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Are simple mechanisms optimal when agents are unsophisticated?. (2020). Dworczak, Piotr ; Li, Jiangtao.
In: GRAPE Working Papers.
RePEc:fme:wpaper:42.

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  1. A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design. (2023). Troyan, Peter ; Pycia, Marek.
    In: Econometrica.
    RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:91:y:2023:i:4:p:1495-1526.

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  2. A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design. (2021). Troyan, Peter ; Pycia, Marek.
    In: ECON - Working Papers.
    RePEc:zur:econwp:393.

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  3. Obviously Strategy-proof Mechanism Design With Rich Private Information. (2021). Halushka, Mariya.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:ott:wpaper:2104e.

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  4. Classification of Priorities Such That Deferred Acceptance is Obviously Strategyproof. (2020). Thomas, Clayton.
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:arx:papers:2011.12367.

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  5. .

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References

References cited by this document

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