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This article uncovers dynamic properties of the von Neumann–Morgenstern solution in weak tournaments and majoritarian games. We propose a new procedure for the construction of choice sets from weak tournaments, based on dynamic stability... more
The evolutionary selection of outcomes (modelled using the replicator dynamics) in games with costless communication depends crucially on the structural assumptions made on the underlying population. (1) In conflicts between two... more
This chapter surveys recent developments on some basic solution concepts, like stable sets, the core, the nucleolus and the modiclus for a very special class of cooperative games, namely assignment games with transferable utility. The... more
Abstract. Given a vertex-weighted graph G = (V, E; w), w(v) � 0 for any v 2 V , we consider a weighted version of the coloring problem which consists in finding a partition S = (S1, . . . , Sk) of the vertex set V of G into stable sets... more
We apply three axioms adapted from decision theory to refinements of the Nash equilibria of games with perfect recall that select connected closed sub- sets called solutions. No player uses a weakly dominated strategy in an equilibrium in... more
This paper gives a combinatorial approach to solving the student exam scheduling problem. The problem is to generate sched- ules that satisfy hard constraints while minimizing soft constraint voilations. This problem is NP-Hard. The... more
We present an algorithm for computing both upper and lower bounds on the Chvátal-rank of antiwebs, starting from the edge constraint stable set polytope. With the help of this algorithm we have been able to compute the exact values of the... more