The Version of Record, after refereeing, has been published in the Journal of Peasant Studies, 22 January 2020 http://www.tandfonline.com/, 2020
NGOs in China cannot operate successfully and achieve their goals if they lose the trust of the c... more NGOs in China cannot operate successfully and achieve their goals if they lose the trust of the community they seek to serve. In the wake of the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, an environmental NGO lost the support of villagers and grassroots leaders partly because of poor communication and limited responsiveness to community concerns. But better downward accountability would only have exposed a deeper mismatch in goals and aspirations. Villagers and village cadres did not want what the NGO had on offer and the NGO, as a value-driven organization, was handcuffed by its mission. This article examines tensions over home reconstruction, organic agriculture, eco-tourism, self-governance, embroidery workshops and local elite displacement to highlight the importance of trust and value clashes when studying how a rural collaboration with an NGO can collapse. It is also a cautionary tale about community power. Villagers and grassroots cadres had the ability to thwart an NGO and drive it out, but theirs was the power to frustrate and block, not to make their dreams of development real.
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authorities sometimes do so by establishing nearly impossible eligibility requirements or requiring paperwork that outsiders struggle to obtain. At times they also nudge migrants to seek healthcare or education elsewhere by enforcing dormant rules or by shutting down a locally
available service provider. Limiting access to public services saves cities a vast amount of money and isolates and disempowers migrants. Phantom services are a consequence of the localization of the household registration system (hukou 户口) and a sign that new axes of
inequality and gradations of second-class citizenship have emerged.
research on protest has produced little on veterans’ collection action, and even
less on that by ex-officers. Newspaper reports, police journals, and veterans’
blogs show that contention by Chinese former officers (ranging from occupying
government compounds to marches, mass petitioning, open letters, and class
action lawsuits) is the result of bad luck in post-military job assignments, a fragmented
political system that makes it difficult to ensure that pensions and other
benefits reach retirees, and pervasive corruption that leads ex-officers to feel
that local officials have embezzled funds meant for them. Contention by former
officers typically uses military rhetoric and builds on military experiences, even
for former officers who were employed in civilian jobs for many years. Although
contention by ex-officers is not likely to rock the state, it says much about how
‘‘sticky’’ military identities are, where veterans fit in the political landscape, Leninist
civil–military relations, and the treatment that old soldiers receive in a fast
changing socioeconomic order.
authorities sometimes do so by establishing nearly impossible eligibility requirements or requiring paperwork that outsiders struggle to obtain. At times they also nudge migrants to seek healthcare or education elsewhere by enforcing dormant rules or by shutting down a locally
available service provider. Limiting access to public services saves cities a vast amount of money and isolates and disempowers migrants. Phantom services are a consequence of the localization of the household registration system (hukou 户口) and a sign that new axes of
inequality and gradations of second-class citizenship have emerged.
research on protest has produced little on veterans’ collection action, and even
less on that by ex-officers. Newspaper reports, police journals, and veterans’
blogs show that contention by Chinese former officers (ranging from occupying
government compounds to marches, mass petitioning, open letters, and class
action lawsuits) is the result of bad luck in post-military job assignments, a fragmented
political system that makes it difficult to ensure that pensions and other
benefits reach retirees, and pervasive corruption that leads ex-officers to feel
that local officials have embezzled funds meant for them. Contention by former
officers typically uses military rhetoric and builds on military experiences, even
for former officers who were employed in civilian jobs for many years. Although
contention by ex-officers is not likely to rock the state, it says much about how
‘‘sticky’’ military identities are, where veterans fit in the political landscape, Leninist
civil–military relations, and the treatment that old soldiers receive in a fast
changing socioeconomic order.