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Relational Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement. (2018). Olsen, Trond ; Chi, Chang Koo.
In: Discussion Papers.
RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2018_006.

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Cited: 3

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Cites: 35

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Cocites: 50

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Coauthors: 0

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Citations received by this document

  1. Balanced Scorecards: A Relational Contract Approach. (2023). Kvaløy, Ola ; Olsen, Trond E.
    In: Journal of Accounting Research.
    RePEc:bla:joares:v:61:y:2023:i:2:p:619-652.

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  2. Balanced Scorecards: A Relational Contract Approach. (2021). Olsen, Trond E ; Kvaloy, Ola.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8922.

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  3. Relational Contracts, Multiple Agents, and Correlated Outputs. (2019). Olsen, Trond E.
    In: Management Science.
    RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:65:y:2019:i:11:p:5360-5370.

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References

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  5. Optimal contracting with private military and security companies. (2015). Fahn, Matthias ; Hadjer, Tahmina .
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  12. The Role of Repeated Interactions, Self-Enforcing Agreements and Relational [Sub]Contracting: Evidence from California Highway Procurement Auctions. (2009). Marion, Justin ; Gil, Ricard.
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