Israel's national security and military history, IDF doctrine.

Israeli strategic culture is offensive and militaristic. However, in the pre-state period the Labor Zionist elites which later dominated the Israeli security and antimilitaristic approach. This article explains that its security policy was designed to perpetuate domestic political hegemony. Since the Jewish people had not developed an approach to the use of force in centuries, the formulation of Labor Zionist approaches to security allows an insight into the process by which security narratives are initially derived and the process by they may (or may not) become a reified strategic culture.

Abstract
As part of Operation Kadesh, a battalion of Israeli paratroopers were dis-
patched at the eastern entry to the Mitla Pass. The Egyptians sent an infantry
brigade to this region, but they did not attempt at destroying the enemy; one
of the battalions, however, occupied defensive positions. When the forces of
the 202nd Brigade commanded by Ariel Sharon arrived at the place, he was in-
clined to storm the Pass, but his superiors did not consent to that. Eventually,
he was allowed to send a „patrol”, to which he assigned substantial forces. The
„patrol”, commanded by Major Mordechai Gur, ran into ambush, which start-
ed long fights that in the end led to the clearing of the Mitla Pass, although it
cost Israel 36 dead soldiers. At the same time, a decision was made in Cairo to
leave the Sinai Peninsula. This article constitutes an analysis of the above Israe-
li military actions.

From the beginning of European involvement in Africa and the Middle East to the present, working with indigenous irregular forces has been, and remains, an integral part of engagement in these regions. This article examines one aspect of this relationship: the command pathways that allowed these relationships to function. By comparing the command pathways of cases in Palestine Mandate and the Horn of Africa during the Second World War, the author explores the structures that led to success and shows the importance of such cooperation. He then applies the lessons gained to suggest a way forward for contemporary operations.

The January 2020 issue of Strategic Assessment: A Multidisciplinary Journal on National Security, which was launched by the Institute for National Security Studies in 1998, is the first to appear in its new, expanded format.

Beginning with this issue, the publication, which includes essays that have undergone a process of double blind academic peer review, will continue to be published in both Hebrew and English and address the wider audience of readers and researchers in Israel and abroad. In addition to expanded academic essays, which will appear in the Research Forum, the new format will feature other content sections. Policy papers will appear in the Policy Analysis section; reviews of professional literature touching on the various disciplines of national security will appear in the Academic Survey; and in-depth interviews with experts and senior thinkers in a variety of national security topics will appear in the Professional Forum. The publication also includes a Book Review section.

Want to learn more? Click here:
https://strategicassessment.inss.org.il/en/issues/no-1-23/

In the Middle East things are not always what they seem to be. It would appear that Israel and Syria are the odd couple in the Middle East. Although their relationship seems to be typical of sworn enemies, full of aggressive rhetoric, distrust and a hostile atmosphere, in fact, however,
both countries were driven for decades by pragmatic security interests and they have managed to avoid a violent military clash. Yet the outbreak of the Syrian crisis in 2011 created an opportunity
for Israel to change the regime in Damascus and made it rethink its policy towards Syria. Therefore, Jerusalem had to decide whether to take the historical chance or stay passive.
The goal of this paper is to answer a few questions – whether the war in Syria is a challenge or a threat for Israel? How Jerusalem has tried to balance the chance to get rid of its old enemy and the fundamental security concerns about getting involved into a massive regional conflict. The analysis finds that Israel has a limited impact on events in Syria, that it is able to react at most, and in no case to create facts on the Syrian battlefront. it is also remarkable that, paradoxically, the turmoil in the Middle east even along the Israeli borders has not directly undermined the Jewish state due to the complexity of a dynamic situation and the fact the at superpowers are embroiled into contradictory campaigns.

תורת ההגנה המרחבית גובשה כבר בימי ראשית המדינה, אך מבחינת יישומה בפועל
. החלה שקיעתה עוד מימי מלחמת סיני ועד סוף העשור הראשון של המאה ה־ 21
האתגרים העכשוויים והעתידיים העומדים בפני מדינת ישראל יכולים לאפשר את
לידתה מחדש. הכותב מציע לבנות ולארגן מחדש את מערך ההגנה המרחבית המבוסס
על תושבי מרחבי הגבולות במדינה, לאור עקרונות ההגנה המרחבית מראשית שנות
החמישים ולאור הלקחים שנצברו בצה"ל ובצבאות אחרים. לטענתו, רק שילוב של מערך
ההגנה המרחבית עם הכוחות המתמרנים המוצבים בגבולות בשגרה, המסוגלים לפעילות
הגנתית והתקפית כאחד, יאפשר התמודדות יעילה עם התקפות פתע של האויב.

""The article analyzes the evolution of Israel’s strategic thought since its conception in 1948 until the 2006 Israeli-
Hezbollah war, a conflict which not only revealed the erosion of Israel’s model of citizen-soldier, the
inadequacies of its traditional strategic paradigm to the new regional environment and the operational
limitations of the Israel’s Defense Forces (IDF) when countering asymmetric and hybrid threats; but also
exposed the changing face of war. Those factors are compelling Israel to redefine its security and defence
policies as a means to adapt the country to the changing strategic landscape""

This study analyzes the sources of the current changes of military doctrines in the Middle East which share the common denominator of adopting more offensive doctrines. Examining three case studies (Iran, Israel and Saudi Arabia), this study challenges the most likely explanation of the doctrinal changes, that is the balance-of-power theory. It shows that notwithstanding systemic factors were influential, they were challenged through domestic-level factors (cultural, organizational and personalized leadership) towards making the change. This paper therefore shows that the Middle East has not been an exception when it comes to the sources of military doctrines and that the chances of interstate military conflict increases because of the adoption of offensive doctrines by important actors.

A study on understanding Israeli chauvinism based on its religious-sociological roots and the effects on Israel's militarism and its understanding of democracy.
Reading documentaries such as "Israeli Military Officer Filmed Kneeling on Palestinian's Head During Arrest" and looking at the underlying video evidence, one may wonder why a non-Jewish human life is worth so little to authoritative Israeli actors. This contribution would like to provide the enlightening background information and raise the question of what this means for the efforts towards a just Middle East peace process.
1. How politically authoritative national-religious rabbis view non-Jewish people.
2. The influence of the military rabbinate on the "sanctification" of Israel's wars.
3. How Israel's institutions deal with war crimes committed by its military.
4. A chronology of state obstruction of the investigation of his war crimes of 1948.
5. Israel's "defective", "non-liberal” democracy.
Summary – the supremacy of the Jewish.
Outlook.
(2020-10-19)

בשנים האחרונות צה"ל מגדיר את עצמו במונחים יותר ויותר מקצועיים. נוסף על החילות, שהגדרתם הפרופסיונלית הייתה ברורה עוד מראשיתם (חיל המודיעין, חיל הרפואה), תופסים לאחרונה חילות תומכי לחימה נוספים, ובהם חיל הלוגיסטיקה וחיל השלישות, את תפקידם באופן ממוקד וברור יותר, ומפתחים זיקה לדיסציפלינות אקדמיות ולמקצועות אזרחיים. גם חיל החינוך והנוער בחן בשני העשורים האחרונים מחדש את מטרותיו ואת הגדרותיו המקצועיות מתוך מגמה דומה. התהליך הזה הוליד שלל נרחב של תורות חיליות, סיכומים ומסמכי מדיניות. עיון בחיבורים הללו יוצר רושם מורכב בנוגע לתפקידו של קצין החינוך. מעֵבר לתנודתיות הרבה בהגדרות - קצין הסברה, קצין תרבות, קצין חינוך - קשה להבחין בדגם אחד ברור העולה מהם. במאמר זה אבקש לטעון כי בבסיס תפקיד קצין החינוך עומד מתח בסיסי ששורשיו בעבר הרחוק בין מודל של איש חינוך למודל של אחראי שירותים ותרבות. לניסיון להפחית את המתח הזה יש משמעות אסטרטגית בנוגע לעתידו של חיל החינוך: בעידן של התמקצעות ולנוכח ביקורת הולכת וגוברת על הפרטת המענה החינוכי לגופים אזרחיים, יהיה החיל חייב לאפיין בצורה טובה יותר את דמות הקצין, ולבחון בביקורתיות את הפרדיגמות הקיימות.

In addition to the familiar military doctrine that was mainly crafted to meet the challenge of enemy states, Israel has an additional policy regarding threats that do not fit the full-scale war rubric: harassments inflicted by hostile non-state actors.

This is an edited English version of a Hebrew-language article which was published on "Between the Boundaries - the IDF's Operational Art Journal", 15 (2018), https://www.idf.il/media/32812/%D7%99%D7%92%D7%99%D7%9C-%D7%94%D7%A0%D7%A7%D7%99%D7%9F.pdf

Civil casualties and collateral damage have been long considered as an undesired outcome of military activity that has to be reduced. While most of the contemporary discourse on this topic has been primarily concentrating on three main factors: the legal aspects of causing civil casualties, the impact of war on local population, and different factors of military professionalism required to avoid disproportional harm to civilians; this book asks an entirely different question. As the subject of civil casualties during military operations seems to be highly politicized, this book takes this discourse out of its usual niches and suggests that the indirect responsibility rests with the politicians and the public, which they represent. When a society, in the beginning of the 21st century, sends its troops to a battle, does it really care about the enemy civilian casualties? To answer this question, this book traces the political and cultural factors that have led to the failure of Non-Lethal Weapons - the great promise of the 1990s, which was intended to make the war significantly less lethal than it was known before. Examining three different cases, this study explains that the idea of minimizing civil casualties is no more than an illusion, and, in fact, neither politicians, nor societies, feel really stressed to change this situation.

On the eve of the June 1967 war in the Middle East, a small group of men in the Israeli elite considered a doomsday scenario. They all supported Israel having an overt nuclear strategy, but the dovish prime minister, Levi Eshkol, had resisted. Now, with war looming, they felt that their hour had come. Behind the scenes, these bureaucrats, scientists and officers prepared the ground for using Israel’s ultimate weapon: the nuclear bomb.

במאי 1951 יצא בן-גוריון לביקור ראשון כראש ממשלה בארצות-הברית כשהוא מלווה ב120 חיילי חיל הים.  יומנו של גולן שופך אור על ההזדמנות הנדירה שניתנה לקבוצה קטנה של חיילים ישראלים לצאת את גבולותיה של הארץ במהלכו של משבר כלכלי כבד ומתאר את המפגש שלהם עם העושר התרבותי והחומרי אותו פגשו במערב. עוד מלמד היומן על טיבו של המפגש המרגש והבלתי-אמצעי בין החיילים הישראלים לבין המוני היהודים בארצות-הברית שראו בהם ביטוי פיזי לרעיון המדינה היהודית.
אולם יותר מכך היומן חושף את הפער שבין המציאות הסמלית לבין המציאות כפי שהיא נחוותה על-ידי האדם הפשוט. מנחם גולן, כמו שאר המלחים על הספינה, נשלח לארצות-הברית כסמל של הממלכתיות הישראלית; אך בתיאורו הנראטיב של הזהות הקולקטיבית נפרט לכדי נראטיב פרטי של "האני החווה". הסמל של מלחי חיל הים הישראלי המלווים את בן-גוריון במסעו באמריקה מפורק ביומן לכדי מציאות יום-יומית של החייל המממש את תהליך ההסמלה ובזה קסמו.

Exhibition catalogue - The exhibition “Evil to the Core” addresses issues pertaining to docility and obedience to authority, conformism, social responsibility, disobedience, and non-conformism in general, and in Israeli society specifically. The exhibition combines different materials, works of art, and documentary films exploring socialization, obedience, power, authority, and resistance. Three major methods run through
them: simulation, experimentation, and reconstruction or reenactment, which may be regarded as methods shaping the reality of the present.
Artists: Amir Yaziv, Rod Dickinson, David Reeb, Artur Zmijewski, Noam Gelbart, David Tartakover, Avi Mograbi, Tamar Yarom, Uri Bar-On, Eyal Eithcowich, Yoav Shamir.

This article examines Israel's decision to launch the 1956 campaign against Egypt. While the current literature tends to argue that, in 1956, the campaign was a response by Israel to security threats, it is suggested here that, if so, these threats certainly did not predetermine any specific response. Israel could, for example, have responded by adopting a defensive posture. In reality, domestic factors were just as influential as external ones. The most important of these was the severe economic crisis caused by mass immigration to Israel during 1948–1951. This crisis in turn led to the creation in 1953–1956 of a war coalition whose three components—David Ben-Gurion (Prime Minister and Minister of Defence), MAPAI's party bosses and the army—had different interests but shared the idea of a war against Israel's Arab neighbours as a way in which each could advance its preferred aims.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: By strengthening cooperation behind the scenes, Saudi Arabia and Israel can take significant advantage of the political crisis in Lebanon and the regional developments that may result from it. Riyadh and Jerusalem should do their best to cooperate vis-à-vis the superpowers involved in Syria and Iraq, especially the US, as they attempt to shift the strategic balance towards their aligning interests. Two dramatic events occurred recently that have the potential to affect the balance of power in the Middle East, particularly in Lebanon. First, on November 4, Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri resigned while in Saudi Arabia, a move suspected to have been directed from the royal palace in Riyadh. A day later, it was reported that Saudi Arabia had intercepted a ballistic missile launched from Yemen by Houthi rebels who had intended to hit the Riyadh airport. On November 22, Hariri put his resignation on hold, but there is no sign of political stability in Lebanon for the foreseeable future. Saudi Arabia backed Hariri's intention to resign and directly accused Iran and Hezbollah of smuggling missiles into Yemen and teaching the Houthis how to operate them. Riyadh went so far as to claim that launching the missile towards the airport could be considered a "declaration of war" by Lebanon. These statements and actions join the boycott imposed on Qatar by the Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia, over what they claim to be cooperation between Doha, Tehran, Hamas, and the Muslim Brotherhood.

'Army of Shadows' is a remarkable book that adds new and significant insight to what is, without a doubt, the most exhausted topic in the modern political lexicon of nationalist disputes. Drawing on original sources in both Arabic documents of the "Arab Executive Committee" (the leading political body of the Palestinian-Arab Nationalist movement), Supreme Muslim Council and the Arab press as well as numerous memoirs, and Hebrew (Central Zionist Archives, Haganah Archives, Hebrew press and personal memoirs), Hillel Cohen traces the heretofore largely unreported history of Palestinian/Arab collaboration with the Zionist movement during the period of the British Mandate. The collaboration took the form of facilitating the sale of land to Jewish settlers, the provision of vital security intelligence, political propaganda and even military assistance.

Israel's unique characteristics call for an exceptionally broad perspective in the discussion of its national objectives. Israel's national objectives can be grouped into ten categories that incorporate the historic objectives of the Zionist movement and the strategic needs of the state that it established. The preconditions for realizing all the national objectives have already attained a critical mass. Today, a strong and self-confident country can deal with the main challenges, taking far less existential risk than it did at its outset. However, it is that very strength that presents a wide variety of options, and it is far from simple to make the choice.

For the full article, click here:
https://strategicassessment.inss.org.il/…/israels-national…/

ב-31 במרץ 1964, באישון לילה, הגיח מטוס תובלה ישראלי בשמי תימן. צוות האוויר בראשות הטייס סגן-אלוף אריה עוז, ניווט את המטוס לעבר צפון המדינה, בינות למחנות צבא מצריים. לאחר מספר רגעים זיהה עוז תחתיו מקבץ מדורות קטנות, והדליק את האור הירוק בבטן המטוס. ההצנחה החלה. תריסר מכולות עץ עמוסות לעייפה בכלי-נשק, תחמושת וציוד רפואי, ריחפו לאטן אל הקרקע,  והמטוס החל עושה את דרכו חזרה לישראל. הצנחה זו – הראשונה מ-14 פעולות דומות בשנתיים הבאות –  בוצעה במסגרת מעורבות חשאית של מדינת ישראל במלחמת האזרחים בתימן בשנות השישים. מטרת הפעילות הייתה לחזק את הפלג המלוכני בתימן, אויב המצרים, שפלשו למדינה בשלהי 1962. במאמר זה אסקור את המעורבות הישראלית בתימן על בסיס מסמכים ארכיוניים שהיו חסויים עד לאחרונה. הסקירה תעמיד את המעורבות הישראלית בתימן בפרספקטיבה של מלחמה קרה שהתנהלה בין ישראל למצרים בשנים 1967-1956.