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An approach to empirical studies of voting paradoxes: An update and extension. (1983). Dobra, John.
In: Public Choice.
RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:41:y:1983:i:2:p:241-250.

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  1. On the empirical relevance of Condorcet’s paradox. (2014). Deemen, Adrian.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:158:y:2014:i:3:p:311-330.

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  3. An Empirical Example of the Condorcet Paradox of Voting in a Large Electorate. (2001). Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:107:y:2001:i:1:p:135-145.

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References

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  10. Ludwin, W.G. (1976). Voting methods: A simulation. Public Choice 25(Spring): 19–30.

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  11. Simulations in Models of Preference Aggregation. (2019). Diss, Mostapha ; Kamwa, Eric.
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  27. Problems of Voting. (2005). Tullock, Gordon.
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  28. On the emptiness of the stability set of order d. (2002). Martin, Mathieu.
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  29. On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data. (2002). Grofman, Bernard ; Regenwetter, Michel ; Marley, A. A. J., .
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  31. An Empirical Example of the Condorcet Paradox of Voting in a Large Electorate. (2001). Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter.
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  44. An approach to empirical studies of voting paradoxes: An update and extension. (1983). Dobra, John.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:41:y:1983:i:2:p:241-250.

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  45. A note on the paradox of voting: Anonymous preference profiles and Mays formula. (1983). Berg, Sven ; Bjurulf, Bo.
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  46. The comparative likelihood of an equivocal outcome under the plurality, Condorcet, and Borda voting procedures. (1980). Gillett, Raphael .
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  47. The effects of abstentions on election outcomes. (1978). Gehrlein, William ; Fishburn, Peter .
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