Non-Cooperative Game Theory

This thesis consists of three empirical studies in economics of education on the determinants and consequences of language-in-education (LiE) policies. The “Environmental settings – Inputs – Processes – Immediate outcomes – Long-term outcomes” (EIPOL) evaluation model is applied to LiE policies and programs and serves as the overall framework of this research (see Introductory Chapter). Each study then targets at least one stage of the EIPOL framework to test the validity of the “green” vs. “free-market” linguistic theories. Whereas the two first studies derive models tested empirically in the African context, the third is tested on a sample of countries from the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS). The first study, Rationales to Language-in-Education Policies in Postcolonial Africa: Towards a Holistic Approach, considers two issues. First, it explores the factors affecting the choice of an LiE policy in 35 African countries. The results show that the countries adopting a uni...

Uncertainty is a daily presence in the real world. It affects our decision making and may have influence on cooperation. Often uncertainty is so severe that we can only predict some upper and lower bounds for the outcome of our actions, i.e., payoffs lie in some intervals. A suitable game theoretic model to support decision making in collaborative situations with interval data is that of cooperative interval games. Solution concepts that associate with each cooperative interval game sets of interval allocations with appealing properties provide a natural way to capture the uncertainty of coalition values into the players’ payoffs. This paper extends interval-type core solutions for cooperative interval games by discussing the set of undominated core solutions which consists of the interval nondominated core, the square interval dominance core, and the interval dominance core. The interval nondominated core is introduced and it is shown that it coincides with the interval core. A straightforward consequence of this result is the convexity of the interval nondominated core of any cooperative interval game. A necessary and sufficient condition for the convexity of the square interval dominance core of a cooperative interval game is also provided.

"OV & DP and BRT" some assumptions and a Case Study for studying John Nash "Game Theory" method in logistics and transportation world and that is only a briefly attempt to get familiar with the idea. A thought which asks "Is it possible to model and analyze one of the authenticity of the transport or logistics service request with respect to the Game Theory optimization idea?

The aim of this article is to measure the power of the members of french universities boards of directors, power such as mentioned by the law relative to the liberties and the responsabilities of universities (in french, the ?LRU? law). We use tools from the cooperative game theory, and particularly the power index of Banzhaf. We show that the number of the representatives of a given group, for instance the professors or the students, and the power, are concepts the relationships of which are sometimes surprising. We provide examples where the real power of decision does not necessarily belong to the groups we thought of intuitively.

We report the results of two experiments designed to study tacit coordination in a class of market entry games with linear payoff functions, binary decisions, and zero entry costs, in which each of n = 20 players must decide on each trial whether or not to enter a market whose capacity is public knowledge. The results show that although the subjects differ considerably from one another in their decision policies, tacit coordination emerges quickly on the aggregate level and is accounted for most successfully by the Nash equilibrium solution for noncooperative n-person games.

We consider non cooperative games in all-optical networks where users share the cost of the used ADM switches for realizing given communication patterns. We show that the two fundamental cost sharing methods, Shapley and Egalitarian, induce polynomial converging games with price of anarchy at most 5/3, regardless of the network topology. Such a bound is tight even for rings. Then, we show that if collusion of at most k players is allowed, the Egalitarian method yields polynomially converging games with price of collusion between ${{3}\over{2}}$ and ${{3}\over{2}}+{{1}\over{k}}$ . This result is very interesting and quite surprising, as the best known approximation ratio, that is ${{3}\over{2}}+\epsilon$ , can be achieved in polynomial time by uncoordinated evolutions of collusion games with coalitions of increasing size. Finally, the Shapley method does not induce well defined collusion games, but can be exploited in the definition of local search algorithms with local optima arbitrarily close to optimal solutions. This would potentially generate PTAS, but unfortunately the arising algorithm might not converge. The determination of new cost sharing methods or local search algorithms reaching a compromise between Shapley and Egalitarian is thus outlined as being a promising and worth pursuing investigating direction.

Change in social norms involves some peculiarities and dimensions not fully explored by conventional Law & Economics. Authors usually assume that their change is characteristically slow and incremental. However, there is not a clear consensus on the causes of those features. A possible explanation might point to computational constraints that prevent or at least hamper, taking into account, swiftly, any change. Experimental conclusions on the Ultimatum Game suggest that socialization influences the players' ...

In this paper the cone of convex cooperative fuzzy games is studied. As in the classical case of convex crisp games, these games have a large core and the fuzzy Shapley value is the barycen- ter of the core. Surprisingly, the core and the Weber set coincide ∗ This paper was written while the authors were research fellows at the

This chapter reviews non-cooperative and cooperative game theoretic models applied to the economics and management of multi-agent fisheries. We first compare two-player static and dynamic non-cooperative games, and then multiplayer non-cooperative and cooperative coalition games. In both comparisons we will make use of same type of models in order to facilitate the comparison of analyses and conclusions.

We present a game-theoretic treatment of distributed power control in CDMA wireless systems. We make use of the conceptual framework of noncooperative game theory to obtain a distributed and market-based control mechanism. Thus, we address not only the power control problem, but also pricing and allocation of a single resource among several users. A cost function is introduced as the difference between the pricing and utility functions, and the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium is established. In addition, two update algorithms, namely, parallel update and random update, are shown to be globally stable under specific conditions. Convergence properties and robustness of each algorithm are also studied through extensive simulations.

Abstract—In the telecommunication world, competition among providers to attract and keep customers is fierce. On the other hand customers churn between providers due to better prices, better reputation or better services. We propose in this paper to study the price war between two providers in the case where users ’ decisions are modeled by a Markov chain, with pricedependent transition rates. Each provider is assumed to look for a maximized revenue, which depends on the strategy of the competitor. Therefore, using the framework of non-cooperative game theory, we show how the price war can be analyzed and show the influence of various parameters. I.