8
Multicultural Citizenship and New Migrations1
Tariq Modood
Introduction
A recognisable multiculturalism as a political idea has been a nationmaking or, more precisely, a nation-remaking project. Its primary
purpose has been that of including into a reformed national citizenship those who were marked by difference (racial, ethnic, cultural,
etc.); and who often have a historical and continuing relationship of
exclusion or oppression; and/or the fact of immigration, settlement
and citizenship acquisition. Its fundamental question is how to reconcile equal citizenship and a sense of belonging together (a shared,
inclusive national identity) with the relevant kind of ‘difference’?
While multiculturalism requires reconceiving citizenship and shared
identities, it has assumed that a collectivity of citizens in the form of
a state/polity has the right and the capacity to control immigration
and that migrants want to be and should be accepted as citizens.
But what if the nature of immigration (and other relevant circumstances) change such that difference is no longer so salient an issue,
citizenship no longer seems to be so normatively prized by migrants;
and immigration is less amenable to control? Does multiculturalism
still have traction in these new circumstances? What is the relationship between the post-immigration normative project of accommodating citizens-marked-by-origin and the managing of current flows
of migrations and mobilities? Is it the case that multiculturalism
may continue to be a relevant political perspective in relation to
the former but not the latter? If so, how are we to relate the two
policy perspectives to each other? This chapter begins the process of
considering these questions with some preliminary thoughts. This
centres on concerns that multicultural citizenship has relatively little
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to contribute to the regulation of immigration and yet the development of any multiculturalism can be (negatively) affected by the
pace, scale and nature of immigration that is not popularly supported or at least accepted.
I offer some normative conceptualisation of a national case,
Britain, where immigration control and emergent multiculturalism
have gone together. The British response, as formed by Labour and
Liberal politicians and supported by many Conservatives, combined
a policy of equal citizenship and immigration controls; a gradual
evolving anti-racist multiculturalism within a national, internally
plural citizenship. It was initially more focused on ‘colour’ and
was indifferent to the national but in the 1990s evolved to also
accommodate ethno-religious communitarianism as well as cultural
hybridity within a plural Britishness. Challenged by perceptions
that multiculturalism leads to segregation and separatism, at the
same time recent migrations have shifted focus from ethno-religious
‘difference’ to freedom of movement and alternative conceptions
of multiculturalism that directly challenge the normative basis of
immigration control. Hence my question, where does multiculturalism stand on immigration today?
Multicultural national citizenship
By multiculturalism or British multiculturalism I do not simply mean
laws and policies but a political idea and movement. Grounded in
a concept of national citizenship and therefore a concept of equality, multiculturalism extends this concept of equal citizenship from
uniformity of rights to recognition of difference; from anti-discrimination, challenging stereotypes to turning the negative into a positive
identity rather than into an undifferentiated citizenship. This means
that the concept of equality and rights is applied to groups not just
individuals, though individual rights remain the bedrock of citizenship. In addition to this qualification of liberal individualism, multiculturalism disavows the ideal of a hands-off neutral state, instead
offering political and institutional accommodation to marginalised
groups. This does not just take place at a local level or in specific
institutions but is followed through at a national level, including at
the level of the national identity. Multiculturalism is a critique of
assimilative nationalism or nation-building/maintenance in favour
of the expanding and remaking of the national identity, remaking the
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‘We’ in an inclusive way and faithful to our given yet changing identities (e.g. Kymlicka 1995, Parekh 2000/2006, Modood 2007/2013).
One of the features of this multiculturalism is that it recognises the
right of states to maintain or to intervene in relation to a sense of
national belonging; that countries have a right to engage in ‘nationbuilding’ – within limits. A corollary of this kind of multiculturalism
that I have sketched, which is often left unstated, is that multiculturalism does not challenge the right of states to control immigration or
‘mobilities’ – but may place limits on it and require that it goes hand
in hand with the multiculturalism of above.
So, if this is what multiculturalism is, this is the basis for judging any policy or development, whether it is an economic or social
policy or about the nature of citizenship and countryhood. Of
course such a criterion may not by itself give us an answer to a
policy question, for example, how many temporary work permits
should be issued and after what period should permit holders be
required to leave the country, or after what period of residence
should they be allowed leave to remain permanently? Issues to do
with employment rights, living standards, housing and so on would
be in play as well as, say, considerations about fairness in the granting of work permits and the nurturing of a multicultural national
citizenship. Here it is important to emphasise that multiculturalism
was not originally a response to current migration but to migration
of some decades earlier; it was a response to the changes brought
about by the presence of settlers and by post-immigration generations. It was not about managing current migration but some challenges associated with citizens-marked-by-origin. Migration was
the significant pre-condition but multiculturalism is a politics of
post-immigration or settlement, in which ‘difference’ and citizenship is central. The prospect of a public philosophy which was a
response to settlement having answers to questions about mobilities, about non-settlement, must be treated with caution, as can be
seen by thinking about the British case in detail.
British migrations and multiculturalism
Each national multiculturalism has its own distinctive character.
This is true of political concepts in general and is important for
understanding the possibilities of adapting, extending or abandoning
multiculturalism in order to respond to the political and normative
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challenges of ‘a mobile world’. The national political culture and
the state tradition will play an important part but so will different
kinds of migrations, and different compositions of ethnic minorities produce different kinds of multiculturalisms (c.f. the chapters
by Kymlicka (6) and Levey (7)). We always, then, need to know
something about the relevant migration and its interaction with the
political system. My own normative concept of multiculturalism is
most related to the British case. In this brief sketch I will highlight
five points that I think are important.
1. Equal Citizens. The post-war migrations were initially by ‘subjects of the Crown’, namely subjects of the British Empire or a
newly independent part of it moving from the periphery to the
centre, to what West Indians referred to as ‘the Mother Country’
(Carter and Coussins 1986). As their numbers grew, there was
a strong reaction against the migration and their right of free
entry was successively curtailed from 1962 onwards. Nevertheless, as native residents of the UK themselves had no formal
citizenship status except as subjects of the Crown (citizenship
being formalised only in 1981), there was a certain formal civic
equality in status between the immigrants and the natives. For
example, the immigrants enjoyed the same franchise, access
to public services and most welfare benefits as natives regardless of nationality and without being asked their nationality.
Some immigrants appealed to the internal British connection
by responding to those who said they were alien intruders by
retorting: ‘We are over here because you were over there.’
2. Race. Beyond legal status and rights, the most salient feature
of the immigrants from the point of view of British society was
their ‘race’, the fact that they were ‘coloured’ or not white. Their
second-class racial status – a legacy of the same Empire that now
gave them rights equal to the natives – derived from this.
The implications of 1 and 2 taken together is that the relationship between the immigrants and Britain begins with equal
rights in a context of racism which was strong enough to override some of those rights in practice (such as job opportunities)
but not in law. The racism was also strong enough to create public pressure upon politicians to regulate the flow of immigration
(but not to reverse it). The response to this situation was from
quite an early period to create laws to resist racial discrimination
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within the country so that the legal equality of subjects of Queen
Elizabeth II could be realised as social equality. This has proved
a long process, with laws getting steadily stronger – contemporaneously always stronger than that of any other European
country – and while some progress has been made, it is not yet a
reality. These two linked responses of limiting immigration and
seeking the reality of social equality were famously summarised
in the 1960s by the Labour politician, Roy Hattersley: ‘Without
integration limitation is inexcusable; without limitation, integration is impossible.’ Neither the legal controls on the scale and
pace of immigration, nor even the racial equality activism are
so distinctive to Britain as the fact that citizenship was taken for
granted. It was not thought of as a prize, something to aim for
or to withhold; nor was it the source of ‘otherness’ in the way
that immigration, colour and culture were. This paved the way
for the view that all subjects/citizens were British but not all the
same kind of British or British in the same way. It took some
decades to mature but the seeds of the idea of a plural Britishness
have this historical depth, perhaps ultimately one of imperial legacy and not just on the side of the white British but also on those
who had brought with them concepts such as ‘Mother Country’.
In Britain the politics of post-immigration begins not with issues
about naturalisation and assimilation but with racial equality
and challenging narrow, islander definitions of Britishness.
3. Religion, As the diversity and distinctive character of different
minority groups began to be recognised, racial equality was
extended to cover ethnicity and religion. These two were not
easily separated, as in the House of Lords decision that banning
the wearing of the religious turban by Sikh men was actually a
form of ethnic discrimination and therefore racial discrimination in law (Mandala v. Lee, 1982). As ethnic group pride and
assertiveness became an accepted feature of and indeed the vehicle for promoting equal citizenship, South Asian identities began
increasingly to take an ethno-religious character. Non-whiteness
remained a social divide but racism began to be thought of
in terms of racisms and in compound forms such as cultural
racism, anti-Muslim racism and so on. From the time of The
Satanic Verses affair in the late 1980s Muslim political activism
began to loom large in the emergent multiculturalism; and after
9/11 in the US and the 7/7 suicide-bombings in London, it
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became central to a multiculturalism that was being overwhelmed by security concerns and, according to some observers,
died (Kepel 2005).
It is a feature of British multiculturalism that while it is built
on anti-racism to a greater extent than in most other countries
and pioneered ethno-religious identity activism (initially Sikh,
later Muslim), the provision of ‘mother-tongue’ teaching or
multi-lingualism is relatively quite minor. Languages like Urdu
or Hindi are provided within the curriculum by relatively few
schools, though more are willing to enter their pupils for them
in national exams like GCSEs (usually taken in Year 11), but it
is expected that most of the necessary learning will have been
acquired from the home and community. Some local authorities and government agencies provide a few of their key public communications (e.g. leaflets) in some minority languages,
though the practice is in decline as it is largely regarded as a ‘first
generation’ need, and many have come to think that it retards
the acquisition of proficiency in English, a goal that no multiculturalist would oppose in itself. The relativities in importance
of race, religion and language in British multiculturalism is very
much a reflection of the political priorities of the ethnic minority
communities and the campaigns they have mounted (Sivanandan
1982; Modood 1992, 2005).
4. Plural Britishness. The ‘nation remaking’ referred to above
involved some ‘deconstruction’ and opening-up but, by the
same token, it involved more standard forms of nation-building
or national culture maintenance. For example, the teaching of
the national language2 and heritage at school; or state support
for a dominant religion or differential relationship between the
state and religions, given that one of them was ‘established’. So,
the kind of ethnocultural criteria that could not be openly or
formally used in the selection of immigrants could be used in the
management of the public culture.
5. New Migrations. From about the 1990s, migration flows
changed considerably. They were no longer primarily of a postimperial kind (which in any case by this time had been largely
restricted to spouses and family unifications). People escaping
war-torn areas predominated (Bosnia, Afghanistan, Somalia,
Turkey (Kurds), Iraq stand out). There were others from even
more diverse origins, though especially from the Middle East
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and Africa, looking for work and a better life (the same motives
as earlier migrants). To some extent they could be considered as
late additions to the demographic and political multiculturalism that was emerging, because while they did not necessarily
share a historical connection with Britain (though some clearly
did, such as those from say Nigeria and Ghana), they mostly
shared the two most prominent characteristics that multiculturalism was challenging Britain to accept, non-whiteness and
being Muslim. As the British economy, public services, cultural
institutions and universities became internationalised the number of work permits offered to high-skilled professionals and
business people grew greatly. Finally, one of the most significant
new migrations was that of nationals from fellow EU member
states, who in a twist of fate came to enjoy the freedom of entry
and rights that ‘subjects of the Crown’ enjoyed during 1948–
1962. Despite key strands of continuity, especially the elements
of cheap labour, ‘colour’ and being Muslim, the post-imperial
and therefore British connection and the dimension of ‘race’
was remade. The latter includes both that white (EU) migrants
had rights of entry and settlement over non-whites, but also that
white migrants too experience some negative ‘othering’ (Fox
et al. 2012). A key stabilising condition which British multiculturalism was built on, immigration control, was however – as
we now see – put at risk by the UK’s acceptance of the Maastricht Treaty provision of freedom of movement for EU citizens,
which in the fullness of time derailed the twin-track approach of
immigration control and equality. If it is the case, as cited above,
that Muslims killed multiculturalism, then we can say that the
EU freedom of movement has also made a contribution. The
current EU combination of rejection of national multiculturalism and prohibition of limiting the entry of EU states’ nationals
seems to be a rejection of both parts of the British formula.3
While it is not the case that the reduction of entry for those from
the Commonwealth was caused by the opening up to the EU (the
former preceded the latter), the de facto effect of this major policy
shift has been a preference for white people from relatively prosperous countries. Of course there is nothing in principle to stop the
UK being open to people from both prosperous and poor countries, though there is bound to be some competition between the
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two types of migrants where a country is trying to reduce the pace
and scale of migration and is only able to deny entry to one but
not the other kind of migrant. The competition is therefore based
on the fact that the UK is only able to regulate non-EU mobilities
(while it is a member of the EU).
One of the results of these new migrations is for the government to create new requirements for naturalisation, primarily
the introduction of a citizenship test and requiring proficiency in
English, and to start celebrating British citizenship through ceremonies for those who have newly acquired it (Brooks 2016). Given
the great and continuing expansion of the kind of citizenship and
migrant diversity now found in many English cities and towns, a
new analytical framework has been offered to capture it as a sociodemographic phenomenon, termed ‘super-diversity’, but it has not
produced an alternative policy approach except to point out that it
does not and probably will not fit easily into British multiculturalism (Vertovec 2007).
Besides highlighting the specific character of British multiculturalism, the main purpose of this section is to emphasise two
points. Firstly, multiculturalism in Britain developed alongside a
restrictive immigration policy. Perhaps it was regarded as a price
for multiculturalism, but it was in the main not engaged with by
most multiculturalists, except in terms of demanding that it be
non-discriminatory, and in relation to its most egregious manifestations.4 Some anti-racists were against the kinds of immigration
policies that were pursued (not just by Conservative but also by
Labour governments) from 1962 onwards, mainly because they
argued that controls implied that immigrants were the problem
rather than the general level of racism in the country (Sivanandan
1982). But in the main, as multiculturalism emerged as a distinct
political idea it did not radically challenge the bipartisan consensus
or itself focus very much on immigration. Political theorists who
emerged as advocates of multiculturalism in the 1980s and 1990s
in Britain (and, actually, elsewhere too) did not have much to say
about immigration policy but focused on the political and ethical
challenges in relation to post-immigration inclusion, participation
and needs of minorities in relation to equal civic status, national
discourses and the public culture. Political theorists of multiculturalism have not written much on immigration and immigration
control (Joe Carens 1987 and 2013 being an exception), but in
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general their implicit position seems to have been that whilst immigration has been and continues to be of benefit to countries such
as those of Western Europe and North America, and immigration
controls have been explicitly or implicitly racist and emphatically
should not be, a country can have ‘a moral right to its territorial and cultural integrity including the right to limit the entry of
outsiders’ (Parekh 2006). Multiculturalists have accepted this fundamental moral right. Just as, analogously, one can accept that foreign investment is of benefit to one’s country without suggesting
that it is always of benefit, or the scale of overseas ownership is not
important or that overseas investors have a right to invest in our
country if the returns earned are higher in our country than their
own (or elsewhere).5
Secondly, multiculturalism assumed that the immigrants were
becoming a settled population and that they either already had citizenship or were on a pathway to full citizenship, and so becoming
an integral part of Britain. In relation to these developments, in
particular the growing into adulthood of a British-born ‘second
generation’, multiculturalism challenged a top-down, static, mononationalism. It promoted ideas of new identities, hyphenated or
multiple identities and was accepting of dual nationality but saw
the goal as all citizens, including members of settled ethnic minorities, coming to have, as expressed by the Commission on the Future
of Multi-Ethnic Britain report, ‘a sense of belonging to society as
a whole’ (CMEB 2000: 49). For the CMEB report (aka the Parekh
Report) this sense of sharing a common fate with fellow citizens
and nationals was achieved when people feel ‘that their own flourishing as individuals and as communities is intimately linked with
the flourishing of public institutions and public services’ (CMEB
2000: 49). The report insisted that this sense of belonging required
two important conditions: the idea that one’s polity should be recognised as a community of communities as well as a community
of individuals; and the challenging of all racisms and related structural inequalities (CMEB 2000: 56).
In the more recent period when the scale of immigration/mobilities exceeds that of the 1950s–1980s and where fewer immigration controls are available (none in relation to the EU6) or effective,
it is a challenge to work out what multiculturalism has got to say
about current mobilities or how it needs to be adapted in the light
of the latter.
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Multiculturalism and immigration control
If we now bring in other countries we can generalise somewhat
the point that there has been no logical or privileged connection
between multiculturalism and immigration policy. For example,
on the one hand, multiculturalist countries such as Canada and
Australia led the way in being choosy between applicants, scoring
them on the basis of the needs of the country (see the Kymlicka and
Levey chapters (6 and 7 respectively)). On the other hand, countries who declared themselves opposed to multiculturalism could
have extensive and less choosy immigration and be very keen on
turning immigrants into citizens, like France; or be very generous
in relation to asylum seekers and refugees while being heterophobic within a mono-ethnocultural conception of citizenship, such as
Germany or Greece. And of course different EU countries could
experience different scales of migration from within the EU and
have different views on its contribution to the country. Singapore’s
version of multiculturalism, ‘multi-racialism’ is closely tied to
labour migration policies designed to maintain the existing demographic proportions between the Chinese, Indians and Muslims.
The Gulf States are completely dependent on migration but grant
residency or equal status in exceptional cases.
So, even though multiculturalism has had little to say about
immigration policy, regarding it as a separate policy area to the question of the relations between citizens and the remaking of national
citizenship to respectfully include difference (see Lægaard’s chapter
(11)), nevertheless there is a connection that has been asserted by
the broad centre of British politics since the 1960s, as intimated in
the Hattersley quote above. A recent version of aspects of it can be
found in this statement by former Prime Minister David Cameron:
People have understandably become frustrated. It boils down to one
word: control. People want Government to have control over the number of people coming here and the circumstances in which they come,
both from the world and from within the European Union. They want
control over who has the right to receive benefits and what is expected
of them in return. (Cameron 2014)
It is a sentiment that is not peculiar to Conservatives or to Britain.7
Of course there is another rising sentiment across Europe and the
US that is xenophobic, racist or Islamophobic. The two sentiments
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can be linked, with the former leading to or strengthening the
latter, as recently expressed by the Australian Minister for Justice,
Michael Keenan, at the Inter-parliamentary Conference on Combating Antisemitism in Berlin: ‘We know that the public’s tolerance
for cultural diversity improves when they are secure in the knowledge that borders are being managed appropriately.’
I think Cameron’s statement captures a genuine sentiment about
lack of control in relation to the scale and pace of flows and can be
felt by ethnic minorities, just as they feel other effects perceived by
white citizens, such as downward pressure on low wages or strain on
local services. ‘Genuine’ in two senses: the sentiment is sincere, not
contrived, the reasons given are operative; as well as that they are
reasonable concerns. In some cases, perhaps even in a lot of cases,
there may be mixed motives, and the mixture may include xenophobia, Islamophobia, racial prejudice and so on, but the concern
in question is not reducible to these, can and does exist without racism, and so has to be considered in its own right: it may be accepted
even where the racism is rejected (Katwala et al. 2014). Moreover,
while it is known that the media, especially the tabloid press, can
exacerbate the sentiment, it does not mean that the sentiment does
not have to be addressed. Some perceptions about the scale and
effects of migration are likely to be mistaken and so while they cannot be regarded as self-validating, neither can they be ignored. The
situation is similar to when we take perceptions of racial discriminations as an indication but not proof that discrimination is taking
place; an indication that there may be a problem that should not be
dismissed but requires investigation and discussion.
As noted by Keenan such anxieties can have effects on intolerance, racism and on attitudes needed to make multiculturalism
work. Multiculturalists will insist that immigration policy, prospective migrants and migrants are not talked about in ways that
undermine the sense of citizenship of ethnic minorities in their own
eyes and/or in the eyes of others. Indeed, that all groups of people, including prospective immigrants and more generally, should
be spoken of and visually represented respectfully, and that questions of policy should not be in terms of negative discourses about
immigrants or groups of people. One will want to attack the antiimmigration rhetoric and the concept of the nation implicit in that
discourse; yet, it is important to do so in a way that will not inflame
but dampen down that rhetoric and movement by addressing some
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of the reasonable concerns of the public. The risks to existing
majority–minority relations should be considered not just in relation to discourses but also in relation to the effects of the immigration policies themselves. Restrictions on immigration may be an
appropriate policy response.8 Such policies must not be discriminatory on the basis of race, ethnicity and religion but they could
rank by other categories those seeking admissions, e.g. give lesser
priority to temporary workers. In the present context of a major
humanitarian crisis in relation to Syrian refugees trying to make
their way into Europe, it is worth thinking about letting those EU
countries who take a large share of refugees being able to temporarily restrict other mobilities, e.g. people looking for work across
national borders in the EU (assuming that this could be properly
agreed, which perhaps is not very likely at the moment). Whatever
restrictions or selections are applied must be consistent with what
David Miller calls the ‘weak cosmopolitanism premise’, meaning
here that the policy ‘must offer relevant reasons to those excluded’,
showing that their claims have been counted but outweighed by
other considerations which they can recognise as reasonable considerations even if they would weigh the considerations differently
(Miller 2015: 400).
Cosmopolitanism
I hope that what I have so far characterised as multiculturalism,
especially in its British variant, resonates with a normative political
orientation as found in academic political theory, in some activist
campaigns and government actions, as well as with wider public discourses and actions within professions such as teachers and
social workers and other elements of civil society. Taken together
there has not been a perfect alignment of positions but nevertheless I think a distinct body of ideas and claims can be discerned.
A multiculturalism consisting of:
• Equality and integration through a shared and remade national
citizenship, partly derived from a shared, albeit conflicted history.
• Anti-racism and ethno-religious accommodation as well as individual rights.
• Backdropped by controlling the pace and scale of immigration
(while appreciating the benefits of migration to the country).
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Yet, I have been not completely straight with you so far. I have
called these political ideas ‘multiculturalism’ as a strategy of presentation. What I have kept temporarily suppressed and now
bring into play is that in more or less the same period of time that
what I have called ‘multiculturalism’ emerged, there also emerged
another position which too has some claim to be called multiculturalist and indeed is often referred to as such. Actually, the two
positions are often referred to as ‘multiculturalism’ and when this
is done many people are unaware that they are referring to two
distinct positions. My strategy of presentation is based on avoiding such a confusion.
I will call this version of multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism. It
is self-consciously offered as a critique and alternative to what I
have so far referred to as multiculturalism and will continue to do
so and also abbreviate to MC. Some of its key points (I shall be
brief, for a longer discussion see Modood 2012 and Modood 2013:
chapter 7) are that no minority group can be understood as being
homogeneous or having a common ‘essence’ such that all members
think alike or engage in all the same cultural practices in the same
way. Yet MC speaks, it is claimed, as if they are when it speaks of
a group being ‘different’ or ‘recognising’ a group or accommodating its cultural needs (Valluvan 2016). If we really want to understand a multicultural society then we cannot speak about groups
in the normative and reified way that MC does but should look
at the internal diversity within each group, and how it overlaps
with all other groups, so that no group is really as different or distinct as multiculturalist theory and politics assumes. This is evident
if we stop speaking at the level of national models and national
policies and study cities, localities and everyday experiences and
see how urban life manages very well without normative theory
(Wise and Velayutham, 2009). People rub along together and negotiate their differences without resort to the rhetorics of group identity politics, which are usually confined to political entrepreneurs
who do not represent anybody other than themselves and their
cabals (Malik 2015). In everyday multiculturalism people become
indifferent to group identities and relate to each other through multiple social roles such as neighbours, colleagues, users of local schools
and public services and so on. Through this common multiculture,
cross-cultural or mixed relationships become common and new
shared, hybridic cultures emerge that may or may not resonate with
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ideas of national identity and normative citizenship (Matejskova
and Antonsich 2015; Cantle 2016). Recent and ongoing mobilities
have brought people from so many backgrounds to countries like
those of Western Europe that differentiated policies and group politics is impossible. Moreover, these more fine-textured, sociological, anthropological and psychological approaches will show that
migrants as well as later generations may remain connected to their
countries of origins or to certain diasporas and imagined transnational communities such as a black Atlantic diaspora or an ummah,
and these transnational networks, ways of living and self-identities
are more real than national identities, multiculturalist or otherwise
(Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004).
A good way to evaluate the relationship between these two versions of muliticulturalism is to deploy the concepts of macro and
micro. By their own self-definitions the first multiculturalism is
focused on the macro (national citizenship) and the second on the
micro (everyday experience). Conceived as such, cosmopolitanism
is not a radical critique of political multiculturalism but highlights
its limited scope and supplements it where it is silent. It is qualifying rather than replacing MC. If however there is a more radical
critique taking place then it can be identified by giving macro–
micro an alternative meaning. Not national–local/everyday but,
rather, understanding the macro as the intellectual-political frame
and the micro as localised empirical accounts. Here the critique is
that empirical accounts of a multicultural society cannot be generated within the framework of a national multicultural citizenship,
so that has to be replaced by a cosmopolitan framework of analysis. For example, in some studies the discovery of the importance
of city identities often too quickly leads to the conclusion that
national identities are not or should not be a focus of promoting
commonalities amongst diverse groups as the city is the best unit
for this purpose. Of course this does not follow as there is no need
to work with an either-or model, a truth nicely illustrated by the
slogan adopted in the naturalisation campaign work in a German
city: ‘Hamburg. My port. Germany. My Home.’9
It may be thought that cosmopolitanism may be more suited to
some of the new mobilities. It prizes individual freedom regardless
of people’s origins or their identity today or group membership (in
fact group membership is often perceived as only a constraint not
as a source of security for and development of an individual) and
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is not normatively wedded to a national citizenship. So, perhaps
it is more desirable or suited to conditions today than MC. I do
not want to deny that possibility, but note something which does
not rest on that claim. Firstly, given the contrast that I have drawn
between full-blooded cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism at the
macro-frame level, it should be clear that cosmopolitanism cannot take on board most of MC in the sense of encompassing it
or creating a synthesis with it. So, it could only replace MC if the
problems that MC addresses no longer needed addressing or could
be addressed by cosmopolitanism. Yet neither of these is true. The
problems of anti-racism, ethno-religious group ‘difference’, assertion and accommodation are live, ongoing issues and despite the
progress made they have become larger and more pressing, as collected together under the rubric of ‘integration’. Moreover it is difficult to see how cosmopolitanism could digest a multiculturalism
based on concepts of national citizenship and group accommodation, when its take on such concepts is intellectually and normatively negative.
Yet it has to be granted that cosmopolitanism does make a contribution of its own and that this contribution is evident in the
light of some recent trends, and which it is fair to say MC has
a less good traction with. It seems, then, that we need both MC
and cosmopolitanism and should advocate both as complementary
(pace some of the advocates of each, who see them in a competitive
relation).
This leaves open the question of whether they can be synthesised
or brought together as part of a larger intellectual-political framework. I doubt that they can. The point I want to emphasise is that
both are important and relevant to our circumstances, that neither
is an adequate substitute for the other, and so they are less competitors and more complementary (Modood 1998). If they are rivals,
they can be friendly rivals. We should not feel that we have to
choose between them, that they are exclusive of each other. Rather,
we should exploit the scope for mutual learning (Modood 2016).
At least this has been my position to date when I have focused on
domestic policy (matters relating to the first two bullet points at the
start of this section). Challenged by the theme of this book to think
about immigration, perhaps we get to a point where complementarity of the ‘both . . . and . . .’ reaches its limit. If the immigration
policy which resonates with cosmopolitanism is something like the
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view that given the growing transnational character of life in countries like Britain – and especially so in the context of freedom of
movement for citizens of member states within the EU – and given
that people who wish to enter, temporarily or permanently, are
large in number, and many are escaping conditions of war, persecution, economic underdevelopment, unemployment and poverty, we
should, it is argued, have a much more open immigration policy,
perhaps extending the freedom of movement pioneered by the EU
to people coming from outside the EU too (for a powerful statement that makes a claim like this at its boldest, see Carens 2013).
Then it is difficult to see what complementarity could be like on this
point. While it is possible to have a multiculturalism that encompasses group accommodation and culturally independent, mixed
individuals, it is difficult to see how to compromise between the
view that a multicultural society requires control of immigration
and the view that it requires freedom of movement across borders.
It is true that freedom of movement in the EU is restricted to
nationals of EU states (and so is not consistent with cosmopolitan
open borders, though the two seem to be conflated in the minds
of some) but this then creates an advantage for one category of
migrants at the expense of other categories, which will be more
controlled where a state seeks to exercise some control. Where a
public believes that immigration is excessive and insufficiently regulated there will be anxiety; it will not be confined to the majority and is likely to manifest itself in hostility to migrants but also
ethnic minority citizens, and therefore damage the prospects of
multiculturalism.
Conclusion
The preliminary answer to the question of what multiculturalism
has to say about new migrations and mobilities, at least in the
British case, is that it does not sit well with it. British multiculturalism was developed in a context of immigration control and does
not challenge the right of the state to control immigration, while
insisting that it must not be exercised in ways that are discriminatory in relation to the composite and overlapping criteria of race,
ethnicity and religion that are at the heart of post-immigration
British multiculturalism. Recent perceptions by a large proportion of the British public that the pace and scale of immigration
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has been too high and too unregulated are based on a number
of factors, which can include racism and xenophobia, which are
damaging to multiculturalism and have to be challenged. A related
factor can be cultural identity questions which cannot be simply
dismissed as majoritarian, let alone as majoritarian prejudice.
Multiculturalism is a national identity remaking project, which
may in some circumstances lead to legitimate questions about
the identity effects of immigration, including its effects on existing citizens and minority groups, as well as of the possible consequences of large-scale migration flows per se, and of people who
are admitted on the understanding that they are not to be thought
of as on a pathway to settlement and national citizenship. While
a cosmopolitan version of multiculturalism is also present in Britain and is largely compatible with a more political, communitarian multiculturalism, the two seem to have incompatible views on
immigration control.
Multiculturalism has to engage with migration at three levels.
Firstly, identifying and opposing negative/racist/othering discourses,
actions and policies against migrants, no less than citizens (whilst
recognising that some citizenship-constituting rights and opportunities will not be available to migrants, e.g. rights of residence or access
to full welfare benefits). Secondly, protecting/promoting the policies,
forms of governance and understanding that constitute the core of
post-immigration multiculturalism, especially in relation to accommodation and civic recognition of ethnic minority citizens and accommodation of ethno-religious groups. Thirdly, protecting/promoting
the project of multicultural Britishness, the multicultural nationbuilding project. Cosmopolitanism is very strong on the first of these
but ambivalent on the second and gives up on the third. There is the
further post-Brexit task of integrating what may be approximately
3 million new Euro-Brits. In some ways, given their whiteness, this
will be relatively easy; in other ways, the white supremacism of some
of them (Fox 2013) threatens to re-valorise whiteness in Britishness
if they seek to marginalise black and brown Britons and to leapfrog over them as generations of European migrants have done over
African-Americans in the US. This may be one of the new ‘frontiers’
of British multiculturalism that will have to be engaged with as
British multiculturalism continues to evolve and expand.
My modest theoretical conclusion is that in relation to multicultural citizenship, multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism are
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compatible as long as the latter operates at the micro level, supplementing and qualifying without displacing multiculturalism at the
macro level. However, this compatibility may not extend to immigration control, where we are forced to choose between multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitan drift in general and
specifically on immigration may be desirable and may be taking
place amongst those who think of themselves as pro-diversity but
we need to acknowledge that this is not the multiculturalism of, say,
Kymlicka nor Parekh, nor is it mine. In relation to the substantive
politics, I cannot help but think that multiculturalism, while continuing to point out the ongoing benefits of immigration, should
reaffirm immigration control. Of course, this must be within the
context of and within the limits of reaffirming that multiculturalism is a citizenship-based nation-remaking project. Which is
another way of saying that I am still committed to the multiculturalism which was discussed at the original EUI conference in 1996,
which the 2016 conference was inspired to honour. The incompatibility between multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism in relation
to migration is seriously problematic for progressive politics today
but is one to which I cannot yet see a solution.
Notes
1. I am grateful for helpful comments and challenges by Jan Dobbernack, John
Denham, Jon Fox, Sunder Katwala, Mike Kenny, Geoffrey Levey, Nasar
Meer, Bhikhu Parekh, Jonathan Rutherford, Mark Sivarajah, Terri-Anne
Teo, Simon Thompson, Anna Triandafyllidou and Varun Uberoi, and I am
aware that I have not met most of the challenges but am encouraged they
saw value as well as difficulties in the chapter. I can, however, sincerely say
that none can be held responsible for my arguments.
2. Including Welsh in Wales.
3. Which I hasten to add is not a sufficient argument for Britain to leave the EU.
Nor is it to say that Brexit will necessarily repair the damage; given how it
has emboldened racists of various kinds, the negative effect on multiculturalism may continue and get worse. My point is simply that the EU freedom of
movement has had a cost for multicultralism in the UK.
4. Most notoriously, virginity tests, carried out on eighty prospective brides
from the South Asian subcontinent in the 1970s, see https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2011/may/13/virginity-tests-uk-immigrants-1970s
5. In effect saying to overseas investors: we know we are denying you an equal
opportunity to invest but national interest considerations must sometimes
trump global equal opportunities to invest.
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6. Originally written before the Brexit referendum, it is still unclear what rights
of entry to the UK for EU citizens will be negotiated in the Brexit deal.
7. It may however soften the paradox that it is the country with the most
developed multiculturalism and the strongest equality laws in Europe which
should vote to leave a supranational union. Many Labour politicians have
come round to the same view, perhaps including Jeremy Corbyn, who
announced on 10 January 2017 that ‘Labour is not wedded to freedom of
movement’, see http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/10/labour-notwedded-freedom-movement-jeremy-corbyns-brexit-speech/
8. The kind of multiculturalism I am outlining assumes therefore the continuing right of states to control immigration. Of course it may pool it as per
Schengen or as per ‘freedom of movement’ in the EU, but it does not have to
be absolute; and pooling also suggests that it is not necessarily permanent,
that there is a possibility under certain circumstances of the relevant power
being taken back to itself by each of the sovereign states. In the absence of a
clear mechanism for asking for some or all of it back, it would seem as if an
element of sovereignty has not been pooled but transferred. In any case, even
EU member states believe they have the right to restrict the entry of nationals
from those outside the EU.
9. See http://citiesofmigration.ca/good_idea/hamburg-my-port-germany-my-home/
referenced in Katwala et al. 2016.
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