Hybrid War

Croatia's successful bid for independence was one of the defining moments of the immediate post-Cold War period. Nevertheless, the means that Croatia used to obtain independence remains relatively unexamined by academics. This article focuses on the early period of Croatia's bid for secession, and specifically the role that Yugoslavia's policy of Total National Defence played in facilitating its independence. Unlike in Slovenia, where the legacies of Total National Defence facilitated Slovenia's bid for secession, in Croatia the decision of its political leaders meant that the country largely neglected its positive legacies, resulting in a protracted four-year struggle.

Abstract:Using leaked emails attributed to covert political actors, this study explores the Kremlin's comprehensive influence operations (active measures) to thwart Ukraine's aspirations to join the European Union. These efforts were launched by Putin as early as the beginning of 2013 to avoid losing Ukraine as part of his Eurasian integration project. In Ukraine, however, pro-Russian political forces were weak, clandestinely suppressed by President Viktor Yanukovych and his party. Moscow's major efforts, including the Rus Baptism anniversary, trade sanctions, and "Medvedchuk project" failed to turn the tide; some even backfired, consolidating support for the European project among the Ukrainian elite and public. Although Putin interrupted the signing of the EU Association Agreement by taking advantage of Yanukovych's personal weakness, he became increasingly frustrated with the Ukrainian president, who "sacrifices Russia's strategic interests&quot...

Although Hybrid Warfare is an old concept, theoretical studies in the western countries mainly began in the post-Col War era, focusing on asymmetrical threats against conventional superiority of western countries such as USA or Israel. September 11th attacks and 2006 Israel-Lebanon war played important roles for the evolution of hybrid warfare theories. However, there has not any consensus among scholars on a exact or unique definition of hybrid warfare. Hybrid warfare became one of the main security issues for the West and especially for NATO after the Russia-Ukraine crisis. Russian military strategies, called " hybrid warfare " by the western countries , resulted in the successful annexation of Crimea and, caused a serious security problem for the West resulting important structural and functional changes for the military system of NATO. Russian activities, which have been based on surprise, ambiguity and deniability, presented a unique example for hybrid warfare studies...

Hybridisota on siitä harvinainen sotatieteellinen käsite, että sen ovat valjastaneet yleisesti käyttöön niin tutkijat, media kuin päätöksentekijätkin. Käsitteestä on kirjoitettu paljon, mutta keskustelussa on viime aikoina nähty harvoja tuoreita näkökulmia. Yksi olennainen ja tähänastisessa keskustellussa puuttunut näkökulma on hybridisodan evoluutio ja tämän seuraukset. Kirjoittaja käsittelee hybridisotakäsitteen alkuperää ja käsitteen laajentumista osana nykyaikaisen sodan sodankäynnin muutosta.

Este artigo tem o intuito de analisar as medidas de política externa adotadas pela Rússia nos anos de 2014-2015 que resultaram na invasão da Federação à Crimeia, sob a ótica do Modelo de Hermann, com a seguinte questão norteadora: diante da invasão à Crimeia e quebra da soberania do país, em que medida as ações de política externa da Rússia foram influenciadas pelas mudanças de governo na Ucrânia? Para isto, levou-se em consideração breve contexto histórico da crise ucraniana, bem como as três mudanças de governo em curto prazo e se aplicou o modelo de Hermann, contextualizado com o entendimento conceitual de GuerraHíbrida, uma vez que as estratégias de guerra do governo russo na Crimeia foram de vias convencionais e não convencionais. Como síntese da pesquisa aqui apresentada, produziu-se um quadro demonstrativo da aplicação do Modelo de Hermann nas mudanças dos governos ucranianos e os tipos de guerra observados.

The issue of the autocephaly of Ukrainian Orthodoxy has once again demonstrated that the concept of atheism and the fight against religion propagated by the communists did not bring the expected results. On the contrary, religion has become a factor that connects societies in the republics of the former USSR with the former metropolis, especially for Slavic and Orthodox populations. It should not come as a surprise, therefore, that the problem of the autocephaly of Ukrainian Orthodoxy has been exploited in the current Russian-Ukrainian dispute, described as a post-imperial hybrid war. The aim of this article is to show how both sides of the conflict are using the issue of the autocephaly of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. Streszczenie: Kwestia autokefalii ukraińskiego prawosławia po raz kolejny pokazała, że propagowana przez komunistów koncepcja ateizmu i walki z religią nie przyniosła w perspektywie takich rezultatów, jakich oczekiwano. Odwrotnie-religia stała się czynnikiem integrującym społeczeństwa republik byłego ZSRR z dawną metropolią, a uwaga ta dotyczy zwłaszcza ludności sło-wiańskiej i prawosławnej. Nie powinno zatem dziwić, że problem autokefalii ukraińskiego prawosławia został wykorzystany w aktualnym sporze rosyjsko-ukraińskim, określanym jako postimperialna wojna hybrydowa. Celem ni-niejszego artykułu jest ukazanie, jak obie strony konfliktu wykorzystują temat autokefalii ukraińskiego prawosławia.

After the Euromaidan (2013) and the war in the East of Ukraine (2014) youth in this country experienced a new situation, i.e., life during the “Hybrid War”. The article analyses the situation of the young generation in Ukraine in the frameworks of this new war. In addition to this, the author attempts to answer the question of whether there is a sense of patriotism among the young people related to the defence of the motherland during the Hybrid War. The results show the first experiences of the young people towards the unusual situation in which they find themselves. The new reality requires them to have a thorough understanding of patriotism. Patriotism is based on primary motives related to a sense of duty to their country and striving for unity of sometimes totally different parts of the country. This article shows that Patriotism not only still exists in the young generation, but it is fundamental for the myth that will influence next generations.

Осторожное начало
Во время Холодной войны многие западные дипломаты и ученые овладели русским языком и изучали с его помощью все аспекты советской политической, экономической, культурной, социальной и научной жизни. Очевидно, все они хотели отполировать и опробовать свое знание русского языка и советских реалий, посетив Союз Советских Социалистических Республик. КГБ тщательно проверял кандидатов, и многих туда не пускали.
С другой стороны, большинство западных гостей остро осознавали необходимость быть осторожными в коммунистическом тоталитарном государстве. Советские власти должны были «помогать»  им путем тщательного надзора, что ограничивало большинство шансов на несанкционированные встречи с простыми советскими гражданами. Обременительная система разрешений на поездки надежно сдерживала поездки любопытных в Москву и Ленинград (нынешний Санкт-Петербург). Для них были закрыты не только большинство сельских и провинциальных районов Российской Советской Федеративной Социалистической Республики, но и, как правило, региональные столицы других четырнадцати Советских Социалистических Республик.
Конечно, русский был основным советским языком, поэтому СССР был лучшим местом для изучения его до падения коммунизма и последующего распада Советского Союза. Однако западные ученые и дипломаты хорошо знали, что Советский Союз не был дружественной страной. Помимо кратковременных периодов разрядки, идеология марксизма-ленинизма предсказывала скорое уничтожение капиталистически-буржуазного Запада, включая его идеологический, экономический и военный центр – США. Холодная война была идеологической борьбой между советским блоком и Западом. Однако только военная доктрина взаимно гарантированного ядерного уничтожения не позволила этому конфликту перерасти в прямую «горячую» конфронтацию между НАТО и Варшавским договором.
Ни для кого не было секретом, что некоторые западные ученики русского языка во время учебной поездки в СССР были или станут шпионами. Это работало и в обратном направлении, когда Кремль разрешил некоторым заранее отобранным советским студентам изредка бывать на Западе. Они совершенствовали владение западными языками для того, чтобы заниматься шпионажем. Самый сложный случай был представлен немецким языком, который был одновременно коммунистическим и капиталистическим, в Восточной и Западной Германии соответственно. Действующий президент России Владимир Путин работал офицером КГБ в Восточной Германии. Свободное владение немецким языком сослужило ему хорошую службу. В прошлом он очаровал бывшего канцлера Германии Герхарда Шрёдера, сделав его горячим сторонником и сторонником кремлевского режима. Взамен Шрёдер был щедро вознагражден постом председателя правления российского нефтяного гиганта Роснефти и Nord Stream AG. Последняя фактически принадлежит крупнейшему российскому нефтегазовому игроку – «Газпрому». Nord Stream AG управляет Балтийским морским газопроводом из России в Германию. Считается, что этот спорный трубопровод нарушает энергетическую политику Европейского союза, которая, среди прочего, запрещает опасную зависимость от поставок энергоносителей со стороны антиевропейских диктаторских режимов.
Однако президенту Путину не так повезло с очарованием действующего канцлера Германии Ангелы Меркель. Благодаря своему детству и юности в Восточной Германии, она хорошо знает, что немецкий язык может быть одинаково легко функционировать и как язык демократии, и как язык тоталитаризма. Немецкие языки Западной и Восточной Германии были весьма разными, так как идеологически противоположными – хотя, казалось бы, взаимно понятными.

Diplomová práce se věnuje nástrojům k zajištění bezpečnosti České republiky v hybridních válkách s důrazem na pozici České republiky ve vyvíjejícím se bezpečnostním prostředí a na východiska české bezpečnosti. Hlavní změny bezpečnostního prostředí a koncept hybridních válek slouží jako teoretický základ, z něhož jsou v rámci zkoumané pozice ČR, změn prostředí a bezpečnostních východisek České republiky definovány výzvy české bezpečnosti na poli hybridních válek. Vymezení a analýza těchto výzev je klíčová ke schopnosti určit relevantní nástroje k zajištění bezpečnosti České republiky vůči hybridním hrozbám. Autor práce využívá především kvalitativní analýzu a z hlediska operacionalizace vychází jeho zkoumání z neo-pozitivistického vysvětlujícího paradigmatu zaměřujícího se na specifický případ, kterým jsou hybridní války v českém bezpečnostním prostředí. První kapitola práce se věnuje novým bezpečnostním výzvám se zvláštním důrazem na hybridní války. Druhá kapitola se zaměřuje na Českou republiku a její bezpečnost v době hybridních válek s ohledem na česká bezpečnostní východiska a hybridní výzvy, kterým je ČR vystavena. Poslední kapitola diplomové práce pak propojuje předchozí zkoumání změn bezpečnostního prostředí, hybridních válek, východisek české bezpečnosti a hybridních výzev a identifikuje a analyzuje nástroje k zajištění bezpečnosti České republiky proti hybridním hrozbám.

This Master thesis deals with Security Instruments of the Czech Republic in Hybrid Warfare with an emphasis on the position of the Czech Republic in the evolving security environment and on the conceptual and strategical bases of Czech security. The main changes in the security environment, in which the Czech Republic is located, and the concept of Hybrid Warfare serve as a theoretical basis to define challenges of Czech security in the field of Hybrid Warfare. Defining and analyzing these challenges is crucial to identify relevant Security Instruments of the Czech Republic to face those challenges. The author uses mainly qualitative analysis and operationalization of his research is based on a neo-positivistic explanatory paradigm focusing on the specific case of Hybrid Warfare in the Czech security environment. The first chapter focuses on new security challenges, with particular emphasis on Hybrid Warfare. The second chapter deals with the Czech Republic and its security in the era of Hybrid Warfare with regard to the Czech conceptual and strategical bases and hybrid challenges that the Czech Republic faces. The last chapter of the thesis combines previous research of changes in the security environment, concept of Hybrid Warfare, conceptual and strategical base of the Czech security and Czech hybrid challenges to identify and analyze instruments to ensure the security of the Czech Republic against hybrid threats.

Розроблено теоретичну модель соціально-психологічного супроводу реадаптації ветеранів в умовах гібридних війни та миру. За допомогою методик визначення посттравматичних станів і адаптивності у форматі case study двох ветеранів представлено їх динаміку після завершення ветеранами реабілітаційного етапу відновлення. Зазначено чинники ретравмівного впливу на їх особистість в умовах гібридних війни та миру. Серед зовнішніх соціальних чинників визначено продовження обстрілів і загибель українських військовослужбовців і мирного населення на сході країни та проросійські настрої певної частини українських громадян. Стосовно психологічних чинників вказано внутрішній конфлікт субособистостей «ворога» і «захисника», зумовлені ним проекції і неадекватні поведінкові прояви. Зазначено необхідність соціально-психологічного супроводу реадаптації ветеранів та членів їхніх сімей для нейтралізації та усунення деструктивної дії цих чинників. З’ясовано мотиви участі ветеранів у супроводі, такі як допомога побратимам, зміцнення психіки, покращення стосунків у сім’ї, забезпечення якості життя для сім’ї, родини і країни. Розроблено теоретичну модель супроводу реадаптації ветеранів в умовах гібридних війти та миру. Показана доцільність використання принципів командотворення та технології взаємодії «рівний – рівному» у реадаптаційному процесі. У якості центрального елемента моделі визначено команду фахівців і ветеранів, учасників програми реадаптації. До її периферійних елементів віднесено мережу громадських та державних організацій, які працюють у сфері психологічної, медичної та соціальної підтримки ветеранів. Серед громадських – це організації ветеранів і волонтерів, які працюють в регіонах. Серед державних організацій - це обласні відділи Департаментів міністерства ветеранів України, військові госпіталі, соціальні центри для сім’ї, дітей та молоді, центри занятості, територіальні центри соціального обслуговування та інші організації. Виокремлено реабілітаційно-профілактичний, соціальної та професійної адаптації, науково-дослідний і інформаційний підрозділі структури моделі. Реабілітаційно-профілактичний підрозділ має убезпечувати ветеранів від ретравматизації, залежностей та суїцидальної поведінки в умовах гібридних війни і миру в Україні. Підрозділ соціальної та професійної адаптації покликаний допомагати ветеранам у віднайдені місця праці та набуття необхідної професійної кваліфікації. Науково-дослідний підрозділ має забезпечувати ефективність реалізації супроводу, проводити моніторинг отриманих результатів, оптимізувати зворотний зв’язок між основними структурними елементами СПСР і системою в цілому. Інформаційна структура має надавати необхідну інформацію користувачам та фахівцям центру щодо обміну досвідом учасників супроводу. Також вона має інформувати потенційних користувачів, партнерські організації, інших представників громади про труднощі і здобутки супроводу ветеранів. У подальших дослідженнях необхідно з’ясувати ефективність розробленої моделі, умови і засоби її поширення, за потребою, в інших регіонах України.

Journalists and think-tankers adopt the Kremlin’s take on the term, speaking of “Russian soft power” when they really mean manipulation practices and disinformation. This corruption of a valuable IR concept has serious ramifications for the freedom of speech. The Kremlin’s disinformation activities produced an unfortunate mutation of the term “soft power”, not only in Russia itself but also in the West. Like many other Western concepts, “soft power” was appropriated by Russians – and misunderstood in the process.  Nye’s original definition referred to the non-military power of attraction that stemmed from a country’s culture and political values. In Russia “soft power” was reinterpreted in much more sinister shades, as an information war weapon, meant to destabilise societies and bring down governments. Following the Ukraine crisis of 2014, the Western policy community has paid increased attention to the Kremlin’s subversive operations, and “propaganda” and “hybrid war” became buzzwords. Sadly, in this context, some journalists and think-tankers adopted the Kremlin’s take on the term, speaking of “Russian soft power” when they really meant disinformation and manipulation practices. This conflation does not only corrupt a valuable IR concept which can be used to analyse genuine Russian soft power. It can also have serious ramifications for key Western freedoms – such as the freedom of speech.

Th e contemporary security environment indicates non-conventional, asymmetric and hybrid security threats as potentially the most accurate threats to global and regional security. Confl ict risks in the regional frame strongly depend on strategically aimed non-military, but hybrid acts. Th e great powers mostly attempt to achieve their own interests' goals in fulfi llment of self-orientated strategic dominance. Th e Balkan region is a crossroads of strongly exposed interest spheres of regional as well as global powers. Th e article aims to determine areas of infl uence in the Balkan States that could become targets of predominantly non-military but hybrid infl uences. Multi-Value Quality Comparative Analyses (mvQCA) of state power, stability and resilience capacities were used in the research. Th e methodology used was based on the approach with multi-valued sets of variables and conditions. A theoretical framework was based on contemporary theories of state power and hybrid warfare concept. Used databases were brought together from generated open source databases of approved international academic or think-tank organisations. Based on a hypothesis regarding hybrid security threats, a theoretical framework of understanding of power and analysing a wide spectra of databases, the article aims to contribute a rational and objective understanding of two main indicators: the potential to become a target and the resilience capacities of countries in the face of hybrid security threats. Its fi ndings indicate that most countries in the Balkan region are potentially under unarmed infl uences and have very low resilience capabilities against  possible hybrid infl uences. Th e conclusions reached help to clarify that the Balkan States are vulnerable to hybrid security threats.

The refugee crisis in Western Europe, Islamist terrorism abroad and increasingly also in the intra-European context, Organized criminality, human trafficking and cyber attacks or, Cybercrime are examples of hybrid threats which more often affect the powers of national security organs and overtax them. The answer would be a Western European basic consensus on regional cooperation of all concerned security agencies to address these threats through a comprehensive security hybrid approach.  Such an approach presupposes, however also an appropriate legal framework alongside a political consensus  - a challenge that must be overcome.

Hybrid Warfare is an old, multifaceted method of war where different actors, state and non-state, aim to reach their political or military goals by using a mix of conventional and non-conventional, or irregular, methods, as well as kinetic and non-kinetic means. Hybrid Warfare has become increasingly sophisticated, and deadly (often involving cyberwarfare, propaganda and non-state adversary) and the methods used has a long history of successful employment. Similarly, Lawfare (the use of law as a weapon) is defined as " the strategy of using or misusing law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective ". Lawfare therefore encompasses both affirmative as well as malicious use and has a goal of manipulating law by changing legal paradigms. Outline of research This paper focuses on Hybrid Warfare and Lawfare and tries to foster discussion and thought on how to use Lawfare affirmatively and how to prevent opponents successfully using law maliciously to achieve their objectives. This paper also examines recent development in Hybrid Warfare including North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO's open source perspectives on 'Hybrid Threats'. Another focus of this paper is to discuss about Lawfare and examine several examples where it has been used maliciously to erode and delegitimize the opponent by ignoring or abusing law in order to create confusion in public opinion. Key findings and impact • Hybrid warfare uses overt and covert activities which can include military, paramilitary, irregular and civilian actors targeted to achieve (geo) political and strategic objectives. • Russia used hybrid warfare in Crimea and the Donbas region of Ukraine, with its deployment of 'little green man' namely, soldiers wearing unmarked uniforms. • NATO, in 2010, used the term 'Hybrid Threats' which was revised in 2011 as 'Concept of Hybrid Threats'. With a resolution to prepare for Russia's use of Hybrid Warfare and threats, in 2015 NATO announced the cooperation on aspects of a new Hybrid Warfare program and a new Hybrid Warfare Strategy. • Lawfare thrives on legal ambiguity and exploits legal thresholds and fault line. It presents challenges to international peace and security by questioning the validity of existing public international law rules thus leading to emergence of " asymmetric warfare by abusing laws " .

This paper analyzes the main themes and patterns used by Romanian communication programs on defense and security during the Ukrainian crises, from November 2013 until the ceasefire of September 5th. Acknowledging the change made in the Romanian leadership’s understanding of the security concept during the last 25 years of country’s transition from communism to democracy, the study found out that the narrative used by the Romanian institutions might lead to a new understanding on whose job is to protect the country in case of a military aggression. Currently. the bearer of this responsibility appears to be, for Romanians, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU) and the Romanians themselves, in this order. For the timeframe analyzed, for what is spoken and written in the media by the politicians and, afterward, re-represented by the general public (developed by opinion polls) it seems that for the military dimension, the security responsibility was somehow outsourced.

В статті розкриті сутнісні характеристики асиметричної відповіді, за допомогою якої слабша сторона може одержати перемогу у боротьбі з сильнішим супротивником. Наведені історичні та сучасні приклади асиметричних відповідей в рамках гібридної війни та асиметричних стратегій, зокрема відповідь Радянського Союзу на програму протидії «Стратегічній оборонній ініціативі» Р. Рейгана та елементи асиметричної відповіді у військово-політичній стратегії сучасної Японії.
Показано, що асиметрична відповідь в умовах гібридної війни передбачає використання як військових, так і невійськових методів: політичних, інформаційних, дипломатичних, економічних та пропагандистських. Серед невійськових методів можна, зокрема, назвати залякування протилежної сторони, провокування її на неспівмірні економічні витрати, спонукання на односторонні поступки.
Окрема увага зосереджена на таких видах асиметричної відповіді, як інформаційна та кібернетична. Проведено розмежування термінів інформаційний та кібернетичний (простір, зброя, атака тощо). Розкрито особливості використання сучасних мас-медіа в гібридній війні. Проаналізовано досвід використання кіберпростору та кіберзброї в сучасних конфліктах. Досліджені перспективи використання кіберпростору в умовах україно-російського протистояння. Підкреслено, що кібернетичний вектор для нашої держави є одним із найперспективніших векторів асиметричної відповіді агресору.

The paper disclosed the essential characteristics of an asymmetric response, through which the weaker side may obtain a victory in the fight against a stronger opponent. Presented the historical and contemporary examples of asymmetric responses in the framework of hybrid warfare and asymmetric strategies, in particular the response of the Soviet Union to the program of counteraction to the Strategic Defense Initiative of R. Reagan and asymmetric response elements in the military and political strategy of modern Japan.
It is shown that the asymmetric response in terms of hybrid warfare involves the use of both military and non-military methods: political, informational, diplomatic, economic and propaganda. Among non-military methods may be called, in particular, intimidating the other side, provoking it to incommensurable economic cost, prompting unilateral concessions.
Special attention is focused on these types of asymmetric responses as information and cyber-response. Given a distinction between the terms “information” and “cybernetic” (space, weapons, attack, etc.). It is shown the features of the use of modern media in the hybrid war. It is analyzed the experience of use the cyberspace and cyberweapon in modern conflicts. investigated the prospects use of cyberspace in terms of Ukraine-Russia conflict. Emphasized that cyber vector for our country is one of the most promising vectors of asymmetric response to aggressor.

Considerable attention is paid by the media to information warfare, even though at times this coverage is rather superficial. What's more, it reveals very little as far as its actual role and effectiveness. At present, high on the agenda is namely the Russian information campaign, which has taken on gargantuan dimensions, mainly in the region of the Baltic states and Central Europe. To grasp its effectiveness, it is first useful to understand what information warfare is. By far, information warfare is not new to conflicts, with some of its elements employed already during antiquity, still new ones appearing with the advent of the information age. Even though the notion of today's information warfare is hard to define, it has several dimensions – information, psychological and cyber. What's more, information warfare is part of hybrid war, a complicated and complex phenomenon in its own right. Information first and foremost Information is of key importance in information warfare, and can be used in several ways, such as manipulation, i.e. provision of erroneous information to the enemy with an aim to confound or to affect the decision-making. A good example of this strategy is the Normandy landings during WWII, when the allies employed manipulation with information to make Nazi Germany believe that the landings will take place elsewhere than expected. The second way to use information to one's advantage is to induce fear and thus dissuade the enemy from action. This example refers to classic deterrence, characteristic of the Cold War period. Third, the information can be used to influence public opinion at home or abroad. When used on the home front, it can be employed for in uencing public opinion with an aim of gaining the support of the popula on in key poli cal decisions or convincing them of the necessity of certain steps. The same goes for in uencing public opinion on the territory of another country with exactly the opposite aim of undermining the peoples' con dence vis-vis the state and thus in uencing the decisions of its top leadership. The last and the most widespread way to use informa on is in cyberspace. Cyberspace allows individuals to manipulate, use, gather and input information at will on a massive scale.

Prime Minister Yatseniuk announces resignation
Dutch voters say ‘no’ to Ukraine’s Association Agreement. Referendum unlikely to stop
Ukraine’s integration with EU but sends a ‘worrisome signal’.
President Poroshenko under closer scrutiny after ‘Panama Papers’ scandal erupts
Western conditionality instigates slow progress in Ukraine’s anti-corruption reforms
Security situation in East Ukraine deteriorates, conflict resolution in deadlock

General Prosecutor Viktor Shokin sacked,  political infighting continues

PM Yatseniuk's resignation failed in Parliament, coalition remains fragile

Visa free travel to EU may be postponed as Ukraine struggles with anti-corruption reform

Hybrid warfare continues, Western partners insist on importance of elections for Donbas

Die Ukraine ist zwar kein EU-Mitgliedsstaat, jedoch aufgrund ihrer geografischen Nähe, prekären Situation und hohen Bedeutung für die europäische Sicherheitsordnung für die Union und Deutschland wichtig. Vor diesem Hintergrund verdienen die sogenannte „Ukraine-Krise“, d.h. die russischen Machenschaften in Osteuropa und ihre sicherheitspolitischen Folgen mehr Aufmerksamkeit. Die häufigen Diskussionen, ob die Ukraine und Russland zu Europa gehören, haben angesichts der Dringlichkeit existenziellerer Fragen eine therapeutische Funktion. Die „großen Fragen Europas“ lenken davon ab, dass die EU zunächst adäquate Antworten auf einige triviale Gefährdungen ihrer eigenen Sicherheit finden muss.

Bakalaura darbā “Francijas, Itālijas un Nīderlandes divpusējā militārā sadarbība ar Ukrainu” tiek pētīts, kā atšķiras Francijas, Itālijas un Nīderlandes divpusēja militārā sadarbība ar Ukrainu kopš militārā konflikta izcelšanās tās teritorijā 2014. gadā. Darba teorētisko pamatu veido mūsdienu hibrīdās karadarbības teoriju iztirzājums, bet empīriskā izpēte tiek balstīta uz militārās sadarbības izpausmju klasifikāciju- tiešā militārā sadarbība (konvencionālā militārā sadarbība un sadarbība hibrīddraudu novēršanas jomā) un netiešā militārā sadarbība (humānā un medicīniskā palīdzība un darbības pret agresorvalsti). Pētījumā secināts, ka atšķirīgas hibrīdkara prioritizēšanas rezultātā Francijai, Itālijai un Nīderlandei ir atšķirīgas pieejas tam, kā īstenot militāro sadarbību ar Ukrainu; šo valstu darbības, īstenojot militāro sadarbību, netiek savstarpēji koordinētas.Bilateral military cooperation of France, Italy and the Netherlands with Ukraine since the outbreak of the military conflic...

The beginning of the twenty-first century was marked by a proliferation of hybrid wars, fought between flexible and sophisticated adversaries engaged in asymmetric conflicts using various forms of warfare according to the purpose and timing. The emergence of this kind of war specifically for the new globalized economy, increasingly integrated and polarized, has questioned traditional and conventional military thinking, generated a debate on the definition of the new concept of hybrid war and appropriate measures to take, in order to adapt to the new reality imposed by it. The violent conflict between Russia and Ukraine that broke out in 2014 has become a case study for hybrid conflict thru which Russia revealed only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to reinforce its imperialistic view on foreign policy. Russia will continue to wage a massive propaganda and information warfare campaign with the ultimate goal of undermining NATO and the EU by creating a pro-Russian narrative and even political change. This part of hybrid warfare will not easily disappear: it has been part of Russian thinking for over half of a century. This article focuses on the Russian strategy of indirect warfare during the Ukrainian crisis, providing also an analytical overview of the political developments of relations between Russia and the EU following the 2014 events in Ukraine.

The Russian Federation has managed to take the world by surprise: first, by conducting a successful rescue operation in support of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, and second, by having become an indispensable power broker in the wider Middle Eastern region. As far as Syria is concerned, by the end of 2019, Assad’s regime had effectively been saved by Russia’s political and military support in the form of its direct intervention in the Syrian Civil War. Russia’s decisive action in this situation enhanced its status throughout the Middle East region. This article aims to ascertain to what extent has Russia’s conduct merely taken advantage of the vacuum left by the U.S. and the West, and to what extent can it be considered a premeditated and carefully considered plan that fits within Russia’s wider strategic objectives. First, the authors will take a closer look at the strategic assumptions that have enabled Russia to enhance its status in the region, focusing in particular on those...

Security issues in the 21st Century must be viewed through a multilayer prism. As the international system moves towards a multipolar structure opportunities and challenges are cast upon strong and less powerful States alike. Russia has become in recent years a key power player in Europe and more recently in other geographical locations outside its post-Cold War priorities during the nineties. It is with this background that the article aims to comprehend the motivations and concrete actions with which Moscow has reshaped its foreign policy towards Latin America. Particular interest is placed on the apparent similarities between Russia and its allies in the region. Focusing on the increasing number of former and active military, security and intelligence officers placed in government and civilian positions in Russia, Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua. Along with the strong ideological, economic, military and intelligence relations between these countries.

This article analyzes the current state of collaboration between NATO and the EU, with particular reference to the hybrid conflict sector. There has always existed a close relationship of interdependence between the two organizations. In 2016, this interdependence experienced a collaborative surge with the signing of a joint declaration at the Warsaw Summit. Since then,NATO and the European Union have actively collaborated in various sectors, including hybrid warfare. In the future, both organizations will need to improve the exchange of information and intelligence collaboration. However, this analysis aims to point out that NATO and the EU, if they wish to limit the scope of their opponents’ manoeuvrability, since hybrid conflict tends to develop below the threshold of what is generally accepted as the definition of armed conflict, will have to work together to outline a new legal framework that redefines the definition of armed conflict.

Desde su fundación, hace ya más de 200 años, la República Argentina ha tenido conflictos que han requerido el uso de las fuerzas armadas, tanto dentro del territorio nacional como fuera de él. El ámbito internacional y el interno se han constituido como coautores de tales situaciones, en la medida en que quienes gobernaron y gobiernan el país llevaron y llevan adelante determinadas estrategias políticas, necesariamente entablando relaciones con diferentes países y sus respectivos mandatarios, que han decantado o pueden decantar en conflictos armados.
Es por esto que siempre es relevante conocer cuáles son los conflictos que se pueden presentar al mandatario de turno en el país hoy, en caso de que exista-repentinamente-una posible necesidad de armarse para la defensa. Nuestra propuesta es examinar cuáles son las características que presentan los conflictos que podrían surgir en la actualidad, bajo el espectro de la denominada "Guerra Híbrida", así como las herramientas que se requieren para hacerle frente. Además, nos interesamos por indagar cuál es la posición de Argentina hoy ante tal situación.

* Ponencia preparada para el IV Congreso Nacional de Relaciones Internacionales del Ateneo de Estudios Internacionales (AEI) y X Jornadas de la Red Federal de Estudios sobre Malvinas (ReFEM 2065) realizados en la Universidad Nacional de Río Cuarto los días 12 y 13 de septiembre de 2019.

The unprecedented transparency shown by the Netherlands intelligence services in exposing Russian GRU officers in October 2018 is indicative of a number of new trends in state handling of cyber conflict. US public indictments of foreign state intelligence officials, and the UK's deliberate provision of information allowing the global media to "dox" GRU officers implicated in the Salisbury poison attack in early 2018, set a precedent for revealing information that previously would have been confidential. This is a major departure from previous practice where the details of state-sponsored cyber attacks would only be discovered through lengthy investigative journalism (as with Stuxnet) or through the efforts of cybersecurity corporations (as with Red October). This paper uses case studies to illustrate the nature of this departure and consider its impact, including potentially substantial implications for state handling of cyber conflict. The paper examines these implications, including:

• The effect of transparency on perception of conflict. Greater public knowledge of attacks will lead to greater public acceptance that countermeasures should be taken. This may extend to public preparedness to accept that a state of declared or undeclared war exists with a cyber aggressor.

• The resulting effect on legality. This adds a new element to the long-running debates on the legality of cyber attacks or counterattacks , by affecting the point at which a state of conflict is politically and socially, even if not legally, judged to exist.

• The further resulting effect on permissions and authorities to conduct cyber attacks, in the form of adjustment to the glaring imbalance between the means and methods available to aggressors (especially those who believe themselves already to be in conflict) and defenders. Greater openness has already intensified public and political questioning of the restraint shown by NATO and EU nations in responding to Russian actions; this trend will continue.

• Consequences for deterrence, both specifically within cyber conflict and also more broadly deterring hostile actions.

In sum, the paper brings together the direct and immediate policy implications, for a range of nations and for NATO, of the new apparent policy of transparency.

What are the ethical pitfalls of countering hybrid warfare? This article proposes an ontological security-inspired reading of the EU and NATO’s engagement with hybrid threats. It illustrates how hybrid threat management collapses their daily security struggles into ontological security management exercise. This has major consequences for defining the threshold of an Article 5 attack and the related response for NATO, and the maintenance of a particular symbolic order and identity narrative for the EU. The institutionalisation of hybrid threat counteraction emerges as a routinisation strategy to cope with the “known unknowns”. Fostering resilience points at the problematic prospect of compromising the fuzzy distinction between politics and war: the logic of hybrid conflicts presumes that all politics could be reduced to a potential build-up phase for a full-blown confrontation. Efficient hybrid threat management faces the central paradox of militant democracy whereby the very attempt to defend democracy might harm it.

In this article for CAPX (https://capx.co), I argue that:

First, Russian strategy is holistic, and so our response must be too.

Second, the UK can't just sit and stare at the burgeoning Russian threat.

Third, an imploding US presidency could turn a series of crises into abject disaster - and Trump is under severe pressure over his links to the Kremlin.

Finally, we need to develop ideas and policies to respond to these threats – yet we are fumbling for answers.

For a Russian language version of this article, please see: https://nv.ua/opinion/sili/britanii-pora-osoznat-uhrozu-rossii--2443240.html

Com o recurso à força armada na Geórgia em 2008 e na Crimeia em 2014 resultou na acusação do Ocidente da Rússia de ser um ator desestabilizador da segurança europeia, na medida em que “aumentou significativamente a atividade militar nas proximidades das fronteiras da North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), bem como a disposição demonstrada a usar a força para atingir os seus objetivos de política externa” (NATO, 2015b). Igualmente, o debate ocidental nos estudos da segurança sobre as aproximações não tradicionais ou pós-clausewitzianas na guerra ganhou proeminência com a anexação da Crimeia em março de 2014. A Cimeira de Gales da NATO, em setembro de 2014, espelhou a resposta internacional à nova e eficaz forma de guerra, que desafia estruturalmente a Aliança – a guerra híbrida.

The purpose of this chapter is to assess how the Department of Defense Law of War Manual approaches the relationship between the law of war and international human rights law, as seen against the broader context of the changing legal framework of warfare and military operations.

National military manuals are widely understood to serve two main functions. They are an instrument for disseminating the law of war and for expressing a nation’s understanding of its own legal obligations. The first function is essentially passive. Manuals convey the rules to their readers, even if this means translating the black letter of the law into a different format. The second function is dynamic. As Professor Charles Garraway notes, the aim of national manuals “is not to reach a consensus agreement, but to reflect the position adopted by the State concerned.” In doing so, national manuals shape the law by applying, reaffirming and developing it. These two functions pull the DoD Manual in different directions. Promoting a better understanding of the challenges posed by international human rights law requires a nuanced approach that acknowledges the multifaceted relationship between the law of war and human rights. However, such subtlety is difficult to reconcile with the certainty that the application of the law on the battlefield and the effective promotion of the United States’ national position on these matters demands. In its response to the changing legal framework of warfare, the Law of War Manual is thus torn between enlightenment and advocacy.

I develop these arguments in three steps. The first section of the chapter will trace the evolving character of the legal framework of warfare, including the impact of international human rights law. The second section will explore the Manual’s response to these developments. The third section will assess the Manual’s approach against the two traditional functions of military manuals, the law-disseminating and the law-shaping function.

The aim of this study is to discuss civilian dimension of hybrid wars. To understand the linkage between civil affairs and military effectiveness in hybrid wars a new model was developed, offering a thorough approach with two pillars colored by hybrid environment. It was argued that the environment shaped by regular and irregular threats compels land forces to understand the chaos in which a vast array of contingencies blend, making the confrontation more complex. Then, civilian dimension was viewed in twofold. It was underlined that while the militaries that hold robust support domestically could be labeled as fortunate in terms of resource allocation, on the other hand the interaction with target population in human security, humanitarian assistance, cooperation and coordination aspects helps soldiers in force employment, force acceptance and force protection domains. It was put forth the argument that because asymmetrical actors in hybrid environment are obliged to exploit civilians for diverse reasons, it wouldn't be so assertive to claim that who wins the civilians wins the war.