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The Optimal Design of Trade Policy Flexibility in the WTO. (2007). Mahlstein, Kornel ; Simon Schropp, Kornel Mahlstein, ; Ito, Tadashi.
In: IHEID Working Papers.
RePEc:gii:giihei:heiwp27-2007.

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  1. Access to Minerals: WTO Export Restrictions and Climate Change Considerations. (2015). Sindico, Francesco ; Gerber, Leonardus ; Switzer, Stephanie .
    In: Laws.
    RePEc:gam:jlawss:v:4:y:2015:i:3:p:617-637:d:56227.

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  33. Gradualism and Uncertainty in International Union Formation. (2007). Konstantinidis, Nikitas .
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  34. Perishable Durable Goods. (2007). Cho, Inkoo.
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  35. Tariff retaliation versus financial compensation in the enforcement of international trade agreements. (2006). Saggi, Kamal ; Limão, Nuno.
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  36. Il était une fois la qualité. (2006). Lupton, Sylvie.
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  37. Delay in Bargaining with Externalities. (2006). Westermark, Andreas ; Bjornerstedt, Jonas.
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  38. Tariff Retaliation versus Financial Compensation in the Enforcement of International Trade Agreements. (2006). Saggi, Kamal ; Limão, Nuno.
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  39. Reputational Wars of Attrition with Complex Bargaining Postures. (2006). Pearce, David G. ; Abreu, Dilip.
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  40. Public versus Private Enforcement of International Economic Law: Standing and Remedy. (2005). Sykes, Alan O..
    In: The Journal of Legal Studies.
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  41. Why Are Similar Workers Paid Differently? The Role of Social Networks. (2005). Fontaine, Francois.
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  42. Escalation and delay in protracted international conflicts. (2005). Heifetz, Aviad ; Segev, Ella .
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  43. Market Integration and Strike Activity. (2005). Vannetelbosch, Vincent ; Mauleon, Ana ; Vincent, Vannetelbosch.
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  44. Market integration and strike activity. (2005). Vannetelbosch, Vincent ; Mauleon, Ana.
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  45. The evolutionary role of toughness in bargaining. (2004). Heifetz, Aviad ; Segev, Ella .
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
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  46. Mediation: incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication. (2003). Sákovics, József ; Ponsati, Clara ; Jarque, Xavier .
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    In: CORE Discussion Papers.
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  48. Uncertainty about Uncertainty and Delay in Bargaining. (2002). Skyzypacz, Andrzej ; Feinberg, Yossi .
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  49. The Role of Inferences in Sequential Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information: Some Experimental Evidence. (2001). Srivastava, Joydeep .
    In: Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes.
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  50. Mediation: Incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication. (2001). Sákovics, József ; Ponsati, Clara ; Jarque, Xavier .
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  52. Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games. (2000). ABREU, D. ; Pearce, D..
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    RePEc:wop:prinet:00f2.

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  53. Bidding and renegotiation in procurement auctions. (2000). Wang, Ruqu.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:44:y:2000:i:8:p:1577-1597.

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  54. Wage Bargaining with Time-Varying Threats. (1998). Tracy, Joseph ; Cramton, Peter.
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