UNIVERSITATEA “BABEȘ-BOLYAI” CLUJ-NAPOCA FACULTATEA DE STUDII EUROPENE Europe's Response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis Asistent univ. Adrian Corpodean Student, Ioana-Nelia Bercean CUPRINS Content ……...………………………………………………………………......…… 2 INTRODUCTION ...……………......……..…………................................................ 4 1. The Dynamics of Syria's Civil War ...................................................................... 11 2. Population Displacement from Syria ................................................................... 14 3. European Union: Stance to Solidarity or Fortress ............................................. 17 4. High Moral Ground or Exacerbated Nationalism? ............................................ 21 CONCLUSIONS ......................................................................................................... 24 BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................... 25 2 ABSTRACT While peace talks between Syria's government and opposition bump along in Geneva or Vienna, battle rage on the ground and the death toll and refugee wave rise. Europe wants its voice to be heard in the talks, but can it keeps its eyes and borders closed to the men, women and children fleeing from Syria? How can Europe better respond to the humanitarian and political disaster looming on its external border? This essay's aim is to briefly present, in its first section, the situation on the ground in Syria, for a better understanding of the dynamics of the Syrian civil war and its consequences. Over the following sections it will be presented the European response to this Hobbesian conflict who generated a huge refugee crisis, seen now as a major threat for the unity and security of the European Union. While a new approach of this crisis is a major challenge, much more is to be done when it comes to leaders' public positions. EU is built on democratic and humanitarian foundations and it has to keep its values. Key words: Syrian civil war, refugee crisis, European Union, Realism, Liberalism, Solidarity, Collective security. 3 INTRODUCTION While peace talks between Syria's govern and opposition bump along Geneva, battle rage on the ground and the death toll and refugee wave rise. Europe wants its voice to be heard in the talks, but it is difficult to protect its own borders and , in the same time to offer protection to men, women and children fleeing from Syria. How can Europe better respond to the human and political disaster looming on its external borders? - this is the question that this essay will try to find an answer. The conflict in Syria began almost six years ago, when few children wrote anti-regime slogans on a wall in the southern town of Daraa. This was a small act of defiance that catapulted Syria to the frontline of the Arab Spring. The story of Daraa is the story of Syrian uprising: a single incident of brutality against 15 boys between ages of 10 and 15 ignited the protests that swept the country. This event triggered an implacable spiral of repression and protests, and the conflict in Syria has now forcibly moved 11 millions people from their homes, including approximately seven millions internally displaced persons (IDPs) and four millions refugees who have fled abroad.1 As in all refugee crisis, the vast majority of those who do not get trapped inside the country, find themselves stuck on just the other side of the border. The bulk of the Syrian refugees is sheltered among four of Syria's five neighbors: Lebanon - the main receiver in the beginning of the war - where about one million refugees are registered with the UNHCR, and many others have not been registered; Turkey, which became lately the main receiver country, with over 2.7 millions; Jordan - with close to one million refugees and Iraq, with around 220.000 refugees. Israel, which is at war with Syria, has, to date, kept its border closed.2 Other refugees have travelled further away and to destinations where they have relatives or friends. Thus some Syrians refugees are currently hosted by Egypt, and ten of thousands find themselves in the Maghreb countries. By contrast, Europe's response to the refugee crisis has been limited and uneven. Moreover, it has been constantly outpaced by events on the ground and riddled with obstacles. 1 Numbers are continuously increasing. Refugees updates are provided: for IDPs by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) at - http://www.unocha.org/syria; for refugees in countries neighboring in Syria by the UN Refugee Agency at - http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/portal/page/portal/population/data/database. 2 Philippe Fargues, Europe Must Take on its Share of the Syrian Refugee Burden, but How?, in Migration Policy Center, pp. 1-5, February 14, 2014, p. 1. 4 The nightmare in Syria has been front and center in the world consciousness for almost six years now, but there is no consensus about what can - or should - be done to stop it. The United Nations and the United States, the European Union and the countries of the Middle East, are flummoxed on how to end this conflict.3 In the light of the overall magnitude of the crisis compared with the actual numbers reaching Europe, this paper work reviews EU's response to the crisis. First, it presents the facts: a historical review of the events in Syria and of displacements, numbers and the route of travel for Syrian refugees, migrants and asylum seekers to Europe. The second part is dedicated to Europe's response to the Syrian crisis, with particular emphasis on the divergent and convergent points. Few speeches will be analyzed, following two of International Relations paradigms, liberal one, for those supporting the humanitarian line, and the realist paradigm, for those who put forefront the security of the states and borders. For the final part few conclusions will be drawn, with an open ending, considering the fact that the events are happening and unfolding while this essay is written. The main strength of this research is its access to credible data as official sources, books, academic reports, articles, publications and social media sources when confirmed by academic researchers. Meanwhile, the main limitation is that the situation in Syria and the behavior of the key actors are changing drastically and in unanticipated ways. This, added to the minimal transparency of main international interveners about their work in Syria, has made it difficult to collect information in a holistic manner and to draw clear-cut findings. Much has yet to be understood as realities are unveiled in Syria. Mixed methods are to be used, along with primary (interviews live tracked and thematic conferences attended) and secondary sources. As Daniel Byman explains, civil war is a common feature in the Middle East; one could recall the wars waged in Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Lebanon, Oman, Syria and Yemen. These wars are often repetitive, cyclical, with spillover effect in their neighboring areas, by the forced displacement or voluntary movement of the population across the borders. As the neighboring states try to take advantage of the country on whose territory is developing a conflict and as they seek to prevent war from expanding beyond its borders, there is generally a tendency for civil war to become regional wars.4 Civil war is a global phenomenon with profound social and political consequences. From 1946 to 2011, a total of 102 countries - about half of the entire world's states - experienced civil 3 Nader Hashemi, Danny Postel (eds.), The Syria Dilemma, THE MIT PRESS Cambridge, MA, 2013, p. 5. Daniel L. Byman, States in Civil War in The Arab awakening. America and the transformation of the Middle East, Kenneth M. Polack (ed.), Washington: The Brookings Institution, 2011, pp. 213-214. 5 Karl DeRouen Jr. (ed.), An Introduction to Civil Wars, CO2 Press, University of Alabama, 2015, p. 10. 4 5 wars5. A profound international consequence of civil wars is human displacement in the form of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), or people who have not crossed international borders to avoid violence, but remain within their countries borders. There are various types of civil wars. Extra-systemic civil wars involve insurgents and the government, but they occur outside the government's territory. When an external actor intervenes, it can become internationalized, and non-state civil wars are between or among nonstate groups.6 This is the type of conflict in Syria, which generated such a huge wave of migrants heading towards Europe, among other location; this concept will be used to explain the source of the ongoing crisis which European Union is facing nowadays. It is also common in Refugee Studies to speak about Convention Refugee and refugee it selves. The term "Convention Refugees" is often used to distinguish refugees from IDPs people. The refugees who have crossed several borders and travelled to western states to claim asylum are forced to play the role of Convention Refugees, described as such by 1951 Refugee Convention. To be considered legitimate, refugees must prove that they have fled individual persecution and that they fear persecution if they return to their own countries. 7 They must become conventional refugees because, under international law, anyone has the right to claim asylum, but only governments have the power to grant it. Refugees and asylum seekers fall into the broad category commonly called forced migrants, but they are differentiated within this category by international law, whereby they are given a special status, based on persecution in their place of birth. For the purpose of this paper work the 1951 Convention is the most relevant, because the focus here is on refugees who managed to travel to countries that have signed the above mentioned document. The "events occurring before January 1951 in the clause above refer specifically to the Second World War and its aftermath, during which an estimated 30 millions people were displaced".8 Following Denmark - the first country which signed this international agreement to shelter refugees and not return them to their country - most western countries signed up as well. The notable exception is the US, which did not signed in 1951, but did sign the subsequent 1967 Protocol, which widened the scope of the Convention, by moving it beyond the conditions specifically pertaining to the Second World War.9 To be recognized as a refugee 6 Karl De Rouen, Op. cit., p. 12. Alison Jeffers, Refugee, Theatre and Crisis. Performing Global Identities, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2012, p. 17. 8 Tony Kushner, Katharine Knox, Refugees in an Age of Genocide. Global, National and Local Perspectives during the Twentieth Century, Routledge, New York, 1999, p. 10. 9 Alison Jeffers, Op. cit., p. 20. 7 6 under the terms of the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol, refugees have to be able to demonstrate experiences described above. In Europe, the panic engendered by the September 11th attacks in the United States, conveniently masked the fact that none of those involved were refugees. Indeed, in subsequent attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London 2005, when bombs were planted on public transport networks, none of the perpetrators were refugees or from refugees backgrounds. The fact that many of those convicted for the Madrid bombings were seen as integrated into Spanish life it caused the doubt that they had any Islamic fundamentalist agenda.10 In London, the perpetrators were British citizens and product of the British education system. This was complicated by the fact that they were second generation immigrants, whose parents came from Pakistan and therefore links with al-Qaeda, real or imagined, have muddled the situation to the point where all refugees appear to be a threat to public security and national integrity. From this point of view nowadays there is a tremendous ongoing debate around the Syrian refugee crisis. Immigration policy shapes immigrations patterns, which in turn have a tremendous impact on the demography, culture, economy and politics of a state. A rapidly expanding literature explores the immigration policies of individual receiving countries. Moreover, immigration is now responsible for population stability or growth in many Western societies.11 Immigration policy consists of two parts: 1) immigration control policy or immigration regulation, namely, the rules and procedures governing the selection and admission of foreign citizens; and 2) immigrant policy, namely the conditions provided to resident immigrants (e.g., work and housing conditions, welfare provisions and educational opportunities).12 Also, immigration policy is an interdisciplinary subject. For the purpose of this research it will be used theories of international relations - liberalism and realism - along with the sociological approach of the national identity. Each of this approaches contributes to a better understanding of the process and crisis that European Union is experiencing now. Realism contributes to a better understanding of refugee policies, and, neoliberal theories of supranational organizations and international regime foster offers an understanding of immigration and refugees policies within the EU. The national identity approach highlights historical experiences, cultural idioms and social conflicts that have shaped past and current immigration policies. Realism - classical realism or neorealism - is perhaps the most prominent approach in the study of International Relations, it "depicts international affairs as a struggle for power among 10 Alison Jeffers, Op. cit., p. 28. Eytan Meyers, Theories of International Immigration Policy - A Comparative Analysis, in International Migration Review, pp. 1245-1282, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Winter, 2000), Published by: The Center for Migration Studies of New York, Inc., p. 1266. 12 Tomas Hammar, European immigration policy. A comparative study, Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 7-9. 11 7 self-interested states".13 Realism is based on four key assumptions: first, states are the principal or most important actors and represent the key unit of analysis; second, the state is viewed as an unitary actor which faces the outside world as an integrated unit; third, the state is essentially a rational actor, and fourth, national security issues are the most important ones on the international agenda.14 Realists focus on actual or potential conflicts among states. Strategic and security issues are sometimes referred to as high politics, whereas economic and social issues are viewed as less important or low politics.15 The emphasis on national security and military conflicts were adopted by few European leaders, this resulting in a fractured joint decision regarding refugee crisis within the EU. The bigger development was the extreme reluctance from the Baltic states, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, to accept any EU burden-sharing scheme, variously invoking their relative poverty, the intrinsic difficulties of accepting deeply alien outsiders or even the refuse of hosting non-Christian, and, on top of this, Hungary is building defense fences against immigrants. Such hostility took many outside observers aback16, given the acceptance in the West of a large number of refugees from the Baltic states after the Second World War (200.000 plus), Hungary after the crushing of the 1956 revolt, and Czechoslovakia after the 1968 invasion17. Liberalism offers a more optimistic worldview than realism. It maintains that international economic interdependence, transnational interactions, international institutions and the spread of democracy can promote cooperation and even peace between nations. In contrast to the realists, liberals assume that non-state actors, such as international organizations and multi-national corporations are important actors in International Relations, and that the economic and social issues are no less important than military ones.18 Some strand of the liberal paradigm - e.g., economic liberalism, interdependence liberalism and republican - have had little direct influence 13 Stephen M. Waltz, International Relations: One World, Many Theories, in Foreign Policy, No. 110 (1998): 2946, p.31. 14 Paul R. Viotti, Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory, Fourth Edition, Longman, New York, 2010, pp. 42-43. 15 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Fifth Edition, Revised, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978, pp.4-15. 16 Ivan Krastev, Eastern Europe's Compassion Deficit, in New York Times, September 8, 2015 http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/09/opinion/eastern-europes-compassion-deficit-refugees-migrants.html?_r=0 accessed at April 4, 2016. 17 *** Baltic* people in DP camps, Undated - http://www.dpcamps.org/balts.html; and, Where Are They Now? The Hungarian Refugees, 50 Years On - Editorial: The 50th Anniversary of the Hungarian Uprising, in Refugee Magazine, no. 144, October 1st, 2006 - http://www.unhcr.org/452665e92.html - accessed at April 4, 2016. 18 Viotti and Kauppi, Op. cit., pp. 118-121. 8 on immigration policy literature, but others, notably institutional neoliberalism and the globalization theory, shed light on immigration policymaking.19 This human policy was put forward by Chancellor Angela Merkel and by August 24, 2015, Germany has dropped Dublin 20 rules by opening its doors to all Syrian refugees, who represented by than about half of the refugee flow coming from Greece and the Balkans21. By taking the moral high ground, Germany adopted the neoliberals theory, along, perhaps, with moral reminiscences of the Second World War. The national identity approach it argues that the unique history of each country, its conceptions of citizenship and nationality, as well as debates over national identity and social conflicts within, shape its immigration policies. In comparison to the other theories delineated here, the national identity approach downplays the importance of external and situational factors. A big part of this literature builds up sociological theories and concepts, such as own identity, nation building, prejudice, alienation and social closure22. The national identity approach contributes to the understanding process of immigration policies in several ways. First, it explores the traditions and cultural idioms that "frame and shape judgments of what is politically imperative"23. State policies are not constructed in a vacuum, but rather are influenced, to some degree, by the history and traditional way of thinking of a society. Second, it explains why some countries favor permanent immigration, while others prefer temporary labor migration. And third, major racial, ethnic and religious conflicts within a society influence the attitudes of the contending groups towards the composition of immigration, as it may alter the demographic and political balance between them.24 19 Eytan Meyers, Theories of International Immigration Policy - A Comparative Analysis, in International Migration Review, pp. 1245-1282, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Winter, 2000), Published by: The Center for Migration Studies of New York, Inc., p. 1266. 20 The Dublin Convention is a piece of European law that has two main aims: to establish a common framework for determining which country in the EU decides on asylum seeker's application and to ensure that only one member state should process each asylum application. For more details see: The Dublin Convention on asylum application. What it means and how is supposed to work in Refugee Council Briefing, August 2002 - http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/ - accessed at April 4, 2016. 21 ***, De Maiziere: Germany to receive up to 800,000 refugees, Deutsche Welle, August 19, 2015 http://www.dw.com/en/de-maiziere-germany-to-receive-up-to-800000-refugees/a-18658409 - accessed at April 5, 2016. 22 John Highman, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 18060-1925, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1955, pp.332-334. 23 Eytan Meyers, Theories of International Immigration Policy - A Comparative Analysis, in International Migration Review, pp. 1245-1282, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Winter, 2000), Published by: The Center for Migration Studies of New York, Inc., p. 1255. 24 Ibidem. 9 The main weakness of the national identity approach its inability to explain the fact that various countries have adopted similar immigration policies at the same time. Such resemblance undermines the argument that immigration policies are shaped by each country's unique history, social cleavages and perception of national identity25. For example, between 1890 and First World War, western countries attempted to block Eastern European; between the two world wars almost all the receiving countries have restricted immigration and during the Cold War, most receiving countries showed preferences for refugees from communism - meaning Eastern Europe. Whereas most EU action remains rhetorical or symbolical, the EU has been taking a more explicit approach to Syrian refugee crisis. After Madrid and London bombings, European political leaders revoked the EU solidarity clause and called for strong anti-terrorism measures by appointing an EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (Gilles de Kerchove)26 to synchronize such measures. But under the light of the latest events - the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels there is an urgent need for the EU leadership to reflect if its action are effective, and, if not, what is to be done in order to manage this crisis. 25 Eytan Meyers, Theories of International Immigration Policy - A Comparative Analysis, in International Migration Review, pp. 1245-1282, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Winter, 2000), Published by: The Center for Migration Studies of New York, Inc., p. 1255. 26 ***, Coordonatorul pentru lupta împotriva terorismului - http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ro/policies/fightagainst-terrorism/counter-terrorism-coordinator/ -accessed at April 7, 2016. 10 1. The Dynamics of Syria's Civil War Syria, a country in the heart of the Middle East, has rich history. A country that has influenced other states in the region, and has often played an important role in international affairs. Syria today, is torn by a major civil war and apparently without the prospect of peaceful solution. This civil war is an offshoot of the Arab Spring, the widespread protests which began in Tunisia 2010 and spread across the region. The term Arab Spring, which first entered the discourse in 2012, covers all social unrest leading to protests and revolutions in the Middle East in this time. Syria’s "spring" began as a peaceful protest by the opposition to the regime of president Bashar al-Assad. The Syrian regime responded with intimidation, thus incubating more radical and militant opposition. The Syrian civil war and its causes have been studied by an increasing body of scholars. The Syrian civil war is still ongoing, a conflict with particular set of problems, including difficulties with access to reliable sources and demonstrably appropriate methods. Given the nature of this research, it is necessary to rely on secondary literature complemented with primary sources such as visual footage and few conferences attended. Since 2011 Syria find itself in a state of civil war. What started as peaceful protests against the Assad regime, developed quickly into a violent conflict that developed into a sectarian struggle, leading shortly to a civil war. In Syria, Bashar al-Assad's regime does not control the whole country, but maintains a tight command over the most important cities and areas, keeping the regime in power. This resulted in a civil war that seems to be a war where different religious communities are pitted against each other27. Assad's forces, with external support, appear to have stalemated a fragmented rebel movement, but Assad will not be able to restore his authority throughout the country. Rebel forces nominally control areas of the country where government forces have withdrawn, but they too will be unable to impose their authority throughout Syria, even if Assad falls. Limitation on its deployable manpower have already obliged the government to abandon large portions of the country in order to defend strategic areas28. The current shape of the Syrian crisis derives from three key developments witnessed in 2013. Two of them directly strengthened the Assad regime after a succession of military 27 Ken Sofer and Juliana Shafroth, The Structure and Organization of the Syrian Opposition, in Center for American Progress https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2013/05/14/63221/the-structure-andorganization-of-the-syrian-opposition/ - accessed at April 2nd, 2016. 28 Brian Michael Jenkins, The Dynamics of Syria's Civil War, Undated, pp.1-26 - http://www.rand.org/ - accessed at April 2nd, 2016. 11 setbacks: first, the growing involvement of foreign Shia militias such as the Lebanese Hezbollah on the side of loyalist forces, starting with the battle for al-Qusayr in the spring; second, the United States' decision to respond diplomatically, rather than militarily, to the chemical attack carried out in Damascus in August. These turning points were followed by a long series of loyalist victories that culminated with the evacuation of the center of Homs by the rebels in May 2014. Politically, Assad's renewed sense of confidence resulted in the failure of the Geneva II peace talks in February 2014, and in the holding of a de facto non-contest presidential election in June. The third major event of 2013 was the creation of the radical Jihadi group the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (ISIS) in April. ISIS' hostile behavior towards other rebel factions led to an all-out war from early 2014 on, adding a new fault line to an already multi-front conflict, since the regime- opposition struggle had been supplemented with fighting between the opposition and Kurdish nationalists from late 2012. The struggle against ISIS diverted much of the military resources of the rebels, but it also had positive effects for the latter, as it accelerated the restructuring of the decaying Free Syrian Army around a handful of robust military coalitions, and helped to ease tensions with Kurdish nationalists29. By May 2014, the state of play was thus determined by two major trends: on the one hand, a reinvigorated regime gradually cleansing the center of the country from rebel presence and strengthening its hold over Damascus; on the other hand, a rebellion which, after expelling ISIS from the western half of the country, demonstrated its persistent capacity to deal severe blows to the regime in peripheral provinces. As no major breakthrough by either side was likely in the foreseeable future, and with a moribund diplomatic process, all the ingredients for the war to continue in the long term were in place. One-third of the population has fled the country or has been displaced internally. By the end of 2014, more than half of the population could be living as refugees , and by winter 2015, almost 4 millions migrants - most of them running from Syria and northern Iraq - were entering Europe, few millions in four of the fives neighboring countries, and almost 3 millions finding shelter in Turkey. While peace talks between Syria's government and opposition bump along in Geneva, battles rage on the ground and the death toll and the refugee wave rise. Europe wants its voice to be heard in the talks, but can it keep its eyes - and borders - closed to the men, women and children fleeing Syria? How can Europe better respond to the human and political disaster looming on its external border and avoid another Madrid, London, Paris or Brussels horrifying moments? The next sections of this essay will try to shed light on these question, by analyzing 29 Thomas Pierret, Evolution and Outlook of the Syrian Crisis, pp.61-66, in IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook, 2014. 12 the taken and the proposed measures, along with the new approaches of this crisis. 13 2. Population Displacements from Syria Syria has a long history of politically motivated, often forced, emigration. Starting a few years after Syria gained its independence (1946), political instability and the succession of military coups incited large segments of the bourgeoisie to leave the country in the early 1950s, mainly for neighboring Lebanon. In the 1960s, after perhaps as many as 100,000 Kurds were deprived of their Syrian nationality under the pretext they (or their parents) had arrived from Turkey after the independence when nationality was defined with reference to the territory, a continuous stream of emigration of stateless people from Northern Syria took place. In 1982, the massacre of thousands of people, when the military crushed the Islamist insurrection of Hama, triggered a new stream of Syrian forced emigration, mainly to Lebanon30. On the eve of the 2011 revolts, more than 400,000 Syrians were estimated as living abroad, including 120,000 in the Gulf States; 112,000 in the EU; and 80,000 in North America and Australia31. Out of them, 28,216 were recorded as persons “of concern for UNHCR”, including 18,452 refugees and 9,764 asylum seekers32. Syrians established abroad were to become a resource for people fleeing the country starting from the spring 2011, facilitating their travel and establishment abroad without necessarily passing through the burdensome procedures of asylum seeking. Syria is not only a source of refugee movements, but also a destination for massive waves of refugees. Having been in 1948 one of the main recipients of the Palestinian exodus - whose survivors and descendants enumerated as living in Syria were 495,970 in 201033 - Syria became in the 2000s by far the most important receiver of Iraqi refugees fleeing their country under US occupation, when Jordan closed its doors in response to bombings perpetrated by Iraqis in Amman in November 2005. Iraqi refugees in Syria were never counted and numbers that were commonly circulated at that time – ranging from 1.2 to 1.5 million in 200834 - seem considerably 30 Philippe Fargues, Christine Fandrine, The European Response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis. What Next?, in Migration Policy Center. Robert Schumann Centre for Advanced Studies, MPC Research Report 2012/14, pp. 1-41. 31 Stock of Syrian Migrants: 416,745 around 2010. Anna di Bartolomeo, Thibault Jaulis, Delphine Perrin, CARIM Migration Profile Syria, Migration Policy Centre, EUI, 2012 Florence http://www.carim.org/public/migrationprofiles/MP_Syria_EN.pdf - accessed at April 7, 2016. 32 ***UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2010 - http://www.unhcr.org/4ef9c7269.html -accessed at April 7, 2016. 33 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistic. Number of Registered Palestinian Refugees by Sex and Country, 2010 http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_Rainbow/Documents/PalDis-REFUGEE-2010E.htm -accessed at April 7, 2016. 34 Ashraf Al-Khalidi, Sophia Hoffmann & Victor Tanner, Iraqi Refugees in the Syrian Arab Republic: A FieldBased Snapshot, Occasional Paper, Brookings Institution - University of Bern, 2007. 14 overestimated35. At the end of 2010, a population of 1,307,918 persons of concern for UNHCR would have been living in Syria, comprising 1,005,472 refugees, 2,446 asylum seekers and 300,000 stateless persons 36 . While retrospectively the number of refugees seems largely exaggerated, it remains that refugees in Syria form a vulnerable group that may be exposed to a high level of risk due to the crisis. Now, this was just an intro to present the background of Syrian movements, but as well, the response of Syria toward the same situation of facing migrants. Nowadays, Syrian themselves are in a difficult situation to flee the country, in order to provide a safe environment for their families. As it was shown above, the number of IDPs and refugees is increasing from one day to another. For the purpose of this essay it will be discuss theirs way to Europe and the attitudes provided by EU' s leadership. In the EU context, one can point to at least three possible motivations for Member States cooperation in this area: (1) promoting European integration; (2) enabling more effective protection; and (3) exploiting free-riding opportunities. People fleeing the conflict in Syria can take three different routes to Europe, each of them corresponding to a likely status while in Europe: land route to Greece or Bulgaria: they travel through Turkey - a county Syrians enter without visa - from which the point of entry in the EU is Greece or Bulgaria. Once in Europe, they are either ordinary travellers or irregular migrants, according to whether they have a visa or not37. If they don't have one, they can either apply for asylum or stay in an irregular situation , and either to remain in the first country they reach Europe or continue their travel to another country. Out of all those reach the EU by land, only those applying for asylum and those detected as irregular migrants will be reflected in statistics; air route directly to any EU member state: as ordinary travellers originating from a third country, Syrians are registered at the external border, however, no statistics of ordinary travellers is routinely produced at EU level by country of origin, so that one cannot know how many Syrians actually use this way to reach Europe; and, sea route across the Mediterranean to Greece, Cyprus, Malta or Italy (and possibly France and Spain): only those lacking regular entry documents take this route to Europe, which they therefore enter as irregular migrants before some of them lodge an asylum claim and join the category of asylum seekers38. 35 Most Iraqi refugees - 80% - 90% - were living in the greater Damascus urban area - Patricia Weiss Fagen, Iraqi Refugees: Seeking Stability in Syria and Jordan, Institute for the Study of International Migration, Georgetown University, 2007, pp.544-560. 36 ***UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2010 - http://www.unhcr.org/4ef9c7269.html - accessed at April 7, 2016. 37 According to a FRONTEX report "In terms of secondary movements from Greece, Syrians were also detected on exit from Greece and on entry to German, Belgian and Dutch airports using counterfeit EU residence permits and forged Greek and Bulgarian travel documents", Frontex, October 03, 2012, Situational update: migratory situation at the Greek-Turkish-border - http://frontex.europa.eu/news/situational-update-migratory-situation-at-the-greekturkish-border-HATxN9 - accessed at April 7, 2016. 38 Philippe Fargues, Christine Fandrine, The European Response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis. What Next?, in Migration Policy Center. Robert Schumann Centre for Advanced Studies, MPC Research Report 2012/14, pp. 1-41. 15 The international refugee protection efforts suffer from collective action problems as states/regions have incentives to shift responsibilities for refugee to others. The Syrian civil war gave rise to the largest refugee flight reaching Europe since the Yugoslavian wars in the 1990's. The crises evidenced the deficiencies of the EU Asylum Policy, which struggled both to offer solutions to Syrian refugees and to efficiently allocate costs across Member States. This refugee crisis in the neighborhood of the European Union puts EU's policies and institutions dealing with refugees and asylum seekers under heavy pressure. The next chapter will present the way in which the EU's leadership responded to one of the biggest humanitarian crisis of this century. 16 3. European Union: Stance to Solidarity or Fortress of Fences? In the spring of 2015, a sudden change occurred in population flows between the southern and northern banks of the Mediterranean. Overall, numbers of new asylum seekers climbed from fewer than 58,000 in April to close to 90,000 in June. The number of new applicants hailing from Syria nearly doubled, from slightly under 11,000 to about 20,00039.This was just the beginning: the wave of refugees picked up during the summer, with the movement of some 190,000 Syrians during July, August and September 2015, three times the number that had arrived during the same period in 2014. This would represent a yearly rate of around 672,000. By late October, a cumulative total of 507,000 Syrians were seeking or had secured an abode within the European Union40. This sudden and massive flow of population has already has a substantial impact on the domestic politics of most European countries. It has generated new tensions, and exacerbated pre-existing ones, between the member states of the EU, and promises to be critically important for the Union as a whole. The crisis also bears on Europe's security choices towards the conflicts in the Middle East. This impact will be magnified as a function of the duration and the scale of the refugees crisis. There is no precedent for such a large and abrupt flow of war refugees from the Middle East to Europe. The exodus is poised to continue, moreover, at a sharp tempo on a massive scale, with only occasional respites as high winds or dangerous seas deter the passage. The ongoing war in Syria provides no prospect for their early return home, on the contrary, as the war intensifies, with the military intervention of Russia in support of Bashar al -Assad's government and the ramping-up of the Western air campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). In other words, the theoretical potential for further Syrian refugee flows is some ten times bigger than the number that have already sought, or are currently seeking, a safe heaven in Europe. Post-NATO Afghanistan and conflict-ridden Iraq have to be added to the equation. As for the longer run, Europe must assume that as the century-old territorial dispensation in the Middle East is further challenged in a 21st century version of the Thirty Years War, additional 39 ***, Eurostat, First Time Asylum Applicants by Citizenship, EU-28, Absolute Change Between Q2 2014 and Q2 2015 - http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics#Asylum_applicants - accessed at April 10, 2016. 40 UNHCR, EUROPE: Syrian Asylum Applications, updated October 19, 2015 http://data.unhcr.org/SahelSituation/country.php?id=501 - accessed at April 10, 2016. 17 refugee flows will be set in motion41. At the domestic level, hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers have predictably provided fuel to those political movements that have made xenophobia their sock-in-trade. But while the ongoing exodus to Europe is a spectacular development, it does not find by itself a solution. The loss of control experienced by countries and institutions is seems to demonstrate that EU can not cope with such a crisis. As the EU ceases to be identified with prosperity and security, euro-skepticism -if not outright euro-phobia - rises. This, in turn, ties into the fears of the social and societal transformations brought upon by the forces of globalization. This brings into discussion the idea of national identity which "explores the traditions and cultural idioms that "frame and shape judgments of what is politically imperative42". The political beneficiaries of the refugee crisis may be well a broader-based French National Front or the multihued forces of euro-skepticism in the UK. The systematic practice of using the national identity as an excuse to shift community and humanitarian duties, by some states members, is not conducive to the emergence of the EU as a single strategic actor. The refugee crisis revealed new EU fault lines cutting across those already laid by the economic crisis. Within weeks of the surge of asylum seekers crossing into Greece and from there to Balkans into the EU's continental heartland, the post-communist members of the Union, made it very clear that they were not ready to accept sizeable numbers of refugees on their territory. The bigger development was the extreme reluctance from the Baltic states, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia to accept any EU burden - sharing scheme, variously invoking their relative poverty, the intrinsic difficulties of accepting deeply alien outsiders or even the refusal of hosting non-Christians. "In Slovakia, we don't have mosques, we only want to choose the Christians43", said one official; Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the leader of Poland's Law and Justice Party, stated during the recent electoral campaign that the migrants carry "various types of parasites", which "could be dangerous here"44. This hostile current is maintained and amplified by Hungarian Prime Minister, Victor Orbán, who's declarations and position are more than 41 During Europe's Thirty Years War (1618-1648), religious war and territorial conflict combined much as they are combining in the Middle East today. A third of Germany's population may have perished at the time. 42 Eytan Meyers, Theories of International Immigration Policy - A Comparative Analysis, in International Migration Review, pp. 1245-1282, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Winter, 200), Published by: The Center for Migration Studies of New York, Inc., p. 1255. 43 Ishaan Tharoor, Slovakia Will Take In 200 Syrian Refugees, But They Have to be Christians, in Washington Post, August 19, 2015 - https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/08/19/slovakia-will-take-in-200syrian-refugees-but-they-have-to-be-christian/ - accessed at April 10. 2016. 44 ***, Poland's Resurgent Right: Voting for a Better Yesterday, in The Economist, October 24, 2015 http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21676782-country-has-benefited-hugely-eu-membership-turns-biteurosceptic-voting-better - accessed at April 10, 2016. 18 painted with overt xenophobia. On the other ideological side of this crisis management, some not-too-well-off non EU countries, notably Serbia, a major transit country, acted with more humanity both officially and at ground level than many EU member states, and the Serbian Prime Minister, Aleksandar Vučić, even declared that "We are more European than more Europeans when it comes to migrants"45. Some may say that this attitude is explain by the bloody background of Serbia or by some flattering feelings for a future adherence to EU, but also the former communists states have their own dark past when comes to previous experiences regarding migration. On this context is mandatory to be noted Sweden acceptance of immigrants, more than 80,00046 Syrian refugees finding shelter here. Sweden’s population is six times smaller than that of France or the UK, which together have given asylum to less than one-fifth as many Syrian refugees47. There was therefore reason to expect Germany and like-minded northern partners to manifest similar solidarity in the face of the current new crisis. The manner in which this was done by Germany, however, came as a complete surprise. On 12 August, Germany's Minister of the Interior stated that up to 800,000 people would be seeking refuge in Germany by the end of 2015; by 24 August, Germany had dropped Dublin rules by opening its doors to all Syrian refugees, who represented by then about half of the refugee flow coming from Greece and the Balkans.48 This humane policy was put forward by Chancellor Angela Merkel to widespread popular support at home, and has earned Germany well-deserved plaudits from the broader public in Europe and beyond. Germany's compassion was all the more necessary in practical terms as refugee flows reached up to 12,000 a day at Munich's main railway station in the closing days of summer, overwhelming local administrations. Furthermore, Merkel has pursued this course in the face of compassion fatigue, slumping opinion-poll ratings, rising budget costs (with €4bn extra spending in 2015 and €10bn more planned for 2016) and attacks from her right-wing coalition partners in the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU).49 Foreign capitals were less then thrilled by Berlin's position and attracted a significant numbers of contestants. Germany was even accused that is taken unilateral decisions which may 45 Davide Denti, Serbia, the Unexpected Friend of Syrian Refugees, in Boulevard Extérieur, September 3, 2015 http://www.boulevard-exterieur.com/Serbia-the-unexpected-friend-of-Syrian-refugees.html -accessed at April 10, 2016. 46 *** UNHCR, Syria's Regional Refugee Response, Updated October 19, 2015 http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php -accessed at April 10, 2016. 47 Ibidem. 48 DeMaiziere: Germany to Receive Up to 800,000 Refugees, in Deutsche Welle, August 19,2015 http://www.dw.com/en/de-maiziere-germany-to-receive-up-to-800000-refugees/a-18658409 - accessed at April 5, 2016. 49 *** Germany's Refugees Crisis-Merkel at Her Limit, in The Economist, October 10, 2015 http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21672296-after-historic-embrace-refugees-german-public-opinion-turningmerkel-her-limit - accessed at April 10, 2016. 19 be affect on long term the already fragile cohesion. In spite of all this, Germany took the high moral ground giving refuge to a disproportionate number of asylum seekers. A double precedent was set: the quota system is mandatory, and the agreement was secured by qualified majority voting, which may be permissible under existing treaties but was unexpected on an issue of principle and great political sensitivity. Berlin got its way, and may expect to do so again in the future. In short, the refugee crisis is aggravating and accelerating the economic, social and political consequences of Europe’s inability to deal jointly and severally, in an effective and legitimate manner, with the challenges of our age. The EU may survive more or less completely, with all or some of its current powers. But its constitutional and strategic ambitions of barely more than ten years ago are already receding in the mist of the pre-crisis age50. Just standing still is made more difficult by the refugee crisis. The official European response to Europe's migrants crisis - championed by German Chancellor as shown above - is for member states to pull together and provide shelter for Syrian people, fleeing war or persecution. But in reality, most member have failed to take their quotas of refugees and few have built barricades to try to keep both, migrants and refugees, out. The European Union was founded in the ashes of World War Two, in part a principle of freedom of movement among member states. But since the fall of the Berlin Wall, European countries have built or started 1,200 km of anti-immigrant fencing, at a cost of €500 million. That distance is almost 40% of the length of America's border with Mexico.51 Many of these walls separate EU nations from outside the bloc, but some are between EU states, including members of Europe's passport-free zone. Most of the building was started in 2015. Now, many can be said about this tremendous crisis and the international response to it. Worldwide, many analysts, politicians, sociologists and even regular people, are discussing about it. A viable solution it was not found yet. Meanwhile, Europe is facing an incendiary crisis amplified by the threat of terrorist attacks. But it is very important to understand that solidarity has to stand up, and even if some action fail it is mandatory to not give up. As it was shown above, the European bloc is now divided and for a better understanding of two position, this essay will analyze on its last section, two main figures, each representing one of the two sides of the position taken. It will be an analyze under the umbrella of two international relations paradigms, as presented in the theoretical approach. 50 *** A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Strategy, Brussels, December 12, 2003 http://www.%20consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsup-%20load/78367.pdf. - accessed at April 10, 2016. 51 Gabriela Baczynska, Sara Ledwith, The Walls go up in Europe, April 4, 2016 http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/migration/#story/48 - accessed at April 10, 2016. 20 4. High Moral Ground or Exacerbated Nationalism? The chosen title most probably is more than suggestive. As previously shown, this crisis created a cleavage among European leadership, and the most prominent figures are those of German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the Hungarian Prime Minister, Victor Orban. This two leaders have chosen two different paths regarding a solution for this ongoing crisis. Victor Orban, the first figure to be brought in discussion, adopted a realist approach, based on the self preservation of the state, emphasizing that the national security is the most important issue on Hungarian agenda. "We should not look at economic immigration as if it had any use, because it only brings trouble and threats to European people. Therefore, immigration must be stopped. That's the Hungarian stance."52 Hungary's closure of its border with Serbia has led to confusion and desperation among refugees who had hoped to cross into Europe there. The border closure has generated chaos and attracted criticism from the West. And the cause is clear. The country, under the leadership of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, is downright inhospitable - even hostile - toward refugees. In the town of Röszke, on the Hungarian border to Serbia, police could be seen in recent days wearing face masks and rubber gloves as they herded together thousands of new arrivals into registration camps, that looked very much like improvised jails. The facilities have tents without rain protection, a lack of blankets, little food and medicines and a dearth of portable toilets, not to mention frequent tensions between refugees and police.53 Hungary has been showing its ugly side to the world. Videos made the rounds of a Hungarian camera women for a right-wing TV broadcaster tripping two children and kicking a refugee father as he held his child. She quickly became the public face of the nastiness emerging from Hungary. And although her employer has since fired her, the images remain.54 Now, some may say that the Hungarian PM is not directly involved in these ugly faces of "humanity". But considering his public speech, and the fact that his internal support reaches 70%, it can definitely be said that his position is influencing population behavior. And he is using this crisis to gain political advantage, stealing - through this speech - votes from the farright wing represented by Jobbik. 52 Krisztina Than, Hungary PM Orban says: Immigration a Threat must be Stopped, January 12, 2015 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-orban-immigration-idUSKBN0KL0L320150112 - accessed at April 15, 2016; See the full speech "Christianity not Caliphate" from January 1st, 2016 at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VrbbyewI9VA - accessed at April 15, 2016. 53 Jan Puhl, Fortress Hungary: Orban Profits From the Refugees, September 15, 2015 http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/viktor-orban-wants-to-keep-muslim-immigrants-out-of-hungary-a1052568.html - accessed at April 15, 2016. 54 Ibidem. 21 Orban is leading the opposition, but he is not isolated in Europe, still, the Hungarian Prime Minister has so far emerged as a political leader for those who are rejecting the idea of mandatory EU quotas. On the other side of this issue, Germany took the high moral ground, strongly expressed by Chancellor Angela Merkel who has taken a firm stance on migration - making it clear that she feels it is her country's duty to help those genuinely claiming asylum from war-torn countries like Syria, and calling on Europe to step up and share responsibility for the huge number of people moving across the region. Her "human stance is a lesson to us all (...). The German leader has stood up to be counted. Europe should rally on her side"55. "There can be no tolerance of those who question the dignity of other people. (...) There is no tolerance of those who are not ready to help, where, for legal and humanitarian reasons, help is due"56 - this is the way thru which Merkel is calling for solidarity and she is right and deserving the support from every European citizen. Migration is what we have done since the earliest of times, triggering growth and enlarging our circles of possibility. Whether we’re discussing the Roman or British empires, 15th century Venice, or 20th century New York, or London today, great civilizations and dynamic cities have been defined by being open to immigrants and refugees57. During a five minutes interview for BBC, Angela Merkel has repeatedly called for a collective approach from European countries to address migration, something the UK hasn't seemed too interested in. "Europe as a whole needs to move"58 she said in August 2015, in a call for greater co-operation which was echoed by France. Refugees are part of Merkel's vision and she is up for the challenge59. The German’s leader stance has been heard and understood by German people, which are welcoming refugees into their homes, and some hold welcome fests at refugee centers when new people arrive, in a picture somewhat different to the fear and hostility towards people trying to reach Britain from Calais. This human policy put forward by German Chancellor has its roots in the liberal paradigm, which is offering a more optimistic worldview than the realist one, adopted by Hungarian Prime Minister. It is a humanitarian policy toward another fellow human beings, and, 55 Will Hutton, Angela Merkel' s Human Stance is a Lesson to Us All, August 30, 2015 http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/aug/30/immigration-asylumseekers-refugees-migrants-angelamerkel - accessed at April 15, 2016. 56 Ibidem. 57 Ibidem. 58 See the full interview at - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zR87zTX1UvI - accessed at April 15, 2016. 59 Louise Ridley, Angela Merkel's Immigrations Quotes Show Germany's Response to Refugees is Widely Different to Britain's, September 9, 2015, The Huffington Post - http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2015/09/01/angela-merkelimmigration-migrants-germany_n_8069928.html - accessed at April 15, 2016. 22 according to Merkel, to receive them well is not only in our interests, but is fundamental to an idea of what it means to be human. But the disruption induced by migration is not all creative: it is disruptive and has downsides. It brings sometimes unwelcome traditions, notably Islamic fundamentalism, although witnesses to the nihilist barbarism of ISIS, al-Qaeda and the Taliban are least likely to be credulous adherents to global jihad or some mystic caliphate. Politicians and their electorates now have to make a choice. There is no middle way. The choice is between building walls and electrified fences, creating mass detention centers, organizing mass repatriation and conceding to the fear of the other or it is to find a way of sustaining openness while doing the very best that can be done to allay the natural fears and apprehensions of host populations. Above all, it is to recognize this is a European - even a global - problem. Germany needs Europe to rally to its side. Together with France, Angela Merkel has called for a pan-European response jointly financing appraisal and screening centers in Greece and Italy, coordinating reprisals against traffickers and sharing out the numbers of asylum seekers. 23 CONCLUSIONS Analysts and scholars from all over the world have offered a range of prescriptions for international involvement in Syria's civil war and on its disastrous consequences. If international commitment to Syria's postwar future is indeed one of the keys to jump-starting serious peace talks, then any signs that the international community is unwilling, or unable to commit, are likely to prolong the war. The Syrian refugee crisis is just one among several crisis that have occurred in the European Union's neighborhoods over the last few decades. This paper examined the EU's political and humanitarian responses to the Syrian refugee crisis. For a better understanding of this ongoing event, first it was brought to the reader attention, a short description of the local situation on the Syrian ground. This is followed by a presentation of displacements from Syria, the number and the routes of travel for Syrian refugees, migrants and asylum seekers to Europe. The third section presents the position adopted by the European leaders and the cleavage between the former communists countries and the central European block. It was shown, thru the two main IR theories - realism and liberalism - the different approaches of this intense issue. Now, the Syrian crisis poses an unprecedented challenge for EU. While the humanitarian crisis continues to worsen in Syria, the international community's support continues to weaken. The EU has every incentive , but only limited means to reduce the effects of this crisis. The institutions and the member states can, first of all, attempt to reduce the future flow of refugees toward Europe. Ideally, this would be the best done through a political settlement of the wars in Syria and Iraq. This is a worthy goal to pursue, but probably not one that will be reached soon. The latest event - the killing of 16 civilians, among them being 10 children, in Aleppo - is bringing a new obstacle for the incoming Geneva Peace Talks. What EU should be doing? First, a reconciling on position would be a first, and very important step. The EU must act in a decisive manner and in line with its values. 24 BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. ***, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Strategy, Brussels, December 12, 2003 - http://www.%20consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsup-%20load/78367.pdf. - accessed at April 10, 2016; 2. *** Baltic people in DP camps, Undated - http://www.dpcamps.org/balts.html; and, Where Are They Now? 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