Alós–Ferrer, C. et D.–G. Granic (2010), Approval Voting in Germany: Description of a Field Experiment , in Laslier, J.–F. et R. Sanver (éds), Handbook on Approval Voting, Springer, p. 397‑411.
Austen–Smith, D. et J. Banks (1996), Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem , American Political Science Review, 90 : 34‑45.
Balinski, M. et R. Laraki (2011), Election by Majority Judgement: Experimental Evidence , in Dolez, B., B. Grofman et A. Laurent (éds), Situ and Laboratory Experiments on Electoral Law Reform: French Presidential Elections, Springer, p. 13‑54.
Balinski, M., R. Laraki, J.–F. Laslier et K. Van der Straeten (2003), Le vote par assentiment : une expérience , Cahiers du Laboratoire d’Économétrie de l’École Polytechnique, n2003‑13.
- Bartholdi iii, J. J. et J. B. Orlin (1991), Single Transferable Vote Resists Strategic Voting , Social Choice and Welfare, 8 : 341‑354.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Baujard, A. et H. Igersheim (2007), Expérimentation du vote par note et du vote par approbation lors des élections présidentielles françaises du 22 avril 2007 – Rapport final , Centre d’Analyse Stratégique, Paris.
- Behue, V. (2004), L’approche expérimentale en théorie du choix social , Thèse de doctorat, Université de Caen–Basse–Normandie.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Behue, V., P. Favardin et D. Lepelley (2009), La manipulation stratégique des règles de vote : une étude expérimentale , Recherches Économiques de Louvain, 75 : 503‑516.
Blais, A. et R. Young (1999), Why do People Vote? An Experiment in Rationality , Public Choice, 99 : 39‑55.
- Blais, A., J.–B. Pilet, K. Van der Straeten, J.–F. Laslier et M. Héroux–Legault (2014), To Vote or to Abstain? An Experimental Test of Rational Calculus in First Past the Post and PR Elections , Electoral Studies, 36 : 39‑50.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Blais, A., J.–F. Laslier, A. Laurent, N. Sauger et K. Van der Straeten (2007), One Round versus two Round Elections: an Experimental Study , French Politics, 5 : 278‑286.
Brennan, G. et A. Hamlin (1998), Expressive Voting and Electoral Equilibrium , Public Choice, 95 : 149‑175.
- Brennan, G. et L. Lomasky (1993), Democracy and Decision, Cambridge University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Cox, G. W. (1997), Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral Systems, Cambridge University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Dittman, I., D. Kübler, E. Maug et L. Mechtenberg (2014), Why Votes have Value: Instrumental Voting with over Confidence and Overestimation of Others’ Errors , Games and Economic Behavior, 84 : 17‑38.
Downs, A. (1957), An Economic Theory of Democracy, Harper.
Duffy, J. et M. Tavits (2008), Beliefs and Voting Decisions: a Test of the Pivotal Voter Model , American Journal of Political Science, 52 : 603‑618.
- Duverger, M. (1951), Les partis politiques, Armand Colin.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Eavey, C.L. (1996), Preference–Based Stability: Experiments on Cooperative Solutions to Majority Rule Games , in Schofield, N. (éd), Collective Decision– Making: Social Choice and Political Economy, Kluwer Academic.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Farvaque, E., H. Jayet et L. Ragot (2009), Quel mode de scrutin pour quel vainqueur ? Une expérience sur le vote préférentiel transférable , Revue d’économie politique, 119 : 221‑246.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Feddersen, T., S. Gailmard et A. Sandroni (2009), Moral Bias in Large Elections: Theory and Experimental Evidence , American Political Science Review, 103 : 175‑192.
- Felsenthal, D. S., A. Rapoport et Z. Maoz (1988), Tacit Cooperation in Three Alternative non–Cooperative Voting Games: A New Model of Sophisticated Behavior under the Plurality Procedure , Electoral Studies, 7 : 143‑161.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Fiorina, M. P. (1976), The Voting Decision: Instrumental and Expressive Aspects , Journal of Politics, 38 : 390‑413.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Fiorina, M. P. et C. Plott (1978), Committee Decisions under Majority Rule: An Experimental Study , American Political Science Review, 72 : 575—598.
Forsythe, R., T.A. Rietz, R. Myerson et R.J. Weber (1996), An Experimental Study of Voting Rules and Polls in Three–Way Elections , International Journal of Game Theory, 25 : 355‑383.
Goeree, J. K. et C. A. Holt (2000), An Explanation of Anomalous Behavior in Binary-Choice Games: Entry, Voting, Public Goods, and the Volunteers’ Dilemma , Virginia Economics Online Papers 328, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
- Green, D. P. et A. S. Gerber (2008), Get out the Vote: How to Increase Voter Turnout , Washington Brookings.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Green, D. P. et I. Shapiro (1994), Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory, Yale University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Grosser, J. et A. Schram (2006), Neighborhood Information Exchange and Voter Participation: an Experimental Study, American Political Science Review, 100 : 235‑248.
- Igersheim, H., A. Baujard, F. Gavrel, J.–F. Laslier et I. Lebon (2015), Individual Behavior under Evaluative Voting: A Comparison Between Laboratory and In Situ Experiments , in Blais, A., J.-F. Laslier et K. Van der Straeten (éds), Voting Experiments, Springer, p. 257-270.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Kabre, A., J.–F. Laslier, K. Van der Straeten et L. Wantchekon (2013), About Political Polarization in Africa: an Experiment on Approval Voting in Benin , Mimeo.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Kittel, B. et K. Marcinkiewicz (2012), Voting Behavior and Political Institutions: an Overview of Challenging Questions in Theory and Experimental Researches , in Kittel, B., W.J. Luhan et R.B. Morton (éds), Experimental Political Science: Principles and Practices, Palgrave MacMillan, p. 17‑53.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Koriyama, Y. et B. Szentes (2009), A Resurrection of the Condorcet Jury Theorem , Theoretical Economics, 4 : 227‑252.
Kube, S. et C. Puppe (2009), (When and How) do Voters Try to Manipulate? , Public Choice, 139 : 39‑52.
- LA QUESTION DU VOTE. EXPÉRIMENTATIONS EN LABORATOIRE ET IN SITU Guarnaschelli, S., R. D. McKelvey et T. R. Palfrey (2000), An Experimental Study of Jury Decision Rules, American Political Science Review, 94 : 407‑423.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- LA QUESTION DU VOTE. EXPÉRIMENTATIONS EN LABORATOIRE ET IN SITU Tullock, G. (1967), Toward a Mathematics of Politics , University of Michigan Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Laslier, J.–F. (2004a), L’homo œconomicus et l’analyse politique , Cités, 3 (19), 133‑138.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Laslier, J.–F. (2004b), Le vote et la règle majoritaire, analyse mathématique de la politique , CNRS Éditions.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Laslier, J.–F. (2006), Spatial Approval Voting , Political Analysis, 14 : 160‑185.
Laslier, J.–F. (2009), The Leader Rule: a Model of Strategic Approval Voting in a Large Electorate , Journal of Theoretical Politics, 21 : 113‑136.
Laslier, J.–F. (2010a), Laboratory Experiments on Approval Voting , in Laslier, J.–F. et R. Sanver (éds), Handbook on Approval Voting, Springer, p. 339‑356.
- Laslier, J.–F. (2011), Lessons from in Situ Tests during French Elections , in Dolez, B., B. Grofman et A. Laurent (éds), Situ and Laboratory Experiments on Electoral Law Reform: French Presidential Elections, Springer, p. 90‑104.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Laslier, J.–F. (2016), Heuristic Voting under the Alternative Vote: the Efficiency of “Sour Grapes” Behavior, Homo Oeconomicus, 33 (1) : 57‑76.
- Laslier, J.–F. et K. Van der Straeten (2004), Élection présidentielle : une expérience pour un autre mode de scrutin , Revue Française de Science Politique, 54 : 99‑130.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Laslier, J.–F. et Weibull J. (2013), An Incentive–Compatible Condorcet Jury Theorem , Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 115 : 84‑108.
- Lebon, I., A. Baujard, F. Gavrel, H. Igersheim et J.–F. Laslier (2014), How Voters use Grade Scales in Evaluative Voting , Mimeo.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
McKelvey, R. D. et P. C. Ordeshook (1983), Some Experimental Results that Fail to Support the Competitive Solution , Public Choice, 40 : 281‑291.
McKelvey, R. D. et T. R. Palfrey (1995), Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal–form Games , Games and Economic Behavior, 10 : 6‑38.
McKelvey, R. D. et T. R. Palfrey (1998), Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games , Experimental Economics, 1 : 9‑41.
McLennan, A. (1998), Consequences of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for Beneficial Information Aggregation by Rational Agents , American Political Science Review, 92 : 413‑418.
- Moulin, H. (1983), The Strategy of Social Choice, North–Holland.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Myerson, R. B. (1995), Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure, Conduct and Performance , Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9 : 77‑89.
Myerson, R. B. et R. J. Weber (1993), A Theory of Voting Equilibria , American Political Science Review, 87 : 102‑114.
Núñez, M. et J.–F. Laslier (2014), Preference Intensity Representation: Strategic Overstating in Large Elections , Social Choice and Welfare, 42 : 313‑340.
- Palfrey, T. R. (2006), Laboratory experiments , in Weingast, B. et D. Wittman (éds), Handbook of Political Economy, Oxford University Press, p. 915‑936.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Palfrey, T. R. et H. Rosenthal (1983), A Strategic Calculus of Voting , Public Choice, 41 : 7-53.
- Rapoport, A., D. S. Felsenthal et Z. Maoz (1991), Sincere versus Strategic Behavior in Small Groups , in Palfrey, T. (éd), Laboratory Research in Political Economy, University of Michigan Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Réimprimé dans Kinder, D. et T. Palfrey (éds), Experimental Foundations of Political Science, University of Michigan Press. Forsythe, R., T.A. Rietz, R. Myerson et R.J. Weber (1993), An Experiment on Coordination in Multicandidate Elections: the Importance of Polls and Election Histories , Social Choice and Welfare, 10 : 223‑247.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Rietz, T. (2008), Three–Way Experimental Election Results: Strategic Voting Coordinated Outcomes and Duverger’s Law , in Plott, C. et V. Smith (éds), The Handbook of Experimental Economic Results, Elsevier, p. 889‑897.
Rietz, T., R. Myerson et R. Weber (1998), Campaign Finance Levels as Coordinating Signals in Three–Ways Experimental Elections , Economics and Politics, 10 : 185‑217.
Riker, W. H. et P. C. Ordeshook (1968), A Theory of the Calculus of Voting , American Political Science Review, 62 : 25‑42.
- Royale des Sciences. Brams, S. J. et P. C. Fishburn (1978), Approval Voting , American Political Science Review, 72 : 831‑847.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Schram, A. et J. Sonnemans (1996a), Voter Turnout as a Participation Game: an Experimental Investigation , International Journal of Game Theory, 25 : 385‑406.
Schram, A. et J. Sonnemans (1996b), Why People Vote: Experimental Evidence , Journal of Economic Psychology, 17 : 417‑442.
Tyran, J.–R. (2004), Voting when Money and Morals Conflict: an Experimental Test of Expressive Voting , Journal of Public Economics, 88 : 1645‑1664.
- Van der Straeten, K., J.–F. Laslier et A. Blais (2013), Vote au Pluriel: How people Vote when Offered to Vote under Different Rules? , Political Science and Politics, 46 : 324‑328.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Van der Straeten, K., J.–F. Laslier et A. Blais (2015), Patterns of Strategic Voting in Run off Elections , in Blais, A., J.-F. Laslier et K. Van der Straeten (éds), Voting Experiments, Springer, p. 215-236.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Wit, J. (1998), Rational Choice and the Condorcet Jury Theorem , Games and Economic Behavior, 22 : 364‑376.