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The Probability of a Cyclical Majority.. (1970). Plott, Charles ; DeMeyer, Frank.
In: Econometrica.
RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:38:y:1970:i:2:p:345-54.

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    In: Sciences Po publications.
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    In: Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/3681.

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    In: Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/3531.

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    In: Post-Print.
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  28. Problems of Voting. (2005). Tullock, Gordon.
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  29. On the emptiness of the stability set of order d. (2002). Martin, Mathieu.
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    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:26:y:1976:i:1:p:1-18.

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