Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin?

Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, vol. 82, issue C, 169-191

Abstract: This paper presents a strategic model of common value elections with endogenous information acquisition. It proves that majoritarian elections can fail to aggregate information when voters have heterogeneous skills and provides necessary and sufficient conditions for information aggregation. Inefficiencies can be partially corrected by limiting participation to the most competent citizens, a result which provides a rational foundation for epistocratic government.

Keywords: Endogenous information acquisition; Heterogeneity; Condorcetʼs Jury Theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:82:y:2013:i:c:p:169-191

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.008

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