Asian Security
ISSN: 1479-9855 (Print) 1555-2764 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fasi20
The Vulnerability of Rising Powers: The Logic
Behind China's Low Military Transparency
Oriana Skylar Mastro
To cite this article: Oriana Skylar Mastro (2016) The Vulnerability of Rising Powers:
The Logic Behind China's Low Military Transparency, Asian Security, 12:2, 63-81, DOI:
10.1080/14799855.2016.1157786
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2016.1157786
Published online: 30 Jun 2016.
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Date: 30 June 2016, At: 16:50
ASIAN SECURITY
2016, VOL. 12, NO. 2, 63–81
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2016.1157786
The Vulnerability of Rising Powers: The Logic Behind China's Low
Military Transparency
Oriana Skylar Mastro
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ABSTRACT
Scholars and officials persistently criticize China for low transparency in its
military affairs. Why does Beijing exacerbate the asymmetric information
problem, even though this theoretically increases the likelihood of conflict?
I offer an explanation, the vulnerability hypothesis, for why rising powers
are likely to reject military transparency and the conditions under which this
may change. By evaluating over 100 authoritative Chinese sources, I identify
four threads of Chinese strategic thinking consistent with the vulnerability
hypothesis: the United States is inherently dangerous as a declining hegemon, transparency heightens the risk of war during power transitions,
transparency grants operational advantages to the opponent, and only
the strong can leverage transparency to enhance deterrence. These findings
have implications for power transition theory and US–China military
relations.
The relatively low level of Chinese transparency about its military affairs exacerbates concerns
about whether China will rise peacefully. The limited information provided about Chinese
decision making, key capabilities, and the purpose of China’s military modernization consistently
disappoints observers. Moreover, Chinese behavior is often inconsistent with the objectives
officially declared.1 Major US Department of Defense strategy documents warn China year
after year about the potential repercussions of secrecy, to include increased suspicion about
Chinese intentions and the possibility of inadvertent conflict due to miscalculation and
misunderstanding.2 Because of these risks, high-level US State Department officials consistently
include a plea for more transparency in their messaging to Beijing.3 Recently, US National
Security Advisor Susan Rice added to the calls, arguing, “greater military engagement and
transparency can help us manage the realities of mistrust and competition.”4 Regional players
such as Japan and Australia are also encouraging Beijing to be more open about its military
capabilities, development plans, and intentions.5 Independent organizations such as the
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI), and Jane’s all indicate that China’s relatively low military transparency,
especially in the realm of military expenditure, makes it difficult to accurately capture trends
in Chinese military modernization.6
Scholars also criticize China’s choices, arguing that transparency would reduce the risk of arms
races and instability during this critical period of China’s rise. The basic logic of the protransparency view is as follows: China’s rapid military modernization creates suspicions in
Washington and capitals across the Asia-Pacific region about China’s intentions. If China does
not in fact harbor secret plans and intends to rise peacefully as its leadership proclaims, even if it
continues to develop its military, greater transparency would significantly reduce the likelihood of
unintended miscalculation, as well as the uncertainty – even “fear” – that can drive “worst-case
scenario” defense planning. In this view, Beijing’s failure to embrace transparency does itself a major
CONTACT Oriana Skylar Mastro
om116@georgetown.edu
University, 3600 N. St. NW, Washington, DC 20007, USA.
© 2016 Taylor & Francis
Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown
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disservice by driving reactive arming by other states that would not occur otherwise. This, in turn,
makes China even more insecure and destabilizes the region. Given these dynamics, prominent
China experts characterize China’s failure to embrace transparency as a serious miscalculation on
Beijing’s part.7
International relations scholarship largely reinforces this view that China should embrace transparency about its changing military capabilities and strategic intentions to increase its chances of
avoiding conflict as relative power shifts.8 In the bargaining model of war, greater information about
the balance of resolve, capabilities or costs of war facilitate bargaining and may allow countries to
reach agreements both prefer to war.9 Defensive realists argue that failing to credibly reveal
information about the nature of one’s military capabilities can lead to deterrence failures, inadvertent
spiraling into war, and failure to cooperate, even when states are purely security-seeking.10 Recently,
Adam Liff and John Ikenberry derived an empirical test from the security dilemma literature and
applied it to the contemporary Asia Pacific, arguing that China’s rise is generating – and its limited
military transparency is exacerbating – nascent security dilemmas in the region.11 Even aspects of
offensive realism believe transparency can enhance stability – uncertainty creates more room for
miscalculation, causing failures in balancing that increase the likelihood of war.12
Despite these potential benefits and over a decade of international pressure and criticism, China
remains relatively secretive about its military modernization compared to international standards.
China significantly underreports its defense expenditures, and estimating the actual amount is
difficult because of poor accounting transparency.13 In addition to an opaque budget, China has
not taken substantial steps to make information more accessible to other countries about its nuclear
weapons modernization, current and future weapons systems, the organization and deployment of
major units, main military operations and exercises, and national strategy.14 China has released
defense white papers every two years since 1998, but their level of information lags behind those
released by other countries in Northeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific.15 While the Chinese Communist
Party’s (CCP) official position is that it embraces transparency, and indeed nominal improvements
have been made over the past decade, China is still far from reaching the levels of transparency
expected of a major economic and military player in the international community.16
This presents a puzzle for students of international relations. Why would China knowingly
and intentionally exacerbate the asymmetric information problem? If indeed transparency will
enhance China’s security by reducing uncertainty and the possibility of conflict, as other
countries consistently argue, why does China continue to adopt a posture of relative secrecy?
The existing literature suggests China’s secrecy is the result of an insufficient appreciation of the
costs and benefits of different degrees of military transparency.17 I will argue, however, that this
conventional wisdom cannot explain Chinese behavior because it gets the cost-benefit calculus
wrong.
Transparency in the military realm is best understood as consisting of two separate dimensions:
intent transparency, regarding strategic plans and preferences; and capability transparency, regarding
the factors that comprise military power. In these terms, most US analyses of China’s military
transparency are actually critical about its lack of capability transparency, rather than its intent
transparency; while Beijing claims to be transparent because it offers a degree of intent transparency.
My central contention – which I label the vulnerability hypothesis – is that China is likely to continue
to reject greater capability transparency during most of its rise, until, in its own assessment, it
approaches local military parity with the United States.18
For most countries in the international system, transparency contributes to their security by
preventing miscalculation and misunderstanding. But for a rising power like China, more information does not equate to greater security because the source of potential conflict and instability is
different – the risks inherent in US decline and potential power transition. Therefore, Chinese
strategists focus more on the severe costs of transparency before the power transition is complete, in
particular increasing the probability the US will adopt disruptive policies and the intensity of those
policies. Low-level capability transparency creates uncertainty about its military growth, which
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creates US uncertainty about the balance of power and likelihood of power transition. The hope is
that this helps Beijing both prepare and prevent – uncertainty may delay any disruptive action to a
more favorable time, or could even discourage such reactions altogether if the US fails to react before
the power transition is complete. Disruption can take many forms, including tactical measures, such
as designing effective countermeasures, political maneuvers, such as forming counterbalancing
coalitions, and in the extreme, preventive war. Therefore, a rising power like China is likely to
embrace a high-level of capability transparency only when it perceives its overall capabilities to be
comparable to those of the dominant power in the region. Once power transition reaches this stage,
the creation of a strong deterrent has mitigated its vulnerability to adverse US actions.
I conduct a plausibility probe by evaluating whether the mechanisms central to the vulnerability
hypothesis are present in Chinese strategic thought. First, I dissect Chinese strategic thinking on the
issue from authoritative and timely Chinese writings. First, I collected all articles in five authoritative
military and political journals in China (Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, Shijie Jinji yu Zhengzhi, Guoji
Wenti Yanjiu, Waijiao Pinglun, and Dangdai Yatai) from the past five years and then selected those
that addressed China’s rise, military modernization, or military transparency. I also gathered
additional articles by searching junshi touming (military transparency) and zhongguo jueqi
(China’s rise) in CNKI (China National Knowledge Infrastructure). The result was 84 potentially
relevant academic articles that I then read for views and rationales concerning on military transparency. I also analyze the most authoritative book on military transparency, junshi touming lun,
published by the Academy for Military Science, the highest-level research institution of the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA).19 Moreover, the editor of this book, Major General Chen Zhou,
is a fellow at the Academy of Military Science and has been a part of the drafting team for all of
China’s defense white papers.
I then analyze the official Chinese position, which focuses largely on intent transparency, from
official statements and coverage in state-sponsored media. This research approach best reveals the
views of Chinese political and military elite on military transparency for two reasons. First, these
sources have strong government and Party affiliations.20 Given the nature of the political system in
China, it is unlikely these highly prolific writers would have high positions in their state run
institutions or be able to publish their views in these government-sponsored publications if such
views were contrary to a consensus within the CCP.21 Second, I have also tried to hedge against bias
by including the full range of views from moderate to hawkish assessments of US intentions; if
indeed there is a convergence in their views, there will be a higher confidence in my findings.
My theoretical contribution is important for two reasons. First, my vulnerability hypothesis is the
first informational approach that offers an explanation of the conditions under which the benefits of
transparency are likely to outweigh the costs and vice-versa. Current scholarship on information in
international politics identifies a tension between states’ incentives to reveal or conceal private
information. Transparency advocates argue that revealing private information may reduce the
likelihood of inadvertent conflict and facilitate cooperation. Pro-secrecy approaches contend that
exacerbating uncertainty facilitates attempts to misrepresent power, allowing a country to feign
strength to elicit greater political concessions and enhance deterrence or weakness to discourage
counterbalancing and other policies disruptive to its rise.22 These tensions are especially acute in the
shadow of a potential power transition, a period in which the balance of power is shifting, countries’
identities are in flux and sticky international institutions are slow to adapt.23 But without additional
variables, these theories about the benefits of transparency and secrecy lead to indeterminate
predictions. I build a theory that seeks to explain the conditions under which the incentives for
one type of information posture may prevail over those of another.
Second, my analysis is the first to comprehensively capture Chinese strategic thinking on this
critical security issue. It demonstrates that the logic and decision making behind Beijing’s policy
reflects that of a utility-maximizing rational actor.24 Existing explanations rely on miscalculation to
explain China’s secrecy because they inadequately account for the perceived costs of transparency. A
more complete understanding of the cost-benefit analysis that drives China’s low military
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transparency would contribute to our scholarly and practical understanding of Chinese military
modernization, its perception of the relationship with the United States, and the challenges of power
shifts more generally. The contours of Chinese strategic thinking on transparency could serve as
inputs to better design policies of engagement, deterrence, crisis management, and managing or
mitigating tension. In the conclusion, I offer specific recommendations to this effect. Moreover, my
findings challenge an article of faith in the policy and scholarly community that greater Chinese
transparency would be a positive stabilizing step.
This article proceeds as follows. First, I address the role of information in international relations
theory, the indeterminate nature of its cumulative predictions, and its limitations in understanding
military transparency in the shadow of potential power transitions. Second, I present my vulnerability hypothesis. Third, I assess the degree to which this approach corresponds with the strategic
thinking behind the preference for low-level transparency about capabilities through an extensive
analysis of authoritative Chinese sources. Lastly, I reflect on the implications of my findings for both
theory and policy.
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Transparency and information in international politics
Past studies have also defined transparency as a state-level variable (the degree to which information
is deliberately revealed) as well as a structural variable (degree of transparency in the international
system resulting from mechanisms such as a free press, open government hearings, or reporting
requirements of international regimes).25 Political scientists have also used the term transparency
broadly, referring to financial, political, and military transparency. This article is concerned with the
latter, the degree to which private information is deliberately revealed, which can range from low to
high.26 While the empirical distribution of cases has undoubtedly shifted towards transparency with
globalization, the information age, advent of international institutions, and advancement in national
intelligence collection methods, states are still extremely powerful players with the ability to keep
secrets, partly due to resource constraints and technical and cognitive limitations.27
I propose that military transparency is composed of two constitutive dimensions: intent transparency and capability transparency. Intent transparency refers to the degree to which information
about a country’s security policy, strategic plans, intentions, decision-making processes, and preferences are accessible, plentiful, and accurate. Capability transparency captures the degree to which
information about a country’s military budgets, personnel management and training, military
hardware research, development and acquisition (RD&A), and order of battle are accessible, plentiful, and accurate. The differentiation between capability and intent often provides analytical leverage
in international relations theories. For example, Stephen Walt argued that states did not devise
balancing strategies based on others’ capabilities alone. Instead, “perceptions of intent play an
especially crucial role in alliance choices.”28 Moreover the signaling literature, with its focus on
incentives to misrepresent and cheap talk, points out that states need to engage in costly actions that
sink costs or tie hands in order to credibly communicate information.29 This suggests that information presented through intent transparency is less informative, credible, and verifiable than information provided through capability transparency. For this reason, capability transparency is weighted
more heavily in the overall concept of military transparency, with intent transparency contributing a
smaller share to the overall concept.
These definitions highlight that transparency is useful mainly as a relative measure – in practice, it
can be difficult to ascertain an absolute measure of accessibility or accuracy without comparison to
other time periods or countries. All countries have state secrets, but some have a much lower
standard for what information needs to be withheld than others. For example, the United States’
default position is transparency, and then it considers withholding a relatively small proportion of
information about its military affairs such as methods of intelligence collection; war plans; programs
for safeguarding nuclear materials; and vulnerabilities of US installations, infrastructure, capabilities,
and protection services based on the threat to national security.30
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In many international relations theories, greater information improves policy outcomes. The
causes of war literature cites private information about the cost of war or the relative balance of
power as the main culprit for the outbreak of war and greater information as a mechanism to end
the war.31 Neoliberal institutionalists argue that the quantity and quality of international institutions
facilitate cooperation by encouraging information provision.32 Transparency can calm threat assessments, push strategic interaction toward peace, and help control provocative and hostile action by
making known defections from agreements.33 Democratic peace theories point to the desire and
ability of democracies to credibly communicate information as one mechanism that reduces the
probability of conflict for such dyads.34 Other studies in the school of liberalism stress that
international trends such as the advent of information technology, economic globalization, and
democratization increase transparency to the benefit of the international system.35 In sum, multiple
literatures argue that transparency can dampen conflictive tendencies as relative power shifts.36
On the other hand, secrecy about military affairs has long been a central goal of military
strategists. Napoleon Bonaparte argued that maintaining private information about strategy, tactics,
and capabilities was the key to military victory, advising “you must not fight too often with one
enemy, or you will teach him all your art of war.”37 Much earlier, Sun Zi famously warned against
predictability, stating, “do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your
methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances.”38 These strategists understood the
value of secrecy in war fighting as a means to gain advantage over the enemy. International relations
scholars have also identified how secrecy allows for states to manipulate their images and misrepresent their power to accrue greater benefits than would otherwise be possible.39 Offensive realism
warns that a state can never be certain about another’s intentions, regardless of degree of transparency, and therefore states should focus on protecting information that would give the opponent an
upper hand in case of conflict.40 Recent scholarship in formal modeling clarifies there are rational
incentives for arming in secret even though doing so creates a risk of war.41
Revealing capabilities can make a state more vulnerable militarily, but there may also be benefits
in terms of enhanced deterrence, reduction of threat, or concessions received in bargaining. Scholars
have identified this tension between the benefits of transparency and secrecy but fail to identify the
conditions under which a state will choose to be secretive or transparent about their military
affairs.42 Without the introduction of additional variables, clarification of concepts, and scope
conditions, the result of this tension remains indeterminate.
Rising powers and the vulnerability hypothesis
I offer a new perspective, the vulnerability hypothesis, which seeks to reconcile the contradictory
views of the pro-transparency and pro-secrecy literature in the case of power transitions. The
vulnerability hypothesis posits that how the rising power perceives its material conditions determines
its level of military transparency. A rising power is a state whose economic and military power is
increasing at such a rate that it may be able to match or supersede the dominant power at some
point in the future. As long as a rising power believes itself to still be militarily inferior to the
dominant power, it chooses strategies to best prepare for any disruptive policies the dominant power
may undertake. This compels the rising power to choose a low level of transparency about its
capabilities.43 The goal of secrecy is not merely to feign strength or weakness, as the existing
literature often assumes, but to create uncertainty which may impose caution and complicate war
planning on the part of the dominant power, thereby mitigating the rising power’s vulnerability.44
The rising power may increase its intent transparency during this period of vulnerability to capture
some of the benefits of openness without the risks associated with increasing capability transparency.
As the rising power’s military capabilities improve to the point that it perceives them to rival or
challenge those of the dominant power, it will become more transparent because more information
now accrues deterrent benefits that make disruption of these specific capabilities much less likely.
This means once material conditions improve sufficiently, the rising power’s capability transparency
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may even reach comparable levels to that of the dominant power if it achieves military parity in the
region during its rise.
Periods of power transition can end peacefully, either with the rising power emerging as the new
great power, as was the case with the United States vis-à-vis Great Britain, or with the rising power
failing to reach its potential, as was the case with the Soviet Union. But more often than not, power
transitions culminate in “hegemonic war,” a conflict brought on by broad changes in economic,
military, and political affairs, which both threatens and transforms the international system.45 The
probability of war is particularly high during power transitions because the balance of power is
shifting constantly, making it difficult to ensure that benefits are distributed to reflect the underlying
distribution of power.46 Moreover, states are attempting to delineate “future influence over a range
of diverse and partly unpredictable issues that cannot be calculated with any degree of precision and
that are not easily amenable to negotiation.”47
The shadow of a potential power transition creates unique incentives for a rising power that
neither the pro-transparency nor the pro-secrecy literature fully captures. First, more information
may not lead to a corresponding decrease in the probability of war in the case of power
transitions. For example, defensive realism argues that there is room for signaling that decreases
the likelihood of conflict based on the offensive-defense balance.48 But the vulnerability hypothesis
suggests that revealing defensive systems may be insufficient to reassure during a power transition
for two reasons. First, a country can reveal defensive systems while concealing the offensive ones
in an attempt to deceive. Second, an enhanced defense inures a state to coercion, which also
creates more favorable conditions for an aggressive offensive. For example, China’s counterintervention capabilities, or A2/AD capabilities, prioritize improving firepower over mobility,
which falls under the definition of defensive.49 However, China’s capabilities concern US strategists
because the more China can protect itself from harm, the lower its costs of war, and the more
difficult it is to deter and coerce.
A rising power tends to be more skeptical that transparency can reassure a dominant power
that fears its declines. It assesses that the dominant power’s threat perceptions are based on the
general trend of its declining power, not on an interpretation of the rising power’s intentions. If a
rising power were to reveal that it is stronger or weaker than estimated, neither reality will
console the hegemon as long as its relative power declining.50 Great powers that feel constrained
by the very presence of other powerful states as well as rising powers fearful of other countries
undermining their rise both require a particularly high sense of security that could result in
aggressive actions.51 Even if transparency reduces the probability of war, these power transition
dynamics ensure that disruptive hegemonic policies, with preventive war as the extreme, will
always be real possibilities.
A rising power will choose the composition and level of military transparency that best ensures
state survival – this will change depending on where the country is in the rising process. In the
beginning stages of rising status and consequently military modernization, it finds itself in a
precarious situation of acute vulnerability. Information about everything from national strategy to
weapons systems and military organization could allow a strategic rival to more effectively neutralize
any new capabilities.52 The rising power also needs to ensure its military buildup does not grab the
attention of potential adversaries, which could then be motivated to respond with policies that
adversely affect its rise. With more information, the dominant power may be able to better target its
disruptive strategies to impact the rising power’s ability to perform specific military missions, a
variable more important than aggregate military assets.53 In other words, at this stage, augmented
capabilities have indeed decreased the rising power’s overall security if it embraces high transparency. However, once the rising power’s military capabilities reach a level of sophistication that deters
attempts to disrupt its military modernization, the rising power is more secure. Therefore uncertainty about where the rising power is in its trajectory, created by low military transparency, is
critical to its successful rise – alerting others without having an adequate deterrent could spark
action that leaves it worse off.
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The vulnerability hypothesis predicts that the need to mitigate this vulnerability will drive the
rising power to choose a low level of capability transparency while it perceives itself to be in an
inferior position to the hegemon. Because capability transparency is weighted more heavily than
intent transparency in the composition of military transparency, this creates low-level military
transparency even if the rising power marginally increases intent transparency. Some scholars may
counter that this is a mistake because poor information flows promote arms racing and worst-case
scenario planning among rivals.54 But that counter-argument embodies a faulty assumption that a
hegemon planning a preventive war is the worst-case scenario for the rising power. In fact, the
worst case is that the hegemon has better information with which to plan a more effective
preventive war. Greater transparency about military budgets, procurement, platform development
and performance, logistics, and order of battle may marginally reduce the possibility of war, but
they greatly increase the chances of defeat if war does occur. In other words, the marginal cost of
an increased risk of war is outweighed by the marginal benefit of the decreased risk of losing that
war. In sum, China currently faces unique incentives that will encourage low military transparency
during most of its rise.
Chinese strategic thinking on military transparency
In this section, I evaluate Chinese strategic thinking and observed behavior and argue that they
provide preliminary support for the vulnerability hypothesis. This section draws from my assessment
of over 100 Chinese language sources – including official statements, press commentaries, scholarly
articles, and semi-official writings – that were collected based on the authoritativeness of the
publication and relevancy to the topic. I then read through all these sources and coded any
information that addressed military transparency which fell into three categories: 1) conceptualization of military transparency; 2) assessments of China’s relative military transparency; 3) rationales
or defenses of China’s degree of military transparency.55 These sources provide substantial evidence
that Beijing’s low military transparency is largely the result of a reluctance to increase capability
transparency due to vulnerability concerns. The main challenge to the vulnerability thesis was not an
alternative explanation for China’s low military transparency but a separate argument that there is
no lack of transparency to explain. Those that argued that China was transparent were rare and
largely printed in the state-run media. The more moderate position that China’s transparency has
increased in recent years was more common and is discussed in a following section on intent
transparency.
In this section, I identify four threads of thinking in the Chinese strategic community that support
this logic. The first argues against the pro-transparency view that more information is sufficient to
reassure the dominant power, often referred to as the declining hegemon in Chinese writings.
The second thread highlights the mechanisms through which transparency can heighten the risk
of war. The third thread warns that greater transparency could reduce the probability of victory in a
conflict by exacerbating military vulnerability. Fourth, a country should only embrace military
transparency from a position of strength when more information yields exceptional deterrent
value that balances the risks of any increase in operational vulnerability. I then show that Chinese
thinkers recognize the risks associated with this posture and attempt to partly reduce them by
increasing intent transparency.
The first thread highlights the dangers a declining hegemon presents for a rising power and the
difficulty in ameliorating them. Chinese scholars and military experts are cognizant of the doomsday
theories associated with power transition, discussing in their own writings the effect of anarchy on state
responses to great changes in China’s relative power.56 History alone provides many examples of
declining powers pursuing aggressive strategies to disrupt a rising power’s trajectory.57 As the Science
of Military Strategy, a highly authoritative source, warns, the most dangerous war is a formidable foe
attacking China with the purpose of destroying its military potential.58 The United States is seen as no
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exception to this rule. To the contrary, Chinese writers point to past US policies of preemption and
willingness to use military means to defend and ensure its international leadership position as evidence
the United States is likely to pursue disruptive politics.59 The popularity of contemporary US scholars
who argue for the need to prevent the emergence of a regional hegemon further alarms Chinese
analysts.60 Even Qin Yaqing, who tends to have more generous interpretations of US policy drivers,
asserts, “the US longs to maintain its preponderance” and its strategic goal is clearly “to continue to
occupy and strengthen its global leadership position.”61 In contrast, Wang Jisi, another known
moderate on US–China issues, wrote optimistically about the future of US–China relations in the
mid-2000s but largely because China’s political, economic, and military power was still greatly
limited.62 Additionally, immediate threats such as terrorism, non-proliferation, and rogue states
distracted the United States and created great incentives to take a cooperative stance vis-à-vis China.63
But the 2011 US announcement of a rebalance towards Asia, with its troop deployments,
expanding presence in Australia, increased military investment, and attempts to strengthen military
alliances, damaged any remaining optimism that Washington would not try to curb China’s rise.64
The shift in US strategic focus demonstrated to many in China a US unwillingness to accept its
decline, potentially foreshadowing even riskier acts to reverse the negative trend, like preventive
war.65 Continued US surveillance operations in China’s periphery and involvement in regional
territorial disputes are considered signs that the United States is unlikely to give China the operational space commensurate with its power and security needs.66 This suggests that Beijing should
take precautionary measures to prepare for confronting the United States.67 The Chinese conventional wisdom is that power transition dynamics are generating antagonism in the bilateral
relationship.68 While all Chinese writings insist on the peaceful nature of China’s rise, they admit
that the trends challenge US strategic interests and regional influence, creating competitive tendencies in both capitals that are likely to intensify.69
Given these dynamics, Chinese thinkers have concluded that transparency is insufficient to
reassure the United States because China’s upward trajectory, not its power at any given period of
time, is the main source of anxiety.70 The United States pushes for transparency because it wants to
know where China is currently in the process of its rise to determine if its own power is at the point
of being challenged – understanding China’s strategic intentions is secondary.71 The desire to
maintain its dominant position motivates Washington, and Chinese policies cannot therefore
eliminate the possibility of disruptive US policies.72 Clearly providing evidence of the dissipating
gap in military power between China and the United States could trigger unwanted US attention and
abruptly end the current period of strategic opportunity in which the United States is not completely
dedicated to stifling China’s rise.73 The popular belief in China is that whether the United States
treats China as a cooperative partner or an adversary depends largely on its assessments of the power
transition trends.74 Since the United States will remain militarily stronger than China for the
foreseeable future, the critical issues for Chinese security become US attitudes towards China’s rise
or the possible measures Washington may take to address it.75
Second, there is a strong line of thinking in Chinese writings on how transparency can increase
the probability of conflict by undermining deterrence for weaker powers, a core logic of the
vulnerability hypothesis. During the early years of its rise, secrecy helped China “to stay under the
radar, to work hard without being overly ostentatious…[to] prevent China from becoming a target
for trouble.”76 But now the trajectory of China’s rise is so clear that the United States has started to
create difficulties for its military modernization programs and treat it as potential opponent.77 This
creates additional incentives for a weaker power to create uncertainty and ambiguity to manage the
risks of hostile policies that may be undertaken in the shadow of a potential power transition.78
While transparency allows strong countries to enhance their deterrent, weaker countries worry about
revealing weaknesses that could ultimately undermine their deterrent.79 In this way, greater Chinese
transparency can boost US confidence in victory, thereby increasing the probability of war.80 As an
op-ed in China Daily warns, adhering to US demands for transparency would be naïve given China’s
inferior military power; the United States could “easily use such an advantage to bully China once
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the latter exposes all of its military power unreservedly.”81 There is a general consensus that the
desire to secure strategic interests, protect its overwhelming advantage, and gain strategic leverage
over China drives US calls for transparency.82
The third thread in Chinese thinking warns against transparency because it grants operational
advantages to the opponent. The long shot of improving trust enough to escape disruptive US
policies comes at the guaranteed cost of providing information that will facilitate the almost-certain
US attempts to undermine China’s rise.83 Transparency can expose security vulnerabilities and
provide inputs into the adversary’s planning process that give it a leg up in an armed conflict.84
In the extreme case of the nuclear realm, secrecy about the exact number and deployment of Chinese
nuclear warheads is considered to be the only way to maintain the survivability of its minimal
deterrent.85 Moreover, China’s aversion to transparency suggests that Chinese leaders are not
confident that the presence of its nuclear weapons would be sufficient to deter a US president
from targeting Chinese conventional forces, particularly on the mainland, in the case of limited
conflicts. The idea that transparency weakens combat effectiveness is not new – ancient Chinese
strategist Sun Zi asserted, “all warfare is based on deception” and “military devices, leading to
victory, must not be divulged beforehand.”86 One point made in an authoritative military journal is
worth quoting at length:
[Secrecy] is the cautious approach to security…there will be consequences if such information is shown to
people without any considerations. The lighter consequence will be the loss of mystique and the needed power
to deter. The heavier consequence will be the accidental exposure of weak points that could be exploited by an
opponent, resulting in serious impact on the foundation of the state.87
Even short of war, transparency about capabilities can support disruptive politics, such as arms
racing, that directly impact a country’s prospects of rising successfully.88 The perception is that
China receives the most attention for its low transparency because other countries want to design the
most effective policies to curb China’s growing military power and ability to act.89 The hope is that
the United States will have a greater difficulty designing targeted cost-imposing strategies when there
is uncertainty about the nature of Chinese capabilities.90
The fourth thread stresses capability transparency is a tool of deterrence for the strong.91 The
view is that if two countries have conflicting interests but are relatively equal in power and wish to
avoid war, transparency becomes an effective way to “subdue the enemy without a fight.”92 But
weaker developing countries must maintain secrecy because transparency does not grant such
deterrent benefits; transparency can expose weaknesses, thereby providing a target set. Or if a
country is stronger or developing strength more quickly than previously thought, transparency
can elicit policy responses such as an arms build up that are unmanageable given limited
resources.93 China’s deterrent power, for example, is still too limited to fully take advantage of the
benefits of transparency, especially given the threats to its security.94 But Chinese thinkers believe
China can be selectively transparent about capabilities that are advanced enough to rival those of the
United States to capture the deterrent benefits.95 This type of “specialized” transparency can occur in
specific domains in which a country has localized superiority with consideration given to the likely
impact on combat effectiveness and security, not external pressure.96 The purpose of publicizing
operations, military preparations, or new weapons in such cases is not to build trust, promote
stability, and avoid miscalculation but to enhance one’s deterrent by credibly signaling the ability
and willingness to retaliate against any action.97
Chinese observed behavior provides additional evidence that minimizing vulnerabilities is the
main motivation behind its approach to military transparency. Of the various components of
capability transparency – military budgets, personnel management and training, military hardware
development and procurement, and order of battle – the outside world has the most information
about the most advanced weapons currently found in the PLA’s active arsenal. Systems are often
brought into the public sphere due to a combination of testing requirements and countries’
intelligence collection capabilities. A few examples of this phenomenon include the January 2007
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ASAT test, January 2010 BMD test, the J-20 prototype tests, the January 2013 DF-21D test, and Wu14 hypersonic glide vehicle flight tests. Efforts to create export demand can also engender greater
information; at the 10th Zhuhai air show, for example, China conducted flight demonstrations of the
Y-20, KJ-2000, KJ-200, and J-10 aircraft, ground demonstrations for 18 kinds of aviation equipment
in active service and six ground-based systems.98 For naval platforms that are particularly difficult to
conceal due to size – for example the Jingdao (056) frigate, Liaoning (CV-16) aircraft carrier, Luyang
III (052D) guided missile destroyer and Qingzhou mine sweeper – China has embraced pageantry
with elaborate commissioning ceremonies and over the top propaganda videos to satisfy nationalistic
audiences and warn weaker regional actors.99 In short, for things it cannot hide, China has attempted
to offset concomitant increases in its vulnerability by exaggerating its deterrent value.100
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Compensating with intent transparency
The vast majority of Chinese articles reviewed recognize there are tradeoffs associated with transparency and secrecy – transparency can bring with it many of the benefits the United States stresses,
if managed well. But this openness can also bring danger, national disaster and can even threaten a
country’s existence.101 Given the likelihood that a declining United States will adopt some sort of
disruptive policies to stifle China’s rise, it would be foolish for China to embrace military transparency while still in a relatively inferior position.102 As the PLA Secrecy Committee (jiefangjun baomi
weiyuanhui) affirms, external criticism will not drive China’s position on military transparency; the
military situation will determine what to reveal, when, and to whom.103 The minimal prerequisites
for capability transparency are that the United States will not endanger China’s security or attempt
to reduce its combat effectiveness.104 Until then, China needs to be vigilant about what information
about its military affairs it reveals to the United States.
China is therefore unlikely to increase its capability transparency in a meaningful way until it
perceives that it is approaching regional power parity with the United States. At the same time,
leading Chinese academics, military strategists, and state-sponsored media providers demonstrate a
deep understanding that this heightens anxiety about Chinese intentions, hurts its image, and
provokes misunderstandings and miscalculations.105 Consequently, many hope China can partly
achieve the benefits of military transparency through corresponding increases in intent
transparency.106 To that end, China has incrementally expanded its military exchanges, established
crisis hotlines, routinized public announcements of strategic intentions, boosted involvement in
multilateral frameworks, and has begun issuing notifications of its military activities and exercises.107
China can improve intent transparency by keeping agreements, being actively involved in international regimes, and reiterating its strategic intention not to seek the expulsion of US forces from
the region in the future.108 China has also increased the number of joint exercises, conducting 31
bilateral or multilateral exercises or training events with foreign militaries in 2014 compared to an
average of only seven per year during the previous decade.109 Top Chinese leaders, including the past
two ministers of defense, also point to military exchanges as critical evidence that China places great
importance on the issue of military transparency and devotes itself to promoting mutual trust.110 An
additional series of measures to enhance intent transparency include establishing a MND website,
spokesperson, and welcoming foreign correspondents – something that would have been “unimaginable” a decade earlier.111 One major step occurred in November 2014 when President Obama
and President Xi agreed to mutual reporting of any major military activities.112
Even as China goes down this path, many realize that relying mainly on improvements in intent
transparency to create progress in military transparency has severe limitations. Most expect international pressure for China to be more open about its capabilities and future development plans to
continue, if not grow, as Chinese power grows.113 But given that increasing capability transparency is
not an option, given that it would expose Beijing to great risk, and increases in intent transparency
come at a relatively low cost, this becomes the logical strategy for any rising power to pursue.
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Theoretical contributions and future avenues for research
While informational approaches to security studies have led to important insights, scholarly understanding of what determines the degree and nature of private information in the international system
is limited because the literature fails to take into account states’ strategic choice of creating or
revealing private information. This article provides preliminary evidence in the crucial case of China
that the degree of vulnerability, determined by material factors, is the main consideration in
decisions regarding military transparency and, therefore, the distribution of private information
among major powers. The vulnerability hypothesis also posits a new reason for low transparency –
to heighten overall uncertainty about the stage of a country’s rise that complicates planning and
delays action – that does not rely on an assumption that states feign either strength or weakness.114
The vulnerability hypothesis adds a component to power transition theory by highlighting another
aspect that makes the period before power shifts potentially dangerous: the uniquely high degree of
incomplete information that hinders agreements short of war.
My findings also show a strong Chinese belief that in the shadow of a potential power transition,
trends in relative power shape threat perceptions more so than assessments of intentions. Chinese
writings also provide rationales for low transparency that are not unique to its political system or
culture but could apply to any rising power. If China were opaque merely due to cultural or political
preference for secrecy, the Chinese discussion about military transparency would be equally secretive
and muted. The plethora of articles and debates on the topic suggests otherwise. This is not to deny
the role of the domestic political system; given that democracies are less likely to fight each other
than autocratic or mixed regime pairs, regime type could play a role in determining when the shift
from low to high transparency occurs. For example, a democratic rising power facing a democratic
great power may determine it needs lesser military capabilities to deter disruptive policies than other
dyads, and therefore begin to embrace high military transparency at lower levels of power.
Additionally, democracy’s need for legislative approval of military budgets may generate a higher
baseline for minimal transparency.
While this in-depth case study provides strong support for the vulnerability hypothesis in the
case of China, future research needs to be done to determine the degree to which it explains the
informational choices of past rising powers. The logic may also apply to other dyads that
experience a higher than average propensity for conflict, such as rivalries. In those cases, scholars
should pay close attention to whether and how the rising power’s position on military transparency evolved as its relative power changed because the vulnerability hypothesis predicts that rising
powers are likely to become more transparent about capabilities at the stage when the power gap is
closing.115 Preliminary evidence suggests the case of Japan’s rise is consistent with this logic. The
vulnerability hypothesis would predict transparency at this stage because Japan believed it had
surpassed the regional hegemons, Russia and China, in military power and had therefore safely
navigated its most vulnerable period.116 Japan was transparent about its capabilities at end of the
19th century, publicizing through writings and public war games its newfound naval power, its
force of 50,000 men in Korea, and their domestically manufactured Murata magazine rifle.117 It
even made public the unified system of public finance it used to raise funds for its military.118
Evidence also suggests that Japan’s military transparency was largely driven by a desire to deter,
not reassure; by providing accurate and credible information about its intentions and military
capacity, Tokyo hoped to prevent disruptive Russian and Chinese responses, and compel both
countries’ acceptance of the new status quo.119
Practical implications for US–China relations
There are three primary practical implications of this research that should inform policy. First,
pressure and persuasion is insufficient to convince China to embrace capability
transparency. Second, if the United States continues the push in spite of the low probability of
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success, it should distinguish between capability transparency and intent transparency and not
reward Chinese progress on each equally. Lastly, movement toward greater military transparency
may actually foreshadow conflict, not cooperation.
The findings of this research suggest the current US policy of pressuring China to be more
transparent about its military affairs has severe limitations. China has made some improvements in
its military transparency due to US pressure but mostly in the low risk realm of intent transparency
by releasing white papers or expanding military exchanges. While such progress should be lauded
and further promoted, China will only embrace capability transparency when its leadership is
confident its ability to fight is so great that the United States would be sufficiently deterred from
action in any future contingency. This does not mean the United States should stop shaming Beijing
on this score – maintaining the talking points about the need for greater transparency about its
military budget, personnel management and training, military hardware RD&A, and order of battle
may have public diplomacy benefits. Also, such complaints may be a way to express concern about
Chinese military modernization without portraying US strategy as one of containment. But the
current focus in US-China military exchanges on increasing Chinese military transparency and
building strategic trust is misplaced, causing key military figures and academics to be overly
confident in the potential impact of dialogue.120 Moreover, concessions should not be made with
hopes of inspiring reciprocity, a practice often used in agenda setting for high-level military
exchanges with the Chinese. Instead, the goal of military-to-military relations should be to enhance
predictability, to understand each other’s standard operating procedures, and expand routine communication to manage the risk of accidents associated with frequent operational encounters.
However, if the United States maintains its talking points on military transparency in spite of the
limitations, which may be politically necessary, interlocutors should at least distinguish between
capability transparency and intent transparency to put more direct pressure on China to reveal
specific elements of military power. Chinese thinkers demonstrate a belief that China can build
strategic trust, control and manage risk, avoid miscalculation, and reduce suspicions sufficiently by
continuing bilateral activities such as exchange visits, high-level meetings, and strategic consultations, as well as ship visits and joint exercises without the risks associated with embracing greater
transparency about capabilities.121 This increase in intent transparency is a positive step but does
little to inform the United States about the nature, purpose, and trajectory of Chinese military
capabilities – the fundamental aim of the transparency push. If the United States continues to
emphasize transparency in its messaging without the distinction, it may grant political rewards to
China disproportional to the actual concessions made, which could further weaken the impact of US
political pressure.
Lastly, China may not provide greater information about its military affairs in the future for
cooperative purposes such as to de-spiral or reassure. This research cautions that if China does
work to achieve high levels of transparency, this is not necessarily a positive indicator of peaceful
intentions and acceptance of the US-led world order. Instead, according to the vulnerability
hypothesis, the more likely explanation is that China is confident in its relative power and
hopes to show its strength to coerce or deter.122 In other words, a shift towards transparency
may presage a more assertive and aggressive China, rather than a more cooperative and friendly
China. However, the good news is a shift towards greater transparency communicates the Chinese
belief that it has reached local military parity with the United States, which given current trends, is
likely to happen in the next ten years.123 Until then, policymakers should understand that
information about China’s military capabilities found in the public realm does not present a
comprehensive and objective picture of Chinese military capabilities. Instead, any information
Beijing fails to hide, it attempts to mold to present its military in the most positive light to deter
external actors and impress domestic audiences.
Shifting global power creates delicate and dangerous periods in international relations that are
rarely navigated peacefully. I have argued that a rising power will prioritize policies that alleviate
vulnerability to disruptive policies during such periods, choosing to shun military transparency even
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if it heightens criticism and concern from the dominant power. Until the power gap closes, the rising
power will protect as much as possible its private information about its capabilities. Thorough
research convincingly demonstrates that Chinese behavior and strategic thought are largely consistent with this logic. The strategic calculations states make regarding military transparency impact the
distribution of private information in the international system, and therefore its stability. The
vulnerability hypothesis greatly enhances our understanding of these calculations; future research
projects should assess the empirical validity of this model in cases of other rising powers, test the
degree to which it is applicable beyond rising powers, and determine in greater specificity how much
more states weigh capability transparency over intent transparency in their assessments.
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Notes
1. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2013, p. I, hereafter cited as DoD China Report. Published by Office
of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. Available at http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/
Documents/pubs/2013_China_Report_FINAL.pdf
2. DoD China Report 2013, p. 13. Department of Defense (DoD), Quadrennial Defense Review, 2014, p. 4.
Published by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. Available at http://archive.
defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf
3. Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, October 11, 2011. Available at http://foreignpolicy.
com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/; David Brunnstrom, “China’s military secrecy justifies surveillance
flights: U.S. official,” Reuters, September 12, 2014. Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-chinasurveillance-idUSKBN0H72KN20140913
4. Susan E. Rice, “America’s Future in Asia,” (Presented at Gaston Hall, Georgetown University, Washington, DC,
November 20, 2013). Published by The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, November 21, 2013. Available
at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/11/21/remarks-prepared-delivery-national-security-advi
sor-susan-e-rice
5. Philip Dorling, “Chinese ‘hiding military build-up,’” Sydney Morning Herald, January 7, 2011. Available at http://
www.smh.com.au/national/chinese-hiding-military-buildup-20110106-19hjc.html; Eliza Borrello, “China still key
to future Defence strategy,” Australian Broadcasting Corporation, May 8, 2013. Available at http://www.abc.net.
au/news/2013-05-03/china-still-the-key-to-future-defence-strategy/4667084; Ankit Panda, “Shinzo Abe At World
Economic Forum: ‘Restrain Military Expansion in Asia,’” The Diplomat, January 23, 2014. Available at http://
thediplomat.com/2014/01/shinzo-abe-at-world-economic-forum-restrain-military-expansion-in-asia/; Japanese
Ministry of Defense (MOD), Defense of Japan 2014, p. 4. Available at http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/
2014.html
6. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2015 (London: Routledge, 2015), p. 215–216; Samuel
Perlo-Freeman, “Measuring Transparency in Military Expenditure: The Case of China,” Policy Brief 2011 4, University
of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, Northeast Asia Defense Transparency Project,
October 2011. Academic paper published by UCSD. Available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/0zk864f1#page-9 6;
Craig Caffrey, “China’s Defence Budget,” in Jane’s Defence Budgets, September 3, 2015. IHS Jane’s 360, p. 4.
7. M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Search for Military Power,” The Washington Quarterly Vol. 31, No. 3 (Summer 2008),
p. 138; Thomas J. Christensen, “Shaping the Choices of a Rising China: Recent Lessons for the Obama
Administration,” The Washington Quarterly Vol. 32, No. 3 (Summer 2009), p. 100; Avery Goldstein argues
that more information about an opponent’s military capabilities increases crisis stability but only when leaders
are only considering the use of conventional capabilities. Avery Goldstein, “First Things First: The Pressing
Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.–China Relations,” International Security Vol. 37, No. 4 (Spring 2013),
pp. 49–89.
8. See the literature reviewed in Charles L. Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of
Competition and Cooperation, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), pp. 272–277.
9. James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995),
pp. 379–414; Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1999).
10. Charles L. Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” World Politics Vol. 50, No. 1 (October 1997), pp. 171–201.
11. Adam P. Liff and G. John Ikenberry, “Racing toward Tragedy? China’s Rise, Military Competition in the Asia
Pacific, and the Security Dilemma,” International Security Vol. 39, No. 2 (Fall 2014), pp. 52–91.
12. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2001).
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13. DoD China Report 2013, p. 45. China’s real military-related expenditure is substantially higher than reported –
possibly in the range of $135 to $215 billion. Jim Garamone, “Report Documents Chinese Military Power, Calls
for Transparency,” American Forces Press Service, May 25, 2007. Washington, DC: United States Department of
Defense, American Forces Press Service. Available at http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=46183.
14. Michael Kiselycznyk and Phillip C. Saunders, “Assessing Chinese Military Transparency,” Institute for National
Strategic Studies (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2010); Japanese MOD, Defense of Japan 2013,
p. 8.
15. Kiselycznyk and Saunders, “Assessing Chinese Military Transparency,” p. 26. Chinese media coverage argues that
the defense white papers have released greater and more relevant information over time. See “Zhongguo shoufa
zhuantixing guofang baipishu, tuokuan junshi touming fangshi” [China’s First Special Topic Defense White
Paper, Expand Methods of Military Transparency], Zhongxin wang [China News], April 16, 2013. Retrieved from
http://www.chinanews.com/mil/2013/04-16/4734488.shtml; “Zhongguo jundui, gengjia touming” [The Chinese
Military, More and More Transparent], Renmin ribao haiwai ban [People’s Daily Overseas Edition], April 17,
2013. Retrieved from http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/html/2013-04/17/content_1226780.htm?div=-1.
16. DoD China Report 2013, p. 32.
17. One of the reasons given for the failure is the extremely conservative political culture of the CCP and closed and
opaque policymaking system of the PLA. Liff and Ikenberry, “Racing toward Tragedy?” p. 90; David Shambaugh
argues that Chinese leaders “do not appreciate the importance of defense transparency as a security-enhancing
measure” because they have been “socialized in a military institution and political culture that prizes discipline
and secrecy.” David Shambaugh, “China’s Military Views the World: Ambivalent Security,” International
Security Vol. 24, No. 3 (Winter 1999/2000), p. 55.
18. Parity in this context refers to an approximately equal conventional military balance in likely regional conflicts.
19. Chen Zhou, ed., Junshi Touming Lun [On Military Transparency], (Beijing, China: Zhongguo Remin Jiefangjun
Chubanshe [PLA Press], 2013).
20. An institution under the Academy of Military Science, a research center under the Central Military Commission,
publishes Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science, hereafter CMS). The Chinese Foreign Ministry
administers the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), which publishes Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (Journal
of International Studies, hereafter JIS) and China’s Foreign Affairs University, which publishes Waijiao Pinglun
(Foreign Affairs Review, hereafter FAR). Lastly, both Dangdai Yatai (Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific
Studies, hereafter JCAPS) and Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (World Economics and Politics, hereafter WEAP) are
published by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), which is affiliated with the State Council.
21. Out of the 60 authors cited in this article, 24 were academics, six were top experts at Chinese state-affiliated think
tanks, four were from Party organizations, 18 were from military organizations, and eight were reporters for
state-sponsored media outlets. The academic authors are from major government-run Chinese universities. The
military authors hail from institutions such as the Academy of Military Science, the Equipment, Command and
Technology University (affiliated with the Second Artillery), and the General Armament Department.
22. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War”; Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1989).
23. Powell, In the Shadow of Power, p. 85.
24. Rationality assumes that a state understands the constraints and opportunities it faces in international politics
and purposefully designs policies to promote its national interests in response. Glaser, Rational Theory of
International Politics, p. 2.
25. Dan Lindley, Promoting Peace with Information (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 17; Bernard
I. Finel and Kristen M. Lord, Power and Conflict in the Age of Transparency (New York: Palgrave, 2002), p. 3.
26. I do not include full secrecy or transparency on the scale because they are empirically nonexistent. For more on
this reasoning, see Gary Goertz, Social Science Concepts: A User’s Guide (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2006), p. 10.
27. Finel and Lord, Power and Conflict in the Age of Transparency, p. 2.
28. Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security Vol. 9, No. 4
(Spring 1985), p. 12.
29. For an example of this, see James Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sunk Costs,”
The Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 41, No. 1 (February 1997), pp. 68–90.
30. U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual, Vol. 5 Handbook 3, TAGS/Terms Handbook, p. 4. Published
by U.S. Department of State, authored by Records and Archives Management Division. Available at http://www.
state.gov/documents/organization/89261.pdf.
31. Dan Reiter, How Wars End (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).
32. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1984).
33. For a comprehensive review of the benefits of transparency, see Lindley, Promoting Peace with Information,
Chapter 2.
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34. James Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” American Political
Science Review Vol. 88, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 577–592; Kenneth A. Schultz, “Domestic Opposition and
Signaling in International Crises,” American Political Science Review Vol. 92, No. 4 (December 1998),
pp. 829–844.
35. Finel and Lord, Power and Conflict, pp. 1–12.
36. Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” in Karen A. Mingst and Jack L. Snyder, eds., Essential
Readings in World Politics, 3rd ed. (New York: Norton, 2008), pp. 346–359; Glaser, “The Security Dilemma
Revisited,” pp. 171–201.
37. Napoleon Bonaparte, “Napoleon on War,” Available at http://www.napoleonguide.com/maxim_war.htm.
38. Sun Zi, The Art of War, trans., Lionel Giles (Radford, VA: Wilder Publications, 2008).
39. Jervis, The Logic of Images.
40. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.
41. Adam Meirowitz and Anne E. Sartori, “Strategic Uncertainty as a Cause of War,” Quarterly Journal of Political
Science Vol. 4, No. 3 (December 2008), pp. 327–352.
42. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War;” Lindley, Promoting Peace with Information.
43. Jack Levy argues that the rising power is concerned in general that the declining hegemon will seek to prevent
the deterioration of its position, including the use of force while circumstances are still favorable. Jack S. Levy,
“Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War,” World Politics Vol. 40, No. 1 (October 1987), p. 87.
44. For feigning strength, see Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War.” For feigning weakness, see Branislav L.
Slantchev, “Feigning Weakness,” International Organization Vol. 64, No. 3 (Summer 2010), pp. 357–388.
45. Robert Gilpin, “The Theory of Hegemonic War,” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring
1988), p. 592.
46. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics; Powell, In the Shadow of Power, p. 85.
47. Levy, “Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War,” p. 96.
48. When the offense has the advantage, it is easier to destroy the other’s army and take its territory than to defend
one’s own; when the defense has the advantage, it is easier to protect and hold than to move forward, destroy,
and take. Transparency may allow countries to escape the security dilemma, but only if the defense has the
advantage, countries can distinguish between offensive and defensive weapons, and countries are building mainly
defensive weapons. Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.”
49. Keir A. Lieber, “Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense–Defense Balance and International Security,”
International Security Vol. 25, No. 3 (Summer 2000), pp. 80–81.
50. All 13 major wars or crises from 1600 to 1945 were initiated by a state fearing decline. See Dale C. Copeland, The
Origins of Major War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 2. For an argument that the weaker but
rising power initiates the war, see A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press, 1980).
51. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1976), p. 64.
52. Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (New York: The Free Press, 1973); Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War:
Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999).
53. Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” p. 175.
54. Liff and Ikenberry, “Racing Toward Tragedy?” p. 90.
55. Only about 80 percent of the gathered sources contained specific and relevant information on Chinese thinking
on military transparency. Out of those, only 64 unique sources are cited here because of redundancy and space
constraints.
56. Qin Yaqing, “Wuzhengfu wenhua yu guoji baoli-daguo de qiangxing jueqi yu heping fazhan” [The Culture of
Anarchy and International Violence—The Forceful Rise and Peaceful Rise of Great Powers], Zhongguo shehui
kexue [Social Sciences in China] No. 5 (2004), pp. 53–56. In 2007 a whole section of China Military Science was
dedicated to evaluating the strategic choices of rising powers. See “Strategic Choices of the Rise of World
Powers,” CMS Vol. 20, No. 3 (2007), pp. 39–85.
57. Zhang Wenmu, “Daguo jueqi de luoji” [The Logic of Great Power Rise], Zhongguo shehui kexue [Social Sciences
in China] No. 5 (2004), pp. 61–63; Yan Xuetong, “Heping jueqi yu baozhang heping-jianlun zhongguo jueqi de
zhanlue yu zhengce” [Peaceful Rise and Ensuring Peace-A Brief Note on the Strategy and Policy of China’s Rise],
JIS Vol. 4, No. 3 (2004), pp. 12–16; Li Xiaodong, “Daguo jueqi anquan zhanlue de lishi kaocha” [Historical
Review of Security Strategy of the Rise of World Powers], CMS Vol. 20, No. 3 (2007), pp. 39–49.
58. Zhanluexue [The Science of Military Strategy], (Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press, 2013), p. 100.
59. Yan Xuetong, “Heping jueqi;” Wu Xianxiang and Gao Yiqun, “Xianfa zhiren yu meiguo baquan” [Preemptiveness and US Hegemony], CMS Vol. 18, No. 1 (2005), pp. 134–138.
60. Zhou Fangyin, “Taoguang Yanghui yu Liangmian xiazhu - Zhongguo jueqi guocheng zhong de zhongmei
zhanlue hudong” [Hiding Capabilities and Developing Strengths and Hedging Bets: Strategic Interactions in
US–China Relations and China’s Rise], JCAPS Vol. 13, No. 6 (2011), pp. 8–9; Li, “Daguo jueqi anquan zhanlue;”
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61.
62.
63.
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65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
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73.
74.
75.
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Wang Jisi, “China’s Search for Stability with America,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 85, No. 5 (September/October 2005),
pp. 39–48.
Qin Yaqing, “Shijie geju yu zhongguo de heping jueqi” [The International System and China’s Peaceful Rise],
Dangjian [Party Construction] No. 5 (2004), pp. 11–12.
Wang Jisi, “Meiguo baquan yu Zhongguo jueqi” [American Hegemony and China’s Rise], FAR Vol. 84, No. 5
(2005), pp. 13–16; Zhao Lingmin, “Leguan kandai zhongmei guanxi” [Optimism in Assessing China–US
Relations], FAR No. 21 (2008), pp. 50–53. Some attack Wang for his moderate views, see Henry C. K. Liu,
“China’s Misguided ‘Experts on the US,’” Asia Times, May 2, 2007. Retrieved from http://www.atimes.com/
atimes/China/IE02Ad01.html.
Yan Xuetong, “Heping jueqi.” Others were hopeful that the presence of nuclear weapons and positive trends in
the US–China economic relationship would dampen conflictive tendencies. Hao Yufan, “Yong dazhanlue sikao
Zhongmei guanxi” [Sino-American Relations and China’s Grand Strategy], Meiguo wenti yanjiu [Fudan
American Review] Vol. 2, No. 1 (2012), p. 8. The impact of nuclear weapons on transparency is addressed in
the implications section.
Hao, “Yong dazhanlue sikao zhongmei guanxi,” p. 2; Yuan Peng, “Dui Zhongmei guanxi weilai fazhan de
zhanlue sikao” [Strategic Thinking on the Future Sino-American Relationship], Xiandai guoji guanxi
[Contemporary International Relations] No. 1 (2010), p. 69; Fan Jishe, “Meiguo duihua zhanlue de piaolue:
shiying yihuo fangfan” [US’s Strategy Towards China: Adaption or Precaution?], FAR No. 1 (2013), pp. 76–77;
Tang Jian, “Quanli zhuanyi yu zhanzheng: guoji tixi, guojia moshi yu Zhongguo jueqi,” [Power Shift and War:
the International System, National Model, and China’s Rise], JCAPS No. 3 (2014), pp. 92–93.
Yang Yuan, “Jueqiguo ruhe yu baquanguo zhengduo xiaoguo? – jiyu gudai dongya lishi de anli yanjiu” [How
Does a Rising Power Struggle for Small Powers against a Hegemonic Power? – Case Studies Based on Ancient
East Asian History], WEAP No. 12 (2012), p. 34.
Hu Bo, “Zhongmei dongya haishang quanli heping zhuanyi: fengxian, jihui ji zhanlue” [The Peaceful Transition
of Maritime Power in East Asia between China and the US: Risks, Opportunities and Strategy], WEAP No. 3
(2013), pp. 31–32, 34.
Wang Jisi, “The Case for Restraint: Comments and Responses,” The American Interest, November 1, 2007; Sun
Xuefeng and Wang Haibin, “Zhongguo huoqu quanqiu shiyou ziyuan de zhanlue xuanze,” (China’s Strategic
Options at Tapping the World’s Crude Oil Resources), JCAPS No. 1 (2010), p. 23. Retrieved from http://www.
the-american-interest.com/2007/11/01/the-case-for-restraint/article.cfm?Id=340&MId=16.
Yang Kai, “Zhongmei junshi jiaoliu yu anquan huxin jizhi jianshe pingxi,” [On Building Institutional
Mechanisms for Greater China–US Cooperation in Military Exchanges and Security Mutual-Trust], WEAP
No. 4, (2009), pp. 62–64; Zhou Fangyin, “Zhongmei xinxing daguo guanxi de dongli, lujing yu qianjing,” [The
Motives, Paths, and Future of Sino-American New Type of Great Power Relations], JCAPS No. 2 (2013),
pp. 15–16.
Zhu Feng, “Zhongmei zhanlue jingzheng yu dongya anquan zhixu de weilai” [China–US Strategic Competition
and the Future of East Asian Security Order], WEAP No. 3 (2013), pp. 12, 14, 23–24. The challenge is understood
as not only as a military one but also economic and ideological. See Fan, “Meiguo duihua zhanlue de piaolue,”
pp. 76–77.
Not one Chinese source argued that transparency would be sufficient to address anxiety associated with power
transitions. The United States is unlikely to easily accept new countries into the great power club. Chen Zhou,
Junshi Touming Lun, p. 327; Ruan Zongze, “Zhongmei mianlin jianli xinxing daguo guanxi de lishi jiyu” [China
and the US are Encountering a Historical Opportunity to Build a New Type of Great Power Relations], JIS No. 6
(2012), pp. 25–27; Cao Wenzhen and Ding Yi, “Zhongguo jueqi yu shijie zhixu de chongsu – jianlun Zhongmei
quanli zhuanyi xia de chongtu yu baorong” [The Rise of China and the Reshaping of the World Order – Focus
on the Conflict and Tolerance under the Transfer of Power between US and China], Taipingyang xuebao [Pacific
Journal] Vol. 21, No. 3 (2013), p. 23.
Chen Zhou, Junshi Touming Lun, p. 103.
Chen Zhou, Junshi Touming Lun, pp. 207, 327. Zhou Fangyin, “Taoguang Yanghui,” p. 14; Cao and Ding,
“Zhongguo jueqi yu shijie zhixu de chongsu,” p. 29; Shi Qingren and Zhou Lin, “Qianxi junshi touming” [Brief
Analysis on Military Transparency], Zhongguo guofang bao [China National Defense News], April 2, 2009.
Wang Haifeng and Wang Jing, “Lengzhan hou Zhongmei junshi jiaoliu yu hezuo” [China–US Military Exchange
and Cooperation After the End of the Cold War] WEAP, No. 3 (2006), pp. 90–91.
Yan Xuetong, “The Rise of China and its Power Status,” Chinese Journal of International Politics Vol. 1, No. 1
(2006), pp. 5–33; Li, “Daguo jueqi anquan zhanlue;” Liu Jianfei, “Suzao Zhongguo Meiguo duihua zhanlue xin
Dongxiang” [Molding China: New Trends in US China Policy], Zhongguo dangzheng ganbu luntan [Chinese
Party-State Cadre Forum] No. 3 (2006), pp. 33–35.
Chen Zhou, Junshi Touming Lun, p. 103.
Song Dexing, “Zhanlue xianshi zhuyi – Zhongguo dazhanlue de yizhong xuanze” [Strategic Realism – An Option
for China’s Grand Strategy], WEAP No. 9 (2012), p. 9.
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77. Chen Jian, “Shilun xinxing daguo guanxi” [On a New Type of Great Power Relations], JIS No. 6 (2012),
pp. 15–16; Hao, “Yong dazhanlue sikao zhongmei guanxi,” pp. 4, 6-7; Yan Xuetong, “The Rise of China in
Chinese Eyes,” Journal of Contemporary China Vol. 10, No. 26 (2001), p. 36.
78. This is especially the case in the nuclear realm. See Teng Jianqun, “Zhongmei he lingyu duihua de huigu yu
zhanwang,” [An Assessment and Forecast of Past Sino-American Exchanges in the Nuclear Realm], JIS No. 3
(2011), p. 28.
79. Chen Zhou, Junshi Touming, Lun, p. 138.
80. Iraq is often given as an example of this phenomenon. Shi and Zhou, “Qianxi junshi touming;” Li Xuejiang,
“Guoji guancha Zhongguo buke bei mei junshi touming suo huyou” [China Should not be Deceived by US’s
Demand of Military Transparency], Renmin ribao [People’s Daily], November 3, 2009. Retrieved from http://
world.people.com.cn/GB/157578/10310343.html.
81. Xu Jia, “Issues of Military Transparency,” China Daily, August 1, 2008.
82. Yan Yongchun, “Gaosu ni yige zhenshi de ‘junshi touming’” [Let Me Tell You the Truth about ‘Military
Transparency’], Zhongguo guofang bao [China National Defense News], January 14, 2013. Retrieved from
http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4164ae6f0101577i.html; Xu and Han, “Meiguo junshi touming zhengce,”
pp. 83–84, 89–90; Wang Changqin, “Zhuanjia tan ‘junshi touming’: ba ‘zhiqing’ yu ‘zhimi’ fenkai” [Experts
Discuss ‘Military Transparency’: Separate ‘Knowing the Situation’ from ‘Knowing Secrets’], Zhongxin wang
[China News], November 18, 2011. Retrieved from http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2011/11-18/3469073.shtml;
“Jieyi shihuo: qianxi junshi touming” [Explaining Points of Confusion: A Brief Analysis on Military
Transparency], Zhongguo guofang sheng [National Defense Students of China], April 15, 2009.
83. Or in the words of the People’s Daily, to be transparent but still fail to credibly communicate your peaceful
strategic intentions (touerbuming) is the scariest situation. Chen Ce, “Renmin Ribao.” Some authors do contend
that Beijing should reform the foreign policy process to make it less opaque. Wang Rihua, “Zhongguo chuantong
de guojia jian xinren sixiang jiqi qishi” [Inspirations from Traditional Chinese Thoughts on Trust between
States], WEAP No. 3 (2011), pp. 119–121. Retrieved from http://www.guofangsheng.com/show.aspx?id=
3686&cid=37.
84. “Jieyi shihuo;” Chen Ce, “Renmin Ribao.” While this is the case across all countries, the risk that countries will
use information to find weak links to exploit is more severe for the weaker party. Chen Zhou, Junshi Touming
Lun, p. 138.
85. Teng, “Zhongmei he lingyu duihua,” pp. 18, 26–29.
86. Sun Zi, The Art of War.
87. Ding Chunguang and Ma Gensheng, “Youxiao kongzhi linghuo shiren – lun zhongda junshi xinxi de chuanbo
kongzhi” [Effective Control, Flexible Demonstration – on the Dissemination and Control of Important Military
Information], Junshi Jizhe [Military Correspondent] No. 4 (2011), p. 42.
88. Teng Jianqun, “Lun Zhongguo de junshi touming du” [On China’s Military Transparency], JIS No. 3 (2009),
p. 51. The logic applies even more strongly in the nuclear realm where more information could influence US
spending priorities in ways that make it harder for China to gain advantages without spending itself into the
ground.
89. Chen Zhou, Junshi Touming Lun, pp. 100–101. For example, the United States may leverage international
regimes to weaken the power and influence of China. See Zhou Fangyin, “Zhongmei xinxing daguo guanxi,”
p. 23.
90. Chen Zhou, Junshi Touming Lun, p. 310.
91. Chen Zhou, Junshi Touming Lun, pp. 38, 137–138, 216.
92. Shi Qingren and Li Xuejun, “Zhongguo junshi touming de lishi qiyuan ji fanzhan tanxi” [The Historical Origins
and Development of Chinese Military Transparency], Guanzi xuekan [Guan Zi Journal] No. 4 (2009), p. 96.
93. Chen Zhou, Junshi Touming Lun, p. 101.
94. “Zhongguo junshi touming buwei quyue xifang yulun,” [Chinese Military Transparency is not Something Used
to Please Western Public Opinion], Zhongguo jun wang [China Military Online], April 18, 2013. Available at
http://txjs.chinamil.com.cn/junshity/2013-04/18/content_5304091.htm.
95. Shi and Li, “Zhongguo junshi touming, pp. 96–97.
96. Chen Zhou, Junshi Touming Lun, p. 321.
97. Chen Zhou, Junshi Touming Lun, pp. 137–138.
98. Ken Allen, “China’s Air Force Foreign Relations Program and Implications for Interaction with the U.S. Air
Force,” Foreign Area Office Association Journal of International Affairs, March 3, 2015.
99. For a video example, see “Huguo liqi: jiexi zhongguo 052D daodan quzhujian” [A Honed Weapon for National
Defense: An Analysis of China’s 052D Missile-equipped Destroyer], Junqing jiema, March 22, 2014. Available at
http://v.ifeng.com/v/ hglqjxzgddqzj/#0127bccb-bb74-48ff-a11e-9a8a8b523f19. On the domestic public dimension, see Isaac B. Kardon, “China’s Emerging Debate on Military Transparency,” China Brief Vol. 10, No. 18
(September 10, 2010). Available at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news
%5D=36811&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=2a2ff14868#.VuBZi_krJQJ.
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100. The ancient Chinese saying, “the gentleman draws the bow without discharging the arrow as a warning” captures
this idea. Ding and Ma, “Youxiao kongzhi linghuo shiren,” p. 42.
101. Select examples include: Wu Xiaoming and Xu Weidi, “Junshi touming yu anquan huxin” [Military
Transparency and Mutual-Trust in the Security Realm], Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary International
Relations] No. 12 (2005), pp. 49–56; Luo Yuan, “Zhongguo junshi ‘yangguanghua’” [The Sunnyization of
Chinese Military Affairs], Guancha [Outlook] No. 37 (2007), pp. 42–43.
102. Wang Changqin, “Zhuanjia tan ‘junshi touming.’” One writer puts it more bluntly, arguing, “it would be foolish
to fully adhere to US calls for transparency given that the United States is preparing for a possible military
confrontation with China.” Xu Jia, “Junshi toumingdu yu Zhongmei junshi huxin” [Military Transparency and
Mutual Trust between China and the United States], Heping yu fazhan [Peace and Development] Vol. 104, No. 2
(May 2008), p. 17.
103. Xu Chen, “Baofang jiehe tuchu zhongdian: 2013 nian guofang baipishu toushe jundui baomi gongzuo xin
dongxiang” [2013 Defense White Paper Reflects New Trends of Military Secret Service], Baomi gongzuo, No. 4
(2013), p. 35. Available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32496.pdf.
104. Luo, “Zhongguo junshi ‘yangguanghua;’” Xu Chen, “Baofang jiehe tuchu zhongdian.”
105. Chen Zhou, Junshi Touming Lun, pp. 101, 137, 310; Su Yincheng, “Zhongguo jundui: geng kaifang, geng
touming, geng zixin” [Chinese Military: More Open, More Transparent, More Confident], Qiushi lilun wang,
October 24, 2012; Yan Yongchun, “Huxin rang shijie geng anquan - ‘junshi touming lun’ pingjie” [Mutual-Trust
Makes the World More Secure – A Review on ‘The Theory of Military Transparency’], Junying wenhua tiandi
No. 4 (2013), pp. 43–44.
106. Guo Rui, “Xifang guojia zhuliu meiti ‘Zhongguo guofang touming du’ baodao yanjiu” [A Study on Western
Mainstream Media’s Reports on ‘China’s National Defense Transparency’], JCAPS No. 2 (2012), p. 47; Wang and
Wang, “Lengzhan hou Zhongmei junshi,” p. 92; For more on the difference between intent transparency and
military (capabilities) transparency, see Wu and Xu, “Junshi touming yu anquan huxin.”
107. Xu Hui and Han Xiaofeng, “Meiguo junshi touming zhengce jiqi dui Zhongguo de yingxiang” [The Impact of
American Military Transparency Policy on China], FAR No. 2, (2014), pp. 91–92; Chen Ce, “Renmin Ribao:
Zhongguo junshi toumingdu dabu maijin, xiang shijie zhan heping chengyi” [People’s Daily: Great Leaps in
Chinese Military Transparency, A Peaceful Gesture to the World], Xinhua, July 5, 2011; Chen Zhou, “Junkeyuan
zhuanjia: Zhongguo junshi touming zhiduhua jianshe chengxiao xianzhu” [Expert at the Academy of Military
Science: Great Success has been Achieved in Institutionalization of Military Transparency], Zhongxin wang
[China News], January 17, 2012; Sun Xianghua, “Zhongguo xin waijiao: yige lingdaoli de jieshi moxing” [China’s
New Diplomacy: an Explanatory Model of Leadership], FAR No. 2 (2010), p. 110.
108. Shi and Li, “Zhongguo junshi touming de lishi qiyuan,” pp. 94–97; Xu and Han, “Meiguo junshi touming
zhengce,” pp. 91–92.
109. “Chinese military exercises create records in 2014,” China Military Online, December 17, 2014. Retrieved from
http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2014-12/17/content_6273930.htm.
110. Chang Wanquan: gongtong nuli cujin yatai diqu junshi guanxi lianghao fazhan,” [Chang Wanquan: Cooperate
to Facilitate the Positive Development of Military Relations in Asia-Pacific], Xinhua wang [Xinhua Online],
(Nov. 21, 2014). Available at news.xinhuanet.com. Hu Yinan, “Visit to U.S. Aims to Ease ‘Misgivings’ between
Militaries,” China Daily, May 5, 2012. Retrieved from http://www.chinadailyasia.com/news/2012-05/05/content_
113591.html.
111. Zhang Tao, ed., “Interview with Guan Youfei, director of Foreign Affairs Office of MND,” China Military Online,
April 17, 2013. Retrieved from http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2013-04/16/c_124589335.htm; “Guofangbu fayanren huanyou xinwen shiwu juzhang jianren,” [Defense Ministry’s Director of News Bureau has Taken on the
Role of Press Secretary], Xinlang junshi [Sina Military], June 23, 2010. Retrieved from http://mil.news.sina.com.
cn/2010-06-23/1404597670.html.
112. Promoting a new type of major power relations is also part of efforts to clearly communicate Chinese peaceful
intentions. Yao Jianing, ed., “2014 zhongguo jundui waijiao shida tupo” [Ten breakthroughs of China’s military
diplomacy in 2014] parts 1 and 2, China Military Online, December 26 and 29, 2014. Retrieved from http://www.
china.com.cn/military/2014-12/26/content_34412790_9.htm; Zhang Feng, “Zhongguo liwailun chuyi” [On
‘Chinese Exceptionalism’], WEAP No. 3 (2012), pp. 88–91; Zhou, “Zhongmei xinxing daguo guanxi,” p. 15.
113. Chen Zhou, Junshi Touming Lun, pp. 302–303; Yang Kai, “Zhongmei junshi jiaoliu,” pp. 60–62; Zhang Ping,
“‘Zhongguo waijiao de xinqidian gaoduan luntan zongshu” [A Summary of High-end Forum ‘A New Beginning
of Chinese Diplomacy’], FAR No. 3 (2014), p. 156; Xu and Han, “Meiguo junshi touming zhengce,” p. 91.
114. The fact that Chinese experts are divided about whether the Chinese military is strong or weak suggests China is
achieving this strategic aim.
115. US transparency about its naval modernization 1883–1900 seems to follow this logic. Walter LaFeber, The New
Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860–1898, 35th Anniversary ed. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1998), pp. 125, 227, 237.
116. John Albert White, The Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964),
p. 145.
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117. S. C. M. Paine, The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895: Perceptions, Power, and Primacy (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University, 2003), pp. 146, 151.
118. Paine, Sino-Japanese War, p. 147.
119. Ian Nish, The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War (Hong Kong, China: Longman Group, Ltd., 1985); Paine, The
Sino-Japanese War, pp. 146–147, 151. James Fearon goes as far as to argue that Japan launched the RussoJapanese War for the purpose of credibly demonstrating its military might. See Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations
for War.”
120. Mike Mullen, “A Step Toward Trust with China,” The New York Times, July 26, 2011. For the objectives of
military relations with China, see Shirley Kan, “US–China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress,” Congressional
Research Service, Washington DC, November 20, 2013.
121. This position is found in dozens of writings. Some examples include Qiu Yuanping, “Zhongguo de heping fazhan
yu gonggong waijiao” [China’s Peaceful Development and Public Diplomacy], JIS No. 6 (2010), pp. 1–3; Yang
Kai, “Zhongmei junshi jiaoliu,” pp. 60–62; Zhang Ping, “‘Zhongguo waijiao de xinqidian’ gaoduan luntan
zongshu” [A Summary of High-end Forum ‘A New Beginning of Chinese Diplomacy’], FAR No. 3 (2014), p. 156.
122. A movement towards greater transparency in the nuclear realm may also be a negative indicator – a warning that
a shift in thinking about nuclear deterrence has occurred – specifically that Beijing has lost faith in the credibility
of its second strike, which would necessitate greater transparency to correct.
123. For a comprehensive assessment of US vs Chinese military capabilities, see Eric Heginbotham, The US–China
Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 2015).
Acknowledgements
The author would like to would like to thank Tom Christensen, Keir Lieber, Adam Liff, Thomas Mahnken, Evan
Montgomery, Will Norris, Xiaoyu Pu, Keren Yarhi-Milo and blind reviewers for their comments on earlier drafts.
Notes on contributor
Oriana Skylar Mastro is an assistant professor of security studies at Georgetown University.