitals that do not serve the poor-empirical research shows
that tax-exempt nonprofit hospitals provide societal benefits that for-profit hospitals simply do not provide.
The special benefits of nonprofit, as compared to for-profit and government hospitals include the provision of
“more profitable services than government hospitals and more unprofitable services than for-profit hospitals.”
Brennen posits that, though Professor Horwitz does not conclude that these unique benefits of tax exempt
nonprofit hospitals are caused by tax exemption, Horwitz does acknowledge that this connection has not been
disproven.
131
See generally, M. Hall & J. Colombo, Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax Exemption, 52 Ohio
State Law Journal 1379, (1991).
132
Id. at 1398.
133
Id. at 1422–23.
134
Id. at 1426 and 1437, arguing that public policy limitation may help voters to accept subsidized
undersupplied goods.
135
Id. at 1437.
136
Id. at 1447.
137
Id. at 1411 and 1437.
138
Id. at 1443.
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there is no generally accepted theory explaining the existence of tax exemption. Scholars
have different perspectives in explaining tax exemption for nonprofit entities. When a
state designs nonprofit tax exemption laws and policies, it is inevitable to include all
possible theoretical reasoning for more open and inclusive discussions and hearing. It is
notable that those theories do not explain the rationales for giving tax deductions for
charitable contributions made to nonprofit entities.
C. Overview of Financial Incentives in the NGO Sector
Central to the NGO tax exemption system is the incentive under IRC Section 170 —
the tax deduction for charitable contributions. Sections 501(c)(3) and 170 of IRC stipulate
an objective formula with measurable standards for exemption and deductibility, and 28
categories of nonprofit organizations are eligible for exemptions from federal income tax.
However, only those that qualify under Section 501(c)(3) are entitled for the “most
favored” treatment per se. While charitable organizations enjoy the generous tax benefits,
they are, at the same time, subject to the most stringent monitoring.
A quantitative measurement of public support is to label a public benefit or
“charitable” organization based on the extent and type of public support it receives.
Section 501(c)(3) classifies public support organizations into “public charities” and
“private foundations.” Public charities are further categorized into three types: donative
charities under Section 509(a)(1); service provider charities under 509(a)(2); and
supporting organizations under 509(a)(3). Each type of pubic charity has its respective tax
treatment based on the extent and nature of their public support. A donative charity must
raise at least one-third of its total eligible revenues from a combination of gifts, grants,
and contracts from the public sector. A service provider charity must raise at least
one-third from a combination of revenues derived from fees, admission sales, and
revenues from the sale of related products, as well as from public gifts and grants. A
supporting organization does not need to raise funds from the public because of its unique
affiliation with another publically supported charity.
A charitable organization has to pass the “organized” and “operated” tests under
Section 501(c)(3), and certain objective standards are applied in this connection. A
nonprofit organization is recognized as exempt if it is organized for a recognized exempt
purpose and is operated in service of such exempt purpose. Since subjectivity and
discretion play an insignificant role in these determinations, the analysis and test
procedures are ascertainable and standardized. Any organization soliciting exemption
should affirmatively seek recognition of its exempt status from the IRS. On the other
hand, IRS merely performs the role of applying and recognizing exemptions according to
the objective standards.
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III. THE CHARITABLE TAX-EXEMPTION SYSTEM IN PRACTICE — A FURTHER
COMPARISON
After briefly evaluating fundamental features of China and U.S. NGO tax treatment
systems, some important provisions in both systems are worthy of detailed comparison.
This part explores the details of the differences between the American and Chinese
systems. Again, this comparison is selectively oversimplified to embrace concepts are that
interpreted differently in the U.S. and Chinese tax contexts. Therefore, the goal is to
exemplify in which settings those terms are introduced or interpreted rather than focusing
on the technical meaning of elements involved.
A. Formation and Registration
1. U.S. — In the U.S., an organization must be “organized” for exempt purpose. The
IRS has no discretion to approve or deny exempt status based on subjective factors,
provided the applicant organization can demonstrate that it has been properly formed
under state law and that its charter contains the appropriate language required by federal
law. The process is straightforward and predictable. The applicant organization submits
an “Application for Recognition of Exempt Status under Section 501(c)(3)” (IRS Form
1023) supported by a conformed copy of the Articles of Incorporation, corporate bylaws,
various financial schedules and a narrative describing current, and planned activities
programs and contemplated fundraising strategies. An applicant organization satisfies
quite easily the organizational tests if the governing documents articulate the
organization’s exempt purpose.
2. China. — In China, almost every law student studying NGO laws knows about the
difficulty of establishing and registering a NGO. As discussed in Part II above, there are
several issues central to the registration and application of NGOs China.
● Dual Management
The dual management requirement forces many NGOs to remain unregistered or even
operate subversively because the potential supervisory agencies probably refuse to
oversee applicant organizations. What makes it worse is that there may be even no
appropriate supervisory agency willing to take on such a role.139 Although unwillingness
to perform supervisory duties may result in a judicial review, obtaining approval for
registration from government branches or GONGOs that are sought as sponsoring
organizations does not appear to require them to act at all — the granting of permission
139
See Simon, fn. 32, suggesting only those SOs that choose to be and are defined as charity
organizations, would be subject to strict scrutiny under the drafted Charity Law. If this were to be done, the
new Charity Law would contain the provisions to accomplish the type of organizational integrity and the
institutional oversight necessary for organizations operating for public benefit.
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is entirely discretionary on the part of supervisory agencies. Additionally, even a
tentatively complete list of required documents for submission to obtain supervisory
sponsorship by an appropriate entity does not exist. This is but one of the reasons
potential supervisory sponsors can ostensibly prolong the application process by
imposing unreasonable paperwork requests.
In this manner, the dual management requirement offers the government the ability to
manipulate the number of organizations that can be registered in a given territory.
Moreover, the Ministry of Civil Affairs may deny registration if “in the same
administrative area there is already a social organization active in the same (xiangtong) or
similar (xiangsi) area of work, there is no need for a new organization to be established.”
On one hand, this provision helps to create an orderly situation that avoids organizations
with duplicated purposes and to eliminate malicious competition for limited social
resources. On the other hand, however, this also allows the government, if it desires to
control certain areas of social services, to establish an NGO beforehand or during the
application process so as to rule out the possibility of the registration of a real NGO
applicant seeking to do the same work.
The dual management system deserves further debates in terms of removing barriers
to establish NGOs. Advantages of removing the dual management structure are obvious.
Many temporarily formed NGOs have made great impacts during early stages of natural
disaster relief and rescue activities. The government has been intentionally silent and
permissive of those activities conducted by unregistered NGOs, and it has thereby de
facto eliminated unnecessary administrative barriers. Arguably, a revised provision as to
dual management is more desirable because it allows special or emergent formation of
NGOs. This solution has also been implemented well in other countries such as Japan.140
● High Endowment Requirement for Foundations
The 2004 Foundation Regulation provides two different types of foundations: private
foundations (formed by individuals or private businesses) and public-fundraising
foundations. The former foundation is intended to encourage affluent individuals and
corporations to establish their own foundations to carry out charitable activities. There
has clearly been a positive response in that regard, as indicated by the giving statistics
from 2007 and press reports regarding new foundations. 141 Public fund-raising
foundations in practice are mostly institutions organized nationally and staffed throughout
140
Id., drawing an interesting comparison between the China and Japan NGO management system
similarly preserving the fundamental freedom of association, which the Chinese constitution guarantees the
Chinese people. Only those SOs that choose to be and are defined as charity organizations, would be subject
to strict scrutiny under the new Charity Law. If this were to be done, the new Charity Law would contain the
provisions to accomplish the type of organizational integrity and the institutional oversight necessary for
organizations operating for public benefit.
141
Id.
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the country by the party-state itself.142 For instance, a public benefit purpose is required
for a public fund-raising foundation, and additional review as to formation and
registration of such fund-raising foundations is validated and expected in the application
process.
Admittedly, the requirement that foundations have to maintain high endowments or
capital reserves needs further deliberation. As illustrated in Part II, a national private
foundation is expected to keep at least RMB2 million as a permanent endowment; a local
private foundation that does not engage in fund-raising is expected to invest at least
RMB2 million as permanent endowment. As to public fund-raising foundations, a local
one should invest at least RMB4 million as permanent endowment, and a national one
should invest at least RMB8 million. Notwithstanding the legislation goal of nurturing
solid and well-standing foundations, these thresholds are somewhat haughty and may
discourage interested parties from forming and developing fund-raising foundations.
B. Recognized Exempt Purpose and Definition of Charity
1. U.S. — Under IRC Section 501(c)(3), there are seven purposes listed in the U.S.
law as recognized exempt purposes,143 and the list is inclusive and intentionally broad.
Among the seven purposes, treasury regulations mostly interpret three purposes
comprehensively: charitable, educational, and scientific purposes. In the meantime, the
U.S. system has adopted extensive flexibility in interpreting the other four purposes
according to social realities and economic development initiatives.144 As a result, the U.S.
system has bolstered the nonprofit sector by enabling creativity, such as through joint
ventures between the enterprise and government to meet the investment capital needs and
142
Id., Simon further argues that the regulations appear to permit the Ministry of Civil Affairs to act as
the registering and oversight agency with regard to large national private foundations, and the experience of
the Narada Foundation offers proof that MCA will assume this role. The language of the regulations also
opens the possibility that as a practical matter MCA may not necessarily enforce the dual management
requirement of the 2004 regulations with regard to smaller foundations when it chooses not to.
143
I.R.C. Section 501(c)(3) stipulates “Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation,
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or
educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of
its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to
children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or
individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to
influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or
intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in
opposition to) any candidate for public office.”
144
See GCM 36993 (1977), providing that innovative enterprises qualify under Section 501(c)(3) for
passing the organization test as long as they (1) lessen burdens of government; (2) promote community
welfare by lessening neighborhood tensions; (3) eliminate prejudice and discrimination, and (4) defend
human and civil rights served by law or (5) combat community deterioration and juvenile delinquency.
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encourage continued commitment to public benefit. 145 As to the educational and
scientific areas, the Treasury has expanded the original tax treatment by providing a
mechanism for accommodating distance learning technologies and unconventional
classrooms along with interactive internet activities.
2. China. — The exempt purpose determination usually depends on the definition and
coherency of the term “charity” in China. A careful reading of current laws and
regulations can reveal several different definitions of “charity.” In practice, the adoption
of the concept “public benefit” to define charitable organization is widely accepted by
many jurisdictions. For example, the English Charities Act 2006 clarifies the definition of
“charity” by emphasizing that public benefit is created.146
The definition of charity also appears to differ from that of “public welfare” for public
welfare trusts (gongyi xintuo) stipulated in the Trust Law, while the “public benefit”
terminology used in the 2004 Foundation Regulation and the tax rules defines charity
with broader scope. Gong yi is the term used in almost all of these legal documents. It is
defined in Article 60 of the Trust Law in the context of “public welfare trusts” and in
Article 3 of the Public Welfare Donation Law in the context of “public welfare
undertakings” (gongyi shiye). The Foundation Regulations include no definition of
“public welfare,” but refer to the term public welfare institutions (gong yi shiye) in Article
2 to define foundations. And the language in the new tax rules with regard to entities
qualifying to receive donations is that they must use the money “for education, civil
affairs, other public welfare undertakings, or for the districts that suffer from natural
disasters or the poverty-stricken districts.” In fact, the word for “charity” (cishan)147 has
only been used one time, at the time of this writing, in Chinese laws and regulations. In
Article 10, Paragraph 2 of the PWDL, there is a reference to the regulations of social
organizations being established “with the principal aim of developing charities.”
According to Professor Karla Simon, the definition of “charity” in the draft Charity
Law incorporates certain enumerated purposes in Article 3 of the PWDL:148
emergency and crisis relief for regions, individuals, and groups in difficulty;
relief for disadvantaged people;
education, health, science, culture, sports for social benefit; and,
145
See Rev. Rul. 98–15, 1998–12, I.R.B. 6.; see also Redlands Surgical Services vs Commissioner, 242 F.
3 904 (9th Cir. 2001), both of which determined that a nonprofit hospital and a for-profit healthcare company
could form an LLC to benefit both parties, on the conditions that the nonprofit serve as the general partner
and that the exempt purpose drive the enterprise. Furthermore, the LLC’s board would be required to reflect
the majority interest of the exempt organization and retain its control over the nonprofit hospital.
146
See generally Na La, fn. 19.
147
Id., stating that there has been some consideration in the Chinese literature of whether the meaning of
the two terms is actually the same or different.
148
See Simon, fn. 32 at 946.
rd
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promotion of urban and rural community development and environment.
In addition to the specifically enumerated categories above, Article 3, Paragraph 5
also includes the term “other charitable activities,” which provides for future
development of the concept of charity.
Therefore, an expansive definition of “charity” should be considered and adopted. As
Lee has proposed, a charity should be regarded as an eligible charity so long as it: (1) is
organized and operated exclusively for public benefit purposes by engaging in public
welfare activities (including emergency relief, relief for the poor, education, health and
social benefit, promotion of community development, etc.); (2) contains restraints on
distribution of profits, dividends, or assets to its members (non-distribution constraints)
and (3) is required to spend its remaining assets on charitable purposes after its
termination149.
C. Requirement of Operation for an Exempt Purpose
1. U.S. — The operational test in the U.S. system views the organization’s financial
and program activities as indicators of its operations, and such review is monitored on an
annual basis. 150 Usually, the IRS waits and sees how newly formed and approved
nonprofit organizations operate and behave by issuing a provisional “advance ruling” for
a four year period, in which the organization can demonstrate its operations in a more
concrete manner. At the end of the four-year period, the IRS assesses the organization’s
level of public support and makes a final determination as to exempt status.
Admittedly, the operational test has been quite flexible over decades of development
and practice. It recognizes the importance of monetary resources for the nonprofit
organizations. Mostly, it enables the organization to charge fees for services and general
dues and non-dues-based revenues without compromising its exempt status.
An exempt organization needs to file an annual information return (Form 990) to the
IRS if it receives more than $25,000 in annual revenues and is not a church. The Form
990 asks pointed questions about the organization’s program, activities, contributions,
grants, compensation and administrative expenses. Moreover, the U.S. system recently
improved accountability of exempt organizations by posting all related available
information online to promote visibility and exposure. Undoubtedly, this practice ensures
that the exempt organizations continue to operate in the interest of their initial exempt
purpose.
2. China. — Monitoring the operation of nonprofit organizations in China presents
one of the crucial problems in the development of nonprofit sector. It is not even clear the
extent to which currently registered nonprofit organizations of all three types need to go
149
150
See generally Lee, fn. 103.
See Brennen, fn. 111 at 6–8.
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through administrative applications and supervision processes in order to become
“verified charities” or the exact benefits if they get verified.
A primary problem is to determine institutionally which government organ is the
supervisory authority as to the activities of nonprofit organizations. Given the dual
management requirement for nonprofit organizations, it appears that an additional layer
of supervisory authority is necessary, however burdensome this might be. It has been
suggested that a new agency should be created to oversee all the aspects of institutional
development, transparency, and accountability (reporting requirements) without involving
a sponsoring organization in the formation process.
Unlike the IRS in the U.S. system, the Chinese MCA and SAT most likely involve the
verification process of all nonprofit organizations. However, due to the intergovernmental
conflicts and staffing problems, nonprofit organizations are not able to manage the
administrative reporting procedures to two departments, especially for deciding the
exempt status in a cost-effective manner. As evidenced in the 2007 Ruling, there are very
weak connections between MCA accreditation and SAT approval of tax exempt status.
Therefore, scholars have proposed a separate “Public Benefit Commission” to supervise
the charitable status of all nonprofit organizations. However, due to the infrastructure
complexities in the party-state China, this proposal is too ideal to be implemented151.
In addition, due to the blurred boundaries among the three types of nonprofit
organization in China, a standard reporting form like the U.S. Form 990 is neither wise
nor feasible. On the other hand, if each form of nonprofit organizations has its own
reporting structure, the administrative costs can limit the government’s ability to adopt
further monitoring and verification procedures.
Finally, many nonprofit organizations in China may even want to register as a
commercial enterprise for its exempt purpose. This is especially true for a few
foundations set up by foreign individuals or international philanthropic organizations.
These foundations still benefit from taxpayer friendly provisions to enjoy tax holidays
while avoiding arduous NGO registration and operative process.
D. Prohibition of Private Inurement
1. U.S. — The IRS historically adopts a zero tolerance policy for personal benefits
inuring to any person with influence over the decision-making affairs of a charitable
organization. The IRS used to have to revoke the exempt status after it identifies a
violation of this rule. However, to balance the IRS and charitable community, the
Congress added a new provision IRC Section 4958, i.e. the Intermediate Sanction clause,
to the IRC. The Intermediate Sanctions focuses on “excess benefit transactions” by
disqualified persons and enacts a two-tier excise tax designed to punish the wrongdoer
151
See Simon, fn. 32 at 946.
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while spring the charity. Under this rule, it is unjust enrichment transactions and their
perpetrators that are sanctioned, but not the charitable organizations.
By adopting the Intermediate Sanctions, the U.S. scheme again exhibits its flexibility
in balancing interests and competing tensions. The U.S. Congress admits that most
charitable organizations behave properly; the Intermediate Sanctions creates a safe harbor
for the majority of nonprofit organizations and their volunteers, staff, and directors.
Under Section 4958, an organization is compliant with Section 501(3)(c) if it i) maintains
proper records, ii) obtains comparability data regarding compensation arrangements, and
iii) has a conflict of interests policy.
2. China. — The nonprofit sector has been infected with accountability issues from
the every outset. In particular, the efficient and responsible use of the funds is now a
public concern. A challenging accountability problem relates to corruption. China’s
notorious corruption on using donation makes it more questionable whether charitable
donations can reach the hands of those most in need and that no personal interests of
management personnel are involved. Widespread fears of misappropriation of donated
funds even have to some degree prevented the general public from donating or induced
the public to switch to foreign nonprofit organizations, which presumably have less
accountability issues.
A frustrating observation as to China’s nonprofit organizational scheme is that the
values of accountability, transparency, and performance evaluation are so downplayed in
practice. Not surprisingly, the immature practice of non-observance and lax
implementation is displayed here. Article 21 of the Public Welfare Donations Law
provides for the donor’s right to access information about the use and management of the
donations. The Foundations Regulations has similar provisions. All current laws contain
regulations on submissions of annual reports to the relevant administrative authority.
However, only the Foundation Regulations contains a duty of disclosure of information,
requiring foundations to make the relevant annual reports public through media channels
to provide for public enforcement of accountability. Thus, compared to information
disclosure requirements of for-profit listed companies, disclosure requirements for
charitable organizations are still quite primitive and under-developed.
The misalignment of interests and information provides charity management with
great decision-making discretion. In order to prevent abuses, appropriate checks and
balances must be put in place to protect charity assets and ensure the accountability of
persons who control them. Appropriate use of checks and balances to improve
governance would be beneficial to the charitable sector as a whole. Well-governed
charitable organizations are more likely to enjoy greater public confidence, which is
critical for fund-raising. Conversely, ineffective charitable governance may reduce the
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ability of the charitable organizations to carry out their missions.152
Another aspect deserving attention is that internal government and financial
management remains under-regulated. For example, Article 15 of the Social
Organizations Regulations requires that a social organization set out the qualifications,
powers, and duties of its members. However, the Regulations provide insufficient
guidance. For example, the SO Regulations does provide that the highest authority rests
with the members, but does not specify the authority scope. The SO Regulations should
clearly delineate the powers and authorities that members can exercise at their meetings,
including the power to amend the organization’s constitution, appoint or remove directors,
and dissolve the organization. The Regulations should also include procedures for calling
meetings and passing resolutions.153
Regarding the duty of loyalty, only the Foundation Regulations prohibit a director and
the director’s associates from engaging in “self-dealing” with their foundation. This
approach must be amended so that all senior officers and board members of a charitable
organization are subject to duties of care and diligence, as well as a fiduciary duty of
loyalty that prohibits them from having actual or potential conflicts of interest. Guidelines
on how to deal with board conflicts would help the management understand their
responsibilities. At the same time, because a voluntary board of trustees usually governs
charitable organizations, the law should provide that they may be relieved from personal
liability for breaches of certain duties if the court believes they have acted honestly and
reasonably or in “good faith.”
E. NGO Asset Management upon Dissolution, Termination and Liquidation
1. U.S. — The U.S. scheme requires that charitable assets remain within the charitable
sector. An exempt organization may not dissolve, terminate, or liquidate without insuring
that assets remaining after paying outstanding liabilities remain within the charitable
sector. The board of directors of a dissolving organization may select an appropriate
charitable recipient with a similar mission; however, under no circumstance can those
assets be diverted to non-charitable recipients or for no-charitable purpose. This rule was
tested repeatedly in the 1990s when nonprofit organizations, usually community
152
Id., suggesting that ninety-nine percent of corporations in China did not engage in any form of
charitable donations. While this may be explained partly by the fact that any concept of corporate social
responsibility is still embryonic among Chinese corporations, it also partly reflects the lack of efficiency and
accountability, and in turn, the lack of public confidence in the charitable sector.
153
See fn. 103, stating that good governance starts with the ability to recruit and retain an effective
governing board. This requires clear rules on the procedures for the appointment and removal of directors, the
qualifications and number of directors, the duration of their appointments, and the terms of remuneration. The
Regulations should also specify the duties and the potential liabilities of the board. While all laws currently
governing the main types of charitable organizations prohibit misappropriation of the organization’s funds,
they fail to stipulate any duty of care for directors respecting their management duties.
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healthcare institutions, merged with for-profit hospital chains. As a result, foundations
were set up to administer charitable assets after closing, and this situation prompted
various states’ Attorneys General to implement protocols to govern such transactions and
to seek court approval for the allocation of the assets before the transaction was
completed.154
2. China. — The treatment of dissolved or liquated NGOs is a big loophole in China’s
NGO legislation. Provisions on termination and liquidation of three forms of NGOs in
China are scattered over various laws and regulations, and most of them are hard to
implement or lack specific guidance in practice. For example, Chapter 6 of the Trust Law
stipulates the definition, creation, and termination of a trust. However, there are no
delineated rules on how to treat the assets after paying all liabilities. Moreover, as discuss
in part II155, the 2007 Ruling by MOF and SAT stipulates that exempt organizations “may
not distribute any surplus upon dissolution or termination,” but this requirement is vague.
Typically, the 2007 Ruling does not establish any detailed procedures to handle assets
after dissolution and termination.
F. Tax Culture
1. U.S. — The divergence between the nonprofit tax exemption in practice in the U.S.
and that in China can be attributed to the significant distinctions in the tax cultures of the
two countries. First, the U.S. tax exemption scheme has evolved through a long process,
by balancing social needs and economic development, as well as bridging the gap
between the Congress, the IRS, and the nonprofit sector. In China, the first law dealing
with a rudimentary form of nonprofit organizations of modern conception was not
adopted until 1989. The development of nonprofit tax exemption scheme in China has
been a long, painful process; even there are quite many transplantable values and
principles underlying modern tax law, such as the rule of law, the ideology of freedom of
association and cohesive legal infrastructure. While the SAT and MCA have conducted
good preparations by inviting leading scholars and legislation consultants to design the
charity law and related lessons from other countries, the gap between the law on paper
(which has been borrowed from the West) and the law in action (which is defined by
local conditions) is still huge.
Moreover, the U.S. scheme is created in a federalist system, which has two levels of
sovereign governments — state and national — each has its own authority on the
nonprofit sector. China, in contrast, is a party-state system that one central government
has formal authority over administrative subdivisions that promulgate and implement the
law. This may lead to the low efficiency in China in carrying out and designing detailed
154
155
Id.
Id.
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rules for specific questions, let alone the huge disparity as to the development level
among different localities in China. In addition to an established system of financial
incentives including tax exemption and tax deduction, U.S. history has created a culture
of giving and philanthropic activities, especially those associated with church and
healthcare institutions, which are protected by the constitutional right of freedom of
religion.
2. China. — The Chinese style of tax law drafting makes it difficult for nonprofit
organizations to engage in the charity sector and related tax planning common in the U.S.
To begin with, the text of the law is unclear in many respects, such as the definition of
charity, the regulations on internal governance, the registration process, judicial review,
and administrative processes. While the U.S. scheme mostly rests on Sections 501(c)(3)
and 170, the IRS has promulgated various regulations, rulings, and notices to guide the
practice, and case law also makes up a substantial part of the content of the existing
scheme. In China, however, the situation is almost the opposite of its U.S. counterpart.
The scattered regulations regarding tax exemptions and tax deduction are vague and
subject to too much discretional review of MCA and SAT. The “opaque” nature of tax
legislation also fails taxpayers in following the laws and drives applicant organizations
into lengthy process of application and registration.
Another important point is that the general public in China has a long tradition of
philanthropic and charitable giving. However, the distrust or fears for unreasonable usage
and corruption do inhibit charitable giving even after more functional tax laws and
regulations are promulgated in the future. This concern in return leads to the formation of
many grassroots or underground NGOs, which sometimes again deepen the insecurities
of donors of their charitable giving or donations.
CONCLUSION
This article focuses on the comparisons of the tax exemption schemes in U.S. and
China in a three-fold structure. First, given the tremendous development of China’s
nonprofit sector, not many comprehensive studies have been completed on reforms
regarding this issue. The tax treatment of nonprofit organizations, as a crucial component
to construct a nonprofit sector, is unsophisticated and short of practical significance.
Echoing China’s success in economic growth in the past decades, literature on Chinese
tax typically focuses on tax incentives for foreign direct investment and tax policies
catering to economic development. This lack of research and study shows the prejudice
against the nascent nonprofit sector as a partner of the state. Second, under the rule of law
constructed in the past decade, some scholars suggest that China might modernize its
nonprofit sector through an “all-in” charity code or unrealistically cultivate expansive
grassroots NGOs. The study of the nonprofit sector has to embody a down-to-earth
understanding of China’ legal and political settings. Third, commercial implications of the
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nonprofit sector invite studies of its tax treatment. Given China’s integration into the
WTO and heightened complaints over national treatment and fair competition, a key issue
arising is that the profitability of foreign investment shrinks as the tax preferential
treatment is gradually discounted. The profitable potential of nonprofit organizations as
foreign investment vehicles may induce inappropriate tax planning activities. Therefore,
it is never too late to develop a tax framework for the nonprofit sector.
The expansion of the nonprofit sector in the past decades has resulted in many
problems associated with its tax framework. Doubting the suggestion of promulgating a
comprehensive charity law, this article does not suggest any unrealistic idea of
transplanting all valid and enabling values under the U.S. tax exemption system to China.
The prime incentive for the tax deduction has not been solidly rooted in the general public.
There is a lack of stimulating push for the tax authorities and MCA to adopt systematic,
responsive reform measures. However, some positive reforms, especially on the tax
exemption and tax deduction in the nonprofit sector, are more implementable and
manageable. A comparison of tax treatment in the U.S. and China on nonprofit sector
reveals the following observations.
First, the public benefit or charity purpose of nonprofit organizations has not been
coherently defined. This confusion predictably inhibits the development of the nonprofit
sector by stalling interested corporate and individual donors to take exemption and tax
deduction.
Second, China has not set up an enforceable fiscal incentive system to promote
charitable donations. The administrative procedure of obtaining a tax exempt certificate is
arduous and discourages donors from donating or causing them to abandon obtaining the
certificate, which worsens the efforts to modernize the scheme.
Third, there are still burdensome requirements for the application and registration of
nonprofit organizations, such as dual management, high threshold of capital endowment
for foundations and prohibition on cross-region development.
Fourth, the administration and supervision on the internal management, human and
resource, and financial and accounting management of nonprofit organizations are very
weak. China’s complex administrative system for the nonprofit sector, including the
MCA, MOF and SAT, is extremely inexperienced with managing fund raising,
appropriate usage of donations, and profiteering from donations. Corruption has also been
a major concern of the general public, discouraging them from making donations.
Fifth, the determination of tax-exempt status and review of such status is ad hoc and
different from locality to locality. Such irregularities on one hand invite unethical
manipulation of tax preferential policies, and create resistance to making donations
through locally available venues on the other.
U.S. tax system for the nonprofit sector arguably embraces maturity, objectivity,
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flexibility, and accountability. Evolving throughout the course of the American history,
the U.S. scheme relies solidly on regulatory authority, government authority checks and
balances, and confidence in the rugged individualism of American democracy. The
qualification requirement to enjoy benefit of tax exemption is objective and is subject to
minimum level of discretional review. Meanwhile, as an outcome-based set of measures,
it enables the nonprofit sector to adapt to new economic development and strike a
continuous balance between external regulations and internal governance.
From a jurisprudential perspective, in the Chinese tax context two cautions are
methodologically identified. Firstly, the scarcity of decent comparative legal tax
scholarship in general does not support comprehensive comparison. A shortage of
paradigmatic discourse shows the simultaneous existence of bluntly conflicting
arguments, parallel courses, and irregularities in analysis. Although some comparative tax
frameworks have been proposed or compiled, their value to the Chinese tax context is not
self-evident. For this reason, this article argues that a comparative tax study relating to
China might be better achieved by focusing on a full “tax law sub-discipline” rather than
on a specific tax concept. One reason is that a western-originated tax concept might be
too narrow to meaningfully inform a Chinese policy orientation. The other reason is that
it lacks geneyality necessary to be applicable to other subsidiaries of tax law.
Secondly, the tax cultural traditions and social, political and legal settings of a
systematic tax governance framework should be included in tax comparatists’
theorizations. A tax study ultimately has to be conducted from a “big-picture” perspective,
in which a tax system is embedded. Otherwise, a comparative study may easily turn into a
descriptive, mechanical, and perfunctory analysis. The practical and academic
significance of comparative tax studies can hardly be achieved by a limited comparison
falling on the technical elements of a tax concept. This “big-picture” perspective is also in
line with the rationale applicable to both the rule of law construction and assimilation to
the WTO system. This article, therefore, tentatively incorporates tax culture into its
considerations to compare primary elements of nonprofit tax schemes of U.S. and China.
It argues that a comprehensive tax transplant effort of valuable ideas and practices,
although bold and uncomfortable for the recipient country at the beginning, is what China
needs to build a robust nonprofit sector.